Descartes- The Meditations

On The Unreliability Of The Senses: Many experiences gradually weakened any - that I had in the senses... [examples include- - - and flaws in visual recognition]... To these causes for doubt I recently added two quite general ones. The first was that everything I ever thought I sensed while awake I could believe I also sometimes sensed while asleep, and since I do not believe that what I seem to sense in my dreams comes to me from things external to me, I saw no reason why I should hold this belief about those things I seem to be sensing while awake. The second was that, since I was ignorant of the author of my origin (or at least pretended to be ignorant of it), I saw nothing to prevent my having been so constituted by nature that I should be mistaken even about what seemed to me most true. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 6, page 95) Thus what I thought I had seen with my eyes, I actually grasped solely with the faculty of judgment, which is in my mind. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 2, page 68)

faith phantom limb pain

The Meditator reasons that he need only.... to doubt his present opinions in order to prompt him to seek - - for his knowledge. Rather than doubt every one of his - individually, he reasons that he might cast them ... if he can doubt the .... upon which his opinions are founded. Everything that the Meditator has accepted as most true he has come to learn from or through his senses. He acknowledges that sometimes the senses can -, but only with respect to - that are very small or far away, and that our sensory knowledge... is quite sturdy. The Meditator acknowledges that- - might be more deceived, but that he is....

find some reason sturdier foundations opinions all into doubt foundations and basic principles deceive objects on the whole clearly not one of them and needn't worry himself about that.

Descartes saw his Meditations as providing the - underpinning of his new physics. Like Galileo, he sought to overturn... injected into the Western tradition by Aristotle. The - thought of Descartes' day placed a great weight on the testimony of the senses, suggesting that all - comes from the - . The Meditator's - that all one's most - knowledge comes from the senses is meant to appeal directly to the - philosophers who will be reading the Meditations. The motivation, then, behind the--is to start in a position the Aristotelian philosophers would agree with and then, ..... Descartes is aware of how - his ideas are, and must pay lip service to the orthodox opinions of the day...

metaphysical two-thousand-year-old prejudices Aristotelian knowledge senses suggestion certain Aristotelian First Meditation subtly, to seduce them away from it revolutionary in order to be heeded.

This argument is plausible if Descartes means that the existence of the mind is better known than the existence of the body, but it seems that he wants to say that the nature of the mind is better known than the nature of the body. That is, Descartes wants to say that "I" know not only that the mind exists, but also "I" know more about the

mind than about the world outside the mind. This argument would only hold if every thought, perception, imagination, etc., told "me" something new about the mind. But, according to the cogito, all these thoughts tell "me" only one and the same thing: that "I" exist, and that "I" am a thing that thinks. Descartes is not as clear as we might like him to be as to what and how exactly each new thought makes the mind better known than the body.

Analysis: The First Meditation is usually approached in one of two ways. First, it can be read as .....that follow, where - is employed as a - tool against Aristotelian philosophy. Second, it can, and often is, read standing on its own as the foundation of- - . We will briefly discuss these - readings in turn.

setting the groundwork for the meditations doubt powerful modern skepticism complementary

Published year

1641

2 The Second Meditation is subtitled ..... and takes place the- - the First Meditation. The Meditator is firm in his resolve to continue his search for - and to discard as false anything that is open to the slightest doubt. He recalls - famous saying that he could shift the entire earth given one ...: similarly, he hopes to achieve great things if he can be certain of- - - . Recalling the previous meditation, he supposes that what he sees does -- that his - is faulty, that he has no senses and no body, that extension, movement and place are mistaken notions. Perhaps, he remarks, the only certain thing remaining is that .....

"The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body" day after certainty Archimedes' immovable point just one thing. not exist, memory there is no certainty

1 The First Meditation, subtitled .........opens with the Meditator reflecting on the number of - he has believed during his life and on the subsequent faultiness of the ... he has built up from these falsehoods. He has resolved to -- all he thinks he knows and to start again from the foundations, building up his knowledge once more on more certain grounds. He has seated himself -, by the fire, free of all worries so that he can demolish his former opinions with care.

"What can be called into doubt," falsehoods body of knowledge sweep away alone

Analysis The cogito argument is so called because of its Latin formulation in the Discourse on Method: ............ This is possibly the most famous single line in all of philosophy, and is generally considered the starting point for .... In it, the Meditator finds his first grip on certainty after the radical skepticism he posited in the First Meditation. The cogito presents a picture of the world and of knowledge in which the - is something that can know itself better than it can know anything else. The idea that we know our....has had a - hold on Western philosophy ever since, and how the mind can connect with- has ever since been a major concern. In this conception, the mind ceases to be something that helps us know about the world and becomes something inside .....

"cogito ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am"). modern Western philosophy mind mind first and foremost reality hypnotic which we are locked

Descartes' next move is a little more questionable. He asserts that "I" cannot know with certainty that what "I" perceive is real (as per the doubts of the First Meditation), but that sensory perception, as a form of thought, confirms that "I" exist ("I" being the mind.) Every time "I" perceive "I" am thinking, and in thinking "I" am enacting the cogito. Every perception confirms the existence of

"my" mind and only gives dubitable evidence for the existence of the world. Thus, Descartes concludes, the mind is better known than the body.

On Teleology:

...the entire class of causes which people customarily derive from a thing's "end," I judge to be utterly useless in physics. It is not without rashness that I think myself capable of inquiring into the ends of God. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 4, page 82)

QUOTES & MEANING But I have convinced myself that there is nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something, then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. [From Meditations on First Philosophy]

Ah, yes: the cogito, in all its glory. So, I'm basically saying that I definitely exist. But what am I actually talking about? It's funny you should ask... First, the backstory. This was all part of my quest to find a solid foundation on which I could build a stable and enduring system of knowledge. Is there any belief which is absolutely certain and indubitable? That's what I wanted to find out. With that goal in mind, I set out to reject as false any claim that was at all capable of being doubted. Now, we're not talking court-of-law reasonable doubt here—we're talking tiniest possible shred of logical doubt. I go so far as to envision a scenario in which an all-powerful demon is deliberately concerned to deceive me as far as he possibly can. Is there anything I can still know? Can I be certain there is a world out there—is there actually a table in front of me? No—this could all be a hallucination caused by the evil demon. But it's not only the world out there that's doubtful; my own physical body might be nothing more than a demon-caused illusion, too. That's beginning to worry me, though I guess that might mean I could skip the gym on Tuesdays. The scary thing is that this demon could be misleading me about even simpler, more basic things—making me falsely believe that 2+2=4, for example, or that a square has four sides. Doesn't everything become doubtful? No. Because even if I am being misled about everything, I know that I am being misled. Even if I doubt the existence of everything, I know that I am doubting. Let the evil demon do his worst, but from the very fact that I am thinking, doubting, being misled, it necessarily follows that I exist! The indubitable truth has been found.

On The Certainty Of His Meditations And Their Potential For Misinterpretations:

Although the arguments I use here do, in my opinion, equal or even surpass those of geometry in certitude and obviousness, nevertheless I am fearful that many people will not be capable of adequately perceiving them, both because they are a bit lengthy, with some of them depending on still others, and also because... they demand a mind quite free from prejudices and that can easily withdraw itself from association of the senses. Certainly there are not to be found in the world more people with an aptitude for metaphysical studies than those with an aptitude for geometry. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Dedication, page 49)

On Why One Can Invent Corporeal Ideas, But Not Divine Ideas:

As to the ideas of corporeal things, there is nothing in them that is so great that it seems incapable of having originated from me... There is another kind of falsity (called "material" falsity) which is found in ideas whenever they represent a non-thing as if it were a thing... Assuredly I need not assign to these ideas an author distinct from myself. For if they were false, that is, if they were to represent non-things, I know by the light of nature that they proceed from nothing; that is, they are in me for no other reason that something is lacking in my nature. If, on the other hand, these ideas are true, then because they exhibit so little reality to me that I cannot distinguish it from a non-thing, I see no reason why they cannot get their being from me. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 3, page 75

On Why He Couldn't Assert Immortality Of The Soul Immediately:

But because some people will perhaps expect to see proofs for the immortality of the soul in this [second] Meditation, I think they should put on notice here that I have attempted to write only what I have carefully demonstrated....... (Meditations On First Philosophy, Synopsis, page 54) [Note: Descartes has to spend a lot of time placating the crazies]

On Why "Everything That - To Exist Has A -" Includes The Non-_: Now it is indeed evident by the light of - that there must be at least as much [-] in the efficient and total - as there is in the effect of that same cause. For whence, I ask, could an - get its reality, if not from a -? And how could the cause give that reality to the effect, unless it also possessed that reality? Hence it follows that something cannot come into being out of -, and also that what is more perfect (that is, what contains in itself more reality) cannot come into being from what is less perfect. But this is manifestly true not merely for those effects whose reality is actual or formal, but also for ideas in which only objective reality is considered... As imperfect a mode of being as this is by which a thing exists in the intellect objectively through an idea, nevertheless it is plainly not nothing, hence it cannot get its being from nothing. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 3, page 73-74

Corporeal Begins Cause nature reality cause effect cause nothing

Objections and replies

Descartes submitted his manuscript to many philosophers, theologians and a logician before publishing the Meditations. Their objections and his replies (many of which are quite extensive) were included in the first publication of the Meditations. In the Preface to the Meditations, Descartes asks the reader "not to pass judgment on the Meditations until they have been kind enough to read through all these objections and my replies to them." Thus, this dialogue could be seen as an integral part of Descartes' views expressed in the Meditations.

We should note, however, the distinction between the "I think, therefore I am" as stated in the .... and the formulation we get in the Meditations: "So after considering everything very -, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is- - whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind." Neither "therefore" nor "I think" appear in the Meditations. The absence of "-" is important, since it dissuades us from reading the cogito as a -, that is, as a three-step argument as follows...

Discourse on Method thoroughly necessarily true therefore syllogism (1) Whatever thinks exists (2) I think Therefore (3) I exist

On "The Unicorn Defense":

From the fact that I think of God as existing, it does not seem to follow that God exists, for my thought imposes no necessity on things. And just as one may image a winged horse, without there being a horse that has wings, in the same way perhaps I can attach existence to God, even though no God exists. But there is a sophism lurking here. From the fact that I am unable to think of a mountain without a valley, it does not follow that a mountain or a valley exists anywhere, but only that, whether they exist or not, a mountain and a valley are inseparable from one another. But from the fact that I cannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from God, and that for this reason he really exists. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 5, page 89)

On Atheism:

Granted, it is altogether true that we must believe in God's existence because it is taught in the Holy scriptures, and, conversely, that we must believe the Holy Scriptures because they have come from God. This is because, of course, since faith is a gift from God, the very same one who gives the grace that is necessary for believing the rest can also give the grace to believe that he exists. Nonetheless, this reasoning cannot be proposed to unbelievers because they would judge it to be circular. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Dedication, page 47)

If his parents or some other imperfect being created him, this creator must have endowed him with the idea of God. If this creator is a finite being, we must still ask with respect to it how it came to possess the idea of an infinite God. We can trace this chain back through countless creators, but we must ultimately conclude that the idea of God can originate only in God, and not in some finite being.

Having concluded that God must necessarily exist, the Meditator asks how he received the idea of God. The idea cannot be adventitious, coming from without, nor can it be invented by the Meditator. Thus, the idea must be innate, and the Meditator must have been created by God with this idea already in him. He clearly and distinctly perceives that God is no deceiver, since all deception relies on some defect or other, and a perfect God has no defects.

The Meditator then moves on to ask how he comes to know of this "I." The senses, as we have seen, cannot be trusted. Similarly, he concludes, he cannot trust the imagination. The imagination can conjure up ideas of all sorts of things that are not real, so it cannot be the guide to knowing his own essence. Still, the Meditator remains puzzled. If, as he has concluded, he is a thinking thing, why is it that he has such a distinct grasp of what his body is and has such a difficult time identifying what is this "I" that thinks? In order to understand this difficulty he considers how we come to know of a piece of wax just taken from a honeycomb: through the senses or by some other means?

He first considers what he can know about the piece of wax by means of the senses: its taste, smell, color, shape, size, hardness, etc. The Meditator then asks what happens when the piece of wax is placed near the fire and melted. All of these sensible qualities change, so that, for instance, it is now soft when before it was hard. Nonetheless, the same piece of wax still remains. Our knowledge that the solid piece of wax and the melted piece of wax are the same cannot come through the senses since all of its sensible properties have changed.

Analysis Descartes draws an important distinction between properties such as heat, color, and taste on the one hand, and size, shape, and texture on the other hand: the latter are primary qualities while the former are secondary qualities. The Meditator can be certain with regard to the primary qualities of a body since he can clearly and distinctly perceive them. They are all geometric qualities and relate to the extension of a body in space, which connects with its essence. On the other hand, the Meditator can often be misled regarding secondary qualities because they are non-geometric and can only be perceived obscurely and confusedly

Here it might be useful to draw a distinction between sensory and intellectual perception. Sensory perception is perception using the imagination, while intellectual perception uses the understanding. In discussing a thousand-sided figure in the Sixth Meditation, Part 1, we concluded that the imagination can only give us a confused and obscure visual representation of geometrical figures whereas the intellect could clearly and distinctly perceive the figure no matter how many sides it has. Similarly, the intellect can grasp the primary qualities of body as they all relate to extension. However, there is no clear way that we can divorce secondary qualities from the imagination. I cannot easily think of the color red without thinking of the visual appearance of red.

But even as I speak, I put the wax by the fire and look: the shape is lost, the size increases; it becomes liquid and hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you strike it, it no longer makes a sound. But does the same wax remain? It must be admitted that it does; no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise. So what was it in the wax that I understood with such distinctness? Evidently none of the features which I arrive at by means of the senses; for whatever came under taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now altered—yet the wax remains...I must therefore conclude that the nature of this piece of wax is in no way revealed by my imagination, but is perceived by the mind alone. [From Meditations on First Philosophy]

Here, I am describing my famous "wax experiment." It's all about me trying to answer the question of what the identity of an object consists in, and how we make that determination. You know you've lain awake many nights worried about that same question—admit it. So, consider this piece of wax, first before it is brought before the fire (BF) and then after it is brought before the fire (AF). BF, the wax has a number of definite qualities—a certain size, shape, smell, and so forth. All these qualities are reported to me by my senses. But AF, all these qualities have changed. Yet it is still the same piece of wax, is it not? I thereby show that the senses alone do not tell me anything about the real nature of the wax. My senses report that BF and AF are totally different, and yet I know that the object in front of me is the same. How do I know? Because it's the mind that makes this determination. Think of it this way: I might say that I see a man walking down the street, but what I actually see is just a coat and maybe a hat. It is my mind that judges or infers that this is a man rather than, say, a body snatcher. I'm not saying the mind always judges correctly, of course—my view is that body snatchers are way more common than most people think. Call me paranoid, if you like, but I have a pretty good track record of being right in my paranoid musings. My grand conclusion is that it is the mind and the mind alone that tells us what the world is really like. This is the basis of my whole view of "rationalism."

On The Relation Between Philosophy And Theology:

I have always thought that two issues - namely, God and the soul - are chief among those that ought to be demonstrated with the aid of philosophy rather than theology. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Dedication, page 47)

Full title

Meditations on First Philosophy in which the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are demonstrated

Now there is in me a passive faculty of sensory perception, that is a faculty for receiving and recognizing the ideas of sensible objects; but I could not make use of it unless there was also an active faculty, either in me or in something else, which produced or brought about these ideas. But this faculty cannot be in me, since clearly it presupposes no intellectual act on my part, and the ideas in question are produced without my cooperation and even against my will. So the only alternative is that it is in another substance distinct from me—a substance which contains either formally or eminently all the reality which exists objectively in the ideas produced by this faculty (as I have just noted). This substance is either a body, that is, a corporeal nature, in which case it will contain formally everything which is to be found objectively in the ideas; or else it is God, or some creature more noble than a body...[But] God has given me no faculty at all for recognizing any such source for receiving these ideas; on the contrary, he has given me a great propensity to believe they are produced by corporeal things. So I do not see how God could be understood to be anything but a deceiver if the ideas were transmitted from a source other than corporeal things. It follows that corporeal things exist. [From Meditations on First Philosophy]

Okay, I'll admit that this is one of those rare cases where I was just a tad long-winded. For the benefit of all you Shmoopers, I will restate the argument much more briefly. I'm proving the existence of the so-called "external world," a world of physical objects. You got that much, right? Up to this point, all I have proven is the existence of myself and of God. How can I prove there is anything else out there? Things, for example. How do I know they exist? I have lots of ideas of physical things—for example, I've got an idea of a table in front of me right now. But how do I know that there is anything that corresponds to that idea? How do I know it's not just all in my mind? Well, everyone told my Aunt Agnes that her many complaints about her health were all in her mind, and then she dropped dead one day. See? You can only go so far with that kind of claim. Anyway, that was my original argument for the existence of the external world, but a lot people seemed unconvinced. So I came up with something still better. In a nutshell, I decided I had to figure out what was causing my ideas of physical objects. One possibility: some faculty in my mind that I don't know about is causing them. But, nah—it can't be that, since these ideas sometimes arise against my will. This pain I experienced after smashing my thumb with that hammer? Definitely not my choice. Then there are only two other options. Either God is causing me to have these ideas, or actual physical things are causing them. I'll admit that there is no way I can tell the difference here: things would appear exactly the same in either case. But I definitely have a strong tendency to assume that physical things themselves are causing my ideas of physical things. And if God set things up in such a way that this belief was mistaken and yet he gave me no way to determine what the truth really was, he would be a great deceiver. Think about it: could God sit back and say "Haha, got you, sucker!" as he saw me over and over again falsely claiming that an external world exists? Never. The God whose existence I proved is benevolent. Therefore I know it's not God but actual physical objects that are causing my ideas of physical objects. And that means that a world of physical objects exists independently of me. Now, these objects may not, in themselves, be exactly as they appear to me. But at least I can be certain that they exist. So, rejoice everyone—your iPhone is not just a figment of your—or God's—imagination.

Moreover, I know that there are many irreligious people who refuse to believe that God exists and that the human mind is distinct from the body - for no other reason than their claim that up until now no one has been able to demonstrate these two things. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Dedication, page 48)

On Atheism .2

I have seen two rather lengthy treatises [that respond to Discourse On Method], but these works, utilizing as they do arguments drawn from atheist commonplaces, focused their attack not so much on my arguments regarding these issues, as on my conclusions. Moreover, arguments of this type exercise no influence over those who understand my arguments, and the judgments of many people are so preposterous and feeble that they are more likely to be persuaded by the first opinions to come along, however false and contrary to reason they may be, than by a true and firm refutation of them which they hear subsequently. Accordingly, I have no desire to respond here to these objections, lest I first have to state what they are. I will only say in general that all the objections typically bandied about by the atheists to assail the existence of God always depend either on ascribing human emotions to God, or on arrogantly claiming for our minds such power and wisdom that we attempt to determine and grasp fully what God can and ought to do. Hence these objections will cause us no difficulty, provided we but remember that our minds are to be regarded as finite, while God is to be regarded as incomprehensible and infinite. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Preface, page 52)

On Atheism .3

There are two major conflicting interpretations of how Descartes views the ontology of secondary qualities. One is called sensationalism, and suggests that secondary qualities exist exclusively in the mind and not in any way in bodies.

Secondary qualities do not represent anything in the corporeal world, according to this interpretation, though they may be caused by things in the world. Sensationalism seems then to imply that when one perceives red, the mind is, in some sense, red. This claim sounds very odd and it is not entirely clear how we are to make sense of it.

Fifth Meditation: "The essence of material things, and the existence of God considered a second time"

The Fifth Meditation opens with the Meditator turning his attention toward material objects. Rather than inquire into the things themselves, he inquires into her ideas regarding material things. He concludes that he can distinctly imagine extension, size, shape, position, and local motion, which is associated with duration.

Fourth Meditation, Part 1: God is no deceiver

The Fourth Meditation, subtitled "Truth and falsity," opens with the Meditator reflecting on the ground he has covered so far, observing that all his certain knowledge, and in particular the most certain knowledge that God exists, comes from the intellect, and not from the senses or the imagination. Now that he is certain of God's existence, a great deal more can follow. First, he knows that God would not deceive him, since the will to deceive is a sign of weakness or malice, and God's perfection would not allow it. Second, if God created him, God is responsible for his judgment, and so his faculty of judgment must be infallible so long as he uses it correctly.

On further reflection, the Meditator realizes that even simple things..... Omnipotent God could make even our conception of mathematics -. One might argue that God is - - and would not lead him to believe - all these things. But by this - we should think that God would not - him with regard to anything, and yet this.... If we suppose there is,,,, then there is even greater likelihood of being deceived, since our imperfect senses would not have been created by a - -

can be doubted false supremely good falsely reasoning deceive is clearly not true no God, perfect being.

But we often make mistakes even with regard to what is harmful to us. For instance, a sick person may crave food or water even if food or water will only make him sicker. To begin answering this objection, the Meditator notes that while body is divisible, mind is indivisible. While we can break extended things into smaller parts, the mind can in no such way be divided up. There are different faculties of the mind: the imagination, the senses, the will, the intellect, etc., but these are not different parts of the mind. When the mind imagines, it is the whole mind that imagines, and not some part of it. Since the mind is totally indivisible and bodies can be easily divided, it is clear that the mind and body are two very distinct things. Further, there is only a small part of the body that can affect the mind. In Descartes' day, it was thought that the pineal gland was the seat of the "common" sense, which sends all sensory perceptions to the mind. Thus, the Meditator concludes, only the pineal gland can send messages from the body to the mind. A sensation in another part of the body must then be transmitted through the body to the pineal gland. Further, these transmissions must take place by means of nervous signals that have a limited range of expression. All these facts combine to suggest that sometimes the body is incapable of sending the right message to the mind.

The Meditator concludes that, on the whole, he can be quite certain of things that he had cast into doubt in the First Meditation. The senses are normally quite adequate in helping us get around in the world, and when in doubt, we can double-check our sensory perceptions with our intellect or our memory. The Meditator also notes that our memory can dispel the doubt presented in the Dream Argument. Any waking experience can be connected through memory to all other waking experiences, whereas in dreams, things happen in a disconnected and somewhat random manner. Since God is not a deceiver, the Meditator is safe from erroneous judgment as long as he applies her mind carefully.

Sixth Meditation, Part 2: Mind-body dualism

The Meditator muses that he has been puzzled as to why his mind seems particularly attached to one particular body, which he calls his own. Why does he feel pain and tickling in this body but not in any body external to it? And why should a tugging in the stomach of that body suggest to his mind that he should eat, since there is no obvious connection between the tugging and the decision to eat? He concludes that he is inclined by nature to assume the things he does about his body and about the world external to it, since he accepts these assumptions prior to developing any arguments regarding them.

Sensory perception is a passive faculty, and, as the Meditator has asserted before, there must be some active cause that creates sensory perceptions and this cause must reside outside of him. Either it could be other bodies with as much formal reality as the sensory perceptions have objective reality or it could be God or some other being capable of creating these perceptions. The Meditator is naturally inclined to suppose that sensory perceptions are created by things which resemble those perceptions, and he would be deceived if the perceptions were caused by some other means. Since God is no deceiver, God would not have misled the Meditator into thinking there are material objects if there were not, so the Meditator concludes that material objects must exist. His perception of most properties of material objects is confused and obscure, so his perception of them might not be perfect, but he can at least be certain of those properties that he perceives clearly and distinctly.

The Meditator next considers those ideas about body that he perceives only confusedly and obscurely, hoping that his knowledge that God is not a deceiver will help him further. First, he reasons that he must have a body, as nature teaches that to him more vividly than anything. Further, mind and body are intermingled to form one unit. If the mind were in the body like a sailor in a ship, he would be able to perceive pains and hungers by purely intellectual understanding. Instead, he feels these sensations sharply and directly as if his mind itself were suffering. The confused modes of thinking that arise with respect to these sensations result precisely because the mind and body are intermingled and the mind cannot survey the matter disinterestedly.

Fourth Meditation, Part 2: Will, intellect, and the possibility of error

The Meditator next looks at the source of his errors. They depend simultaneously upon the intellect (the faculty of knowledge) and the will (the faculty of choice, or freedom of the will). The intellect, however, only allows us to perceive ideas, not to make judgments on them, and so in this strict sense, it cannot be the source of error. In contrast to the intellect, which he knows is limited, the Meditator reflects that he could not conceive of his will as being any greater or more perfect. In all his other mental faculties-- memory, imagination, understanding, etc.--the Meditator realizes that God is endowed to a much greater degree than he is. But in freedom of choice, or the will, the Meditator realizes he is unlimited, and in this respect more than any other he resembles her creator. God's will may be greater in that it is accompanied by a greater knowledge and power and that it ranges over everything, but when considering the will in the strict sense, the Meditator concludes that his will is just as great as God's. Exercising the will consists simply in affirming or denying, pursuing or avoiding. The feeling of indifference is not a weakness in will but rather a lack of knowledge of what is the true or right course to pursue. Thus, God's will is only superior to our own in that God has supreme knowledge and can always will what is good.

Third Meditation, Part 2: Descartes' theory of ideas (cont.)

The Meditator reasons that all ideas are mere modes of thought, and in that sense they are all equal: they all have the same amount of formal reality, that is, reality intrinsic to themselves. However, what they represent differs greatly, and so their objective reality--the reality of the things they represent--also differs greatly. Thus, the idea of God has more objective reality than the idea of a tree, which has in turn more objective reality than the idea of the color red. Nonetheless, all three of these ideas are just ideas, and all have the same degree of formal reality. (The commentary section below will explain in more detail what is meant by "formal" and "objective" reality and what it means to have more or less reality.)

Having questioned these assumptions in the First Meditation, he finds that there is plenty of reason to doubt that material things are the way he is naturally inclined to assume they are. However, he believes he is now well enough equipped that he needn't doubt their existence entirely. First, he clearly and distinctly perceives that he is, in essence, only a thinking thing. Body is essentially extended and mind is non-extended, so he can conclude that he really is distinct from his body and could exist without it.

The Meditator reasons that imagination and sensory perception are modes of thought. He could conceive of himself without imagination or sensory perception, so they are not essential to him, but imagination and sensory perception could not exist without a mind to contain them. Similarly, there are modes of extension that cannot exist without a body to contain them.

The Meditator considers what he can know about the piece of wax, and concludes that he can know only that it is extended, flexible, and changeable. He does not come to know this through the senses, and realizes that it is impossible that he comes to know the wax by means of the imagination: the wax can change into an infinite number of different shapes and he cannot run through all these shapes in his imagination. Instead, he concludes, he knows the wax by means of the intellect alone. His mental perception of it can either be imperfect and confused--as when he allowed herself to be led by his senses and imagination-- or it can be clear and distinct--as it is when he applies only careful mental scrutiny to his perception of it.

The Meditator reflects on how easy it is to be deceived regarding these matters. After all, we might say "I see the wax," though in saying that we refer to the wax as the intellect perceives it, rather than to its color or shape. This is similar to the way in which we might "see" people down in the street when all we really see are coats and hats. Our intellect--and not our eyes--judges that there are people, and not automata, under those coats and hats.

Third Meditation, Part 1: clear and distinct perceptions and Descartes' theory of ideas

The Meditator then contrasts his natural assumption that adventitious ideas represent outside objects with his knowledge that he exists. He cannot doubt that he exists or that this fact follows from the fact that he doubts, because that truth is "revealed...by the natural light." Natural assumptions, on the other hand, are far less certain than the natural light, and have misled him in the past. Further, he has no reason to suppose that these ideas are adventitious at all. The will may have no effect on them, but they still may be produced from within him. And if they do come from without, there is no reason to think that they resemble the objects that they represent. For instance, the sun looks very small according to our senses, but astronomical reasoning suggests that it is in fact very large.

part ii: the Wax argument

The Meditator tries to clarify precisely what this "I" is, this "thing that thinks." He concludes that he is not only something that thinks, understands, and wills, but is also something that imagines and senses. After all, he may be dreaming or deceived by an evil demon, but he can still imagine things and he still seems to hear and see things. His sensory perceptions may not be veridical, but they are certainly a part of the same mind that thinks.

Sixth Meditation, Part 1: Cartesian body

The Sixth and final Meditation is entitled "The existence of material things, and the real distinction between mind and body," and it opens with the Meditator considering the existence of material things. The Meditator accepts the strong possibility that material objects exist since they are the subject-matter of pure mathematics, the truths of which he perceives clearly and distinctly. He then produces two arguments for the existence of material things, one based on the faculty of the imagination, the other based on the senses.

What does the Wax Argument show? What is it meant to show? Does it succeed?

The Wax Argument is meant to show that the mind is better known than the body. It does so by suggesting that everything "I" know about bodies "I" know through intellectual perception rather than through the senses. Since every act of thought reinforces the cogito that also suggests that "I" am a thinking thing, every act of thought brings me closer to understanding my own mind. We might question how accurate this assessment is, however. Every act of thought may reinforce the cogito, but that doesn't mean it brings me closer to an understanding of my mind every time. It just reinforces the same one piece of knowledge--that I exist. But perhaps Descartes is not thinking of items of knowledge when he says that the mind is better known than the body. Perhaps he simply means that it is known more distinctly, and a constant reinforcement of the mind's existence might help to give the distinct knowledge.

Descartes seems to want to escape the problems involved in clear and distinct perceptions by relying on God's existence to make them true. However, Descartes also seems to want to prove God's existence by claiming it as a clear and distinct perception. This further conundrum is famously called the "Cartesian Circle," and we will look at it more closely in the commentary to the Third Meditation, Part 3.

The discussion of the theory of ideas is a preamble to Descartes' attempt to prove the existence of God. According to Descartes, ideas are the atoms of thought, and all thought is made up of composite ideas. Descartes' suggestion that ideas are "as it were the images of things" is not meant to reduce ideas to being simply visual representations. We can have ideas of God, of justice, of how to fix the kitchen sink, none of which are necessarily accompanied by an image--hence the "as it were" that qualifies "the images of things."

Influence and legacy

The historical impact of the six meditations has been divided. The first two meditations, which employed the skeptical methodic doubt and concluded that only the ego and its thoughts are indubitable, have had a huge impact in the history of philosophy.[19] They are often considered as epoch-making for modernity, and an unavoidable first step for any modern philosophical thinking.[19][20] Arthur David Smith, author of the Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Husserl, claims that since Edmund Husserl usually refers only to "the first two" of the Meditations, therefore Husserl must have thought that they are the only part of Descartes' work with any philosophical importance at all.

The source of error, then, lies in this disparity between the scope of the will and the scope of the intellect. The will is unlimited and can affirm or deny any proposition, while the intellect is limited and can only clearly and distinctly perceive a small number of propositions. Most of what the intellect perceives is confused and obscure, like our sensory perceptions. The only time that we can be certain that we are judging correctly is in cases of clear and distinct perception. The question then arises of how we can know which perceptions are clear and distinct. Descartes' answer is that clear and distinct perceptions are those that the will cannot help but affirm. For instance, the Meditator finds it impossible to deny that he exists, since his every thought confirms his existence. On the other hand, he can doubt what he sees, as the Dream Argument (in the First Meditation) shows. Therefore, visual perceptions are not clear and distinct.

The objection could then be raised as to what we are to make of a fool who cannot help but affirm that 2 + 2 = 22. How can we know that our inability to deny the cogito or mathematical truths is not a result of a weakness of our own? The answer to this question is not at all clear, and it is hard to give a better answer than that the fool who thinks that 2 + 2 = 22 ought to think harder before affirming his judgment.

We should also note that Descartes is a proponent of free will. The Meditator asserts that only the will, of all human mental faculties, is on an equal footing with God's, because it is unlimited. The will is free to affirm or deny whatever it wishes. In fact, free will is the source of error: if God had not blessed us with free will, we would not blithely pass judgments on our confused and obscure perceptions and we would never make mistakes.

The problem of free will and determinism is a common one in philosophy, and it is important that we explain the compatibilist position of Descartes. The problem runs something like this: "if we are a part of nature and subject to nature's deterministic laws, how is it that we can have free will?" Descartes' answer is that we do not have the "freedom of indifference," that we could have acted differently. All his conception of free will requires is that we have "freedom from external constraint," that we don't feel we are being forced into behaving as we do. We behave under the idea of freedom, and that is enough to ensure that our judgments are made freely.

Analysis Having ascertained that he exists and that he is a thinking thing, the Meditator tries to determine how he can know these things, and whether he might come to know other things as well by similar means. He concludes that his knowledge of the cogito and the sum res cogitans are clear and distinct perceptions. Thus, he concludes, all clear and distinct perceptions (which he sometimes refers to as "the natural light") must be certain.

The reasoning here might seem a little circular. On one hand, the cogito is certain because it is clearly and distinctly perceived. On the other hand, clear and distinct perceptions must be certain because they are the means by which the certainty of the cogito is achieved. There is also the difficulty raised with the case of geometry and arithmetic. These truths seem clear and distinct to us as well, but there is still the possibility that we are deceived with respect to them. And if God can deceive us of our clear and distinct perceptions, perhaps even the cogito can be cast back into doubt.

The Meditator happily concludes that he can know at least that he exists, that he is a thinking thing, that his mind is better known than his body, and that all ....

clear and distinct perceptions come by means of the intellect alone, and not the senses or the imagination.

In the First Meditation, does the Meditator want to suggest the possibility of a universal dream or the universal possibility of dreaming? In other words, is he suggesting that all life might be one big dream or simply that we could be dreaming at any given moment for all we know?

There is no definite answer to this question, and it is debated among interpreters. Perhaps the interpretation more consistent with Descartes' wider project is the universal possibility of dreaming. We could see this idea, this measure of doubt, as meant to question the Aristotelian reliance on the senses without doing away with knowledge and the world altogether. If he were suggesting the possibility of a universal dream, the Meditator would be sweeping away a great deal more than just Aristotelian epistemology. Also, the Painter's Analogy which follows the Dream Argument seems to rely on the fact that there are things in this world that we can derive images from, which would suggest to us that the Meditator has not yet fully abandoned the notion of a material world.

What stops the doubt of the First Meditation? What kind of reasoning supports the cogito?

This crucial question is infuriatingly difficult to answer. While the classic formulation of "I think, therefore I am" is easy to read as a syllogism, that reading is probably inaccurate. After all, it comes at a time when the Meditator has cast even rational thought into doubt. More likely, the cogito is meant as an intuition rather than an inference. Part of the puzzle lies in the fact that the Meditator calls the cogito a "clear and distinct perception," but then goes on to suggest that we can only be certain of our clear and distinct perceptions once we have established that God exists. If that is the case, then the cogito is not confirmed at all until a bit later in the Meditations.

So there remains only the idea of God; and I must consider whether there is anything in the idea which could not have originated in myself. By the word 'God' I understand a substance that is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, and which created both myself and everything else (if anything else there be) that exists. All these attributes are such that, the more carefully I concentrate on them, the less possible that they could have originated from me alone. So from what has been said it must be concluded that God necessarily exists. [From Meditations on First Philosophy]

This is my main argument for the existence of God. You will appreciate my ingenuity even more if you realize what my starting point is: according to my argument at this juncture, all I know for certain is that I exist. How do I know there is anything else—bodies, other minds, fellow Shmoopers? All of this has to be proved, somehow, without my assuming the existence of anything other than my own mind. Well, my first step is to prove God's existence. Pretty natural, right? Obviously, before I can know that the table in front of me exists, I first have to know that a supreme being exists. (If that doesn't make sense, read on.) So, what I do is I show that the idea of God is the one idea in my mind that I could not possibly have caused. Now, I need to make a few tiny little assumptions to make this argument work. The main assumption is a little something I call Descartes's Principle (it has a nice ring to it). You remember the distinction I drew between formal and objective reality? That comes into play here. Descartes's Principle states that there must be at least as much formal reality in the cause of an idea as there is objective reality in the idea itself. Sounds pretty impressive, I know, but it's very simple and actually quite obvious once you think about it. All I'm saying is that whatever causes an idea must be at least as real—as perfect or complex—as what that idea is about. If I have an idea of a purple cat, the cause of this idea has to be at least as perfect or complex as a purple cat. As I say, it's pretty obvious when you think about it. Suppose there is some guy named Jack who you and everyone else thinks is a total doofus. But then it turns out Jack has just come up with an amazing, complex invention. And so you say, "Oh, well—I was wrong about old Jack. I guess he is actually a total genius." That's Descartes's Principle in action: we assume that the mind that comes up with an idea has to be at least as perfect or complex or evolved as the idea that it produces. So I go through some of the ideas in my head—ideas of rocks, animals, Desiree Hartsock. There is nothing in those ideas that is so complex that, according to Descartes's Principle, my own mind could not have created them. (Now I admit that I would not have thought that I could have come up with a scenario where someone accepts a marriage proposal from a guy after telling some other guy just two days earlier on national television that he was the true love of her life. But, then again, maybe I'm just more imaginative than I realized.) But then I come to my idea of God. (This is just where the above quote comes in.) According to Descartes's Principle, I could not have caused this idea myself, since the idea is of an infinite being, while I am only a finite being; the idea is beyond me in complexity and perfection. Instead, by my principle, only an actually infinite being could have caused this idea. Therefore, God must exist, as the cause of my idea of God. Now, I suspect this proof won't quite make you ready to accept God's existence if you are not already so inclined. But you have to admit it's pretty clever. (Somehow that seems to be the effect of most of my arguments.)

The discussion of sensory perceptions as being "caused" by some outside source marks an important turning point in the history of Western philosophy. The mind is sharply distinguished from the world of bodies around it. The Meditator argues that mind and body have nothing in common, so they must be two totally distinct substances. We could point out that Clark Kent and Superman are very dissimilar and are yet the same thing, and so argue by analogy that mind and body might be two very different ways of looking at the same thing. However, even the primary attributes of mind and body are different. Body is essentially extended, whereas mind is non-extended and essentially thinking. Since the two are totally different, the Meditator concludes that he is only mind, and not body. This is a step beyond what is stated by the sum res cogitans in the Second Meditation, as there the Meditator asserts that he only knows that he is a thinking thing. Now he knows that he is only a thinking thing.

This sharp distinction between mind and body is called "mind-body dualism" and has had tremendous impact on Western philosophy ever since. If sensory experience is in the mind and the bodies that cause our sensations are in the world, the question arises as to how the two can causally interact. What is the connection between mind and world? This has been a great concern in particular for the rationalist philosophers that followed Descartes--Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz being the most important--as well as for philosophy of mind in general ever since. When the mind and the world are held as totally distinct, the mind becomes conceived of as being trapped within the body, unable to know about the world except through a causal interface at the sensory surfaces. As mentioned in the commentary to the Second Meditation, Part 2, the causal interface generated by mind-body dualism has only begun to be questioned in the past hundred years.

Sixth Meditation, Part 3: Primary and secondary qualities

Though the Meditator can reach conclusions about his own body and also conclude that there are other bodies which are the source of his many sensory perceptions, there are certain claims about material things he is not justified in making. For instance, he cannot claim that the heat, color, and taste that he perceives resides in that object in the same way as it is present to his senses. Nature, as the combination of mind and body, teaches us to seek out pleasure and avoid pain, among other things, but it does not teach us to draw any conclusions about material objects based solely on sensory perception. Correct judgment in such matters depends on the intellect alone and not the senses. It would be unreasonable to infer from the sensation of heat or pain in approaching a flame that the heat or the pain reside in the flame itself. The fact of the matter is that the senses are meant only to inform us as to what is beneficial and what is harmful, and in that respect they are perfectly clear and distinct. Our mistake comes in expecting them also to inform us of the true nature or essence of the things we are perceiving, when they can only give us very obscure information in this regard.

The other interpretation is called physicalism, and suggests that secondary qualities exist both in bodies and in the mind, but in very different ways. Colors, for instance, manifest themselves in bodies as surface textures which reflect light. We might feel uncomfortable calling a surface texture a color, but the thrust of the physicalist argument is not that secondary qualities are present in the bodies themselves. Rather, the physicalist argument suggests that these surface textures are what cause color sensations to be present in the mind.

We should note that sensationalist and physicalist agree that secondary qualities do not reside in material objects, but that they also agree that secondary qualities are caused by objects. The debate is over what precisely we are to call the color, taste, sound, etc. The sensationalist wants to say that "red" is a sensation and the physicalist wants to say that "red" is a surface texture.

Third Meditation, part 3: the existence of God and the Cartesian Circle

When considering God as "a substance that is infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, and which created both myself and everything else," the Meditator realizes that the idea of God must have far more objective reality than he has formal reality: God is an infinite substance whereas he is only a finite substance. Since the idea of God cannot have originated in himself, he concludes that God must be the cause of this idea and must therefore necessarily exist.

The seventeenth century in Europe saw the culmination of the slow process of detachment of philosophy from theology. Thus, while philosophers still talked about - and even offered arguments for the existence of -

a deity, this was done in the service of philosophical argument and thought. (In the Enlightenment, the "Age of Reason", 18th-century philosophy was to go still further, leaving theology and religion behind altogether.)

On Truth And Clarity And Certainty:

am certain that I am a thinking thing. But do I not therefore also know what is required for me to be certain of anything? Surely in this first instance of knowledge, there is nothing but a certain clear and distinct perception of what I affirm. Yet this would hardly be enough to render me certain of the truth of a thing, if it could ever happen that something that I perceived so clearly and distinctly were false. And thus I now seem able to posit as a general rule that everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is true. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 3, page 70) The idea of God discloses to me something real... it is] an idea that is utterly clear and distinct... for whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be real and true and to involve some perfection is wholly contained in that idea. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 3, page 77) But once I perceived that there is a God, and also understood at the same time that everything else depends on him, and that he is not a deceiver, I then concluded that everything that I clearly and distinctly perceive to be true. Hence even if I no longer attend to the reasoning leading me to judge this to be true, so long as I merely recall that I did clearly and distinctly observe it, no counter-argument can be brought forward that might force me to doubt it. On the contrary, I have a true and certain knowledge of it. ... For what objections can now be raised against me? That I have been made such that I am often mistaken? But I now know that I cannot be mistaken in matters I plainly understand. That I have taken many things to be true and certain which subsequently I recognized to be false? But none of these were things I clearly and distinctly perceived. But I was ignorant of this rule for determining the truth, and I believed these things perhaps for other reasons which I later discovered were less firm. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 5, page 92) [Note: Notice how God's existence ties in (precedes?) this understanding of truth as clarity.]

The Meditations can be seen to follow the model of St. Ignatius of Loyola's Spiritual Exercises. The first step in the Jesuit exercises is to purge oneself of one's...In the First Meditation, Descartes leads us through a similar purgation, though with a - - . Here he wants to persuade his - readers to purge themselves of their prejudices. He also hopes to.... from the senses that are so heavily relied upon by the _. In the meditations that follow, he will argue that our - - knowledge comes from the mind unaided by the senses. Lastly, this process of radical doubt will hopefully rule out any doubts from the positive claims Descartes will build up in the next five meditations. Read in the wider context of the Meditations, these skeptical doubts are a means to the end of preparing a resistant audience to the metaphysics Descartes plans to build.

attachment to the material, sinful world. different purpose. Aristotelian lead the mind away Aristotelians most certain

Some ideas are ideas in the strict sense only, while others are ideas in the strict sense as well as something else. That "something else" can be volition, emotion, or judgment. Descartes is particularly interested in judgments, since these are the things we can

be wrong about, and he wishes to identify the source of error in order to identify the source of doubt. Most error in judgment has to do with identifying things in the material world, since that is where the mind tries to pass judgment regarding things outside of it. Thus, of innate, invented, and adventitious ideas, Descartes takes the greatest interest in adventitious (not inherent but added extrinsically) ideas. He realizes that often we assume we are perceiving things outside our mind without any degree of certainty or justification.

Reading the First Meditation as an effort to coax Aristotelians away from their - - allows us to read different interpretations into the different stages of -. For instance, there is some debate as to whether Descartes intended his famous "- - " to suggest the - - of dreaming--that though there is waking experience, I can never know which moments are - and which are waking--or the possibility of a universal dream--that my whole life is a dream and that there is no waking world. If we read Descartes as suggesting the universal possibility of dreaming, we can explain an important distinction between the Dream Argument and the later "- - -." The latter suggests that all .... and that we cannot trust the - one bit. The Dream Argument, if meant to suggest the universal possibility of dreaming, suggests only that the senses are- - and wholly - . The Dream Argument questions - - while the - - Argument does away with it altogether. The "Painter's Analogy," which draws on the Dream Argument, concludes that mathematics and other purely cerebral studies are far - - than astronomy or physics, which is an important step away from the- reliance on the senses and toward Cartesian - .

customary opinions doubt Dream Argument universal possibility dreams Evil Demon Argument we know is false senses not always reliable Aristotelian epistemology, Evil Demon more certain Aristotelian rationalism

However, the Meditator realizes that he is often convinced when he is - that he is sensing real objects. He feels certain that he is - and sitting by the fire, but reflects that often he has dreamed this very sort of thing and been wholly convinced by it. Though his present sensations may be dream images, he suggests that even - - are drawn from waking -, much like paintings in that respect. Even when a painter creates an - creature, like a mermaid, the composite parts are drawn from real things--women and -, in the case of a mermaid. And even when a painter creates something entirely new, at least the colours in the painting are drawn from real experience. Thus, the - concludes, though he can doubt - things, he cannot doubt the simple and universal parts from which they are constructed like shape, quantity, size, time, etc. While we can doubt studies based on - things, like medicine, astronomy, or physics, he concludes that we cannot doubt studies based on - -, like arithmetic and geometry.

dreaming awake dream images experience imaginary fish Meditator composite composite simple things

17th century philosophy is generally regarded as s

eeing the start of modern philosophy, and the shaking off of the medieval approach, especially scholasticism. It succeeded the Renaissance and preceded the Age of Enlightenment. It is often considered to be part of early modern philosophy.

The Meditator finds it almost impossible to keep his - - and assumptions out of his head, try as he might. He resolves to pretend that these opinions are- -in order to counter-balance his habitual way of thinking. He supposes that not -, but some evil demon has committed itself to - him so that everything he thinks he knows is false. By doubting everything, he can at least be sure not to be...

habitual opinions totally false God deceiving misled into falsehood by this demon.

On Thought And Forms: Rather, the very nature of an - is such that of itself it needs no - - other than what it borrows from my thought, of which it is a -. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 3, page 76) I am a -. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 3, page 76

idea formal reality mode substance

On Self-Knowledge Never Being Wrong: Now as far as - are concerned, if they are considered - and in their own right, without being referred to something else, they cannot, properly speaking, be -. For whether it is a she-goat or a chimera that I am imagining, it is no less true that I imagine the one than the other. Moreover, we need not fear that there is - in the - itself or in the affects, for although I can choose evil things or even things that are utterly non-existent, I cannot conclude that it is untrue that I do ... Thus there remain only - in which I must take care not to be mistaken. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 3, page 71) [Note: Above passage seems to hint at an is-ought distinction.]

ideas alone false falsity will choose these things. judgments

On God's Existence:

n fact the idea I clearly have of the human mind - insofar as it is a thinking thing, not extended in length, breadth or depth, and having nothing else from the body - is far more distinct than the idea of any corporeal thing. And when I take note of the fact that I doubt, or that I am a thing that is incomplete and dependent, there comes to mind a clear and distinct idea of a being that is independent and complete, that is, an idea of God. And from the mere fact that such an idea is in me, or that I who have this idea exist, I draw the obvious conclusion that God also exists, and that my existence depends entirely upon him at each and every moment. This conclusion is so obvious that I am confident that the human mind can know nothing more evident or more certain. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 4, page 81) However, as far as God is concerned, if I were not overwhelmed by prejudices and if the images of sensible things were not besieging my thought from all directions, I would certainly acknowledge nothing sooner or more easily than [God]. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 5, page 91). For just as the objective mode of being belongs to ideas by their very nature, so the normal mode of being belongs to the causes of ideas, at least to the first and preeminent ones, by their very nature. And although one idea can perhaps issue from another, nevertheless no infinite regress is permitted here; eventually some first idea must be reached whose cause is a sort of archetype that contains formally all the reality that is in the idea merely objectively. (Meditations On First Philosophy, Meditation 3, page 74)

Then, he wonders, is not he, the source of these meditations, ....? He has conceded that he has no ...., but does that mean he cannot exist either? He has also noted that the - - does not exist, which might also seem to imply his -. And yet to have these doubts, he must exist. For an evil demon to mislead him in all these insidious ways, he must....There must be an "I" that can doubt, be deceived, and so on. He formulates the famous - argument, saying: "....."

not something senses and no body physical world nonexistence exist in order to be misled. cogito So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind

Read on its own, the First Meditation can be seen as presenting skeptical doubts as a subject ... Certainly, skepticism is a much discussed and hotly debated topic in -, even today. Descartes was the first to raise the mystifying question of ....about the world around us. The idea is not that these doubts are -, but that their possibility can never be entirely ruled out. And if we can never be certain, how can we claim to know anything? Skepticism cuts straight to the heart of the ... and its attempt to provide a certain foundation for our - and understanding of the world. It can even be pushed so far as to be read as a challenge to our very notion of -.

of study in their own right philosophy how we can claim to know with certainty anything \probable Western philosophical enterprise \knowledge rationality

We should note that Descartes' doubt is a methodological and rational doubt. That is, the Meditator is not just doubting everything at random, but is providing solid reasons for his doubt at each stage. For instance, he rejects the possibility that he might be mad, since that would undercut the rationality that motivates his doubt. Descartes is trying to set up this doubt within a rational framework, and needs to maintain a claim to rationality for his arguments to proceed.

skeptical doubts

This argument is another move against the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, according to which all knowledge comes from the senses. Descartes acknowledges that the senses inform us about

the world, but asserts that the senses can only give us disorganized information. Without the intellect, we could make no sense of what we perceive. Descartes thus places himself firmly in the rationalist camp, as compared to empiricists such as Aristotle or Locke who argue for a sense-based theory of knowledge.

The Meditator's next question, then, is what...?. He initially thought that he had a -, by means of which he was nourished, moved, could sense and think; and also that he had a -. All these attributes have been cast into doubt, except one: he cannot doubt that he -. He may exist without any other of the above attributes, but he cannot exist if ..... Further, he only exists as long as he is thinking. Therefore, thought above all else is - from being. The Meditator concludes that, in the strict sense, he is only a ....

this "I" that exists is soul body thinks he does not think inseparable thing that thinks.