Micro Ch.9
Refer to the figure below. Player B can infer that Player A will:
always choose Up
Refer to the figure below. In this game, how many dominant strategies does Player B have?.
0
Refer to the figure below. In this game, how many dominant strategies does Player A have?
1
A credible threat is:
in the threatener's interest to carry out
Suppose the market for bottled water is served by two oligopolists. If they reach an agreement to restrict production and charge a price above marginal cost, then:
their agreement is likely to eventually collapse
A prisoner's dilemma illustrates situations in which:
there is a conflict between the narrow self-interest of individuals and the broader interests of a group
According to the text, everyone shouts at a party in order to be heard. If instead everyone spoke at a normal volume people would still be heard, but people continue to shout because:
shouting is a dominant strategy
Suppose there are two small island countries: Avarice, which is populated by people who are completely self-interested, and Altruism, which is populated by people who have adopted social norms of generosity and cooperation. Commitment problems will be:
largely avoided in Alturism, but prevalent in Avarice
Suppose Acme and Mega produce and sell identical products and face zero marginal and average cost. Below is the market demand curve for their product. Suppose Acme and Mega decide to collude and work together as a monopolist with each firm producing half the quantity demanded by the market at the monopoly price. If Mega cheats on the agreement by reducing its price to $1 and Acme matches the price cut, then if consumers are evenly split between the two firms, Acme's economic profit will be ______.
$75
The market for bagels contains two firms: BagelWorld (BW) and Bagels'R'Us (BRU). The owners of the two firms decide to fix the price of bagels. The table below shows how each firm's profit (in dollars) depends on whether they abide by the agreement or cheat on the agreement. In the Nash equilibrium of this game:
both firms cheat on the agreement
Consider the accompanying payoff matrix. When Row Resorts and Column Cruises both play their dominant strategy:
both firms do worse than is they had both played their dominated strategy
The dilemma in a prisoner's dilemma is that:
the players would be better off if they both played a dominated strategy.
Suppose Firm A and Firm B are considering whether to invest in a new production technology. For each firm, the payoff to investing (given in thousands of dollars per day) depends upon whether the other firm invests, as shown in the payoff matrix below. Which of the following statements is correct?
"invest" is a dominated strategy for Firm A
The payoff matrix below shows the payoffs (in millions of dollars) for two firms, A and B, for two different strategies, investing in new capital or not investing in new capital. An industry spy comes to firm B and claims to know what firm A has decided. Given that each firm already knows the payoff matrix, how much would this information be worth to firm B?
$0
Joe is the owner of the 7-11 Mini Mart, Sam is the owner of the SuperAmerica Mini Mart, and together they are the only two gas stations in town. Currently, they both charge $3 per gallon, and each earns a profit of $1,000. If Joe cuts his price to $2.90 and Sam continues to charge $3, then Joe's profit will be $1,350, and Sam's profit will be $500. Similarly, if Sam cuts his price to $2.90 and Joe continues to charge $3, then Sam's profit will be $1,350, and Joe's profit will be $500. If Sam and Joe both cut their price to $2.90, then they will each earn a profit of $900. If both players choose their dominated strategy they will each earn ______, and if both players choose their dominant strategy they will each earn______.
$1,000; $900
Quick Buck and Pushy Sales produce and sell identical products and face zero marginal and average cost. Below is the market demand curve for their product. Suppose Quick Buck and Pushy Sales decide to collude and work together as a monopolist with each firm producing half the quantity demanded by the market at the monopoly price. If Quick Buck cheats by reducing its price to $1 and Pushy Sales matches the price cut, then if consumers are evenly split between the two firms, what will be Quick Buck's economic profit?
$1,500
Suppose Acme and Mega produce and sell identical products and face zero marginal and average cost. Below is the market demand curve for their product. If Acme and Mega decide to collude and work together as a monopolist with each firm producing half the quantity demanded by the market at the monopoly price, then what will be Mega's economic profit?
$100
Suppose Acme and Mega produce and sell identical products and face zero marginal and average cost. Below is the market demand curve for their product. Suppose Acme and Mega decide to collude and work together as a monopolist with each firm producing half the quantity demanded by the market at the monopoly price. If Mega cheats on the agreement by reducing its price to $1 while Acme continues to comply with the collusive agreement, then Mega's economic profit will be ______.
$150
Mexico and the members of OPEC produce crude oil. Realizing that it would be in their best interests to form an agreement on production goals, a meeting is arranged and an informal, verbal agreement is reached. If both Mexico and OPEC abide by the agreement, then OPEC's profit will be $200 million and Mexico's profit will be $100 million. If both Mexico and OPEC cheat on the agreement, then OPEC's profit will be $175 million and Mexico's profit will be $80 million. If only OPEC cheats, then OPEC's profit will be $185 million, and Mexico's profit will be $60 million. If only Mexico cheats, then Mexico's profit will be $110 million, and OPEC's profit will be $150 million. To OPEC, the payoff to abiding by the agreement is either:
$150 million or $200 million
Miniville is an isolated town located on the southern shore of Lake Condescending, a very large lake. The western edge of Miniville is adjacent to impassable mountains and there are no towns or businesses for many miles to the east. The 300 residents of Miniville are evenly distributed along 3 miles of shoreline on the lake, east of the mountains. Lake Shore Drive, the only street in town, provides access to Miniville's homes and businesses. All residents live between the lake and the street; businesses locate on the other side of the street. Lake Shore Drive is 3 miles long, and the points labeled A, B, and C are 1, 2, and 3 miles from the western end of Lake Shore Drive, respectively. All residents of Miniville shop at the store located closest to their homes. If one store is located at A and the other store is located at C:
200 people will shop at the store at A, and 100 people will shop at the store at C
Tracy and Amy are playing a game in which Tracy has the first move at X in the decision tree shown below. Once Tracy has chosen either the top or bottom branch at X, Amy, who can see what Tracy has chosen, must choose the top or bottom branch at Y or Z. Both players know the payoffs at the end of each branch. If before Tracy chose, Amy could make a credible commitment to choose either the top or bottom branch when her turn came, then we would expect Tracy to get a payoff of ______ and Amy to get a payoff of ______.
300; 200
Before it became illegal, cigarette manufacturers once relied heavily on TV advertising. According to the textbook, when the government banned TV advertising, the cigarette manufacturers:
benefited because the decision about whether to advertise on TV was a prisoner's dilemma
Mexico and the members of OPEC produce crude oil. Realizing that it would be in their best interests to form an agreement on production goals, a meeting is arranged and an informal, verbal agreement is reached. If both Mexico and OPEC abide by the agreement, then OPEC's profit will be $200 million and Mexico's profit will be $100 million. If both Mexico and OPEC cheat on the agreement, then OPEC's profit will be $175 million and Mexico's profit will be $80 million. If only OPEC cheats, then OPEC's profit will be $185 million, and Mexico's profit will be $60 million. If only Mexico cheats, then Mexico's profit will be $110 million, and OPEC's profit will be $150 million. In the Nash equilibrium of this game:
both Mexico and OPEC cheat on the agreement
Relative to a world in which some people are motivated by nonmaterial incentives, if all people were motivated solely by financial incentives, then:
both business transactions and personal interactions would be different
The table below shows how the payoffs to two political candidates depend on whether the candidates run a positive or negative campaign. The payoffs are given in terms of the percentage change in the number of votes received. In the Nash equilibrium of this game:
both candidates run negative campaigns
Hotelling's model has been used to describe differentiation in the political "market." Suppose that 100 voters are evenly distributed between the extreme left and the extreme right on the political spectrum, and that all voters vote, and they always vote for the candidate closest to them on this spectrum. The numbers on this spectrum represent the number of voters lying to the left of the number. So, at the midpoint, fifty voters lie to the left and fifty to the right. If Candidate Y is running against Candidate Z:
both candidates will have an incentive to move toward each other's position
Tracy and Amy are playing a game in which Tracy has the first move at X in the decision tree shown below. Once Tracy has chosen either the top or bottom branch at X, Amy, who can see what Tracy has chosen, must choose the top or bottom branch at Y or Z. Both players know the payoffs at the end of each branch. If before Tracy chose, Amy could make a credible commitment to choose either the top or bottom branch when her turn came, then Amy would commit to the ______ branch and Tracy would choose the ______ branch.
bottom; top
Something that changes incentives so as to make otherwise empty threats or promises credible is called a:
commitment device
A monopolistically competitive firm:
sometimes distinguishes its output from that of its competitors by locating in a more convenient place
In sequential games, the player who moves first:
sometimes has an advantage and sometimes has a disadvantage
Game theory provides tools that are used to model:
strategic interdependencies
Suppose there are two small island countries: Avarice, which is populated by people who are completely self-interested, and Altruism, which is populated by people who have adopted social norms of generosity and cooperation. Suppose residents of each island often play prisoner's dilemma games, always matched with a person from the same island, but not a person who they know or will play with again. If the same number of games is played on each island, you would expect:
the residents of Altruism to have higher average payoffs than the residents of Avarice
Suppose two companies, Macrosoft and Apricot, are considering whether to develop a new product, a touch-screen t-shirt. The payoffs to each of developing a touch-screen t-shirt depend upon the actions of the other, as shown in the payoff matrix below (the payoffs are given in millions of dollars). Suppose Apricot makes its decision first, and then Macrosoft makes its decision after seeing Apricot's choice. What will be the equilibrium outcome of this game?
Apricot will develop a touch-screen t-shirt, and Macrosoft will not
Suppose two companies, Macrosoft and Apricot, are considering whether to develop a new product, a touch-screen t-shirt. The payoffs to each of developing a touch-screen t-shirt depend upon the actions of the other, as shown in the payoff matrix below (the payoffs are given in millions of dollars). Suppose Apricot makes its decision first, and then Macrosoft makes its decision after seeing Apricot's choice. What will happen if, before Apricot chooses, Macrosoft announces that it is going to develop a touch-screen t-shirt no matter what Apricot does?
Apricot will develop a touch-screen t-shirt, and Macrosoft will not because Macrosoft's threat is not credible
Suppose two companies, Macrosoft and Apricot, are considering whether to develop a new product, a touch-screen t-shirt. The payoffs to each of developing a touch-screen t-shirt depend upon the actions of the other, as shown in the payoff matrix below (the payoffs are given in millions of dollars). Which of the following statements is correct?
Apricot does not have a dominant strategy
Hotelling's model has been used to describe differentiation in the political "market." Suppose that 100 voters are evenly distributed between the extreme left and the extreme right on the political spectrum, and that all voters vote, and they always vote for the candidate closest to them on this spectrum. The numbers on this spectrum represent the number of voters lying to the left of the number. So, at the midpoint, fifty voters lie to the left and fifty to the right. If Candidate X is running for office against Candidate Z, then:
Candidate Z will win
Suppose Firm A and Firm B are considering whether to invest in a new production technology. For each firm, the payoff to investing (given in thousands of dollars per day) depends upon whether the other firm invests, as shown in the payoff matrix below. What is the Nash equilibrium of this game?
Firm A doesnt invest, and Firm B doesnt invest
Mexico and the members of OPEC produce crude oil. Realizing that it would be in their best interests to form an agreement on production goals, a meeting is arranged and an informal, verbal agreement is reached. If both Mexico and OPEC abide by the agreement, then OPEC's profit will be $200 million and Mexico's profit will be $100 million. If both Mexico and OPEC cheat on the agreement, then OPEC's profit will be $175 million and Mexico's profit will be $80 million. If only OPEC cheats, then OPEC's profit will be $185 million, and Mexico's profit will be $60 million. If only Mexico cheats, then Mexico's profit will be $110 million, and OPEC's profit will be $150 million. Which of the following statements is correct?
OPEC does not have dominant strategy
Player 1 and Player 2 are playing a game in which Player 1 has the first move at A in the decision tree shown below. Once Player 1 has chosen either Up or Down, Player 2, who can see what Player 1 has chosen, must choose Up or Down at B or C. Both players know the payoffs at the end of each branch. What is the equilibrium outcome of this game?
Player 1 chooses Up and Player 2 chooses Down
Consider the accompanying payoff matrix. What is player A's dominant strategy?
Up
The payoff matrix below shows the daily profit for two firms, Row Restaurant and Column Cafe, for two different strategies, publishing coupons in the student paper and not publishing coupons in the student paper. If Row Restaurant publishes coupons, Column Cafe would earn the highest profit if it:
also published coupons
In a repeated prisoner's dilemma, players:
can sustain cooperation by employing a tit-for-tat strategy
The market for bagels contains two firms: BagelWorld (BW) and Bagels'R'Us (BRU). The owners of the two firms decide to fix the price of bagels. The table below shows how each firm's profit (in dollars) depends on whether they abide by the agreement or cheat on the agreement. For Bagel World, ______ is a ______.
cheating on the agreement; dominant strategy
The last time you went on a road trip, you noticed that there were several fast food outlets clustered near some freeway exits, but none at the others. Now that you are familiar with Hotelling's model, you know that the reason for this is:
firms vying for a favorable location
Commitment devices are necessary when
following through on a threat or promise is not in a player's best interest
Refer to the figure below. In this game, the dominated strategy for Player A:
is to play down
Joe is the owner of the 7-11 Mini Mart, Sam is the owner of the SuperAmerica Mini Mart, and together they are the only two gas stations in town. Currently, they both charge $3 per gallon, and each earns a profit of $1,000. If Joe cuts his price to $2.90 and Sam continues to charge $3, then Joe's profit will be $1,350, and Sam's profit will be $500. Similarly, if Sam cuts his price to $2.90 and Joe continues to charge $3, then Sam's profit will be $1,350, and Joe's profit will be $500. If Sam and Joe both cut their price to $2.90, then they will each earn a profit of $900. In this situation, the Nash equilibrium yields a:
lower payoff than each would recieve if each played his dominated strategy
Suppose Firm A and Firm B are considering whether to invest in a new production technology. For each firm, the payoff to investing (given in thousands of dollars per day) depends upon whether the other firm invests, as shown in the payoff matrix below. Is this game a prisoner's dilemma?
no
Hotelling's model has been used to describe differentiation in the political "market." Suppose that 100 voters are evenly distributed between the extreme left and the extreme right on the political spectrum, and that all voters vote, and they always vote for the candidate closest to them on this spectrum. The numbers on this spectrum represent the number of voters lying to the left of the number. So, at the midpoint, fifty voters lie to the left and fifty to the right. If Candidate X is running against Candidate Z, by moving to the right Candidate X would:
not lose any votes from voters on the left and gain some votes from Z
Consider the accompanying payoff matrix. If Row Resorts keeps its rates high, then Column Cruises would receive the highest payoff if it:
offered reduced rates
The payoff matrix below shows the payoffs (in millions of dollars) for two firms, A and B, for two different strategies, investing in new capital or not investing in new capital. This game is an example of a:
prisoner's dilemma
A commitment problem exists when people cannot achieve their goals because:
they cannot make credible threats or promises
Refer to the figure below. If Jess chooses A, then Cory's best response is:
to choose A
Mexico and the members of OPEC produce crude oil. Realizing that it would be in their best interests to form an agreement on production goals, a meeting is arranged and an informal, verbal agreement is reached. If both Mexico and OPEC abide by the agreement, then OPEC's profit will be $200 million and Mexico's profit will be $100 million. If both Mexico and OPEC cheat on the agreement, then OPEC's profit will be $175 million and Mexico's profit will be $80 million. If only OPEC cheats, then OPEC's profit will be $185 million, and Mexico's profit will be $60 million. If only Mexico cheats, then Mexico's profit will be $110 million, and OPEC's profit will be $150 million. To Mexico, the payoff to cheating is either:
$80 million or $110 million
One thousand adults live in Milltown. Every day, they all leave work at 4:30 p.m., arrive home at exactly 5:00 p.m., and go to bed at 9:00 p.m. Three fundraisers, Alpha, Beta, and Charlie, have targeted Milltown's population. To get a donation, they must call Milltown's residents after they get home from work but before they go to bed. Because the charities raising the funds are identical, the first to call a willing donor will get the donation. Beta's manager has decided that the best time to call is 7:00 p.m. because it is exactly halfway between 5:00 p.m. and bedtime. Which of the following is true?
Beta's manager did not choose wisely
Player 1 and Player 2 are playing a game in which Player 1 has the first move at A in the decision tree shown below. Once Player 1 has chosen either Up or Down, Player 2, who can see what Player 1 has chosen, must choose Up or Down at B or C. Both players know the payoffs at the end of each branch. If Player 2 could make a credible commitment to choose either Up or Down when his or her turn came, then what would Player 2 do?
Player 2 would commit to choosing Down
The table below shows how the payoffs to two political candidates depend on whether the candidates run a positive or negative campaign. The payoffs are given in terms of the percentage change in the number of votes received. Running a negative campaign is ______ for the ______ candidate.
a dominant strategy; Democratic
The market for bagels contains two firms: BagelWorld (BW) and Bagels'R'Us (BRU). The owners of the two firms decide to fix the price of bagels. The table below shows how each firm's profit (in dollars) depends on whether they abide by the agreement or cheat on the agreement. Suppose the game above is repeated every day, and both firms adopt the following strategy: cooperate on the first day, then if the other firm cheats, cheat the next day, and if the other firm abides, abide the next day. This type of strategy is known as:
a tit-for-tat strategy
Mexico and the members of OPEC produce crude oil. Realizing that it would be in their best interests to form an agreement on production goals, a meeting is arranged and an informal, verbal agreement is reached. If both Mexico and OPEC abide by the agreement, then OPEC's profit will be $200 million and Mexico's profit will be $100 million. If both Mexico and OPEC cheat on the agreement, then OPEC's profit will be $175 million and Mexico's profit will be $80 million. If only OPEC cheats, then OPEC's profit will be $185 million, and Mexico's profit will be $60 million. If only Mexico cheats, then Mexico's profit will be $110 million, and OPEC's profit will be $150 million. Suppose Mexico chooses first, and then OPEC, after seeing Mexico's choice, chooses second. Before Mexico chooses, OPEC tells Mexico that if Mexico cheats on the agreement, then OPEC will also cheat, and if Mexico abides by the agreement, then OPEC will also abide. This is an example of a ______, and the outcome is that ______.
credible threat; neither will cheat
Joe is the owner of the 7-11 Mini Mart, Sam is the owner of the SuperAmerica Mini Mart, and together they are the only two gas stations in town. Currently, they both charge $3 per gallon, and each earns a profit of $1,000. If Joe cuts his price to $2.90 and Sam continues to charge $3, then Joe's profit will be $1,350, and Sam's profit will be $500. Similarly, if Sam cuts his price to $2.90 and Joe continues to charge $3, then Sam's profit will be $1,350, and Joe's profit will be $500. If Sam and Joe both cut their price to $2.90, then they will each earn a profit of $900. For Joe, keeping his price at $3 per gallon is a:
dominated strategy
Miniville is an isolated town located on the southern shore of Lake Condescending, a very large lake. The western edge of Miniville is adjacent to impassable mountains and there are no towns or businesses for many miles to the east. The 300 residents of Miniville are evenly distributed along 3 miles of shoreline on the lake, east of the mountains. Lake Shore Drive, the only street in town, provides access to Miniville's homes and businesses. All residents live between the lake and the street; businesses locate on the other side of the street. Lake Shore Drive is 3 miles long, and the points labeled A, B, and C are 1, 2, and 3 miles from the western end of Lake Shore Drive, respectively. All residents of Miniville shop at the store located closest to their homes. If the first store to open in Miniville is located at A, to maximize the number of customers it attracts, the next store to open should locate:
just east of A
Hotelling's model has been used to describe differentiation in the political "market." Suppose that 100 voters are evenly distributed between the extreme left and the extreme right on the political spectrum, and that all voters vote, and they always vote for the candidate closest to them on this spectrum. The numbers on this spectrum represent the number of voters lying to the left of the number. So, at the midpoint, fifty voters lie to the left and fifty to the right. To an economic naturalist, this model helps explain why political candidates:
move toward more centrist positions during campaign season
P-TV and QRS-TV are trying to decide whether to air a sitcom or a reality show in a given time slot. Viewers like both sitcoms and reality shows, but sitcoms are more expensive to produce than reality shows since real actors need to be hired. QRS-TV makes its decision first, and then P-TV observes that choice before making its decision. Both stations know all of the information in the decision tree below. Suppose QRS-TV enters into an agreement with P-TV that gives QRS-TV the exclusive right to air a reality show during this time slot. QRS-TV would be willing to pay P-TV _______ in order to persuade P-TV to enter into this agreement.
no more than $10 million