AP Gov't - All 51 Court Cases

Marbury v Madison

(1803) John Adams had made William Marbury as a federal justice of the peace with his midnight appointments, but Jefferson took over before the appointment was officially given to Marbury, Jefferson instructed Madison that Marbury wasn't to be given the appointment, Marbury sued Madison to get the appointment he felt he deserved, asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus, requiring Madison to deliver the appointment, Judiciary Act, passed by Congress in 1789, permitted the Supreme Court of the United States to issue such a writ Did the Supreme Court of the United States have the power, under Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, to interpret the constitutionality of a law or statute passed by Congress SC decided that Marbury's request for a writ of mandamus was based on a law passed by Congress that the Court held to be unconstitutional, that the federal law violated the Constitution Chief Justice John Marshall established the power of judicial review: the power of the Court not only to interpret the constitutionality of a law or statute but also to carry out the process and enforce its decision Two chief principles of this case: that when there is a conflict between the Constitution and a federal or state law, the Constitution is supreme; and that it is the job of the Court to interpret the laws of the United States

McCulloch v Maryland

(1819) Bank of US, much debate over it, while Jefferson was present charter wasn't renewed. After the War of 1812, President James Madison determined that the country could utilize the services of a national bank to help fulfill its powers listed in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution. In response to his suggestion, Congress proposed a Second Bank of the United States in 1816. States didn't like this, since Bank competed with their own, found many of the managers to be corrupt, felt that the federal government was exerting too much power over them by attempting to curtail the state practice of issuing more paper money than they were able to redeem on demand Maryland wanted to drive Bank out, required that all banks chartered outside of Maryland pay an annual tax of $15,000, with a penalty for each violation, and James McCulloch, cashier of the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States, refused to pay the tax State took him to court, arguing that because Maryland was a sovereign state, it had the authority to tax businesses within its border, and that because the Bank was one such business, it had to pay the tax, Luther Martin, one of the attorneys for Maryland, reasoned that because the federal government had the authority to regulate state banks, Maryland could do the same to federal banks. Besides, he argued, the Constitution does not give Congress the power to establish a Bank of the United States. McCulloch was convicted by a Maryland court of violating the tax statute and was fined $2,500. McCulloch appealed the decision to the Maryland Court of Appeals. His attorneys, who included Daniel Webster, asserted that the establishment of a national bank was a "necessary and proper" function of the Congress. Webster stated that many powers of the government are implied rather than specifically stated in the Constitution. Furthermore, he argued, Maryland did not have the authority to levy the tax, because doing so interfered with the workings of the federal government. After the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the original decision against McCulloch, he appealed again. The case was heard by the SC, then headed by John Marshall. SC decided that Maryland's actions were unconstitutional, held Bank was constitutional

Gibbons v Ogden

(1824) Key turning point for the expansion of federal power to address national problems Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston acquired a monopoly from the New York state legislature to operate steamboats on the state's waters. This monopoly extended to interstate waterways, those areas of water that stretch between states. Aaron Ogden held a Fulton-Livingston license to operate steamboats under this monopoly. However, Thomas Gibbons held a federal coasting license, granted under a 1793 Act of Congress, and operated steamboats between New Jersey and New York that competed with Ogden's. Ogden filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery of New York asking the court to restrain Gibbons from operating his boats. Ogden's lawyer contended that states often passed laws on issues regarding interstate matters and that states should have fully concurrent power with Congress on matters concerning interstate commerce. The monopoly, therefore, should be upheld. Gibbons' lawyer, Daniel Webster, argued that Congress had exclusive national power over interstate commerce according to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution and that to argue otherwise would result in confusing and contradictory local regulatory policies. The Court of Chancery of New York found in favor of Ogden and issued an injunction to restrict Gibbons from operating his boats. Gibbons appealed the case to SC SC decided in favor of Gibbons, that Gibbons who had the federal license had a right to secure those waterways for himself, connecting to the Commerce Clause

Dred Scott v Sanford

(1857) By the time Scott's case made it to trial, U.S. political sentiments had changed and it took 11 years for his case to reach the SC, decision is among most controversial Slavery was root cause, Dred Scott sued master to obtain freedom for self and family because he had lived in a territory where slavery was illegal, so he could never again be enslaved, in Missouri where he filed his suit many people in his situation had sued their masters for freedom and won Scott had lived with Dr. Emerson in Illinois and Ft. Snelling, Emerson died and Scott asked Mrs. Emerson if he could work for money and buy his freedom, she refused, Scott sued her for false imprisonment and battery, in 1847, Emerson was able to win in Missouri Circuit court on a technicality; Scott's lawyers failed to prove to the jury that Emerson was holding Scott as a slave. Scott's lawyers successfully argued for a retrial with additional witnesses that could prove Emerson's ownership of Scott. Sanford (Emerson's brother) took over The jury agreed that Scott and his family should be free because of the doctrine "once free, always free." Sanford, acting for his sister, appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court. In 1852, two of the three judges found in favor of Mrs. Emerson and John Sanford. The decision consciously reversed earlier precedent. The newly elected proslavery justice, William Scott, wrote the decision, arguing that states like Missouri must have the power to refuse to enforce the laws of other states. Thus, regardless of wherever else Scott had been with his master, slavery was legal in Missouri. Unfortunately for Scott, the political divisions over slavery worsened from the time that his case first came to trial in 1847 through 1857 when the Supreme Court of the United States finally announced its decision. Events of this period that increased conflicts included the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act (1850), publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852), enactment of The Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854), violence in "bleeding Kansas" (1856), and Representative Brooks' beating of Senator Sumner in the U.S. Senate (1856). Like almost all people of their time, the justices had strong personal views about slavery. One justice, Peter V. Daniel of Virginia, supported slavery so much that he even refused to travel north of the Mason-Dixon line into a free state. Some historians believe that Chief Justice Taney hoped that his decision in the Dred Scott case would help prevent, not create future disputes over slavery. SC found in favor of Sanford and stated that Scott should remain a slave, that as a slave he is not a citizen of the U.S. and thus not eligible to bring suit in a federal court, and that as a slave he is personal property and thus has never been free. The Court further declared unconstitutional the provision in the Missouri Compromise that permitted Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories.

Munn v Illinois

(1876) One of the most prominent Granger cases (group of lawsuits initiated by the National Grange who challenged constitutionality of certain state laws regulating business, wanted Congress to intervene) Munn and Scott were convicted of violating the laws set forth by the State of Illinois regulating the maximum rates that a private commercial operation would be able to charge for its services; subsequent to the initial guilty verdict, Scott and Munn appealed the decision before the Supreme Court. For their part, the operators charged that the statute not only infringed Congress' constitutional right to regulate commerce, but also violated their private property rights under the Due Process clause In finding for the Grangers, Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite stated in his majority opinion that it was well within the rights of the state of Illinois to regulate commerce within its boundaries, that any effect on interstate commerce was incidental. Suggested that when private property exposes itself to a public interest, it ceases to be private, and that, in general, complaints about bad legislation must be taken "to the polls, not to the courts." Addressing the issue of whether the public good was necessarily served by the state's actions against private property, he broadly pronounced that "we must assume that if a state of facts could exist that would justify such legislation, it actually did exist when the statute under consideration was passed." Justices Stephen J. Field and William Strong dissented, refusing to accept the public interest argument, and pointing out that if Justice Waite's opinion represented good law, then "all business and all property in the state are held at the mercy of the legislature." They held that a substantive construction of the Due Process clause protected private rights against public power. Justice Waite's opinion did, in fact, come to reflect the judicial view of economic rights in the later twentieth century -- at least at the federal level -- the dissenting opinion formed some of the early thought on what became "substantive due process". Under this latter doctrine, citizens are found to have "fundamental rights", including freedom of contract and property rights, which mitigate against state interference for less than overwhelming public need. The substantive due process view of economic freedom governed the Court's outlook for about the first quarter of the twentieth century. In a further twist, the fundamental rights aspect of substantive due process, abandoned in its economic arguments for far more interventionist policies, came to support the post-war discovery of new personal rights, especially that of privacy and its subsidiaries. In the majority decision the states had the right to regulate commerce

Reynolds v US

(1879) Reynolds a Mormon, practiced polygamy, found himself indicted for bigamy under Utah's federal statutes, sentenced to prison under hard labor Did the federal anti-bigamy statute conflict with the free exercise clause of the Constitution? The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Reynolds conviction was constitutional, but that hard labor as punishment should be lifted This was a case of the balancing test, understood Reynolds' point, but needed to maintain integrity of family, Reynolds' and free exercise of religion v monogamous American society

Plessy v Ferguson

(1896) Louisiana law passed that required railway companies to have segregated cars, Plessy (black) sat in a white car and was arrested for the violation Court ruled Louisiana law was constitutional Upholds "separate but equal" law In between this and Brown v Board of Education was legalized segregation (Jim Crow laws)

WV v Barnette

(1943, during WWII) WVA State Board of Education required students in public schools to salute the flag daily, Barnette family were Jehovah's Witnesses, thought saluting the flag was idol worship, children refused to salute flag and were expelled, state officials had threatened to send the children to reformatories for criminally inclined persons, Barnette sued in federal court for an injunction to against the enforcement of the flag salute In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that WVA statute was in violation of the first and 14th amendments. They declared the flag salute law unconstitutional.

Sweatt v Painter

(1946) Sweatt (black) applied to University of Texas, which was segregated, rejected because of race, When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission, the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students Did the Texas admissions scheme violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? SC held unanimously that Sweatt should be admitted, found that the "law school for Negros" was grossly unequal, found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students' abilities to compete in the legal arena

Shelley v Kraemer

(1948) Shelleys (black couple) moved into a neighborhood governed by a restrictive covenant, which was a private agreement that prevented blacks from owning property, the Kraemers (white couple) lived there and went to court to enforce restrictive covenant against Shelleys Does the enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment? State courts could not constitutionally prevent the sale of real property to blacks even if that property is covered by a racially restrictive covenant. Standing alone, racially restrictive covenants violate no rights. However, their enforcement by state court injunctions constitute state action in violation of the 14th Amendment. IN END SHELLEYS WON, STATE COURT RULED IN FAVOR OF SHELLEYS, SC WENT WITH THAT Supreme Court Ruling: based on local regulation, felt equal protection clause didn't apply, stepped back from localness

Zorach v Clauson

(1952) (In the aftermath of decision in McCollum v. Board of Education, which disallowed an Illinois program in which representatives of religious groups came to public schools and taught classes during the school day) NYC began program in which public school students could leave class to participate in religious instruction elsewhere Did the NY program violate the establishment clause? SC held that it neither constituted the establishment of religion nor interfered with the free exercise of religion, public facilities were not being used for the purpose of religious instruction and that no student was forced to go to the religious classroom, no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence

Brown v Board of Education

(1954) Combination of 5 cases each involving constitutionality of segregated public schools Court ruled segregation of public schools was unconstitutional and left task of desegregation to individual districts Overturns "separate but equal" law

Hoyt v Florida

(1961) Florida statute exempted women from jury duty, though they could volunteer, all male jury convicted Mrs. Hoyt of murdering husband, who appealed decision based on all male jury Did the Florida statute violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? SC ruled the statute was based on a reasonable classification and was therefore constitutional. Noting that women were "still regarded as the center of home and family life," the Court found that the states could relieve them from the civic responsibility of jury duty unless they themselves determined that such service was consistent with their own "special responsibilities."

Engle v Vitale

(1962) Board of Regents for NY authorized short generic voluntary prayer for start of school day, attempt to defuse the politically potent issue by taking it out of the hands of local communities Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day violate the establishment of religion clause SC ruled yes, it was a violation, by providing the prayer NY officially approved religion 1st in series of cases in which Court used establishment clause to eliminate religious activities which had traditionally been a part of public ceremonies, unpopular decision

Baker v Carr

(1962) Forerunner of a case heard the following year, Gray v. Sanders, which would establish the doctrine of one person one vote. Baker did not go quite that far, though Chief Justice Earl Warren called it the "most vital decision" during his term on the high court. If this is a little exaggerated, the case nevertheless was a crucial moment in the key area of voting rights. Suit filed by a variety of urban Tennessee voters that the state's redistricting plan -- calling for a reapportionment among its counties with every decennial census -- was arbitrary and weighted against urban voters. Compounding the issue was the fact that the state had not carried out a formal reapportionment since 1901. Plaintiffs in the case had had no relief from Tennessee authorities or state courts, and the federal courts found that they had neither constitutional jurisdiction in the issue, nor was it justiciable, i.e. it could not or should not be resolved by the judiciary, being a political issue. The high court was divided over the issue of justiciability, with Justice Frankfurter reminding them of a recent squeaker of a case, Colgrove v. Green, wherein the Court had refused to interfere in redistricting problems in Illinois, calling them a "political thicket". But Justice William Brennan, writing for the Court in the current case, had no difficulty with the jurisdiction issue, and very little with the question of justiciability. Instead he found that the plaintiffs had sufficient interest in the value of their votes to have standing before the Court, and that the larger issue of Equal Protection of the Laws expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment made it imperative that the Court invest itself in such cases. Court decided that the Baker plaintiffs could go back to federal court and pursue their lawsuit against the state of Tennessee. The Court also indicated that Tennessee's failure to abide by its own constitution in reapportioning voting districts should not limit the scope of the decision, but that any state whose apportionment methods fail to show a "rational basis" is open to suit by effected voters. In their dissents, Justices Harlan and Frankfurter expressed concern that this decision would interpret the Equal Protection Clause as requiring mathematically precise vote distribution (which in fact did become the interpretation in Gray), and that the federal courts were opening themselves to involvement in an arena which has since "time out of mind" been determined by an "essentially political conflict of forces..." Although the doctrine of one person one vote seems ultimately to be the proper interpretation of the Constitution, setting aside the purely practical concerns of constantly maintaining such a precise balance, Justice Harlan made a valuable observation when he suggested that it may not be so wrong for a state like Tennessee to use apportionment to insure that less populous rural areas maintain a sufficiently strong voice in government. In any event, Baker opened the floodgates for voter suits against the states, with thirty-six states finding themselves defendants in such suits within a year. The barrage forced the Court to abandon the somewhat loose concept of "rationality" and adopt mathematical apportionment in Gray.

Abington v Schempp

(1963) PA law required that at the beginning of each school day students were to read at least 10 verses from the Bible and then recite the Lord's Prayer. Students could not be excused from these exercises unless they had a written note from a parent or guardian. These exercises were followed by the flag salute and then announcements. All of these exercises were held in the school buildings, under the local school authorities, and during school sessions. The Schempp family was of the Unitarian faith and the son and daughter attended Abington Senior High School. The husband Edward Schempp testified that a literal reading of the Bible presented religious doctrines "which were contrary to the religious beliefs which they held, and to their family teaching". Although the religious exercises were voluntary, Edward Schempp chose not to have his children excused from participation due to his belief that it would have a negative affect on the children's relationships with their teachers and classmates. Did this violate the religious freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Federal district court agreed with the Schempps, saying that statute violated Establishment Clause of 1st Amendment as applied to the States, Abington school district countersued SC ruled for Schempp family, found that the exercises were essentially religious ceremonies supported by the State and therefore a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, said that the practice preferred the Christian religion

Heart of Atlanta Motel v US

(1964) Landmark decision for the right of Congress, under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations Earliest test of the constitutionality of applying the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to private endeavors, and opened the way for further regulation of business in the interest of an ever-broadening view of civil rights. Motel discriminated against blacks often even after the enactment of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited such actions, owners claimed the Act violated their Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of their property without just compensation (in this case the free use of their property), and their Thirteenth Amendment right not to be subjected to involuntary servitude. They also claimed that Congress had exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause. Congress had cited the Commerce Clause as substantiation for the Civil Rights Act because, at that time, the standing interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment held that it did not apply to private enterprise, an interpretation surviving from the Civil Rights Cases of 1883. Court cited many cases which confirmed Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause It further stipulated that, even though an enterprise may serve entirely local customers, the fact that it may buy supplies through interstate commerce is enough to subject it to Congress' regulatory power under the Clause. Suggested that Congress could use its "national police power" to regulate both interstate and intrastate activities that affected commerce, when necessary to legislate against moral wrongs. In effect, the Court has thus given Congress carte blanche to regulate all business under the Commerce Clause for any cause which it deems to be in the national interest.

Griswold v Connecticut

(1965) Supreme Court ruled that a state's ban on the use of contraceptives violated the right to marital privacy Concerned a Connecticut law that criminalized the encouragement or use of birth control. The 1879 law provided that "any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purposes of preventing conception shall be fined not less than forty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days." The law further provided that "any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principle offender." Estelle Griswold, the executive director of Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Dr. C. Lee Buxton, doctor and professor at Yale Medical School, were arrested and found guilty as accessories to providing illegal contraception. They were fined $100 each. Griswold and Buxton appealed to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, claiming that the law violated the U.S. Constitution. The Connecticut court upheld the conviction, and Griswold and Buxton appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reviewed the case in 1965. Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision written by Justice William O. Douglas, ruled that the law violated the "right to marital privacy" and could not be enforced against married people. Justice Douglas contended that the Bill of Right's specific guarantees have "penumbras," created by "emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and opinion." In other words, the "spirit" of the First Amendment (free speech), Third Amendment (prohibition on the forced quartering of troops), Fourth Amendment (freedom from searches and seizures), Fifth Amendment (freedom from self-incrimination), and Ninth Amendment (other rights), as applied against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, creates a general "right to privacy" that cannot be unduly infringed. Further, this right to privacy is "fundamental" when it concerns the actions of married couples, because it "is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions." Because a married couple's use of contraception constitutes a "fundamental" right, Connecticut must prove to the Court that its law is "compelling" and "absolutely necessary" to overcome that right (i.e., the "strict scrutiny test"). Because Connecticut failed to prove this, the law was struck down as applied. Other justices, while agreeing that marital privacy is a "fundamental right" and that the Connecticut law should be struck down, disagreed with Justice Douglas as to where in the Constitution such a "fundamental right" exists. In his concurrence, Justice Arthur Goldberg argued that the Ninth Amendment, which states that the Bill of Rights does not exhaust all the rights contained by the people, allows the Court to find the "fundamental right to marital privacy" without having to ground it in a specific constitutional amendment. In another concurrence, Justice John Marshall Harlan II maintained that a "fundamental right to marital privacy" exists only because marital privacy has traditionally been protected by American society. Finally, in yet another concurrence, Justice Byron White argued that a fundamental right to marital privacy constitutes a liberty under the Due Process Clause, and is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against the states. Majority in Griswold v. Connecticut agreed that the "right to privacy," in addition to being "fundamental," was "substantive." These do exist in non-economic areas like "the right to privacy," even if they do not in economic activities like the right to contract. Over the next 10 years, the Court expanded this fundamental, substantive "right to privacy"

Epperson v Arkansas

(1968) Arkansas legislature passed a law prohibiting teachers in public or state-supported schools from teaching or using textbooks that teach human evolution, Epperson sued claiming it violated free speech rights and establishment clause Does a law forbidding the teaching of evolution violate either the free speech rights of teachers or the Establishment clause of the First Amendment? SC held it violated establishment clause, based on fundamentalists' view of evolution, violated also due process clause of 14th Amendment and free speech

Terry v Ohio

(1968) Police officer noted some men acting suspiciously, after some time he approached, identified himself, and asked their names, they responded incoherently, he patted down outside of clothing and found guns on two of them. Once the officer found the weapons on the two suspects, this gave him probable cause to fully search those individuals for any other contraband. He then called for backup, and took all three men into custody, and Terry, along with the other man whom had a weapon, were to be charged with carrying concealed weapons. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, and was sentenced to one to three years. The gun and ammunition confiscated by the police offer was used as evidence in the trial. The defense had filed a pre-trial motion to have the evidence suppressed. Any evidence found as the result of an illegal search, in this case the gun, would not be admissible. However, first the search needed to be deemed illegal. The motion was denied, as the judge felt that on the basis of the officer's experience, he had cause to conduct an interrogation, therefore not violating Terry's fourth amendment rights. Upon the outcome of the trial, the defense appealed to the Supreme Court. The main question the Supreme Court had was whether Terry's right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure. First, the Court decided that any time an officer restrains a person's ability to walk away, he is seized. The Court also said that a patting of outer clothing is indeed a search. Therefore, the judgment here is as to whether or not the actions were considered reasonable. They went on to state that when practical, police must have probable cause, and a warrant to perform a search. However, during on-the-spot observations during a beat, it is not practical for an officer to obtain a warrant. Yet, good faith alone cannot be enough to determine a situation unpractical, and to override these regulations. The Court believed that the actions the officer witnessed were enough to allow the officer to reasonably suspect the men could have been armed. The search was carefully restricted to the outer clothing where a weapon may have been located. On the one man where no weapon was found, the officer discontinued his search. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Terry. The outcome of this case causes repercussions that are not obvious to some. A police officer now has the right to detain and search any individual, without a warrant, or even probable cause, as long as he or she can justify a suspicion that the individual may be armed. Also, anything the officer feels during that pat down may then be used as probable cause, allowing the officer to complete a full search. Since Terry v Ohio, other cases have come before the Supreme Court that have extended the power of the "stop and frisk", extending that power to "frisk" cars, for example. Whenever the judiciary "creates" law, it can and will cause controversy, and this is no exception.

US v Nixon

(1974) In 1972, five burglars were caught breaking into the Democratic National Committee Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel and office complex in Washington, D.C. Media and government investigation of the break-in revealed that the burglars were associated with the campaign to re-elect Nixon. The inquiries also revealed that the president and his aides had probably abused their power in other ways as well. During the congressional hearings on the break-in scandal, it was revealed that President Nixon had installed a tape-recording device in the Oval Office. The special prosecutor in charge of the case wanted to get tapes of the Oval Office discussions to help prove that President Nixon and his aides had abused their power and broken the law. President Nixon tried to stop the special prosecutor from obtaining the tapes and even had him removed from his job. However, a new special prosecutor, supported by the ruling of a federal district court judge, again requested the tapes. The president responded to this demand by releasing edited transcripts and shortened versions of the tapes. His incomplete compliance with the special prosecutor's demands was challenged in another federal district court case. The court ordered the president to respond to all of the special prosecutor's requests. When the president appealed this decision to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, the special prosecutor asked the Supreme Court of the United States to hear the case instead. In front of the Supreme Court of the United States, President Nixon's lawyers argued that the case couldn't be heard in the courts because it involved a dispute within the executive branch. In case the Supreme Court disagreed, Nixon's lawyers also argued that the president's executive immunity and privilege should protect the tapes. The concept of executive privilege, though not specifically detailed in the U.S. Constitution, is based on the constitutional separation of powers. It provides a certain level of confidentiality of communication between the president and his aides, especially where defense and national security are concerned. President Nixon's lawyers argued for an absolute executive privilege based only on his discretion. The special prosecutor, however, argued that executive privilege is not absolute and that in this case the confidentiality normally accorded a president and his aides had to give way to the demands of the legal system in a criminal case. To give the president absolute executive privilege, he claimed, would amount to an unchecked power that could undermine the rule of law.

Buckley v Valeo

(1976) After Watergate Congress tried to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute. Did the limits placed on electoral expenditures by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech and association clauses? 2 conclusions of SC: First, it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations guard against unscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association.

Lynch v Donnelly

(1983) City of Pawtucket displayed nativity and other stuff for Christmas, petitioners thought this wrong and brought a suit The Court ruled 5-4 that the city of Pawtucket could continue to display a nativity scene as part of its Christmas display, refused to take an absolutist stance regarding the Establishment Clause, each case is to be independently checked to determine whether the intent is secular or religious, religion in general may be advanced by the government in some cases so long as there is no administrative entanglement with religion Because of this country's rich religious history, the Court has declined to take an absolute view of the Establishment Clause. Each case must be analyzed to determine if the questionable behavior was meant to endorse a particular religion. "The display is sponsored by the city to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the origins of that Holiday. These are legitimate secular purposes. The District Court's inference, drawn from the religious nature of the crèche, that the city has no secular purpose was, on this record, clearly erroneous." The displaying of the crèche offers no greater benefit to religion than supplying textbooks for students at religious schools or the imposition of Sunday closing laws. Each of these other activities were supported in earlier Court decisions. The fact that religion may benefit from the display is not sufficient to make it unconstitutional. The benefit is indirect and unintentional. The city did not consult religious leaders about the crèche, already owns the crèche, and does not have to pay for its maintenance.

Wallace v Jaffree

(1985) Alabama statute authorized teachers to set aside a minute for silent prayer at start of day, Ishmael Jaffree filed a suit seeking injunction Did Alabama law violate establishment clause? SC ruled yes, applied secular purpose test to determine constitutionality, which asked if the state's actual purpose was to endorse or disapprove of religion, held that Alabama's passage of the prayer and meditation statute was not only a deviation from the state's duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion, but was an affirmative endorsement of religion and lacked any secular purpose as it sought to establish religion in public schools

New Jersey v TLO

(1985) Female student at a public school who was a minor at the time of her arrest was convicted of possessing illegal paraphernalia for marijuana; called T.L.O. The arrest occurred after the student was caught smoking marijuana; subsequent to her being caught, the high school administration enacted a search of both her and her belongings - as a result of the search, they discovered that she had paraphernalia presumed to be drug-related. At trial she maintained that the school had violated her 4th Amendment rights, which provide for the protection of citizens of the United States from unlawful searches and investigative measures undertaken by law enforcement and authoritative entities. The student maintained that the school retained no right to search her belongings, which resulted in what she had cited as an expressed violation of her privacy. Did the search violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? No. Citing the peculiarities associated with searches on school grounds, the Court abandoned its requirement that searches be conducted only when a "probable cause" exists that an individual has violated the law. The Court used a less strict standard of "reasonableness" to conclude that the search did not violate the Constitution. The presence of rolling papers in the purse gave rise to a reasonable suspicion in the principal's mind that T.L.O. may have been carrying drugs, thus, justifying a more thorough search of the purse.

Edwards v Aguillard

(1987) Fundamentalists disliked evolution, were for creationism instead, attempts were made to reintroduce legal bans directed towards the teaching of evolution, the Supreme Court ruled that bands on teaching evolutionary biology are unconstitutional for they violate the establishment clause of the United States Constitution, which effectively forbids the Federal Government of the United States from advancing a particular religion Louisiana legislature passed a law, entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act", which didn't require the teaching of creationism, but did require that when evolutionary science was taught "creation science" must be taught as well Court invalidated Louisiana's "Creationism Act" because it violated the Establishment Clause The Lemon test must be used to gauge the constitutionality of the Creationism Act. The Act does not have a secular purpose. It does not advance academic freedom and restricts the abilities of teachers to teach what they deem appropriate. Louisiana offers instructional packets to assist in the teaching of creationism but not for the teaching of evolution. The Act does not require the teaching of creationism, it only asserts such an interest when evolution is taught. "The preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind...The Louisiana Creationism Act advances a religious doctrine by requiring either the banishment of the theory of evolution from public school classrooms or the presentation of a religious viewpoint that rejects evolution in its entirety." "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion.""

Hazelwood v Kuhlmeier

(1988) Censorship: Kuhlmeier was a student who was on 'The Spectrum'. The review process with regard to the content of The Spectrum typically involved the Principal of the School undertaking the review of the content and subject matter expressed in the publication. After discovering news stories reflecting teen pregnancy and divorce - albeit attributed with pseudonyms in order to allow the subject of the piece to retain anonymity - the Principal mandated that those specific news stories were a violation of the privacy of the student about whom the story was written; the story neither sufficiently protected the identity of the student nor allowed for dissenting opinion due to the presumed anonymity within the news story, but the editors of the paper said the Principal had violated their respective 1st Amendment rights. Did the principal's deletion of the articles violate the students' rights under the First Amendment? No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The actions of the principal, the Court held, met this test.

Texas v Johnson

(1989) During the Republican National Convention of 1984 taking place in Dallas, Texas, Gregory Lee Johnson undertook an expression of protest in the form of setting fire to the American Flag. Johnson was an admitted member of a private institution that was comprised of individuals promoting the Communist movement; he enacted his nature of protest in order to presumably express his dissatisfaction with the Republican National Convention and Ronald Reagan. Upon incinerating the American Flag, he was subsequently arrested by the Dallas Police Department on the grounds that he had violated as statewide statute mandating the illegality with regard to the destruction of items and objects considered to be both 'respected and venerated'; he was fined $2,000. Is the desecration of an American flag, by burning or otherwise, a form of speech that is protected under the First Amendment? In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."

Allegheny v ACLU

(1989) Two public holiday displays (nativity in courthouse and menorah outside city-county building) challenged by ACLU Did the public displays violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? SC held nativity was unconstitutional as it unmistakably endorsed Christianity, by prominently displaying the words "Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ," the county sent a clear message that it supported and promoted Christian orthodoxy, BUT the menorah was constitutional as it was outside

Planned Parenthood v Casey

(1992) PA legislature amended abortion control law, required informed consent and 24 hour waiting period prior, a minor had to have one parent consent, married woman had to tell husband, this was challenged by abortion clinics, federal appeals court upheld all provisions except for husband one Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, and if minor obtain parental permission without violating right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe v Wade Court reaffirmed Roe, upheld most of PA provisions, imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions, asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability", under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement, The opinion for the Court was unique: It was crafted and authored by three justices

Romer v Evans

(1996) Colorado adopted Amendment 2 of their Constitution precluding any judicial, legislative, or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships", challenged Does Amendment 2 of Colorado's State Constitution, forbidding the extension of official protections to those who suffer discrimination due to their sexual orientation, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? SC ruled it was unconstitutional, violated equal protection clause, singled out homosexual and bisexual persons, imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and receive specific legal protection from discrimination

US v Virginia

(1996) Virginia Military Institute very prestigious, only for men, US brought suit against them saying it was unconstitutional because of 14th Amendment's equal protection clause, 4th Circuit found admission policy to be unconstitutional, Virginia proposed to create Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership as parallel, 4th Circuit ruled that this would provide comparable educational benefits despite difference in prestige, US appealed to SC Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy, as a comparable program to a male-only academy, satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? SC held it was unconstitutional, VA had violated equal protection clause b/c it hadn't justification for VMI's male only policy, VA failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to educational diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. Furthermore, Virginia's VWIL could not offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men. The VWIL would not provide women with the same rigorous military training, faculty, courses, facilities, financial opportunities, or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords its male cadets.

PA State Police v Suders

(2004) Suders quit job as dispatcher for PA State Police, claiming she had been sexually harassed, and had quit after she was accused of theft, handcuffed, and questioned, before quitting had contacted the state police equal opportunity officer about the harassment, but did not file a report because the woman was unhelpful and unsympathetic Suders filed suit, but district judge found that she had failed to use the internal procedures set up by the state police to deal with sexual harassment, and that she therefore could not bring suit unless the police had taken a "tangible employment action" that substantially changed her employment status, but on appeal 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the harassment had been so bad that Suders had no choice but to quit, though the police had not fired her they had been directly responsible for her resignation and therefore could not use her failure to file a report as a defense When a supervisor makes a workplace environment so hostile (through sexual harassment) that an employee has no choice but to quit, may the employee bring suit even if she did not use the internal procedures established by the employer to report sexual harassment claims? SC ruled that an employee faced with a situation in which a "reasonable person ... would have felt compelled to resign" could bring suit even if she had not filed a report with the employer before resigning. Her employer, however, could use her failure to file a report, along with evidence of the safeguards it had in place to prevent harassment, in its defense. If it could prove that she had not attempted to prevent the harassment, and that the safeguards in place would have prevented it if she had, the employer would not be liable.

Everson v Board of Education

(A 1941 New Jersey law gave school districts the authority to make rules and contracts for transporting children to and from schools, including private and parochial schools. The board of education of the Township of Ewing established a plan to reimburse parents for the cost of using public transportation to get their children to and from these schools.) Everson objected to having his tax dollars paying for bussing kids to religious schools, SC decided to hear case even though they normally don't take taxpayer cases, (Establishment clause), separation of church and state SC ruled in favor of the New Jersey law, since the First Amendment only requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of believers and non-believers. It does not require the state to be their adversary

Brandenburg v Ohio

Brandenburg leader of KKK group, threatened violent revenge at televised rally if SC continued to "suppress the white race", arrested and convicted under Ohio statute, but said this violated free speech rules as applied to the states by the 14th Amendment SC ruled for Brandenburg, each justice wrote their own opinion, said Ohio statute was unconstitutional

Mapp v Ohio

Cleveland police went to Ms. Mapp's home in search of a bombing suspect, she refused to let them in without a warrant, they came back, claiming to have a warrant, Mapp snatched it away, police recovered it and handcuffed her, searched house, found obscene books, was convicted under that, at trial no warrant produced, nor was failure to produce one explained Does the right to privacy implied in the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibit the use of illegally seized evidence in state courts SC ruled for Mapp

Schenck v US

Congress passed Espionage Act during WWI which outlawed any attempt to foster insubordination or block the draft, Schenck, leader of the Socialist Party, was arrested to for conspiring to print and circulate documents calculated to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the US, claimed this violated his free speech rights SC ruled against Schenck, that in the "extraordinary times of warfare" Congress has the right to hinder free speech and press that would hinder the country's war effort, established "clear and present danger" test regarding free speech violations

Miranda v Arizona

Consolidation of four cases dealing with people being convicted on the basis of confessions made after long periods of interrogation, none were informed of their right to counsel or the right to remain silent. In title case Miranda was arrested on charges of rape and kidnapping, not advised of right to lawyer or remain silent, signed a written confession, definitely guilty Under what circumstances may an interrogation take place that will produce a confession constitutionally admissible in a court of law? SC ruled for Miranda

Roth v US

Court's first major review of obscenity law. It's decision upheld the view that obscene materials were not protected by the First Amendment, while mandating a clearer definition of what is obscene. As such, it broke prohibitions against obscenity away from the common law of centuries past, and introduced it to judicial management and interest group pressure. Laws against the sale, display and possession of obscene materials first appeared in the United States in the early nineteenth century. At that time, and for the subsequent century and a half, the notion that obscenity might be difficult to define was not entertained to any great degree by either the people or the courts. The Supreme Court made only passing references to the constitutionality of the restrictions in a handful of cases, always finding them outside the purview of the First Amendment. During this period, even works of seeming literary value, but which were inherently obscene, were restricted. In Roth, and a companion case, Alberts v. California, the Court continued to uphold the historical and precedential view that obscenity was not protected by Freedom of Speech, finding that it was the equivalent of conduct, not speech. However, the Court went further in the case and said that, unlike in the past, the test for obscenity would have to meet the requirements of the First Amendment, which protects all speech, regardless how unpopular, that attempts to convey ideas. Court substituted a far more vague test for the historical understanding that had survived the previous century. Arguments over the meaning of "taken" (which sounds like an argument over "is"), and "whole", as well as concerns over what constitutes the "average person", have simply led to new efforts to redefine obscenity. Perhaps most pointedly, the Roth test's use of the "average person" removes the "most susceptible" attribute from the earlier traditional test. As such, obscene materials which can in some way be represented to convey an idea, are at least in theory available to children incapable of grasping anything beyond their obvious sexual connotations. The Roth test was made moot in the 1973 case of Miller v. California, where Chief Justice Warren Burger created a new three-pronged test. The new standards, while offering some hope for communities to participate in the definition of obscenity, also allowed even more leeway for "social value".

Sheppard v Maxwell

Dr. Samuel Sheppard was accused of murdering his wife at their home in a Cleveland, Ohio suburb on July 4, 1954, claimed that the murderer had been an intruder with whom he had fought and by whom he had been knocked unconscious. The courtroom was filled with reporters and the rest of the building was largely given over to the media for telephone lines and broadcasting facilities. During the trial, witnesses, lawyers and jurors were constantly photographed leaving and entering the courtroom. Information about deliberations "leaked" and were printed in newspapers accessible to the jurors. Jurors were permitted, although not encouraged, to hear and read all kinds of pretrial and trial publicity, much of it damaging to Sheppard's case. Jurors were permitted to make telephone calls at recesses. The trial judge declined motions for delay and to change the trial to a new location. Sheppard was convicted of second-degree murder. His appeals were all denied and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review his case. Several (12) years later he filed a petition of habeas corpus directed against the prison warden, E.L. Maxwell. (Habeas corpus - refers to a prisoner's right to be brought before the court to determine whether or not he has been denied due process of the law) Constitutional question; was Sheppard denied a fair trial, in violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment? SC ruled for Sheppard, his rights had been violated by the judge's failure "to protect Sheppard from inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and to control the disruptive influences in the courtroom". Sheppard's habeas corpus petition was granted and he was released from prison. The state was given 60 days to order a new trial. (Never did because they had no new evidence).

Gideon v Wainwright

Important for requiring states to provide attorneys for those who can't afford them (1963) Gideon overturned the precedent set in 1942's Betts v. Brady decision that only required the Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment to be applied to the states in special cases. With Gideon, the Sixth Amendment became fully incorporated into the Fourteenth and right to counsel became universal in criminal proceedings. Small-time criminal Clarence Earl Gideon charged with breaking and entering, opted to defend himself at trial when the court refused to appoint counsel. Found guilty and began to file petitions and briefs on his own behalf charging that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated. When Gideon filed an in forma pauperis petition (a request for review from a petitioner unable to pay the Court's costs) with the Supreme Court, it accepted it as a long-sought opportunity to review its Betts decision. Court unanimously overturned Betts, deciding that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to recognize the right to counsel provided by the Sixth. Gideon was ordered retried with appointed counsel. (In this case, counsel uncovered new defense witnesses and Gideon was acquitted in his new trial.) Three years later Miranda case took place Gideon was generally accepted to apply only to felony cases, but in a similar case in 1972, Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court extended the right to counsel to misdemeanors as well, as long as the defendant is threatened with jail time. Subsequent cases have continued to refine the point in criminal proceedings at which the defendant becomes entitled to counsel, and to establish that the right to counsel includes the concept of effective counsel. In addition, there continues to be agitation for extending the right to civil cases.

Miller v California

Miller had sent adult stuff via mass mailing, prosecuted under California's obscenity laws and found guilty, can a state under the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and free press, prosecute publishers of materials considered "obscene" by local authorities? SC ruled for California, and established 3 criteria for new statutes regarding obscenity; Would the average person, "applying contemporary community standards" find that the work, when viewed as a whole, appealed to "prurient interest"? Does the work describe or depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive way? Taken as a whole, does the work lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value?" Continues to be a state issue, standards are subjective

Palko v Connecticut

Palko stole a phonograph from a store, cornered by and killed two cops, when captured was initially charged with first degree murder and got a death sentence, which was revised to second degree murder and got a life sentence, prosecutors appealed and got a new trial, where Palko was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death, Palko appealed the death sentence stating Fifth Amendment provides protection against double jeopardy applied to state gov'ts through the due process clause of the 14th Amendment Does Palko's second conviction violate the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment because this protection applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause? The Supreme Court upheld Palko's second conviction. In his majority opinion, Cardozo formulated principles that were to direct the Court's actions for the next three decades. He noted that some Bill of Rights guarantees--such as freedom of thought and speech--are fundamental, and that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause absorbed these fundamental rights and applied them to the states. Protection against double jeopardy was not a fundamental right. Palko died in Connecticut's gas chamber in April 1938.

Santa Fe ISD v Doe

Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court enjoined the public Santa Fe Independent School District (the District) from implementing its policy as it stood. While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted, but did not require, student-initiated and student-led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian prayer. The Court of Appeals held that, even as modified by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech. Does the Santa Fe Independent School District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as "private," wrote Justice Stevens for the majority. In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the "disturbing" tone of the Court's opinion that "bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life."

Korematsu v US

Relocation of Japanese in America during WWII to internment camps because they thought they were a security threat, Japanese-American citizen refused to leave home SC voted against Korematsu, stated they could not discount the opinion of the War Department and the President on matters involving national security

Roe v Wade

Roe, an unmarried pregnant woman, challenged a Texas statute prohibiting abortions except when in a doctor's judgement an abortion is necessary to save the mother's life Based on "right to privacy" Constitutional question: Should a woman's decision to obtain an abortion be protected by the right to privacy, a right that was derived from the Bill of Rights as implied by 4th Amendment and applied by the 14th amendment? Court ruled for Roe

Regents of University of California v Bakke

School had quota system for minorities, Bakke (white) was not accepted, sued on basis of discrimination because of race, California Court ruled for Bakke, university took case to SC Court ruled for Bakke, since no evidence he would have been rejected without a quota system, ordered his admission to school Constitutional question; Are educational racial quotas regarding admission requirements to higher educational institutions constitutional as applied by the 14th amendment?

Gregg v Georgia

Two guys picked up two hitchhikers, next day the drivers were found dead, hitchhikers were found driving the car, with the gun used, Allen (one hitchhiker) said Gregg (the other) had planned to rob the drivers, Gregg said he fired in self defense after the drivers attacked him, was sentenced to death penalty Did the Georgia death penalty statute amount to "cruel and unusual punishment" under the eighth and fourteenth amendments? SC ruled in favor of Georgian death penalty, this set the standard, death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment

Gratz v Bollinger

Two people applied to University of Michigan and were rejected, U admitted it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body", also has policy to admit virtually all qualified applicants who are African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans who are considered to be "underrepresented" on campus Concluding that diversity was a compelling interest, the District Court held that the admissions policies for years 1995-1998 were not narrowly tailored, but that the policies in effect in 1999 and 2000 were narrowly tailored. Gratz and Hamacher petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 for a writ of certiorari before judgment, which was granted. Does the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Court ruled that it is wrong, University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violates both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI, Court reasoned that the automatic distribution of 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single "underrepresented minority" applicant solely because of race was not narrowly tailored and did not provide the individualized consideration Justice Powell contemplated in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause."

New York Times v US

Vietnam War, political scientist Daniel Ellsberg was against the war, stole classified info from the Pentagon, which was called the Pentagon Papers (in which Truman, Ike, JFK, Johnson gave public misleading info about US involvement in Vietnam, but Nixon said it was classified), gave them to the NYT, federal gov't sought to stop NYTs, SC heard case immediately SC ruled for NYT, said there could be no prior restraint on the press in this instance, gov't offered no clear cut evidence that material contained info that jeopardized national security, Pentagon Papers were published

Weeks v US

Weeks suspected of illegal gambling, police entered home and seized papers and property twice, without a warrant both times, plaintiff argued that with 4th Amendment people are safe from illegal search and seizure, thereby ruling any evidence obtained in violation of such a guarantee cannot be used in the court of law, US argued that the prosecution of Weeks proceeded in a logical sequence and that the police officers involved in the arrest and subsequent searches acted on an increasing body of evidence which incriminated Weeks in a violation of federal law SC ruled for Weeks