Crim Pro Cases:

LoJi Sales

Active participation in execution of warrant will disqualify magistrate

Arizona v. Gant

- knocks the pins off of Belton some. Facts: Cop places D under arrest about 10 ft. from his car for driving without a license and placed him in backseat of police car. Cop then searched D's car and found cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Held: Search of car was INVALID. RULE: Incident to a lawful arrest, the police may search the passenger area of a car recently occupied by the arrestee only when: (1) D is unsecured, and (2) Within reaching distance of the passenger compartment (3) At the time of the search, OR, (4) When it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.

Illinois v. Lafayette

Inventory Searches Pursuant to Jail Booking Facts: D arrested for disturbing the peace and brought to station. D ordered to empty pockets and he placed his bag on the counter. Cop emptied bag and found drugs in it. Issue: Does an Inventory Search of personal effects during the booking of an arrested person violate the 4th Amendment? Held: NO - Search was VALID. Reasoning: • Police may constitutionally perform an inventory search of the personal effects of an arrested person during booking. • At the police station, it is entirely proper for police to remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the possession of an arrested person who is to be jailed.

Florence

Issue: Whether the 4th Amendment allows prison authorities to require individuals arrested and detained for minor offenses to remove their clothing and expose the private areas of their bodies to close visual inspection as a routine part of the jail intake process. Held: This is ALLOWED. • Close visual inspections of the naked bodies are reasonable because "there is a substantial interest in preventing any new inmate, either of his own will or as a result of coercion, from putting all who live or work at jails at risk when he is admitted to the general population." • This holding does not encompass searches of detainees who are held "without assignment to the general population and without substantial contact with other detainees."

Robinette:

Issue: Whether the 4th Amendment requires that a lawfully seized D must be advised that he is "free to go" before consent to search will be recognized as voluntary? Held: NO • Advice that one is free to go, like advice that one has a right to refuse, is a relevant fact, but is NOT essential to voluntariness.

Pringle

Issue: Whether there was probable cause to arrest a passenger in a car Held: YES Reasoning: • There was probable cause to believe that someone in the car committed felony narcotics possession because during a lawful search, cops found lots of cash and cocaine. • None admitted ownership. All were arrested. Passenger contends this. • It was an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised control over the cocaine. Thus, a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that the passenger committed the crime, either solely or jointly.

Miller Case

(How Smith would apply in our workings with banks) - The Court held that a bank depositor has no "legitimate expectation of privacy" in financial information "voluntarily conveyed to banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business." • "This Court has held repeatedly that the 4th Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a 3rd party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, EVEN IF the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the 3rd party will not be betrayed."

Michigan v. Mosley

- Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Facts: D arrested for robbery and brought to station. Given Miranda warnings. Cop began questioning about the robbery and D said he did not want to answer any questions about the robberies. Questioning ceased. D then taken to a cell. 2 hours later, D was taken to the homicide office for questioning about a murder. Given Miranda warnings again. Questioning began and D made a statement implicating himself in the murder. At no time during this questioning did D say he wanted a lawyer or indicate he did not want to discuss the murder. D argues it was unconstitutional for 2nd cop to question him about the murder after he told 1st cop that he did not want to answer any questions about the robberies Held: D's statements ADMISSIBLE Reasoning: • "If the accused indicated he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." But Miranda didn't say when questioning could resume. Resolution by this Court: • The admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his "right to cut off questioning" was "scrupulously honored." • Here, D's right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored: Factors: o There was a significant period of time (2 hours) between questioning and fresh warnings given. o 2nd interrogation was about a different crime o Different detective questioning in a different location. NOTE - Best we have for what "scrupulously honored" is, is an analogy to Mosley. RULE: Once a suspect invokes the Right to Counsel 1. Custodial Interrogation must cease 2. And may NOT be reinitiated by the police (as opposed to the accused himself) 3. Without counsel present a. (All this is true even if you have all the factors present in Mosley)

Dunaway v. New York

- Terry Stop Must Take Place on Street, Not Station House Facts: Informant supplies lead implicating D in murder, but the information is not enough to get a warrant for D's arrest. Nevertheless, cops go pick up D and take him into custody (do not handcuff him). Although he was not told he was under arrest, he would have been restrained if he tried to leave. He was taken to an interrogation room and asked questions after being given his Miranda rights. Issue: Can the police seize a suspect and bring him to the police station based only on reasonable suspicion? Held: NO Reasoning: • State concedes that the police lacked probable cause to arrest D before his incriminating statement during interrogation. • What happened here was exactly like an arrest. He was driven to the station, he was not free to go, he was placed in an interrogation room, he would have been restrained if he tried to leave. • To lawfully bring a suspect into formal police custody and interrogate him at the police station, the police must have probable cause.

Alderman

4th Amendment Rights are personal rights, which may not be vicariously asserted. A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his 4th Amendment rights infringed. • The additional deterrent effect that might be gained by extending the exclusionary rule to those whose rights were not personally violated is just not worth the cost of letting guilty D's go free. (Balancing the interests).

Florida v. Royer

A person is "seized" when: 1. By (slightest application of) physical force OR (ADDITION to Rule from Hodari D) 2. Show of authority, to which the person submits (ADDITION to Rule from Hodari D) 3. His freedom of movement is restrained through means intentionally applied (ADDITION from Brower - Pg. 419 Such that, in view of all the circumstances, 4. A reasonable innocent person would have believed 5. that he was not free to leave....OR otherwise terminate the encounter. No seizure when cops approached D in an airport concourse and asked for and examined his ticket and driver's license. He was seized however, when the cops identified themselves as narcotics agents, told him he was suspected of narcotics transportation, and asked to accompany them to a police room, while retaining his ticket and license and not indicating that he was free to leave.

Shatzer:

An inmate is not in custody, for Miranda purposes, simply by virtue of his confinement in prison. But this Court did not address when a prisoner IS in custody. • Fields - Removing a prisoner to a conference room and questioning him does NOT constitute being "in custody"

Chimel v. California

Area of Immediate Control Pursuant to Arrest: Facts: Pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, cops went to D's home to arrest him. They do and without a search warrant and without permission, cops conducted a complete search of D's home and find evidence. Issue: Whether the warrantless search of D's entire home can be justified as incident to the lawful arrest Held: NO - Search of D's home was INVALID. Reasoning: • Incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search of the area in POSSESSION and CONTROL of the person under arrest is permissible under the 4th Amendment. • When an arrest occurs, it is reasonable for the police to search the PERSON being arrested to ensure he is not armed (for officer safety) and to ensure no evidence is destroyed. • An area that the person might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items is also reasonable to be searched. • Thus, cops can search the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control. NOTE - How would Watson work here if cops didn't have a valid arrest? Wouldn't work because Watson dealt with PUBLIC arrests, here D was arrested in his home. NOTE - PUBLIC doesn't necessarily just have to mean "public" it can mean anywhere the police are lawfully allowed to be. So if D allows cops in his house and then he punches his wife, the cops can arrest him.

Chambers v. Maroney

Automobile Exception for Search Warrants Facts: D's robbed a gas station. Within an hour, a car matching the description was pulled over. D's arrested and car was driven to police station where it was searched. Held: Search was VALID (Automobile exception) STRONG RULE: IF there is: • (1) Probable cause to believe an item subject to seizure is located in • (2) a readily mobile vehicle • (3) in a public place • (4) and so situated that an objective observer would conclude it is not being used as a residence THEN: • (5) It can be searched on the spot, at the scene OR • (6) transported to the police station and searched there • (7) (Scope of the search) - The police may search a car and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence is contained in the car. But only where they have probable cause to believe the container is located. If they just think it is SOMEWHERE in the car they can search wherever they think it CAN be located. If they see it placed in the trunk they can only search the trunk. Reasoning: • See Rule above When police stopped the car they had probable cause to arrest the occupants - could they have searched the car Incident to Arrest on the spot? YES (under Gant, they can search the passenger compartment and containers within the passenger compartment) • Under Gant: Incident to a lawful arrest, the police may search the passenger area of a car recently occupied by the arrestee only when the person being arrested is unsecured and still within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search OR, When it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. • BUT, here they didn't search on the spot. They took it back to the station. Could they conduct this search at the station wagon without a warrant under the Incident to Arrest Exception? NO - because it would not be reasonably contemporaneous to the arrest itself, too much time has passed. • The Search conducted in this case is allowed though under the Automobile Exception.

Hodari D

B. Determining Whether a Person Has Been Detained or Seized: (so as to trigger 4A protections) 1. 4a requires completed seizure; Unsuccessful Effort to Catch is Not a Seizure (Hodari D): and hence it does not have to be reasonable. 2. Seizure of a Moving Suspect: Can happen in either of two ways: a) Restraint of suspect by physical force (even if suspect not subdued), OR • Mere laying of hands not enough (if suspect breaks away, the seizure has ended until the hands return) b) Must have show of authority AND Submission by suspect (Hodari D.) c) Example: Hodari D. See youths around auto, POs approach, youths flee away, several officers follows Hodari who throws away what is later shown to be crack. High-crime area. No seizure. But, if Hodari had stopped in middle of pursuit then this WOULD be a seizure.

Kilgore:

Carves out an Exception to the Private-Property Exception of Coolidge Facts: Cops have probable cause to believe that narcotics would be found in D's truck. Truck was parked on the driveway of a farmhouse that belonged to another person. Without a warrant, cops searched the truck and found cocaine. Held: Search was VALID • Automobile Exception applies here. It was on someone else's private property. Another's property = public. Public = anywhere the cops are lawfully allowed to be at.

New Jersey v. TLO

Beyond Stop and Frisk: Special Needs Facts: Teacher at high school saw D smoking in bathroom. D denied it. Principal demanded to see D's purse and found a pack of cigarettes and accused D of lying to him. He also saw rolling papers and knowing people use that to smoke marijuana he searched the purse further and found marijuana, a pipe, and 2 letters implicating her of dealing. Principal notified police and turned over the evidence to them. Issue: Whether Principal's search of D's purse violated the 4th Amendment Held: NO Reasoning: • RULE: A search of a student by a school official will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will TURN UP evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law OR the rules of the school. • Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. • The school setting requires some ease of restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. Requiring a teacher to get a warrant before searching a child suspected of breaking school rules or the law would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in schools. • Here, a teacher reported that D was smoking, that gave Principal reason to suspect that D was carrying cigarettes. And if she did have them, her purse was the obvious place to find them. Thus Principal did not act unreasonably. • The discovery of rolling papers gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that D was carrying marijuana in her purse as well. This suspicion justified the further search of D's purse, which turned up more evidence (the pipe, letters, and the marijuana).

Franks. v. Delaware

Challenging Facts in Affidavit offered in support of Warrant HYPO: Cop goes to a magistrate and lies about the facts, based on these lies judge issues a warrant that looks good on its face. A 2nd police officer executes the warrant in good faith. 2nd cop thinks everything is fine. Suppress the evidence? YES • "Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth." • Let's say the cop didn't lie, but he did know that his informant was probably lying. What then? The evidence will be suppressed. "reckless disregard for the truth.." - also basis for suppression. • What if 2nd cop acted reasonably to this 1st cops lies - still suppressed. Whole point of exclusionary rule is to deter. (That the AFFIANT knew was false - Leon)

Georgia v. Randolph

Consent Searches: One objecting party v. one consenting party Facts: Police arrive at D's house after domestic disturbance call. Police asked for permission to search the home for evidence after wife says D used cocaine. Wife gave consent but D, who was present, refused. Cops searched anyway based off of wife's consent. Held: Search was INVALID Reasoning: • A warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident. • A cop cannot purposefully remove the objecting person for the purpose of keeping that person from objecting.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte

Consent search: Voluntariness Standard Voluntary Consent to Search of Car Facts: Cop stopped car after seeing headlight was out. 6 men in car and driver could not produce driver's license. Only Alcala produced a license and said the car was his brother's. Cop asked Alcala if he could search the car and Alcala said, "sure, go ahead." Cop found 3 stolen checks. Held: Search was valid because VOLUNTARY CONSENT was given. Reasoning: • Consent cannot be coerced (either explicitly or implicitly). The resulting consent would be invalid. • Instead the consent has to be "voluntary." • "Voluntariness" does NOT mean that the subject has to know of his right to refuse consent. • The state must demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion. • Here, the consent was voluntary and thus valid. Side Note - Could the Automobile Exception have worked here? NO - because there was no Probable Cause. Car was only stopped because the headlight was out. • Would the Search Incident to Arrest work? NO because there was no arrest. They could have arrested them though because he didn't have a license. But there was no arrest so won't work.

Chadwick

Containers are not Automobiles (NOTE: No impact on automobile exception) Movable Vehicles vs. Movable Containers IF there is: 1. Probable cause to believe an item subject to seizure is located in 2. A movable container 3. In a public place THEN: 4. It may be seized WITHOUT a warrant 5. BUT, the interior cannot be searched WITHOUT a warrant or a separate exception to the warrant requirement. Facts: D's footlocker was heavy and leaking talcum powder (used to mask smell of marijuana). Dog also signaled it had drugs in it. D put footlocker into trunk of car. Before the car started, and while the trunk was still open, cops arrested D and took D and the footlocker to the station where the footlocker was searched and found marijuana. No consent was given. No search warrant was issued. Held: Search was INVALID. Reasoning: • Side Note - Courts have repeatedly stated that Drug sniffing dogs in a public place is not a search. • The cops could have searched at the car because of: Search Incident to Arrest. But, they didn't do that; instead they searched it at the station 1.5 hours later. Not contemporaneous. • The government could have also argued: Automobile Exception - because they have probable cause to believe there are drugs in the footlocker. If they had argued this it would have been an easy case for the government. • Note - This case does NOTHING to the automobile exception because it is not argued. • This case says NO to treating small containers like cars.

Sibron v. New York

Cop watched man talk to known drug addicts. Man went to a restaurant; cop followed and told him to come outside. Cop said, "you know what I am after." Man mumbled and reached into his pocket, the cop then thrust his hand into the pocket and took out packets of heroin. • HOLDING -It was UNCONSTITUTIONAL for the cop to Stop and Frisk D • The officer did not have "reasonable grounds to believe that D was armed and dangerous." • Mere association with drug addicts did not give rise to a "reasonable fear of life or limb." • Even if there had been adequate grounds for a stop and frisk, the search conducted here exceeded the limited bounds of the patdown authorized by Terry.

Dunn

DUNN Factors: (to determine whether an area is curtilage) o 1) proximity to the home o 2) the existence of an enclosure around the area o 3) nature of the use of the area o 4) the precautions taken to exclude others from the area

California v. Hodari D

Facts: Cops on patrol in high crime area. They see youths huddled around a car. Youths see cop car and run. Cops are suspicious and chase them. D tossed the crack cocaine he was carrying, cop tackled him and then handcuffed him. Issue: Whether, at the time D dropped the drugs, D had been "seized" Held: NO Reasoning: • While an arrest can occur by the slightest application of physical force, if the subject frees himself from such restraint the arrest and seizure come to an end until the subject is brought back into police custody. • There is no application of physical force here. D was untouched by cop when he threw away the cocaine • Cop's pursuit qualified as a "show of authority" calling upon D to halt. But, D did not stop running. • Thus, assuming that cop's pursuit in the present case constituted a "show of authority" enjoining D to halt, since D did not comply with that injunction, he was not seized until he was tackled. Thus, the cocaine was not the fruit of a seizure

Florida v. Bostick

Facts: 2 cops boarded a bus and picked out D without articulable suspicion. They explained they were narcotics agents and requested D's consent to search his luggage and informed him of his right to refuse consent. He gave consent. Held: NO SEIZURE here Reasoning: • A seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions • There is no doubt that had this same encounter taken place before D boarded the bus, or in the lobby of the bus terminal, it would NOT rise to the level of seizure. • Even when cops have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask for their ID, and request consent to search his or her luggage as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required. • The fact that D did not feel free to leave the bus did not mean that the police seized him. The bus was about to depart; he would not have felt free to leave even if the police had not been present. • If it's all police conduct that restricts freedom of movement then that would be a seizure

Florida v. JL

Facts: Anonymous caller tells police that a black male standing at a particular bus stop wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. Nothing is known about the informant. Cops arrived at the stop and saw 3 black males hanging out (one of whom was wearing a plaid shirt). Apart from the tip, the cops had no reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct. Cops stopped and frisked D, and seized a gun from his pocket. Issue: Whether this anonymous tip raised a reasonable suspicion enough to justify a Stop and Frisk Held: NO Reasoning: • The officers' suspicion that D was carrying a weapon arose not from any observations of their own, but solely from a call made from an unknown informant. • There are times when an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits "sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop." This is not one of those times. • White - Only after police observation showed that the informant had accurately predicted the woman's movements, did it become reasonable to think the tipster had inside knowledge about the suspect and therefore to credit his assertion about the cocaine. • Here, the tip lacks sufficient indicia of reliability. It provided no predictive info and thus left the cops without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. • All the police had to go on was the bare report of an unknown informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about D. • State's Argument: We should have a "firearm exception" where a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk even if the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. • Court Counter: That would enable any person trying to harass another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the target's unlawful carriage of a gun. • However, we do not say that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a gun before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk. • Nor do we hold that public safety officials in quarters where the reasonable expectation of 4th Amendment privacy is diminished, such as airports, and schools, cannot conduct protective searches on the basis of information insufficient to justify searches elsewhere.

California v. Ciraolo

Facts: Anonymous tip that D is growing weed in his backyard. The yard was shielded from view by a 6-foot perimeter fence and a 10-foot interior fence. Cops flew over the house in a private plane and saw the weed. Cops took photos with a standard 35 mm camera from 1,000 ft. Using the anonymous tip and the photos, cops got a search warrant and seized the marijuana plants. Issue: Whether flying over and viewing D's backyard is a search Held: NO search here - D's expectation of privacy was NOT REASONABLE. Reasoning: • An individual must demonstrate (1) a subjective expectation of privacy in the area and (2) that the expectation is reasonable in order for the protections of the 4th Amendment to apply. • #1 Met - D's subjective expectation of privacy is undisputed given the long high fence around his yard. • #2 NOT Met - The yard is within the curtilage of the home, but the 4th Amendment does not prohibit a cop from observing the area from a publicly accessible viewpoint where he is legally entitled to be. • The officers observed D's yard with the naked eye from public airspace. They did not physically enter the property. • What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. D knowingly exposed his marijuana plot to this kind of visual intrusion (by air). • Thus, D's expectation of privacy in this case is NOT reasonable - Fourth Amendment not violated.

U.S. v. White

Facts: At trial, government was permitted to testify to conversations D had with a government informant. The agents overheard the conversation through a wiretap the informant had been wearing, allowing them to hear every word in real time. Few of the conversations happened in informant's home, another happened in D's home. Held: This is NOT a search. Reasoning: • The 4th Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures does NOT protect people from their misplaced expectations of trust and therefore, there is no 4th Amendment search and seizure when the person the D is speaking with is secretly a government agent or an informant wearing a wire and recording what is being said • The Court has held that undercover cops can write down notes about a conversation they have with a D while undercover and testify to those transactions. • Katz held that the use of a recording device on the outside of a phone booth amounts to an unconstitutional search because the user of the phone booth has a justifiable expectation that his conversation will remain private. • Here, unlike in Katz, the D's assume the risk when they confide in others about their illegal activities. (no justifiable expectation that person in home D is conversing with will not then or later reveal the conversation to the police So in Katz terms: 1. A person must exhibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy - D here definitely did otherwise he wouldn't have been saying anything to the informant. 2. The expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." - The expectation of privacy here was NOT reasonable because you assume the risk when talking to someone in front of you.

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond

Facts: City sets up vehicle checkpoints on the roads in an effort to bar unlawful drugs. At each checkpoint, one officer advises the driver that he or she is being stopped briefly at a drug checkpoint, and asks the driver to produce a license and registration. The officer also looks for signs of impairment and conducts an open-view examination of the vehicle from the outside. A narcotics-detection dog walks around the outside of each stopped vehicle. Held: Checkpoint here is UNCONSTITUTIONAL Reasoning: • We have upheld brief, suspicion-less seizures of motorists at a fixed Border Patrol checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens, and at a sobriety checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road. • We have never indicated an approval of a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing • The previous checkpoint cases we have approved were designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to border control or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. • Because the purpose of this checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, it violates the 4th Amendment

Berkemer v. McCarty

Facts: Cop forces D to stop his car after seeing D weave. D is drunk. Cop concluded that D would be charged with a traffic offense and D's freedom to leave was terminated. But D was not told that he would be taken into custody. Cop then asked D questions and D said he had been drinking. At no point was D given Miranda warnings. Issue: During a routine traffic stop, is a motorist subject to custodial interrogation for the purpose of the Miranda doctrine? Held: NO Reasoning: • While a person in custody who is suspected of a misdemeanor traffic offense must be read his Miranda warnings, a motorist temporarily detained on the side of the road after being pulled over by an officer is not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda. • A routine traffic stop does not create an environment where a person would feel compelled to speak and incriminate himself. • First, a roadside stop is generally temporary and brief. • Second, during a routine traffic stop, the police officers' aura of authority and ability to intimidate is less than would be at the police station. Traffic stops generally take place where others can see, whereas questioning at a stationhouse takes place in private. • In these respects, a traffic stop is akin to a Terry stop where no Miranda warnings are required either • Here, D was not in custody when he was questioned on the side of the road and his statement is therefore admissible

Minnesota v. Carter

Facts: Cop, standing in a public area, peered into the apartment through a crack in the blinds and observed Johns and D putting white powder into bags. Cop called to get a warrant, got one, and an eventual search pursuant to the warrant revealed that Johns and D had been bagging cocaine. The apartment belonged to a woman who was present when the drugs were being packaged. Johns and D were from another state, had only been at the apartment for a few hours, and did not have a preexisting relationship with the owner of the apartment, who was simply allowing them to use the apartment to bag their drugs in exchange for cocaine. Held: D's do NOT have STANDIING Reasoning: • D's argue peering into the crack in the blinds was an illegal search. Note - Was looking through the blinds a search? • Argument for NO: Anybody could have seen in, cop was in a public place. • Argument for YES: Owner of apartment had manifested her expectation of privacy by closing the blinds, thus this is a search. Because the prosecutor is claiming D's do not have standing, whether this was a search or not does not matter. • An overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the 4th Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not. • Here, D had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment and the drug evidence is admissible. Unlike in Olson, D was not an overnight guest with a preexisting relationship with the owner, but was instead only present in the apartment for a brief time, solely for commercial purposes, and he had no prior relationship with the owner of the apartment Factors: • This was not social, but commercial • It was a relatively short time • No long-term connection with the owner Thus, NO reasonable expectation of privacy here. Note - This is distinguishable from renting out a taxicab because of customary social usage. People rent out taxicabs, not houses for 2 hours.

Brown v. Illinois

Facts: Cops broke into D's home without probable cause or a warrant and arrested D less than 2 hours pass Miranda warnings Incriminating Statement 5-6 hours pass Miranda warnings again 2nd Incriminating Statement Issue: Whether D's statements were to be excluded as the fruit of the illegal arrest, or were admissible because the giving of Miranda warnings sufficiently attenuated the taint of the arrest Held: Both Statements SUPPRESSED (fruit of the illegal arrest was not attenuated) Reasoning: • Incriminating statements made following an unlawful arrest are only admissible if the statements, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, are "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint." • A blanket rule treating the Miranda warning as a universal cure for all constitutional violations would nullify the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. o (A 5th Amendment remedy standing alone is not enough to cure a 4th Amendment disease) • Thus, determinations of admissibility for statements made after an illegal arrest must be made on a case-by-case basis after assessing all relevant facts and circumstances including: (Factors to know whether there is attenuation:) o Miranda warnings o The time elapsed between the arrest (illegality) and the statement (evidence) (temporal proximity) o The presence of intervening circumstances (intervening act of free will) o The purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct. • Here, D's statements were made a short time after his arrest (2 hours), and the cops' constitutional violations were purposeful. Thus, D's statements are inadmissible.

Murray v. United States

Facts: Cops have D and his coconspirators under surveillance. They observed D drive a truck into a warehouse, and drive out of the warehouse 20 minutes later. Upon driving out, cops saw a tractor-trailer rig bearing a long, dark container. D then turned the truck over to someone else, who were then followed and arrested, the vehicles were lawfully seized. Truck was found to have marijuana. After getting this info, other cops forced entry into the warehouse. In plain view were numerous burlap-wrapped bales. Cops left without touching the bales, kept the warehouse under surveillance and did not reenter until they had a search warrant. In applying for the warrant, cops did NOT mention the prior entry, and did not rely on any observations made during the entry. When the warrant was issued (8 hours after initial entry) the cops reentered the warehouse and seized the bales of marijuana. Held: REMANDED to see if the second search pursuant to the warrant was a genuinely independent source. Reasoning: • "Independent Source" Doctrine: When evidence is initially discovered through an illegal search, but later obtained by an independent source, the evidence will be untainted by the initial illegality and thus admissible. • Here, knowledge that the marijuana was in the warehouse was assuredly acquired at the time of the unlawful entry. But it was also acquired at the time of entry pursuant to the warrant, and if that later acquisition was not the result of the earlier entry there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply. • Case remanded to determine whether the second search pursuant to the warrant was a genuinely independent source of uncovering the information and the tangible evidence. If so, the information and the tangible evidence are admissible under the independent source

Oregon v. Elstad

Facts: Cops have an arrest warrant and go to D's home where his mother let them in. While one officer went into kitchen to explain what was happening to D to D's mother, the other officer remained in the living room with D. Without reading D his Miranda warnings, the officer in the living room began talking with D. When the officer said he believed D was involved in the robbery, D replied he was there. (S1). When D and cops arrived at the station, D was given his Miranda warnings, which he waived, and made a full statement implicating himself in the burglary (S2). Held: S1 - INADMISSIBLE. S2 - ADMISSIBLE Reasoning: • D argues his confession was tainted by the earlier failure of the police to provide Miranda warnings and must be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree" but this assumes a constitutional violation. • There is no constitutional violation here, just a Miranda violation. • "Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn solely on whether it was knowingly and voluntarily made." - This wipes out fruit of the poisonous tree analysis when the poison is a Miranda violation. • "Absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining an initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion, and a subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a prior voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement." • We hold today that a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.

California v. Carney

Facts: Cops have probable cause that D is selling weed out of his mobile home. It was parked in a public lot and curtains covered the windows. Cops entered the mobile home and found evidence of drugs. Cops didn't have a warrant nor did they receive consent. Held: Search was VALID. Reasoning: • A mobile home that can be quickly moved can be searched without a warrant when probable cause exists • It is true that a motor home can function as a home and not merely as a vehicle. However, to avoid drawing arbitrary distinctions among different types of moveable vehicles, it is preferable to treat motor homes as vehicles for 4th Amendment purposes • Factors to consider - whether it is elevated on blocks, whether it is licensed, whether it is connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public road. • If an objective observer would conclude that a mobile home is being used as a residence, then it will be treated as a residence and will not be subject to the automobile exception.

U.S. v. Jones

Facts: Cops installed a GPS tracking device on D's car and monitored its movements on public roadways for 28 days. Held: This IS a SEARCH. Reasoning and Takeaway: "The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test was added to, NOT substituted for, the common-law trespassory test" for whether conduct constitutes a 4th Amendment search. • So question to ask to determine whether there is a search or not under Jones: o 1) Whether the government activity physically intrudes on o 2) a constitutionally protected area (houses, persons, papers, and effects) o 3) in order to obtain information? If the answer is YES, there is a search without going into Katz. If the answer is NO, go to Katz. • So Katz can still call something a search even though it is not a search under the traditional approach under Jones. • THUS: Here we have a search because installing the GPS device on the car was a physical intrusion on a constitutionally protected area to obtain information ("effect" - the car).

Illinois v. Wardlow

Facts: Cops patrolling in a high crime area known for drugs. Cop saw D standing next to a building holding an opaque bag. D looked in the direction of the officers and fled. Cops chased him and cornered him on the street. Cop immediately conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons. During the frisk, cop squeezed the bag D was carrying and felt the shape of a gun. Cop then opened the bag and found a gun. D was arrested. Issue: Does a subject's unprovoked flight from a police officer, while in a high crime area, amount to a reasonable suspicion to justify a stop and frisk? Held: YES Reasoning: • An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. • But being in a high crime area is a relevant consideration in a Terry analysis. • Here, D was in a high crime area and fled (unprovoked) as soon as he saw the police. Together, these two factors gave the police reasonable suspicion and the police lawfully conducted a Terry stop. • Side Note - Cop here made no reasonable inquiries to the D. Courts don't talk about reasonable inquiries even though that seems to be in the Terry holding (nor identifying self as a cop)

Minnesota v. Dickerson

Facts: Cops saw D leaving a crack house. D began walking toward the police but upon spotting the squad car and making eye contact, abruptly halted and began walking in the opposite direction. Cops ordered D to stop and conducted a patdown. Patdown revealed no weapons, but cop did feel a small lump in D's jacket. Cop says it felt like a lump of crack cocaine and then slides it between his fingers. Cop then reached into the pocket and retrieved a small plastic bag containing a rock of crack cocaine. D was arrested. Issue: Whether the 4th Amendment permits the seizure of contraband detected through a police officer's sense of touch during a protective patdown search Held: YES (but not here because cop went beyond limited scope of the patdown) Reasoning: • Both the stop and frisk were valid under Terry, but the seizure of the cocaine was unconstitutional. • If a protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed. • If a cop lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, (on a probable cause level) there has been no invasion of privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the "plain feel doctrine." • Here, cop went outside the strictly limited scope of the patdown when he continued to search into D's pocket after determining that D had no weapons. Terry does not permit this type of evidentiary search. Thus, the cocaine was NOT lawfully seized. • It was not immediately apparent that the rock was crack cocaine. He knew it was not a weapon so he no longer had a Terry justification for the patdown. NOTE: If cop had reasonable suspicion that the item was contraband when first touching the item upon a justified Terry frisk, could cop seize it? NO. To seize there needs to be Probable Cause under the Plain View Doctrine or it is NOT immediately apparent. NOTE: If cop has probable cause to believe that the person has drugs, cop can arrest them and then the Search Incident to Arrest would get them to the crack because you can do a full search under Robinson.

Arizona v. Johnson:

Facts: Cops stopped a car because vehicle registration was suspended, a civil infraction that justified a citation. D was a passenger in the rear seat. Cop asked him to get out of the car after observing suspicious behavior and receiving suspicious responses to her inquiries. Cop believed he might have a weapon, patted him down, and found a gun. Held: Patdown was LAWFUL • Because traffic stops are particularly dangerous encounters, officers may automatically remove both drivers and passengers during a traffic stop. • To justify a patdown of either a driver OR a passenger during a traffic stop, however, just as in the case of a pedestrian reasonably suspected of criminal activity, the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.

Florida v. Jardines

Facts: Cops took a trained dog to D's front porch. The dog indicated the presence of drugs. Marijuana was found during a search of the home pursuant to a warrant issued on the basis of the dog sniff. Issue: Whether using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner's porch to investigate the contents of a home is a "search" Held: YES - This IS a SEARCH. Reasoning: • Here, the officers gathered information by physically entering and occupying the curtilage of the home to engage in conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner. • An "implicit license" permits a visitor to approach a home, knock, wait, and then leave absent invitation. • There is no customary invitation to bring a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence. • Thus, here the Jones standard for whether a search had occurred is satisfied. No need then to go into Katz. NOTE - It is OK if a drug-sniffing dog sniffs by a car. Why? Because we have an implicit license to walk by cars.

Rhode Island v. Innis

Facts: D arrested but police suspected that D had hidden a gun somewhere nearby. D given Miranda warnings and D says he wants a lawyer. While in squad car, 2 cops speaking to each other expressed their concern that a student from the nearby school might find the weapon and hurt himself/herself. D then told police to turn around and showed them where the gun was. Issue: Whether D was interrogated in violation of his Miranda rights Held: NO Reasoning: • Here, D was not interrogated. There was no express questioning of D nor was he subjected to the "functional equivalent" of questioning. It can't be said that cops here should have known that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from D. Note - How does the cop's motivation factor in here? "The intent of the police is not irrelevant, for it may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response."

Missouri v. Seibert

Facts: D arrested for the killing of a teenage boy in a fire, without being read her Miranda warnings, D was questioned for 30-40 minutes until she admitted she knew the boy was meant to die in the fire (S1) 20 minutes break Miranda warnings Asked same questions again, being reminded of her initial answers. D confessed again. (S2) Held: Both statements INADMISSIBLE Reasoning: • For police to maintain a policy where suspects subject to custodial interrogation are initially denied their Miranda warnings, and then are subject to the same questioning for a second time renders Miranda warnings ineffective. • Upon hearing Miranda warnings after confessing, no reasonable suspect would think that he now has the right to remain silent. In fact, the very purpose of this technique is to make the warning ineffective so suspects will continue to speak. • Elstad does not apply here. There, the questioning in the living room had "none of the earmarks of coercion" and was an "oversight" that may have resulted in confusion as to whether the brief exchange qualified as custodial interrogation. • Significant facts here: The completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the 1st and 2nd, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator's questions treated the 2nd round as continuous with the 1st o These factors sound like "Attenuation" factors. Just use these factors though to see if the Miranda warning is effective. Note - Court is NOT using "fruit of the poisonous tree analysis." Elstad Court rejected using "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis for Miranda violations. • Instead, Court says D was not adequately and effectively Mirandasized. The subsequent Miranda warnings were not effective because: o D could not reasonably believe that she actually had a right to remain silent after just confessing because "anything you say can and will be used against you" so D would think that her previous confession will be used against her. o Thus, since we do not have effective warnings because of the first statement then S2 is inadmissible because it is a Miranda violation.

Spinelli v. United States

Facts: D challenges the warrant, which authorized a search. The affidavit used to get the warrant could NOT establish probable cause without the informant's tip. Tip just had a bare assertion that D was operating a gambling scheme. Everything else in the affidavit was innocent looking (2 phones, D is known by affiant and other cops as a bookie). Held: NO probable cause here (The informant's tip was NOT sufficient to provide the basis for a finding of probable cause to issue a warrant) Aguilliar-Spinelli Test for informant tips: Tip constitutes probable if information in affidavit also provides basis for magistrate to find both that: 1. Information was obtained in reliable manner 2. Informant is generally credible. BUT a tip that is inadequate may be saved if: 1. The tip contained sufficient detail of the appropriate type; or 2. Affidavit sets our facts providing sufficient corroboration of some facts "reported" in tip. BIG NOTE: Though this is no longer the federal test, state constitutions or statutes may still impose it on state courts.

Arizona v. Fulminante:

Facts: D in jail for a weapons offense. He was suspected of murdering his 11-year-old stepdaughter. He was receiving "rough treatment" from the other inmates because the prison population detested child killers. Informer disguised as another inmate asked D about it and D denied it. Informer then asked again saying he would provide protection from the other inmates but only if he told the truth and D confessed. Held: Confession is NOT ADMISSIBLE • The confession was coerced. He faced a credible threat of violence unless he confessed.

Caballes:

Facts: D lawfully stopped for speeding. One cop wrote him a ticket while the other walked a dog around D's car. Dog alerted to the trunk, cops searched it and found marijuana. Holding: This is OKAY • Cops do not need reasonable suspicion to conduct dog sniffs of lawfully stopped vehicles.

United States v. Place

Facts: D raised suspicions to cops in Miami. He consents to search of his luggage and gives ID, but because flight is about to board the cops don't search. He says he knew they were cops. Cops look at the tags and see addresses are non-existent and phone # matches a 3rd party's address, not the address on the tag. Call up NY and NY DEA Agents are waiting for D. Again D's behavior aroused suspicions and agents approach him to ask questions (THIS IS NOT A SEIZURE). D says he knew they were cops. Agents say they think he has drugs. D refuses to consent to search. Agents say they are taking the luggage to a judge to get a search warrant and D can accompany them. D declines. Agents take the bags to get a "sniff test" and signaled they had drugs. They then got a search warrant on Monday morning (it was Friday afternoon when they seized the bags). Agents then find cocaine. Held: Seizure was INVALID Reasoning: • When a cop's observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of Terry and its progeny permit the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope. • Where the authorities possess specific and articulable facts warranting a reasonable belief that a traveler's luggage contains drugs, the governmental interest in seizing the luggage briefly to pursue further investigation is substantial. • Dog sniff is NOT a search so don't need probable cause. After the alert from the dog there is Probable Cause. Alerts by dogs will generally be enough to show probable cause. • The two ends of the Terry Zone - The seizure to the finding of Probable Cause (which was 90 minutes here) - Thus the duration of the Terry stop and the duration at issue is 90 minutes. • The 90-minute detention was UNREASONABLE. o The duration of the seizure was too long and D does not know where his luggage is. o The length of the seizure alone was enough to make this unreasonable o Plus, police diligence was a problem. They could have brought the dog to the airport after they got the call from Miami.

Weeks v. United States

Facts: D used mail system for gambling. Cop found evidence against D in D's home which cop searched without a search warrant. Held: Evidence will be SUPPRESSED in federal courts. Limit: Did not apply to state courts. Reasoning: • Items taken by a federal official from an individual's home when no warrant has been issued are seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and must be excluded from evidence • The Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures would be unenforceable if evidence obtained in violation of the amendment were still permitted to be entered into evidence.

Bond v. United States

Facts: D was a passenger on the bus. Cop boarded and squeezed the soft luggage, which passengers placed in the overhead storage. Cop felt D's bag and felt a "brick-like" object. D agreed to allow the officer to open it. Cop found a brick of meth. Held: The squeezing of the bag was a SEARCH. Reasoning: 1. Has D exhibited an actual expectation of privacy? (Whether he sought to preserve something as private) Yes. By using an opaque bag and placing it above his seat. 2. Whether D's expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable? Yes. A passenger does not expect that people will feel his bag in an exploratory manner. (i.e - in order to obtain information - Jones) • He did consent to allow the officer to look in the bag. Why doesn't this solve the case? Because he never consented to the bag being squeezed, which is what this case is all about ("fruit of the poisonous tree") • Applying Jones, this would still be found as a search because there was a physical intrusion on a constitutionally protected area (effect-bag) in order to obtain information. What if it was just a soft patting and cop feels gun? OK because it is the same as other passengers would do.

Moran v. Burbine:

Facts: D was in custody for murder. Attorney called and said she would represent him if he was to be questioned. Cops said he wouldn't be until next day. Then later that evening they gave D Miranda warnings and D waived his rights and made incriminating statements. They never told D an attorney wished to represent him. Held: Waiver was VALID. • The police are not required to supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.

Chavez v. Martinez:

Facts: D was in hospital being treated for gunshot wounds he received during an altercation with police officers. Although he had been arrested, he was never given his Miranda warnings. Cop questioned D while he was in hospital despite D saying he didn't want to answer questions. D was never prosecuted for a crime but brought a civil action claiming his 5th Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination had been violated. Held: Violation of a person's 5th Amendment privilege can only occur when compelled statements are introduced against a person in court.

Berghuis v. Thompkins

Facts: D was interrogated about his involvement in a murder, which lasted 3 hours. The room was 8ft. x 10ft. D given his Miranda warnings and read the form with Miranda warnings on them out loud. Cops then began interrogation. At no point did D say he wanted to remain silent, that he did not want to talk to them, or that he wanted a lawyer. He was largely silent during the 3 hours. When asked if he believed in God D said yes. When asked if he prays to God to forgive him for shooting down the boy, D said yes. Held: D WAIVED his right to remain silent. Thus his statement is ADMISSIBLE Reasoning: • A waiver does not have to be express, it can also be implied - Butler • Implied Waiver = Miranda Warning + Understanding + Uncoerced Statement ("course of conduct") • D here understood the warnings (he got a copy of the rights, he read it out loud, and it was read to him) Note - So it seems like knowing English and being able to read will establish Understanding • The waiver must be voluntary in the sense that it was free from coercion AND made with full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. • "knowing and intelligent" - understanding of the rights and awareness of the consequences

United States v. Payner:

Facts: IRS Agents did a deliberate illegal search of a banker's briefcase to get to evidence about a customer. They knew that the customer, the person who would be criminally charged, would not have standing to challenge the illegal search and that the banker, the person who would have standing, would not be charged with any offense. Held: This is OK • Did not violate the protected right of the D

U.S. v. Watson

Facts: Informant tells cop D had a stolen card. Cop checks it out and it is in fact stolen. Meeting set up. During meeting, informant signaled that D had more stolen cards. Cop arrested D without a warrant. Held: Arrest of D is VALID despite not having an arrest warrant. Reasoning: • An officer is permitted to make a public arrest WITHOUT a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence. An officer is also allowed to make a public arrest for a felony not committed in his presence if there is probable cause for making the arrest. • Cop didn't find any cards on D after informant signaled him over. Does this undermine probable cause? NO - Probable Cause existed BEFORE the meeting. If you have probable cause, you have probable cause; it is not affected by the outcome. • Felony = greater than 1 year in prison LIMIT: This is an arrest made in public. If you are going to arrest someone in their own home you need a search/arrest warrant?

Johnson v. United States

Facts: Informant told cops that people were smoking opium in a hotel and that he could smell it in the hallway. Cops went to the hotel and could smell the strong odor of opium, which led them to Room1. Cops knocked on the door and when asked who was there responded, "Lieutenant Belland." After a short delay and some shuffling, D opened the door. When told that cop wanted to talk to her, D "stepped back acquiescently" and admitted the cops in. D denied any opium. D was then told, "I want you to consider yourself under arrest because we are going to search the room." She did not consent. Cops found opium still burning. Held: Search was INVALID. Reasoning: • A judge could have found probable cause for issuing a warrant here. • There are exceptional circumstances where a warrant isn't needed. • Here, no reason is offered for not obtaining a warrant other than mere inconvenience

Herring v. United States

Facts: Investigator asked the Coffee County's warrant clerk if there were any warrants out for D's arrest. When none were found, the investigator asked the clerk to check with the clerk in Dale County, who reported that there was one active arrest warrant. The investigator asked that a copy of the arrest warrant be faxed over as confirmation. However, Dale County clerk discovered that the warrant had been recalled. She immediately called to tell the Coffee County clerk, who radioed to tell the investigator. However, while all this only took 10 to 15 minutes to transpire, the investigator had already pulled D over, arrested him and, after conducting a search of his car, found drugs and a gun. D moved to have the drugs and the gun suppressed at trial because there was in fact no warrant for his arrest and thus his initial arrest had been unlawful Held: Evidence ADMISSIBLE Reasoning: • To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system • The exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct or recurrent or systematic negligence. The error in this case does not rise to that level. o (This list leaves out isolated negligence) • The exclusionary rule does not apply, where as here, the error was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest. Note - Attenuated in this context means - it is not the person doing the search or seizure that made the mistake/that was negligent. Note - Court assumed that whoever failed to update the records was a law enforcement officer. Note - Herring took Leon 2 steps further.

U.S. v. Patane

Facts: Miranda violation leads to gun (physical evidence) Issue: Whether a failure to give a suspect the warnings required by Miranda, requires suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements Held: NO Reasoning: • The Miranda rule protects against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause ("No person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself"). The Self-Incrimination Clause, however, is not implicated by the admission into evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement. • The Clause cannot be violated by the introduction of non-testimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary statements. • The word "witness" in the constitutional text limits the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause to testimonial evidence.

Virginia v. Moore:

Facts: Officer stops Moore for driving w/ a suspended license. State law says that an offender should be given a citation. Instead, the officer here arrested him, asked for consent to search his hotel room. They received consent, searched and found cocaine. Issue: Whether an officer violates the 4th Amendment by making an arrest based on probable cause but prohibited by state law. Held: NO violation • An arrest in violation of state law does NOT violate the constitution. • An arrest based on probable cause serves interests sufficient to justify a seizure whether or not the state has chosen to forego the option of arrest. • Thus, when officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their presence, the 4th Amendment permits them to make an arrest. • State's may raise the protection against searches and seizures but this does not affect the constitutional standard.

Smith v. Maryland

Facts: Pen register installed at Telephone Company's office to record #'s dialed from D's home. They did not have a warrant. The register revealed that D had called Patricia. Police then get a warrant and searched D's home finding a phone book turned to Patricia's name and #. D seeks to suppress "all fruits derived from the pen register." Issue: Whether the installation and use of a pen register constitutes a "search" Held: NO - This is NOT a search. Reasoning: • We do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the phone #'s we dial. People in general know that phone companies record the #'s dialed. • A person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to 3rd parties - The 3rd Party Doctrine - therefore it is NOT a search. • While D believed he had an expectation of privacy in the # he dialed, this expectation was not reasonable, thus the use of the pen register does not constitute a search

Rawlings v. Kentucky:

Facts: Police discovered drugs in a purse belonging to the D's acquaintance. D argues: Because he claimed ownership of the drugs in the purse, he should be entitled to challenge the search regardless of his expectation of privacy. Held: Drugs ADMISSIBLE (D did NOT have Standing) • Ownership of the property seized as a result of a search does not by itself entitle an individual to challenge the search. To contest the legality of the search, the individual must demonstrate that his or her legitimate expectation of privacy was violated by the search. (he suddenly dumped the drugs in the purse, only knew owner for a few days, had never before sought or received access to the purse - all factors showing he did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy)

Mapp v. Ohio

Facts: Police forcibly entered D's home without a proper warrant. They found and seized books and photos, which were used to convict D of knowingly possessing lewd and obscene materials in violation of state law Held: Evidence will be SUPPRESSED. Reasoning: • Evidence obtained through unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible in state courts as required by the 4th Amendment through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment NOTE: The purpose of the exclusionary rule is NOT to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim. Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the 4th Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Hudson v. Michigan

Facts: Police got a warrant for a search for drugs and fire arms. They find both. Before entering, police announce presence, wait 5 seconds and then open the unlocked front door and enter. Issue: did this violation fo te knock and annoucne give an evidence suprression remedy? holding: no, there is no suprression remedy for violations of knock and announce. Reasoning: Interests in teh knock and annoucne rule: privacy, have nothign to do with the supression of evidence. Also, it would generate a flood gate problem. Also increasing police professionalism makes this less of a worry.

Alabama v. White

Facts: Police received an anonymous tip that D (informant gave a name) would be leaving her house, carrying a briefcase with cocaine inside. Informant gave the police D's address, a description of her car, and said that D would be heading to a certain motel. Said the taillight was broken. Police go to D's house. The car fit the description given by the informant and soon the police observed D exit her home, without the briefcase, get in her car, and head towards the motel. Just before D arrived at the motel, the police stopped the car. They informed D of what they were looking for and asked to search the car. She consented to the search and when the police found a briefcase she gave them the combination to the lock. The police found marijuana in the briefcase and arrested her. Issue: Whether an anonymous tip may furnish reasonable suspicion for a stop Held: YES, it CAN (here it did) Reasoning: • Gates dealt with an anonymous tip in the probable cause context and found in favor of a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine whether an informant's tip establishes probable cause. (veracity, reliability, basis of knowledge) • To determine whether an informant's tip provides reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be analyzed, with attention given to the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of an informant. • A tip, such as this one, standing alone, would not be enough. • Here, when the cops stopped D, the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that D was engaged in criminal activity. Thus, the investigative stop did NOT violate the 4th Amendment. • Also informant predicted D's future behavior. Informant had insider knowledge. Side Note - There is no difference in the Gates approach to determine probable cause and the White approach to determine Reasonable Suspicion. (They use the same test). The White approach just has a lower standard because White deals with Reasonable Suspicion, rather than Probable Cause. NOTE: Different Standards: Probable Cause - "Fair Probability" or "Substantial Chance" Reasonable Suspicion - "Some minimal level of objective justification" A mere hunch...

Katz v. United States

Facts: Prosecution entered into evidence recordings of D's end of a phone conversation. The recordings were obtained after the FBI placed a wiretap on the outside of the public phone booth where D placed the call. There was no physical intrusion into the booth. Issue: Whether the unwarranted wiretapping of a public phone booth constitutes a search and seizure Held: YES - this was a "SEARCH and SEIZURE" Reasoning: • The government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the D's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure" • When do you have a search? When a person's Reasonable Expectation of Privacy has been violated. 2 things needed for there to be a "search" under Katz: o 1) A person must exhibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, o 2) The expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." • Remember: The above is just a threshold. There is no violation unless the search is unreasonable. This case just tells us what a "search" is, not whether it is reasonable.

United States v. Sharpe

Facts: Reasonable Suspicion is conceded. Issue: Whether it was reasonable under the circumstances facing the cops to detain Savage (D) (driver of truck) that contained the marijuana, for 20 minutes Held: YES Reasoning: • An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop - to confirm or dispel the initial suspicion. • In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the D. • Cops pursued their investigation in a diligent and reasonable manner • The stop of the truck was justified at the outset because of the speeding and dangerous swerve past the cop car • The stop of the truck for 20 minutes until the search was also justified. A lot of the delay was attributable to D and cops pursued their investigation in a diligent and reasonable manner. NOTE: What if the police pursue some other matter during a traffic stop? Can cops ask questions about immigration status, or bring out the drug-sniffing dog? (This doesn't seem to be reasonably related to the traffic stop) but would this be okay? YES • It really turns into an issue of duration; these things can't unreasonably delay the stop. • So cops can ask questions ancillary to the case - "An officer who has properly detained a suspect on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity does NOT need additional justification to ask questions about an unrelated topic if those questions do not increase the length of the justified detention."

U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez:

Facts: Reasonable suspicion that D was concealing narcotics-filled balloons in her alimentary canal. She refused to an X-ray. This resulted in a 16-hour detention where the cops waited for her to poop. She then excreted 88 balloons filled with narcotics. Issue: Is there any limit on the length of a Terry detention? If so, what is the limit? HOLDING: The detention in this case was NOT unreasonably long. • Alimentary canal smuggling cannot be detected in the amount of time in which other illegal activity may be investigated through brief Terry-type stops. • Because she refused an X-ray, the only alternatives were a lengthy detention or the release of a person reasonably suspected of narcotics smuggling. • D's own "heroic" efforts to resist a bowel movement extended the period of the detention. • Thus, this lengthy detention was "necessary to either verify or dispel the cop's reasonable suspicion."

Safford School District v. Redding:

Facts: School officials strip-searched 13-year old girl looking for forbidden prescription and over-the-counter drugs. Held: UNCONSTITUTIONAL • This violated the 4th Amendment because there was no reason to suspect the drugs presented a danger or where hidden in the student's underwear.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista

Facts: Texas law says not wearing a seatbelt is punishable by fine or arrest without a warrant. D pulled over for not wearing a seatbelt and cop arrested her without a warrant. Issue: Whether the 4th Amendment allows for a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation Held: Warrantless Arrest here was VALID. Reasoning: • An officer with probable cause to believe ANY crime has been committed in his presence may arrest the suspect without violating the 4th Amendment.

Dickerson v. United States

Facts: Trial Court held that Miranda was not a constitutional holding and therefore congress had the authority to effectively overrule Miranda with a statute. Held: Miranda established a CONSTITUTIONAL HOLDING Reasoning: • A number of factors support the position that Miranda was a constitutional decision. • First, Miranda, and two of its companion cases, applied the new rule to state cases and, since then, Miranda has been applied to cases arising out of state courts. • Second, the Miranda decision acknowledged that it was establishing "constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." • Third, the Miranda opinion recognized that congress had the authority to create new guidelines but any subsequent legislation had to be at least as effective in informing suspects of their right against self-incrimination.

Maryland v. Buie - Protective Sweep

Facts: Two men committed an armed robbery. One was wearing a red running suit. Police got arrest warrants for both men. Police secretary called D's house to be sure he was home. A woman spoke first, and then D. Cops went to D's house, went inside, and spread out. One cop went to basement, gun drawn, and shouted down to basement ordering anyone to come out. D emerged and was arrested. Then another cop entered the basement in case there was someone else there. Cop noticed a red running suit lying in plain view and seized it. Issue: Incident to a lawful arrest, may the police conduct a warrantless search of a premises when they have reasonable suspicion to believe that other people who may pose a threat could be hiding in the home? Held: YES Reasoning: • Possessing an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe D was in his home, cops were entitled to enter and search anywhere in the house where D might be found. Once he was found, the search for him was over and there was no longer that particular justification for entering any rooms that had not yet been searched. What can you do under Chimel after the arrest? Can search the areas within D's immediate control and D's person. Can you go into closets or other rooms under Chimel? NO: "Although you can search the arrestee, there is no comparable justification for routinely searching any other room • Buie expands on this authority: o ZONE 1 - "As an incident to the arrest the officers could, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spacing immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched." (This part does not expand Chimel because a search incident to arrest under Chimel is automatic, don't need anymore justification). But it does expand it in the sense that Chimel does not give automatic authority to search a closet (D would have to be close to it) o ZONE 2 - "Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts, which taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." (reasonable suspicion) NOTE: How thorough can the protective sweep be (whether it be in zone 1 or zone 2)? • Spatial limitation: Has to be a place where a person may be found • Temporal limitation: The sweep can be no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.

Illinois v. Perkins

Facts: Undercover cops placed in jail where D was being held on unrelated charges. They ask him questions to get to the murder and D boasts about the killing thus incriminating himself. Held: Statements ADMISSIBLE Reasoning: • Conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda. A "police-dominated atmosphere" and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone that he believes to be a fellow inmate. • Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner.

New York v. Quarles

Facts: Woman tells cops she was just raped and gives description of him and where he is. Cops go to the store and see D. Cops catch him and frisk him and find an empty gun holster. After handcuffing D, cop asked D where the gun was and D said the gun was "over there." Cops found gun and read him his Miranda rights. Held: "The gun is over there" is ADMISSIBLE Reasoning: • Where public safety demands it, a suspect in police custody may be questioned without first being read his Miranda warnings. • An officer's motive for questioning the suspect is not relevant where the questions could reasonably be motivated by the desire to ensure public safety • Here, while D was in police custody when he indicated where the gun was, the officers were motivated by public safety when they asked him where it was. Note: Was there a seizure when D was stopped? YES - he submitted to a show of authority and there was physical force when he was frisked

Florida v. Harris (Supplement)

Facts; Here the dog signaled that there were drugs in the car, but the dog had not been trained to detect meth which is what they found. D challanges dog's signal as basis for probable cause leading to warrantless search. Issue: How a court should determine if the "alert" of a drug-detection dog provides probable cause to search • HOLDING - When a probable cause determination depends on a dog's alert to the presence of contraband, a court should evaluate all the circumstances, avoiding inflexible evidentiary requirements. Ultimately, the question is whether all the facts surrounding a dog's alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. But the dog's alert may be considered. NOTE: no need to show evidence of the dog's reliability in the field to prove PC. PC takes into account the totality of the circumstances.

Connally

Financial incentive will disqualify magistrate.

Arizona v. Hicks

Focusing on the "immediately apparent" language Facts: Bullet fired through D's apartment. Cops search D's apartment for the shooter and weapons. They find and seize 3 guns. Seeing expensive stereo equipment (in the run down apt) cop is suspicious. Cop read and recorded the serial #'s (moving some of the equipment to do so), which he then reported to the station. The turntable was stolen so cop seizes it. Issue: Is probable cause necessary for a cop to invoke the Plain View Doctrine? Held: YES. It was NOT lawful to search and seize the turntable. Reasoning: • Cops here do not have probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen. • The recording of the serial # is NOT a seizure because a seizure is something that "meaningfully interferes with a person's possessory interest." BUT moving equipment was a search. (Pg. 184 of E&E) • For a warrantless search OR seizure to be reasonable under the 4th Amendment, the Plain View Doctrine can only be invoked to search OR seize evidence if the police have probable cause of the evidence's incriminating character Scope - Exigent circumstances allowed the cops to enter the apartment. What is the proper scope of a search under the exigent circumstances exception? To look for victims, the shooter, or the gun. In general, the scope of the search under exigent circumstances is "to the extent that the exigency requires." • The looking under the turntable was NOT within the scope of an exigent circumstances exception because looking under the turntable would not find the shooter, gun, or victims.

U.S. v. Leon AND Massachusetts v. Sheppard

Good Faith Exception for Warrants that Lack Probable Cause Facts: Leon - Police executed a search warrant that the government conceded was invalid because it lacked probable cause. Sheppard - Technical defect in the warrant - it did not describe with particularity what was to be seized. Held: Evidence ADMISSIBLE in both cases. Reasoning: • When the police reasonably rely on a facially valid search warrant, there is no improper police conduct to deter and therefore no 4th Amendment interests are advanced by excluding the evidence. • The exclusionary rule is not itself a constitutional right but is a judicial remedy intended to deter police from infringing on one's constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which will then prohibit the introduction of evidence obtained unlawfully. • "When law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty D's offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system." • "Our good faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization." • Thus, if a reasonable well-trained officer would have believed that a warrant was valid, then evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant is not subject to suppression even though the warrant is later declared invalid. • Thus, if the officer is negligent under Leon, the good faith exception will not apply. • Where an officer knows or should know that the magistrate issuing a warrant has been misled, or where an affidavit is so lacking in probable cause that no reasonable officer could assume it, or the warrant, to be valid, the evidence obtained must be excluded • In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.

Wyoming v. Houghton:

HOLDING - Where there is probable cause to search a vehicle, the Automobile Exception permits the warrantless search of a passenger's personal belongings. • The inability to search a passenger's belongings would impair effective law enforcement when there is reason to believe contraband or evidence is in a vehicle. Criminals would be able to hide contraband in passenger's belongings and thereby thwart law enforcement.

Nix v. Williams

Inevitable Discovery Facts: D transported to prison for murder. Police told D's attorney that he would not be questioned. During transport, cop urged D to lead them to the body. D did and the girl's body was found 2 ½ miles from the nearest search team. The evidence of the body was suppressed for D's 1st trial as fruit of an unlawful interrogation. During 2nd trial, prosecution did not offer D's statements or that D had directed the police to the body, but did present evidence of the condition of the body. Held: Evidence ADMISSIBLE Reasoning: • Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may be admitted if police would have inevitably discovered it • Although the independent source doctrine is inapplicable in this case, its underlying principles warrant the adoption of the inevitable discovery doctrine. • We want to put the police in the same position, not a worse position, than they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. • The exclusion of evidence that would inevitably have been discovered would put the government in a worse position, because the police would have obtained the evidence if no misconduct had taken place. • If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means (here the volunteer's search) then the evidence is admissible.

South Dakota v. Opperman

Inventory Searches of Cars: NO Pretext Allowed Facts: Police ticketed and towed an illegally parked car. At the impound lot; cop performed a routine inventory search, using a standard inventory form. Cop found marijuana in the unlocked glove compartment. Held: Inventory Search was VALID. Reasoning: • Police may constitutionally perform an inventory search of a vehicle lawfully in police possession. • Impounding a car is legal for community-care taking (which is separate from criminal investigation). • Can't get a warrant after it has been impounded anyway because there is no probable cause to believe that there is anything in there (no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause) • We don't need probable cause because we are outside the category of criminal investigation. WHEN can the police conduct an inventory search of a car? • If the car is lawfully impounded o When can you have a lawful impoundment? If there are reasons of public safety or convenience or the efficient flow of traffic. (Community-care taking function) • The cops can search for things not even in plain view during an inventory search. • LIMIT: Having a pretext will invalidate the inventory search (Whren won't apply since inventory searches don't deal with criminal investigation but the community-care taking function of the police) NOTE - Routine inventory searches of a lawfully impounded car are reasonable under the 4th Amendment without a Warrant or Probable Cause so long as it is not a pretext for criminal investigation and it is conducted under the standard police procedures.

Edwards v. Arizona -

Invocation of the Right to Counsel Facts: D arrested and taken to station. Given Miranda warnings. D said he understood and would answer questions. D said he wanted a deal and then said he wanted an attorney before making a deal. Questioning then ceased and D was taken to county jail. Next morning, detectives came to see D. Given Miranda warnings. D said he was willing to talk and implicated himself in the crime. Held: Statement INADMISSIBLE Reasoning: • When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. • An accused, such as D, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication or conversations with the police.

Knowles

Issue: Cop has discretion to take a person into custody for an offense but chooses to issue the person a citation instead. Does the cop still have the same authority to search that person that she would have had if she had affected a custodial arrest? Held: NO Reasoning: No need to worry about officer safety or evidence being destroyed if just giving a citation. Side Note for me - Because Atwater authorizes arrests for all minor offenses committed in a cop's presence, a cop can avoid the strictures of Knowles by arresting a minor offender. Plus Whren makes it clear that a search incident to arrest is not unreasonable simply because a cop decided to arrest an individual in order to exercise the authority to search incident to that arrest.

Minnesota v. Olson:

Issue: Whether a suspect's 4th Amendment rights had been violated when the police made a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a house where D was an overnight guest and arrested him. Held: YES (D has STANDING) • An overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host's home, an expectation that entitles the guest to object to a warrantless entry to arrest him.

Colorado v. Spring:

Issue: Whether a suspect's awareness of all the crimes about which he may be questioned is relevant to determining the validity of his decision to waive the 5th Amendment privilege Held: NO - Awareness of the crimes that will be the subject of an interrogation is not necessary for a valid Miranda waiver. • A valid waiver does not require the subject to be informed of all information that would be useful in making his decision or that might affect his decision to confess.

Devenpeck v. Alford:

Issue: Whether an arrest is constitutional when an officer lacks probable cause to arrest a person for the offense he stated to be the basis for the arrest, but has probable cause to arrest the person for another offense that is NOT "closely related" to the stated offense. Held: YES - Constitutional Facts: Police had probable cause to arrest Davenpck for impersonating a police officer but they said they were actually arresting him for violations of the privacy act. Though they were ultimately found to have no PC for the privacy act arrest, the arrest was not a violation of the 4th amendment bc PC existed for the impersonating a police officer arrest. Reasoning: • Whren made it clear that an arresting officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause and that "his subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause." NOTE: The crime the officers say they are arresting the D for need NOT be closely related to teh offense they actually have PC for. The officers state of mind, except the facts as he knows them, is irrelevant to probable cause.

U.S. v. Banks

Knock and Announce: How long must officers wait? Facts: Police were arriving to serach for cocaine. Announced they had a serach warrant. Ther ewas no indicatino anyone was home after 15 to 20 seconds so they broke dwn the door. D was in the shower, heard nothing. Police found guns and drugs. When can police no knock: Case-by-Case Specific Determination: Factors (i) Level of invasiveness (ii) Likelihood that the encounter will trigger violence (iii) Embarrassment factor (likelihood that POs would bust in and D would be in his PJs) Holding: Here police could reasonabley suspect that evidence was being destroyed, thereofer they coudl enter withotu a warrant. BUT NOTE This seems to be based on the destruction of evidence exception NOTE: the nature of the evience sought afects who long the polcie msut wait before destroyign a door.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire

Limit to Automobile Exception Involved searches of a car that was parked on an arrestee's driveway (private property) at the time he was arrested in his home. Car was towed to police station and searched. • HOLDING: Search was INVALID. o Cardwell - Search of a car parked in a parking lot VALID. A vehicle searched on PUBLIC property is subject to a warrantless search under the Chambers exception.

Vale v. Louisiana

Limit to Search of Immediate Area Pursuant to Arrest Doctrine: Facts: Cops holding a warrant for D's arrest witnessed what they believed was a narcotics deal outside D's house after D went inside and brought something out to give to a known addict. Cops arrested D on the front steps and proceeded to enter and search the house, discovering drugs in the bedroom. Held: Search was INVALID. Reasoning: • The search cannot be justified as incident to a lawful arrest because when an arrest occurs outside the house, a warrantless search of the inside of the house cannot be justified as incident to the arrest. • Chimel - Held that when the search of a dwelling is sought to be justified as incident to a lawful arrest, it must constitutionally be confined to the area within the arrestee's reach at the time of his arrest—"the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." • "We decline to hold that an arrest on the street can provide its own exigent circumstances so as to justify a warrantless search of the arrestee's house."

Steagald v. U.S.

Limit: Arrest Warrant Does Not Provide Entry to Third Party's Home Facts: Cops have an arrest warrant for Lyons and are told they can find him at D's house. Cops then went into D's home to search for Lyons. Did not find him but found drugs. Issue: Whether an arrest warrant—as opposed to a search warrant—is adequate to protect the 4th Amendment interests of persons not named in the warrant, when their homes are searched without their consent and in the absence of exigent circumstances Held: NO Reasoning: • The 4th Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance of the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. • The cops here used the arrest warrant for Lyons, to enter the house of a 3rd person (D) on their belief that Lyons would be there. • So, the warrant protected Lyons from an unreasonable seizure, but did not to protect D's privacy interest in being free from an unreasonable invasion and search of his home. • Since the cops had an arrest warrant for Lyons, this would have allowed them to enter Lyon's house and arrest him if they had reason to believe that he was in his home. (Payton) • Cops could have gotten a search warrant to search D's home for Lyons. This would have protected D's privacy interests.

Payton v. New York

Limit: No Warrantless Arrests At Private Residence Facts: Probable cause established to believe D killed a person. Cops went to his house without a warrant, broke open the door. No one was there but they seized evidence, which was in plain view. Riddick Case: Cops went to D's house, 3yr old son opened door, cops entered house and arrested D without a warrant for robbery. Issue: Can the police enter a suspect's home without a warrant to make a routine felony arrest? Held: NO Reasoning: • Absent exigent circumstances, the police may NOT enter a person's home to make an arrest without a warrant. • RULE - If you have an arrest warrant you can go into the arrestee's home if you have reason to believe that he is in his home. • An arrest warrant found on probable cause implicitly carries with it a limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe that the suspect is within.

U.S. v. Ceccolini:

NOTE - Facts: Cop casually, but without probable cause or a search warrant, opened an envelope on the counter of D's place of business and found papers indicative of gambling. Cop asked D's employee who the envelope belonged to and employee said it belonged to D. 4 months pass and cop tells FBI. FBI asks employee and employee implicates D again. 2 more months pass and employee gives statement at grand jury. Some time passes (don't know how long) and gives more testimony at trial. Is this final testimony sufficiently attenuated? Held: YES • Connection here was sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the 4th Amendment taint • In deciding whether a connection is attenuated the policies underlying the exclusionary rule require a distinction between physical and verbal evidence. • The greater the willingness of the witness to freely testify, the greater the likelihood that he or she will be discovered by legal means, and concurrently, the smaller the incentive to conduct an illegal search to discover the witness. • Witnesses are not like guns or docs that remain hidden from view until one turns over a sofa or opens a filing cabinet. Witnesses can, and often do, come forward and offer evidence entirely on their own volition. • "The Exclusionary rule should be invoked with much greater reluctance where the claim is based on a casual relationship between a constitutional violation and the discovery of a live witness than when a similar claim is advanced to support suppression of an inanimate object."

New York v. Harris:

NOTE - Facts: Cops have probable cause to arrest D for murder. They went to his apt without an arrest warrant, knocked, displayed their guns and badges, and entered. Gave Miranda warnings, D said he understood, and agreed to answer questions and thus admitted to the murder. D taken to station where he was again given his Miranda warnings, D signed an inculpatory statement. After a 3rd reading of his Miranda warnings, D indicated he wanted to end the interrogation. But, the DA interviewed him and the D made additional incriminating statements. Issue: Whether the signed statement should be suppressed because cops entered D's home in violation of Payton, which held police must obtain an arrest warrant to enter a home to arrest a suspected felon. Held: NO (S1 - inadmissible; S2 - admissible) • Where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the use of a statement made by a D outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton. • The rule in Payton was designed to protect the physical integrity of the home, not grant criminal suspects protection for statements made outside their premises. • There is no casual connection between a home entry in violation of Payton and a statement made by an arrestee outside the home Class Discussion: Court said the continued custody was lawful. This doesn't make sense to us because without the illegal arrest they would never have had him in custody. Harris is a troublesome case and should be cabined to its own facts.

Michigan v. Fisher

Objective Standard for Emergency Assistance Exigent Circumstance NOTE - Officers don't need ironclad proof of a likely serious, life-threatening injury. An exigency exists when there is "an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person within the house is in need of immediate aid. The reasonableness of an entry depends on an objective inquiry into appearances.

Gerstein

Really applies only to warrant less arrests at this point. The 4th Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on liberty following arrest. The determination must be made before or promptly after arrest (within 48 hours).

Illinois v. Gates

Overrules Aguillar-Spenelli in favor of totality of circumstances Facts: Police received a letter implicating D in drugs. The letter contained many details about the couple and their drug business, including how the D's would get the marijuana and when the next transaction would occur. Cops conducted an investigation and found much of the letter's information to be true. Cops secured a search warrant and found drugs. (informant had predictive information) Held: Probable Cause EXISTS here. Reasoning: • Court overrules 2-prong test in favor of a Totality of the Circumstances Test in order to determine a fair probability. (1 prong's strength can make up for a weakness in the 2nd prong). • Probable Cause requires only a Fair Probability or Substantial Chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity. • THUS, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. • Note - because an informant is right about some things, more likely right about other things. o If it's for an Arrest - fair probability that an offense has been/or is being committed by the person to be arrested o So Veracity and Basis of Knowledge are still very important.

Horton v. California

Plain View Doctrine Facts: Probable cause exists to search D's home for the proceeds of the robbery and for the weapons used. The Warrant issued only authorized a search for the proceeds. Cops search D's home but did not find the stolen property (coins). Instead they find weapons in plain view and seize them. Cops testify that while he was searching for the proceeds, he was also interested in finding other evidence (thus the seized evidence was not discovered "inadvertently") Held: Seizure here was VALID Reasoning: • When the police have a legal right to be where they are and they find incriminating evidence and the incriminating character is immediately apparent, the police may seize the evidence without a warrant under the Plain View Doctrine • However, the police cannot violate the 4th Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed. • Here, the items seized were discovered during a lawful search. When they were discovered, it was immediately apparent that they constituted incriminating evidence.

Coolidge

Prosecutor actively involved in investigation cannot issue valid warrant.

Kyllo v. U.S.

RULE: There is a SEARCH if: (1) The use of sense-enhancing technology to obtain (2) any information regarding the interior of the home (3) that could NOT otherwise be obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area is a SEARCH (4)...at least where the technology in question is not in general public use. Facts: Cops suspect D is growing marijuana in his home so they use a thermal imager to scan the home (shows heat images). Cops find that D's home was warmer than neighbor's and roof over the garage was hot. Based on the thermal imagine and tips, a warrant was issued and cops find marijuana. Held: This IS a SEARCH. Reasoning: • Obtaining by sense-enhancing technology, any information regarding the INTERIOR of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without PHYSICAL intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search, at least where as here the technology in question is not in general public use • Where the government uses a device that is not in general public use to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a "search" and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.

Thornton

Search of Car Incident to Arrest Issue: Whether Belton's rule is limited to situations where the officer first makes contact with the occupant while the occupant is inside the vehicle, or whether it applies as well when the officer first makes contact with the arrestee after the arrestee has stepped out of his car Held: Belton governs even when an officer does not make contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle.

New York v. Belton

Search of Car Incident to Arrest: Facts: D pulled over for speeding. Cop smelled marijuana and saw an envelope on the floor marked "Supergold" that cop knew was associated with marijuana. Cop arrested all men for possession and gave Miranda warnings. Cop searched passenger compartment of the car and saw D's jacket in backseat. Cop unzipped one of the pockets and found cocaine. Held: Search of both the car and inside of the jacket pocket was VALID Reasoning: • Bright-Line Rule from Belton - When a cop has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of a car, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that car. Thus, police may also examine the contents and containers found within the passenger compartment whether open or closed. (Arizona v. Gant takes some of the strength out of this Rule) o Doesn't matter that the containers could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested - Robinson. • The passenger compartment does NOT include the trunk. Side Note: What triggers a Search Incident to Arrest exception? A lawful custodial arrest • The arrest here was lawful because the cop had probable cause to arrest. Why? Because he could smell the weed and saw the "Supergold" envelope.

U.S. v. Robinson

Search of Person Pursuant to Arrest: Facts: D driving with a revoked license. It is conceded that cop had probable cause to arrest. Cop then searched D with a patdown. Feels object in D's breast pocket. After removing the object (a cigarette packet), and feeling something inside that were definitely not cigarettes, cop opened the packet and found capsules of heroin. Issue: During a lawful custodial arrest, is it reasonable to conduct a full search of the person being arrested? Held: YES Reasoning: • During a lawful custodial arrest, it is reasonable under the 4th Amendment to conduct a full search of the person being arrested including the removal and search of the containers found on the person. • Full Search - A search examining all of the contents in pockets and everything found in the pockets. RULE from Chimel and Robinson put together: IF there is: 1. A lawful, custodial arrest THEN, without a warrant or other justification, police may conduct: 2. A full search of the person arrested 3. And of the area within his immediate control (from which he can destroy evidence or get a weapon) 4. As a contemporaneous incident to that arrest.

Rakas v. Illinois

Standing to challange consent to search Facts: Cops pull over car fitting description of car used in a robbery. D's and 2 females were ordered out of the car. Subsequent search revealed a rifle and rifle shells. D's arrested. D's claim the search violated the 4th Amendment. They conceded that they did not own the car, they were just passengers, owner of the car was the driver. They did not claim to own the rifle or shells either. Prosecutor argues D's don't have Standing to object to the lawfulness of the search because neither the car, the shells, or the rifle belonged to them. Held: D's do NOT have STANDING. Reasoning: • 4th Amendment Rights are personal rights, which may not be vicariously asserted. A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his 4th Amendment rights infringed. • Jones held that "anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality." • Standard after Rakas: The phrase "legitimately on premises" is too broad. Instead, the rule is interpreted to mean that D can question the legality of the search if he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. • The fact that D's were "legitimately on the premises" in the sense that they were in the car with the permission of its owner is not determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the car searched. • D's did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in owner's car. (ownership of the guns or shells would not be enough)

Terry v. Ohio

Stop and Frisk Facts: Cop sees suspicious activity. Cop thinks they may be armed. Cop identifies himself as a cop, asked for their ID. They mumbled, he spun them around and pats them down and feels a gun in pocket, reaches in pocket and takes out gun. Held: Stop and Frisk VALID Reasoning: • When an officer observes unusual conduct that reasonably leads him to assume that criminal activity may be afoot and that the people he is interacting with may be armed and presently dangerous, the police officer may conduct a limited search for weapons of the outer clothing. • Justification for the STOP - Reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot • Justification for the FRISK - Reasonable suspicion that suspect may be armed and presently dangerous. • Reasonable Suspicion - A suspicion that is articulable and particularized o Important because at some point a judge will have to evaluate the "stop and frisk," like at suppression hearings. So cop has to be able to tell judge why he had a reasonable suspicion.

Michigan v. Long

Terry Frisk of an automobile Facts: Cops see a car driving erratically and at an excessive speed. It swerved off into a shallow ditch. Cops stopped to investigate. D (driver) met cops at rear of car, which was protruding from the ditch onto the road. After repeated requests for his license, D turned away from cops towards the car door. Cops followed and saw a large hunting knife on the floorboard on the driver's side. Cops stopped D and did a protective patdown, which revealed nothing. Cop then pointed flashlight in car to search for other weapons and saw something protruding out of the armrest. He lifted it and saw an open pouch of marijuana. D was then arrested for possession of marijuana. Held: Scope of the "car frisk" was REASONABLE Reasoning: • RULE: The search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas where a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. • Thus, a cop must have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is dangerous and can gain access to weapons to search the passenger compartment only where a weapon can be placed and D has to be able to gain immediate control of weapons. • Circumstances here justified cops in their reasonable belief that D posed a danger if he were allowed to reenter his car. • The search here was limited to those areas where D would generally have immediate control, and that could contain a weapon. Side Note - The search of the car started when the cop knelt into the car. Just flashing the light in would NOT be a search.

Wong Sun v. United States

The Attenuation Doctrine Facts: Cops arrested Hom Way for drug possession and says he got the drugs from "Toy" Toy answers door at his Laundromat, slams the door, and ran back into his home/Laundromat, and cops break door down, arrest Toy, find nothing, but they get a statement from Toy and go to Yee's house Cops just enter Yee's home and Yee surrendered his drugs and says he got drugs from Wong Sun (D) D's wife let cops in their home and D was arrested, no drugs found. All 3 leave on their own recognizance (promise to return) several days pass and all 3 return and give statements. (all agree there was no probable cause for D's arrest) Holdings and Reasoning: Standard: To decide whether it will be excludable fruit of the poisonous tree or not • We do not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question is whether the evidence has been come at by exploitation of the primary illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint • There is no suppression if the connection between the illegality and the discovery of the challenged evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. Toy's statements - INADMISSIBLE (as to Toy only) • Statements derived immediately from the unlawful invasion of his home. • There was no independent intervening act of free will because cops broke door down, 6 cops surrounded him, and he was arrested. • "Under such circumstances it is unreasonable to infer that Toy's response was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Drugs found on Yee - INADMISSIBLE (as to Toy and Yee himself) • Because Toy's statement regarding Yee is inadmissible, drugs found on Yee is inadmissible. Cops are exploiting the original illegality to squeeze something out of Yee (Cop says to Yee, "Toy says he got the drugs from you, Yee.") • Can Yee's drugs be used against Wong Sun though? YES - something can be attenuated as to one but not attenuated as to another. o Yee has standing. Wong Sun does NOT. It wasn't Wong Sun's 4th Amendment rights that were violated; Yee's 4th Amendment rights were violated. D's statements (when he went back) - ADMISSIBLE (as to everyone) • D's confession was NOT the fruit of his unlawful arrest (was sufficiently attenuated) because he was released and returned voluntarily a few days later where he was interrogated. (Independent intervening act of free will when Wong Sun came back voluntarily) (not exploiting the initial illegality) • Thus, the connection between his unlawful arrest and his statement had become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of illegality.

California v. Acevedo

The Automobile containing a Movable Container (worlds collide) Facts: Lots of evidence to think a bag contains marijuana. D walked to car and placed the bag in the trunk and started to drive away. Fearing loss of evidence, cop stopped D, opened trunk and bag and found marijuana. Issue: Whether the search of this closed container, which was in the trunk of the car, was justified under the Automobile Exception? Held: YES Reasoning: • When the police have probable cause that a container in a moveable car contains contraband, they may search the container without a warrant. However, their search must be limited to that specific container, unless they have probable cause that the car itself contains contraband too. • Side Note - Would this search have been valid under the Search Incident to Arrest exception if he had been arrested? NO - because the trunk is not in the passenger compartment. • Side Note - Thinking about Daza - Going into the trashcan and taking out the box would be OK because there is no more expectation of privacy when you throw something into the trash.

Michigan v. Chesternut

The mere following of D in a marked police car did NOT amount to a seizure. They didn't flash there lights, ask D to stop, or block or control the D's movements.

Shadwhick

The person issuing a warrant must be neutral and detached. Issuing person must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists, BUT this person need nto be a judge or law trained person, at least when issuing arrest warrants for misdemeanors.

Brigham v. Stuart

Warrantless Entry Exception: Exigent Circumstances-Emergency Assistance NOTE - Court allowed, under exigent circumstances exception, cops to enter a home without a warrant after witnessing an altercation in the kitchen that involved 4 adults and 1 child. • One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury. • It is reasonable for an officer to enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury. • An officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant. An entry is valid if the objective circumstances establish sufficient need to assist or protect an occupant. Thus, it did not matter whether the officers entered the kitchen to arrest the D's and gather evidence against them (as D argues) or to assist the injured and prevent further violence.

Hiibel

The principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop.

U.S. v. Matlock

Third Party Consent Facts: D arrested in his front yard for robbing a bank and put in the squad car. Cops went up to the house door where Mrs. G (who lived there with D and in the same bedroom as D) allowed them in and gave consent to search the house. Cops found the money. Held: The Consent here was VALID and thus the Search was VALID. Reasoning: • The consent of one who possesses common authority (mutual use) over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, non-consenting person with whom that authority is shared. o Landlord could not give consent for example. It has to be mutual use. • What scope does the consent give? Objective Reasonableness - We have to think about what is being searched for. The scope of the search will be limited to where the object can be found in the areas the 3rd person has common authority over. o The scope of a consent search is governed by a standard of "objective reasonableness." If it is objectively reasonable to understand a person to be giving consent to search her entire home, the entire home may be searched.

Illinois v. Rodriguez

Third Party Consent: Objective Officer Standard Facts: Woman says D beat her in an apartment. She consents to travel there with them so cops can arrest him. She referred to the apt as "our" apt and said she had furniture and clothes there. She unlocks the door with her key and gave cops permission to enter. They enter and see drugs in plain view. D moved to suppress arguing she moved out several weeks earlier and had no authority to consent to the entry. Evidence shows later that Woman did NOT have common authority. Issue: Is warrantless entry into a home and subsequent search constitutional where the police reasonably believe that the person consenting to their presence has the authority to do so but the person in fact does NOT possess such authority? Held: YES Reasoning: • The police may enter a home without a warrant if they reasonably believe the person who consents to their presence has the authority to do so • A warrantless entry and the subsequent search are valid provided the police REASONABLY BELIEVE that the person giving consent has the authority to do so, even though they may later learn that no such authority exists

Missouri v. McNeely (Supplement)

There is no "per-se" exigency for warrantless blood draws--You generally need a search warrant After arresting D for driving under the influence, a cop without getting a search warrant, took him to a hospital where his blood was drawn. Issue: Whether the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a per se exigency that suffices on its own to justify an exception to the warrant requirement for non-censual blood testing in drunk driving investigations. Held: NO • While the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, it does not do so categorically. Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case on the totality of the circumstances.

Whren v. U.S.

Using Probable Cause as a pretext/cover to support other hunches Facts: Cops patrolling a high drug area. They see a truck stopped at a stop sign for an unusual amount of time. Being suspicious, cops drive towards truck. Truck took a very fast right turn, did not signal. Cops pulled over truck and saw two bags of crack in D's hands. Everyone in car was arrested (Pringle). Issue: When a cop has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred, is the 4th Amendment violated if his primary reason for pulling over and detaining the motorist is NOT to enforce the traffic laws? Held: NO Reasoning: • When there is probable cause that a traffic offense has occurred, the cop's true motives for detaining the motorist do not invalidate the officer's actions under the 4th Amendment.

Miranda v. Arizona

Warnings: If a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must be informed of: 1. You have the right to remain silent 2. Anything said can and will be used against you in the court of law 3. You have the right to an attorney and to have the lawyer with you during interrogation 4. If you can't afford one, a lawyer will be appointed to represent you prior to any questioning if you so desire Miranda RULE: What does it require before a statement can be used in a criminal case? IF you have a statement stemming from: 1. Custodial 2. Interrogation Those statements MAY NOT be used to prove guilt WITHOUT: 3. Warning (the 4 things they list out) and 4. Waiver of those warnings (voluntary, knowing, and intelligent) 5. OR if the State comes up with its own fully effective procedural safeguard: At least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it. NOTE: Even for a person that knows his rights (like a lawyer) the Miranda rights still have to be given. NOTE: What if the cops don't have a lawyer? The cops can question but the questions and answers won't be admissible. It is not unconstitutional to question. Miranda is a rule of evidentiary exclusion.

Maryland v. Garrison

Warrant Requirements: particularity Facts: Police went to search an address specified in a warrant. It turns out there were actually two apartments on the third floor. THey serached the wrong one. Issue: does that make the serach unconstitional under 4a? I.e. did it violate teh particularity requirement? Rule: Warrant msut describe with particularity the palce to be serached and the things to be searched for. Rationale for particularity requirement: it is to prevent general searches. I.e. it limits both the addresses that teh officers can serach and the places in that address. If they are looking for an ilegal alien, they can't look in a suit case, etc. Holding: The warrant was valid bc it comported with teh knowledge the officers had. The acutal search was valid as well Reasoning: The officers failure was reasonable and understandable. Test: was teh officer's understanding of teh warrant reasonable? a) Place to be searched: Must be described with reasonable precision so POs know what they can/can't search. (1) Warrant is sufficient if it accurately describes what the officers reasonably believed to be the premises, does not have to accurately describe what turns out to be the place involved. [Garrison] (2) Not a 4A violation if POs engage in search before realizing that the warrant is too broad when warrant is invalid as applied. (Garrison) (a) In Garrison warrant for search of 3d floor apartment, but there are actually TWO 3d floor apts, searched the wrong apt found drugs before realized there were two.

Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden

Warrantless Arrest in a Residence and Search of the Home: Exigent Circumstances Exception Facts: D robbed and ran. Two cabbies followed him and notified cops where he was. Police arrived at the house; wife gave no objection (which is NOT the same as consent) when cops said they believed a robber entered the house. Cops search the house and found D along with a gun in the flush tank, ammunition in a drawer, and clothing in the washing machine that matched the robber's description. Held: Search was VALID under the Exigent Circumstances exception Reasoning: • We are worried about the public's safety and evidence being destroyed and escape here • Justification for looking in the washing machine - looking for weapons. o But how dangerous are these weapons when the D had already been found and they determined there was no one else there? The cop who found the weapons in the washing machine did not know that the cops upstairs had found D, so this search was OK. • Note - This is NOT a "hot pursuit" case. For it to be a hot pursuit case the cops would have to be in hot pursuit from where the crime happens to where the suspect ends up. Here, the taxi drivers were following him, not the cops. The pursuit has to be "immediate and continuous from the scene of the crime."

U.S. v. Santana:

Warrantless Arrests on Threshold of Home Issue: What is required for an officer to arrest a suspected felon in the threshold of the doorway to his or her home? Holding: Court held that a suspected felon who stood precisely in the threshold of the front door of her home was subject to warrantless arrest under the Watson holding.

Kentucky v. King

Warrantless Entry Exigent Circumstances: Preventing the Destruction of Evidence NOTE - Cops smelled weed coming from an apt. When they banged on the door and announced that they were the police, they could hear people shuffling inside and moving things. Thinking evidence was about to be destroyed they kicked the door down. Issue: Whether the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant rule applies when police, by knocking on the door of a residence and announcing their presence, cause the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence. Held: YES the exception will apply thus allowing warrantless entry. • Where the police do NOT create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the 4th Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.

Washington v. Chrisman

Warrantless Entry into Protected Areas While Accompanying an Arrestee NOTE - Facts: Student is suspected of possessing alcohol while he is under 21. He takes officers back to his dorm room so that he can present ID. While there, they find some MJ on his desk and arrest him for that. Another exception to the warrant requirement: This case held that an officer could enter an arrested student's dorm without a warrant because "it is not unreasonable under the 4th Amendment for an officer, as a matter of routine, to monitor the movements of an arrested person, following the arrest." • This case involved an arrestee who wanted to enter his dorm and acquiesced when the officer said he would have to accompany him. • Insofar as the monitoring requires a warrantless entry into a private place, the Court concluded that an "exception" is justified by the officer's compelling needs "to ensure his own safety" and "the integrity of his arrest." Unresolved: • The Court has not decided whether Chrisman would apply if an officer requested or commanded an arrestee to enter a private area NOR has it stated whether an officer has any authority to search areas nearby while exercising the authority to monitor an arrestee's movements.

Illinois v. McArthur

Warrantless Seizure: Preventing Likely Destruction of Evidence While Warrant is Obtained D's wife asked cops to accompany her to the trailer where she lived with her husband to keep the peace while she removed her things. When W came out, she told cops that H had weed. Cop knocked and asked to search but D said no. One cop went to get a search warrant and the other stayed outside and told D, who now was outside the porch, that he could not reenter the trailer unless a cop was with him. Cop came back with a search warrant and found weed. Issue: Whether officers who had probable cause to believe that D had weed in his home acted in violation of the 4th Amendment when they prevented him from entering the home for about 2 hours while they obtained a search warrant. Held: NO • Because it involved exigent circumstances, the restriction here was reasonable. • Cops here had good reason to fear that unless restrained, the D would destroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant.

Maryland v. King

When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA is ALLOWED. This is a reasonable police booking procedure under the 4th Amendment. • The procedure is reasonable even without a warrant or any individualized suspicion about the person tested. • The Court's holding is limited to individuals who are arrested and held for SERIOUS offenses. • The Court did not say what constituted a serious offense though....

Riley

a helicopter flying 400 ft. above was OK.

Maryland v. Wilson:

• During a traffic stop, cops can routinely order persons out of the car during the traffic stop, including passengers.

Silverthorne Lumber v. United States

• Physical evidence obtained in violation of the 4th Amendment, and information derived from such evidence, may not be presented at court or used by the government to help develop its case. • While the exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of illegally obtained evidence at trial, it is broader than that, prohibiting the government from using in any way information it obtains illegally. • However, if, after violating the constitution, the government can acquire the information through another, independent and legal method, it becomes admissible.