PHIL FINAL
One reason Aquinas gives for thinking that suicide is morally impermissible is that, by committing suicide, a person injures the community of which he is a part. What is Hume's response to this kind of argument? Is it convincing? Why or why not?
Aquinas: EVERY MAN IS PART OF A COMMUNITY AND IF YOU KILL YOURSELF YOU ARE DESTROYING A VITAL PART OF THE COMMUNITY · IN A COMMUNITY YOU HAVE MORAL DUTIES TO OTHERS AND SUICIDE VIOLATES THIS · WITHIN SOCIETY, YOU CAN HARM SPECIFIC OTHERS SUCH AS YOUR FAMILY AND FRIENDS BY COMMITTING SUICIDE. Hume's rejoinders · My interests versus society's interest: my interests should outweigh society's interests · Suicide in the interest of society: it's best for society for someone to commit suicide, · Living versus flourishing: it is not worth is to just live if you are suffering while living. You should only have to live if you are flourishing · Are you obligated to live in pain for your family? · SUICIDE SHOULD BE PERMISSIBLE BECAUSE: YOU ONLY OWE SOCIETY AS MUCH AS IT PROVIDES FOR YOU YOU AREN'T DOING ANY HARM, BUT YOU CEASE TO DO GOOD BUT WHEN YOU'RE DEAD, YOU AlSO AREN'T RECEIVING ANYTHING FROM SOCIETY SO YOU DON'T OWE ANYTHING PEOPLE HAVE A REASON TO END THEIR LIFE, NO ONE THROWS IT AWAY IF THEY BELIEVE IT'S WORTH LIVING EMPLOYMENT EXAMPLE: YOU ONLY OWE YOUR TIME TO YOUR JOB WHILE YOU ARE EMPLOYED THERE. THE MOMENT YOU QUIT THE JOB YOU NO LONGER OWE ANYTHING TO THAT JOB. YES, HUME IS CONVINCING, BECAUSE: ARE YOU ACTUALLY DOING ANY GOOD FOR THE COMMUNITY IF YOU ARE IN PAIN AND SUFFERING ALL THE TIME YOU MAY ACTUALLY BE HINDERING COMMUNITY I AM NOT OBLIGATED TO DO A SMALL GOOD FOR SOCIETY AT THE EXPENSE OF A GREAT HARM TO MYSELF.
What is the current best interests approach to making decisions for incompetent patients? Does it leave enough room to respect the wishes of those with minority beliefs?
Best Interest Standard- this idea questions whether the burden of what someone is facing outweighs the potential benefits of what treatment can provide. Also it questions how much pain the patient is in. Ultimately, this standard debates if the patient's quality of life after treatment would be good enough to be worth it. This standard faces a similar problem compared to having family members making decisions for incompetent patients because we can't make judgements about the quality of life without letting our own preferences and desires influence those judgements. Minority Values debates on if someone has a deep passion for something, if that changes how their situation should be treated if they can't make a decision for themselves. Ex: if someone is deeply committed to Christian Science. This does not respect minority values, but it allows patients to be able to develop new values that they could be just as passionate about and maybe even find a new minority value They may even be able to find a new way of expressing their minority value. The best way to make decisions for incompetent patients is with the help of a doctor because: If a patient has a living will or medical proxy can be outdated. The wishes that someone may have had earlier in life may be completely different than they are now. Also that proxy may not understand what you would want currently. Objectors say that family members should be able to make the decision. But they shouldn't because they may have a bias opinion that favors the family interests, not necessarily the individual
Dworkin argues that, even if individual choice is intrinsically good, some paternalistic interventions can still be justified. Do you think his argument succeeds? Why or why not?
Dworkin's argument is that: 1. There are goods that's all people recognize as good 2. But sometimes there are moments when certain individuals can't recognize these things as goods ex (delusional jumper) 3. In cases like these, interfering with a person's expressed will is not really interfering with their judgment of what is good. 4. Interfering does not dent the intrinsic value of individual choice 5. Therefore, not all paternalistic restrictions are incompatible with the intrinsic goodness of individual choice. Yes, some paternalistic interventions can be justified because people are not always thinking clearly · Dax, a patient that was severely burned all over his body wanted the doctors to stop treating him because he thought that even if he made it out alive after all the treatments, his life wouldn't be worth living. But it turns out that Dax is actually very happy with his life, and extremely successful. He is not happy from the same things that he did before the accident but he would have never known that law school would be something of interest if it wasn't for the doctors bc he would be dead. · Paternalistic intervention should also be justifiable when someone is not mentally stable. So, if someone has Downs Syndrome, it makes sense to allow intervention because that person may not realize what is best for them at that time. Or even if that person is depressed then they are not thinking clearly and could make decisions that are completely different from those they would make when they are "normal" · This is justified because the doctors were doing what they thought Dax would have wanted if he weren't in intense pain at the time. When someone is in intense pain, often times they don't make the same choices that they would without that pain. The people who worked to save Dax's life wanted to make the choice to save him bc they believed they were making the choice that he would have made if he wasnt experiencing that pain · With this being said, paternalistic intervention is only justifiable when the treatment is potentially life saving. If a person wants to make a decision that doesn't affect his or her life, then that is fine and they should be able to make that individual choice. Dresser and Robertson: Argue that they should treat Iris' pneumonia even if she wrote a living will that if she can no longer do philosophy and write novels they should just let her die bc she doesn't want to live anymore. However, she is a different person now than she was when she was alive and the doctors can make an unbiased choice to allow her to live if the "cost" is not high. Why should we privilege the desires of past self over her present self?
IS SCREENING FOR, AND THEN TERMINATING, DISABLED FETUSES COMPATIBLE WITH THE VIRTUES REQUIRED OF A GOOD PARENT? OR DOES IT VIOLATE A PARENTAL IDEA OF UNCONDITIONAL LOVE?
EXPRESSIVIST ARGUMENT: IT IS NOT JUST ABOUT BEING BORN WITH A DISEASE BUT IT IS ALSO ABOUT THE WAY PEOPLE TREAT PEOPLE THAT ARE DISABLED. IT WOULD BE MORE BENEFICIAL FOR A DISABLED ADULT TO LIVE WITHOUT THE STIGMA FACED, PROVIDING A HEALTHIER SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFE. ALSO THEY WOULDN'T FEEL LIKE THEY NEED TO PROVE THEMSELVES AS GOOD AS EVERYONE ELSE WHO IS NORMAL. WITHOUT A DISABILITY LIFE WOULD BE EASIER AND MORE EFFICIENT, AND IT WOULD BENEFIT THE GROUP/SOCIETY MORE IF THE CHILD WASN'T DISABLED FROM A ECONOMIC PROSPECTIVE. Singer's Utilitarian Argument which says that normal people supply more utility than disabled, so you should be able to terminate a disabled fetus because a normal fetus would provide you with more utility. Also a disabled child will bring more pain, so you should again abort to maximize pleasure. · Another idea is that if a mother could give a child a life without a disability, then it would be wronging the child to carry it to term. EX ZIKA VIRUS o Similar to pregnancy, if she could give a fetus a life without a disability by screening, aborting, and trying again, she should do that.
According to Philippa Foot, there is a morally relevant difference between killing and letting die. How does she argue for this claim? Is her argument successful?
FOOT'S ARGUMENT: She says the thing that makes these two different is because of agency and natural rights. 1. Agency a. A particular sequence of events explains why a particular thing happened (consequences) b. Some particular person or agent originated that sequence of events (something wouldn't happen otherwise. *To explain this she uses a rescue case: Rescue 1: I must drive quickly to save 5 people. One person who is in trouble asks me to stop. If I stop and save him, I won't reach the other 5 and they will die. I drive past the one and save the five Rescue 2: I must drive quickly to save 5 people. The path is narrow and I can't leave it. A man is injured on the path. If I stop, I can save him, but I won't reach the other 5 in time and they will die. I drive over the guy in the path, killing him, and save the other 5. ** In Rescue I, I am not the agent of the man's death. In Rescue II, I am the agent of his death (but I'm not the agent of the death of the other five). James Rachels thinks that his Smith and Jones case shows that agency doesn't matter, that only the results matter. But Rachels is ignoring rights. 2. Rights to noninterference- create a moral situation in which an agent must not interfere—there is a negative duty, a duty not to be an agent. 3. Rights to service- say that the agent must be an agent—there is a positive duty to do something specific for a particular person Right to life is noninterference, it is not the right to a service. It is harder to override your right to life, but easy to deny you service if the same service is put to better use elsewhere. ** In the Smith vs. Jones case, they owe a service to the child in the bath, to take care of them. Counter Argument- Runaway Trolley- A runaway trolley is headed for 5 people on a track, but you can throw a switch and send the trolley down another track with only one man. Does being the agent of the man's death make it immoral to throw the switch? He says agency is one that is diverting a sequence, not starting one ***Nonvoluntary active euthanasia ALWAYS violates a right to noninterference and is always wrong. ***Nonvoluntary passive euthanasia only violates a right to service, it's only wrong where that right tot service isn't overridden.
Most people who advocate physician-assisted suicide propose a number of limiting conditions on its use. According to the first (theoretical) slippery slope argument against PAS which we considered, the justifications offered for PAS are incompatible with such constraints. Is that true? If it were true, would that be a reason not to allow PAS?
If the justifications for PAS are true, then the case of the angry boyfriend/girlfriend would be as morally permissible as a chronic illness causing the pain. We cannot determine the amount of pain another individual is feelings, and if they feel that their suffering is too much they have as much of a right to PAS as does someone who is suffering on a hospital bed from a serious illness. They too have a right to their own body just like anyone else. Can assisting in suicide be limited to paradigm cases? If the boyfriend/girlfriend does not have a right to PAS than other patients should not be allowed to use PAS with the current justification. It doesn't matter what causes the pain, if an individual feels that the amount of pain and suffering they are enduring is too much for them, they should be able to use PAS bc they have control over their own body.
Onora O'Neill offers a Kantian response to the problem of world hunger. In what respects does it differ from the utilitarian theory of Singer? Which is more plausible?
Kantian view: Kant believes that that you should alwyas treat humanity never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end. Intentions and maxims are the same basically. Nothing particularly wrong about using someone as a means as both parties consent. The first key principle that O'Neill homes in on is that duties of justice must be fulfilled because if they aren't people have been used as mere means. Having written that, O'Neill continues her deliberation by declaring how Kantian ethics does not say anything about the moral status of unintentional action, or in other words, agent K letting the famine problem continue whilst purchasing a new fur coat. O'Neill elaborates by declaring that Kantian moral theory primarily says that we should do no injustice. She shows that in any situation, whether it's as part of a famine-stricken society that has a rationing scheme or not, or whether one like the United States in relation to Senegal, one must always be dutiful as a matter of justice. One must not deceive or take advantage of. The second key principle she mentions pertains to Kantian duties of beneficence. That is, helping to promote others' ends and their capacities to be independent. As an example, it would be fun to purchase a fifty dollar ticket to Sea World, but it would be better, or rather, more important to contribute it as a means by which to assist someone become minimally independent. Time is not a factor. Such are Kantian approaches to famine. O'Neill goes on to illustrate the difference between her advocated Kantian famine solutions and the standard utilitarian approach, which entails the knowledgeable consequences of all possible actions, that means actions committed and non. One such difference is the massive, comprehensive scope that utilitarianism takes to the problem. This scope involves all of the space-time continuum as well as moral factors, the consummate weight of moral good, and the needs of the many. Critically, it also involves the unintentional realm of action. Kant would not believe that people who have done something unintentionally "wrong" would be unjust or bad. Indeed, this is precisely why O'Neill argues for the Kantian approach to famine: Kantians would not need to know all the miserly details of a causal utilitarian scope or the full results of any possible action. Instead, they must have good will, good intentions, and it must be reflected through their actions. Peter Singer disagrees completely. In contrast to O'Neill's Kantian approach, Singer adopts a very strong utilitarian solution. He begins his argument by stating what is obvious: suffering and death from famine is bad. He inserts the utilitarian element of the argument, that of advocating for the greater good, by writing that if it is within one's ability to prevent something bad from occurring, and in the process, not sacrifice something of comparable moral good, then one is bound to do it. Unlike the Kantian approach, Singer's does not exempt certain actions by virtue of space-time excuses. By accepting that people are equal, one is bound to help no matter where the famine is. That is, without sacrificing something of equal moral good. For example, if agent Y passes a toddler drowning in a large puddle, it would be a duty to help the toddler out of the puddle. There is no difference, according to Singer, with the problem of famine. Singer's argument is just that simple, but broadly sweeping in nature. Unlike the Kantian approach, it would entail major changes to the way civilization works. There are areas where O'Neill and Singer agree. They agree that people dying and hurting from famine is bad, while duties of beneficence are good. The difference lies in the duties assigned. O'Neill believes it will be all right as long as the intentions are good and people do not commit injustices. Do not commit injustices is to be just. Singer believes that by ignoring a responsibility (a responsibility because it is morally good and people dying of famine is bad) to help others one is engaging in grave injustice. The contrast between these prevailing ideas is stark. SINGER: · Absolute poverty is very bad · If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening without thereby sacrificing something of comparable moral significance, we are obligated to do it. · We can prevent some absolute poverty without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance. · Therefore we are obligated to prevent some absolute poverty as long as it doesnt affect us too negatively He uses the argument if a child was drowning right in front of you, you'd have to save them even though your shoes and clothes might get ruined in the process. Those things aren't of equal value compared to the child's life. · He also thinks that people should give up 25-40 percent of their income for those in poverty because you won't be sacrificing anything of moral significance by doing this. O'NEILL · Argues that results are not all that matters, world hunger should not be complete dependent on "moral significance" · He is not concerned with results but towards the action of considering it. · Categorical Imperative- "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." o You should treat other people as people who can make their own decisions, people that can step back on their desires. · Kantian approach to world hunger is that there is no empirical fact for morality. · Humans aren't tools, treat them like means
A number of thinkers worry that allowing PAS will lead to widespread abuse, in which people who don't fit the proposed criteria will be helped to die. Because of this, they oppose the legalization of PAS. Do you agree with this line of reasoning? Why or why not?
No I do not agree with this because: If someone is not happy and wants to end their life. It is better that a doctor assists them with this instead of them using other dangerous methods on their own and not knowing what they are doing. · Doctors know how the body works, have access to drugs · It's part of the doctor's role to make people feel better, and if ending someone's life will make someone feel better (end unhappiness, etc...) the doctor should help do this Quil Case- Dr. Quill knew a women very well who was sick and told him that she didn't want to die out of control. · Her reasoning wasn't just because of pain, but she was afraid of not being able to enjoy her life attached to tubes and didn't want to depend on others · She asked the doctor to end her life · He didn't want her to do this herself and have a failed suicide, so he gave her some medication and helped her out · She took the medication and died alone. This already happened in the past and PAS will only be used where the person isn't being pressured by family, mentally competent, has good medical care, and the doctor has asked the patient multiple times if this is what they want. · PAS wouldn't allow more suicides, it would just expand and allow doctors to better attend to some of their patients needs and decrease the number of failed suicide attempts such as the women in the Quill case. Failed suicide attempts have even worse consequences because often times the patient ends up mentally disabled, etc.
Based on what Dworkin says in, "Paternalism," was it defensible to continue treating Dax Cowart against his wishes?
Respect what people really want,not just in a given time period to determine what people want is to ask what they want when they are completely rational : ex is to be healthy For example, there are laws that require people to wear seat belts and if they are caught not wearing a seatbelt they can be punished. These laws are examples of paternalism but we allow them to happen because they are in the best interest of the person to follow the laws. They can be seen as things that restrict the liberties of the individual because another person is making decisions for an individual. However, they are ultimately put into place to protect an individual. In the same manner, it was the best decision for Dax to be treated because he was in danger and others had his interests in mind. Paternalism will always involve limitations on liberty. For example, the work week is limited to a max of 40 hours a week which is a number that has been put into effect after many studies, etc. However, Dworkin argues that these measures are not paternalistic because such measures are "required not to overrule the judgment of individuals respecting their own interest, but to give effect to that judgementL they being unable to give effEct to it by concert, which concert again cannot be effectual unless it receives validity and sanction from the law."
According to Peter Singer, failing to assist those in absolute poverty is morally equivalent to watching a child drown in a pond while doing nothing to assist him. Is he right?
SINGERS ARGUMENT: Poverty is very bad, and if you can prevent it from happening without sacrificing something of comparable moral significance, then you are obligated to do it. So ultimately, people are obligated to prevent absolute poverty. BUT THIS ISN'T RIGHT: 1. The reason you are obligated to save a child is because it's happening right in front of you, but a starving person in absolute poverty isn't always happening in front of you so you aren't obligated. a. People can look a way from a problem if it isn't blowing up right in front of their face. This can be seen with many issues that the United States has been dealing with, such as global warming. They know it's happening but people continuously to make choices that harm the earth 2. You are the only one there to help the child, but there are millions of people that could help the starving (bystander effect) 3. The amount you have to give or the amount of time changes how obligated you are a. People work hard for their money, but in the case of a drowning child, no money is involved, just a service was provided to save the child. b. If someone hears a girl screaming for help outside, they are obligated to call the police more then people are obligated to donate money i. It takes little money to make a phone call and 2 seconds to dial, versus donating 50 dollars takes a lot more work and time if someone is only making minimum wage.
GLOVER'S IDEA OF HUMAN FLOURISHING
THE IDEA THAT IN ORDER FOR HUMANS TO BE ABLE TO FLOURISH THEY MUST BE ABLE TO ENGAGE IN "NORMAL" ACTIVITIES. EX: HAVING SPECIAL ED CLASSES, WHICH SEPARATES FROM NORMAL STUDENTS THE IDEA OF WHAT IS CONSIDERED NORMAL IS AND HOW MUCH IT RESTRICTS SOMEONE DEPENDS ON TIME AND PLACE. EX: HANDICAP SITUATION NOW VERSUS 100 YEARS AGO, DISABLED IN US VERSUS AFRICA. BY SOCIETY CHANGING IT'S STRUCTURE, DISABLED PEOPLE CAN ENGAGED IN MORE "NORMAL ACTIVITIES" EVERYONE HAS THEIR OWN IDEA OF FLOURISHING EX: AFRICA VS. US
In class, we discussed a number of different definitions of death. Which of these do you find the most plausible? Why?
The three definitions are 1. When the soul leaves the body a. Fundamental criteria? b. Requirements of publicity? 2. Death= whole brain dead a. Significance of breathing and circulation b. Psychological capacities and personhood 3. Death= death of higher brain functions a. Personhood and consciousness b. Slippery slope · The one that makes sense is the death of higher brain function. · Case of Claire Conroy, questionable of when Conroy died o Even though she was still able to breath, everything that made Conroy herself was gone the minute she lost all higher brain function. o When someone will never gain consciousness and cannot create their own thoughts, they are considered dead because everything that made that person a person is dead § It's also important to consider the quality of "life" Conroy was "living" as they kept her alive with a feeding tube. She would never be able to accomplish any more of her goals, nor would she progress in life any farther than she did the moment she went brain dead, so the quality of her life isn't worth "living" · Brody said the standard approach of trying to find a definition of death isn't working, but instead death is a process not and event. o I agree with this statement that Claire Conroy's death was a process, but with this being said she was dead from the start which was when she lost all higher brain function. · The question of dementia? o Those people, while they are losing what makes them themselves, they didn't lose entire higher brain functions. So, until the process of death proceeds until that point, someone isn't dead.
