Phil 3330 Final Exam

Overview: 3 ways of responding to Black and White Mary

Jackson: physicalism is false: not all facts are physical because Mary learns a new, non-physical fact Lewis: Mary gains ability knowledge Loar: learns a new way of thinking

According to Lewis, what does Mary learn when she leaves the black and white room? Jackson? Loar?

LEWIS: Lewis says Mary learns a new ability. She learns the abilities to see, remember, recognize color. Experience is required for the development of these abilities. Learning physical Jackson: Mary is a scientist who knows all the physical facts about color, however she has been stuck in a black in white room for her entire life and she had never seen color. When she leaves the room and sees color for the first time, she learns what it feels like to see color, or the phenomenal qualia to the experience of seeing color. She couldn't know this before because knowing purely physical facts is not sufficient to know the felt quality of an experience. Loar: Learns a new way of thinking about an old fact

Mary the color scientist (Jackson's claim)

Locked in the black and white room from birth, learns all the physical facts about color and color vision: wavelengths of color, neural pathways, etc. when she leaves the room for the first time and sees red, Jackson claims learns a new fact about the world. She learns that red looks like this. She gains the conscious experience of seeing red, what it's like to see red, the qualitative character, phenomenal feel of what it's like.

State the afterimage objection to identity theory.

Mind brain identity theory states that mental states are identical to brain states. Leibniz's law states that if A equals B if and only if A and B share the same properties. The afterimage objection says that when you have a mental state of afterimage, the afterimage has certain characteristics that a brain state does not have (for example, the after image is green and not located in physical space but the brain state representing that afterimage is not green and is located in physical space). Therefore, since the properties of the mental state and brain state of an afterimage are not identical, mental states and brain states are not identical.

Smart: The mind is identical to the brain. Mind-Brain Identity Theory

Conscious mental states are type-identical to brain states. the mind IS the brain. Mental state: it feels like something to be in a mental state

Objection 2 to ability hypothesis: brain damage

Mary gets brain damage effecting memory, imagination, recognition. can still know what it's like in the moment. but lack abilities lewis claims are needed for knowing red.

Loar: New way of thinking objection to Jackson

Says Mary does know all the physical facts while she's imprisoned. Free mary gains factual knowledge, not ability knowledge, but she does not learn a new FACT. Rather, she learns a new way of thinking about a new fact

Why have conscious mental states?

Self representation. conscious mental states tell us about the world and ourselves (our mental states about the world. knowing about ourselves is important.

State consciousness vs creature consciousness

State: What explains the felt quality of mental states? feels different to be in different mental states. Creature: What explains why organisms are sometimes conscious (Awake, dreaming) and other times unconscious

Nagel: Point of view dependence (premise 1 of argument)

To understand what it's like to be an organism, you must 1) have a similar point of view and 2) use your POV to imagine what it's like to be that organism

Advantages of TUT view: Cases

cases of mind wandering are task unrelated (mind wandering is antithetical to active goal-directed thought. mind wandering is TUT, goal directed is task related

Higher order state (perception) -first order perception vs higher order representation

first order perception: content: the apple is red. brain, visual cortex. insufficient for consciousness. higher order representation: content: my visual state represents that the apple is red. brain: prefrontal cortex represents visual cortex. need a higher order representation (aware of perceptual state) in order to make a first order perception conscious.

Meta awareness

Conscious higher order thought (HOT) that is a mental state that explicitly represents another mental state

Schwitzgebel's theory about introspection

"Introspective" judgments combine lots of sources Inner sense Expectations Bias Lay beliefs, etc. Upshot: Introspection isn't reliable, subject to consistent bias

Objection 1 to Smart: Ignorant Experiences (and Smart's reply)

- Someone ignorant of science/brain states can know a lot about his conscious experiences - Reply: inappropriate application of Leibniz's law. example someone might not know the chemistry of H2O but they can know about water. Doesn't mean H2O isn't water. ***Attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, ignorance cannot be applied to Leibniz's law. Attitudes towards H2O and water can be different even if the things are the same.

Ways to show that the mind and body do interact (spirit and matter do NOT interact)

-Bodily state can affect a mental state: ex. take aspirin, chemical change in your body, you feel less pain (affects your mental state) -Spirit and matter don't causally interact (something located in physical space (extended bodies) cannot interact with something not located in physical space (non-extended minds))

Global Workspace Model/Theory. Dennett Motivating question, what's the functional difference between conscious and unconscious mental states?

-Fame in the brain. Conscious representations become known by all parts of the brain. -Unconscious representations are encapsulated within specialized modules (ex. face recognition, while conscious representations are broadcast to the whole brain, or large parts off it. Unconscious: within a very specialized system -when unconscious, very little communication between modules. when conscious, lots of communication between modules.

Metzinger: Meta-Awareness and Veto Control

-Mind-wandering lacks meta-awareness, and thus veto control -Goal-directed thought has both

Schwitzgebel's Interpretation of change in dream reports (color vs black and white)

-Self-report reflects beliefs about dream experience, not experience itself -Beliefs are sensitive to familiar media (paintings, TV) -Unreliable measure of experience

Higher Order Thought: Representational Theory of MInd

-mental states are representational/intentional -intentionality = representation, aboutness, directed at stuff in the world -representational content: what a representation is about -belief/perception: content is a situation or state of affairs (believes x is __) -desire: content is the object (ex. desire ice cream)

Regress problem

1) Every conscious mental state is accompanied by a HOT 2) But a HOT is conscious 3) So each HOT must be accompanied by another HOT, and so on to infinity Response: HOT's are not normally conscious, they function to make first-order mental states conscious. you're not aware of HOT, just makes the first order thought conscious. SO regress and circularity objections don't work. Processing is unconscious, but you are conscious aware of the content in the first order perception. not usually introspecting on HOW you're processing your environment

Point of View Argument: Nagel - What it's like to be a bat

1. Consciousness can only be understood from within a subjective point of view 2. Scientific explanations are objective: abstract away from subjective points of view 3. SO scientific explanations of consciousness abstract away the thing they're trying to understand. This is the one thing science will never lead us to understand.

Inference to the Best Explanation about dream report reliability

1. Dream reports are methodologically necessary 2. Dream science is massively successful 3. Candidate explanations --Dream reports are reliable -- Dream reports (and therefore science) is unreliable 4. Explanation A is better 5. So dream reports are reliable

Disembodiment argument (premises and conclusion) Gertler/descarte

1. I can conceive of having this pain without having a physical body 2. If I can conceive of something USING sufficiently comprehensive concepts, it's possible 3. Therefore, it's possible to have pain without a physical body (from 1, 2) 4. If A=B, it's not possible to have A without B 5. Therefore, pain ≠ physical state (from 3, 4)

Nomological Danglers Argument for Mind Brain identity theory

1) Observations - consciousness is natural, science finds type identities, conscious mental states correlated with brain states 2) candidate explanations - mental states are type-identical to brain states, mental states are "irreducibly physical" 3) Identity theory provides best explanation

2 Responses to Nagel

1) consciousness is more objective than Nagel thinks. really just brain states (cortico-thallamic oscillation) 2) science can be more subjective than Nagel: Example: dream-research - Subjective methods • First-person dream reports, where subjects describe their own experiences, indispensable to dream research

Why type identity? Motivations

1) general theory of pain (not just Anna's pain) 2) Other sciences discover type theories (Example water = H2O, lightening = atmospheric electrical discharge, heat = mean molecular kinetic energy. how science proceeds is by finding type identities.

Children and animals can't think about mental states

1) infants and animals can't attribute mental states to others 2) animals that can self-attribute mental states are a subset of those that can attribute mental states to others - more evolutionarily useful to think about others' mental states, evolved first. 3) so infants and animals can't think about their mental states cases where you think they can understand others' mental states, they're actually just expecting certain behavior. example dog play bowing or **HOT theory places too much conceptual ability on consciousness: infants and animals can't. Why should feeling pain require being able to think about pain?

Advantages of Functionalism

1) multiple realizability 2) token identity (Every mental state is token identical to some brain state) 3) commonalities (explains common/same function of human, octopus, and android)

Kim's 2 objections against interactionist dualism

1. Causal closure of the physical 2. No overdetermination

Publicity, Science, and Introspection conundrum

1. Introspection is a scientific method 2. Scientific methods are public: observations can be replicated across experiments 3. introspective observations cannot be replicated across subjects One of these has got to go. 1. could say introspection is not a scientific method (but then a TON of psychoanalytic research has got to go) 2. Scientific methods don't have to be public 3. Introspective observations can be replicated across subjects (siamese twins?)

Mind wandering lacks veto control

1. Meta-awareness is necessary for veto control (can't knowingly withhold a thought if you aren't meta aware of that thought) 2. Mind-wandering lacks meta-awareness (if you were aware that your mind was wandering, you would stop it) 3. So mind-wandering lacks veto control. (Difference between mind-wandering and goal-directed thinking)

Objection 2: Switching to new task

1. Mind wandering is frequently related to ongoing goals 2. Ongoing goals are tasks 3. Mind-wandering is frequently task-related

Goldman: is science necessarily public?

1. Multiple investigators can apply M to the same questions Interpretation 1 • Multiple investigators actually exist who can apply M Response • World with one scientist • World where scientists are on opposite sides of the universe Interpretation 2 • Possible for multiple investigators to apply M • Response • Brain-linked Siamese Twins could introspect each other's experiences •àintrospection is public

Objection 3: Afterimages (And reply)

1. My afterimage is greenish and not located in physical space 2. My brain states are not greenish and are located in physical space. 3. Leibniz's law 4. Therefore, my afterimage is not my brain state Reply: phenomenological fallacy: identity theory claims that my EXPERIENCE of a greenish after image = a brain process, not the afterimage itself = brain process. mistake: have to distinguish between experience and what the experience is about. analogy: when i imagine a wizard in hogwarts, my experience is not in hogwarts.

Elizabeth's two theses about causation

1. Nexus thesis: If C causes E, there must be a causal nexus between C and E: an interface by which C transmits energy to E 2. Contact thesis: A causal nexus requires physical contact

Objections to Metzinger

1. Too broad: rumination --repetitively focusing on duress. no meta-awareness (unaware you're focusing on that. can't knowingly correct yourself). doesn't distinguish between mind-wandering and rumination 2. Too narrow: watching mind wander --let your mind wander, meta-awareness: watching thoughts drift from topic to topic. don't actively control thoughts, but aware that you could (veto control). ppl say they "let their minds wander"

Zombie argument (including sufficiently comprehensive concepts)

1. Using sufficiently comprehensive concepts, I can conceive of a zombie me: a physical/functional duplicate of me without consciousness 2. If I can conceive of something using sufficiently comprehensive concepts, that thing is possible 3. Therefore, it's possible to have my physical and functional states without consciousness (from 1, 2) 4. If A=B, it's not possible to have A without B 5. Therefore, consciousness ≠ physical or functional state (from 3, 4)

Disembodiment Argument improved

1. Using sufficiently comprehensive concepts, I can conceive of having this pain without having a physical body 2. If I can conceive of something using sufficiently comprehensive concepts, that thing is possible 3. Therefore, it's possible to have pain without a physical body (from 1, 2)

Global Workspace 3 advantages

1. consciousness has function: integrated representations/global access 2. doesn't require HOT (infants/animals) 3. correlation between attention and consciousness.

Emergent properties

1. consciousness is made up of physical stuff 2. consciousness is genuinely new. cannot be reductively explained.

Anti-skeptical arguments (2) (Windt)

1. unwarranted under ideal reporting conditions 2. introspection is methodologically necessary

Objections to Smart/MInd-brain identity theory (Leibniz's Law)

A = B if and only if A and B have same properties (qualities, features, attributes of a thing). General structure of objections: 1)Mental States and brain states have different properties 2) Mental States = brain states if and only if mental states and brain states have all same properties (Leibniz' law) 3) Mental states do not equal brain states

Functionalism

A mental state is identical to whatever physical state performs the input-output function characteristic of that state. multiple realizable: allows pain, perception, etc. -example: pain. inputs: bodily damage. outputs: belief (body damage), desire (protect body) desire (avoid stimulus)

Science is public if... Publicity problem of introspection

A method M for producing evidence is public only if 1. Multiple investigators can apply M to the same questions 2. If multiple investigators apply M to the same questions, they'll typically replicate the same answers • Objectivity of science Publicity Problem • Your experience isn't public: no one else can have your experience • Method cannot be replicated by anyone else

Define access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. According to Block, which type of consciousness is captured by Global Workspace Theory?

Access consciousness is what we are explicitly aware of and can call to mind. Phenomenal consciousness is what it feels like to be in a mental state (felt quality of experience). Global Workspace Theory captures access consciousness because it states that S only becomes conscious of something once it is projected or globally broadcast throughout the brain. Access conscious If it's available for the free use in reasoning and rational control of behavior and thought. Access consciousness is when information is globally broadcast.

Is emergentism for or against the zombie argument

Against the zombie argument. says if it's a physical duplicate, the emergent properties must also be a duplicate.

Emergentism and downward causation (alexander's dictum)

Alexander's dictum: to exist is to have causal powers. Emergent properties must have novel causal powers, cause other emergent properties. Ex. C ---> C*, but consciousness/emergent properties supervene on the physical, so C* must emerge from P* if C causes C*, and C* supervenes on P* (any possible duplicate of P* must also have C), there must be downward causation from C to P*. C must cause P*

When is content broadcast? attention as an agent

Attention plays a large role in broadcasting. Mental states competing to be broadcast. who wins? Step one: strong activation (neurons firing/activated strongly. strong activation begins to initiate long-range communication). Step Tw: attention networks have lots of long-range connections, called workspace neurons. workspace neurons amplify certain mental states, broadcasting their contents to many modules. attentional bias attention has lots of connections and spreads the word. facilitates/leads to fame.

Overdeterminism (ex. rasputin's death)

Can argue that causal closure is true, and if a physical event has a cause it does have a physical cause, but there are ALSO spiritual causes (overdetermine their effects, Multiple causes: example rasputin poisons and gunshot and drowned. or firing squads. so why not say, there can be a spiritual cause (conscious desire) AND physical cause (neurons firing) that lead to physical effect (walk to coffee shop)

Illumination without analysis

Can give characterizations that illuminate it but don't define it. Helps pin it down. Can pick it out by pointing to it. Illustration through examples, felt quality of all these experiences. pointing through metaphors.

Chalmer's view on consciousness: "trying to define in more primitive notions is fruitless." consciousness is a fundamental concept, infinite regress argument

Can't define consciousness in terms that we wouldn't understand without consciousness. candy only be understood by conscious beings. fundamental concepts: cannot be analyzed in terms of simpler concepts. has to bottom out somewhere. example atom, matter, space, wave. irreducible infinite regress: infinite chain of progressively simpler concepts is absurd

2. Emergent properties are genuinely new

Cannot be reductively explained in terms of basal properties basal facts can't predict/explain emergent consciousness because consciousness is a genuinely novel property. Black and white mary - red is an emergent property. Consciousness: Basal facts • Facts about neural physiology and function Emergent properties • Can't predict + explain emergent consciousness • Why? Consciousness is a genuinely novel property of the whole brain/organism

No over determinism - Kim

Cases of over determinism are interesting because of their rarity: dualism makes cases of overdetermination way too pervasive and systematic. (happens in every mind body cause). massive coincidence. no systematic causal overdetermination

Children and Animals Objection to HOT theory

Claim: HOT implies that infants and animals are not conscious (that's nuts) 1. If HOT is true, all conscious beings can think about their mental 2. If HOT is true, either infants and animals can think about their mental states or they're not conscious 3. Infants and animals are conscious 4. Infants and animals can't think about their mental states 5. HOT is false

Emergentism's response to the conceivability argument

Conceivability/Zombie argument: can conceive of a zombie (physical/functional duplicate without consciousness) so it's possible to have all my physical/functional states without consciousness, so consciousness isn't physical. Reply: yes, you can conceive of a zombie version of yourself because emergent properties are novel; can never predict what it's like to have a brain. ex. can conceive of chemicals without life. there's a cognitive gap for all emergent properties. • Conceivability tests are a bad guide to possibility for emergent properties • Why? Emergent properties cannot be reductively explained Minimal physical duplicate is also a conscious duplicate. consciousness supervenes on the physical.

Disembodiment Argument (Gertler, Descarte)

Conceivable that a mind could exist without the body, therefore, mind does not equal body. use conceivability test to determine whether it's impossible for mind to exist without body. phantom limb pain.

Emergence

Conscious emerges from physics Problem: Downward Causation problem

Objection to Jackson's view of consciousness as epiphenomenalism (and Jackson's reply)

Conscious experiences (e.g. pain) cause physical changes in body (e.g. shielding limb, saying "ouch!") • Jackson's Reply: Conscious experiences and physical changes are correlated; doesn't show that one causes the other. General principle: correlation between A and B doesn't imply that A causes B. A and B can result from a common cause. (ex. brain state can cause both consciousness and behavior of protecting a limb).

Machine Functionalism

Conscious minds are machines. Same machine can be made up of many types of substances (multiple realizability). Therefore, conscious minds are multiple realizable. Compatible with token identity, but can also say what they have in common

Epiphenomenalism - Jackson (says mind and body do not interact) and advantages

Consciousness is an epiphenomenon: no causal powers. says there are physical to spiritual causal powers, but no spiritual to physical Advantages: Causal closure • Physical effects have physical causes • No Overdetermination • Only physical causes

Hard problem of consciousness

Consciousness is hard to reconcile with a physicalist view of the mind (physical: located in space, subject to physical laws, requires metabolic resources) -How can the objective reality give rise to subjective experience (explanatory gap, consciousness is different for everyone. every electric circuit will give you the same result. but for each person, neurons firing used by a place, etc causes a different reaction).

Limits of Science

Consciousness places a principle limit on what science can discover. Goal of science to abstract, get at something's objective reality. Problem" consciousness is a subjective point of view (no appearance/reality gap). objective explanations abstract away from consciousness

Reductive Physicalism

Consciousness reduces to physics Problem: Knowledge Argument + Conceivability Argument

Epiphenomenalism

Denies conscious experience can cause a change in physical body. Consciousness is an epiphenomenon- has no causal powers. says physical to conscious causation is ok, but opposite no.

Supervenience

Dependence = supervenience. Rough idea: Emergent properties are made up of basal properties Precise idea: Emergent properties supervene on basal properties, Any possible world that is a minimal basal duplicate as our world is an emergence duplicate of our world

Objection 1 to Gertler's disembodiment argument (for physicalism): Concept of non-physical is not sufficiently comprehensive

Disembodiment argument requires conceiving of both pain and not having a physical body. even if pain is a sufficiently comprehensive concept, not having a body isn't. Non-physical is not sufficiently comprehensive.

What is physical? Fundamental vs non-fundamental

Distinguish between fundamental and non-fundamental physical stuff -fundamental physical: described by physics (waves, particles, protons, etc) -non-fundamental physical: depends on fundamental physical stuff. mind depends on physical stuff in the same way as chairs, neurons, etc.

Explain how to interpret a dog's play bow in mentalistic and behaviouristic terms.

Dogs engage in play boys in order to initiate play with each other. In a mentalistic view, when a dog sees another dog bowing, it is recognizing the mental state of that dog. The dog may appear to be thinking, "Beto wants to play." In behvioristic terms, when a dog play bows it is simply expecting behavior from another dog, showing "dogs that boy will play." In mentalistic terms, the dog that sees the play boy attributes a play boy to the dog having a mental state "the dog wants to play" In behavioral terms, the dog

physicalism

Everything is physical, including everything mental. All the facts (everything true in the world) are physical facts. The mental depends on the physical

Possible to think about the same fact in different ways (ex. Clark Kent)

Example: know that clark kent sits next to you at work, doesn't know that superman sits next to you at work. Same fact, diff way of thinking. superman = clark kent, so any fact about 1 is also a fact about the other man. so colleague and hero express same fact. Louis Lane learns new factual knowledge when she discovers superman (hero). not a new fact, she already knew, new way of thinking about that fact.

Do infants attribute beliefs to agents?

Eye tracking movements. look longer at unexpected thing. Sally and Anne false belief task, HOT theory would imply that kids have no consciousness before the age of 4 (Wrong). but maybe it's just a problem with the language.

HOT theory: simple argument

Functional difference between conscious and unconscious mental states? ex. absent minded driving. perceptual system still engaged even though you weren't thinking about it. making complex motor decisions, so must be unconscious perceptual motor abilities. change blindness - not conscious of whole plan when we think we are. don't notice big changes. what's the difference? 1) conscious mental states are mental states we're aware of 2) to be aware of mental state M is to have another mental state that represents M (that is, to have a higher-order representation of M) 3)Therefore, conscious mental states are those our brain represents with higher-order representation.

Multiple Realizable Machine: Car

Gas Car, electric car, hydrogen car. How are all of these the same machine? function, physically has the same skeletal structure, engine that makes them drive by converting stored energy into kinetic energy. -each have same parts -parts have the same functions -ex. engine, converts stored energy (Electricity, gas) into mechanical energy -parts are defined by causal relations to other parts (input output function)

Dualism redux: Interactionist Dualism (Gertler)

Gertler says spirit and matter can interact

Objection 2 to Smart: Conceivability Argument (and reply)

I can imagine myself turned to stone and yet having images, aches, and pains and so on. ie. not having brain states but still having mental states. Reply: example of masked man fallacy. doesn't matter if you can imagine it b//c attitudes of imagination isn't about consciousness = brain

What Jackson says about the mind body problem

If we give up physicalism, what do we say about mind/body problem? Jackson/knowledge argument says the mind and body don't interact. Aren't causal interactions between mind and body. 1. The human body is a material thing 2. The human mind is a spiritual thing 3. Mind and body interact <--- says this is wrong 4. Spirit and matter do not interact

What's logically possible vs physically possible

If you can conceive of it it's logically possible. doesn't make us feel internally conflicted. physically possible dictated by laws of nature. logically possible, physically possible, actually possible (world)

Objection 1 to ability hypothesis

Implausible. Does Mary really only gain abilities? Doesn't she learn factual knowledge? ("ah red looks like this!") comes down to where our intuitions lie. knows THAT red looks like this now

Emergentism's response to the knowledge argument

Imprisoned mary knows all the basal facts of color vision before she leaves the room. knows all the physical facts 1. Consciousness is an emergent property 2. Emergent properties cannot be reductively explained by basal facts 3. So Mary's can't understand consciousness with mere knowledge of the basal facts Mary thought experiment doesn't show that consciousness isn't physical. Mary couldn't know mob mentality with just basal properties of individual students. same with consciousness.

Insight vs non-insight problem

Insight: "aha" moment, breaking riddles, pleasurable experience. goes from cold up to hot immediately Non-insight: traditional algebra problem. gradually work towards solution, FOW steady.

Start of Part 3 of course: Introspection

Introspection is a central method in consciousness research: reflect on own experience. gets at subjective nature of consciousness.

State Goldman's two interpretations of the following claim: a scientific method M is public only if multiple investigators can apply M to the same question. Give a counter-example to both interpretations.

Multiple investigators actually exist who can apply M. Counter example: world with only one scientist, that scientist can still perform experiements. It's possible for multiple investigators to apply M. Brain-linked Siamese twins could introspect each other's experiments (introspection is public).

Which general claim does Nagel's bat example support and how?

Nagel's bat example supports the claim that consciousness is subjective and point of view dependent. It claims that consciousness can only be understood from a subjective point of view. Humans can't echolocate, we don't have the point of view of a bat so we can never understand what it's like to be a bat.

What two theses about causation does Elizabeth assume?

Nexus thesis: in order for one thing to cause another, there has to be an interface/causal nexus that enables transfer of energy. Contact thesis: there must be physical contact in order for one to cause the other, or for a causal nexus to exist. Ex. shooting a pool ball Why can't spiritual causes satisfy? Because they are not located in physical space they cannot satisy the contact thesis.

Evolutionary argument for being able to think about others' mental states before own

Not as helpful to think about my mind because I'm already generating behavior and it's easy to predict. Thinking about my mental states can be paralyzing and slow you down from just doing what you need to do. Response to this argument: theory of mind, need to understand self before others, blindfold on infant teaches them that parents can't see without blindfold. but not necessarily how animals evolved

Mind wandering: not guided

Not reactive: if distracted, drift onwards unchecked. dynamics: unstable over time, wanders from one topic to another

Lewis' Ability Hypothesis (Response to Jackson's knowledge argument)

Objects to Premise 3 (If Mary learns something, she learns a fact). Lewis says Mary learns ability knowledge, not factual knowledge. factual: knowledge THAT claim is true ability: knowledge HOW to do something 3 abilities mary learns: recognize, remember, and imagine • Mary's factual knowledge doesn't give her the ability to remember, imagine, and recognize red • Why? Because factual knowledge is insufficient for ability knowledge

Multiple realizability on earth

Octopus minds: octopi have tool use (belief, desire, intention), play (curiosity, pain - recoil from injury to limbs and protect damage). octopus brains are completely different from other mammals. small central brain, 1 ganglia in each arm that controls motor movements. ex. detached octopus limbs capable of complex/goal directed movements 1) mind-brain identity theory implied pain = CTO 2) if x = y, something can't have x without y 3) octopus nervous systems don't have CTO 4) therefore, octopuses don't feel pain 5) but octopuses do feel pain 6) inconsistent **solution. can generalize pain to "M" and CTO to "b" to apply to more things

The Surprise Principle

One of the hard problems. Example, robot that knows everything about physical science, has no experience. Would be surprised to find out that other beings are conscious. Can't know it unless you are conscious yourself

Jackson's knowledge argument (premises)

P1: Imprisoned Mary knows all the physical facts C1: If physicalism is true, Mary knows (or can know) all the facts before her release (Motivation: Physicalism says that all the facts are physical facts; so Mary knows all the facts) P2: After her release, Mary learns something that she couldn't have known while imprisoned (Motivation: She learns what it's like to see red.) P3: If Mary learns something, she learns a fact. To learn something is to gain new knowledge. To know something is to know a fact. C2: Mary learns a fact after her release C3: Physicalism is false.

Sufficiently comprehensive concepts • Question • What makes a concept sufficiently comprehensive? • Why think that my concept <pain> is sufficiently comprehensive?

Pain is sufficiently comprehensive because there's no appearance/reality distinction. conscious pain IS how it's experienced. appearance = reality no distinction between how pain appears (how we experience it) and what it is. there's no hidden nature. so pain is sufficiently comprehensive.

Consciousness parts/whole/emergent prop

Parts • Physical stuff: neurons, functions, etc. Whole • Brain with phenomenal consciousness: felt quality to experience Emergent Property • Phenomenal consciousness

Mind-body problem (Elizabeth's argument against descarte)

Princess Elizabeth: how can dualism explain the interaction between mind and body? how could mind-body union occur? 1. The human body is a material thing 2. The human mind is a spiritual thing 3. Mind and body interact 4. Spirit and matter do not interact inconsistent tetrad: any 3 entail that the 4th is false.

How do you establish that it's impossible to have A without B? does a perfect correlation between A and B mean that A equals B?

Problem: A could cause B, or A and B could have a common cause.

Descarte: rejection to nexus thesis and contact thesis

Rejection to nexus thesis: doesn't have to be a causal nexus. doesn't have to involve transmission. causation by omission, did the tree die because the person didn't water it? not actually a cause, causation is not having water and cells dying. blame is different that causation. causation by omission has be a special relationship Rejection to contact thesis: causation doesn't require physical contact. magnetism/gravitation pull. there are magnetic fields we just can't see around objects. are in contact with their fields

Advantages of emergentism

Responses to hard problems 1. Knowledge Argument 2. Conceivability Argument

Objection to HOT theory: Problem of the Rock (And reply)

Rock: When I become aware of a rock, the rock doesn't become conscious. Mental states: Why should becoming aware of a mental state make it conscious? Reply: not goal to explain what makes anything conscious, just explain what makes MENTAL STATES conscious. rock isn't conscious because it's not a mental state.

Solves 3 Problems: Rumination Task-switching Meta-Awareness

Rumination: rumination is affectively guided, distinguishes between the two Task switching: problem: mind wanders frequently related to ongoing tasks. Solution: no reactive control with unguided: if distracted, drift on unchecked. Meta awareness: watching the mind wander, watch thoughts drift, that's ok because you're not guiding your thoughts. still unguided.

Objection 1 to TUT view: Overly broad, Irving

TUT is an overly broad category Includes mind-wandering and antithetical forms of thinking (e.g. rumination) Rumination problem: Wander = "Move hither and thither without fixed course or certain aim... to be (in motion) without control or direction" (OED) Problem: Can't "move hither and thither" if fixed on single thing (ruminating) single/unified scientific theories are better than disunited ones. wandering and rumination likely not a unified category. (rumination has diff neural correlates, phenomenology, clinical conditions, etc) people don't intuitively see mind wandering and rumination as the same either.

The Knowledge Argument: Jackson

Targets physicalism. Says not all the facts in the world are physical facts. Knowledge argument: even if you understood all the physical facts, you wouldn't understand consciousness.

2. Ongoing goals are tasks (count as tasks)

Task = "What you're currently doing" What are you doing? Writing essay, planning trip Task-Switching Old task : attending to lecture New task: writing essay, etc. just switching to a new current task.

Introspection example: mind wandering

Task unrelated thought (TUT). In life, unrelated to what you're currently doing. In an experiment, unrelated to the experimental task. ask someone every minute "were you thinking about the task at hand?"

Mind wandering as TUT (task-unrelated thought)

Task: experimental task or what you're currently doing 30-50% of thoughts are task-unrelated typical paradigm: thought sampling: were you thinking about something other than the current task?

Explain the Vedānta school's notion of witnessing consciousness. Explain one problem that witnessing consciousness creates for Global Workspace Theory.

The vendanta's school's notion of witnessing consciousness is the experience of nothingness. Specifically your consciousn mental state does not represent anything. It has no representational content. Global workspace theory says that modules must broadcast representation to each other in order to create consciousness.

Introspection Skepticism (empirical evidence, dream reports)

Theoretical skepticism: in principle, introspection is not public and not scientific. Empirical skepticism: empirical evidence that introspection is NOT reliable for judging their experience. ex. dream reports: percentage of people reporting dreams. arc of opinions. interpretation 1) dreams became black and white then turned colored because modeled on tv (implausible, have way more daily experiences in color than black and white tv). and no change in color words from direct reports

Phenomenality without Access: Sperling partial report paradigm- Dennett's reply

There is background experience without access. Is a background that's not accessible. can only report 4 but you feel like you know all nine/have the subjective experience of all nine letters. 1. experience the whole array, so it's phenomenally conscious 2. can't report on the whole access to array, so it's not access conscious 3. therefore, phenomenality without access Dennett's reply: shows different kinds of access, not phenomenality without access. different kinds of memory (working memory - report, vs iconic memory - visual persistence/stains

Phenomenality without Access: Jackhammer argument (Dennett's reply)

There's a jackhammer going outside, suddenly become aware of it. becoming access conscious of something you were experiencing the whole time. Dennett: just an illusion that you were conscious of it. Like the refrigerator light. only know it's on when you check, but before you check you actually have no idea.

Irving: Saying there could be no dream research without dream reports is too strong

Thought Experiment 1. Everyone immediately forgets their dreams on awakening 2. Dream enactment is pervasive SO windy would say dream science is impossible, still have ways to analyze dreams through action, neural activity, active/placid sleep, specific behaviors. seems like science

Core motivation for HOT theory

To be conscious of a mental state is to be aware of that mental state.

Global workspace theory doesn't make a distinction between P and A consciousness

To have fame in the brain is to have phenomenal consciousness

Objection 2: Inconceivable - Dennett

Trying to conceive of removing "consciousness while leaving cognitive systems intact is a[n]...entirely bogus feat of imagination" • Analogy: Removing health while leaving bodily systems and powers in tact Consciousness is a functional concept, like health. Chalmers responds that health is functional but consciousness isn't.

Abductive argument

Type of inductive argument: inference to the best explanation. 1) observations made 2) candidate explanations considered 3) best explanation considered 4) therefore, best explanation likely to be true. ex. Sherlock Holmes

Multiple Realizability Objection to type-identity theory

Type-identity theory: every type of mental state = type of brain state. pain = portico thalamic oscillation. if pain = CTO, can't have pain without CTO. (Analogy: cannot have water without CTO) M.R.O: 1) A mental state (ex. pain) could be made up of diff physical states across species (ex. CTO in humans, something else in octopi) 2) so one can have pain without CTO 3) so pain does not equal CTO token identity theory would still be ok, but ethical consequences

3. Mind-wandering is frequently task related

Unrelated to old task (lecture) Related to new task (essay)

Overview: Interactionist Dualism View and Problem

View: Consciousness is spiritual + interacts with body Problem: No spirit- matter causes (Elizabeth, Kim)

Epiphenomenalism

View: Consciousness is spiritual + no causal powers Problem: Alexander's Dictum

token identity theory allows for multiple realizability, but problem (what cross-species mental states have in common)

What about android/alien pain without brains? what do diff tokens o pain have in common? should explain what diff cases of pain have in common. what makes this state pain? too broad

Minimal physical duplicate

World identical to ours with respect to basal properties (eg all of the same chemicals with nothing added). Would also have all the same emergent properties (Against the zombie argument)

1. Mind-wandering is frequently related to ongoing goals

Writing essay, planning camping trip, deciding on dinner, etc.

Block: access consciousness

a mental state that is broadcast for free use in reasoning and direct rational control of action, including report

Veto control

ability to knowlingly cease a behavior you've already begun to execute.

soundness

argument's premises are true

consciousness as access/function of consciousness

conscious mental states can be accessed by systems other than the module(s) in which they're usually stored. conscious access allows different modules to form an integrated representation of the world.

Emergentism (physicalist theory)

consciousness "emerges" once physical stuff becomes sufficiently complex • Whole is more than the "sum" of its parts (new properties)

Emergentists hold that consciousness supervenes on the physical (supervenience physicalism)

consciousness is physical. supervenience physicalism: any possible world identical to our has identical consciousness. all the same conscious states if duplicate physical world. all the same conscious states if duplicate physical world. emergent properties supervene on basal qualities.

deductive arguments

designed to guarantee that their conclusion is true

type-identity (distinguish between type and token)

distinguish between types and tokens. example: 2 golden retrievers - one type of dog, two token dogs (particular individual) type identity theory: every mental state (ex. pain) = a type of brain state (ex. portico-thalamic oscillation) *type identity theory implies token identity theory (not vice versa).

1. unwarranted under ideal reporting conditions

dream report: action concocted with sincere intent to communicate info about a particular dream. skepticism warranted for questionares, but not for dream reports, especially if administer immediately after waking. color words in dream reports didn't change

token identity theory

every token mental state (ex Anna's pain) = a token brain state (ex. the state in Anna's brain) versus diff pains in someone else or an octopus etc.

Objection 3: Against sufficiency

expert imaginer, great at imagining colors between one's she's seen. she's seen scarlet, crimson, etc. and she can imagine what it would be like to see vermillion, but she doesn't know what vermillion is like until she sees it or imagines it. Just because she holds the ability, doesn't actually know. abilities are insufficient to know what it's like, just as scientific knowledge was insufficient.

Guided thinking

goal directed. proactive (likely to attend goal) reactive (return to goal, if distracted) dynamics: stable over time for both goal directed and affective guidance reliably focus on goal or distress, if distracted, pulled back to the task/rumination

validity

impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false

inductive arguments

increase confidence. designed to increase the likelihood that their conclusion is true

Global workspace doesn't require HOT advantage and correlated with attention.

infants and animals can globally broadcast representations, capable of integrated experience and action global workspace explains the correlation between attention and consciousness. attention plays a key role in broadcasting.

Access without phenomenally: blindsight/super blindsight

lesion to primary visual areas, report having no visual experience. but can reliably report what they're seeing if they guess. they just don't have any subjective feeling of having that mental state -super: guesses so accurate they learn to trust them and can navigate the world

2. introspection is methodologically necessary

must use dream reports or measures justified by dream reports to measure whether we were or weren't framing and the phenomenal character of dreaming. methodologically necessary ex. REM sleep. dream reports were necessary to back up evidence that REM and dreaming are correlated.

Irvinig: Unguided thought

need to focus on dynamics rather than mental states. Mind-wandering: Meanders from topic to topic (camping groceries party) Contrast: focused thinking: Goal-directed (Rumination) Explanation: Mind-wandering is unguided thinking

Nomological Danglers Argument

nomological: concerning the laws of nature dangler: if we deny mind-brain identity theory, consciousness will be a weird outlier that sits away from everything else in nature. 1) consciousness is a natural phenomenon 2) science tends to find type identities for natural phenomenons 3) conscious mental states are closely associated with brain states 4) mind-brain identity theory offers simpler explanation than view that consciousness is "irreducibly psychic" 5) therefore, mental states are type-identical to brain states. *this is an inductive argument (premises 2, "tends to find")

Interpretations that introspection can't be publicly validated

option 1: introspection isn't a scientific method option 2: not all scientific methods can be publicly validated (fundamental methods can't be) - ex. memory. can't validate memory without appeal to memory introspection is fundamental, not unscientific option 3: introspection CAN be publicly validated (ex. lie detector tests, use pysiological correlates (heart rate) to validate subjective reports. also feelings of warmth. mind wandering, brain scans. more activity in brain's default network when report they're mind wandering.

Problems with downward causation

over determinism. C must supervene on P, so P must be sufficient to cause P*. Which means that the same problems that arose with dualism and over determinism arise here, there are always 2 sufficient causes. • Emergence violates the No Pervasive Overdetermination principle. If try to fix by saying C has no causal powers, run into alexander's dictum

Mind-brain theory: mental state = brain state (pain example)

pain: firing in pain regions in brain visual experiences: firing in visual areas in brain. different mental states are different brain states

Substance dualism: two kinds of substances/properties

physical: material things, wave molecule, phone, brain. -- extended (located in space) and subject to physical laws mental substances: souls or spirits. -- mental (have consciousness and mental representation). non-extended (not located in space and not subject to physical laws. minds are wholly mental, immaterial substances that are not located in space and aren't subject to physical laws.

modules

small parts that can be used to construct complex structure, like ikea furniture.

Block: Phenomenal consciousness

something it is like to be in that mental state. the subjective, felt quality of experience.

Objection 1 to HOT theory: circularity problem

try to define something in terms of itself. having a mental state that's conscious. 1) HOT theory defines consciousness in terms of higher order thoughts 2) But HOT's are conscious 3) So HOT is circular: it defines consciousness in terms of consciousness. can't define something in terms of itself.

Encapsulation

unconscious. Modules are relatively encapsulated. Do not communicate while performing their specific functions typically. Consciousness: not encapsulated. integrate representations from multiple modules

Alexander's dictum (response to epiphenomenalism)

• "To exist is to have causal powers" • Epiphenomena aren't genuine things, but consciousness is

Public validation (Goldman says introspection can't be publicly validated)

• A method M for producing evidence is public only if • M has been validated by wholly public methods • Scientific Instruments • Readings not trusted until reliability is established through public methods • Ex: spectrometer

Introspection examples: blindsight and feeling of warmth

• Blindsight. No visual experience in blind field. Can reliably guess about objects in blind field. Introspection used to establish that there's no visual experience • Feeling of Warmth: Subjective evaluation of how close you are to solving a problem. Subject reports on their own subjective FOW

Zombie argument (Chalmers) - against physicalism/functionalism

• Conceive of a philosophical zombie: Physical/functional/ behavioural duplicate of you that entirely lacks conscious experience • Consciousness is not material. just copying physical stuff can't copy consciousness. it is possible to have physical and functional states without consciousness. If A = B, it's not possible to have A without B. Therefore, consciousness does not equal a physical or functional state.

Objection 1: Zombie Utterances

• Functional Duplicate: Zombies can make meaningful utterances. But how do we interpret Zombie utterances? • Zombie: "Mmm! Fresh coffee!! I love that smell!" • Mistaken? Lying? True? Without truth value? • Unclear how Chalmers can coherently answer this question In order to make sense of saying that, a zombie must be having an experience that makes it feel that way, ie having consciousness.

Objection 2 to Gerlter's disembodiment argument: Functionalism

• Functionalism • A mental state is identical to whatever hardware performs the input-output function characteristic of that state • Implication • Allows that disembodied minds are possible, even if our minds are bodily • Pain is essentially connected to its outputs • Desire to avoid painful stimuli • Desire to protect limb • Etc. • So non-functioning pain is inconceivable

Good/bad case of conceivability

• Good case • Concept <bachelor> is sufficiently comprehensive • Bachelor = unmarried man • Bad case • Concepts <triangle>, <water> insufficiently comprehensive • Don't know geometry of triangles, chemistry of water

Causal closure of the physical

• If a physical event has a cause, it has a physical cause • 1st law of thermodynamics: Within any closed system (the physical universe) energy can neither be created nor destroyed • Spiritual to physical causes would introduce energy Reply from descarte: physical/spiritual is a closed system Kim's reply back: If physical universe isn't closed, we should see LOTS of violations of 1st law of thermodynamics; we don't

Identity theory and possibility

• If pain = CTO, it's impossible to have pain without CTO (or vice versa) Analogy: • If water = H2O, impossible to have water without H2O • Water look-alike is not water

Objection to conceivability: Arnault (Concievability does not equal possibility) Reply: insufficiently comprehensive concepts

• Imagination is fallible: we sometimes conceive impossible things • So conceivability doesn't always entail possibility • Example: child could imagine the following • Triangle whose angles don't add up to 180 degrees • Water without H2O • Reply • Conceivability fails only when we have insufficiently comprehensive concepts to fully understand a scenario

Loar: New way of thinking in relation to Mary

• Loar: the following claims express the same fact •(PHYS) B123* is the conscious experience of red •(CONS) This is the conscious experience of red • Why? Because this = B123* gains new way of thinking about conscious redness: as this, whereas imprisoned Mary's only way of thinking was a B123. experiential way of thinking versus scientific way of thinking.

• Examples

• Mobs • Life:• Parts: Lifeless chemical molecules. Whole: Living organism that strives to survive and has meaningful goals: eat, reproduce, avoid predators. Emergent Properties: Organisms, goals • Ants: • Parts: Relatively "dumb" organisms with simple nervous systems • Whole: Intelligent, problem-solving, colonies that can farm, build bridges, forage for food, etc. Emergent Properties: Intelligence, problem solving • Consciousness:•

Is Nagel a dualist?

• Nagel is NOT a dualist! • Are minds are physical? Maybe, maybe not • Problem: Scientific Method • Objective, scientific, explanations ill-suited to understand consciousness • Consciousness will remain mysterious to science

Physical duplicate/functional behavioral duplicate

• Physical Duplicate • Molecule-for-molecule duplicate • Functional/Behavioural Duplicate • Mental states have the same input-output functions • Zombie • Indistinguishable outside, "dead" inside

Bat example

• Question: Can a human understand what it's like to be a bat? Nagel says No, human POV doesn't allow us to imagine what it's like to use echolocation, fly, etc. Human with echolocation abilities? This actually supports Nagel, we need that ability/point of view in order to know what it's like to echolocate

Science: View from nowhere (premise 2)

• Scientific explanations are objective: they abstract away from subjective points of view • Scientific explanations seek objectivity • "View from nowhere" • Appearance to reality: abstracts from how things appear from species-specific POVs • Reveals objective POV- independent reality; understandable by any rational creature ex. lightening. looks different to diff species, but science tries to look at it from an objective standpoint. tries to understand lightening in an objective way (electrical discharge from atmosphere) that gets away from POV. not looking at how things appear to be • Where Science Works: Explanations of things whose reality is distinct from its appearance • Basically: everything except consciousness consciousness places a principle limit on what science can discover.