Functionalism

What is the functionalist definition of the mind

All it is to have a mind is to have a system of internal states that causally interact with one another in the right ways and are caused by the right physical inputs and cause the right physical outputs

Give a functionalist definition of a specific mental state (such as pain)

(What makes something going on in my brain a pain or a belief or a desire or a memory etc. is the way it functions with respect to the production of behavior, given appropriate physical inputs) Construes the concept of causal role in such a way that a mental state can be defined by its causal relations to other mental states. o According to functionalism, we can define what each mental state is by reference to its mediating role o A Parallel: What makes something a mousetrap? Answer: the way it functions

In what way is the mind like a mousetrap? o What is a functional concept? Give an example. o What part of the functionalist definition of pain refers to a functional concept?

Both are functional concepts. o Something is a mousetrap if and only if it is designed to take a live mouse as input and deliver a trapped or a dead mouse as output o The concept mousetrap is functional concept o Likewise, the concept PAIN, the concept of FEAR, the concept MEMORY, etc are concepts -Functional concept (Construes the concept of causal role in such a way that a mental state can be defined by its causal relations to other mental states. ) -the mental state that occupies the pain role in the organism

In what way is the mind like a game? o What is a cluster concept? Give an example. o What part of the functionalist definition of pain refers to a cluster concept?

Both have a set of necessary and sufficient conditions in order for them to be called a game or a mental state. Conditions not individually necessary for something to be a game or mental state. But they are jointly sufficient. We count something as a game if and only if it has enough of the above features that are typical of games Mental concepts, according to functionalism are both functional and cluster concepts Pain- caused by bodily damage Causes anxiety Causes nursing Causes the desire that it cease Causes groaning Causes the attempt to move the body away Preliminary functionalist proposal: What makes it true that a creature is in pain at a particular moment is that it have something going on inside it (in its brain) at that moment that has enough of the above casual features What is true for pain is true for all other mental state types Each mental state type is definable by reference to its normal causal role

What does functionalism hold to be true about the mind?

Functionalism is the doctrine that what makes something a thought, desire, pain (or any other type of mental state) depends not on its internal constitution, but solely on its function, or the role it plays, in the cognitive system of which it is a part. More precisely, functionalist theories take the identity of a mental state to be determined by its causal relations to sensory stimulations, other mental states, and behavior. (To account for the multiple realizability of mental states)

CASE: o What does the functionalist say about the Perfect Actor? Is the Perfect Actor a challenge for Functionalism? Why/why not?

In a well-known version of this argument, one imagines that there could be "Super-Spartans" who never exhibit pain behavior (such as flinching, saying "ouch") or even any dispositions to produce pain behavior (Putnam 1963). functionalism says that what makes something a mental state is what it does, and it is fully compatible with the diverse brains of mammals, reptiles, and mollusks that they all have mental states because their different brains do the same things, that is, they function in the same ways. Functionalism is supported because it is a theory of mind that is compatible with the likely degree of multiple realization of mental states. P1. If behaviorism is true, it is not possible for there to be a perfect actor or doppelgänger who behaves just like me but has different mental states or none at all. P2. But it is possible for there to be a perfect actor or doppelgänger who behaves just like me but has different mental states or none at all. P3. Therefore, behaviorism is not true. (by modus tollens)

What is tacit knowledge? o What about mental states does the Functionalist say we have tacit knowledge of?

Knowledge that can not be easily transferred or understood simply by vocalizing it. It is skill based knowledge about how to do something. We have tacit or implicit knowledge for the causal roles of mental states and the relevant inputs,outputs, interactions, not necessarily the explicit knowledge to accurately vocalize those specific functions.

• Functionalism is supposed to be a physicalist/materialist view. At the same time, Functionalism doesn't identify mental states with brain states. Why might this seem like a problem for the Functionalist? How would they respond? o What is the Coke machine example (or the Pain*/Worry* example) supposed to prove about functionalism? How?

Materialist believe that each type of mental state is identical with a particular type of neural state. This thesis seems to entail that no creatures with brains unlike ours can share our sensations, beliefs, and desires, no matter how similar their behavior and internal organization may be to our own. Functionalist could respond with their claim that mental states are multiply realized, while this means that in humans certain types of mental states could be identical to certain brain states, it allows other species to share the same mental states as long as the functional and cluster concepts are the same. They prove they can define mental states without any mental language with a purely function definition. Pain is functionally definable in a way that users no mental language; and so are all the other mental state types - according to functionalists All it is to have a mind is to have a system of internal states that causally interact with one another in the right ways and are caused by the right physical inputs and cause the right physical outputs

CASE:o What does the functionalist say about the Masochist? Is the Masochist a challenge for Functionalism? Why/why not?

Pain-in-the-normal-human is caused by bodily damage, causes distress, etc. Pain-in-the-masochist is caused by bodily damage, causes sexual arousal, etc. There are many different functional definitions of pain, each appropriate to different contexts. The fact that pain has different causes and effects for different people doesn't show that pain can't be defined as a state that has a certain causal profile; it only shows that there are different kinds of pain. The masochist's pain is pain because it's a state that typically causes avoidance and distress; i.e. for most people in this state, the state causes avoidance and distress. Psychosomatic pain is pain because it's a state that's typically caused by bodily damage; i.e. for most people in this state, the state has been caused by bodily damage.

CASE: o Does a completely paralyzed person feel pain, according to the Functionalist? Why/why not?

People who are paralyzed and people who are on drugs may be unable to exhibit any of the behaviour usually associated with pain.

CASE: o Does the brain in a vat still have mental states, according to the Functionalist? Why/why not?

The mental internalist (about features of type T) holds that, since the brain-in-a-vat is a duplicate of what's in your head, it must share your mental features(of type T) aswell

• Why does the functionalist define mental states in terms of functions, rather than identifying them with brain states? That is, what's the problem for Type Identity theorists that Functionalists are trying to avoid? o How do they avoid this problem?

The problem of multiple realizability. Organisims with different brain compositions would not be able to experience the same mental states as humans. They avoid this by defining a mental state as All it is to have a mind is to have a system of internal states that causally interact with one another in the right ways and are caused by the right physical inputs and cause the right physical outputs

• Consider the following cases and answer on behalf of the Functionalist. Explain and defend your position in Functionalist terms. Consider any counter-arguments or challenges to your position. Note: Some cases may have more than one reasonable answer.

These examples show that pain cannot be defined in terms of its causes and effects. It should be easy to see how similar problems arise for other mental states. This is the multiple realizability argument against functionalism. Each type of mental state can be realized by many types of functional states

• Which other positions that we've studied are compatible with functionalism?

identity theory materialism sort of dualism that takes mental states to cause, and be caused by, physical states. Introspective Belief

• Can you compare and contrast common-sense functionalism and empirical functionalism?

o Common sense: mental states lie behind and cause behavior and they are caused by inputs to the body of one sort or another ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

• How does Functionalist differ from Behaviorism? Why isn't Functionalism just Behaviorism?

o Is this just Behaviorism? -no According to functionalism: Mental states are tokened (proved) in the brain Mental states lie behind and cause behavior So, mental states are not to be identified with behavior or with dispositions to produce behaviors

CASE: o Does the Super Stoic still feel pain, according to the Functionalist? Why/why not?

super-spartans' or 'super-stoics' — a community in which the adults have the ability to successfully suppress all voluntary pain behavior. They may, on occasion, admit that they feel pain, but always in pleasant well-modulated voices ...They do not wince, scream, flinch, sob, grit their teeth, clench their fists, exhibit beads of sweat, or otherwise act like people in pain ...However, they do feel pain, and they dislike it (just as we do)., They even admit that it takes a great effort of will to behave as they do

• What problem exists for Empirical Functionalism (but not for Common-sense Functionalism)?

• Couldn't there be creatures who share some of our mental states by whose __ scientific level is different from ours?