APUSH Unit 5.11 - : Topic Questions - AP Classroom

"After [the Confederate surrender at] Appomattox the South's political leaders saw themselves entering an era of revolutionary changes imposed by the national government, which many viewed as an outside power. Continuing a long pattern of American . . . behavior, many whites found an outlet for their frustration by attacking those deemed responsible for their suffering: white Republicans and blacks. . . . "Frustrated at their inability to bring their states back to Democratic control, some southerners turned to the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist organizations, using terrorism to eliminate opposition leaders and to strike fear into the hearts of rank-and-file Republicans, both black and white. . . . "[Violence] in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina exposed the impotence of the Republican party in the South and the determination of Democrats to defeat their opponents by any means necessary. The final triumph of the counterrevolution awaited the withdrawal of northern Republican support from the so-called 'carpetbag regimes' in 1877. The inconsistency of federal Reconstruction policy and the strength of southern resistance seem to have doomed the Reconstruction experiment to inevitable collapse. Although Americans have often been loathe to concede that violence may bring about [political] change, terrorism in the Reconstruction era was instrumental in achieving the ends desired by its perpetrators." George C. Rable, historian, But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction, published in 1984 "In its pervasive impact and multiplicity of purposes, . . . the wave of counterrevolutionary terror that swept over large parts of the South between 1868 and 1871 lacks a counterpart . . . in the American experience. . . . "By 1870, the Ku Klux Klan . . . had become deeply entrenched in nearly every Southern state. . . . In effect, the Klan was a military force serving the interests of the Democratic party, the planter class, and all those who desired the restoration of white supremacy. . . . "Adopted in 1870 and 1871, a series of Enforcement Acts embodied the Congressional response to violence. . . . As violence persisted, Congress enacted a far more sweeping measure—the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 1871. This for the first time designated certain crimes committed by individuals as offenses punishable under federal law. . . . If states failed to act effectively against them, [these offenses could] be prosecuted by federal district attorneys, and even lead to military intervention. . . . "Judged by the percentage of Klansmen actually indicted and convicted, the fruits of 'enforcement' seem small indeed, a few hundred men among the thousands guilty of heinous crimes. But in terms of its larger purposes—restoring order, reinvigorating the morale of Southern Republicans, and enabling blacks to exercise their rights as citizens—the policy proved a success. . . . So ended the Reconstruction career of the Ku Klux Klan. . . . National power had achieved what most Southern governments had been unable, and Southern white public opinion unwilling, to accomplish: acquiescence in the rule of law." Eric Foner, historian, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, published in 1988 Based on their arguments in the excerpts, both Rable and Foner would most likely agree with which of the following claims? A. The North achieved its aims for Reconstruction B. Federal policy during Reconstruction was inconsistent C. Southern resistance hindered Reconstruction D. Republicans dominated the South after Reconstruction

C. Southern resistance hindered Reconstruction

"After [the Confederate surrender at] Appomattox the South's political leaders saw themselves entering an era of revolutionary changes imposed by the national government, which many viewed as an outside power. Continuing a long pattern of American . . . behavior, many whites found an outlet for their frustration by attacking those deemed responsible for their suffering: white Republicans and blacks. . . . "Frustrated at their inability to bring their states back to Democratic control, some southerners turned to the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist organizations, using terrorism to eliminate opposition leaders and to strike fear into the hearts of rank-and-file Republicans, both black and white. . . . "[Violence] in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina exposed the impotence of the Republican party in the South and the determination of Democrats to defeat their opponents by any means necessary. The final triumph of the counterrevolution awaited the withdrawal of northern Republican support from the so-called 'carpetbag regimes' in 1877. The inconsistency of federal Reconstruction policy and the strength of southern resistance seem to have doomed the Reconstruction experiment to inevitable collapse. Although Americans have often been loathe to concede that violence may bring about [political] change, terrorism in the Reconstruction era was instrumental in achieving the ends desired by its perpetrators." George C. Rable, historian, But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction, published in 1984 "In its pervasive impact and multiplicity of purposes, . . . the wave of counterrevolutionary terror that swept over large parts of the South between 1868 and 1871 lacks a counterpart . . . in the American experience. . . . "By 1870, the Ku Klux Klan . . . had become deeply entrenched in nearly every Southern state. . . . In effect, the Klan was a military force serving the interests of the Democratic party, the planter class, and all those who desired the restoration of white supremacy. . . . "Adopted in 1870 and 1871, a series of Enforcement Acts embodied the Congressional response to violence. . . . As violence persisted, Congress enacted a far more sweeping measure—the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 1871. This for the first time designated certain crimes committed by individuals as offenses punishable under federal law. . . . If states failed to act effectively against them, [these offenses could] be prosecuted by federal district attorneys, and even lead to military intervention. . . . "Judged by the percentage of Klansmen actually indicted and convicted, the fruits of 'enforcement' seem small indeed, a few hundred men among the thousands guilty of heinous crimes. But in terms of its larger purposes—restoring order, reinvigorating the morale of Southern Republicans, and enabling blacks to exercise their rights as citizens—the policy proved a success. . . . So ended the Reconstruction career of the Ku Klux Klan. . . . National power had achieved what most Southern governments had been unable, and Southern white public opinion unwilling, to accomplish: acquiescence in the rule of law." Eric Foner, historian, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, published in 1988 Which of the following describes a difference between Rable's and Foner's arguments in the excerpts? A. Rable asserts that violence in the South achieved its political goals during Reconstruction, whereas Foner asserts that this violence was suppressed at the time B. Rable claims that the violence during Reconstruction was unprecedented, whereas Foner claims that this violence followed earlier patterns in United States history C. Foner argues that the North lost the will to enforce Reconstruction, whereas Rable argues that the North passed laws carrying out Reconstruction D. Foner contends that the South accepted Reconstruction, whereas Rable contends that the South revolted against Reconstruction.

A. Rable asserts that violence in the South achieved its political goals during Reconstruction, whereas Foner asserts that this violence was suppressed at the time

"After [the Confederate surrender at] Appomattox the South's political leaders saw themselves entering an era of revolutionary changes imposed by the national government, which many viewed as an outside power. Continuing a long pattern of American . . . behavior, many whites found an outlet for their frustration by attacking those deemed responsible for their suffering: white Republicans and blacks. . . . "Frustrated at their inability to bring their states back to Democratic control, some southerners turned to the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist organizations, using terrorism to eliminate opposition leaders and to strike fear into the hearts of rank-and-file Republicans, both black and white. . . . "[Violence] in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina exposed the impotence of the Republican party in the South and the determination of Democrats to defeat their opponents by any means necessary. The final triumph of the counterrevolution awaited the withdrawal of northern Republican support from the so-called 'carpetbag regimes' in 1877. The inconsistency of federal Reconstruction policy and the strength of southern resistance seem to have doomed the Reconstruction experiment to inevitable collapse. Although Americans have often been loathe to concede that violence may bring about [political] change, terrorism in the Reconstruction era was instrumental in achieving the ends desired by its perpetrators." George C. Rable, historian, But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction, published in 1984 "In its pervasive impact and multiplicity of purposes, . . . the wave of counterrevolutionary terror that swept over large parts of the South between 1868 and 1871 lacks a counterpart . . . in the American experience. . . . "By 1870, the Ku Klux Klan . . . had become deeply entrenched in nearly every Southern state. . . . In effect, the Klan was a military force serving the interests of the Democratic party, the planter class, and all those who desired the restoration of white supremacy. . . . "Adopted in 1870 and 1871, a series of Enforcement Acts embodied the Congressional response to violence. . . . As violence persisted, Congress enacted a far more sweeping measure—the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 1871. This for the first time designated certain crimes committed by individuals as offenses punishable under federal law. . . . If states failed to act effectively against them, [these offenses could] be prosecuted by federal district attorneys, and even lead to military intervention. . . . "Judged by the percentage of Klansmen actually indicted and convicted, the fruits of 'enforcement' seem small indeed, a few hundred men among the thousands guilty of heinous crimes. But in terms of its larger purposes—restoring order, reinvigorating the morale of Southern Republicans, and enabling blacks to exercise their rights as citizens—the policy proved a success. . . . So ended the Reconstruction career of the Ku Klux Klan. . . . National power had achieved what most Southern governments had been unable, and Southern white public opinion unwilling, to accomplish: acquiescence in the rule of law." Eric Foner, historian, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, published in 1988 Which of the following is a similarity between Rable's and Foner's arguments in the excerpts? A. Both highlight the use of federal force to uphold the Constitution B. Both focus on many Southerners' opposition to racial equality C. Both discuss congressional legislation to protect African American suffrage D. Both assert that Northerners cared little about the outcome of Reconstruction

B. Both focus on many Southerners' opposition to racial equality