PHI5800 Quiz 2
Plato on love
"The best things we have come from madness, when it is a gift of the gods" - Plato referring to love BEAUTY has a special status among the forms, because it has the ability to be seen Love is what happens when we are reminded of true Beauty by beautiful things on earth
characteristics of emotion
- all emotions are false beliefs about what is valuable, and therefore all emotions are bad - the stoics classify value into three categories: good, bad, and indifferent - emotions are false beliefs that things are merely indifferent are actually good or bad
reflection upon Nehamas' account of love/beauty
- provides a way to understand appearances or the physical; names we give to everything we think we already know about someone or something - explains why its difficult to state exactly what we find beautiful about someone or something; love looks to the future and goes beyond what we already know - provides resources to explain difference between love and sexual attraction; sexual attraction involves knowing what one wants from from another - it explains the difference between what we find pleasant and what we find beautiful
characteristics of impulses
- the impression to which one assents in having an impulse is an evaluative impression - impulses are sufficient to produce action: no other mental event or activity is necessary to make the agent act other than the belief that it would be good to perform some available action - moreover, every impulse does not produce action: if it does not result in an action, then it does not count as an impulse - conversely, every voluntary action results from an impulse: if a person does something that did not result from an impulse, then it was not a voluntary action - because impulses are beliefs, they can be true or false
the effects of love, according to Plato
- the lover's hearts desire is to draw the young man toward the divine and make him as much like the gods as possible - the young man experiences back love towards the lover; this is the stream of his own beauty reflecting off of the lover and back to him: he feels love, but cannot explain what or why - if the couple exercises self control and purses philosophy together, they achieve the greatest rewards you will have from a lover's friendship... they are as great as divine gifts should be; if they pursue ambition instead and sometimes act weakly, they achieve a second best happy life
Nehamas' reflections on the evolutionary theory
--> it assumes that attractiveness is the same thing as being beautiful; whereas beauty mobilizes emotions, these ratings do not --> it fails to account for the fact that objective and subjective beauty come apart; not everyone in the world is attractive, yet everyone has loved and been loved by someone --> it distinguishes too sharply between the physical appearances and the nonphysical ones; the inner and outer go hand-in-hand
what are the three components of the soul, according to Plato?
1) reason (the charioteer) --> knowledge, wisdom, what is best 2) spirit (the good horse) --> honor, power, respect, friendship 3) appetite (the bad horse) --> bodily pleasure
4 features of emotion
1) they have intentional objects: they are about something (ex: spider) 2) they have formal objects: they implicitly or explicitly ascribe properties to their intentional objects (ex: fearfulness) 3) they often involve changes in a person's physiological conditions 4) they are capable of being evaluated for reasonableness, appropriateness, or inappropriateness (the conditions under which the emotion occurs)
Gorgias' argument in defense of Helen of Troy
1. Helen could only have sailed away with Alexander due to one of four causes: a) the gods willed it b) she was physically forced c) she was persuaded by speech d) she was in love *Gorgias argues all four are physical compulsions* 2. No matter which of the four causes it was, Helen is not blameworthy 3. Therefore, Helen is not blameworthy
Seneca on anger
ANGER < PLEASURE anger is "the most hideous and frenzied of all emotions" - it is the most violent emotion and the one most opposed to human nature, which is built for mutual love and assistance - it represents a corrupt state of reason itself, which means that it cannot be controlled by reason - the impetuous nature of anger allows no time for reconsideration or a change of mind - it is voluntary false judgment: the agents passively receives false impressions (which can have involuntary effects on their bodies), but they actively accept those impressions as true - the angry person makes the false judgments: (a) that someone has done something bad to them, (b) that the person did something bad intentionally, and (c) that it would be good to exact revenge
perceptual theory of emotion
Emotions are forms of cognition or perception that purport to tell us something about the world; they are perceptions of various kinds of properties and values. Alternatively: they are lenses through which we perceive the world, or spotlights on certain features of the world, rather than perceptions themselves 1) fear tells you something is dangerous, not always accurate 2) highlights aspects of situation that wouldn't normally be noticed if not affected by emotion
stoic definition of impulse
a belief that attributes (positive or negative) value to an object or action; it is assent to the impression that an object or action has (positive or negative) value
Aristotle's definition of anger
a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one's friends slighting is "the actively entertained opinion of something as evidently of no importance"
stoics on emotion
according to the stoic theory, all emotions are impulses, and all impulses are beliefs
Aristotle on anger
actions committed out of anger are less blameworthy than actions due to pleasure and appetite, for a number of reasons: - appetite is disobedient to reason, but anger "seems to listen to reason to some extent" - anger is more natural than appetites for excess (not innate), and natural desires are less blameworthy - appetite involves plotting and deceit (indicates rationality), but anger is "open" and does not involve plotting - anger necessarily involves pain, while acts committed out of appetite involve only pleasure ANGER > PLEASURE
stoic definition of emotion
an impulse/belief that falsely attributes goodness or badness to an object or action (all emotions are false beliefs, therefore all emotions are bad)
the views of the Athenian, according to Plato
anger and pleasure have different effects on our psychology - anger is "unruly and difficult to fight" and "overturns many things through its irrational force" - pleasure "wields her power on the basis of an opposite kind of strength: she achieves whatever her will desires through persuasion mixed with forceful deception
Rosen's definition of excuse
any fact that defeats the standing presumption of an agent's responsibility for wrongdoing
stoic definition of belief
assent to an impression or appearance - humans receive impressions or appearances passively and involuntarily, but assent is always a voluntary act of reason - humans always voluntarily decide to believe the things they do (ex: you can't help having the impression that two lines are different lengths, but you can control your belief of whether they are different or not)
blameworthiness of actions
behaving in a certain way is blameworthy just in case (and to the degree that) the behavior results from the agent's caring inadequately about what is morally significant- where there is a matter of caring about what is in fact morally significant
blameworthiness of beliefs
beliefs (and failures to believe) are blameworthy if they involve inadequately caring about what is morally significant. believing a certain kind of behavior is wrong on the basis of a certain consideration is a way of caring about that consideration
ignorance as an excuse
both morality and the law operate with a "defeasible presumption of responsibility": they assume agents are responsible for their actions and wrongdoings unless the agents have a genuine excuse
Harman on ignorance and responsibility
challenges Rosen on two points: 1) blameworthiness of actions 2) blameworthiness of beliefs *agents can be blameworthy both for their actions and their beliefs regardless of whether they have met their epistemic obligations as Rosen understands them- ex: case of Huck Finn (inverse akrasia)
Rosen's case of the chattel slaveholder
defends the parity thesis; the case is designed to show: (a) our epistemic obligations do not normally require us to "rethinking the uncontroversial normative principles that form the framework for social life" - ex: when there is no disagreement about a given moral matter and one's views meet with no objection, and (b) that even if we are required to reflect in such cases, it is possible for us to meet that obligation and yet still remain blamelessly ignorant after reflection
Rosen's case of the American sexist dad
designed to show: (c) that even when the morally ignorant person is confronted with, or has access to, morally correct views, he may still meet his epistemic obligations and yet remain blamelessly ignorant
cognitivist theory of emotion
emotions are (at least partly) propositional attitudes or beliefs: "One can't be angry with someone unless one believes that person guilty of some offense; one can't be envious unless one believes that someone else has something good in her possession" emotions ARE (strong case) or INCLUDE (weak case) beliefs and judgments
physiological theory of emotion
emotions are feelings; they are perceived physiological changes and bodily sensations: "We feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and [it is] not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful"
Nehamas on love
finding something beautiful is equivalent with the experience (in some form) of love the experience of love is characterized by several features: - the feeling that one does not know everything there is to know about that person or thing - the sense that ones life would be better with that person or thing in it - the inability to state how exactly this person or thing would make ones life better - the desire to find out- to learn more and try to understand the person or thing - the willingness to change in unknown ways as a result of making this person or thing a part of ones life
moral ignorance
ignorance about whether an action is right or wrong, what moral obligations or duties one has and to whom, and how moral principles apply in a particular case
factual ignorance
ignorance of basic descriptive features of an action- ex: what the action is, what its effects will be, in relation to whom the action is being performed - sometimes factual ignorance acts as an excuse for wrongdoing: sometimes being ignorant of facts is no excuse, however - when ignorance excuses, it is because the agent is not to blame for her ignorance; when ignorance does not excuse, the agent is to blame for her ignorance: the blameworthy ignorant agent should have know the fact in question, where as this is not true of the blamelessly ignorant one
normative ignorance
ignorance of how heavily moral considerations should weigh in our deliberations about what to do; it is ignorance of the fact that, or the degree to which, an action's moral wrongness gives us strong reasons not to do it the normatively ignorant person knows an action is morally wrong, but (like Rosen's example of Bonnie) does not think that matters, or matters much, in deciding whether she should do it Rosen proposes Bonnie is blameless on the basis of the following principle: it is unfair to blame someone for doing something if she blamelessly believed that all things considered she had a compelling reason to do it
correct passions
impulses/beliefs (actually: knowledge) that correctly attributes goodness or badness to an object or action according to the Stoics, the only things that are actually good or bad are virtue and vice; therefore, correct passions are always impulses to maintain or pursue virtue, and to avoid vice
selections
impulses/beliefs that attribute the value of preferability or dispreferability to an object or action - the stoics subdivide indifferents into "preferred indifferents" and "dispreferred indifferents" - the preferred indifferents are worth trying to pursue, and dispreferred indifferents are worth trying to avoid, but whether we succeed in pursuing or avoiding them is neither good or bad for us and cannot affect happiness (living a good life, not literally emotion)
distinguishing crimes committed out of anger and crimes committed for the sake of pleasure, as a result of Plato's view
in terms of voluntariness - crimes committed for the sake of pleasure (especially for money) are fully voluntary - crimes committed out of anger are neither entirely voluntary nor entirely involuntary -- premeditated are closer to voluntary -- unpremeditated are closer to involuntary
distinction between injury and injustice
injury: an action that results in harm or loss to another person or persons injustice: an action that is caused by an unjust condition of the soul- a condition in which an irrational motivation like anger or pleasure "rules" instead of correct reason injury can be voluntary, but injustice cannot be since injustices cannot be voluntary, lawmakers should establish laws that differ depending on whether the injury was voluntary or involuntary
Phaedrus and Socrates on Love
love is a form of sickness/insanity lovers have lost control of themselves two opposing forces within our psychology: 1) our inborn desire for pleasure 2) our acquired judgment that pursues what is best love is a pleasure that opposes judgment the lover is "devastating to the cultivation of soul, which truly is, and will always be, the most valuable thing to gods and human beings; the lover keeps the young man away from philosophy, which is what would most improve his mind"
Rosen's positions
moral and normative ignorance are always blameless --> the only morally wrong actions are those that do not involve ignorance of any kind; the only agents who are blameworthy for their actions, on this view, are akratic or weak-willed agents --> if above view is right, then it is only fair or reasonable to blame someone if we know or have reason to be confident that they acted akratically --> NEVER FAIR OR REASONABLE TO BLAME SOMEONE; how are you supposed to know or have reason to be confident that the agent acted akratically? you cannot know for sure
Plato on anger
no one commits injustice voluntarily, but one can commit injury voluntarily ANGER > PLEASURE
evolutionary theory of beauty
psychological research identifies apparent standards of beauty that largely determine judgments of beauty across cultures this data seems to provide a scientific answer to the question of what beauty is- symmetry and suitability for reproduction
epistemic obligations
related to factual ignorance- is an agent to blame? whether agents are culpable for their ignorance depends on whether they have met their epistemic obligations- obligations to get information about, and reflect upon, the moral permissibility of actions
Gorgias on persuasion
speech is physical in nature: it is "a great potentate, which by means of the tiniest most invisible bodies achieves the most divine effects" speech affects the mind in the same way drugs affect the body: it produces effects on the mind that are involuntary for the listener: --> it produces emotional effects --> it changes a person's beliefs: it results in "errors of soul" and "deceptions of judgment"; "it drugs and bewitches the soul with a kind of pernicious persuasion"; and "persuasion proceeding through speech impresses the soul at will" his conclusion: speech is a compulsive physical force the power of speech to persuade depends on the fact that most people have only belief, not knowledge, about most things
Plato on psychology
the soul is self-moving- it is the source of its own motion, and it is the cause of motion in bodily things the soul is immortal and consist of three components every human soul has seen the "forms" of things like Justice, Knowledge, Beauty, etc. --> difficult to remember these forms during embodiment
Gorgias on love
vision is an involuntary physical process, and it results in emotional and motivational effects the emotions and desires caused by vision are also involuntary; they are like diseases that are "contracted": their effect on the mind and behavior are like the effects of illness on the body his conclusion: agents under the influence of love act on an irresistible compulsive force and are not blameworthy
parity thesis
whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, he is culpable for the act only if he is culpable for the ignorance from which he acts; if an agent performs a wrongful act out of blameless ignorance, whether factual or moral, then he is not culpable for the action