Limits Final

Dissimilar treatment between married and unmarried persons is unconstitutional when the dissimilar treatment is unrelated to a rational State objective.

Eisenstadt v. Baird rule of law?

Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth

About a year after the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, the State of Missouri passed a law regulating abortions in the state. Planned Parenthood of Missouri and two doctors who supervised abortions at Planned Parenthood sued to prevent enforcement of certain parts of the law. The challenged parts of the law: (1) define "viability" as the "stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life support systems"; (2) require a women submitting to an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy to sign a consent form certifying that she was not coerced; (3) require written consent from the woman's spouse during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, unless the abortion will save the mother's life(4)require parental consent if the woman is younger than 18; (5) require physicians to exercise professional care in preserving a fetus life or risk being charged with manslaughter; (6) declare an infant who survives an abortion attempt as a ward of the state, depriving mother and father of parental rights; (7) prohibit saline amniocenteses after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; and (8) require reporting and record keeping for facilities and physicians that perform abortions. The district court upheld all of the provisions except 4, holding that it was overbroad because it did not exclude the stage of pregnancy before the fetus is viable.

Griswold v. Connecticut

Appellant Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and Appellant Buxton, a licensed physician who served as Medical Director for the League at its Center in New Haven, were arrested and charged with giving information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons on means of preventing conception. Appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. Appellants appealed on the theory that the accessory statute as applied violated the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellants claimed standing based on their professional relationship with the married people they advised.

Roe v Wade

Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to obtain an abortion, sued on behalf of all woman similarly situated in an effort to prevent the enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing all abortions except those performed to save the life of the mother. Texas statutes made it a crime to have or attempt an abortion except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional b/c she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Eisenstadt v. Baird

Appellee William Baird was convicted under a Massachusetts State law for exhibiting contraceptive articles and for giving a woman a package of Emko vaginal foam. The Massachusetts Supreme Court set aside the conviction for exhibiting contraceptives on the grounds that it violated Appellee's First Amendment rights, but sustained the conviction for giving away the foam. The law permitted married persons to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, but forbid single persons from obtaining them.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions. Instead, this issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and government intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Court's authority both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the most basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected representatives. In taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to protect people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the state legislature to determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does not address the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to the states to decide whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By allowing a majority of the Court to create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from the democratic process and greatly expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.

Dissent reasoning in Obergefell v. Hodges

No, but The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion, which although not expressly included in the Amendment, is necessary to make the express guarantees meaningful. The association of marriage is a privacy right older than the Bill of Rights, and the State's effort to control marital activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges on protected Constitutional freedoms.

Griswold holding

Obergefell v. Hodges

Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.

May the State sterilize an individual against his will for being convicted of three felonies involving moral turpitude?

Legal issue in Skinner V Oklahoma

Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.

Holding Obergefell v. Hodges

Yes in part. The Court followed the three-trimester framework laid out in Roe v. Wade. The Supreme Court held that provisions 1, 2 and 8 were constitutional. Provisions 3 and 4 were unconstitutional because the state cannot delegate the authority to prevent an abortion to anyone but the physician and the woman during the first trimester of pregnancy. Provision 5 was unconstitutional because it required physicians to preserve the life of the fetus at any stage of pregnancy. Provision 7 was unconstitutional because it failed to regulate in reference to the mother's health, and instead was designed to prohibit most abortions after 12 weeks. The Court refused to consider provision 6.

Holding Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth

ustice William Douglas (J. Douglas) notes that sterilization of habitual offenders in no way guarantees that new offenders will not be born. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that habitual offenders would spawn offenders themselves. J. Douglas cannot justify the distinction between larceny (involving moral turpitude) and embezzlement (not involving moral turpitude) in the eyes of the statute. This is clear discrimination in J. Douglas's view. In terms of fines and imprisonment the crimes are identical to the State. Only when it comes to sterilization do the crimes differ. As such, equal protection is violated. Stone (J. Stone) concurs in the judgment, but rests his decision on due process grounds, arguing that the invasion of personal liberty is too great.

Holding in Skinner V Oklahoma

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services

In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortions. The statute's preamble indicated that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have abortions was prohibited; and physicians were to perform viability tests upon women in their twentieth (or more) week of pregnancy. Lower courts struck down the restrictions.

Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt

In 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2 (H.B. 2), which contained several provisions related to abortions. One such provision required that any physician performing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of where the abortion was performed, and another provision required that all abortion clinics comply with standards for ambulatory surgical centers. The petitioners are a group of abortion providers who sued the State of Texas seeking to invalidate those provisions in H.B. 2 as they relate to facilities in McAllen and El Paso. The petitioners argued that H.B. 2 denied equal protection, unlawfully delegated lawmaking authority, and constituted arbitrary and unreasonable state action. The district court dismissed the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the two contested provisions of H.B. 2. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and partially reversed the injunctions because the plaintiffs failed to show that they placed a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.

Did the Missouri restrictions unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to privacy or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Issue webster v reproductive

Stanley v. Illinois

Joan Stanley and peter stanley had three children and never married, but lived together off and on for 18 years. When Joan died, her children were taken by the State of Illinois. Under Illinois law, fathers who were not married were viewed as unfit parents. Peter took this issue to court arguing that the Illinois law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment b/c Joan was not married and she was never deprived of her children nor are any other single mother. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Stanley's Equal Protection claim, holding that his actual persona as a parent was irrelevant b/c he and the children's mother were unmarried.

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health

Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car accident, which left her in a "persistent vegetative state." In order to feed her and to facilitate her recovery, surgeons implanted into her a gastronomy feeding and hydration tube. After it become apparent that Cruzan had virtually no chance for recovery, Petitioners, Cruzan's parents, asked hospital employees to terminate the life support procedures. The State hospital employees refused to honor this request without court approval. After trial, on appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court refused to order termination of the life-support, because clear and convincing evidence was not produced to show that Cruzan herself would have chosen to refuse treatment.

Skinner V Oklahoma

Oklahoma defined a "habitual criminal" as a person who, "having been convicted two or more times for crimes 'amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude' either in Oklahoma or another State, is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a Oklahoma penal institution." Such habitual criminals could be subject to forced sterilization. The Petitioner had been twice arrested for theft offenses before being arrested and confined for armed robbery. During his third incarceration, the Act was passed and proceedings were instituted against him.

Roe is upheld. Accordingly, a State's interest in the life of the unborn has sufficient force so that a woman's right to an abortion can be restricted. As to when in the stage of a pregnancy the right to an abortion can be restricted, the Supreme Court hereby rejects the trimester framework of Roe and announces the "undue burden" standard. Under this approach, all of the Act, except the parental consent requirement, the Court finds proper. The Supreme Court's reasoning is as follows: Because the informed consent requirement facilitates the wise exercise of a woman's right to an abortion it cannot be said to impose an undue burden on the right Roe protects

Planned parenthood v casey holding

Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, and, if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade violate the 14th amendment?

Planned parenthood v casey issue

The idea that important decisions will be more informed if they follow some period of reflection (24-hours) does not strike us as unreasonable. The Supreme Court disagrees with the District Court on this issue. Because petitioners' argument regarding parental consent is essentially a reprise of their argument against informed consent, we reject petitioners' argument here as before and find parental consent proper. Because there are very good reasons, e.g., fear of abuse, for a woman's not wishing to inform her husband of her decision to obtain an abortion, the spousal notification requirement is an undue burden, and therefore invalid. Because the recordkeeping and reporting requirements do relate to health, it cannot be said that they serve no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult. Restrictions on abortion violate a woman's right to privacy in two ways: (1) it infringes upon a woman's right to bodily integrity, and (2) it deprives a woman of the right to make her own decisions about reproduction and family planning. Justice Stevens: Provisions of the Act requiring a physician to inform a woman of the nature and risks of the abortion procedure and of carrying to term, are neutral requirements, like those imposed for other medical procedures, and therefore are constitutional.

Planned parenthood v casey reasoning

A law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle (i.e., an "undue burden") in the path of a woman seeking an abortion at a stage of her pregnancy before the fetus attains viability. This case is really one about whether Roe v. Wade should be overturned. The Supreme Court here says no. The Supreme Court does decide to change the methodological structure Roe announced for evaluating whether particular laws burdening a woman's right to an abortion amount to constitutional violations. Rejecting the trimester framework of Roe, the Supreme Court here announces the undue burden analysis, whereby a law is held unconstitutional if it poses an undue burden on a woman at a stage of her pregnancy before the fetus has become viable. Justice O'Connor, for the majority, writes that the trimester framework was never intended to be the essence of the holding in Roe.

Planned parenthood v casey rule of law

The right of privacy is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion.

Reasoning Eisenstadt v. Baird

Justice Potter Stewart concurred, expressing that the mother's consent provision was constitutional because not prevents a state from ensuring that the abortion decision is made knowingly and voluntarily. The parental consent provision was unconstitutional places a potential prohibition on abortion for women under 18. The spousal consent provision was also unconstitutional because the woman's right to make the decision outweighed a father's right to associate with his offspring. Justice Lewis F. Powell joined in the concurrence. Justice Byron R. White concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the physician care provision was constitutional because the state can require a physician to preserve the life of a fetus once it is viable. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in Justice White's opinion. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that prohibiting saline amniocenteses was unconstitutional because it essentially prohibited abortions after the first trimester. The parental consent provision was constitutional because the state has an interest in protecting the welfare of its young citizens.

Reasoning Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth

The Court acknowledges that the State has a legitimate interest in prompt efficacious procedures furthered by the presumption that unwed fathers are unfit. However, such an interest is outweighed by the father's right to demonstrate that he is fit when the right taken away from the father would be the right to raise his child.

Reasoning Stanley v. Illinois

Skinner represents the Supreme Court of the United States' growing awareness of the right to reproductive autonomy. Unlike later cases that focus on due process and a right to privacy, the majority in Skinner holds that sterilization in the present situation violates equal protection principles.

Reasoning in Skinner V Oklahoma

the provisions of H.B. 2 at issue do not confer medical benefits that are sufficient to justify the burdens they impose on women seeking to exercise their constitutional right to an abortion. Therefore, the provisions unconstitutionally impose an undue burden. The Court held that the judicial review of such statutes need not be wholly deferential to the legislative fact-finding, especially when the factual record before the district court contradicted it. In this case, the evidence presented before the district court showed that the admitting privileges requirement of H.B. 2 did not advance the state's interest in protecting women's health but did place a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion by forcing about half of the state's abortion clinics to close. This additional layer of regulation provided no further protections than those already in place. Similarly, the requirement that abortion clinics meet the standards for ambulatory surgical centers did not appreciably lower the risks of abortions compared to those performed in non-surgical centers. These requirements were so tangentially related to the actual procedures involved in an abortion that they were essentially arbitrary. If these requirements took effect, only seven or eight facilities in the entire state would be able to function, which is in and of itself a substantial burden on women seeking abortions because those remaining facilities would not be able to meet the demand. The Court also held that the petitioners were not precluded from challenging the provisions as they were applied despite previous litigation on whether the provisions were unconstitutional on their face, especially given the evidence about how their enforcement had actually affected abortion access across the state.

Reasoning in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt

Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion? Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy in the concept of personal liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and protected by the Bill of Rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?

Roe v wade issue

Zebloki v red hail

Roger C. Redhail, a minor from Wisconsin had a child and was put on child support. Two years later, he applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee county. His application was denied by the county clerk, Zeploki b/c Redhail owed $3,700 in child support. Redhailed filed a class action in federal district court against zablocki and the Wisconsin county clerks. Wisconsin federal district court ruled in favor redhailed, and zeploki appealed it to the SCOTUS. The law stated that you cannot marry if you owe money, you have to prove the child is not on welfare and had the kid out of wedlock if the clerk allows it they are subject to penalities.

The right to have offspring is a fundamental right, requiring a compelling state interest to interfere with it.

Rule of law Skinner V Oklahoma

The statute violated appellant's equal protection under the laws by depriving him of custody of his children when married fathers and unwed mothers could not be deprived of custody without being shown to be unfit parents.

Stanley v. Illinois rule of law

Planned Parenthood v. Casey

The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act (the "Act") imposed several obligations on women seeking abortions and medical practitioners. The Act exempted compliance with the obligations in the event of a medical emergency. The constitutionality of the Act was brought into question. The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989.1. The law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. 2. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). 3. A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.

Does the Constitution provide for a privacy right for married couples?

What is the issue in the Griswold case?

The right to privacy in marriage is not specifically protected in either the Bill of Rights or the Constitution. Nonetheless, it is a right so firmly rooted in tradition that its protection is mandated by various Constitutional Amendments, including the 1st, 9th and 14th Amendments.

What is reasoning of griswold ?

The dissimilar treatment of similarly situated married and unmarried persons under the Massachusetts law violates the Equal Protection Clause. First, the deterrence of premarital sex cannot be reasonably regarded as the purpose of the law, because the ban has at best a marginal relating to the proffered objective. Second, if health is the rationale of the law, it is both discriminatory and overbroad. Third, the right to obtain contraceptives must be the same for married and unmarried individuals.

What is the holding for Eisenstadt v. Baird?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were generally "odious to a free people" and were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. The Virginia law, the Court found, had no legitimate purpose "independent of invidious racial discrimination." The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites and found that racial classifications were not subject to a "rational purpose" test under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the Virginia law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State."

What is the holding in Loving v Virginia?

Is there a rational ground for the different treatment of married and unmarried persons under the Massachusetts State law?

What is the issue in Eisenstadt v. Baird?

(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? (2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?

What is the issue in Obergefell v. Hodges

Does the Illinois statutory scheme that assumes unwed fathers are unfit parents violate the Equal Protection Clause and due procress?

What is the issue in Stanley v. Illinois

Did the Wisconsin statute violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

What is the issue in Zebloki v red hail

If a statute significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right, it must be supported by sufficiently important state interests and closely tailored to effectuate only those interests. Such interests are subject to strict scrutiny or "critical examination."

What is the rule of law in Zebloki?

The right of a married couple to privacy is protected by the Constitution.

What is the rule of law in griswold

The statute is unconstitutional because it significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right and is not supported by sufficiently important state interests and is not closely tailored to effectuate only those interests. The court employs a critical examination of the state interests advanced in support of the statute because the right to marry is of fundamental importance. Previous court decisions have confirmed that the right to marry is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. the present statute absolutely prevents some in the protected class from obtaining the required order, and places sufficient burdens and significant intrusions on others. Appellant claims that the statute supports the State's interest in counseling the applicant as to the need of fulfilling his prior support obligations and protects the welfare of the out-of-custody children. The first claim is faulty because even if counseling is provided there would be no interest in continuing to withhold permission to marry after counseling is completed. The second is faulty for two reasons. First, if the individual is unable to meet payments, the statute simply prevents marriage without providing any money to the minor children. Second, the State has numerous other means for extracting the payments. There is also suggestion that the statute prevents applicants from incurring new support obligations. However, this is underinclusive because it limits only the new financial commitments arising out of a marriage and overinclusive because in many cases the income from the new spouse may increase the applicant's ability to pay. The statute may only result in more children being born out of wedlock.

What was the holding in Zebloki?

Did Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

What was the issue in Loving v virgina

Loving V Virgina

two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's anti-miscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).

No and No. The Missouri Supreme Court is affirmed. Prior decisions support the principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing medical treatment under the Due Process Clause. But incompetent persons do not enjoy the same rights, because they cannot make voluntary and informed decisions. The right to terminate life-sustaining treatment of an incompetent, if it is to be exercised, must be done for such incompetent by a surrogate. Missouri's interest in the preservation of life is unquestionably a valid State interest. The Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as a right to refuse life-saving treatment. Missouri may legitimately safeguard these personal decisions by imposing heightened evidentiary requirements. Moreover, even when available, family members will not always act in the best interests of a patient. The State is entitled to safeguard against such abuses.

holding Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health

In applying the substantial burden test, courts must weigh the extent to which the laws in question actually serve the stated government interest against the burden they impose.

holding in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt

the Court held that none of the challenged provisions of the Missouri legislation were unconstitutional. First, the Court held that the preamble had not been applied in any concrete manner for the purposes of restricting abortions, and thus did not present a constitutional question. Second, the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not require states to enter into the business of abortion, and did not create an affirmative right to governmental aid in the pursuit of constitutional rights. Third, the Court found that no case or controversy existed in relation to the counseling provisions of the law. Finally, the Court upheld the viability testing requirements, arguing that the State's interest in protecting potential life could come into existence before the point of viability. The Court emphasized that it was not revisiting the essential portions of the holding in Roe v. Wade.

holding webster v reproductive

Are the challenged provisions of the Missouri law regulating abortion unconstitutional?

issue Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth

Should a court's "substantial burden" analysis take into account the extent to which laws that restrict access to abortion services actually serve the government's stated interest in promoting health?

issue in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt

Did Cruzan have a right under the United States Constitution that would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment? Did Missouri's procedural requirement for clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent person's desire to terminate life support before it is terminated violate the Constitution?

legal issue Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health

This case is labeled a "right to life case." Most of the attention, however, is focused on burden of proof standards for showing a person's intent with regard to a life-threatening matter. This type of case, where a person requests that her life be left to natural processes, must be distinguished from cases that involve assisted suicide, whereby a doctor will take an affirmative step to induce a person's death.

reasoning Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health

The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gave a woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters. 1st trimester is the decision of the mother and doc 2nd reasonably related to the health of the mother 3rd viability protect the baby and mother at this point the state can govern and forbid it Viability is when there is realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing an embryo outside the womb

roe v wade holding

A State may condition the exercise of a patient's right to terminate life-sustaining treatment on a showing of clear and convincing evidence of the desire of the patient to exercise such a right.

rule of law Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health

As a matter of due process of law, appellant was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him. By denying him a hearing when all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged are permitted one, the State denied appellant the equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. Under Illinois law, children of all parents can be taken from them in a neglect proceeding, but only after notice, hearing, and proof of unfitness. In contrast, an unwed father is uniquely subject to the more simplistic dependency proceeding. The private interest of a man and the children he has sired and raised warrants deference and protection. The State claims that the interest furthered by the statue is to protect the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community. In support of this interest, the State asserts that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents. However, the State registers no gain toward its goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents. The State's insistence on presuming rather than proving appellant's unfitness solely on the basis of convenience is unconstitutional.

what is the holding in Stanley v. Illinois