Parameters of Cooperation in Communication

pragmatic connection

is made between proper names and objects that will be conventionally ASSOCIATED, within a socio-culturally defined community, WITH THOSE NAMES ("Can I borrow your Shakespeare?" —> book)

pre-sequences

pre-request ("Are you busy?") pre-invitation ("What are you doing this Friday?") pre-announcements ("Mom, you know what?")

Davies' conclusion about Grice's CP

rationality/logic is central, cooperation is not the „driving force" in communication

speech acts

(Austin, 1962) - actions performed via utterances - most times interpreted to mean only the illocutionary force of an utterance

the cooperative principle of communication

(Grice, 1975) - Make your conversational contribution such as is required, - at the stage at which it occurs, - by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange - in which you are engaged.

Grice's aim

(according to Davies, 2007) to find the logic of conversation which could account for the gap between saying and meaning

parameters of cooperation

(by changing the following parameters of cooperation, you can change the level of cooperation in a conversation) 1. to what extent one FOLLOWS the MAXIMS of - quality - quantity - relation - manner (perspicuity, but no ambiguity/obscurity) (—> CP contains those four parameters) 2. the USE of HEDGES (if the speaker isn't sure if he/she can adhere to the maxims all the time) 3. the USE of IMPLICATURE (if the maxims seem not to be adhered to) —> can be calculated by the listener via inference 4. to what extent - if the speaker doesn't fully adhere to these maxims - the interlocutor TRIES TO correctly INFER what the speaker means —> look for implicatures

politeness

(in an interaction) - the means employed to show awareness of another person's face - can be accomplished in situations of social distance (respect, 'deference (Hochachtung)) or closeness (friendliness, camaraderie, solidarity)

negative politeness strategy

(more common) most typical form: a question containing a modal verb and very often expressions of apology for the imposition: "Could you lend me a pen?" "I'm sorry to bother you, but can I ask you for a pen?"

the performative hypothesis

(one way to think about speech acts) underlying every utterance (U) there is a clause containing a performative verb (Vp) which makes the illocutionary force explicit: I (hereby) Vp you (that) U.

four Grice maxims

(sub-principles of the cooperative principle of communication) - QUANTITY > Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current purposes of the exchange). > Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. - QUALITY > Try to make your contribution one that is true. > Do not say what you believe to be false. > Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. - RELATION > Be relevant. - MANNER > Be perspicuous. (deutlich) > Avoid obscurity of expression. (Unklarheit) > Avoid ambiguity. (Mehrdeutigkeit) > Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). (Weitschweifigkeit) > Be orderly.

Three related acts within a speech act

(three dimensions) - LOCUTIONARY ACT (the basic act of utterance; producing a meaningful linguistic expression; if some expression is foreign (e.g. in another language), one might fail to produce a locutionary act) - ILLOCUTIONARY ACT = illocutionary force (most discussed dimension; while uttering s.th., we usually have a function/purpose in mind; the illocutionary act is performed via the communicative force of an utterance) - PERLOCUTIONARY ACT = perlocutionary effect (indending an utterance to have an effect)

types of implicature

- CONVERSATIONAL i ( "I hope you brought the bread and the cheese." - „Ah, I brought the bread." (b & c? - b. +> NOT c)) - GENERALIZED CONVERSATIONAL i (no special knowledge required in the context to calculate the additional conveyed meaning.) - SCALAR i ( scales can e.g. be <all, most, many, some, few> <always, often, sometimes, never> <impossibly, possibly, maybe, probably, certainly, definitely> <could, should, must> e.g. „I'm studying linguistics and I've completed some of the required courses." (+> not all, +> not most, +> not many) - PARTICULARIZED CONVERSATIONAL i (the most common one); further knowledge assumed; often seems to flout one of the maxims, e.g.: „Whoa! Has your boss gone crazy?" - „Let's get some coffee." (seems to flout maxim of relation) —> implicature: Mary cannot answer the question in that context - CONVENTIONAL i (not based on the cooperative principle, "even"/"yet")

speech act classification

- DECLARATIONS (speech acts that >>change the world via their utterance) Referee: „You're out!" - REPRESENTATIVES (speech acts that state what the speaker >>believes) „The earth is flat." - EXPRESSIVES (speech acts that state what the speaker >>feels) „I'm really sorry!" - DIRECTIVES (speech acts that speakers use to get someone else to >>do something) „Don't touch that." - COMMISSIVES (speech acts that speakers use to >>commit themselves to some future action) „We will not do that."

What does Lumsden say about the CP?

- Grice says that speakers are usually cooperative in conversation - Lumsden: CP refers to a NARROW MEANING of cooperation: linguistic/formal cooperation (makes conversation possible, doesn't mean that speakers always pursue the same interests) - Lumsden recommends to bring the CP back more to center stage while requiring sensitivity in a range of situations

types of presuppositions

- POTENTIAL presuppositions (can only become ACTUAL p. in context with speakers) - EXISTENTIAL presuppositions (speaker is assumed to be committed to the existence of the entities named, e.g. „the cat, the King of Sweden, the girl next door" etc.) - FACTIVE presuppositions (treated as facts, often following a verb like „know", „realize", „regret", „to be <adj.> that"...: „Everybody knows that q" - with q as the factive presupposition) - LEXICAL presuppositions (the use of certain words or expressions conventionally presupposes a certain meaning, e.g. start, stop, again („They started complaining." >> They weren't complaining before)) - STRUCTURAL presuppositions (the use of certain sentence structures (e.g. wh-questions) presupposes that part of the sentence is already assumed to be true. „When did he leave?" >> He left) - NON-FACTIVE presuppositions (are assumed not to be true, using verbs like „imagine", „dream", „pretend" etc.) - COUNTERFACTUAL presuppositions (are not only believed not to be true, but even the opposite of it: „If you were my friend, you would have helped me." >> You are not my friend (counterfactual conditional))

manner hedges

- This may be a bit confused, but - I'm not sure if this makes sense, but - I'm not sure if this is clear at all, but

parameter

- a 'VARIABLE that can be changed by a subject - decides or limits the way in which sth. can be done

implicatures

- an additional conveyed MEANING not directly said. („a hamburger is a hamburger" —> the one answering the question how she likes the hamburger has no opinion, finds it neither good nor bad or thinks that all hamburgers are the same —> depends on context) - i. can be calculated by the listeners via inference

conventional implicatures

- are NOT based on the cooperative principle or the maxims - don't have to occur in conversation - don't depend on special contexts for their interpretation —> like lexical presuppositions: associated with specific words —> result in additional conveyed meanings; e.g.: > „but" —> implicates contrast between information in p & q; > „even" —> contrary to expectation („Even John came to the party." „He even helped tidy up afterwards.") > „yet" —> present situation is expected to be different, or perhaps the opposite, later („Dennis isn't here yet.")

quality hedges

- as far as I know - I may be mistaken, but - I'm not sure if this is right, but - I guess / I think

quantity hedges

- as you probably know - to cut a long story short - I won't bore you with all the details, but

relation hedges

- by the way (—> go on to mention some potentially unconnected information) - anyway (—> indicate that they may have drifted into a discussion of some possibly non-relevant material and want to stop) - I don't know if this is important, but - This may sound like a dumb question, but - Not to change the subject, but

Why is it not called the 'rational principle'? (Davies)

- cooperation is the NECESSARY OUTCOME from the application of reason to the process of talk —> cooperation is the realisation of rationality applied at the level of discourse

three types of speech acts distinguished on the basis of structure

- dec'laratives (statements) - inter'rogatives (questions) - im'peratives (commands)

direkt vs. indirekt speech acts

- direct speech acts contain a direct relationship between their structure and their function —> e.g. a declarative used to make a statement - indirect speech acts contain an indirect relationship between structure and function —> a declarative used to make a request ("It's cold in here." —> "I hereby request you to close the window.") —> Indirect speech acts are generally associated with greater politeness in English than direct speech acts

"on record"

- directly address the other person - mostly using imperative forms = "bald on record"

face threatening act vs. face saving act

- face threatening act: an utterance that represents a threat to another individual's expectations regarding self-image - face saving act: an utterance that lessens the possible threat to another's face

implicit vs. explicit performatives

- implicit performatives (= primary performatives) are utterances like „The work was done by Elaine and myself." - explicit performatives are utterances like „I tell you that the work was done by Elaine and myself."

entailment

- information treated as known and therefore not being stated - something that LOGICALLY FOLLOWS from what is asserted (behauptet) in the utterance. —> Sentences, not speakers, have entailments - not really a pragmatic concept, rather a logical one

presupposition

- information treated as known and therefore not being stated - something the speaker ASSUMES to be the case PRIOR to making an utterance —> Speakers, not sentences, have presuppositions - a relationship between two propositions: Mary's dog is cute. (p) Mary has a dog. (q) p >> q (p presupposes q) - CONSTANCY UNDER NEGATION: If p is negated (—> turned to the opposite), q remains the same: Mary's dog is NOT cute. (NOT p) Mary has a dog. (q) NOT p >> q

positive politeness strategy

- leads the requester to appeal a common (gemeinsam) goal (and even friendship) - "getting to know you" talk sometimes necessary before making a request - greater risk for speaker of suffering a refusal

"say nothing" approach

- many people seem to prefer to have their needs recognized by others without having to express those needs in language (e.g. looking for pen in bag, hoping that someone will notice) - when those needs are recognized, clearly more has been communicated than was said

cooperation drift

- misinterpretation of Grice's use of the term 'cooperation' - mixing up the meaning of the technical term 'cooperation' (in the Gricean sense) with the more general meaning of the term. (e.g. Grice doesn't mean that people never disagree or contradict one another)

a person's positive face

- need to be connected - need to be accepted, even liked - need to be treated as a member of the same group - need to know that one's wants are shared by others

a person's negative face

- need to be independent - need for freedom of action

two parameters of reference

- speaker's goals (e.g. to identify something) - speaker's beliefs (e.g. if the listener can be expected to know that particular something)

referent

- the OBJECT one refers to - intended referent vs. inferred referent

referring expressions

- the linguistic FORMS used for refer to something - can be: > proper nouns (Shakespeare, Hawaii) > noun phrases (definite: the author, the island; indefinite: a man, a beautiful place) > pronouns (he, her, it, them)

range of reference

- the possible interpretations a word allows = the number of possible referents. - limited by the co-text

pragmatics

- the study of... > speaker meaning > contextual meaning > how more gets communicated than is said > the expression of relative distance - the study of the relationship between linguistic forms and the users of those forms

an'aphora

= anaphoric reference = subsequent (nachfolgende) reference to already introduced referents

zero anaphora

= ellipsis („Cook _ for three minutes.") —> more being communicated than is said.

tautologies

EXPRESSIONS like „a hamburger is a hamburger" or „boys will be boys" —> communicate more than is said

IFIDs

Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices - performative verbs (explicitly name the illocutionary act - being performed („I (Vp) you that...")) - word order - stress - intonation

positive politeness

a face saving act which is concerned with the person's positive face; will tend to... - show solidarity - emphasize that both speakers want the same and have a common goal

negative politeness

a face saving act which is oriented to the person's negative face; will tend to show... - deference (Ehrerbietung) - emphasize the importance of the other's time or concerns - include apology for the interruption or imposition (Auferlegung, lästige Pflicht)

deference strategy

a negative politeness form (strategy involved is called "formal politeness", impersonal, emphasize the speaker's and the hearer's independence) e.g. "There's going to be a party, if you can make it. It will be fun."

solidarity strategy

a positive politeness form (emphasizing closeness between speaker and hearer: include personal information, use of nicknames, shared dialect or slang expressions, often inclusive terms such as "we" and "let's") e.g. "Come on, let's go to the party."

inference

an ACT in which a listener/reader tries to correctly interpret an utterance made by a speaker/writer as to which entity he/she refers to

reference

an ACT in which a speaker or writer uses linguistic forms to enable a listener or reader to identify something

speech event

an activity in which participants interact via language in some conventional way to arrive at some outcome (p. 57) —> e.g. a newspaper article, a dialogue, a letter, a conversation

hedges

expressions speakers use to mark that they may be in danger of not fully adhering to the maxims of the cooperative principle —> Indicate that the speaker tries to be a cooperative conversation partner

referential use (e.g. of indefinite articles)

having a specific person in mind (There's a man waiting for you.) —> „There was no sign of the killer." is used attributively or referentially depending on the context.

IFIDs and felicity conditions

help listeners to recognize the intended illocutionary force

felicity conditions

if the circumstances are expected / appropriate to a specific illocutionary force (infe'licitous = inappropriate; fe'licitous = appropriate) - GENERAL conditions (e.g. if the language can be understood) - CONTENT conditions (e.g. for both a warning and a promise, the content of the utterance must be about a future event) - PREPARATORY conditions (e.g. for a warning, these are: 1. it isn't clear that the hearer knows the event will occur 2. the speaker does think the event will occur 3. the event will not have a beneficial effect) - SINCERITY condition (promise: the speaker genuinely intends to carry out the future action) - ESSENTIAL condition (promise: state of speaker changes from non-obligation to obligation; warning: state of speaker changes from non-informing of a bad future event to informing)

anaphoric connection

sometimes (when the anaphoric expressions don't seem to be linguistically connected) a.c. have to be made by the listener by inferring more specifically. (cf. bike example or: „I rented a house. The kitchen is really big." - the kitchen of that specific house is meant. Because you know, a house usually has a kitchen.)

"off record"

statements not directly addressed to the other (e.g. "Uh, I forget my pen.")

co-text

the LINGUISTIC MATERIAL accompanying the referring expression („Brazil wins World Cup." —> „Brazil" is a referring expression, „wins World Cup" is part of the co-text)

context

the PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT, the social situation (in which an utterance is made)

antecedent

the initial expression used for anaphora

face

the public self-image of a person

'anaphor

the subsequent (second) expression used for anaphora

attributive use (e.g. of indefinite articles)

whoever/whatever fits the description (e.g. „He wants to marry a woman with lots of money.") —> „There was no sign of the killer." is used attributively or referentially depending on the context.

different illocutionary forces

—> what the utterance „counts as": warning, request, praise, promise, prediction etc.