Unit 8 - The Nazi Dictatorship (1933-1939)

Réussis tes devoirs et examens dès maintenant avec Quizwiz!

Social policy towards young people, women, and workers

-Control of education and the curriculum: The civil service reform of 1933 meant that many teachers were dismissed for political and racial reasons, on grounds of political unreliability or racial impurity: most often the latter were Jewish. Teachers were pressed into joining the National Socialist Teachers' League (NSLB) but most in any case appeared willing to comply with the demands of the regime. All teachers had to take an oath of loyalty to Hitler. The historian Joachim Fest has claimed that the teaching profession was one of the most politically-reliable sectors of the population. The vetting of textbooks was undertaken by local Nazi committees after 1933, and from 1935 central directives were issued by the Ministry of Education covering what could be taught. By 1938 these rules covered every school year and most subjects. Political indoctrination permeated every aspect of the school curriculum, and education was closely controlled from the moment children started school. From an early age, they were indoctrinated with Nazi beliefs. There was an increasing emphasis on physical education, in which military-style drilling played a significant part. In history, children were taught the Nazi version of the past, that Germany had been 'stabbed in the back' at the end of the First World War by German politicians influenced by the Jews. Nordic sagas and other traditional stories played a large part in history, as a means of increasing the consciousness of being German. Other subjects were influenced by Nazi beliefs, for example, biology was taught in a way which demonstrated that Aryan Germans were superior to all other races. The Nazis placed a great emphasis on race and heredity, and evolution and survival of the fittest. Geography was taught in a way which emphasized historic German claims to land in Eastern Europe, and which justified Nazi claims to 'living space' in the East. Atlases implicitly supported the notion of "one people, one Reich". The Nazis had clear ideas about the teaching of boys and girls. Boys were taught military skills, and girls were taught house-keeping, cookery, and how to be good mothers. For older children, a new subject was introduced: eugenics, the study of how to 'improve' the German race through selective breeding and racial hygiene: that is, seemingly demonstrating that inter-racial breeding was harmful to the German race. The Nazis downgraded academic education, and the number of university students decreased between 1933 and 1939. Access to higher education was rationed and selection was based on political reliability. Female students were restricted to 10% of available university places, and Jews to 1.5%, which was consistent with their proportion of the population. Coordination of universities followed the same pattern as the schools, with approximately 1,200 university staff, around 15% of the total staff, dismissed on political and racial grounds. In November 1933, all university staff were made to sign a declaration in support of Hitler and the National Socialist state. Students had to join the German Students' League although approximately 25% of them managed to avoid doing so. Students had to perform 4 months' labour service and 2 months in the SA. Labour service would give students more experience of working life, considered by the Nazis as more important than academic life. There was little resistance to bringing the universities under control, and coordination was made easier by the voluntary self-coordination of many faculties. Even during the Weimar period, universities had been dominated by nationalist and anti-democratic attitudes, and student fraternities were dominated by reactionary politics. The Nazis were therefore tapping into a pre-existing culture of extreme nationalism.

Concentration camps

As we have seen, in 1934, Hitler established the 'People's Court' which tried people for 'crimes against the State'. By identifying the party with the State, the Nazis ensured that any opponent of the Nazis was defined not as an enemy merely of the Nazi party, but as an enemy of Germany. The Nazis abolished the right to trial before imprisonment. The legal system became part of the Nazi system of government, with judges replaced where necessary by Nazi supporters. The SS and Gestapo could put people in concentration camps without a trial. The first concentration camps were established by the British during the Boer War to intern and confine civilian captives. In Nazi Germany, they were used to confine and supposedly re-educate 'hostile elements' such as Communists, Socialists, and clerics, and to provide forced labour. Anyone arrested by the Gestapo could be held in 'protective custody' in a concentration camp indefinitely. Concentration camps emerged after the Nazi seizure of power, for the prisons were full. Over 100,000 prisoners were held in the camps when they were first established. Factories and camp buildings were first initially used but these types of camps were gradually phased out. Once the Nazis had consolidated their power in Germany, there were fewer political prisoners, as the consequences of opposing the regime became notoriously well-known. The guarding of camps was initially the responsibility of the SA and SS but after the Night of the Long Knives, became the responsibility of the SS alone, in Death's Head Units. The SS were ruthless and cruel, with beatings administered for minor offences, and more serious offences often leading to execution without trial. The first concentration camp opened on 22 March 1933 on the outskirts of the Bavarian town of Dachau in a former ammunition factory. The original capacity was 5,000 (reaching 17,000 in 1943). Originally for political prisoners, Dachau soon housed other elements deemed hostile to the Nazi regime. Within the camps, the fostering of mutual discrimination and spying impeded group solidarity. Dachau was the model for other camps, with training and courses provided for other camp commandants. Camp regulations issued on 1 October 1933 provided a pattern of organization for other camps. At first, only political prisoners were held in protective custody but by a Reich Justice Ministry Decree of 14 December 1937 'career and habitual criminals, and asocial persons' were placed in camps. They were joined by Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the 'Work-Shy', by a Decree of 26 January 1938. Jehovah's Witnesses were described by the Nazis as 'advance agents of world Bolshevism', and banned from Germany in mid-1933. The 'Work-Shy' were those unemployed men capable of work but who had twice rejected offers of employment or left jobs shortly after beginning them. The Gestapo was instructed to send them to Buchenwald concentration camp. Dachau was not planned as an extermination camp. Indeed, concentration camps to begin with were primarily intended to imprison possible hostile elements to the Nazi regime, and to provide an army of forced labour. Prisoners were identified by an inverted triangle made of coloured fabric attached to their clothing, which was coloured to indicate their 'deviant' status: - Criminals: Green - Politicals: Red - Asocials: Black - Homosexuals: Pink - Jehovah's Witnesses: Violet Jewish prisoners were marked by a yellow triangle sewn on top of the first one to form a Star of David. Many temporary camps were closed—by May 1934 there were only 25% as many prisoners as there had been one year previously. The effectiveness of the camps was demonstrated by the routine torture and brutality which made most prisoners unwilling to resist the Nazi regime after they were released. After 1934, all concentration camps were under SS control with the result that the treatment of prisoners became systematised. After 1936, the SS moved on from persecuting communists and socialists towards dealing with "undesirables" like criminals, non-Aryans, and "asocials".

Censorship

Censorship was an important aspect of propaganda, for what was not seen or heard was often as important as what was seen and heard. The Nazis attempted to control all public cultural output and nothing was permitted to contradict the propaganda which advertised the greatness of the Nazi state. Hitler despised the liberal culture of the Weimar period in German history and was determined to regulate information and ideas, and suppress anything deemed to be anti-national or Marxist. The Nazis were very concerned at defining what German culture should be; censorship and propaganda restricted freedom of expression and ideas. Modern art was dismissed as 'degenerate' and plays and films were examined to ensure they met the standards demanded by the Nazis, that is, that they promoted Nazi ideals. The permissiveness and freedom of Weimar Germany, with its nightclubs and American music, was rejected, as was the work of Jewish writers and composers. New developments in the arts were stifled, and Nazi propaganda pervaded all aspects of German culture. Many artists and authors suffered in silence, but some, such as the playwright Bertolt Brecht were forced to flee the country in the mid-1930s. It was not safe for Brecht to remain, for his plays conveyed a negative impression of Germany and were openly critical of the Nazis. Scientists were also persecuted, and Albert Einstein, the most famous, chose to leave Germany for the United States during the Second World War. No criticism of any kind was permitted. In February 1933 two members of the Prussian Academy of Arts who were critical of the Nazis were forced to resign; thirteen others also stepped down in protest. A few months later in May 1933, 20,000 works of "undesirable and pernicious" writers were burned in staged book-burning ceremonies throughout Germany. The works of over 2,500 writers were officially banned, including the American writer Ernest Hemingway, the left-wing playwright Brecht, and Karl Marx. Reflecting their concern with correct racial and political theories, the Nazis cast their net wide in banning books, from economics, history and geography, to biology and novels which offended their sensibilities and political ideas. A few examples of directives issued from Goebbels office of 'Forbidden Books' containing "harmful and undesirable" works demonstrates the breadth of the Nazis' concerns. The novel See Berlin, Then Go on Probation by Erich von Voss was described as offering "a picture of the criminal plague and its organisation in Berlin which no longer corresponds to the facts" while also providing an inaccurate portrayal of the tasks of the police forces. The historical work Of Swabia's Past by Ulrich Baumann offended the Nazis for its depiction of Germany's folklorist past as being heavily influenced by religion rather than race. Assessed against the Nazi framework of race, history, and culture, it was severely criticised in the following terms: "An account is made in this series to identify German folklore with religious endeavours, and to describe ecclesiastical institutions as part of "German customs". At a time when German folklore is being systematically described and analysed in relation to its special racial characteristics, such obvious folkloristic confusion must be sharply resisted". The RMVP ominously proclaimed when it announced the Theatre Law of 15 May 1934: "The arts are for the National Socialist state a public exercise; they are not only aesthetic but also moral in nature and the public interest demands not only police supervision but also guidance". Artistic freedom and the freedom to challenge and criticise authority were not permitted, and the Nazi state assumed responsibility for setting the rules on what was acceptable in German culture and society. The Nazi pre-occupations of anti-Communism, the construction of a racial state, and the heroic Germanic past were at the forefront of this propagandist assault on reason. One can see these themes even in the visual arts, where favoured themes were portraits of Hitler, heroic individuals, and idyllic rural scenes.

Religious resistance

Churches were the only institutions in Nazi Germany with an alternative ideology which retained some organisational and ideological autonomy. The influence of individual pastors was particularly important but the Churches as institutions and organisations acknowledged that they would lose in any conflict with the Nazi regime. Their survival required that they continue to enjoy some degree of protection and to achieve this protection, compromises were necessary. Nevertheless, some issues were so important and so integral to religious and doctrinal identity that there was no prospect of compromise. Where this happened, resistance to the Nazi regime followed. Overall though, the response of the Churches to the Nazis varied considerably in time and place, and was often inconsistent and uneven. -The Protestant Churches: The absorption of the Protestant (Lutheran) Church by the Nazis into the Volksgemeinschaft led to divisions among the Protestant congregations. The establishment of the Pastors Emergency League and its development into the Confessional Church in 1934 were acts of resistance led by pastors who were not Nazi party members but who came from academic backgrounds, and who refused to be coordinated into a "Reich" Church. They sought to protect their independence from the Nazi regime, and resisted attempts to impose the "Aryan paragraph" which involved purging the Church of anyone who had converted from Judaism to Christianity. The 1933 Law on the Reconstruction of the Professional Civil Service had stated that those not of Aryan birth had to be dismissed from their jobs, and this also applied to pastors in the Protestant Evangelical Church. Those pastors who resisted the Nazis also wanted to defend orthodox Lutheran theology which was based purely on the Bible. With those disputes, it was hardly surprising that in 1934 there was a struggle between the Confessional Church and the Nazi regime. Pastors spoke out against a "Nazified Christ" from their pulpits, and many Churches refused to display swastikas. Demonstrations were held against the arrest of bishops, and the Nazis responded with repression. Dissenting pastors had their salaries stopped, were barred from teaching in schools, and many were arrested. By the end of 1937, over 700 pastors had been arrested. The classic statement of religious opposition to the Nazis came retrospectively and perhaps was not a true indicator of the attitude of the Churches during the Nazi period. In a seminal piece of writing on the importance of resistance to tyranny, Martin Niemöller wrote in 1946: 'In Germany, they came first for the Communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist; and then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist; and then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew; And then ... they came for me. And by that time there was no one left to speak up'. Niemöller was a strongly nationalist protestant pastor who, despite his anti-Semitism opposed the Aryan Paragraph as he believed that Jews should be welcomed into the Church if they would convert. As co-founder of the Confessional Church, the main Protestant resistance to Nazi encroachments, Niemöller was persecuted by the Nazis. Tried and acquitted he was immediately re-arrested in 1937. In prison, he was treated as one of Hitler's personal prisoners and received certain privileges. After his experience in prison Niemöller renounced his anti-Semitic views. While the Nazis failed to silence the Confessional Church, it was also the case that the Church did not develop into a fully-fledged opposition. Most of the Church preferred a non-confrontational approach. Protestant Churches in their entirety became inward-looking, and consumed with internal doctrinal and personal struggles. While there were heroic individuals, the Churches remained silent and there was no consistent condemnation of the human rights abuses and atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis between 1933 and 1939. -The Roman Catholic Church: The Roman Catholic Church was in a strong position in Germany owing to the greater unity of the Church, its traditional and historic place within nation-states, and its doctrinal coherence. Despite all these strengths, the Roman Catholic Church wanted to reach an accommodation with the Nazi regime. The Concordat of 1933 granted certain privileges to the Church, but when these came under attack, the Church found itself increasingly at odds with the regime. In 1937 the Pope issued a papal encyclical entitled With Burning Concern which attacked Nazi Germany and expressed anxiety for the state of the Church in Germany, and condemned the Nazi regime for its attacks on the Church. Article 23 of the encyclical stated: "You will need to watch carefully, Venerable Brethren, that religious fundamental concepts be not emptied of their content and distorted to profane use. "Revelation" in its Christian sense, means the word of God addressed to man. The use of this word for the "suggestions" of race and blood, for the irradiations of a people's history, is mere equivocation. False coins of this sort do not deserve Christian currency. "Faith" consists in holding as true what God has revealed and proposes through His Church to man's acceptance. It is "the evidence of things that appear not". (Heb. ii. 1). The joyful and proud confidence in the future of one's people, instinct in every heart, is quite a different thing from faith in a religious sense. To substitute the one for the other, and demand on the strength of this, to be numbered among the faithful followers of Christ, is a senseless play on words, if it does not conceal a confusion of concepts, or worse." The encyclical was smuggled into Germany, secretly printed and distributed before being delivered from pulpits in March 1937. The delivery of this encyclical was the only time that the Catholic Church as an institution defied the regime. It was met with repression, and charges against priests for abusing the pulpit. Intimidation had the desired effect and such widespread opposition was not repeated. Many individuals displayed great courage in resisting the Nazis religious policies but the Catholic Church was careful not to move into open defiance and opposition. Clemens von Galen was particularly outspoken against the atheistic views of leading Nazis, especially one of the leading Nazi ideologues, Alfred Rosenberg. In his 1935 Easter message, Galen condemned Rosenberg's concept of the "racial soul". Demonstrations took place in favour of Galen and despite moves to have him arrested, he was considered too well-known and respected; arrest would, the regime believed, only bring bad publicity.

Youth movements: The Hitler Youth

Hitler also aimed at controlling the minds and activities of children outside of school. The Hitler Youth (Hitlerjugend), was formed in 1926. Their motto was 'Blood and Honour'. By the end of 1933, the Hitler Youth was the central agency of National Socialist youth policy. By the same date, all other youth organizations, except for Catholic youth organizations protected by the Vatican's agreement (or Concordat) with the Third Reich, had either been banned or integrated into the Hitler Youth. The Hitler Youth was officially part of the SA, the paramilitary group of the Nazi Party. There was a good reason for this, for the Nazis placed great emphasis on winning over young people who could be moulded to their purposes, and whom they needed for the forthcoming war. The aim was to assimilate all young males as fully as possible into the Hitler Youth and then the Labour Service and the armed forces. By 1936, the Law for the Incorporation of German Youth gave the Hitler Youth the status of an official educational movement, equal in status to schools. The Hitler Youth was granted a monopoly over all sports facilities and competition for children under the age of 14. The law was backed by growing social pressure upon those still outside its membership, to enrol 'voluntarily'. Youth membership was finally made compulsory by a further law of 25 March 1939, and non-membership a punishable offence. All who served in the Hitler Youth swore an oath of personal allegiance to Hitler. The youth groups were divided into different age groups, for ages 6-10, 10-14, and 14-18 year olds. The Jűngvolk was the name of the 10-14 group before at age 14 they graduated into the Hitler Youth. The educational activity consisted of a blend between political indoctrination and physical activity. Education was based on the Nazis' racial ideas, and the importance of obedience and subordination, military values important to a militarist state, were given a great deal of emphasis. All groups were taught about Nazi beliefs, and given a large amount of physical exercise and training. The older boys were expected to learn military drilling and discipline, while for girls, the League of German Girls (Bund Deutscher Mädel) aimed to make girls fit to become strong German mothers. From the age of 10 boys were taught to "Live faithfully, fight bravely, and die laughing". Competitions were intended to show the importance of struggle, heroism and leadership, as preparation for their future role as warriors. Children were also taught to sing Nazi songs, and were encouraged to read political pamphlets. Many children and their families welcomed the youth movements, as they provided opportunities for weekends away camping and hiking. Rituals, ceremonies, and singing songs reinforced the induction into Nazi ideology. Despite the Nazi view of women, girls could partially break free of the role of homemaker by travelling away and meeting 'teenagers' from other parts of Germany. For many people, the outdoor activities were of more importance than the Nazi ideology. As one participant stated: "Service in the Hitler Youth, we were told, was an honourable service to the German people. I was, however, not thinking of the Führer, nor of serving the German people, when I raised my right hand, but of the attractive prospect of participating in games, sports, hiking, singing, camping and other exciting activities away from school and the Home. A uniform, a badge, an oath, a salute: there seemed nothing to it." M. MacKinnon. The Naked Years: growing up in Nazi Germany (1991) The opportunity to participate in sports and camping trips away from home made the organisation attractive to millions of German boys. Many of their formative experiences were shaped by Hitler Youth and the Nazi emphasis on struggle, sacrifice, loyalty, and discipline, which were all accepted as the norm. Many children even joined against the wishes of their parents. Hitler Youth offered an outlet for teenage rebelliousness. By the late 1930s the organisation was becoming more bureaucratic and rigid and there were signs that enthusiasm was beginning to wane. There were reports of poor attendance at weekly parades and many boys resented the harsh punishments meted out for minor infringements. As one observer noted, the establishment of the Hitler Youth was, for the Nazis, a very serious business, for military training and discipline acted as preparation for service to the Nazi state: "It is claimed that the work of the Hitler Youth is in no way a pre-military training. All the same, I should think it is a good preparation for the army. The children learn discipline. They march in ranks. They drill. When I attended a Hitler Youth camp, I asked a boy what they had done last night. In the presence of several others and one of the leaders, he said pistol-shooting. Very good fun, and not necessarily a military pastime. However, it hardly justifies the claim that the youth movements have nothing to do with military training." J. A. Cole, Just Back from Germany (1938) Membership of the Hitler Youth increased from 50,000 in January 1933 to 5.4 million in 1936 before it became compulsory.

Influencing Hitler

Hitler himself had at least three official state roles. He was President (and had a corresponding Presidential Chancellery), he was Chancellor (and had a corresponding Reich Chancellery) and he also had a Führer Chancellery. In each case, separate corps of state officials existed, authorised to carry out his will. In addition, there was a parallel party official (Martin Bormann) and a further official secretary. There were, then, at least five sources of possibly simultaneous and conflicting 'Führer orders'. In this system, even the ablest of administrators could not have made more than partial sense of what was going on. Consider the following extract from Werner Willikens, State Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture, who said in February 1934: "Everyone who has the opportunity to observe it knows that the Führer can hardly dictate from above everything which he intends to realize sooner or later. On the contrary, up till now everyone with a post in the new Germany has worked best when he has, so to speak, worked towards the Führer ... in fact it is the duty of everybody to try and work towards the Führer along the lines he would wish". This is a comment on the vagueness and the lack of clarity of Hitler's leadership and the notion of orders from above. It suggests that individuals had to use their own understanding of the Führer's will and to interpret this into policy. The key problem was trying to know what exactly Hitler's 'will' was. Given how rarely the Cabinet met and that he excluded himself from the everyday running of the country, the only solution was to try to get direct access to Hitler. However, many ministers could go months or years without having access to Hitler and so officials would have to make the most of the few minutes when Hitler made a decision, which more often than not consisted of throwaway remarks or casual phrases. So, in contrast to the traditional image of a firm and decisive great leader, the image emerges of a leader who was reluctant to make decisions. Hitler did not intervene in disputes between Party members, believing that they would sort it out among themselves, and so adopted, by default, a situation in which leading Nazis haggled over responsibilities and power. With such an approach, it was inevitable that 'empires' would develop, and this was compounded by Hitler's tendency to create further agencies, ministries and departments - not to replace existing ones, but to run parallel with them. As Hitler's press officer, Otto Dietrich, stated: "In the 12 years of his rule in Germany Hitler produced the biggest confusion in government that has ever existed in a civilized state. During his period of government, he removed from the organization of the state all clarity of leadership and produced a completely opaque network of competencies". Nevertheless, despite the unorthodox governing style and competing administrative structures, the first phase of the Nazi consolidation of power had been completed: the political Left had been crushed, along with all other opposition, and German conservatives and crucially, the army, were for now willing to trust Hitler with supreme power. After 1934 there were few constraints on Hitler's use of power. In a symbolic example of how the German state had been taken over by the Nazis, the Nazi party symbol, the swastika flag, became the official flag of Germany in 1935.

The beginning of persecution

Hitler's insurance against loss of popularity, should he need it, lay in the totalitarian state's weapons of secret police, censorship, propaganda and terrorism. Immediately after Hitler's appointment to Chancellor and the Nazi accession to power, Hitler began to persecute Jews and political opponents, arresting them in large numbers. On 1 April 1933, the Government organised a one-day boycott of Jewish shops and businesses, which was organised by the rabid anti-Semitic propagandist Julius Streicher. The American journalist William Shirer, stated that Streicher was known to be the "number one Jew-baiter and editor of the vulgar and pornographic anti-Semitic sheet the Stürmer". (William Shirer, Berlin Diary) A key event in this violence was the 'Köpenick Week of Blood' of 21-26 June 1933, during which the SA arrested hundreds of people, many of whom were tortured and beaten. Motivated by the effective abolition of other political parties, although the decree making the Nazis the only legal party was not issued until 14 July, members of the Köpenick storm-troopers and units of the SA, SS and police force began to systematically arrest, beat and torture political opponents and Jews in Berlin-Köpenick. At least 23 people were murdered and thrown into the Dahme River or died from complications resulting from their abuse. Terroristic methods had been tried and tested during 1933, but from the summer of 1934 they were to be used at full throttle against the enemies of the regime. For many thousands of Jews, communists, socialists and others openly hostile to Hitler, or to whom Hitler was hostile, these were years of fear, violence, imprisonment and death. Even though those unhappy with the regime were numerous, those openly opposed now constituted an ever-smaller minority. For most of the population, the weapons of totalitarian dictatorship were not needed, though; for most Germans, Hitler was either venerated as Germany's saviour, approved for his positive achievements, or simply tolerated. Some German citizens were thankful for stable government; some admired the economic and industrial recovery and the way the Nazis provided jobs; some were relieved to see Germany resuming what they regarded as its rightful place on the world stage after the Versailles humiliation of 1919. For those supporters, old and new, who were perturbed at the less pleasant aspects of the regime, it was not difficult to turn a blind eye and pretend not to see what was happening. In an authoritarian state, passive acceptance is as important as active support and, at this time, varying degrees of acceptance far outweighed any meaningful threats of opposition.

Topic 3 - Economic and social policies

In 1933, the German economy was in the depths of depression with nearly six million unemployed. Hitler promised to set Germany to work and, by 1935, unemployment had fallen to two million. By 1939, there were labour shortages in key industries. These developments were the basis of what became known as the economic miracle of Nazi Germany. The notion of Volkgemeinschaft was a powerful Nazi vision. It envisaged a Germany united by race, blood and ideology, with a common bond of loyalty to Hitler. The Nazis aimed at eliminating all opposition and creating a community which would be loyal, self-disciplined and ready to make sacrifices. It was also a gendered vision, for the Nazis possessed rigid views on the place of each gender in German society. With such broad, sweeping, and ambitious ideas, it is nonetheless remarkable that the Nazis managed to achieve so much, for the extent of the social and economic transformation in Germany between 1933 and 1939 was astonishing.

The balance-sheet of Nazi social and economic reforms

Many Germans believed that Nazi rule was improving the lives of the people, with unemployment reduced and hunger no longer a feature in people's lives. Many people - not just Germans - were impressed at the attempts which the Nazis made to deal with the economic crisis, and the ability of the Nazis to take ostensibly difficult decisions and introduce radical measures. Although wages only increased marginally, and the working week was extended, there was a new optimism in mid-1930s Germany. Small businesses did well, especially when Jewish businesses competing with them were closed by the Nazis. Big business gained considerably from the large capital construction projects and often made big profits. From July 1935, it was compulsory for all German men between the ages of 18 and 25 to perform six months' work on practical projects. They were not paid wages but received 'pocket money', which was not popular but the work at least provided a sense of purpose among the unemployed. The Nazis appeared concerned with working class welfare and leisure, and the 'Strength through Joy' organization provided leisure activities for workers. Holidays and cruises were the most extravagant activities but there were also visits to theatres, concerts, and sporting events. This new movement provided workers with many leisure opportunities which they had not previously had. As part of this emphasis on leisure, Hitler also wanted more Germans to own cars. The Volkswagen (the 'people's car') was designed and in 1938, Hitler laid the foundation stone for the Volkswagen factory. Even before production began, Germans were encouraged to make hire purchase payments for cars, but when war broke out, none had been delivered, and the factory was converted to producing military vehicles, and no money was repaid to the workers. Nonetheless, the work and leisure policies of the Nazis led to many Germans feeling pleased with the effects of Nazi rule. Unemployment was falling and pride was restored to the German nation. When Hitler sent German troops into the demilitarized area of the Rhineland in 1936, Germans felt more secure from attack, and were elated with the removal of another element of the Versailles Treaty. A similar sentiment of national pride was even more apparent when Germany and Austria were joined by the Anschluss (union) in March 1938. The benefits of Nazi rule cannot be ignored in assessing Nazi Germany. Indeed, to begin with, the advantages appeared to outweigh the disadvantages, at least to some. The reduction of unemployment and the increase in living standards were significant developments, and the recovery from the Depression led to greater national pride in Germany. Many workers were converted to support, or at least, acceptance of Nazi rule, and had become reconciled to the trade-off this involved, of having in power a militaristic and aggressive regime which sought to re-make Germany. A survey of Germans in 1951 found that those respondents over the age of 45 considered the years of the German Empire between 1900 and 1914 to be the best Germany had experienced in the century. Perhaps more surprisingly, among those citizens aged 45 and under, a majority believed the period between 1933 and 1939 to be the best Germany had experienced (Institut fűr Denoskopie Survey, No. 0044. October 1951). With full employment, leisure opportunities and political stability creating an orderly society, it is perhaps not so surprising. Yet while Hitler's peacetime government brought many benefits for some it did not do so for all. Even those previous supporters, who had helped the Nazis to power, the farmers and the Mittelstand, seem to have gained little from Nazi policies. Conversely, large companies on the whole did well if they toed the Nazi line. Ultimately the Nazis failed in their attempt to construct the national community which they aspired to, but they did succeed in closing down political debate and providing sufficient material benefits to win acceptance and thus legitimacy and consent from a large section of the German population.

The status of women in Nazi Germany

Nazi Germany opposed greater emancipation of women, which had been a notable if incomplete trend during the Weimar Republic. Hitler had stated that a "women's world is her husband, her family her children and her home". The Nazi vision for women thus echoed the nineteenth-century belief in the three Ks - Kinder, Küche, Kurche (Children, Church and Kitchen). In an address to women at the Nuremberg party rally on 8 September 1934, Hitler summed up the Nazi view of women's position in society as follows: "If one says that man's world is the State, his struggle, his readiness to devote his powers to the service of the community, one might be tempted to say that the world of woman is a smaller world. For her world is her husband, her children and her house. But where would the greater world be if there were no one to care for the small world? ... Providence has entrusted to women the cares of that world which is peculiarly her own ... Every child that a woman brings into the world is a battle, a battle waged for the existence of her people ..." Nazi propaganda portrayed this reversal of the measure of emancipation gained during the Weimar years as reinvigorating women's rightful role in society and reinstating the family as the 'germ cell of the nation'. In the economic conditions of the Depression, as unemployment reached six million, the proposed removal of women from the workplace was supported by many sectors of society. The aim was to reverse the trend of the 'Weimar woman' by removing women from the workplace and bolstering the falling birth rate. The main priority was to re-populate the country with people of the 'right' race, which required raising the birth-rate. Nazi policy towards women was motivated by traditional concepts of differences between the sexes and their traditional social roles. Women were expected to be good wives and mothers, and look after the domestic household, while their husbands worked to provide for the family. These gender roles formed the basis of the ideal National Socialist family which featured heavily in Nazi propaganda. Concerned at the declining birth rate of Germany, and wanting to reinvigorate the 'racially-pure' Aryan race, the Nazis introduced incentives to encourage women to marry and to have children. For example, the Law for the Reduction of Unemployment in June 1933 introduced interest-free loans of up to 1,000 Reichsmarks for young married couples on condition that the wife gave up work. Between 1933 and 1937, 800,000 newly married women received loans on condition that they did not seek re-employment. The loan was to be repaid, dependent on the number of children a woman had. The birth of one child meant 25 per cent of the loan did not have to be paid back; two children meant that 50 per cent of the loan need not be paid back; four children meant that the entire loan was cleared. The most productive mothers were awarded special medals. The Mother's Cross (Mutterkreuz) offered a gold cross for women who had eight children, silver for six children and bronze for four children. Three million women won a medal for having four or more children in 1939. Single men and childless couples were taxed more heavily to fund these measures. Contraception was restricted and there was compulsory sterilisation for those deemed 'undesirable'. Women considered racially impure or genetically deficient (mentally or physically disabled) were forcibly sterilised. During Hitler's first year of office, 30,000 women were sterilised, of whom 5 per cent died in consequence of the operation or complications thereafter. Divorce was made easier to allow men to leave women who were 'unproductive' and allow them to re-marry. Laws against abortion were strictly enforced. Women were encouraged to adopt a healthy lifestyle with plenty of exercise, and no smoking and drinking. From 1936 special maternity homes were opened, which were designed to be breeding grounds for pure Aryan children. Racially-approved Aryan mothers were matched with SS men with the intention of filling Hitler's Germany with pure-bred Aryan German children. These measures aimed at encouraging an increase in the birth rate, and indeed it slowly rose between 1933 and 1939 (but this may have been due to improved economic conditions); however, it declined thereafter.

The police system of Nazi Germany

Police forces and their powers: The Nazis did not abolish separate police forces of the different state authorities but they did create a system of party-controlled, political police forces amenable to Hitler which gradually gained control over the entire police system. Proliferation created confusion and competition between various police forces and disputes as to who controlled them. Firstly, there SS under Heinrich Himmler, then the SD, the intelligence gathering arm of the SS, and finally the SA controlled by Röhm who had acquired police powers of arrest and detention of political prisoners. The Gestapo was the secret state police, formed initially in Prussia but in 1933, the remit of the Gestapo was extended to the entire country. Between 1933 and 1936 there was great competition between these groups for control of the police forces in Germany. -The Gestapo: The Gestapo had been set up initially only in Prussia but under the Nazi regime its operations were extended across the country. In 1933, Goering reorganized the Prussian plain-clothed political police as the Gestapo, Geheime Staatspolizei. The Gestapo were the 'Secret State Police', and in 1934, control of the Gestapo passed to Himmler as head of the SS. The Gestapo became a national force, and a sub-division of the SS. The leadership of the Gestapo, under the higher authority of the SS, passed to Reinhard Heydrich, and the powers of the Gestapo were immense. It was the job of the Gestapo to root out political opposition, and it had powers of arrest and imprisonment and its members used torture to extract information and confessions. Informers were used to uncover any attempts to organize opposition. The Gestapo developed a reputation for efficiency and knowledge. Its agents were believed to be everywhere but the reality was somewhat different, for even by 1939 there were only 20,000 agents for the entire country. Most of the work was office-based and not fieldwork among the public, and most of the agents were professional police officers, not Nazi party agents. Recent scholarship has undermined the idea that the Nazi Germany police apparatus was so extensive as to terrorise and intimidate the entire population. Germans with the right racial characteristics and no record of political opposition to the Nazis had little to fear. The police were not so numerous nor effective to monitor the entire population. The police often got the information they needed partly because the Nazi regime and especially Hitler were very popular. The Gestapo relied heavily on spies and informants. Every block of flats of street had a "block leader" who reported suspicious activity. In addition, voluntary denunciations of workmates and neighbours were a huge source of information, even though much of the time such reports were based on personal grudges or the settling of old scores, rather than by a genuine exposure of seditious political views. However, in a political environment in which any deviation from Nazi party policy could be and often was considered seditious and dangerous to state security, the point where subversive activity began was notoriously difficult to discern. Such was the volume of reports on alleged crimes, it proved to be impossible to investigate all reports. In any case, the Gestapo did not baulk at breaching normal legal principles and resorted to arbitrary arrests and "preventive custody". The Gestapo was very successful in instilling fear and suspicion among the German population, and many people were tortured under questioning. The Gestapo was one of the most important institutions in Nazi Germany and yet the small number of agents employed indicates that it was the framework of propaganda in which it operated as its actual resources which accounted for its success. When a population is terrorised and fearful it does not oppose the ruling regime but more often collaborates as a means of self-preservation.

Rearmament and the war economy

Schacht's measures raised problems of balance of payments and shortage of foreign exchange, food shortages, rising prices, and lower living standards in 1935-6. While there had been great investment in construction, transportation, and rearmament, the purchasing power of individuals had not improved and many jobs were poorly paid. With more imports than exports, there was a balance of payments crisis, and a renewed danger of inflation. Internal reports from this period point to widespread disillusionment. Food shortages could be resolved by imports but that would use up valuable foreign currency, which was also needed for the import of raw materials and for the armaments industry, thus potentially damaging the rearmament programme. Germany was faced with a choice of "guns or butter", a decision which was resolved by the decision to go for economic self-sufficiency, for increasing domestic production would in theory reduce the need for import dependence and currency depletion. The model of economic autarky was the economic basis for the new Four-Year Plan. Schacht opposed the policy as misguided but was marginalised and the responsibility for implementation of the plan was given to Goering. Schacht had kept the Nazi party financially solvent after the election defeat of 1932, and by introducing Hitler to leading industrialists whose support was crucial to the party's subsequent development and rise to power, he played a crucial role in the establishment of the Nazi regime. He had no wish to see his work undone by Hitler's rashness. At Nuremberg in 1945, Schacht stated: "All I wanted was to build up Germany industrially ... The only thing they can accuse me of is breaking the Versailles Treaty."

Success of the Plans

Since it was geared to preparing Germany for war, the success of the plan must be judged by the extent to which the state built up German armaments. By this criterion it was only successful up to a point. The results of the Plan did meet up to the claims of Nazi propaganda and industry did not meet the targets set by the regime. Certainly, almost all the growth in the economy, which included an increase in Gross National Product from 49.9 billion Reichsmarks in 1933 to 87.6 billion Reichsmarks in 1938, went on remilitarisation and war preparations. The military budget took up 52 per cent of state spending and 17 per cent of GNP. However, in the crucial respect that Germany was not economically ready for a major war by 1939, with some capital projects not likely to be ready until 1942, it certainly fell short. Autarky was by no means assured by 1939, and Germany still imported one-third of its raw materials - some of which, like rubber, were difficult to replace with durable synthetic alternatives - with similar shortfall in food production. The reality was that the German economy did not have the resources to meet the Nazis' objectives, and some labour and capital had to be diverted from war production to consumer industries in order to avoid risking the alienation of a large section of the population. By 1939, almost one-quarter of Germany's natural resources were being devoted to military purposes, a level of commitment that could hardly be maintained for any length of time. It is now generally accepted that these shortcomings did not mean, as some historians had previously argued, that Hitler was deliberately only preparing for small wars, or blitzkrieg, but rather that full-scale war came earlier than expected. Historians such as Richard Overy and Ian Kershaw have identified excessive bureaucracy and inefficiency as serious handicaps to the effectiveness of the economy at the end of the 1930s: - A continued inability to make agriculture more efficient meant a continuing need to import foodstuffs. - Differing and competing agencies meant that it was never possible to focus wholly on self-sufficiency for war. - It was not politically acceptable to ignore consumers completely, and there was a slow but steady increase in the production of consumer goods at the end of the 1930s. Hitler was also fortunate with the world economic improvement and the cyclical upturn of the German economy after 1933. Whatever the balance of luck and design, though, there was much to support the view that Germany was experiencing a return to prosperity after the depression years. Unemployment had dropped to 1.6 million in 1936 and was, according to Nazi figures, a mere 0.1 million by 1939. This fall was far more rapid than in comparable economies; Britain, for example, still had well over one million people out of work in 1938. Wages were also increasing for most German workers. In 1933 they averaged 70 per cent of their 1928 level, but had recovered to 80 per cent by 1936 and 85 per cent by 1938. For most people, their standard of living had improved by 1939 and millions of Germans were reconciled to the regime despite some loss of rights and freedoms and the prospect of another war.

Women and the German economy

The Law for the Reduction of Unemployment in 1933 was followed by restrictions in civil service appointments. Official guidelines for appointing civil servants stated that in the event of males and females being equally qualified, the male should be given preference. Women were banned from being judges and lawyers and dismissed from high-ranking civil service jobs. Thousands of German women holding positions of responsibility, such as doctors and civil servants, were sacked from their jobs, and the number of women teachers was gradually reduced. There were also campaigns to reform the way women dressed and looked. A more formal, conservative look was favoured by the Nazis. Hair was to be worn in a bun or in plaits, and not dyed or permed. Make-up and trousers were frowned upon and discouraged. The Nazis were also opposed to slimming, as women had to be capable of healthy child-bearing. For the Nazis, this was the primary function of women but they were not always successful in applying the principle. Other aspects of the economy affected how far Nazi family policies could be implemented. The priority given to rearmament meant there was a shortage of housing, which meant young couples wishing to raise a family found it difficult to find adequate housing. A shortage of workers later in the 1930s meant a return to the workforce for German women, to the extent that more women were in paid employment in 1939 than there were in 1933. In 1939 the Nazis introduced a compulsory agriculture labour law for unmarried women over the age of 25 years. Women were encouraged to help the war effort, but it was not until 1942 that all women aged 17 to 45 were told to register for work. Though the number of women in work rose, they had a marginal effect on overall employment and it mainly impacted on the professions. The number of women in higher education was reduced dramatically. In the year before the Nazis came to power there were 18,315 women students in Germany's universities; by 1939 this number had fallen to 5,447. However, during the Second World War the trend was reversed as men were called up to join the German armed forces. By 1944 there were 28,378 women students. No women were allowed to be members of the Reichstag. Two women's organisations were founded, the National Socialist Women's League or NSF (Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft) and the Deutsches Frauenwerk (DFW), but these were largely honorific and symbolic. By 1939, the latter organisation contained 6 million members, and 70% of them were not Nazi party members. The NSF was more of an elite organisation, formed to promote the nation's traditional gender relations, and to stress the importance of marriage, family, blood and race. Gertrud Scholtz-Klink was appointed in 1933 as Reich Women's Leader and head of the NSF. A good orator, her main task was to stress male superiority in public life and the importance of childbearing. In July 1934, she was appointed head of the Women's Bureau in the German Labour Front with responsibility for persuading women to work for the good of the Nazi government. In 1934, the Reich Mother's Service (RWD) was formed, as a branch of the DFW for training mentally and physically able mothers for the important duties attached to motherhood, and domestic and family life. By 1939, 1.7 million women had attended its motherhood training services. Nazi plans to limit female employment were undermined by the demands of industrialisation and rearmament. In 1939 women constituted a third of the workforce, only slightly lower than the 37 per cent of 1933. In industry, they represented 23 per cent of the workforce overall, though in some areas such as clothing and textiles they constituted two-thirds and over half respectively. As the economy expanded in 1937, the government rescinded its stipulation that women qualified for marriage loans only if they undertook not to enter the job market. During 1935-8, women's wages showed a slightly faster rate of increase than men's, 18 per cent as against 16.5 per cent.

Workers and the working class

The Nazi Volksgemeinschaft was to be a society in which class differences as well as many other social, cultural, and economic divisions would be overcome by national unity. With a powerful trade union and socialist base among workers, appealing to the German working class was going to be a difficult task for the Nazis. The ban of separate trade unions of 2 May 1933 was followed by the "coordination" of workers into a Nazi organisation, the German Labour Front (Deutsches Arebitfront or DAF) established by Dr Robert Ley on 6 May 1933. The DAF took over the assets of the banned trade unions and became the largest organisation in the Third Reich. Though membership was not compulsory, the membership grew rapidly, since it was the only organisation representing workers. The DAF had two main aims. Firstly, to win workers over to Volksgemeinschaft, and to encourage workers to increase production. The DAF included employers as well as workers, so although the DAF replaced trade unions, it was not a trade union itself. It had no role in national wage bargaining and little influence over Nazi social and economic policies but it did have its own propaganda department to spread Nazi ideology among working class Germans. The DAF also established an important subsidiary organisation, known as Strength through Joy (Kraft durch Freude or KdF). The DAF built up a large business empire of its own, including banks, housing associations, and construction companies. In Nazi propaganda, workers were not working for personal material gain but for the benefit of the nation and serving the community. Improving facilities and creating opportunities were part of the process of instilling and securing the loyalty of workers to the regime. 'Strength through Joy' was set up by Robert Ley and the DAF to organise workers' leisure time. The theory was that workers would gain strength from the work they did by experiencing joy in their leisure time. Workers who were refreshed would be more efficient when returning to work. The organisation, like most of the Nazis' organisations, aimed to submerge the individual in the mass, and to see themselves as part of the national community. The regime was therefore attempting to organise the leisure and working times of ordinary Germans. By spreading Nazi ideology, it was hoped that there would be a greater spirit of social equality and all Strength through Joy activities were organised on a classless basis with no distinction between rich and poor. Activities aimed at breaking down regional and religious differences, and to improve the moral and physical health of the nation. Every youth in employment was obliged to undertake two hours per week of physical education at their workplace. Ambition and competition were to be encouraged. For apprentices, the National Trades Corporation was established to improve skills and standard of workmanship. Workers were offered subsidised holidays in Germany and carefully selected locations abroad, with sporting activities, hikes, theatre and cinema at reduced prices. Strength through Joy wardens were in every factory of workplace with over 20 people, and there were over 7,000 paid employees of the organisation by 1939, by which time it had become a large enterprise. Membership was automatic for those in the DAF, and by 1936, there were 35 million members, making it one of the Nazis' most popular organisations. Inclusiveness, adventure and opportunity were all guiding principles of the Strength through Joy movement, but Nazi Party officials enjoyed perks. On cruises, they were given preference, and the moral mission of the organisation was often at odds with the behaviour of some officials, who indulged in drunkenness and womanising. This behaviour undermined part of the remit of the cruise ship ventures, which was intended to demonstrate the social and technological superiority of Germany. The reaction of workers to the Nazis' attempts to win their support was mixed. Those who had held socialist and communist sympathies were not easy to persuade and influence. The popularity of the ventures undertaken by Strength through Joy did not necessarily imply acceptance or approval of Nazi ideology. Indeed, many of the most worthy and profitable ventures from the Nazis' point of view may well have been mundane initiatives to improve workplace conditions and to offer canteens and sports facilities at workplaces. These concerns were the main remit of the organisation known as The Beauty of Labour (Schönheit Der Arbiet). While the Nazis claimed that many improvements had been made, in 34,000 workplaces by 1938, it was also the case that much of the cost of these improvements had been borne by workers.

Why did the role of women in the German economy and German society change between 1933 and 1939?

The Nazis aimed primarily to reverse the trend of the 'Weimar woman' by removing married women from the workplace and bolstering the falling birth rate. Nazi policy towards women was motivated by traditional concepts of gender differences and roles with women expected to be wives and mothers, looking after the domestic household, while husbands worked to provide for the family. This was the Nazi ideal family which the Nazis sought to promote by introducing incentives to encourage women to marry and have children. The Law for the Reduction of Unemployment of 1933 introduced interest-free loans of up to 1,000 Reichsmarks for young married couples on condition that the wife give up work. Between 1933 and 1937, 800,000 newly married women received loans conditional on them not seeking re-employment. Women who had children were financially rewarded, on a sliding-scale, by the amount of the loan being written off and three million women won a medal for having four or more children in 1939. Conversely, single men and childless couples were taxed more heavily. Contraception was restricted and there was compulsory sterilisation for those deemed 'undesirable'. Women considered racially impure or genetically deficient were forcibly sterilised. From 1936 special maternity homes were opened, designed to be breeding grounds for pure Aryan children. Racially-approved Aryan mothers were matched with SS men with the intention of filling Hitler's Germany with pure-bred Aryan German children. While these measures aimed at increasing the birth-rate, the birth-rate increased slowly between 1933 and 1939 but this may have been due to improved economic conditions; it declined thereafter. The Reduction of Unemployment Law of 1933 was followed by restrictions in civil service appointments. Thousands of German women holding positions of responsibility, such as doctors and civil servants, were sacked from their jobs, and the number of women teachers was gradually reduced. There were also campaigns to reform the way women dressed and looked. Yet there were difficulties in applying such a rigid approach. A shortage of workers later in the 1930s meant a return to the workforce for German women, to the extent that more women were in paid employment in 1939 than in 1933. Nazi plans to limit female employment were undermined by the demands of industrialisation and rearmament. In 1939 women constituted a third of the workforce, only slightly lower than the 37 per cent of 1933. In industry, they represented 23 per cent of the overall workforce, though in some areas such as clothing and textiles they constituted two-thirds and over half respectively. As the economy expanded, in 1937, the government rescinded its stipulation that women qualified for marriage loans only if they undertook not to enter the job market.

The Roman Catholic Church

The Roman Catholic Church represented a far greater challenge for the Nazis than that of the Protestant churches. As part of an international church, Catholics looked to the Pope for spiritual guidance and leadership. Catholics were generally less susceptible to Nazi ideology. The Nazis regarded Catholic allegiance to the Pope as potentially undermining German unity. In the early 1930s, Catholics had been one of the groups least likely to vote for the Nazis yet after Hitler came to power, the Church was keen to reach a compromise and accommodation with the Nazi regime. The points of convergence, such as opposition to Communism, and (less powerfully and less prevalent, but still important) residual anti-Semitism, made a compromise more likely. Although Roman Catholics took issue with the anti-Christian elements within the Nazi movement, the Vatican was willing to enter a formal relationship with the Nazi state. The Concordat of 1933 which the Roman Catholic Church made with the Nazis was designed as a means of retaining the independence of the Church. Already in 1933 Catholic trade unions had been voluntarily disbanded and the Vatican made the agreement or Concordat with the Nazis in July 1933. In the agreement, the Vatican recognised the Nazi regime as the legitimate government of Germany and promised not to interfere in politics. In return the Nazis promised they would not interfere in the Roman Catholic Church, and that the Church could keep control of its schools, youth organisations, and lay groups. With the voluntary dissolution of the Catholic Centre party, Catholic interests were now largely based on good relations with the Nazis, as forged through the Concordat. Almost immediately the Nazis began breaking the agreement by seizing Catholic property and ordering Catholic newspapers to drop the word 'Catholic' from the title. The Gestapo and the SS put many priests under surveillance but in the face of mounting repression and blatant illegality, the Catholic Church hierarchy made no protest, believing that continued expressions of support for the regime was the best way to protect the Church. Some priests did begin to speak out, most prominently Bishop Galen of Munster, but in response to such criticism, the Nazis merely tightened their repression: severely restricting the permission to hold meetings, and censoring newspapers and magazines. Goebbels launched a campaign against alleged financial corruption by the Catholic lay organisations. Many had their funds seized and offices closed by the SA. The later enactment of compulsory membership of the Hitler Youth made the existence of Catholic youth organisations very difficult. After Pope Pius XI issued the encyclical With Burning Concern in 1937, SS and Gestapo agents were placed within church congregations, and there was a further tightening of the restrictions on the Catholic press. Pilgrimages and processions were restricted, youth groups closed, and some monasteries closed with their assets seized. Crucifixes were removed from Roman Catholic schools. Goebbels published sex scandals of Catholic priests, and approximately 200 were arrested and tried on sexual charges. The Nazis began to close church schools, and by the summer of 1939 all church schools had been converted into community schools. By the summer of 1939, the power and influence of the Roman Catholic church was severely weakened. The Concordat was never formally repudiated by the Nazis but they ceased to honour the agreement. The Nazis placed a great emphasis on preventing Catholic youth participating in Catholic group activities, as part of a long-term strategy to weaken the church. Many older Catholics were torn between their faith and the wish to be good Germans, and while many still attended church they were often careful not to offend the Nazi regime. Overall, the church in its entirety did not mount any serious organised resistance to the Nazis, and its subordinate role was clear. In fact, whether fairly or not, it has often been vehemently criticised since the end of the war as cravenly surrendering to tyranny and injustice.

Nazi propaganda and Hitler

The effectiveness of Nazi propaganda is difficult to gauge. There was a great emphasis on indoctrination but there were no free elections to judge how far the Nazi support was freely given and how much was coerced. Gestapo reports indicate at the very least scepticism among many elements of the population at some claims of the regime. Yet there are so many variables in judging public opinion, such as age, class, gender, region, and occupation, that it is difficult to say how far different socio-economic circumstances affected responses to Nazi propaganda. The work of a number of historians in this field has added considerably to our knowledge of the impact of Nazi propaganda. Most notably, the pioneering work of David Welch is particularly illuminating, especially his publications: The Third Reich: politics and propaganda (1993) and Nazi propaganda: the power and the limitations (1983). People's opinions may also have changed over time. The fundamental problem for historians of all authoritarian regimes is that extensive propaganda, fear, and suspicion, all make it difficult to differentiate between image and reality. Yet perhaps it is valid to state that Nazi propaganda appeared most effective when aimed at impressionable young minds or older, more conservative people who harboured anti-democratic notions. Elements of the middle class clearly feared communism and almost by default supported the virulent anti-Bolshevism which Hitler provided. Anti-Semitism was an attraction for some, but perhaps more important was the sense among many Germans across all socio-economic classes that the hated Treaty of Versailles must be overturned. The propaganda of the Third Reich was most effective when it built upon existing belief-systems and prejudices. When challenging deep-seated beliefs, like the tenets of religious faith, it was less successful. -The Hitler Myth: In 1941 Goebbels claimed that the Hitler Myth had been his greatest achievement. By the end of 1934, a powerful Hitler cult seems to have taken hold in the national consciousness. Hitler was the symbol saviour of the nation, and the imagery of Hitler alongside the words "Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Fűhrer" was a ubiquitous one. Even during the difficult early years of his rule, Hitler appeared to escape criticism. As one example from many, the SOPADE report of April/May 1934 indicated a combination of propaganda and charisma as the factors behind Hitler's popularity: "In general we can say that Adolf Hitler is exempted from criticism; his aims are conceded as honourable and people think he cannot be blamed for the mismanagement of his subordinates. That is partly the result of the systematic Führer propaganda, but it is also undoubtedly the effect of his personality. His personality impresses simple people, and Hitler still has a lot of support among the workers". Detlev Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life (1982) Indeed, as one historian observed: "The evidence of Hitler's popularity to be found in both the SOPADE [Social Democratic Party exiles] and the police and government morale reports is too plentiful and convincing to be overlooked. Approval of, not to say enthusiasm for, Hitler as an individual was indeed a feature of everyday life in the Third Reich ... approval began to crumble only when Hitler's optimistic forecasts were all too clearly given the lie by wartime realities". Detlev Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life (1982) Nazi propaganda made Hitler appear as the man of the people, the symbol of the unity of the Nazi party. For the German people, after the disorder of the Weimar years, Hitler provided security, stability, and restored national pride by his uncompromising stance towards internal and external enemies. Hitler was also portrayed as a political genius responsible for restoring national greatness and awakening, and as dynamic and forceful in contrast with the weak and supine Weimar politicians. In terms of his personal qualities Hitler was portrayed as living a simple life, and making sacrifices for the German people. He was presented as the upholder of traditional conceptions of morality and popular justice. For instance, the booklet Der Führer in den Bergen [see link above] included a paragraph which incorporated these elements of political greatness and personal sacrifice, stating: "It is obvious that a man who is as involved in political affairs as the Führer must sacrifice his private life. Even if he wants occasionally to free himself from the pressure of daily affairs, political problems follow him even to the furthest corner of the German homeland. After all, everything in Germany both begins and ends with this man. Some people wonder why the Führer has chosen the Obersalzberg as his home. One who has been there understands that there is probably no place in Germany where, despite the nearness of the surrounding mountains, one has so wide and unhindered a view of the beauties of nature. The Führer lives here in the midst of the beauties of nature, a metaphor for human events. Here he writes his major speeches which affect not only Germany, but give new direction to events in the entire world. Far from the confusion and noise of everyday life, the seeking spirit, surrounded by the vastness of the landscape, finds the right paths for the people and Fatherland. As the mountains remain eternal despite the passing of millennia, so, too, the work the Führer has begun here will live for millennia in the history of his people". This type of imagery contrasted with the reality of Hitler being surrounded by officials who vied and competed for his favour and attention. While Hitler provided the vision, ministers and officials interpreted his wishes and turned them into detailed policies. Hitler was not often involved in detailed policy-making. Equally, Hitler was not a hard worker, and he disliked reading official documents. It was often difficult for his officials to get him to make decisions, especially in domestic policy. Propaganda was used more widely to portray Hitler as a powerful, yet caring leader. He was photographed with children and dogs, and presented as a friendly and warm person. This view of Hitler did not contradict the other propaganda which showed Hitler as a German patriot who possessed the political and military skills to lead Germany and restore her as a strong international power. Hitler was held in high esteem by many Germans, and both men and women were attracted by his strong leadership and promises of a resurgent Germany. Praise for Hitler's influence was not confined to the German population. Even the British Prime Minister at the time of the Treaty of Versailles, David Lloyd George, on visiting Hitler in Berlin on 4 September 1936, paid tribute to Hitler in glowing (if misjudged) terms: "As to his popularity, especially among the youth of Germany, there can be no manner of doubt. The old trust him; the young idolise him. It is not the admiration accorded to a popular Leader. It is the worship of a national hero who has saved his country from utter despondency and degradation. It is true that public criticism of the Government is forbidden in every form. That does not mean that criticism is absent, I have heard the speeches of prominent Nazi orators freely condemned. But not a word of criticism or of disapproval have I heard of Hitler. He is as immune from criticism as a king in a monarchical country. He is something more. He is the George Washington of Germany—the man who won for his country independence from all her oppressors. To those who have not actually seen and sensed the way Hitler reigns over the heart and mind of Germany this description may appear extravagant. All the same, it is the basic truth. This great people will work better, sacrifice more, and, if necessary, fight with greater resolution because Hitler asks them to do it. Those who do not comprehend this central fact cannot judge the present possibilities of modern Germany. On the other hand, those who imagine that Germany has swung back to its old Imperialist temper cannot have any understanding of the character of the change. The idea of a Germany intimidating Europe with a threat that its irresistible army might march across frontiers form no part of the new vision." (Published in The Daily Express, 17 November 1936 under the by-line "I talked to Hitler.") Transcript: Once, they hated him. Now, Lloyd George is the welcome guest in Germany. And his promenade with daughter, Megan through the picturesque Bavarian village of Garden is preliminary to an interview with Hitler in the fuhrer's mountain retreat. The interview took place, but it was held in privacy. And it is with von Ribbentrop, Germany's London Ambassador elect, that the grand old statesman poses. How well he looks, the man whom the Germans regarded as the greatest force against them of the war, now, he is their friend.

Hitler acts against the SA

The industrialists and army leaders distrusted by Röhm were the very men whose support Hitler valued. The outcome was the 'Night of the Long Knives' on 30 June 1934, when the arrest and execution of hundreds of critics - including Röhm, Strasser and former Weimar Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher - left Hitler firmly in control. The majority of its victims, though not all, were from within the Nazi movement. Hitler was informed that Röhm and other SA leaders were plotting against him and planning to seize power immediately. It was true that Röhm was plotting against Hitler but there were no plans to immediately seize power. Hitler moved to quash this threat to his power, and in the 'Night of the Long Knives' a name coined by Hitler himself, ordered the murder of the more radical elements of the SA. Hitler used the SS to arrest and shoot leading members of the SA. Leading SA members had been holding a meeting at a village inn near Munich. SS cars arrived at the village. Hitler was in one of them, and he himself woke up Röhm with the words 'You're under arrest'. This was repeated in other bedrooms of SA members. Leading SA members in Berlin were also rounded up, and some were shot as they answered the door. Röhm was shot in his prison cell after he refused to commit suicide. For the next few days, the carnage continued. Seventy-seven of Röhm's followers, including Röhm himself, were murdered over the weekend of 29-30 June 1934. Not all of those shot, approximately 200 in total, were SA members. Other opponents, including the previous Chancellor, von Schleicher, were also murdered. In a radio broadcast of 1 July 1934, Goebbels justified the elimination of the SA: "A short meeting, and then Hitler's mind was made up. He decided not to wait until the morning but to hunt down the conspirators who were led by Röhm and the SA, and destroy the plot immediately. We arrived at 7.00am. We were able to enter the house and surprised a band of conspirators who were asleep. We took them prisoner at once. With great courage, Hitler personally made the arrests". The execution of Röhm and his followers ended the anti-capitalist wing of the Nazi party, and secured Hitler's complete domination over the movement. Hitler told the Reichstag that he had acted quickly to save the nation from potential civil war. The Reichstag, composed of only Nazi members, accepted this version of events unquestioningly. No imminent plot appears to have existed, there was no resistance, and the only shots fired were those of the Nazi executioners. Hitler's action against Röhm thwarted the SA's desire to absorb the regular army, while assuring Hitler of the gratitude and support of the generals and conservative elements in society. Even though he was using violence himself, Hitler's popularity was enhanced by the decisive way in which he dealt with the violent and radical elements of the Nazi Party. For example, President Hindenburg commented as follows: "Through your decisive intervention and your courageous personal commitment you have nipped all the treasonable intrigues in the bud. You have saved the German nation from serious danger and for this I express to you my deeply felt gratitude and my sincere appreciation". These events were even portrayed as evidence of Hitler's moderation and good sense and they consolidated his authority and popularity with many Germans. General von Blomberg, writing in Völkischer Beobachter (the Nazi Party newspaper since 1920) on 29 June 1933, said: "The Army's role is clearly determined; it must serve the National Socialist State, which affirms with the deepest conviction. Equally it must support those leaders who have given it back its noblest right to be not only the bearer of arms, but also the bearer, recognized by State and people, of their unlimited confidence ... The Army stands, loyal and disciplined, behind the rulers of the State, behind the President, Field Marshall von Hindenburg, its Supreme Commander, and behind the leader of the Reich, Adolf Hitler, who came from within its ranks and remains one of ours". As the army was the only institution capable of removing Hitler, placating it was vital for Hitler, for the army owed its loyalty to Hindenburg not Hitler. It was not a Nazified institution but retained some of its independence. The removal of any military threat to his power was a great outcome for Hitler.

Protestant churches

The main Protestant (Lutheran) church in Germany was the German Evangelical Church which many Nazis saw as a potential nucleus for a single national church. These Evangelicals were, on the whole, politically very conservative and staunch nationalists who regarded Germany as a Protestant State. They had a strong tradition of respect for and cooperation with the State authorities. Many of these Protestants were anti-Semitic and anti-communist. There were therefore many points of contact and convergence between Nazi ideology and the views of the largest group of German Protestant church-goers. The strongest area of support for the Nazis was in the Protestant North and East. In the early months of the Nazi regime, some Nazi-leaning Protestant pastors staged mass weddings of SA Brownshirts and their brides, and the Nazis turned the 450th anniversary of the birth of the great German Protestant theologian Martin Luther into a major national celebration. There was therefore the basis for a working relationship between the Church and the government which the Nazis hoped to promote and develop further. In 1933, the Nazis began to coordinate the Protestant Evangelical Churches into a single Reich Church under Nazi control. In the church elections of 1933, the German Christians (see The Nazis and the churches) won a sweeping victory and began to Nazify the Church. A Nazi nominee, Ludwig Műller, was appointed Reich Bishop and took over the administration headquarters of the Evangelical Church with the help of the SA. Műller abolished all elected bodies within the Church and reorganised it on the leadership principles of the Nazi party. In November 1933, the German Christians celebrated their triumph in taking over the Reich Church with a major rally at the Sports Palace in Berlin, and demanded that those pastors who had not paid allegiance to the new regime should be dismissed, along with all non-Aryans. 'The Reich Church was forced to accept the exclusionary 'Aryan Paragraph' and the law was applied mainly to those such as Jews and Roman Catholics who had converted to the Protestant Evangelical Church but who were now classified as non-Protestant and non-Aryan. Fifteen of these 'converts' were immediately dismissed. By the end of 1933, at face value at least, it appeared that the Reich Church had been successfully coordinated into the Volkgemeinschaft. Yet this was not to be the case. While many people had accepted the Reich Church on the basis that many were Nazi supporters and would even wear Nazi uniforms in church, not all Protestant pastors were willing to accept Nazi infiltration of the church. Objecting to this enforced union, they formed their own separate church. A group of dissidents led by pastor Martin Niemöller and Dietrich Bonhoeffer established a breakaway church which became known over time as the Confessional Church. With the support of approximately 5,000 pastors, the Church was established to resist state interference in the Church and to re-establish the theology based purely on the Bible. The opposition of the Confessional Church to the Reich Church represented a clear challenge to Nazi power, and led to the arrest of hundreds of pastors. Nevertheless, especially in traditional farming communities, many congregations went over to the Confessional Church as they wanted to celebrate Church festivals in the traditional way. The regime's initial attempts to coordinate the church therefore failed. In 1935, a new Ministry for Church Affairs was created and Reich Bishop Műller marginalised. The Nazis tried to weaken the Confessional Church by repression and exploiting divisions within it. More broadly, the Nazis attempted to reduce the influence of the Church and religion overall by abolishing Church schools in the late 1930s, and by pressuring young people to join the Hitler Youth. They also launched the Church Secession Campaign to persuade party members to renounce Church membership. The campaign was successful up to a point. Many party members appear to have renounced formal religious ties. Party members were also not allowed to hold any office in Protestant or Roman Catholic churches. Stormtroopers were forbidden to wear uniforms at church services. Priests and pastors were forbidden to take part in the Nazi party, and pressure was applied to those Roman Catholic and Confessional Church members, whose employment depended on the German state, to renounce their Christian faith - especially teachers and civil servants.

Nazi propaganda: the written and spoken word

The most traditional form of media, the newspaper press, was smothered at an early date. In January 1933, there were 4,700 privately-owned circulating newspapers, whilst Nazi newspapers had a limited circulation. Socialist and Communist newspapers were closed by the legislative Decree for the Protection of People and the State. After their electoral success, the Nazis embarked on purchasing newspaper titles until, by the end of 1933, they had acquired 27 daily papers, with a combined circulation of 2.4 million per day. Detailed instructions were given to journalists at daily press conferences about how the news was to be presented. The only newspapers allowed were those controlled by the Nazis. News agencies which supplied the press with information were all merged into a State-controlled organisation, which then became the sole source of content, with the somewhat inevitable result that newspapers became bland and conformist. Unsurprisingly, press circulation declined. The radio had if anything a greater propaganda value. Both Hitler and Goebbels thought the spoken word had great influence, as they had used radio broadcasts in 1932 and 1933 very effectively. German radio was brought under State control in 1934, and all broadcasts were vetted by the Propaganda Ministry. In 1933 alone, Hitler made 50 radio broadcasts, with loud-speakers set up in town squares and factories so that everyone could listen to him and to government announcements. A siren sounded when one of Hitler's broadcasts was about to be aired so the population could prepare to listen. The Nazis, through the RMVP, persuaded manufacturers to produce a cheap radio (the VE 30131) or Volksempfänger (People's Receiver). While most families could afford to buy one, foreign stations were difficult to tune in to because of the wavebands used by German stations. By the beginning of the war, over 70% of all households owned a wireless set: the highest percentage anywhere in the world. Goebbels also purged those working in radio broadcasting on political and racial grounds. By April 1934, all radio stations were brought under the control of the Reich and the radio companies were controlled by the Propaganda Ministry. The Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda funded theatre performances and the making of films, which increased their control over what was performed and screened. Some productions were overtly propagandist but it soon became clear that it was better to provide a lot of cheering light-entertainment through all media channels as well. Goebbels was quick to see the value of the relatively new medium of film as a vehicle for propaganda. Images worked on the sub-conscious mind, he believed, delivering subliminal messages, and reinforcing prejudices. Goebbels was personally responsible for approving every film for public release after 1933. Foreign films were carefully checked for political and racial content and context. From America, many of the highly-popular Walt Disney animations were approved by the Nazi authorities, and although many American films were not allowed to be shown as the 1930s progressed, it was not until April 1940 that all Americans films were banned. Between 1933 and 1945, over 1,000 films were produced in Germany, and cinema audiences increased four-fold. Only approximately 14% of these films had overtly political content; the most commonly produced films were the less politically-contentious genres of historical dramas, comedies and musicals. The cinema provided a similar blend of entertainment and politics to radio. The most popular films in terms of audience numbers were escapist romances or adventures, which Hitler himself enjoyed watching. All German films had to some extent a political message, whether it was the glorification of leadership, the emphasis on blood and soil or race and land, or the demonization of Jews and Communists. Consistent with the Nazi theme of struggle and the virtue of martial life, pacifist themes were banned outright. Among some of the most notorious Nazi-produced films are the following: - The anti-Semitic films, Jew Sűss (1940) and The Eternal Jew (1940) - and Heimkehr (Homecoming) (1941) about the invasion of Poland and the persecution of Germans.

The political basis of dictatorship

The national socialist revolution began with the conquest of political power. However, the SA had a different conception of the national revolution. The SA's conception of the Nazi revolution was that the SA would play a prominent role in the further radicalization of the army, which would be conjoined with the SA, as a prelude towards further reform in the institutions of German government. The SA continued to promote social and national revolution in German society, reflecting the original aims of the National Socialist movement, but Hitler needed the support of traditional conservative groups in German society and wished to curb the socialistic tendencies of the SA. While this dissent within his own political party was troubling to Hitler, he first needed to eliminate the non-Nazi political parties and other independent organisations, together with securing Nazi control over local and national institutions. Only then could he concentrate his efforts on the direction in which the Nazi party proposed to take Germany. On 1 February 1933 Hitler, as newly-appointed Chancellor, gave a speech which indicated his awareness of the importance of cooperation with conservative forces in German society. The tone of the speech was that of conservative revivalism: "The national government sees as its foremost task the restoration of the unity of spirit and will of our people. It will preserve and protect the fundamentals on which the strength of our nation rests. It will preserve and protect Christianity, which is the basis of our system of morality, and the family, which is the germination cell of the body of the people and the state. It will disregard social rankings and classes in order to restore to our people its consciousness of national and political unity and the responsibilities that entails. It will use reverence for our great and glorious past and pride in our ancient traditions as a basis for the education of German youth. In this way, it will declare a merciless war upon spiritual, political, and cultural nihilism. Germany shall not and will not sink into anarchistic communism". In setting out the destructive as well as the constructive tasks ahead, Hitler indicated that the government of Germany was going to be very different from the fragmentation, shifting alliances and political instability of the Weimar Republic. -The creation of the one-party state: Hitler had come to power legally but not democratically. He held a deep contempt for the party system, and saw parties as mere electoral machines which were unrepresentative the nation, whereas the Nazi party represented the "racial core" of the German nation. In the Nazi conception of the Volksgemeinschaft, there could be no other political parties, for the nation and not sectional, regional and class differences must be at the forefront of the political system. Some trade union leaders were at first willing to work with the Nazis and were lulled into a false sense of security by the Nazis proclaiming 1 May a national holiday. Since the nineteenth century, 1 May had been a socialist day of celebration; the full name of the Nazi Party was the National Socialist German Workers' Party and they could thus claim this as a significant day. Thereafter, though, the independent trade unions were eliminated and replaced with an all-embracing union - the Deutsche Arbeitsfront or German Labour Front (DAF) led by Robert Ley. This organisation claimed to represent workers but, as striking and pay bargaining were now illegal, it was essentially a means to control the workers. Political parties were outlawed or voluntarily disbanded. After the Reichstag fire, the communist KPD was outlawed, and after the elimination of the trade unions, the SPD was officially banned on 22 June 1933. The DNVP and the Centre party voluntarily disbanded on 27 June and 5 July 1933 respectively, and on 14 July 1933, with the passing of the Law Against the Formation of New Parties, Hitler outlawed all other political parties. The law of 14 July forbade the formation of new political parties in the following terms: 'The German Government has enacted the following law, which is herewith announced: Article I: The National Socialist German Workers' Party constitutes the only political Party in Germany Article II: Whoever undertakes to maintain the organizational structure of another political Party or to form a new political Party will be punished with hard labour up to three years or with imprisonment up to three years, if the action is not subject to a greater penalty according to other regulations'. In June and July 1933, the surviving parties were forbidden and dissolved themselves under Nazi pressure. The SPD in its newspaper Neuer Vorwärts struck a defiant note: "The ban clears the path! While this paper was being printed we received word of the banning of the Social Democratic Party. For days we have known that Germany's economic difficulties and the tensions within the National Socialist movement had become so great that the suppression of all political parties by force was being considered ... with the forcible removal of the legally elected Social Democratic representatives the last pretence of democratic legality has been destroyed." The formal announcement of one-party rule in Germany was established and legalized by the Law to Secure the Unity of Party and State, on 1 December 1933. In July 1933, Hitler also signed an agreement with the Pope, known as the Concordat. Catholics agreed to accept Hitler's promise that he would not interfere with Catholicism in Germany, and this agreement provided Hitler's regime with legitimacy and gave him international prestige.

List the benefits of Nazi economic policy between 1933 and 1939 and assess to what extent German society was improved.

Unemployment fell to 1.6 million in 1936 and a mere 0.1 million by 1939. This fall was far more rapid than in comparable economies. Wages were also increasing for most German workers. In 1933 they averaged 70 per cent of their 1928 level, but had recovered to 80 per cent by 1936 and 85 per cent by 1938. By 1939, most people had experienced improvements in their standard of living and millions of Germans were reconciled to the regime despite some loss of rights and freedoms and the prospect of another war. Some employment schemes had been introduced under earlier governments, especially the Brűning government, and reduction of unemployment was also partly achieved through married women giving up employment, and the reintroduction of conscription in 1935, for males aged 18-25. Both these measures took a large proportion of women and young males out of the labour market. Another area of job creation emerged from rearmament, with vast amounts spent on the production of military equipment, and an increase in military personnel. Hitler was fortunate with the world economic improvement and the cyclical upturn of the German economy after 1933. Whatever the balance of luck and design, though, there was much to support the view that Germany was experienced a return to prosperity after the depression years.

The Nazis and the churches

-Control of the churches: Hitler had little respect for Christianity but kept his views vague as he recognized that many of his supporters were Christians. To overcome the potentially divisive issue of religion, with Protestantism and Catholicism strong in different areas of Germany, Hitler spoke of 'positive Christianity'. Hitler knew that Nazi opposition to communism would gain the support of most Christians, since communism was identified with atheism. These considerations partly explain the Catholic Church's readiness to agree to the 1933 Concordat with the Nazis but if the Catholic Church expected an advantage from this agreement they were disappointed. The Nazis interfered in the curriculum of Catholic schools, sacked some teachers, and later in the 1930s, arrested hundreds of priests and nuns on mostly false charges. It was a difficult challenge for the Nazis to integrate the Churches into the Volksgemeinschaft. Most Germans were Protestants but there was a significant Catholic minority. During the Weimar period, there were approximately 58% (40 million) of the population who were Protestants and 32% (22 million) Catholics. Protestants were located mainly in the North and East while Catholics mainly resided in the South, especially Bavaria, and the West, especially the Rhineland. Religious loyalties were deep-rooted and a formidable obstacle to the Nazis' aim of making loyalty to Hitler the fundamental loyalty of all Germans. Nazi philosophy did not have a coherent view of religion and the churches. Hitler was born and raised as a Catholic and often talked of "positive Christianity" but this was a concept which appeared to lack much meaning, for at other times he tried to discredit religious leaders. Other Nazis were not so careful and cautious. Robert Ley for example was an atheist who wanted to replace religious belief with a new, more relevant 'truth'. There was something of a lack of coherence towards how the Nazis dealt with the churches. Infiltration was one way: the German Christians, a pressure group of Nazis operating within the German Evangelical Church, was first established in May 1932; by the mid-1930s it had some 600,000 supporters, who described themselves as the SA of the Church. German Christian pastors wore SA or SS uniforms and hung swastika flags from their churches.

The 'Night of the Long Knives' in June 1934

-Divisions within the Nazi party: By the summer of 1933, Hitler's dictatorship was nearly complete. However, he was not in full control over the SA, the Nazi private army. The SA was led from 1931 by Ernst Röhm, a radical anti-capitalist whose ambition was to make it a partner with the Nazi party and the army, believing that the SA should serve as a vehicle for the Nazi revolution of the State. The SA had a reputation for lawlessness and violence, which continued to give the Nazis a bad name. Hitler wanted a professional army, not a loose rabble. For Hitler, a major consideration in his achieving power was to secure the support of the German officer class and leading industrialists and businessmen. Röhm's activities threatened to undermine the attempt of the Nazi party to portray itself as a German national party. Hitler considered Röhm a potential rival, and Röhm was personally ambitious. With the successful implementation of gleichschaltung by 1934, the threats to Hitler's dictatorship came more from inside the Nazi Party than outside. Gregor Strasser, Röhm and others were unhappy with some developments. Röhm did not like the continuing authority of the army High Command, which he hoped to replace with the SA leadership. He criticised Hitler personally, accusing him of betrayal and of association with reactionaries from the old regime. He supported the idea of a 'second revolution' to sweep away industrialists and army officers. Hitler on the other hand, after the passing of the Law against the Formation of New Parties, declared that the national socialist revolution was over. Here was the basis of the divisions within the Nazi party. By November 1933, there was only one political party in Germany so there was no real need for SA intimidation and violence. Hitler had acquired dictatorial powers, all other parties had been banned or dissolved, and the process of gleischschaltung was technically complete. The SA became disillusioned at being marginalised and its revolutionary rhetoric and actions appeared increasingly at odds with Hitler's need for stability and consolidation of Nazi power. The SA and Röhm were determined to continue the revolution with the SA as the nucleus of a new national militia which would eventually absorb and replace the existing army. By January 1934, the combined membership of the Stahlhelm and the SA was 4.5 million, with Röhm's forces vastly outnumbering the official army, but since the summer of 1933 the importance of the SA had declined. In August 1933, it had lost its "auxiliary police" status and was subject to stricter regulations over its powers of arrest. The SA had been one of the main instruments of terror which had helped the Nazis to power and which had expanded its role and influence. From a membership of 500,000 in January 1933, the SA increased to over one million members one year later. The merger of the Stahlhelm and the SA meant a huge police apparatus within Nazi Germany which possessed greater authority than traditional police, who were told not to interfere in their activities. With the Nazis in power, the activities of the SA, many of which had been illegal, gained legal status. The violence of the SA was often unplanned, uncoordinated and piecemeal. Hitler was happy to use the SA when it was a case of eliminating opposition, but assaults on the official police and army were not permissible, for Hitler knew that he had to keep the conservatives in the Cabinet on his side, and that for that to happen, the violence of the SA had to be restrained. -The army and the SA: Röhm's ambitions were considered by the army leaders as a threat and it was not only the reckless actions of the SA but their infringement of the army's role in the German state which caused concern. The SA confiscated weapons and supplies belonging to the army which caused irritation and concern at this encroachment on the army's property. There was pressure on Hitler to do something about the SA, with both Himmler and Goering seeing it as a threat to their organisations within the party. That pressure increased on 17 June 1934 when Papen made a speech at Marburg University which while personally praising Hitler for his role in German national renewal, criticised the excesses of the Nazis relative to freedom of speech and freedom of political organisation. Papen argued that "the government must represent the people as a whole, and must on no account, be the exponent only of particular groups; otherwise it would fail in its attempt to construct the national community". Papen called for an end to SA activity and called on Hitler to reject its calls for a second revolution, with the comment "The movement must come to a standstill sometime ... have we gone through an anti-Marxist revolution in order to carry out a Marxist programme". The speech revealed the dilemma of conservatives who shared some Nazi goals, but disapproved of their methods. Papen's speech had been approved by Hindenburg and thus was reported in the newspapers. When Blomberg, the Defence Minister, threatened to declare martial law and give the army the power to deal with the SA, Hitler knew he had to act to reassure his conservative allies and to retain control of the party. He conducted a ruthless purge with the SS acting on his orders, eliminating the SA leadership and many other opponents. This murderous purge was known colloquially as the 'Night of the Long Knives'.

The Four-Year Plans

-Economic planning: Schacht's new plan: As in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany placed a high degree of faith in economic planning, with projections and targets relating to productivity. In peacetime Nazi Germany, there were two economic plans, the Schacht's new plan (1933-6), and The Four-Year Plan (1936-9). The main economic aim in the 1933-6 four-year plan was to reduce levels of unemployment. More government intervention and greater state investment to kick-start the economy were the 'new' features used to shape the economic recovery. Although there was a commitment to rearmament from the outset, this was not the key priority at this stage. One important strategy was to reduce economic ties with other countries and, quite simply, renege on foreign debts wherever possible. Schacht was the key figure in implementing what can be termed "economic nationalism". In 1934, Schacht devised his 'New Plan' imposing protectionist tariffs and strict controls on imports and movement of capital abroad. Barter agreements were negotiated where possible to acquire essential goods and raw materials. The state also took over direct responsibility for the banking system and increased the level of state spending to stimulate new demand. Government spending went up by 70 per cent over the period of the plan. Rearmament in these early years was financed by a form of deficit financing in the use of mefo bills, promissory notes issued by a fake company and convertible into Reichsmarks. These were designed to allow industry to buy materials, disguise early rearmament and overcome the limited funds the Nazis had available. The motor industry and construction were the main beneficiaries from public investment. Taxes remained quite high to cover expenditure, and Schacht encouraged savers to use public savings banks to make more funds available. The Nazis encouraged the use and growth of savings banks, which they viewed as people's banks, rather than the big commercial banks. The deposit and savings banks as well as insurance companies had to invest their incoming monies into government loans to finance the war effort. The result of this reckless approach to spending was that the total debt of the Reich by the end of the war amounted to 387 billion marks, compared to 11.6 billion in 1932 and 47.3 billion in 1939. There was also a massive programme of public works, with the main planks of house building and road construction providing many new jobs. The building of the autobahns came to symbolise Nazi success in putting people back to work and restoring German pride. The political changes of 1933-4 reinforced and helped economic change. Germany had effectively become a one-party state and the trade unions and the labour movement had been crushed; all this made central control much more effective. Hitler also ignored the siren calls of the 'left' of the Nazi Party for greater socialist-type measures. He realised the crucial importance of a big business alliance in achieving recovery and did all he could to keep industrialists, financiers and other big players behind him in his quest to improve employment figures. This direct state intervention in the economy produced impressive results, even allowing for an upturn in the world economy: the number of unemployed was reduced to under two million by 1936; industrial production increased by 60 per cent; and Gross National Product (GNP) increased by 40 per cent. -Economic planning: the second Four-Year Plan: Foreign policy and economic policy were directed at overturning the Versailles Treaty, and revising the territorial settlement which had been imposed on Germany, by negotiation or threat. The Second Four-Year Plan established under Goering in October 1936 was predicated on the fear that the Red Army would become too powerful and would menace Europe with communist revolution or as Nazi propaganda stated, 'Jewish-Bolshevism'. The Plan laid the foundations for a programme of heavy industrial expansion of chemicals, machinery, synthetic oil, rubber, iron and steel, alongside a general aspiration for greater agricultural self-sufficiency. Under the Plan, the economic emphasis changed from tackling unemployment to speeding up rearmament in readiness for the war that Hitler now regarded as inevitable. There was a greater emphasis on a managed economy with controls on the labour supply, prices, raw materials, and foreign exchange. State supervision was increased and Hermann Goering was put in charge of the plan when it was announced in October 1936. Consumer industries now took a back seat to rearmament industries. Conservative economists such as Schacht, who had played such a central role in guiding Nazi economic policy under Schacht's new plan, were increasingly side-lined. Schacht was one of many in the business community opposed to prioritising armaments, believing that Germany should consolidate recovery by improving living standards and overseas trade. He eventually resigned as Minister of Economics in November 1937. His successor, Walther Funk, was not a man likely to challenge Goering, who was in effect economic dictator of Germany during 1938-9. The central aim of the plan was to have Germany nearer to war readiness within four years. A key element of this was the achievement of self-sufficiency or autarky in essential raw materials such as metals and oil. Autarky fitted in well with the Nazi ideology of national chauvinism and independence, and freedom from international capital markets. The entire community must participate in the 'struggle', and purchasing German goods, of food and raw materials, were patriotic duties. Unfortunately, the drive towards autarky involved interfering with other political and economic goals, even war preparations. Nazi propaganda encouraged ordinary Germans to save more to fund investment in industrial production. There were also campaigns to collect scrap metals to compensate for the shortages of raw materials. The Hitler Youth, for example, was involved in the collection of old pots and pans. If autarky could not be achieved domestically, the Nazis reasoned, then Germany would develop synthetic or ersatz substitutes rather than relying on imports. Trade in essential raw materials was only considered with the relatively weak countries of South-Eastern Europe. Priority was also given to increasing agricultural production and retraining workers for key industrial production. Two-thirds of industrial investment between 1936 and 1939 went (directly or indirectly) into preparation for war, giving help to the chemical industry and engineering. By 1939, 25 per cent of industrial workers were working directly on production orders for the armed forces. The massive Reichswerke Hermann Göring at Watenstedt, a state-owned industrial enterprise eventually employing 700,000 workers, was designed to process low-grade iron ore and reduce reliance on imported ore from 80 to 50 per cent. Between 1936 and 1939 production of priority raw materials such as oil, rubber and steel increased considerably. Hitler had indeed in his economic manifesto of 1936 threatened that the state would take over iron production should private manufacturers shirk from the responsibility of using lower-grade German iron ore "It is further necessary to increase German production of iron to the utmost. The objection that we are not in a position to produce from the German iron ore, with 26 per cent content, as cheap a pig-iron as from the 45 per cent Swedish ores, etc., is irrelevant because we are not in fact faced with the question of what would rather do but only of what we can do. The objection, moreover, that in that event all the German blast furnaces would have to be converted is equally irrelevant; and, what is more, this is no concern of the Ministry of Economics. It is for the Ministry of Economics simply to set the national economic tasks, and it is for private industry to carry them out. But should private industry believe that it is not able to do this, then the National Socialist State will succeed in carrying out this task on its own. In any case, for a thousand years Germany had no foreign iron ores. Even before the war, more German iron ores were being processed than during the period of our worst decline." Ultimately it was a mixture of government, party, and private companies which influenced economic decision-making but the economic policies of the Nazis exposed the irrationality and inefficiency of the Nazi system of government. While Hitler's economic manifesto provided general economic guidelines for self-sufficiency and war preparations, it failed to resolve specific conflicts or to fulfil economic objectives.

The use of propaganda

-Goebbels and propaganda: Before 1933, Joseph Goebbels had shown himself adept at propaganda techniques, in popularising the Nazi party as a dynamic and revolutionary force in German society and in portraying Hitler as a messianic figure. Manipulation of public opinion was given a very high priority in Nazi Germany. One of the first ministries to be set up when the Nazis came to power in 1933 was the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (RMVP) under Goebbels. It began the assimilation of all cultural, economic and political activity within Germany to the Nazi state. Goebbels believed that propaganda would lead to the "spiritual mobilisation" of the Germany people. Hitler and Goebbels both believed that art and culture should be subordinated to Nazi control and influence. With his new Ministry, Goebbels created a vast bureaucratic empire which had a huge influence over all aspects of German cultural life, leading to the purging of any dissenting material, especially of a politically-unreliable or racially-impure kind. The Nazi state used propaganda ruthlessly to impose its own ideas on the German population. Goebbels understood that propaganda was more effective if the German people received simple ideas with short slogans and powerful visual imagery. This was much easier if enemies could be easily identified. Nazi propaganda therefore was concerned with criticism of the Treaty of Versailles, the patriotic ideal of making Germany great again, and blaming the Jews and other racial enemies for Germany's difficulties. Propaganda assumed many forms in Nazi Germany, in posters, newspapers, films, speeches, and radio broadcasts.

Hitler's governmental and administrative methods

-Hitler as Führer: On the day of Hindenburg's death, 2 August 1934, the offices of Reich President and Reich Chancellor became legally centred in Hitler's person as Führer (leader), and the Nazi dictatorship was complete. German troops now swore a personal oath of loyalty to Hitler, who now possessed complete political power in Germany. Although he was now all-powerful in Germany, Hitler was personally lazy and delegated much routine paperwork to his subordinates. Much of the detailed work and decision-making was left to others. Hitler preferred to dream up grand schemes which would reflect the greatness of Germany under Nazi rule, and to plan the expansion of the German state. Hitler was greatly concerned with international affairs but in matters relating to internal policies in Germany, he allowed his subordinates a large degree of flexibility. Nevertheless, it seems clear that all his followers knew the type of policies and initiatives that he wanted. Flattery of Hitler was therefore worth engaging in, and those vying for political power and influence were not ashamed to indulge in effusive praise. For example, Goering in 1934 wrote: "There is probably nobody else right now who attracts the general interest as much as the Führer. And yet there is nobody whose qualities are as difficult to describe as are those of Adolf Hitler. To begin with, it does, of course, go without saying that for us who are his followers—and anyone who knows the close relationship that exists between Hitler and his men will understand that—there is no single quality or characteristic of his which, to our eyes, he does not possess to the highest perfection. If the Catholic Church is convinced that in all matters of faith and morals, the Pope is infallible, then we National Socialists declare, with the same inmost conviction, that for us, too, the Führer is flatly infallible on all matters political as well as on all other matters which affect the national and the social interests of the people. What now is the secret of his powerful influence over his followers? Is it his human kindness, his strength of character, or his unique modesty? Is it perhaps his political talent of always correctly anticipating, and providing for, future events, or is it his outstanding courage or his special loyalty toward his men? I think that no matter what it is you look at, you will finally conclude that it is not the sum of all these three virtues, but that there is something mystical, unsayable, almost incomprehensible about this man. And the person who does not intuitively sense that will never comprehend it, for we love Adolf Hitler, because we believe, with a faith that is deep and unshakable, that he was sent to us by God to save Germany". What mattered were Hitler's convictions and Hitler's desires. Germany had become a Füuhrerstaat—a state defined by the Führer. Thus, Germany was Hitler, and Hitler was Germany. And the Führer who was so closely identified with the state and the nation could do little wrong in the public mind. -Governing style: As historian D.G. Williamson has memorably put it, 'Historians are in no fundamental disagreement about the fact that the government of Nazi Germany was chaotic in structure ... The Third Reich was a Bedlam of rival hierarchies, competing centres of power and ambiguous chains of command' (Williamson, The Third Reich) Administrative chaos means a situation in which it is not clear who is meant to do what. Hitler had shown no interest in the day-to-day running of government. He was bored by paperwork, was reluctant to sign any orders and, as Führer, appeared absorbed by the big projects, the great visions: 'Germanica' (the idea of a Greater Germany), military, foreign and racial policies. Hitler's rule was characterised by a decline in Cabinet government and a developing relationship with the army. After 1934 there was virtually no organised platform for discussion of government policy. While the Cabinet was maintained, it increasingly had no purpose. In 1933, before he had consolidated his power, Hitler accepted the necessity for a Cabinet as a formal means of governing the country. By 1935, Hitler had removed many conservatives within government and the Cabinet met only 12 times. By 1937, the last remaining conservatives were removed and the Cabinet met only once after 1937. Hitler's supreme legislative powers meant that there was simply no point debating new proposals. Decisions were made by Hitler on an ad hoc basis, with little consultation, scrutiny, debate or support from anyone else. The Reich Chancellery took over the role of drawing up legislation. Hitler had been aware of the power of the army as a potential opposition to his own power; the army was, after all, the only body that could force him from office. In addition, Hitler needed the army as a well-trained and disciplined force to achieve his foreign policy aims. The army leadership was supportive of Hitler as he had promised to expand the army and reinstate its important position in society. In the aftermath of the 'Night of the Long Knives' the army leaders swore an allegiance to Hitler personally; they welcomed a strong authoritarian leader and were aware of the potential of the SA but as Hitler consolidated his dictatorship, military leaders found themselves side-lined in an increasingly subservient role.

Nazi economic policies

-Schacht and economic growth: Hitler came to power at a time when the German economy was in ruins. Other developed countries around the world suffered from similar problems following the financial crash of 1929. Hitler promised people jobs at a time of rampant unemployment: and unemployment fell dramatically, much more so than in European countries with democratic governments. The Nazis spent huge amounts of public money on job creation, with expenditure doubling between 1933 and 1938. Public works programmes were an important element in Nazi economic policy, and a vital component of the Nazi programme to revitalize the German economy. It was primarily the economic crisis that gave the Nazis the opportunity to get into office and establish a dictatorship. There had been over six million unemployed (some would give the figure as eight million) when Hitler took office. Even those in work were often on reduced wages or working part-time. German capitalism seemed to be in terminal decline. The Nazis' economic solution was based on the simple promise of 'Bread and Work'. As a slogan, it was catchy and effective in winning votes from often desperate voters. As an economic policy, though, it was practically meaningless, and most historians agree that at the outset Hitler had little or no idea how his economic policy would work out in detail. While Hitler had no coherent plans or policies in this area, he did have clear aims. Most obviously, he aimed at reducing unemployment, and the equally important aim of sustaining an economy capable of an extensive rearmament programme. Nazis hoped, too, that Germany could become self-sufficient in the production of vital raw materials and food (autarky). The German economy under the Nazis recovered at a much faster rate than any other country affected by the Great Depression. The main focus was on deficit financing. The key economic figure in the early years of the Nazi era was Hjalmar Schacht, the President of the Reichsbank and from August 1934, Economics Minister. Schacht enacted numerous measures which promoted economic activity and fuelled economic growth. Schacht pumped money into the economy, through infrastructure projects such as building houses and roads. He aimed at stimulating consumer demand with tax concessions and grants to a range of social groups. Subsidies were given to firms for them to hire more workers, and by placing controls on prices and wages as a means of controlling inflation. Schacht also introduced the 'New Plan' of 1934 to control Germany's foreign trade and improve the country's balance of payments. Crucially, as a means of achieving Hitler's wider aims, Schacht took the first steps towards rearmament by using the Mefo Bill which, as an instrument of credit, was very useful in financing the necessary expenditure. The construction of autobahns was held by the regime as a great advance, and the propaganda value was great, in expressing technological advancement and cultural and racial ingenuity and supposed superiority. The architect of the autobahn road system Fritz Todt said in his 1937 book Germany's Highways that: "Fulfillment of the simple transportation function is not the ultimate meaning of German road construction. The German road must be an expression of the German essence." Road construction was a central plank of the Nazi programme. Hitler proposed to build nearly 7,000 km of autobahns (motorways), and this was among the most important public works projects of the Third Reich, in terms of transportation technology, and as a symbol of technological progress. On 27 June 1933, Hitler produced a law to create a Reich Autobahn Agency, with inspectors appointed to produce a plan for a new German road system. The law proposed the construction of roads the total length of 4,728 miles. The first section, from Frankfurt to Darmstadt, was opened on 19 May 1935. By 15 December 1938, 1,860 miles were completed. Autobahn routes were to be constructed to blend in with the landscape, harmoniously swerving or with bold curves to follow its contours. They were conceived as massive artworks. The extent and pace of road construction was more possible in a dictatorship, where no effective economic controls were observed. The party could simply confiscate or transform land, and had an army of (previously jobless) labourers to use at will. Work creation was the central justification for autobahn construction, and after 1933 hundreds of thousands of unemployed were sent to autobahn construction sites. Refusal meant the loss of unemployment payments. The German Labour Front organized and directed workers into jobs, which were found in numerous areas, from forestry work, the building of new hospitals, schools, and sports stadiums. Job creation agencies also provided employment, with an estimated 44,500 paid officials of the German Labour Front. Concentration camp prisoners and foreign workers were also employed, especially to break stones. Most workers lived apart from their families in military-like barracks. Yet, autobahn construction employed relatively few people in comparison to the overall size of the workforce, with only 125,000 employed at the peak of construction. Construction slowed after 1938 and ceased altogether by 1942, by which time there were 3,870 km of new roads - but since relatively few Germans owned a car, the autobahns were relatively underused.

Opposition and non-conformity

-Support for the Nazis: The Nazis had a strong base of support in Germany, and through propaganda and Gleichschaltung, the regime gained approval from a large segment of the population, and acceptance from a majority. The SS police system was presented as necessary to protect the population from the corrupting influences of minorities. The People's Court and "popular justice" were intended to project the image of Nazism as a reflection of the popular will. This type of propaganda appears to have been quite effective, for it seems clear that the Gestapo, with its limited resources could not hope to achieve this result unaided. Within Germany there was very little active, public opposition to the regime, and Hitler appeared to gain in popularity. There was no open or free debate on the merits of the regime and its policies, but historians have not taken the repressive apparatus and lack of democratic debate as examples of the regime's intrinsic unpopularity. On the contrary, most agree that the Nazis were widely accepted as far preferable to the political disorder and multitude of governments during the era of the Weimar Republic. -Political resistance: There remained a modicum of resistance to the regime. After 1933, Hitler continued to fear that the left-wing parties, allied with the trade unions, could stage a general strike, as they had done to end the Kapp putsch in 1920, to bring an end to the regime. By 1933 the German Left was fatally divided by the German Communists' insistence, at the behest of the Soviet Union, that they must oppose the "social fascism" of the SPD. The SDPD, as a constitutionalist party, was not equipped to organise resistance to a party which did not respect the law. The SPD suffered greatly at the hands of the SA during the 1933 election campaign where its visibility and refusal to be silenced was met by repression and violence. The SPD had defied the Nazis over the Enabling Act but in the aftermath, Hitler moved to crush the SPD. By the end of 1933, thousands of its members had been murdered or placed into "preventive custody". The SPD leadership went into exile, and gradually adapted to the new conditions they faced. Organised in exile in Prague by Ernst Schumacher, the party managed to establish secret cells in factories. The reports produced by SPD agents of the internal condition of Germany under the Nazi regime are an important source for historians of social and political history. A SOPADE report from 1934 reported on German opinion of the Nazi regime: "The weakness of its opponents is a strength of the regime. Its opponents are ideologically and organizationally weak. They are ideologically weak because the masses consist only of dissatisfied people, only grumblers; their dissatisfaction is based solely upon economic reasons ... their criticism stems from only narrow personal interests." Another SOPADE report from Saxony in 1935 commented on morale in the factories, stating: "There is a lot of grumbling in the companies about the low wages, about the rising prices, about the militaristic treatment, about the fast pace of work." The priority of the SPD was to prepare for the future collapse of the Nazi regime rather than to mount a serious challenge to overthrow the Nazis. As such, and having been weakened by years of Nazi repression, they remained largely passive and for the most part ineffective.

The degree of economic recovery by 1939

-The achievements of the Nazis: By 1936 the so-called battle for work was not mentioned as the Nazis had convinced the vast majority of people that unemployment was no longer a problem. By 1939 Goebbels set out to show through propaganda how great the Nazis' success had been. Personal and household consumption was one way of demonstrating the Nazi success, with an increasing use of motorcars, radio sets, and even cruise ship holidays, to give the impression that there had been a significant improvement in the living standards of Germans. Military parades and displays of military hardware, as well as restoring national pride and fuelling militarism, were a demonstration to the population that autarky was working. Nazi propaganda exaggerated the successes and obscured the failures of Nazi policies. -The reduction of unemployment: The official figures stated that there was a rapid recovery under the Nazis but recovery began before the Nazis came to power. Some schemes had been introduced under the Brűning government. Reduction of unemployment was achieved partly through married women giving up employment, for which they were given marriage loans, and this freed up work for male workers. The reintroduction of conscription in 1935, for males aged 18-25, took a large proportion of young males out of the labour market. There was statistical inflation of those in work, with those employed part-time and even those performing unpaid work, being counted as employed. The historian Richard Evans referred to these factors as "invisible unemployment" meaning out of work but not officially counted, and estimated the number in these groups to be as high as 1.5 million, so the official figure of 1.6 million unemployed in 1936 should perhaps be 3 million. If these revised figures are anywhere near the truth, and historians are not all in agreement on the matter, then the claim that the "battle for work" had been won was in fact bogus. Another area of job creation emerged from Hitler's promise to revise the hated Treaty of Versailles. By 1935 when it was officially announced to the world, conscription and rearmament were well under way. The army increased from 100,000 in 1933 to 1.4 million in 1939, and vast amounts were spent on the production of military equipment such as planes and tanks. Table 1: Unemployment in Germany, 1928-32: 1928 - 1,862,000 1929 - 2,850,000 1930 - 3,217,000 1931 - 4,886,000 1932 - 6,042,000 Table 2: Unemployment in Germany, 1933-38: 1933 - 4,804,400 1934 - 2,718,300 1935 - 2,151,000 1936 - 1,592,700 1937 - 912,000 1938 - 429,500 After 1936, rearmament did lead to a rapid expansion of employment leading eventually to labour shortages in 1939. The most obvious example of this State-led growth was the Hermann Goering Steelworks, owned by the State but partly financed by private companies who were forced to invest in it, which was given priority and preference over private companies in the allocation of labour and materials. By 1939, it was the largest industrial enterprise in Europe, and its operations extended into coalmining and the manufacture of heavy machinery and synthetic fuels.

The impact of the death of President Hindenburg

-The end of the Weimar Presidency: The question of the succession to Hindenburg was of vital importance to Hitler, who aimed to merge the offices of President and Chancellor after Hindenburg's death. So long as Hindenburg lived, Hitler did not have absolute power and control, for the army owed its allegiance to the President not the Chancellor. Indeed, Hindenburg had become so concerned about the excesses of the SA that he had considered handing over power to the army and dismissing Hitler. These were views shared by the army command and Papen. Hitler was left in no doubt that he had to control the SA, else he could not count of the army's support once Hindenburg was dead. This was the factor which had led Hitler to purge the SA. After that had been done, Blomberg and the army leaders had no further objection to Hitler succeeding Hindenburg. Within an hour of Hindenburg's death in August 1934, an announcement was made that the offices of Chancellor and President had been merged. On the previous day a law had been passed which legitimised this action. The Law Concerning the Head of the German State on 1 August 1934 consisted of two articles: Article 1: The office of President shall be combined with that of Chancellor. Thus all the functions heretofore exercised by the President are transferred to the Führer and Chancellor Adolf Hitler. He has the right to appoint his deputy. Article 2: This law is in force as of the date of the death of President von Hindenburg. Hindenburg had drawn up a political testament which was published in the German press on 16 August. It provides an example of how far the forces of conservatism in Germany had not only accepted but embraced National Socialism. In the document, Hindenburg condemned the chaotic Weimar system of government as unfitted for a great power such as Germany. Whereas he had previously disparaged Hitler for his lowly origins, he now praised him for restoring national unity to Germany, which he described as "a decisive step of historic importance". While refraining from naming Hitler as his successor, Hindenburg made it clear that in his later years he had been pleased to witness a national revival in Germany. Hitler had little difficulty in persuading members of the armed forces to swear a personal oath of allegiance to him as Führer and leader of state, and as the new Commander-in-Chief, the army gave an oath of allegiance to Hitler. On 19 August 1934, a plebiscite (or referendum) was held in relation to Hitler's appointment as Fűhrer (leader) and Reich Chancellor. The result was that 89.9% of voters approved the major constitutional change, though 10.1% (4.5 million voters) had the courage to vote against. This vote was the final constitutional act in the Nazi takeover of the German state. Hitler was now head of the Nazi party, Fűhrer of the German people, and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. By the summer of 1934, the Nazi state was a reality. It had been achieved in little more than eighteen months by terror, legal power, and compromises with established conservative forces. Hitler's authority was now unquestioned.

Topic 1 - Hitler's consolidation of power, March 1933-1934

After coming to power, Hitler sought to establish a one-party state consistent with the doctrine of gleichschaltung. The elimination of political opposition and the purging of the government apparatus were means to the end of Nazi domination of the German state. Yet, Hitler had to face enemies within his party who threatened to undermine his leadership and represented a threat to the fragile alliance he had established with the senior army officers, traditionalist conservative political parties, and other right-wing forces in Germany. The Night of the Long Knives in 1934 was one of the final acts in Hitler's consolidation of power. There had been limits to that power even after the Enabling Act of 1933. The power of the President on constitutional matters was still important, and the SPD remained vocal in opposition to the Nazis. While the Nazis controlled the state government in Prussia, the elected governments in most of the other German states were under the control of other parties. However, the period between March 1933 and August 1934 saw the remaining obstacles to the Nazis' power removed, and Germany well on the way to being a one-party state, where political opinion, ideas, and action were all monitored and subject to the will and control of the Nazi party.

Explain the role of the different police forces in Germany

After the Night of the Long Knives had destroyed the SA in June 1934, the SS, formed in 1925 as Hitler's personal bodyguard, was the most important military group in the State, under the leadership of Heinrich Himmler. By the early 1930s, the SS had become part of the Nazi party's own police force. In 1933, Goering reorganized the Prussian plain-clothed political police as the Gestapo, the 'Secret State Police'. In 1934, control of the Gestapo passed to Himmler as head of the SS. The Gestapo became a national force but a sub-division of the SS, with the leadership of the Gestapo, under the higher authority of the SS, passing to Reinhard Heydrich. The powers of the Gestapo were broad-ranging and it was their job to root out opponents, and it had powers of arrest and imprisonment. The Gestapo used an extensive network of informers to uncover any attempts to organize opposition. Proliferation created confusion and competition between the various police forces and disputes as to who controlled them. There was also the SD, the intelligence gathering arm of the SS, and finally, before 1934, the SA controlled by Röhm who had acquired police powers of arrest and detention of political prisoners. Between 1933 and 1936 there was great competition between these groups for control of the police forces in Germany but Himmler's powers were extended and strengthened after the Night of the Long Knives. In 1936 the SS, SD and Gestapo were placed under Himmler's control, and his victory was sealed in 1939 with the creation of the Reich Security Department HQ (RHSA) which placed all party and state police organisation under the SS.

Trade Unions

Before 1933, the German working class was the largest and the most unionised workforce in Europe. The trade unions were linked with the SPD but the political and industrial resistance of the unions crumbled rapidly when faced with the all-out assault of the Nazis. After 1933, trade unions were absorbed into the DAF or German Labour Front, with Nazi propaganda emphasising the importance of nationality as opposed to class solidarity. Strikes still occurred—in 1937, 250 were recorded, mainly arising from poor working conditions or low wages, but many strikers were imprisoned, for any dissent was taken as a challenge to the regime, and punished accordingly. Absenteeism was a form of resistance, and in 1938 new more punitive measures were enacted to deal with "slackers". Industrial sabotage also increased, as did the number of prosecutions. While these acts of political and industrial defiance perhaps amounted to little, the resistance provided by organised religion was perhaps of more consequence.

Why did Goebbels place such a high propaganda value on party rallies and marches?

Before the war, the Nazis had become very proficient at staging mass events, such as rallies and pageants at which Hitler often spoke to great effect. Goebbels saw the value of parades and rallies as forming a large part of the Nazi party's visibility to Germans and the outside world. The theatricality of the marches, uniforms, medals, banners, and singing, and the precision and orderliness of the rallies contrasted sharply with the disorder and discontent of the Weimar years. The Nazis were adept at capturing attention and the imagination of observers, albeit with some coercion for householders were encouraged to show support for the regime by hanging swastikas outside their windows, with compliance enforced by the local Nazi block leaders. Failure to conform could be reported to the authorities and thus could be dangerous. Parades and marches were "proof" that the German people were fully behind the Nazi regime, despite the choreography of Goebbels and the Propaganda Ministry. The annual party rallies at Nuremberg were highly stage-managed, with the 1937 rally, for example, attended by 100,000 people, and had an international as well as a domestic impact in promoting the virtues of the regime.

Nazi propaganda: parades and rallies

Before the war, the Nazis had become very proficient at staging mass events, such as rallies and pageants at which Hitler often spoke to great effect. Parades and rallies formed a huge part of the Nazi party's visibility to Germans and the outside world. The theatricality of the marches, uniforms, medals, banners, and singing, and the precision and orderliness of the rallies contrasted sharply with the disorder and discontent of the Weimar years. Indeed, this was how such events were meant to appear. The Nazis were adept at capturing attention and the imagination of observers. Householders were encouraged to show their support by hanging swastikas outside their windows, with compliance enforced by the local officials, spies, and informers. Failure to conform could be reported to the authorities and thus could be dangerous. Parades and marches, the NSDAP claimed, were "proof" that the German people were fully behind the Nazi regime, despite the choreography of Goebbels and the Propaganda Ministry. The annual party rallies at Nuremberg were highly stage-managed, with the 1937 rally, for example, attended by 100,000 people. Transcript: With Soviet Russia lodged within the axis camp, Adolf Hitler felt his path was clear to wage total war against vanquished Poland's powerful allies, France and England. To reassure Europe's frightened neutrals, Adolf Hitler vowed that from now on Nazi Germany would respect the sanctity of their frontiers.

The SS

By the early 1930s, the SS (Schutzstaffel), formed in 1925 as Hitler's personal bodyguard, had become part of the Nazi party's own police force. After the Night of the Long Knives had destroyed the SA in June 1934, the SS was the most important coercive power in the State, under the leadership of Heinrich Himmler. The SS continued to gain significant powers throughout the 1920s and 1930s until by 1936 they possessed complete authority over the police system and concentration camps. After 1936, there was a tightening of control and an increase in repression with an increase in the number of concentration camp inmates. The SS operated in a far more systematic way than the SA. Himmler intended the SS to be strictly-disciplined, racially-pure, and unquestioningly obedient. The key values were loyalty and honour, defined in terms of adherence to Nazi ideology. Violence and murder were instruments of State power to be employed ruthlessly and without reference to moral and ethical standards. SS concentration camp guards were deliberately brutalised to remove any feelings of humanity they might have towards their prisoners. SS camp guards had been given immunity from prosecution by Himmler. Himmler's powers were extended and strengthened after the Night of the Long Knives, and Himmler could exploit the rivalries between Goering, and the Minister of the Interior, Wilhelm Frick. This dispute was partially resolved in 1936 when SS, SD and Gestapo were placed under Himmler's control, and his victory was sealed in 1939 with the creation of the Reich Security Department HQ (RHSA) which placed all party and state police organisation into one organisation under the SS.

Governmental change and establishment of the one-party state

Chronology of political and constitutional events, 1933-34 24 March 1933: Enabling Act 31 March 1933: Law for the Coordination of the Federal States 7 April 1933: Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service 22 June: SPD outlawed as a party "hostile to the nation and the state" 5 July: Centre party voluntarily disbanded 14 July: The Law against the Formation of New Parties effectively makes Germany a one-party state 12 November 1933: Reichstag elections at which Nazis win 92% of the vote and all 611 seats 30 January 1934: Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich 14 February 1934: Reichsrat abolished 30 June 1934: Night of the Long Knives 2 August 1934: Death of President Hindenburg—Hitler combines the officers of President and Chancellor, with the army swearing an oath to him personally 19 August 1934: Hitler takes the title of Fűhrer

How do historians explain the policy-making process in Nazi Germany?

Historians agree that the governing structures of Nazi Germany made the tasks of governing unorthodox, chaotic and complicated. With parallel structures and offices of party and state, it was a regime characterised by rival hierarchies, competition between individuals and agencies. This complexity created difficulties of job demarcation and led to administrative and bureaucratic overlap which meant inefficiency and time wasted. Much depended on personal relations and personal approaches and proximity to Hitler was a key element in policy formation, prioritization and completion. In dispensing with traditional structures of government, and legislative bodies at federal and state level, Hitler created a scramble and battle for influence among policy-makers which was ultimately harmful to the policy-making process.

Why was Röhm and the SA a threat to Hitler's control of the Nazi party?

Hitler was happy to use the SA when it was a case of eliminating political opposition but assaults on the official police and army were not permissible, for Hitler knew that he had to keep the conservatives in the Cabinet on his side, and that for that to happen, the violence of the SA had to be restrained. Röhm's ambitions were considered by the army leaders as a threat to established authority and it was not only the reckless actions of the SA but their infringement of the army's role in the German state which caused concern. The SA and Röhm were determined to continue the revolution with the SA as the nucleus of a new national militia which would eventually absorb and replace the existing army. Hitler also was concerned at the potential for Röhm to mount a challenge to his leadership of the Nazi party. For these reasons, of party and state, Röhm was a great threat to Hitler and had to be dealt with if Hitler was to be free of threats from within his own party.

Youth resistance

In the early years of the Hitler Youth, it seemed that the organisation was successfully channelling the rebellious spirit of teenage years into safe and predictable areas. Both the Hitler Youth and the League of German Girls made demands on the time of German youths, with various activities such as hiking, gymnastics, and military drilling. These activities were based on the Nazis' beliefs that children should have no independent activities outside of the state, the party, and the family. By the mid-1930s, disillusion had set in and membership of the youth groups fell, with many children not attending weekly parades, and even among those who attended, dissent was apparent in the form of humming banned songs. Though these types of activity may have been little more than teenage rebellion, to the Nazis, any form of independent thought was considered dangerous and a threat. The continued formation of gangs, prevalent during the hard times of the Weimar Republic, was another indication that the Nazi concept of Volksgemeinschaft was less than complete.

The courts and the criminal justice system

Most judges and lawyers tended to be very conservative but few were loyal to the Nazi party. There was a long tradition of freedom from political interference in German legal circles. Violence and intimidation of the SA was clearly illegal and many prosecutions began by lawyers who wished to uphold the law. A few judges and state prosecutors were dismissed by the regime but the Nazis primarily concentrated their efforts on reforming the structures of the legal system, designing those structures as a means of ensuring that the legal system served the Nazi regime rather than independent notions of freedom and justice. To this end, there were significant changes in the legal system. The Nazis merged the various professional associations with the formation of the League of National Socialist Lawyers, creating the Front of German Lawyers in April 1933. It was made very clear to judges and lawyers that their career prospects largely depended on good relations with the Nazi regime. New courts were established with Special Courts set up in 1933 and People's Courts in April 1934. These courts were to run alongside the pre-existing system but to deal predominantly with political crimes. They were staffed by three Nazi judges and two professional judges. Significantly, defendants had no right of appeal. With this raft of measures, lawyers and judges fell into line with the regime. Though the old justice system continued for non-political 'crimes', the criminal justice system had no power to interfere with the Nazis' use of state terror. Between 1934 and 1939, approximately 3,400 people were tried by the People's Courts, most of whom were former communists and socialists. Many more people in Nazi Germany received the death penalty, which was increasingly used. Once in power the Nazis extended the application of the death penalty from homicide to political offences, and an increasing number of executions took place for political offences. On 24 April 1934, the death penalty was extended to anyone who attempted to or planned to alter the Constitution. This measure was aimed specifically at communists. In some cases, the Nazis dispensed with legal proceedings altogether. In June 1934, eighty-nine people were shot, although they had not been subject to judicial proceedings of any kind. The number of executions increased under Hitler, from four in 1932 to fifty-six in 1933. This irregular mode of dealing with crime began to worry many in Germany's legal profession.

Why did the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches not offer more resistance to the Nazis?

Most of the churches preferred a non-confrontational approach. Protestant Churches in their entirety became inward-looking, and consumed with internal doctrinal and personal struggles. While the Nazis failed to silence the Confessional Church, it was also the case the Church did not develop a fully-fledged opposition. While there were heroic individuals, the Churches remained silent and there was no consistent condemnation of human rights abuses and atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis between 1933 and 1939. The Roman Catholic Church was in a strong position in Germany owing to its great doctrinal unity, and its traditional and historic place within nation-states. Despite these strengths, the Catholic Church wanted to reach an accommodation with the Nazi regime. The Concordat of 1933 granted certain protections to the Church, but when these came under attack, the Church found itself increasingly at odds with the regime. The strategy of trying to compromise with the regime to moderate excesses was understandable but ultimately unsuccessful, for persecution and intimidation still characterised the Nazis' approach to religious groups.

Living standards

Nazi propaganda stressed the benefits of Nazi rule while encouraging workers to work harder, longer hours, and accept relatively high taxes on wages. Between 1933 and 1939, however, the income for many workers did increase. Some employers paid bonuses and other benefits to get around the pay freeze and attract more skilled workers. Wages were however subject to compulsory contributions, to the German Labour Front, and to other welfare organisations. The standard of living of German workers is difficult to estimate: workers in some industries, especially the armaments industries, were clearly better off, but those in consumer good production did not enjoy the same advantages. Prices also impacted on the standard of living, for prices increased and there were shortages of some key goods. German consumers could feed their families but could not afford luxuries even if these had been attainable. Cheaper goods were available, such as potatoes and rye bread, rather than meat, fruit, and eggs. Higher prices and a reduced standard of living were reflected in some discontent but there was no general revolt nor was there any runaway wage inflation, which is perhaps an indication that the Nazis had won the "battle for production." The drive for autarky and rearmament caused strains in German society, of longer hours, higher prices, and shortages, often serious shortages at times. Price controls and rationing on some commodities helped alleviate the pressure. With few signs of unrest, it appears that most Germans were largely prepared to accept the sacrifices asked of them. While the Nazis had some success in reducing unemployment, the demands of the Four-Year Plan strained the economy, and targets were often not achieved. By 1939 there were shortages of food and some other basic materials such as clothing, leather, soap, and shoes.

Closing the national socialist revolution

On the opening day of the Nazi Congress at Nuremberg in September 1934, a highly-anticipated proclamation by Hitler was read. In it, Hitler declared that the revolutionary period of the Nazi party was over. Having now attained power, it was time to implement policies and consolidate the power of the National Socialist regime. The proclamation was intended to indicate to party members that the socialist tendency in the party led by Röhm, had perished with him and his associates during the Night of the Long Knives two months earlier. Hitler stated: "The Nazi revolution is closed. This revolution, as a revolution, has achieved everything which it could be hoped to accomplish. It is important that this should be clearly understood, because every revolution produces all too easily extravagant or interested persons, who cannot or will not recognize the borderline between the possible and the impossible. No revolution can last indefinitely without inevitably leading to total anarchy ... A revolution can never accomplish a programme by itself. It can only clear a way for forces which have adopted a definite policy, and are in a position to guarantee that it is to be carried out". (The Times, 6 September 1934) To this effect, at the close of the event, Hitler made a speech which left no doubt that the Nazis intended to hold on to power, and to use that power to pursue their ideological aims: "The S.A. and the S.S. are assembled today for the fourth time in the history of our movement. Last year we met to show that we had conquered power in the State. Today we meet to proclaim the continuation and summation of the means by which we achieved that victory. The whole power of the German Reich is in our hands today. The National-Socialist Party is the Lord of Germany. Those are blind who still imagine that our regime can be destroyed or that we will voluntarily relinquish power". (The Times, 10 September 1934) Hitler could speak with such confidence because, with the death of President Hindenburg in the previous month, there were no limits to his power within the German state.

Why was Hitler's introduction of a one-party state so easily achieved?

Once Hitler had attained the Chancellorship and Presidency he used a combination of armed force and constitutional methods to outlaw political parties and to shape the political system and government administration as he wished. Once he had passed the Enabling Act, Hitler could legislate as he wished, from national security concerns. At this stage, there were few limits to Hitler's power. While Hitler adeptly used the political machinery of Germany for his own ends, it was also the case that he managed to convince many at the centre and right of German politics that his vision of a national community could not encompass a host of sectional interests in the form of different political parties. The DNVP and centre parties voluntarily disbanded, with the former merging with the Nazi party. The idea that the Nazi party represented the core of the German nation, and that the nation and not sectional, regional and class differences must be at the forefront of the political system was therefore accepted in some parts of German political life and culture.

The extent of opposition

Opposition was expressed in numerous ways, and most often was not primarily political but fuelled by economic hardship, the cost of living, and low wages. Religious and military circles had grievances, some of which were very serious and which could threaten the regime, but Hitler was never seriously imperilled before 1939. The prevalent and pervasive atmosphere of propaganda, intimidation, and repression meant that most Germans were prepared to accept the Nazi regime, despite misgivings in different policy areas. There appeared to be no common basis for an organised, unified or sustained opposition or resistance, and there was certainly no basis for a movement which could draw on mass support. Even many of those who had grievances with the regime, credited it with having restored order and national pride to Germany. In these terms, the regime had become firmly entrenched and would be difficult to remove, for opposition was dangerous.

The work of Leni Reifenstahl

Parades and ceremonies offered a tremendous opportunity for visual propaganda of a very-high quality. Every September from 1933 to 1938 a huge party rally and Congress was held at Nuremberg. The event lasted several days, and was a mixture of spectacle, parade, festival, and religious ceremony. The overall aim was to show the Nazis as restoring order and glory to Germany. The 1934 rally was recorded for posterity by Leni Riefenstahl (1902-2003), actress, dancer, and film director, who was entrusted by Hitler with the production and direction of Nazi propaganda films. Reifenstahl was later reproached for her association with the Nazis but referred to it as her artistic duty. Riefenstahl was tasked with producing films which ensured for the Nazis maximum publicity and propaganda effect. They were shown in cinemas across Germany. The most famous of these documentaries was the film of the 1934 Nuremberg rally, attended by over one million people, entitled Triumph of the Will (1935) which was skilfully filmed to glorify the regime, and to show the close relationship between the Nazi party and the German people. After witnessing the rally, William Shirer wrote of the deeply-ingrained militarism of Germany, and the German flouting of the Versailles Treaty, with the aid of the Soviet Union, in relation to arms restriction: "They acted today like children playing with tin soldiers. The Reichswehr 'fought' today only with the 'defensive' weapons allowed them by Versailles, but everybody knows they've got the rest—tanks, heavy artillery, and probably airplanes". (William Shirer, Berlin Diary, entry for 10 September 1934) Above all, the film of the 1934 Nuremberg rally graphically portrayed Hitler as the glorious leader, and holding the centre of attention of an entire nation. Technically superb for the time, the film received many plaudits and prizes, including a prize from the Venice Film Festival. It is an impressive record of the Führer cult and an important historical source for the Nazi regime's self-portrayal. The film was cut to Hitler's orders, with the scene of his arrival by plane at Nuremberg appearing as the arrival of a higher being.

The 'Battle for Work'

Reducing unemployment was a central element of the Nazi plans. Increasing political pressures meant that Germany moved rapidly towards full employment. Loans to and tax relief on private companies were utilised in building roads and bridges. When the Nazis came to power the recession had bottomed out but their measures did reduce unemployment more rapidly. In 1935, the Reich Labour Service introduced rules under which young unemployed men were compelled to perform six months' labour in farming or construction, and later the same year, military conscription was re-introduced for young men. With the 1934 'New Plan', Schacht aimed at dealing with some of the problems associated with economic growth. The economic revival meant that imports grew faster than exports, leading to a shortage of foreign currency, which was needed to purchase new imported goods. Thus, import limits and controls on access to foreign currency were introduced. Trade agreements were made with foreign countries, especially states in the Balkans and South America, which supplied Germany with food and raw materials. The supplying countries could then use these earnings to purchase German goods. It was necessary for Germany to borrow but there existed a great fear of inflation. Schacht devised a scheme whereby the government paid for military expenditure using credit notes or Mefo Bills, which could then be exchanged for cash at the Reichsbank, thereby ensuring the private companies had confidence they would be paid. Companies were given an incentive to defer asking for payment by a 4% interest per annum on bills if they kept them for a full five-year term. In this way, the rearmament programme could begin in 1935 without the government having to find the funds to finance it. This system also had the advantage that rearmament could be kept secret as payments would not appear in government accounts.

What were the main aims of the Strength Through Joy organisation?

Strength through Joy (Kraft durch Freude or KdF) was set up by Robert Ley and the DAF to organise workers' leisure time. The theory was that workers would gain strength from the work they did by experiencing joy in their leisure time, and that workers who were refreshed would be more efficient when returning to work. Like most Nazi organisations, KdF aimed to submerge the individual in the mass, and to see themselves as part of the national community. It was hoped that there would be a greater spirit of social equality and all KdF activities were organised on a classless basis with no distinction between rich and poor. Activities aimed at breaking down regional and religious differences, and improving the moral and physical health of the nation. Workers were offered subsidised holidays, with sporting activities, hikes, theatre and cinema at reduced prices. KdF representatives were in every factory of workplace with over 20 employees, and there were over 7,000 employees of the organisation by 1939. Membership was automatic for those in the DAF, and by 1936, 35 million were members, making it one of the Nazis' most popular organisations. Inclusiveness, adventure and opportunity were guiding principles of the KdF movement, but Nazi officials enjoyed perks and privileges thus somewhat undermining the ethos of the organisation.

In what ways did the Roman Catholic Church benefit from compromising with the Nazi regime?

The Concordat of 1933 which the Roman Catholic Church made with the Nazi government was designed as a means of retaining the independence of the Church. In the agreement, the Vatican acknowledged the Nazi government as the legitimate government of Germany and promised not to interfere in politics. In return the Nazis promised not to interfere in the Roman Catholic Church, and that the Church could retain control of its schools, youth organisations, and lay groups. The Church did not gain as much from the agreement as they originally anticipated. The Nazis began breaking the agreement, seizing Catholic property, imposing censorship on Catholic newspapers, and subjecting many priests to surveillance. Yet in the face of mounting repression and blatant illegality, the Catholic Church hierarchy made no protest, believing continued support for the regime was the best way to protect the Church. Some priests began to speak out leading to further repression: severely restricting permission to hold meetings, and imposing further censorship. After 1937, the Nazis aimed at removing the Church's influence over the youth by making membership of the Hitler Youth compulsory. Further persecution and intimidation followed, with pilgrimages and processions restricted; by 1939 all Catholic church schools had been converted into community schools. By 1939, the power and influence of the Roman Catholic church in Germany was severely weakened. The Concordat was never formally repudiated by the Nazis but they ceased to honour it. The Church thought the Concordat would provide protection from a repressive regime but they misjudged the vehemently aggressive nature of Nazism and its intolerance of any other belief system within Germany, which it saw as a threat. With the Concordat, the subordinate role of the Church was made abundantly clear, and the Church's conduct in the 1930s has often been vehemently, and at times perhaps unfairly, criticised since 1945 as a craven surrender to tyranny and injustice.

How effective and by what means did the Gestapo keep German society under surveillance?

The Gestapo or secret state police, had been set up initially only in Prussia but under the Nazi regime its operations were extended across the country. The Gestapo developed a reputation for efficiency and great knowledge. Its agents were believed to be everywhere but the reality was somewhat different, for even by 1939 there were only 20,000 agents for the entire country. Most of the work was office-based and not fieldwork among the public and most agents were professional police officers, not Nazi party agents. With limits on personnel and the extent of the police apparatus, the Gestapo relied on spies and informants reporting suspicious activity. In addition, voluntary denunciations of workmates and neighbours were an important source of information—much of the time, such reports were based on personal grudges or settling of old scores, rather than by a genuine exposure of seditious political views. However, in a political environment in which any deviation from Nazi party policy could be and often was considered seditious and dangerous to state security, the point where such activity began was notoriously difficult to discern. The Gestapo was very successful in instilling fear and suspicion among the German population. It was one of the most important institutions in Nazi Germany and yet the small number of agents employed indicates that it was as much the framework of propaganda in which it operated as its actual resources which accounted for its success.

The Nazi view of the law The legal system

The Nazi regime was not bound by established law or a traditional legal system. The leadership principle was the main organising theme, and there were no new legal or constitutional principles promulgated after 1933. New laws were introduced to deal with political offences, and the Nazis forced the existing justice system to adapt and comply with their will. New courts and police powers ensured that political opposition was supressed. The legal principles of the Weimar Republic no longer applied. Judges were no longer independent of governments and individuals could be arrested without trial, without the police having to produce any evidence against them—the law applied in this way was arbitrary and inconsistent. The Nazis' attitude to the law was not, as in democratic countries, that the law should serve all the people and be administered impartially, but rather that it should be a tool of the government which could be used against enemies of National Socialism. The Nazis did not accept that crime had social origins, but argued, consistent with their racial theories of mankind, that it emerged from racial character and defects. Two systems of legal administration evolved in relation to crime. Crimes dealt with in regular courts of law, and detention in concentration camps. The latter was used to take people out of the criminal justice system. The Nazis rejected traditional concepts of law, and held the view that punishment could be quickly adapted to the needs of each situation. This attitude not only meant that a code of laws was rejected as it was too rigid but also that there was an arbitrary element in the application and enforcement of the law. It was left to judges to determine whether an act required punishment, even if it was not punishable under the present laws. The act of committing the offence was no longer the most significant factor, but the intent of the perpetrator. In this way, the law became an instrument of the Nazi party and the State. Those who did not fit in with the 'Volk Community' (Volksgemeinschaft), the type of society promoted by the Nazis, such as Jews, Gypsies, and Poles, were subjected to special regulations after being stripped of their civic and legal rights.

The SD

The SD (Sicherheitsdienst) was established in 1931 as the internal security service of the Nazi party. It was an offshoot of the SS which had been set up to investigate claims that the party had been infiltrated by its political enemies. After 1933, the role of the SD was primarily intelligence-gathering, with an important role in monitoring public opinion and in identifying potential enemies of the regime, for example, the 10% of voters who had voted against Hitler in the plebiscite of 1934. The SD was staffed not by professional police officers but by amateurs who were committed Nazis. With 50,000 officers, the vast staffing of the SD was some indication of how important its role was perceived to be, and how successful Heydrich had been in establishing a power base within the party's internal structures. As a Nazi party organisation, the SD worked independently of the Gestapo, which was a state organisation, but there remained considerable overlap in the functions and responsibilities of the two groups.

Centralisation of power and local government control

The Weimar Republic had been a federal state with devolved powers to its constituent state governments. The Nazis seized power in the federal states 'legally'. SA storm-troopers would create disorder using violence and intimidation, then Wilhelm Frick, as Reich Minister of the Interior, would be 'requested' to intervene to restore order. In Prussia, Goering used his powers to bring the police force and the civil service into line. With 60% of the territory and 50% of the population of Germany, Prussia was so large that it could operate semi-independently of central government. In July 1932, the Prussian state government had been suspended by Papen and a Reich Commissioner appointed to run the state. In Hitler's Cabinet, Goering held this post, and this provided a precedent and paved the way for controlling power within the entire Reich. On 31 March 1933, the First Law for the Coordination of the Federal States, the first law to be passed under the Enabling Act, dissolved the existing state assemblies, apart from Prussia, and these were then reformed and replaced with Nazi-dominated assemblies. A second law of 7 April 1933 created Reich Governors in all länder except Prussia, where Goering was put in charge; the governors were, in the main, local Nazi leaders or Gauleiters (district leaders) who wielded absolute control in their region. The second Law for the Coordination of the Federal States created a new post of Reich Governor to oversee the government of each state though Prussia was excluded as it already had a Reich Commissioner. These Reich Governors were responsible for ensuring that state governments followed the policies laid down by the central government. In January 1934, a further law, the Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich, took centralisation a stage further. State assemblies were abolished and the governments of the states formally subordinated to the Reich government. The post of Reich Governors was now obsolete but Hitler did not abolish the posts, and allowed rivalry and tension between the state governments and Reich Governors to continue. On 14 February 1934, the Reichsrat, the parliamentary assembly to which the state assemblies sent delegates, was abolished—since the state assemblies no longer existed abolishing the Reichsrat was the logical next step. Effectively the federal system had been abolished by 1934. The Nazi party had its own organisational structures both locally and nationally which dated back to the mid-1920s. Each administrative district (Gau) was headed by a Gauleiter who exerted near-complete control over local government—many assumed the role of Reich Governors within their areas. Local mayors were brought under control of Nazi party officials in January 1935. Germany was divided into 32 districts, and more added as additional territories were added to the Reich. Each Gau was further sub-divided into regional and local units. The Nazis also instigated violent campaigns to oust political opponents such as town mayors and replace them with Nazi party nominees but the precise relationship between party and state as local and national level was never clearly defined, and was intentionally kept vague and fluid. However, the government apparatus effectively became an elaborate executive organisation controlled by the Nazi party. -Control of the civil service: Under the Kaiser, civil servants enjoyed a status on a par with soldiers. The higher ranks were recruited almost exclusively from the aristocracy, and civil servants were closely associated with the authoritarian values of the Second Empire. Many refused to embrace the democratic values of the Weimar Republic and some had even worked for Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, believing that the conservative elements in the Cabinet would restrain the Nazis and allow the civil serviced to continue much as before. However, the Nazis would not abide by such rules and regulations; they regarded the civil service as an obstacle to dictatorial power. The Nazis purged the civil service consistent with the racial basis of the State they wished to create. Those civil servants who held left-wing views were forced out as were "non-Aryans", including after June 1933, all persons married to non-Aryans. As a concession, the purge did not apply to combat veterans, people who had lost close relations in the war, and those who had worked within the civil service since 1914. This reprieve (mainly for special-category Jews) was designed to retain conservative support for the purge but it was only temporary and within a year of Hindenburg's death, these exemptions were rescinded. Those local officials who were forced to resign were often replaced by Nazi appointees, many of whom had little or no experience in government. The SA began to place party officials in government offices as a means of ensuring that the civil service was carrying out the orders of the regime. Before long, it was clear that the Nazis were firmly in control of the governmental machine. From August 1934, all holders of public office, like the military, had to pledge an oath of allegiance to Hitler.

Benefits and drawbacks of Nazi rule

The appeal of Volksgemeinschaft: The Volksgemeinschaft or 'People's Community', was derived from the 'spirit of 1914' which had united Germans at the outbreak of the First World War. The divisions and tensions during the Weimar Republic created nostalgia for the perceived unity of 1914. During Hitler's rise to power he had promised to create a classless society of racially pure Germans which would exclude those deemed 'unfit' racially or mentally. In other words: "The central goal of Nazi propaganda was radically to restructure German society so that the prevailing class, religious and sectional loyalties would be replaced by a new heightened national awareness". (David Welch, Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft) This was an ambitious aim of restructuring society which would require the transformation of social and mental attitudes. Germany's youth were to be trained and educated to be racially aware and physically fit; women were to be re-educated into their fundamental roles as wives and mothers. The DAF would represent all workers regardless of skill or status. Everyone in the nation was to be equal before the Führer. Support came from the vagueness of the notion of a people's community. Big business and the army offered support in return for authoritarian law and order; Catholics gave implicit consent in return for the destruction of communism; the promised destruction of the hated Treaty of Versailles united Germans; and the desire not to return to the instability of the Weimar period brought further support. There was something for everyone in the propaganda myth of a 'people's community', that is, provided they were Aryan and committed to Nazi ideals.

Elite resistance

The conservative, traditional elites which resided in the civil service and armed forces were not wholly rooted out by the Nazis. Yet there were difficulties arising from the alliance which these elites had made with the Nazis in bringing Hitler to power. After the death of Hindenburg, the only way of removing Hitler was by military coup. The public ethos and non-partisan nature of the army and civil service inhibited their readiness to challenge the regime. There were a small number of identifiable opponents of the regime who were of sufficient stature to cause discontent among a wider body, about concerns they had over Hitler's foreign policy. Despite agreeing with Hitler's plans to re-build Germany's military strength, a few important military figures thought he was leading Germany into war in an unprepared state. When Hitler revealed his plans for a union with Austria and an invasion of Czechoslovakia, General Blomberg, the Defence Minister, and Commander-in-Chief Werner Freiherr von Fritsche expressed doubts as to the viability of the plan. Within three months, both men had been removed and replaced with more compliant generals. Fritsch was worried that the SS was becoming a rival to the regular army and that German was not ready for the war which Hitler's foreign policy appeared to be leading to. He resigned in February 1938 after being accused of being a homosexual. In late 1938 Hitler ordered the army to prepare plans for the invasion of Czechoslovakia but the threat of France and Great Britain intervening was very great and senior military figures were very concerned. The Head of the Army General Staff, Ludwig Beck, and other senior officers plotted to remove Hitler in a military coup. Plans were made for a march on Berlin if war was declared but the plot depended on Britain and France standing by Czechoslovakia which they signally failed to do. Both countries had been informed of the plot but would not risk war, and ultimately agreed to a peaceful Germany takeover of the Sudetenland. Emboldened by his success in achieving another bloodless victory. Hitler was strengthened. The plot was quietly forgotten about, and allowed to lapse; it remained undiscovered by the Nazis.

Totalitarianism and the Nazi state

The coordination of all German life under the control of the Nazi party through propaganda, censorship, fear and repression, or gleichschaltung was embodied in the police, surveillance and prison system. The party infiltrated all aspects of German life, and the pockets of resistance to it were uncoordinated, divided and small-scale. Fear of punishment severely inhibited any open defiance of the regime's legitimacy. The Nazis had taken over the institutions of the State while developing their own organisations. The result was that there existed a system of overlapping responsibilities between party and State officials. The rivalry over police control was a classic example of the different jurisdictions and authority residing in different institutions. Equally, Goering's appointment in 1936 to take charge of the Supreme Reich Authority and to run the Four-Year Plan was remarkable, for there already existed Ministers for Economics, Agriculture, Labour, and Transport who notionally had responsibilities for the stimulation of economic output. There were great divisions within the party itself. Hitler was at the hub, but he took little interest in policy coordination and development. He delegated authority on an individual level to those he trusted. Those officials who succeeded did so by "working towards the Fűhrer", that is, working out what Hitler wanted and tailoring an approach to him on that basis. Himmler was an expert at this type of politicking and he advanced rapidly by devious and clever means. Himmler has been termed astute and clever on account of his activities, for as head of the SS he surrounded himself with men who in different ways compensated for whatever was lacking in his own nature while simultaneously ensuring that they remained at his service. Equally, Himmler was respectful of those like Heydrich who were ambitious and had ability, and he was aware of Heydrich's desire for advancement. His leadership of the Waffen SS (the armed SS) was so successful that although it had been originally dependent on the regular army for weapons and training, the Waffen SS grew to such an extent that it had become a rival to the army.

Why did the Nazis place great emphasis on influencing the young at school and through youth movements?

The establishment of the Hitler Youth was, for the Nazis, a very serious business, for military training and discipline acted as preparation for service to the Nazi state. Similarly, the League of German Girls was part of the process of preparing girls for their future role as housewives and mothers. The highly-gendered condition of German society, and the aspirations of the Nazis to deepen these differences, were apparent in the differences between the organisations. Boys were taught the values of struggle, sacrifice, loyalty, and discipline, while girls were taught to be healthy, for their bodies belonged to the nation and they needed to be fit for their future roles as child-bearers. At weekly "home evenings" girls were taught handicrafts, sewing, and cooking but for boys and girls, indoctrination was a key element, with continual sessions on political education and racial awareness. The opportunity to participate in sports and camping trips away from home made the organisation attractive to millions of German boys, and the sense of adventure was undoubtedly part of the process of indoctrination.

The relationship between party and state

The extent of the problem can be gauged from the rival hierarchies in the Nazi state. On the one hand, there were the state hierarchies: ministers of state, state secretaries, civil servants. On the other hand, there were Party hierarchies, for example the system of authority in the Nazi Party with regional party leaders or Gauleiters at its head under Hitler. On the other hand again were the hierarchies of Party organisations (often independent of the Gauleiters) ranging from the SA to the League of German Maidens (Bund Deutsche Mädel or BDM). Furthermore, there were the hierarchies of remaining non-Nazi organisations such as the army which were in practice separate from the state. Finally, there were the hierarchies of special Nazi organisations independent of the Nazi Party and directly answerable to Hitler only, for example the SS and the Four-Year Plan, which became a separate organisation with several departments. In this situation, there was often no clarity about the division of tasks or about who was responsible for certain tasks. Rival groups often duplicated each other or conducted 'turf wars' for dominance of a particular area. Often this lack of clarity remained unchanged for years at a time. As the Nazi regime grew, more and more rival hierarchies were created as new organisations were created, often duplicating aspects of the roles of existing organisations. For example, in economic departments there was a multiplication of offices and hierarchies that was typical of the regime. There was a state Ministry of Economics (headed until 1937 by Hjalmar Schacht). From the start, however, the Nazi Party involved itself in economic affairs, and as the regime developed, further organisations with economic roles arose. Dr Robert Ley's German Labour Front (DAF) and the SS both developed extensive economic roles and, in 1936, Goering was given extensive economic powers as Plenipotentiary of the Four-Year Plan. All these groups were independent of each other and making decisions about substantially the same area (the German economy). Similar complications arose in other areas, for example the police.

What do the two extracts from Hitler's speech at Nuremberg in 1934 tell us about his conception of the future direction of the Nazi party?

The extracts from Hitler's speech demonstrated to party members that the radical socialist tendency in the party had perished. That radical phase of the Nazi revolution was over and Hitler proceeded to inform his listeners that while it had been successful to overthrow the reactionary forces represented by the establishment parties in Weimar Germany, it was now time to consolidate and build the Volksgemeinschaft or People's Community based on race. It was therefore necessary for the Nazis to hold on to power to pursue their ideological aims, and Hitler promised that the Nazis would not relinquish power. In the Nazi conception of the Volksgemeinschaft, there would be no other political parties, for the nation and not sectional, regional and class differences must be the organising concept at the forefront of the political system.

Youth movements: The League of German Girls

The female equivalent of the Hitler Youth was the League of German Girls (Bund Deutscher Mädel/BDM). The motto of the BDM was "Be faithful, be pure, be German". The BDM was part of the process of preparing girls for their future role as housewives and mothers. As with the Hitler Youth, by 1939 membership was compulsory. There was a difference in emphasis in the BDM from the Hitler Youth, which reflected the highly-gendered condition of German society, and the aspirations of the Nazis to entrench these differences. Girls were taught to be healthy, for their bodies belonged to the nation and they needed to be fit for their future roles as child-bearers. Hygiene, cleanliness, and healthy eating were stressed, and formation dancing and group gymnastics served the dual purpose of raising fitness and developing comradeship. At weekly "home evenings" girls were taught handicrafts, sewing, and cooking but there were also sessions on political education and racial awareness. Annual summer camps were highly-structured, with sports, exercises, flag-waving and marches. In 'Faith and Beauty' groups, young women were instructed on baby care and social skills such as ballroom-dancing. Many girls found the experience liberating, in escaping sometimes tough conditions at home. The BDM groups were relatively classless. An important part of the teaching and instruction concerned marriage and family life. After 1934, girls were expected to spend a year working on the land or in domestic service. In this way, they would be in touch with the land, while gaining experience in childcare and in serving the community. This type of service was very unpopular with city girls and many tried to avoid it but in 1939 the scheme was made compulsory. All women up to the age of 25 had to do a year's unpaid work with the Reich Labour Service before obtaining paid employment. This was the female equivalent of compulsory military service for boys and part of the growing "coordination" of all levels of German society under Nazi rule. The experience of the Hitler Youth and the BDM were some indication that the Nazis were successful in guiding education to their own purposes. Yet it was also true that both organisations reinforced certain values which were well-established in German culture, such as duty, obedience, honour, courage, and physical strength.

Topic 2 - The Nazi Dictatorship, 1933-1939

The following material explains the evolution of the terror apparatus in Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1939, in terms of the various police forces, legal institutions and practices which represented the fundamental basis of the criminal justice system of Nazi Germany. Accompanying these institutional developments, it is important to consider the extent to which coercion was needed, and to what extent the population of Nazi Germany was compliant with the demands of the regime. The extent to which there was acceptance of the regime was obviously a factor in determining the overall legitimacy of the regime and its practices. There were clearly limits to opposition and nonconformity in Nazi Germany, undoubtedly arising from fear of the consequences, and the lack of a unified movement, especially when opposition was divided by class, age, and religion. Equally, effective propaganda and indoctrination appear to have made the regime genuinely popular at least among some segments of the population - though how far this stretched has been a matter of argument between historians. Imagery and spectacle were as important as the written and spoken word, with Goebbels proving to be a master of propagandistic techniques. In restoring pride to Germany internationally, Nazi propaganda attempted to cultivate deep-rooted pride in the cultural and historical development of Germany, and its emphasis on nation and race drew on historical, biological, and cultural traditions.

The 1936 Berlin Olympics

The largest propaganda event, and one which allowed the Nazis to project themselves internationally, was the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin. Every public aspect of the Games was carefully stage-managed. All filming of the Games was supervised by Riefenstahl, who approved all camera crews. Her film, Olympia, was the only official record of the Games permitted and was distributed worldwide. The stadium was, at the time, the largest in the world. News reports of the event were carefully controlled. During the Games, the Nazi state was on show to the world. On 21 June 1935, a decree by the Reich Interior Ministry ordered the removal of anti-Jewish slogans from road and other official signs in preparation for the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. Jewish anti-fascists distributed leaflets to foreign visitors during the Olympic Games telling them not to be taken in by the absence of anti-Semitic slogans and notices. Despite their efforts, thousands of visitors came away with a positive view of Germany. Yet the true nature of Nazi Germany could not be easily hidden. Hitler had hoped that the Games would demonstrate the superiority of the German Aryan race. However, when the black American athlete Jesse Owens, won four golds, Hitler refused to shake his hand or present him with his medals.

Why were good relations with the German army an important concern for Hitler?

The question of the succession to Hindenburg was of vital importance to Hitler, for he aimed to merge the offices of President and Chancellor after Hindenburg's death. So long as Hindenburg lived, Hitler did not have absolute power and control, and the army owed its allegiance to the President not the Chancellor. Hindenburg's concerns over the SA were shared by the army command and Papen. Hitler was made aware that he could not count of the army's support once Hindenburg was dead. This was an important consideration for Hitler, and threatened with martial law undermining his powerbase, Hitler knew he had to act, and he consequently purged the SA in the Night of the Long Knives. After he had done so, Blomberg and the military leaders had no further objection to Hitler succeeding Hindenburg.

What were the main purposes of concentration camps between 1933 and 1939?

To begin with, concentration camps were primarily intended to imprison possible hostile elements to the Nazi regime, and provide an army of forced labour. In Nazi Germany, they were used to confine and re-educate 'hostile elements' such as Communists, Socialists, and clerics to provide forced labour. Anyone arrested by the Gestapo could be held in 'protective custody' in a concentration camp indefinitely. Over 100,000 prisoners were held in the camps when they were first established, and factories and camp buildings were initially used but these types of camps were gradually phased out. Once the Nazis had consolidated their power in Germany, there were fewer political prisoners, as the consequences of opposition became notoriously well-known. After 1934, all concentration camps were under SS control with the result that the treatment of prisoners became systematised. After 1936, the SS moved on from persecuting communists and socialists towards dealing with "undesirables" like criminals, non-Aryans, and asocials which included homosexuals and Jehovah's Witnesses. By a Reich Justice Ministry Decree of 14 December 1937 'career and habitual criminals, and asocial persons' were placed in camps. They were joined by Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the 'Work-Shy', by a Decree of 26 January 1938.


Ensembles d'études connexes

Writing Workshop 1B: Types of Nouns

View Set

Chapter 24: Asepsis and Infection Control

View Set

Psychology: "Research Methods" by Michael W. Passer Glossary

View Set

7 - collaborators and resistance

View Set

HW 2 Construction Project Delivery System

View Set