INTL 4440 Mid Term

Intelligence Producer:

"A phrase usually used to refer to an organization or agency that participates in the production step of the intelligence cycle."

TECHINT

"In addition to providing original information to policymakers, human sources are necessary to clarify or explain the data gathered through more technical means of collection. Although technology breakthroughs have enabled TECHINT to shoulder an increasing share of the information collection burden in the Post Cold War era, policymakers should be wary of measures that upset the delicate synergy between HUMINT and TECHINT. As Jeffrey Richelson notes: The increasing capability to collect intelligence via technical means has reduced reliance on human sources; however, human sources are not inconsequential. Such sources can be used to fill gaps - in some cases important gaps - left by technical collection systems."

Gorillas in the Stovepipes-

"Of concern, too, was another first-order issue: how to organize the intelligence agencies—and, especially, how to overcome the problem of "gorillas in the stovepipes." Here was more jargon, referring to the individual intelligence agencies acting separately (as if in isolated stovepipes) under the leadership of their own strong program managers (the gorillas, such as the NSA director) and beyond the control of the DCI.

Analytic Stovepipes:

"stovepipe problem"= physical barriers, now psychological barriers that cause a lack of trust/ communication between analysts and operators. As Defense HUMINT grows, perhaps the same problem will arise. The National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agencies are devoted mostly to collection, but they tend to be tightly compartmentalized, creating a different kind of "stovepipe" problem. In theory, all the intelligence agencies should share raw data and coordinate analysis, but for a variety of reasons they do not always do so. This was the main critique of both the 9/11 Commission and the commission investigating the intelligence failure surrounding the estimate on WMD

FISA/FIS court

(Foreign Intelligence Surveillance act) Court emplaced to approve the wiretaps (surveillance) of American citizens

forward liason

(Forward Observer) - Not used in the military sense, but in reference to relevance. Sending people into the offices of policymakers in order to discover what is considered relevant to each group or organization. Networking with these individuals and then returning to the IC to use what has been gleaned in order to produce intel that can be used by policymakers

I and W

-Warning Intelligence: informs policymakers about direct and immediate threats to national security or the impending failure of foreign policy. Someone has to designate what needs to be monitored. Analysts would prefer specific people/places/etcetera, but policymakers tend to provide blanket orders in the belief that this will protect them from surprise. This disconnect between the IC and policymakers cause many problems -methodology based on devising a series of indicators that highlight a change in an opponent's forces, especially a move from "normal" or peacetime operations to an "attack" or wartime posture. During the Cold War, focused on major military formations, relying on national technical means to spot posture changes. Today the process relies on more subtle targets, individuals, or clandestine/covert cells who often hide in plain sight. I&W methods detect subtle anomalies that suggest something is afoot. Can provide policymakers with information to be used to raise or lower security precautions.

Sherman Kent

-an early theorist and practitioner of intelligence defined intelligence as: knowledge, organization, and as an activity to describe the way intelligence services collect and analyze information, the finished intelligence product that agencies provide to policy makers, and the way intelligence services are organized. -Sherman Kent's approach to the intelligence-policy nexus is based on the premise that effective intelligence is independent intelligence. Analysts often champion this model of the intelligence-policy nexus because it provides them with the intellectual freedom to pursue their interests within the relatively broad guidelines created by intelligence managers -separation of policy and analysis

stan turner

1978 Carter issued Executive Order on intelligence, which reaffirmed Turner, as DCI, had community-wide authority over priorities, tasking, and the budget. "National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978" Creation of "Director of National Intelligence" With broader powers than the DCI to serve as head of Intelligence community. DCI Turner formed the NIOs into the National Intelligence Council.

Robert Gates:

1991,DCI who undertook a comprehensive reexamination of the post-Cold War Intelligence Community- A formalized requirements process would be established for human source intelligence collection; new office created at the CIA to coordinate the use of publicly available information and improve CIA support to the military. -The Intelligence Organization Act of 1993 (enacted as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act) defined the Intelligence Community by law, enunciated the three roles of the DCI, set forth the authorities and responsibilities of the DCI in relation to other elements of the I.C. and Sec. of Defense

zacarias moussaoui

9/11 hijacker who the FBI was aware of as a flight student interested only in flight and not landing or takeoff procedures. FBI felt that there was not enough probable cause to search his apartment and did not present to the FISA Court. This search, if it had been approved and had occurred, had the potential to prevent part, or possibly all, of the events of 9/11.

Worst-case Analysis-

A common reaction to traumatic surprise is the recommendation to cope with ambiguity and ambivalence by acting on the most threatening possible interpretations. If there is any evidence of threat, assume it is valid, even if the apparent weight of contrary indicators is greater. Operationalizing worst-case analysis requires extraordinary expense; it risks being counterproductive if it is effective (by provoking enemy countermeasures or pre-emption), and it is likely to be ineffective because routinization will discredit it. The norm of assuming the worst poses high financial costs. Frequent mobilizations strain the already taut Israeli economy. Precautionary escalation or procurement may act as self-fulfilling prophecies, either through a catalytic spril of mobilization or an arms race that heightens tension, or doctrinal hedges that make the prospect of nuclear war more 'thinkable.' Worst-case analysis as a standard norm would also exacerbate the "cry wolf" syndrome. Seeking to cover all contingencies, worst-case analysis loses focus and salience; by providing a theoretical guide for everything, it provides a practical guide for very little.

confidence levels

Assignment of a probability figure to an estimate or assessment. This is something that analysts dislike doing, but that is very useful for policymakers who are attempting to determine what issues require higher priority or more immediate attention. That said, there are times when these values are incorrect or when policymakers ignore them. This can lead to the occurrence of a "high cost/low probability" event occurring. These values should never be treated as set in stone.

Intelligence Cycle: Dissemination

Broken down into a variety of products, supposed to be delivered to policy officials-dissemination- then policy officials either make cia decisions or create further requirements and the cycle starts over again= FALSE. Depends on the kind of intelligence product that is being delivered. Warning intelligence: alert policy officials to breaking world situations, especially those for which that may have to take action. Usually intelligence officers decline to provide advice on how to respond to crisis

COS

Chief of Station; top CIA officer in the field

Intelligence Cycle: Collection

Collection managers wait for guidance in regard to gaps in the intelligence database to begin the collection process=FALSE. Collection managers CANNOT wait for guidance before filling in gaps. Gaps filled once the collection process is underway. Example: when running espionage operations, commonly called HUMINT (human intelligence), it may take years to find a person who has access to the information needed and is willing to be recruited as a spy. Unmanned aerial vehicles may not be in the right place at the right time, so it is important to constantly develop HUMINT aspect. **Intelligence managers, not policy officials are the real drivers of the intelligence process. Intelligence does go from collection → analysis, but analysts do not always need new intelligence material to understand world events....open sources work well. Analysts: evaluate raw material and put into perspective.

Woolsey:

DCI during Aldrich H. Ames scandal- gave perceived mild disciplinary measures. President Clinton's first Director of Central Intelligence, "we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes." -Created greater cohesion in CIA between DI analysts and DO operatives

DCI Task forces

DCI's Iraqi Taskforce as part of Nonproliferation Center

co-location

Decision made by DCI John Deutch to move members from the Directorate of Intelligence and the Directorate of Operations to one location so each could take advantage of the others expertise. The concept was to bring the "library" knowledge and the "ground" knowledge into the same sphere. At the time is was not well received, but today it is the operational norm.

DDI

Deputy Director for Intelligence-

DCIA

Director of Central Intelligence Agency- in charge of operations within CIA

DCI

Director of Central Intelligence- CIA formed under the auspices of the National Security Council, NSC, "to coordinate national security intelligence", an idea that was generally supported by the military, though they were unwilling to give up their own collection programs and analytical capabilities. Initially, to avoid another Pearl Harbor, Truman established a National Intelligence Authority in 1946, as well as a Central Intelligence Group under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence, DCI, and an Intelligence Advisory Board, IAB. The first DCI, Rear Admiral Sidney Souers, held the position for only six months. The second DCI, Lt. General Hoyt Vandenberg was more aggressive and gained more power to hire and fire, expanded collection activities, research, analysis, organization size, and the first national estimate was drafted under his watch. Vandenberg saw the opportunity to create an independent centralized intelligence agency and recommended it to President Truman. This led to the National Security Act of 1947 and the formation of the CIA. (pg. 28-38 for full history of DCI)

DNI

Director of National Intelligence- Recommended during the Carter presidency, following the Church Committee and the National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978. Not established and filled until 2005 by President Bush following the 2004 release of the 9/11 Commission report and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Up until this point the DCI was head of the IC and the CIA, but the DNI replaced the DCI and head and assumed the top position of the IC. John Negroponte was the first DNI, appointed by George W. Bush. Current DNI is James Clapper

DO

Director of Operations- accountable to the President, Congress, and the American public to strengthen national security and foreign policy objectives through the clandestine collection of human intelligence (HUMINT) and by conducting Covert Action as directed by the President - this is what you'll do in the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO).

DS&T

Directorate for Science and Technology- The DS&T brings expertise to solve our nation's most pressing intelligence problems. We attack national intelligence problems with effective targeting, bold technology and superb tradecraft. We create, adapt, develop, and operate technical collection systems and apply enabling technologies to the collection, processing, and analysis of information.

DA

Directorate of Administration-

DI

Directorate of Intelligence- is responsible for analyzing the intelligence obtained by the special agents of the CIA. Through the collection of information, which may be at times, incomplete or even contradictory, the DI provides organized and analyzed intelligence that is then used in making U.S. policy decisions.

DS

Directorate of Support- officers are often among the first CIA officers into difficult operational areas. We are responsible for getting key support functions — to include security, supply chains, facilities, financial and medical services, business systems, human resources, logistics and others — up and running. We are present throughout operations, providing ongoing support for each mission component. And, at the end of the operation, we ensure that people and equipment get out safely.

aspin-brown commission

During 1995-96, the United States conducted a major inquiry into the status of the nation's intelligence agencies. Carried out by a high-level commission, chaired in succession by former secretaries of defense Les Aspin and Harold Brown, the inquiry's avowed purpose was to determine how best to adapt the Intelligence Community to the challenging new world that had emerged following the end of the Cold War. The commission also shaped intelligence policy to some modest extent by publicizing and giving legitimacy to the idea of strengthening the DCI's authority,

verification

For an agreement or treaty to be effective, the agreed upon terms must be verified, then typically verified again and again with some regularity. This is where MASINT and GEOINT thrive, especially in terms of using satellites to track ground activities. An example is an agreement of nuclear disarmament or the removal of troops from a given area.

GEOINT

Geospatial intelligence, formerly known as imagery intelligence....spy satellites and reconnaissance aircraft...offers real-time electro-optical, radar, or infrared images of specific areas of interest. Photography-snapshots taken with the U-2 or unmanned drones like the Global Hawk.

Intelligence Cycle: Processing

In reality, the people who collect the information sometimes don't give the information to the analysts, but give it first to policymakers or give it to the analysts and the policymakers at the same time—even when the policymakers aren't equipped to analyze the raw data, which may be contradictory.

intelligence to please

Intel products that are tailored to the needs of the consumer. Altered to support an opinion or to avoid upsetting a consumer of differing opinion.

IOB

Intelligence oversight board-

JIC

Joint Intelligence committee- British developed the JIC in the wake of German attacks in the spring of 1940 and under the threat of invasion that followed. Cabinet-level office that brings together senior British policymakers and intel officials on a weekly basis. Actually functional since 1936, and responsible for setting intel priorities and producing weekly intel summaries. Members include the principal producers and consumers of intelligence. Similar in some ways to the American NSC and in others to the NIC/NIO's

NCS

National Clandestine Service - perform HUMINT, lead by DO

NGA

National Geo-spatial intelligence agency- takes images of things we want to know more about

NIC

National Intelligence Council- consists of approximately 20 National Intelligence Officers (see NIO above) who are experts on specific issues or regions. Falling under the DCI, they supervise the production of NIE's. DCI Turner turned the NIO's into the NIC. NIC members are seen as the senior analysts of the IC in their respective areas of expertise

Key judgements

National Intelligence Estimates have sections called "key judgements" sometimes ignored by policymakers. Sometimes includes warnings about the thinness of evidence- problem with nuanced language. In the October 2002 NIE before the invasion of Iraq, key footnotes were only read by 6/100 of the senators and since the dissenting opinions about WMDs in Iraq that were in the footnotes were not in the Key Judgements Section of the NIE. This was a key flaw in the DCI-run of (George Tenant?)

NIE

National Intelligence estimate- Major intelligence reports produced by the NIC. Like the PDB it begins with Terms of Reference, ToR, but unlike the PDB, the turnaround is slower and the contributors typically meet in person

NIO

National Intelligence officer system- Was eventually replaced by the National Intelligence Officer system, but this system has criticized as well as being vulnerable to departmental pressures. ***Responsible for briefing the combined intel to consumers.

NRO

National Reconnaissance office- managerial agency, designs, builds, sends out satellites

Penkovsky

Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky, codenamed HERO, was a colonel with Soviet military intelligence during the late 1950s and early 1960s who informed the United Kingdom and the United States about the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba, including operational manuals, drawings of missile bases in the U.S.S.R.

Intelligence Cycle: Analysis and Production

Operating in parallel: Intelligence collection and intelligence analysis Raw material from the collection process usually goes to policy officials and analysts at about the same time. This independence from each other can be problematic, lack of trust

Intelligence Cycle: Planning and Direction

Policy makers provide guidance to intelligence managers to begin the intelligence process. In practice this is not true. In reality, intelligence managers take the initiative to obtain the information. They make decisions about what should be covered. Intelligence managers often know what gaps exist in the intelligence database, derived from intelligence collectors, and analysts. Filling the gaps is what drives the intelligence collection process.

predator

Predator was one of the first UAVs, used for recon, then eventually modified to conduct missile strikes

Richard Nixon

Pres. that least liked intelligence because

George H.W, Bush

Pres. that liked intelligence the most because

PDB

President's Daily Brief- daily, multi-source intel report give to the president. Truman was the first to receive the "Daily Summary" which was much less formal than today's PDB. Evolved in years to come, taking on a variety of forms and increasing in scope. Initially came from the CIA, but in 1958 it began to incorporate intel from the rest of the IC. In 1961 JFK requested a more concise all-source summary covering key issues, and the President's Intelligence Checklist was created. This held until LBJ made changes and the documents name changed to the PDB in 1964. Under IRTPA in 2004, production of the PDB moved from the hands of the CIA to ODNI with the analysts at CIA remaining primary contributors. Style and format are tailored to each president's liking. Under Obama the last hard copy was printed and the PDB is now presented to the President six days a week on a tablet.

PFIAB

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (as of 2008, PIAB) Conducted critical review of DCI's management of the intelligence community. At their recommendation, Eisenhower created a board of intelligence advisors to provide advice to DCI on intelligence activities.

Richard Helms

Presidential Authority Theory expressed to the Church committee that the Agency did have presidential authority for its intrigues against Castro-though an authority heavily clothed in ambiguity and the doctrine of plausible denial. The professorial Senator Mathias questioned Helms with an historical analogy: Senator Mathias: "When Thomas Beckett was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said, ' Who will rid me of this man?' He didn't say, go out and murder him. He said who will rid me of this man, and let it go at that. "

reaper

Reaper was the next evolution of UAV, much larger and able to move 3 times as fast with 15 times the armament

Mysteries vs. Secrets-

Secrets are empirical facts that, with luck and perseverance, the United States might be able to acquire-steal, if necessary- such as information about the number of Chinese nuclear submarines... Mysteries- more imponderable questions faced by intelligence officers and policymakers, such as the likely longevity of the current Chinese leadership, or whether relations between Israel and Egypt will improve... No one really knows the answers to mysteries; their importance, though, warrants grappling with possible outcomes regardless, and a well-trained analyst can often come up with helpful insights for policymakers to consider as they contemplate the future. The collection phase of intelligence cycle concentrates on unearthing secrets, leaving the sifting of tea leaves about mysteries to analysts steeped in the history and culture of foreign lands.

Glomar explorer

Ship used during Project Jennifer, the CIA operation to raise part of a sunken Soviet submarine from the floor of the Pacific Ocean. The ship assigned to perform the recovery mission was a deep-ocean mining vessel, Glomar Explorer, owned by mysterious billionaire recluse Howard Hughes. Senator Church had added this "James Bond adventure story" to list of investigations. Cost $225 million to execute this operation. Cables tore through the submarine as it was raised. Half of sub fell to ocean floor. The other half was collected at returned to CIA. Initially there was a plan to go back for the second half, but this was cancelled after the story was leaked. Gen. Colby asked that the story not be published, but Jack Anderson wrote about it and the mission was scrubbed.

SMO

Support to Military Operations. Critics of intelligence have complained that the tasking I tilted too much toward support to military operations especially protecting the warfighter in the foxhole or at sea at the expense of support to diplomatic intelligence (Political, economic, and cultural information) that might help prevent the outbreak of war in the first place

phoenix memo

The Phoenix memo on Osama bin Laden was forwarded to a FBI field office as it appeared pertinent to an ongoing criminal investigation - FBI agent noticed inordinate amount of persons of interest attending flight schools in Arizona... but memo never shared with the CIA despite an explicit request within the document itself to do so. Around the same time, during a period of intensifying warnings about possible terror attacks, the FBI's acting director held a conference call with all field-office special-agents-in-charge in which he mentioned the heightened threat levels but recommended only that each field office prepare its evidence-response teams to investigate an attack at short notice after it occurred.

PIAB

The President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB), with its component Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), is an independent element within the Executive Office of the President. The President's Intelligence Advisory Board exists exclusively to assist the President by providing the President with an independent source of advice on the effectiveness with which the Intelligence Community is meeting the nation's intelligence needs, and the vigor and insight with which the community plans for the future. The Board has access to all information needed to perform its functions and has direct access to the President.

Jointness

The most important criticism of intelligence to emerge from the hearings of the Joint Intelligence Committee was the lack of cooperation among the secret agencies and the problem of information sharing (the shortcoming that drove President Harry S. Truman to create a modern intelligence community in the first place). Well before the events of 9/11, virtually every scholarly study of American intelligence called for greater "all-source fusion" of information and better "jointness" among the secret agencies (e.g.m., Johnson 2000). Yet, these agencies have changed little from the damning description of them as a "tribal federation," made by a deputy director of the CIA some thirty years ago (Marchetti and Marks 1974, 96). As one commentary on "jointness", in 1999 and 2000 the DCI and the Secretary of Defense never met a single time! -Dr. Johnson told me this is a Pentagon term that basically means the same as ALL-SOURCE FUSION.

OSINT

The most mundane of the ints, though in some ways the most important, is simply tapping into public sources of information-open- source intelligence, or OSINT.

curveball

The need to improve CIA-FBI sharing of info about terrorists bound for U.S. and with respect to Iraq WMDs, the need to double check intelligence sources rather than rely excessively on foreign intelligence organizations to provide information to us, as happened during the 2nd Bush administration with the German source known as "Curveball" who emphatically swore that Iraq had WMDs- all lies.

HUMINT

The oldest form of spying is the use of human intelligence- not Americans but rather local assets recruited by U.S. intelligence officers, who then serve as their "case officers." The critical aspect of HUMINT success is access to a given location or group. Spies tend to be the more venal individuals in a society, possibly with dubious histories of human rights abuses- perhaps with criminal records.

cherry picking

There are two forms of politicization of the intelligence process- 1. Is cooking the books. 2. Cherry-picking, or selecting from intelligence reports only those items of information and analysis that upholds one's policy or political preferences, ignoring countervailing facts.

Betts's Enemies: Inherent enemies

These are the limitations that are part of the human condition and that exist in the nature of the practice of intelligence itself. They "pervade the process no matter who is involved, and they intrude time and time again. Although not immune to defeat, they are extraordinarily resistant.

footnote wars

This refers to the disagreement that the IC had with the statements that the Bush administration and policymakers used to justify the Iraq invasion. The assessments provided by the IC were "cherry picked" and the dissenting information was buried in the footnotes. This in turn made the information seem as if the invasion was much

backfire bomber

This was a disagreement between assessments made by the CIA and DIA. These differing assessments arose because the Backfire's fuel capacity was not large enough to reach the US and return to Russia. DIA assessed that the Backfire was a tactical bomber, essentially meaning that it was built to be used as a tactical weapon, i.e. a kamikaze, one way bomber that the Russians would use as an end game play. The CIA assessed that the Backfire was a strategic bomber that was built to operate in Europe. Dr. Johnson's intent was highlighting the tendency of the DIA (military intel) to overestimate. This is related to the "missile gap", "bomber gap", etc... Also related to the tendency of the military to take a worst case scenario approach to estimates. Many connections here, but the gist of the topic is the variations in the assessments and why.

SIGINT

To supplement imagery, nations also rely on the gathering of signals intelligence, especially the electronic communications that travel between telephones and personal computers. SIGINT overwhelms the abilities of translators. Adversaries, like with GEOINT, have learned how to use deception against SIGINT. In 2005, became controversial w/ George W. Bush when he bypassed legal warrant procedures for conducting national security wire taps.

UAV

UAVs, unmanned aerial vehicles, have the ability to stay on station over a target for hours, out of sight, conducting recon and striking when needed. There has been a good bit of controversy over the usage of UAVs, especially in terms of the American citizens that have been killed overseas.

James R. Clapper Jr.

US director of National Intelligence (DNI) "Cyber threats pose a critical national and economic security concern" [2012] Iran is not technically capable of producing and processing enough plutonium for a weapon before 2015... can eventually produce nuclear weapons.." DNI Clapper agrees with this view.

MASINT:

Weapons systems, such as ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads, give off emissions as they are being tested, and factories produce gases and waste products. Measurement and signature intelligence can provide information about these and other forms of weapons systems and can add significantly to America's understanding of an adversary's military preparedness. It can also reveal what is being made inside a factory: lethal chemical or biological substances.

agent acquisition cycle

When American intelligence officers are sent abroad for clandestine humint recruitment operations, they follow certain procedures (methods or "tradecraft"), known collectively as the agent acquisition cycle. -The first goal is to identify someone abroad who has good access to government secrets or to those who hold secrets, and who might also be vulnerable to a recruitment pitch -takes up to seven years sometimes

kent vs. consequentialists

a debate of moral philosophy between the doctrine of Immanuel Kant, an 18th century German philosopher, who believed that people should not act based on the consequences of the action, and the doctrine of the Consequentialists who felt that an act being deemed "right" or "wrong" was dependent on the consequences of the act.

analysis and production

a long process look at open source intelligence cycle

ISIS

a non-profit, non-partisan institution dedicated to informing the public about science and policy issues affecting international security. Its primary focus is on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology to additional nations and to terrorists, bringing about greater transparency of nuclear activities worldwide, strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, and achieving deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (or Islamic State in Iraq andSyria): a radical Sunni Muslim organization whose aim is to restore an Islamic state, or caliphate, in the region encompassing Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, and southeastern Turkey.

modus operandi

a particular way or method of doing something, especially one that is characteristic or well-established."

deutch rules

a requirement that all CIA field agents get approval from CIA headquarters before recruiting assets with a history of human rights violations. This stemmed from John Deutch's time as DCI under Clinton, during which it was discovered that atrocities had been committed by CIA assets in Guatemala. Also known as the "dirty hands" guidelines. The rules are limited and stop at the threshold of terror organizations. These assets are invaluable, but by their nature have committed crimes simply to be a part of the organization of interest

Politicization-

analytic distortion to support or undermine a policy initiative, issued forth from one or both camps. (Paul Pillar article pgs 498-504)

processing

as a step in the intelligence cycle, this is the phase where collected intelligence is turned into a workable format to be analyzed. This can include translation from another language, an explanation of what is seen in a picture, or an explanation of information gleaned from large data sets.

prior restraint

attempt by executive branch to cover up stories, however people in a democracy have a "right to know"- withholding of the right to publish information by the government (ex. New York v. United States 1971 Nixon Administration on D.O.D. documents - Vietnam War history)

denial

based on secrecy and a keen awareness of the signatures-observable phenomena related to planning, preparing, and undertaking an operation-that can tip off an opponent about what is actually about to happen.

INR

bureau of intelligence and research- State Department entity that is the smallest member of the IC. Mainly conducts analysis and was one of only 3 IC members that estimated there were not WMDs in Iraq.

CIA

central intelligence agency- leading human intel agency, independent from policy, devotion for the truth

Betts's Enemies: Innocent enemies

consists of organizational shortcomings that cause failure, including institutional myopia, negligence in standard procedures, gaps in coverage, inefficiencies caused by organizational redundancies, the lack of particular skill sets--the kinds of things that bureaucracies, particularly government bureaucracies, do or don't do out of institutional legacies or laziness.

aerial terrorism

could be said to include hijacking aircraft(s), sabotage of airplane(s), causing damage to aircraft(s) or airport lounges, gunning down passengers at airports and turning aircrafts into guided missiles aimed at financial and/or governmental institutions. (9/11)

John Brennan

current director of the CIA, prior to this he served at the White House for 4 years as the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, before that was a civilian for a while, and before that was the head of the National Counterterrorism Center, NCTC.

aggregate intelligence budget

current- 54 mil highest (2010)- 80 mil

DIA

defense intelligence agency- analytical agency

foreign liason

different from an "observer", acts as a bridge to foreign intel services/communities. Necessary as we (the IC), cannot cover the entire world, therefore needing the assistance of others

threat assesments

established list of people and places that pose a threat to a nation, ranked high to low in a Tier system beginning with Tier 0, then Tier 1A, 1B, Tier 2, Tier 3, and Tier 4. This methodology is used to prioritizes efforts and funds to the most threatening of adversaries and/or situations. SMO is a high priority while a topic such as illegal Japanese fishing may rank relatively low. This is dependent on the nation making the assessments.

actionable intelligence

estimates that policymakers find useful in developing and/or executing current policy. Also, there is a view that intelligence reports and estimates should be tailored or crafted to provide "actionable" intelligence as opposed to providing "academic analysis", thereby creating a finished intelligence product that is more relevant to an individual policymaker. The raw reports are generated by analysts and managers then tailor them to a policymakers agenda. This obviously disrupts the objectivity of the reports and almost guarantees politicization

high cost/low probability event

events such as 9/11 and the Cuban Missile Crisis that have a low probability of occurring and therefore render normative theory useless when it comes to predicting them as analysts are dismissive. IC is then left scrambling to catch up or explain.

Team A/Team B

exercise in competitive analysis taken on by the DCI in 1976 at the request of the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, PFIAB. Team A conducted an analysis of Soviet nuclear capabilities and were not advised that Team B, led by Harvard historian Richard Pipes, would be competing against them to provide an estimate that in itself was critical of previously generated NIE's. (Full store on pg. 86 on Enemies of Intelligence.) Team A, comprised of Soviet Union experts from the CIA, estimated that the Soviets were not capable of launching a first strike that would immediately win the war. Team B not only stated that the Soviets were capable, but critiqued the other Teams report. In the end Team B was discounted for taking too much of an ideological approach, mixing technical factors with nontechnical factors. Ultimately the exercise was flawed and criticized. It was a good test for the analysts on each side, giving them the opportunity to question their views, but in the end it cast doubt on the CIA's ability to provide reliable analysis.

FBI

federal bureau of investigation- crime oriented, lots of counter intelligence

estimates

formal intelligence reports produced by the entire intelligence community to support key policy decisions

Which intel helped most during cold war?

geo-int (could see where nukes are)

research intelligence

information of a deeper kind that provides a longer perspective and more nuanced understanding of world affairs

walk-in

intelligence assets that "walk-in" ready to provide information/intel, typically in exchange for asylum, money, or other compensation. There is a risk that this is can be used as an intentional play by the enemy to mislead, expose, or damage intelligence operations in that the "walk-in" is actually an asset or agent of the enemy. Can be useful if properly vetted and carefully managed. Has been very successful for CIA when dealing with other nations, but not as well with terror groups

IC

intelligence community (see diagram) encompasses all 17 agencies, president, DNI, and other councils/boards

self-licking ice cream cone

it meant an agency/organization that self-perpetuates its own existence

deception

limited only by the creativity and the guile of the deception planner-bogus stories published by legitimate media outlets, fake documents and plans, and false electronic signals. Denial generally requires only security or self-awareness when it comes to the "signatures" generated by various activities. Deception can be costly

case officer

live abroad and are responsible for the recruiting and handling of native agents or "assets" who if they are prick-eared and well positioned, can collect useful information in their respective countries, either open source or close source info. Same as "operations officer".

assest

local nationals or members of a government, group or organization who are recruited by intelligence agents and convinced to provide useful information about critical facets of an enemy's operations, plan, etc..

NSA

national security agency- signal intelligence focused, does eavesdropping and code breaking

fire-hose analogy- SIGINT:

nations also rely on the gathering of signals intelligence, especially the electronic communications that travel between telephones and personal computers... Problem of information overload, as a "firehose" of SIGINT transcripts from around the world overwhelms the ability of U.S. translators and analysts to keep up with the torrent.

tradecraft

operational methods employed to accomplish a task. In the case of the IC, each agency employs their own tradecrafts

Betts's Enemies: Outside enemies

our national enemies--the foreign adversaries whose capabilities we must divine, whose plans we must thwart, and whose allies here must be caught.

pop-up phenomenon

people or events that arise without previous knowledge or expectation

intelligence consumer

policymakers

DCI centers

represents efforts by the CIA and DCI to increase cooperation among intelligence agencies-increase coordination and cohesion

collection overload

sophistication of modern information-gathering systems produces the problem of overload. The drive to collect everything occurred after 9/11. NSA created headquarters in Utah, but still not enough analysts/skills to analyze all the data collected

all-source fusion

synergism between all of the types of intelligence collection methods (HUMINT, MASINT, GEOINT, SIGINT, OSINT). Intent is to provide policymakers with a more comprehensive understanding of the world, especially our adversaries and enemies. Weakest link in intel is HUMINT, especially after 9/11 and Iraq WMDs, so the US is pushing hard for stronger All-Source Fusion, hiring new analysts, managers, etcetera, to prevent future failures due to lack of communication and all-source picture of things. Lack of sharing of intel is a common obstacle. This push seeks to close the gap. All-Source is important as it can be easy to evade one method, but much harder to evade all methods combined.

bean counting

task of assessing enemy strength and capabilities. Counting tanks, cars, ships, missiles, formations, etc. Large Cold War assets devoted to this process.

noise

the "fluff", the information that is not useful or is irrelevant.

Competitive Analysis

the Intelligence Reform Act specifically requires that the DNI ensure that there is competitive analysis among the various analytic agencies. That would have meant that in 2003 the lesser probability assigned to WMD by the State Department's intelligence bureau would have been given more weight than it was.

the wall

the barrier that is supposed to exist between policymakers and analysts. He referenced this when discussing the president reaching out and asking the IC to generate something specific. It seems that this wall is situationally permeable, but for the most part is a way of preventing politicization to some extent

Traffic analysis; Chatter-

the process of intercepting and examining messages (aka chatter) in order to deduce information from patterns in communication. In general, the greater the number of messages observed, or even intercepted and stored, the more can be inferred from the traffic.

*Requirements; Tasking-

to be "tasked" as an intel officers is simply being asked to "go find out." Can tie into Politicization of the first step in the intelligence cycle, where politicians task the IC to seek information supporting their position.

signals

useful information gathered or captured by an intel agency

capabilities

what a state can do (usually quantitative)

intentions

what a state would like to do (want to do)

current intelligence

what is likely to happen today or tomorrow