Epistemology (PHRE 370) Quiz 1

Why do our "physical world" beliefs continue to be justified for us? (According to Russell)

They are part of the BEST explanation (or, at least, a very good explanation) of our experience

Kant's actual refutation

"I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception. This permanent cannot, however, be something in me, since it is only through this permanent that my existence in time can itself be determined. This perception of this permanent is possibly only through a thing outside me... and consequently the determination of my existence in time is possibly only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me"

Candidates for foundational beliefs (Part II)

- Beliefs arising through the faculties of perception, memory, introspection, reasoning - Less basic beliefs: "I see that p" or "I remember that q" - More basic beliefs: "I seem to see that p" or "I seem to remember that q" - Beliefs arising from the operation of a reliable belief producing faculty

Induction/probabilistic inference

'Most bulldogs love Truman students' supports the conclusion that 'This bulldog loves Truman students'

Abduction (Inference to the Best Explanation)

'The olives are gone' supports (because it is best explained by) 'Chad ate them.'

Internalist Justification

- "In the head" - Determined by things one is introspectively aware of (beliefs and other internal mental states) - Results more or less from believing in epistemically responsible ways

Why not Strong Foundationalism? (Tim McGrew's defense of classical foundationalism)

- "Strong" foundations: "certain" ~ McGrew waffles between classifying foundational beliefs as "certain" and classifying them as "incorrigible" (more accurately, "infallible") - Weak (non-deductive) supports relations ~ Inference to the best explanation: explanations are justified by the phenomena/evidence they explain

BonJour's reply to the Externalist

- A person is not rational or responsible in holding a belief that, though external justified, the person has no reason to believe - So the person isn't justified in holding the belief

The method of radical doubt: Descartes' mental housecleaning

- Aim: get rid of the errors of his youth - But how much error is there? (some reason to doubt --> possible some error) - So, suspend belief in everything that's the least bit doubtful

Candidates for foundational beliefs:

- Certain - Indubitable - Incorrigible - Infallible

The "availability" of one's supporting reasons

- Does a person have to "have available" the reasons for a belief, in order to be justified in holding that belief? - Or is it enough for the reasons to play some causal role in the belief formation/maintenance?

Does the possibility of dreaming create doubt?

- Dreaming state similar to waking state--so how do I figure I'm not dreaming now - One concession: couldn't have some ideas (math ones) without there being real objects corresponding to them - Math is true in both sleep and wakefulness

BonJour's reply to the Internalist (one more dilemma)

- Either justifying states are cognitive states OR they are not - In either case, the states are inadequate as foundations

Illustrating "a belief is probable only in relation to other beliefs"

- Genevieve believes Rupert is home, but is not completely certain - That belief she is made probable for her by her belief that when she rang the doorbell she heard a noise from inside - So her belief about Rupert is supported by her belief about that strange sound

Kinds of skepticism

- Global kind (e.g. Descartes) - Narrower kinds that question... a) objectivity of science b) rationality of religious belief c) justification for beliefs about the future

G. E. Moore's "Proof of an External World"

- Here is one hand, and here is another - Therefore, there exists at least two objects outside of our minds.

A skeptical response to Moore

- I don't know that I'm not a brain-in-a-vat -If I don't know that I'm not a brain-in-a-vat, then I don't know that I have hands - Therefore, I don't know that I have hands

McGrew: what's wrong with not completely certain foundations

- If a belief is not certain, the it is merely probable - But a belief is probable only in relation to other beliefs - So merely probable beliefs are not foundational; they are supported by the beliefs that make them probable

Introspective states as cognitive states

- If the states are cognitive, then they will be in as much need of justification as any belief - After all, they involve some propositional content, which can be true or false - So we need to justify them too - Thus, they can't serve as justifying foundations

Bertrand Russell's skepticism

- Instinctive beliefs are "innocent until proven guilty"--i.e. they are justified until we have reason to reject them - Among those instinctive beliefs are many about the external world - As long as those beliefs are part of a simple, systematic account of experience, we are justified in continuing to hold them

Externalist justification

- Justification is determined by the connection of one's beliefs with one's environment - A belief is justified if: it's caused in the right way, or the process that produces it meets a certain standard of reliability - One needn't be aware of the justifiers of a belief for it to be justified

Externalist response to the Epistemic Ascent Argument

- Nope, Mr BonJour, basic beliefs don't need to be backed up by reasons available to the believer - It's enough that they are produced in the right sort of way - So there don't have to be further foundations for the foundational beliefs

The Foundationalist Solution

- Not all beliefs get their justification via relations to other justified beliefs - There's no circle or infinite regress because the justificatory chains stop at the foundational beliefs

BonJour's preliminary principles

- One's epistemic justification for a belief indicates why the belief has some connection to the truth - To be justified in holding a belief, a person has to have the belief's justification "available" to her or him

Basic claims of foundationalism

- Some beliefs--the foundational (or basic) ones--have some degree of justification apart from their relation to other beliefs - Other beliefs are justified by being appropriately related to the foundational ones

What does it take for a non-basic belief to be justified (counterexample)?

- Some of my beliefs (that I'm not thinking about) are good reasons for believing that Fred ate the last eggplant - I only come to that belief via randomly guessing it

What does it take for a non-basic belief to be justified?

- The belief is supported by other beliefs the agent holds

Moore's Conditions of Adequacy for the Proof

- The premise is different from the conclusion - The conclusion follows from the premise - The premise is known

Kant's Refutation of Idealism

- The refutation is (part of) Kant's answer to the "scandal of philosophy" of no adequate proof of the existence of an external world - Attempts to show that complete global skepticism is not viable ~ Some beliefs of ours are true ~ There are things "outside us"

Some responses to skepticism

- The skeptic is just wrong - The skeptic has too high a standard for the justification/knowledge he's trying to undermine

Infinitism (advocated by Peter Klein)

- The view that beliefs are justified only on the basis of other justified beliefs - Accepts that every complete justification involves an infinite number of justifying reasons - Beliefs can be provisionally justified with a finite number of reasons from the infinite justifying chain

Internalist response to the Epistemic Ascent Argument

- What justifies foundational beliefs are not other beliefs, but introspectively accessible states of the believer - These states are something like mental images or intuitive apprehensions

Hillary Putnam's Brain-in-a-Vat Argument

- What our words refer to is determined by what is causally involved in our coming to use them - Suppose we are brains in vats - Then what we refer to by 'brains in vats' is, by the 1st premise, the parts of the computer responsible for giving us experiences of "brains" and "vats." Those computer parts are what are causally involved in our coming to use the terms 'brains' and 'vats.' - But then, when we say, 'we are brains in vats,' what we are saying is that we are parts of a computer - But we are NOT parts of a computer - So 'we are brains in vats' is false

Epistemic Regress problem

- Where do those "other beliefs" get their justification? - From still other beliefs, of course - And those beliefs are justified on the basis of still more beliefs, and so on: either ad infinitum, or until one gets back to the initial beliefs

Where foundationalist theories principally differ:

- Which beliefs are the foundational ones - What the "supports" relations are

Justification for basic beliefs perhaps only "prima facie"

- You're justified in the absence of reasons to the contrary - The justification can be "defeated" by those opposed reasons

Introspective states as non-cognitive states

-If the states are non-cognitive, then they won't be able to provide reasons for one's belief, since reasons are propositions - So the states can't justify one's foundational beliefs - Hence these states can't serve as foundations, either

Argument from Epistemic Ascent (2 horns)

1) If the believer has no reasons available for holding the foundational beliefs, then one is not epistemically justified in holding them, after all: one has available no reasons to think them true 2) If the believer DOES have reasons available for the foundational beliefs, then the beliefs don't look to be foundational anymore

Why be a foundationalist?

1. Accords with the ways beliefs are actually adopted a. Some beliefs held on the basis of others b. Others arise in a more immediate, non-inferential way 1. Accords with intuitions about justification a. Some beliefs justified even though they are not believed on the basis of others b. Justification is "linear": a (non-foundational) belief is supported by a chain of other beliefs 3. Solves the epistemic regress problem

Questions about Infinitism

1. Infinitists believe that every justification is provisional, not complete. Is that realistic? 2. Could we have an infinite number beliefs 3. If not, could the infinities still somehow allow that others have justification for our beliefs

The anti-foundationalist claim that leads to the problem:

A belief can ONLY be justified on the basis of other justified beliefs

Justification via inference to the best explanation:

From... - I have experience E - The best explanation of E is X ... we can infer that X is true

Non-basic belief

Justified if it is based on beliefs that support it

Concept of justification of interest

Something like reasonableness (with respect to epistemic goals) or lack of epistemic blame (you've done what you're allowed to do as an epistemic agent)

Consequence of BonJour's 2 preliminary principles

To be justified in holding a belief, a person has to have "available" to her or him reasons for thinking the belief true

Are our physical world beliefs really part of the best explanation of our experience?

Whatcha think???

The Basing Relation

When A is believed on the basis of B, B need not be the original basis for believing A

Indubitable

can't be doubted

Incorrigible

can't be refuted

Infallible

can't be wrong

Cognitive states

involves a representation/thought/attitude concerning some proposition

Certain

is not doubted

Deduction

p & (p --> q) supports q