py2013 exam

contexualism

- a work of art is an object that is the product of human invention at a particular time and place -it is historically embedded -it has neither art status, nor determinate identity, nor aesthetic character, nor definite significance apart from the cultural context in which it was constituted -forgeries have a different value than originals -in contrast to formalism/empiricism

Problem of Bruteness for Realism

-1. Moral facts are metaphysically brute--there's no explanation why things are good/bad -2. There's no explanation for why we should care about moral facts (even granting we do)

true judge criteria

-1. strong sense -2. delicate sentiment -3. improved by practice -4. perfected by comparison -5. free from prejudice

enlightened empiricism

-acknowledges relevance of contextual factors in art appreciation but holds that 'all artistic value must ultimately reside in characteristics of the experiences elicited in receivers in a suitably informed engagement with the work - "informed" gaze -(psychological thesis) what aesthetic properties a work is perceived to have depends on the category in which it is viewed--> (normative thesis) the aesthetic properties a work really has are determined by which category it is right to view it in -Walton: aesthetics of nature adhere to psychological thesis (scientific categories) but not normative thesis

Ginsborg--Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology

-aesthetic judgement: a judgement based on feeling -four moments of beauty (1) disinterested pleasure (distinguished from judgements of morality or the agreeable or ones based on emotion) (2) judgements of beauty have universal validity (but they cannot be proved bc they do not rely on the object's properties) (3) judgements of the beautiful do not presuppose an end/purpose which the object is taken to satisfy (4) judgements of beauty reference the idea of necessity: aspect of normativity -judgements of beauty: pleasure in the beautiful depends on free harmony of imagination and understanding -free and adherent beauty: adherent: influenced by object's sensory appeal, they can be contingent on a certain concept's applying to the object, free: non-representational art (ex. music)

empiricism

-aesthetic judgements can only be based on properties that can be seen, heard, or verbally understood (depending on art form) -nothing but a painting's intrinsic qualities matter (ex. facts about artist, process, etc.) -issues: (1) forgeries don't matter in this framework (although painting would be perceived as "derivate" or "unoriginal" if a forgery (2) ignores context

practicality of morality

-although Moore's argument is flawed, it shows that moral properties and concepts are practical in ways that no natural property is (the open feel of the open question is due to the naturalistic analyses missing out on this practicality) -motivational internalism: sincere moral facts are intrinsically motivating -externalists: morality is usually motivational because most of us have the right kinds of desire and values to be motivated to act morally -amoralists are not making sincere judgements, but they are motivated by them -motivation: judgements about moral properties are motivated in ways that judgements about natural properties aren't (objective prescriptivity--moral properties are reason-giving)

Irvine--The Pervasiveness of the Aesthetic in Ordinary Experience

-argues for the aesthetic in everyday (against Dewey) -Dewey: experience--can have aesthetic quality, ceases only when active energies have done their proper work (unity: single quality pervading experience, consummation is anticipated and savored with special intensity) -Irvine: unconsciousness--information what we are not aware of still contributes to experience -Irvine: unity-- some of aesthetic experiences do not fulfill unity: modern art, reframing of a natural scene changes it character -importance of aesthetic attention to everyday: we deprive ourselves of gratification if we discount the everyday, if we are satisfied with everyday, than we will seek less from consuming material goods -moral relevance: aesthetic choice might reduce tendency to cause harm in satisfying our needs (ex. viewing vegetarianism as way to find new different foods)

everyday aesthetics

-challenge to traditional aesthetics -the possibility of aesthetic experience of non-art objects/events -rejection of distinction between high/low art, fine art/craft, aesthetic/non-aesthetic objects -includes nature, the built environment, "low" art (ex. comic books/video games), aesthetics of the everyday, aesthetic multiculturalism -John Dewey: art provides us with an experience, but many other things give us such experiences -the everyday: ongoing, common, activity (rather than product/object) (five categories (Melchionne) food, wardrobe, dwelling, conviviality, and going out)

Motivational internalism

-claims motivation is internal to moral judgment -either by the sense that moral judgment itself motivates without need of an accompanying desire ("strong internalism") -or that there is a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation "weak internalism" -a person cannot sincerely make a moral judgment without being motivated at least to some degree to abide by her judgment -generally applies to those not "not depressed or apathetic or suffering from weakness of will"

aesthetic knowledge

-pessimism: we can't gain aesthetic knowledge from testimony (need to explain why aesthetic knowledge is "special") (1) aesthetic judgement is subjective (2) it seems counter-intuitive to have a judgement about something you've ever seen -optimism: we can gain aesthetic knowledge from testimony (1) there are cases when we accept that something natural is beautiful (2) we act on aesthetic recommendations from others

aesthetic testimony

-pure testimony: someone forms a belief on the basis that her informant's claim independently of any evidence/reasons that the informant offers for that claim -seems to be asymmetry about aesthetic testimony relative to mundane testimony--reasons (1) there is no aesthetic knowledge (2) aesthetic judgement is relative (no there is no "true" judgement) -Kant--judgements must be first-hand -Hume--aesthetic judgements can be done by testimony (true judges)

male gaze

-refers to the frequent framing of objects of visual art so that the viewer is situated in a "masculine" position of appreciation (ex. man as protagonist, woman as object--men look, women are looked at) -can be (and is) enacted by women as well as men

Conolly and Haydar--Aesthetic Principles

-thesis: irreversible generalism is correct -generalism: reasons for aesthetic evaluation are general -particularism: there are no general reasons in aesthetic evaluation (problem: denies that any properties are inherently good, only situationally applicable (weak)) -illusionism: when we seem to be giving reasons for aesthetic judgements, we are just attempting to get another person to see the work the same way we do (problem: we do give reasons for our judgements and do using by referring to their properties) -reversible generalism: positively valenced properties do not need explanation unless they are detrimental, non-valenced properties always need to be explained (problem: it attempts to combine the claim that inherently valenced properties can interact in such a way that their valence is affected) -irreversible generalism: non-valenced qualities are reversible but valenced are not

moral understanding

-understanding WHY a moral claim is true -morally good action requires moral understanding, not just moral knowledge or true belief

extrinsic (instrumental) value

-value of art as a means to independently specifiable effects or outcomes that are valuable (something else could fulfill these same functions/yield same benefits) -ex. financial gain, covering a stain, using a book as a doorstop -ALSO some works can be valued instrumentally insofar that people value them only for knowledge/emotional experience--but this is usually not the case

intrinsic value

-value qua art (art for its own sake) -means (art) are constitutive of an end (ex. emotional experience)--cannot substitute on work for another to get the exact same emotional experience -ex. pleasure, representation, form, expression, cognitive value

relationship between aesthetic and descriptive features

-we often use non-aesthetic terms to support aesthetic ones -dependent relationship--aesthetic properties are founded on non-aesthetic figures--but the latter is not automatically sufficient to grant the form (same non-aesthetic features will not always yield the same aesthetic property)

Compositionally of meaning

Competent speakers of a language should be able to understand a sentence they have never heard before, combo of words and syntax a theory of meaning must explain how meaning of complex sentences follow from the meanings of their constituent parts forms the compositionally constraint of the Frege-Geach Problem

Reporting/describing vs. expressing

Idea central to non-cognitivist theories Declarative/reporting or describing statements feature a world to mind fit easy to explain moral disagreement, as we are just expressing our feelings towards something explains why non-moral judgements don't motivate you to act but moral ones do on surface moral judgements have mind-to-world fit, that is descriptivism Hume--> morals aren't describing or reporting world, as there is not commitment to facts and properties MURDER IS WRONG Describing (speaker subjectivism--> I feel murder is wrong Expressing (non-cognitivist)--> an expression of disapproval of murder OUCH vs I'm in pain

Vavova Evolutionary Debunking

Introduction -evolutionary debunking arguments→ aim to undermine epistemic status of moral beliefs by appealing to their evolutionary origins -skepticism→ about moral realism and moral knowledge of these facts -worry→ if evolution shaped our beliefs, but evolution aims of survival/fitness, not moral truth, then moral skepticism follows -targets moral realism→ holds that moral truths are independent of our moral beliefs -if realism is true and evolutionary story is true → evolution has pushed our moral beliefs in direction having nothing to do with the attitude-independent moral truths -aim of paper→ to clarify the role of evolution in arguments -conclusion→ realism seems more correct The Science -even if the evolutionary psychology is false, it should be approached as true -if the evolutionary debunking argument succeeds--provides either a reductio of realism or a scientifically backed argument for skepticism -argument must be empirical, targeted and epistemological -empirical→ threat arises because origins are suspect -targeted→ should threaten ONLY moral realists' moral beliefs -epistemological→ conclusion isn't that there aren't moral truths, but that we cannot know them The Epistemology -must show if realism is true, moral knowledge is, somehow out of reach -how to formulate the challenge -ex. Optometrist v. skeptic telling you you are colorblind -optometrist→ must demonstrate that you are are probably colorblind, cannot be so easily negated/ignored, more legitimate -skeptic→ raises distant but uneliminated possibilities of error, demands you demonstrate that you are not colorblind, shifts the burden, undermines all beliefs, not specific -the evolutionary debunking should take it upon herself to give realists reasons to doubt The Probability of Error -debunker must provide evidence of error -must show that, if realism is true, it would be a massive coincidence that our moral beliefs and moral truths coincide -empirical explanation→ we evolved, but evolution selects for survival not truth -other explanation→ Street -universe of logically possible evaluative judgements/truths is huge and it would be a fluke if they matched -not based on an evolutionary claim→ will not work for debunker -structure -1. There are many possible coherent normative belief systems -2. Only one of these is right -3. The odds are low that mine is the right one -4. I have no non-question-begging evidence that might is the right one -5. If the odds are low that I'm right and if I have no non-question-begging evidence that I'm right, I cannot conclude that I'm right -6. I cannot conclude that my normative belief system is the right one -does not rely on evolution premise -does not target → implies that our non-normative beliefs could also be wrong The Evolutionary Argument -distortion and illegitimate influences on beliefs→ reason to think we are probably mistaken -debunker needs an argument that goes from -realism→ moral truths are attitude-independent -and -influence→ evolutionary forces have influenced our moral beliefs -to -mistaken→ we have good reason to think that our moral beliefs are probably mistaken -but realism and influence don't (by themselves) entail mistaken -we need to know that whatever evolution aims at doesn't correlate with the moral truth -1. realism→ moral truths are attitude independent -2. influence→ evolutionary forces have influenced our moral beliefs -3. off-track → evolutionary forces aim at fitness, not attitude-independent moral truths -4. gap→ the fitness enhancing beliefs and moral truths come apart -5. mistaken→ we have good reason to think our moral beliefs are mistaken -has all three very important features→ can't be easily discharged -responses must do moral than give a moral epistemology -good response must either -1. Establish that she's wrong and we have no reason for doubt -2. Establish that she's right and we do have such reason, but that we also have resources with which to dismiss it Some Responses -Nagel→ rejects just the evolutionary psychology of the theory -since moral realism is true, a Darwinian account of the motives must be false despite scientific consensus (rejects influence) -finds moral realism more plausible than evolutionary theory -does not defeat strong debunking argument -Dworkin→ case of moral luck -the influence of evolutionary forces makes this unlikely -does not deny gap between moral truths and adaptive beliefs -Parfit→ if we find belief intrinsically credible, and we know what we find intrinsically credible is more likely to be true--our finding this belief credible may give us an indirect reason to have this belief and help to make it justified -problem→ the debunker does not assume that we cannot be responding to intrinsic credibility--just that we are probably not -we do not know that intrinsic credibility is a guide to tuth -insists on a reliable intrinsic-credibility detecting faculty -tracking account→ evolution influenced our beliefs but true moral beliefs are adaptive -evolutionary forces aim at moral truth because believing the moral truth is fitness enhancing -third-factor accounts→ aim to show that we would track moral truths, even if we did not evolve to detect them→ evolution indirectly selects for the moral truth (accepts off-track, denies gap) -Wielenberg→ assumes that creatures like us have rights -for evolutionary reasons we are perfectly reliable at detecting that we have rights -although evolution doesn't directly select for creatures like us to truly believe we have rights, it does select for creatures without advanced cognitive capacities -in selecting for creatures like us to have cognitive capacities, evolution selects for creatures with rights--if we believe we have rights, we do -Enoch→ survival is good -evolution, by inclining us toward survival seeking, and the attitudes that accompany such tendencies, also inclined us toward moral truth -worry→ doesn't address moral beliefs -Wielenberg→ since the debunkers aim is to establish conditional that even if there are moral truths, human beings lack knowledge of such truths, it is unproblematic to assume the antecedent The Upshot so Far -all responses are wanting -first two→ rejecting realism is giving up and rejecting science is unstrategic -the rest→ question beginning -perhaps realists and debunkers are talking past each other Hope for Realists -assumption→ pain is bad -evolutionary factors select for creatures good at surviving (avoiding pain) -pain is bad so evolution has selected creatures with tendencies or judgements that can track this -morality could be about anything (ex. Causing ourselves pain) -perhaps we should be reluctant to grant that morality could be about anything -basic moral claims are conceptual truths--if we don't have them, we don't have morality -if we cannot make any substantive assumptions about particular moral norms, then morality could be about anything -third-factor accounts might be helpful if we can show that we are entitled to starting assumptions Notes -Moral skepticism vs global skepticism -global skepticism→ burden on person, wider scope -moral skepticism→ burden on skeptic, targeted, empirical -Argument -1. Moral truths are attitude independent -2. Evolutionary factors have caused our moral beliefs -3. Evolution aims at survival and fitness (and not moral knowledge) -4. Fitness/morality gap -C. Our moral beliefs are probably mistaken -sets us dilemma for Realist: either accept Realism and accept your beliefs are probably wrong OR don't be a Realist OR reject the premises -Third Factor Accounts→

Harman Is it reasonable to rely on intuitions in Ethics?

Is it Reasonable to Rely on Intuitions in Ethics? Thesis -some philosophers argue for ethical conclusions by relying on specific ethics claims about cases -author defends this practice -practice is often described as "relying on intuitions" → but this description is misleading Ways in which ethical arguments can rely on ethical claims Specific ethical claim can be offered as a counterexample to a general claim Specific ethical claim can be used to support a general ethical claim Ex. might argue that a specific claim is true because a more general claim is true Specific ethical claim may be used in argument for another specific ethical claim Examples -Singer→ Famine, Affluence, and Morality -argument→ we ought to give a lot of money to famine relief -relies on example of man saving a drowning child at expense of his suit -underlying claim→ if one can prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing something of comparable moral values, they should do so -Thomson→ A Defense of Abortion -argument→ ordinary abortions are permissible even if fetuses have full moral status -relies on example of violinist -underlying claim→ permissible to violate right to life to control one's own body Why might it be unreasonable to rely on specific cases? -not everyone agrees of specific claims -argument have a premise a certain claim about the case -does not assume that the claims are agreed upon Disagreement about Premises -having premises that are not agreed upon are the nature of philosophical arguments -arguments often have substantive premises with which some people agree/disagree -those who believe the premise follow the line of reason outlined and believe the conclusion -those who do not believe follow the line of reasoning to a weaker conclusion -if those premises were true then the argument's conclusion is true -examples -Singer→ if we are not morally obligated to give away money then the man is not obligated to save the child (weaker modus tollens conclusion) -Thomson→ might gain something about relationship between obligations to be a good samaritan and obligations not to abort Epistemological Worry about Disagreements -the fact that there is disagreement over premise may give those who believe the premise sufficient reason to doubt their judgement so that they should cease to believe the premise -worry about whether belief is justified not if it is true Worry arising from Disagreement -ethical case→ train heading for 5 people, pushing fat man off bridge would stop the train -Anne believes that pushing the man off the bridge is wrong -there is disagreement about correct action in this case -epistemic peer disagreement→ Anne may expect that other people would be roughly as good as she is at discerning moral truth if they have same evidence -she has no reason to think she is better at responding than other people but she would have to have a reason to trust her own judgement more than others' -the view is justified whether or not it was true because it was independent -conclusion→ if one's beliefs are justified, disagreement should not undermine them Worry arising from Intuition -1. All specific ethical beliefs are formed on the basis of an intuitive seeming -2. It is unreasonable to form specific ethical beliefs on the basis of intuitie seemings -not all specific ethical beliefs are formed on the basis of seemings -some are based on ethical theories -ethical beliefs about described cases may have been implicitly inferred from other ethical commitments the person has -example→ doctor who cuts on innocent healthy person to save five dying people -people often immediately react by believing this is wong -they either implicitly believed/ were committed to this belief -most of the time, beliefs about described cases are not formed intuitively -intuitive seemings may play no role in epistemology of specific ethical beliefs -intuitive seemings justify beliefs in the sam way the perceptual seemings do -intuitive seemings justify beliefs simply because of their content Problems with "Relying on Intuition" -conflation of (1) relying on certain claims that may in fact be intuitive and (2) relying on the claim that these claims are intuitive -many arguments do not rely on claims about intuitions but rather on specific moral claims -assumption that whenever we believe specific moral claims we do so because they are intuitive (which has been argued to be false) Worry arising from "reasonable belief" -some cases seem too odd or complicated to entail reasonable beliefs -Singer→ not odd or complicated -Thomson→ involves fiction but is not too far removed (ex. Organ donors) -Bridge case→ not complicated -Doctor case→ not complicated -the fact that some people lack beliefs about claims deemed too odd does not show to everyone does as well -much stronger claim that some particular described cases are too odd that no one could reasonably have a justified belief about the cases -but this is not true about the aforementioned cases Conclusion -defended making of arguments for ethical conclusion on the basis of specific ethical claims about described cases -objections to this fail Notes -deductive reasoning→ true premises→ true conclusion -inductive reasoning→ the premises make the conclusion likely -disagreement -its not a problem because justification is not reliant on your peers disagreement/agreement -too odd -intuition -sometimes we rely on specific moral cases -worry--circular reasoning of intuition

Mind-independent properties vs. mind-dependent properties

Mind/attitude independent properties are properties, natural or not, which exist independent of our conceiving of them Realists view ethical properties as mind independent, where as constructivists and relativists see them as mind dependent

Mackie, "The Subjectivity of Values"

Moral Scepticism -thesis: there are no objective values -there are neither good nor bad moral values -first-order moral views→ the person who adopts them is taking a certain practical, normative stand (ex. Murder is bad) -second-order moral views→ view about the status of moral values and the nature of moral valuing (author's position) (ex. Things are good because God says they're good) -first and second order are completely independent Subjectivism -the action is right means→ I approve of this action -moral judgments are equivalent to reports of the speaker's own feelings or attitudes -if all of our moral statements were subjective reports, then there are no moral values -entails more scepticism -but scepticism does not entail subjectivism -denial of objective values does not commit one to any particular view about what moral statements mean Multiplicity of Second-Order Questions -accounts of first order moral statements will never be sufficient to understand the nature of morality Is Objectivity a Real Issue? -to say that there are objective values would not be to say merely that there are something which are valued by everyone -descriptivism→ doctrine about the meanings of ethical terms and statements--namely that their meaning are purely descriptive rather than prescriptive or emotive -neither entails nor is entailed by objectivity -main tradition of European moral philosophy→ combined the view that moral values are objective with the recognition that moral judgments are partly prescriptive Standards of Evaluation -value statements cannot be either true or false -however comparative judgements will be capable of truth/falsehood -subjectivist→ not denying objective evaluations relative to standards -no objective way to set a standard--they are certainly not arbitrary Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives -hypothetical imperative→ If you want X, do Y (or You ought to do Y) -categorical imperative→ you ought to do Y irrespective of any such desire for any end to which Y would contribute -would express a reason for acting which was unconditional in the sense of not being contingent upon any present desire of the agent -moral judgements are categorical imperatives -author objects to this The Claim to Objectivity -no ends or purposes are objective as opposed to being merely intersubjective -naturalist analysis→ moral judgements can be practical but their practicality is wholly relative to desires or possible satifications of the person whose actions are to be guided -but moral judgements seem prescriptive -ordinary moral judgements include a claim to objectivity The Argument from Relativity -radical differences between cultures makes it difficult to treat those judgement as apprehensions of objective truths -actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions of objective values -counter argument→ items for which objective validity is claimed are not specific moral rules or codes but general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some extent in all societies -other moral judgements are objectively valid or true but only derivatively or contingently→ if the framework was different it might have been wrong The Argument from Queerness -if there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, different from all others in the universe -objective values would be almost like Plato's forms -What would the connection be between the natural fact of an action and its moral quality? Patterns of Objectification - Notes -meta-ethics→ second order ethics -hypothetical imperative→ if someone wants harmony, happiness, functioning society then they should pretend that there are objective moral values -if we act as if there are objective values than we get these positive things -Argument from Queerness -metaphysical -need to be intrinsically motivating -need to direct action -supervenient on natural properties -determining the "goodness" in an action -P1: If there are OMVs they would be very strange (metaphysically) -P2: There are no things like that -C: There are no OMVs -epistemological -P1: If there are OMVs they would be very strange -P2: We would need a strange faculty to perceive them -C: We can't know about OMVs even if they do exist -Error Theory -all moral claims are false -we can explain how moral concepts arise without objective values -P1: We can explain everything in another way -P2: We believe that there are objective moral values because of objective moral values -P3: This is the best explanation of our moral practice (Occam's Razor) -C: There are no objective moral values -Argument from Relativity -P1: There is lots of relativity in 1st order claims -P2: Best explanation of relativity is differences in societal norms -P3: Best explanation for society norms explaining ethics -C: There are no objective moral truths

Evolutionary debunking argument

Street mostly 1. Realism. Moral truths are attitude-independent. 2. Influence. Evolutionary forces have influenced our moral beliefs. 3. Off-track. Evolutionary forces aim at fitness, not attitude-independent moral truths. 4. Gap. The fitness enhancing beliefs and the moral truths come apart. 5. Mistaken. We have good reason to believe our moral beliefs are mistaken. (Vavova 108). An EDA is distinct from skepticism or other theories of anti-realism, in three ways. Its empiricism, requiring the debunker to provide reason to doubt, to distinguish it from true skepticism. Its small target, threatening only realists meta-ethical beliefs, distinguishing it from global skepticism. Lastly its epistemological nature, as it seeks not to disprove AIMTs existence, but to give near perfect doubt they are unknowable, distinguishing EDA's from other anti-realist claims (Vavova, 105).

Amoralists

Those who do not care about living up to the moral views they sincerely hold a challenge to the idea of motivational-internalism do these guys exist? potentially psychopaths, they could just be making insincere judgements? Meat-eaters? might have made sincere judgement that they don't see meat eating as wrong

Hume Treastise on Human Nature

Treatise of Human Nature Book 2, Part 3, Section 3 Of the Influencing Motives of the Will -tendency of philosophy→ to talk about combat of passion and reason and preference reason -men are only virtuous so far as they conform to dictates of reason -triumph of reason over passion -thesis: reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will -it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will -things done in reason are always done because of some motivation -ex. Math itself does not have influence→ designed for some end/purpose -when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object we feel aversion/propensity -reason discovers link between between action and result -impulse is directed by reason but does not arise from it -reasons alone cannot prevent or dispute preference of passion -nothing can oppose the impulse of passion but a contrary impulse Passions -do not have representative quality--cannot be countered by truth/reason because they are ideas -can be contrary to reason only so far as they are accompanied with judgement/opinion -scenarios when passion is unreasonable -when a passion is founded on the supposition of objects which do not exist -when in exerting a passion in action, we choose means insufficient for the end and deceive ourselves in our judgement of causes and effects -ex. It is not contrary to reason for me to prefer the destruction of the world to scratching my finger -in these cases--the judgement is unreasonable, not the passion -it is impossible that reason and passion can ever oppose each other because they are different -when falsehood of supposition is detected→ passions yield to reason Types of Passions -reason exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion -does not convey pleasure or uneasiness -calm desires and tendencies→ are passions, but produce little emotion -general principles ("background") → kindness to children -these are taken for reason because they do not appear different -violent passions→ have great influence -ex. When someone injures you, you feel a violent passion of resentment which makes you desire the person's punishment -people often act knowingly against their interests -strength of mind is the overtaking of violent passions by calm passions Book 3, Part 1, Section 1 Moral Distinctions not Derived from Reason -nothing is present to the mind but its perceptions To approve of one character/condemn another is only different perceptions -two kinds of perceptions -impressions -ideas -since morals have an influence on the actions and affections it follows that they cannot be derived from reason -moral excite passions and produce/prevent activities Reason -reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood -truth/falsehood consists in a (dis)agreement either to real relations of ideas or to real existence and matter of fact -if something cannot be true or false, it cannot be an object of reason -actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason -reason can never immediately prevent/cause any action -cannot be the source of moral good/evil -reason can influence our conduct in only two ways -1. Excites passion by informing us of existence of something -2. discovers connection of causes and effects -mistakes of passion are based on judgement and a rarely immoral -mistakes cannot be the original source of immorality because it supposes right/wrong Judgements -judgements are effects of actions -out actions never cause judgement in ourselves but only in others -reason and judgement may be the mediate cause of an action -judgements cannot bestow moral qualities on actions (?) Thought and Understanding -if thought and understanding were capable alone of fixing boundaries of right and wrong → character of virtuous/vicious must lie in some relations of objects or must be matter of fact -if you assert that vice and virtue consist in relations/demonstrations that can be shown then you commit to: resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality and proportions in quantity -as moral good/evil belong only to actions of mind and are derived from reaction to objects -moral distinctions must lie only b/w internal actions and external objects -would mean that actions could only be moral in relation (relativity (?)) -in this framework, effects of relations are supposed to be the same -we cannot provide a priori that relations would be universal forcible/obligatory -example -ingratitude -tree drops a seed that grows to overtake/destroy the parent tree -same consequence of action as child killing parent but different motivation/determining factor -we can detect this in the human case because of reason--but its existence to be detected relies on its prior existence -example -willful murder→ matter of fact vice -but the judgement comes from you--not the action Notes -passion as the motivator -reason -moral judgements--expressions of passions -against Kant (reason before passion) -passions--disapproving/approving of actions -Hume trying to be a naturalist Argument P1→ Moral judgements are motivating P2→ Reason can't motivate C→ moral judgements cannot come from reason (non-cognitivism→ morals can't be true/false→ expressions)

analytic naturalism

-moral properties are identified with some natural properties, where the identification is part on the meaning of the moral words (ex. being right is identical to maximizing happiness)

Nietzschean Debunking

-A debunking argument for ethics -debunking aims to show that beliefs are not justified due to their source 1. give story for why we have beliefs 2. show how based on this story those beliefs aren't justified Nietzsche has realists and english psycologists as his opponents (those who believe that we value things that were beneficial to our ancestors, thus we project traits onto them) nietzsches story: 2 groups masters and slaves masters value streghth pride, health etc slaves are powerless and spiteful so they start to think being humble sour grapes, don't want to be powerful if you cant get it, better off to be powerless they add punishment and make the powerful morally bad create afterlife to reward suffering in life and punish power in life neitzsche thinks this is bad as it hinders the creation of geniuses explains why anti-realism doesnt exist, as objective moral truths dont have any role in explaining the world, if something has no explanatory role then we aren't justified in believing in it, thus we aren't justified in accepting anti realism as this story means our beliefs are unjustified we are unjustifed in our moral beliefs

Objectivity of Morality

-An idea central to most meta-ethical thought -Like taste it appears to be both objective and subjective -strongly in favor: realists (nat and non-nat), constructivists -unclear: subjectivists (objective relative to a framework) -against: nihilists (error theorists), non-cognitivists -The source of the objectivity is different to frameworks, subjectivists and constructivists its a construction, realists its part of the fabric of the world -this fabric of the world argument makes it vulnerable to Mackie's argument from queerness

Morality's grip

-How is it that morality gets a rational grip on us? -Why do we care about it? -Why should we? -we criticized naturalism on these grounds--but is non-naturalism better off here? -natural properties typically don't get a grip on us--but how does it help to say "see, so moral properties must be non-natural" The reason we care to obey morality

judgements of taste

-Kant: subjective universality of judgements (OUGHT), aesthetic, not cognitive -Hume: judgement about aesthetics are subjective, but there can be universal principles of taste and a standard of taste (true judges)

Argument from Queerness

-Mackie's argument that moral properties, understood as non-natural properties, are (metaphysically and epistemologically) puzzling and improbable, which is a reason to believe they do not exist. Argument from queerness If there are objective moral facts then they would be very epistemic/metaphysically different to anything else in the world. Such things can't exist, so there are no moral facts. For epistemic we would need an epistemic faculty to detect queer faculties

Patterns of Objectification

-Mackie's conceptualization of how ethical frameworks evolve -Societies practice things, for example monogamy then through the years it becomes part of the cultural social fabric, and around it forms an ethical value of it -an answer to moral disagreement more favorable than some cultures have more evolved queer faculties

Meskin--Solving the Puzzle of Aesthetic Testimony

-THESIS: aesthetic testimony is impoverished but not completely lacking in epistemic value -aesthetic testimony is often asserted without argument/reason giving -acquaintance principle: aesthetic judgements must be based on first hand experience -aesthetic error theory: all substantive aesthetic judgements are false (so there is nothing to transmit) -aesthetic relativism: syntax of ordinary aesthetic judgement is misleading (judgement is relative to culture, but does not explain inability to transfer within cultures) -aesthetic expressivism: aesthetic judgements do not count as true/false in normal sense -aesthetic emotivism: there can be no justified aesthetic judgement transmitted by testimony (no knowledge) -norm expressivism: to think X is aesthetically good is to think it is rational to appreciate X in some way--bc of assumption of shared norms -experientialism: mental states cannot occur in absence of the object (but this is an issue because of memory) -author's solution: not all testimony is of equal epistemic value (ex. art critics), unreliability explains the epistemic weakness of aesthetic testimony -people tend to overestimate their own aesthetic credibility (we confuse what we like with what is good)

Moral bargaining and implicit agreements

-The subjectivist conception of the evolution and creation of ethical frameworks -frameworks are enforced by implicit cultural agreements -moral bargaining is the process through which they evolve, seemingly in a dialectical pattern however, if there are no moral values, yet when they evolve with moral bargaining that feels like progress, surely we don't make progress to something made up? this point could be countered by cultural theories, ie no longer beneficial to the majority to have slaves so it dies out, or the tribes survival no longer relies on producing as many people as possible so gays become accepted etc. still this might intuitively feel wrong to say that these aren't progress

Moral Relativism

-The view that there is no absolute or universal moral law or truth, resulting in a morality determined by cultural factors or personal preference -nihilism is a best explanation argument -moral relativism assigns truth values to things relative to a framework -no objectively correct frameworks -Gilbert Harman: "framework is a set of values and norms along with their relative importances" -moral disagreements are not disagreements -more like arguing over whether haggis is tasty -there is no disagreement among people from different frameworks -can be disagreement within a framework -frameworks evolve from moral bargaining like social contracts -frameworks are not exhaustive and revisable -hard to tell if theres enough common ground between societies for moral bargaining -these boundaries between frameworks are getting fuzzier Strengths: allows for ethical discussions despite doubts about the existence of ethical values de-trivializes ethical discussion, unlike nihilists creates moral truths that are seemingly obvious Problems: -objectivists and nihilists reject these "objective to a framework values" they are not objective, like non-magical witches -also there is evidence of objectivity 1) textual, kant, plato etc 2) maintain moral judgements even upon learning an act is unacceptable in a society 3) phenomenology of moral deliberation implies that we work towards something objectively right, not just make something up 4) there appears to be sensible moral disagreement also can two people from different frameworks talk about ethics, or are they just talking past each other, is there even disagreement? also no one is a relativist about god, this is a partners in guilt argument

Constructivism

-constructivism thinks that moral properties are mind-dependent -things only have moral properties in virtue of our attitudes toward them -this gives us an answer to the first problem of bruteness -things can be explained as good because we value them -Realism→ the latter--there's value in the world and we recognize it -Constructivism→ the former--there's no value in the world independently of our valuing things--but if we do value something, then it is valuable -this sounds close to noncognitivism--but -this is a theory of properties, not thought and talk -saying x is wrong isn't an expression of our attitudes--it's just that what it is for x to be wrong is for us to have a certain attitude towards it -it also differs from subjectivism: -saying x is wrong isn't a report on our attitudes--it says that x has a certain property, not that we have a certain attitude -that's disgusting vs yuck vs I feel grossed out by that -Constructivism, Noncognitivism, Subjectivism -constructivism can capture: -1. Calling an action wrong is saying something about what the action is lik -2. Some of these claims are true -but remember the third aspect of commonsense metaethics -3. Morality is to a signficiant degree objective -some relativistic responses -accept rampant, individualistic relativism -try to reduce the relativity -this is Haman's strategy: moral properties are grounded in our shared attitudes of intending to keep agreements with others -non-relativist responses: -ideal observer/contractors→ ground moral properties in the attitudes of idealized contractors -idealized self→ ground moral properties in the attitudes of idealized version of yourself

feminist aesthetics

-critique of traditional aesthetics -emphasis on the connection between art and life -emphasis on context over universality -inclusion of the female voice/gaze (in feminist art)

Zangwill--Formal Natural Beauty

-dependent beauty: things that are dependently beautiful have a function (beauty expresses that function), to judge beauty must be subsumed under a category that picks out that function -free beauty: does not express a function, is beautiful in and of itself -extreme formalism: all beauty is formal beauty -anti-formalism: all beauty is non-formal beauty -THESIS: moderate formalism (both types of beauty) for art and nature -demanding anti-formalism: correct appreciation of nature depends on scientific understanding -less demanding: must appreciate things as things of their kinds (not scientific) -qua thesis (strong): we must appreciate a natural thing as the particular kind of natural thing it is -qua thesis (weak): one must only appreciate a natural things as a natural thing (author rejects both) -qualess biological beauty: biological things have aesthetic properties that are no dependent on their biological kind (ex. a polar bear swimming gracefully is a beautiful spectacle--it is also surprising (not biologically specific) considering that we think that polar bears are not graceful) -inorganic natural beauty: aesthetic properties of inorganic natural things depend in part of their history/context--but things can retain their artistic identities despite their contribution to wider aesthetic whole(basin example) -the frame problem: problem over the boundaries of natural thing--does not believe that there are radical fluctuations in beauty as we modify the arbitrary "frame" of nature -the magnification problem: need a notion of total aesthetic nature of a thing: sum of all aesthetic properties it possess (in various levels of magnification) -active appreciation: being active and immersed in nature might be the best way to appreciate its three dimensional formal aesthetic properties

possible objections to Kant

-disinterest: some things might be beautiful because of their cognitive/moral value -universality: people might have cognitive differences

category perception

-enlightened empiricism--Walton -psychological thesis--what aesthetic properties a work is perceived to have depends on the category in which it is viewed -normative thesis--the aesthetic properties a work really has are determined by which category it is right to view it in -how to know which category is right (1) work possesses a large number of features standard for a particular category (2) the work is more pleasing/interesting seen in said category (3) the artist intended the work to be experienced in said category (4) the category is well established and recognized by the society in which the work was produced

formalism

-form is the only thing that is aesthetically important in a work of art -does not require any special aesthetic faculty (just senses) -if painting has a representational element, it is merely a "peg" on which to hang formal elements--it is has value because of its form, not because it is a representation -explains aesthetic value of modern art -explains aesthetic value of works that are morally reprehensible

subjective universality (Kant)

-in practice judgements are subjective and not tied to determinate concepts -however--judgements that something is beautiful is made w/ belief that other people OUGHT to agree

valence

-inherent polarity that belongs independently to a property -ex. elegance is a positively valenced property

moral knowledge

-intuitionalism: we can gain moral knowledge by intuition (we can just "see" that something is wrong), beliefs based on moral intuitions can be foundational, if you're thinking clearly and are morally mature, some moral claims: cannot be doubted, cannot fail to be known once you understand them, are not open to question (issue: debunking argument) -weak intuitionalism: intuition aren't self-evident truths, but can provide justification in a non-inferential way for moral beliefs (if it seems to us that x is wrong, and we don't have any reason to doubt out intuitions, we can know it -naturalism: moral knowledge can be gained by scientific methods/perception (like other natural facts) -non-naturalism: we can't gain moral knowledge by ordinary empirical methods -moral anti-realism: there's no such thing as moral knowledge -moral realism: there are moral facts that can correspond to moral claims

naturalism

-moral facts and properties are natural facts and properties that can be studied by ordinary specific methods -natural properties: can be investigated using scientific methods (including perception), part of the causal network of the world, can be explained by laws of nature -examples: Utilitarianism--moral rightness is the property of maximizing pleasure (what's good is what's pleasurable) -advantage: if there are moral properties then we could gain knowledge of them (no "mysterious properties") -objections: (1) Moore's Open Question argument (2) normativity objection: moral facts are normative in a way natural facts are not (3) triviality objection: if a moral and natural fact make claims about the same fact, then they must be the same (and thus trivial) (4) practicality: moral properties are intrinsically practical, natural properties aren't--so moral properties aren't natural properties

Moral Naturalism

-moral properties are natural properties -we can gain moral knowledge by normal, empirical methods -philosophical naturalism→ the only properties there are are natural properties; the only ways of gaining knowledge about the world are the methods used by empirical science -a variety of metaethical views are consistent with this: -noncognitivism (trying to explain how moral judgements are motivational) -nihilism (moral disagreement) -relativism -these are all naturalistic views--but in some respect anti-realist -there are no objective moral facts -moral naturalism usually denotes naturalist realism: there are objective moral properties and moral facts, but they're natural -advantages -maintains reality and objectivity of morality -more naturalistically respectable metaphysics and epistemology -moral facts supervene on natural facts -two worlds exactly alike with respect to all natural facts cannot differ with respects to the moral facts -this is thought of as a necessary, conceptual truth about morality--whatever our metaethical theory, it has to respect supervenience -how can the non-naturalist explain this? -non-natural facts seem to "float free" of the natural facts, so why would supervenience hold? -naturalism seems to have an easy answer: moral facts are natural facts, so supervenience is trivial -utilitarianism → action x is right if and only if and because x maximizes happiness -analytic naturalist version → when we say right, we just mean maximizes happiness -non-naturalist version → when an act has the natural property of maximizing happiness, this makes it have the further, non-natural property of being right -so now we can give a new argument against naturalism -1. Moral properties are intrinsically practical -2. Natural properties aren't -3. So moral properties aren't natural properties

Moral non-naturalism

-moral properties are not natural properties; there's a fundamental, metaphysical distinction between moral and natural properties -we can't gain moral knowledge by ordinary empirical methods -utilitarianism → action x is right if and only if and because x maximizes happiness -analytic naturalist version → when we say right, we just mean maximizes happiness -non-naturalist version → when an act has the natural property of maximizing happiness, this makes it have the further, non-natural property of being right -so now we can give a new argument against naturalism -1. Moral properties are intrinsically practical -2. Natural properties aren't -3. So moral properties aren't natural properties

non-analytic naturalism

-moral rightness is a natural cluster property having to do with conduciveness to human ends; but there's no analytic reduction of moral terms to non-moral terms

asymmetry of moral and non-moral testimony

-normal testimony (ex. being a restaurant and trusting a food recommendation) -moral testimony (ex. someone telling you eating meat is wrong and not believing them) -impure testimony: pointing out morally relevant considerations, giving your moral opinion along with the grounds for it -pure testimony: just telling someone what you take to be the facts -impure deference: taking someone's moral claim into consideration in your own deliberation -pure deference: simply believing what someone tells you and acting on that basis -answers to issues with pure moral deference: (1) we can't gain moral knowledge by testimony (moral anti-realism: there's no moral knowledge) (2) we can gain moral knowledge by testimony, but there are moral reasons not to (moral judgement may constitute knowledge, but genuine moral judgement requires motivations and desires (moral understanding) (which cannot be transmitted by testimony) (3) there's no asymmetry (children defer to parents, deferring due to bias, deferring to members of marginalized groups), moral testimony is problematic for other reasons (not just bc its moral): people have ulterior motives, some people lack knowledge of obvious truths (could be true of non-moral facts as well)

Levinson--Hume's Standard of Taste: The Real Problem

-objections to Hume's standard: (1) circularity: it presupposes prior identification of what is beautiful--for a judge to compare a bad and good work presupposes knowledge of a good work (2) does not explain why true judges are needed if others can approximate their qualities (3) classist: requires education and conditioning (4) too optimistic regarding consensus in critics -the "real" problem: (1) essentially why should we care what art the critics say is best? (2) how do we know that critic's traits put them in better position have aesthetic experience? (3) why should one care what is truly beautiful? why not just enjoy what you find beautiful? -response: canon of masterwork coupled w/ artist-value-as-capacity theory can identify idea critics who can measure value generally--approved works are most likely to provide high order satisfaction bc good works will be ones that are somehow comparable in rewards to agreed upon masterworks (relies on a canon of masterworks, reason for thinking these are masterworks, thinking that preferences of idea critics are actually better--made by author without proof) -Why ordinary people should follow recommendations of ideal critics: (1) primary value of an artwork is understood in terms of capacity of work to afford experiences worth having (2) masterworks appreciated across temporal/cultural barriers (3) masterworks cannot be the standard but they can be touchstones (4) experience afforded by masterworks generally preferred by critical over other art is indicative of its favorability (5) ideal critics have certain characteristics (6) we should attend these judgements because on likely wants to have the pleasurable experiences possible

Moore's Open Question Argument

-open question: there is some aspect of sensible doubt about the answer (ex. I know this will promote human flourishing, but is it good?) -argument (i) for any natural property N, "I know x is N, but is it good?" (ii) if goodness were identical to N-ness, this would not be an open question (iii) so far any natural property N, goodness is not N-ness--if goodness isn't any natural property, then it must be non-natural objections: (1) non-reductive naturalism: goodness is a cluster property--collection of properties no one of which is necessary or sufficient for the thing to be good (as long as it has enough)--so for any natural property beside goodness will be genuinely open (?) (2) paradox of analysis: a lot of philosophy is concerned with giving conceptual analysis of concepts like knowledge, free will, etc.--if Moore's argument works, then these projects are all a waste of time (true analysis is obvious and non-obvious analysis false) (3) non-obvious identities: some true property identities are not obvious--ex. early on, asking if water was H20 was an open question, but that doesn't mean that the identity is false

low level perception/properties

-perceiving color, shape, or size of visible objects -properties: brightness, shape, texture, pitch, texture

particularism

-there are no general reasons in aesthetic evaluation -work X is good (V) because of quality A--not committed to notion that A is a generally good-making quality in art -issue: not generalizable--citing a property cannot give support for a verdict

Moral Nihilism

-see Mackie -the view that there are no ethical values or properties -a form of error theory -a view that moral judgements would be true if moral values and properties exist, but as they don't these judgments are false (ERROR THEORY) -makes all ethical practice mistaken -two arguments: 1. Argument from relativity Observes the large amount of moral disagreement among people. Best explanation for this comes from "reflect adherence to and participation in different ways of life." This is a better explanation than some cultures have better ethical faculties than others. Grants primacy to the emergence of cultural practices like monogamy, then believes that its ethical value comes after, a pattern of objectification. -Against this argument, point out how widespread moral agreement is more prominent. Or that we could accept moral disagreement yet reject the premise the moral nihilists explanation 2. Argument from queerness Really two arguments epistemic and metaphysic If there are objective moral facts then they would be very epistemic/metaphysically different to anything else in the world. Such things can't exist, so there are no moral facts. For epistemic we would need an epistemic faculty to detect queer faculties These give us the error theory Problems: 1) there are seemingly obvious moral truths 2) there has been apparent moral progress 3) the :now what?" argument 4) relativism

Hume--Of the Standard of Taste

-sentiment: always right because it references nothing outside of itself, is based on sense perception, does not make claims about the object itself -sentiment is restrained by common sense (some sentiments are clearly ridiculous) -stages of perception: 1. perception of color and shape, 2. feeling in response to perception -true taste requires certain qualities and only some people possess (true judges) -humor, age, and country affect the ability to have a fixed standard of taste -standard of taste--the joint verdict of the true judges -people are blameless in "bad taste" in the context of character disposition and moral differences originating from cultural difference

epistemic foundationalism

-solution of the Regress Problem there are some foundational beliefs that are justified (but not because they are they're inferred from any other beliefs)

Schellekens--Taste and Objectivity

-taste as a sense: Plato (hierarchy of senses)--more corruptible because it is bound to the body and desire -analogy with gustatory taste: similar because they are both grounded in pleasure and based on perceptual experience (but they are separate because taste is a discretionary skill and carries some sense of objectivity) -Kant: aesthetic taste is agent neutral, authority of judgements are universally valid -paradox of taste: Hume: although people have different tastes there seems to be generally strong consensus Kant: judgements lay claim to universal validity despite being grounded only in pleasure paradox: how do we reconcile subjective pleasure with objective aspirations? -ontological status of beauty: Locke: beauty has a lower ontological status that taste/color Hutcheson: beauty=pleasure Hume: we attribute aesthetic qualities to objects although they are simply our projections on said objects Kant: agrees with Hume -aesthetic sensibility: aesthetic taste is best conceived as a kind of discernment that depends both on cognition and feeling in order to yield its "evaluative assessment" -subjectivity/objectivity distinction: aesthetic judgements can be objective if the definition of objectivity is revised to mean a form of objectivity appropriate to the subject, objectivity as a "stable inter-subjective convergence in judgements among qualified perceivers" -current debate: realists v anti-realists

Argument from disagreement

-the argument that ethical skepticism is justified because there is often deep and widespread disagreement on ethical issues -Mackie's argument from relativity 1. Argument from relativity Observes the large amount of moral disagreement among people. Best explanation for this comes from "reflect adherence to and participation in different ways of life." This is a better explanation than some cultures have better ethical faculties than others. Grants primacy to the emergence of cultural practices like monogamy, then believes that its ethical value comes after, a pattern of objectification. Rebuttals: Large amount of agreement, people might agree on deeper issues, or we could accept disagreement and try to give an alternative explanation for why this disagreement exists

Objective prescriptivity

-the idea that some properties can carry with them a prescription to act in a certain way, distinct from other propositions -contrast 'go to bed' which is tacitly conditional, ie go to bed to get a good nights sleep vs "do not murder" which to an ethical realist is objectively prescriptive -Mackie believes that this is metaphysically queer and forms the grounds for his argument from queerness

Devereaux--Oppressive Texts, Resisting Readers, and the Gendered Spectator

-the male gaze: men look, women are looked at (as objects)--no vision is neutral -film: the gaze of the (male) filmmaker, functions to incorporate "wayward' woman through modeling, spectator has no choice but to identify with male protagonist, male characters cannot be debased because of power in real world -effect of film on spectators: film as presenting "truth"--narrative illusion, spectators derive erotic pleasure by (1) viewing someone as an erotic object (2) identifying with the male "ego-ideal" (esp. in women--identification with "early masculine period") -proposed solutions: new art (female voice/gaze), re-reading of existing works

high level perception/properties

-the process of making sense of complex data at an abstract, conceptual level (ex. knowing someone is sad/in pain) -properties: moral, aesthetic, semantic, personal taste

generalism

-the reasons we give in aesthetic evaluation are general -if X work is good (V) because of quality A, we are committed to saying that A is a good-making feature in a work of art -issue: such general qualities are not uncontroversial/discovered

expression theory of art

-the value of art lies in its capacity to express emotions -how does art express emotion? (1) Transmission model (Tolstoy): artist uses art to transmit their feelings--imbues art with signs to transmit these feelings--viewer feels these feelings (sincerity: artist has to have experienced these emotions, arousal: audience has to feel these same emotions) -issues: (1) do artists actually have to experience the feelings the work expresses? (2) does the audience actually have to feel the emotion? (3) makes art extrinsically valuable (2) art as expressive: to say that an artwork expresses X means that it manifests, exhibits, projects, embodies, or shows forth some X, where X is a human quality (1) does not entail Tolstoy's sincerity condition (expressive properties) (2) does not entail arousal condition

Idealized attitudes constructivism

A response to the claims that constructivism deteriorates into rampant and and individualistic relativism We can ground the values of a constructivist framework in the attitudes of an idealized self or group of people from these idealized people we get one morality, solving the problem of relativism problems: how do we idealize without values? the grip problem, why care about what these people think? if we do act as an idealized person its hard to get values out without originally giving them values, something we sought to avoid.

Humean Theory of Motivation

A theory according to which there are two distinct kinds of mental states, beliefs, and desires, which have different directions of fit. The theory also claims that both states are required to motivate us to act. However on Hume's dichotomy, reasons cannot motivation action as it is mind to world, need passions to motivate actions as they are world to mind fit An agent acts to change the world this requires a world to mind fit, which is the passions As beliefs when inconsistent with the world go out of existence Reason can not motivate action and passions cant be overridden with reason options for people to have weak will/be depressed how strong is link?-- Amoralists

Frege-Geach problem

A theory of meaning must satisfy the compositionality constraint, how the meanings of complex sentences follow from the meanings of simple ones Non-cogs assign meanings to simple sentences If you embed a non-cog sentence like stealing is wrong aka "Stealing!!!" into a sentence like stealing or my parents lied to me it is unclear if it means: "Stealing!!! or my parents lied to me" or "Stealing or my parents lied to me!!!" Should mean the same in each sentence 1)S is W 2)no the case S is W 3)S is W or my parents lied to me 4)if S is W the Killing is W 5)is it the case SIW? 1 and 2 are inconsistent, 1 answers 5, and 1 and 4 are modus ponens in 1 there is disapproval, none in the others if non cog is true then S is W means something different in 1-5 and it fails compositionality constraint non-cogs could say they don't care, but as a theory of meaning it is subject to these

Moral knowledge by intuition

Answers how we get moral knowledge Moral Knowledge by Intuition -a traditional answer is that we can gain moral knowledge by intuition -we reflect on the situation and can just "see" that the action was wrong -we can gain moral knowledge in this way Intuitions -unmediated -intellectual seemings -intuitions aren't recognitions of self-evident truths, but can provide the justification in a non-inferential way for moral beliefs -if it seems to us that x is wrong, and we don't have any reason to doubt our intuitions, we can know it -critical distinction→no independent reasons to trust our intuition vs reason to doubt our intuitions Central to Harman's beliefs Ways in which ethical arguments can rely on ethical claims Specific ethical claim can be offered as a counterexample to a general claim Specific ethical claim can be used to support a general ethical claim Ex. might argue that a specific claim is true because a more general claim is true Specific ethical claim may be used in argument for another specific ethical claim -conflation of (1) relying on certain claims that may in fact be intuitive and (2) relying on the claim that these claims are intuitive -many arguments do not rely on claims about intuitions but rather on specific moral claims -assumption that whenever we believe specific moral claims we do so because they are intuitive (which has been argued to be false) HARMANS BELIEFS

Korsgaard's Kantian constructivism

As a rational agent you must value something (a rational agent has reasons, having reasons means valuing something) To value anything you must value yourself as a rational agent (your valuing of something only gives reason to pursue it if it matters that you value it) If you value yourself as a rational agent then it is irrationally arbitrary not to value other rational agents Valuing other rational agents is how we get moral reasons So all rational agents have moral reasons Problems: might not be arbitrary to value others the same as oneself Or with street, she points out that you needn't value yourself, for example a bee may value the hive but not value itself having a reason to value, comes from the outside, thus is a form of realism, as it isn't grounded in our valuing

David Enoch Non-Naturalistic Realism in Meta-Ethics

Everyone is a naive realist when talking about objects abstract or otherwise, attempt to latch onto parts of reality average weight of male analytic philosopher--> most are realists, think saying he is >130 pounds is independent of our thinking that _-> not ontologically exciting -> dont attempt to put this property into fabric of univer -> facts of average weight are grounded in peoples weights -.> ontologically nothing more involved in latter than former relevant domain for paper: ethical talking and speaking Meaning of non-nat realism claims that this is trying to capture reality and in better moments non-nats do this these facts aren't grounded in in other non-moral facts or properties or objects unlike non-cogs, non-nat realists think moral talk is representationa and truth evaluable, facts are objective, god is also bound by these truths facts are not made true by decision making unlike constructivists agree with error theorist that no softer version captures the nature of ethical discourse, but non-nats believe it captures some non trivial ethical truths Argument 1, its the default position, arguments defeat it vs establish it a)normative language behaves like representational language,--> discrimination is common and wrong, seem to function the same, take language at face value b)moral discourse has objective purport, comfortable in applying moral standards without knowing the standards of who we apply it to, eating meat is wrong without it being judged so, disagreement seems to be serious disagreement, thus objective purport is default position b2) two kinds of facts.: humiliation is wrong vs exchange rates, some facts aren't grounded on or supervene on natural, so non nat is default position, to say otherwise is confusion of formal vs full-bodied normativity, its wrong not to play game of ethics, thus ethical facts are full bodied, thus its the default position to reject natural grounding of moral facts Why isn't everyone on board? 1) some reject default position sections points 2) some people put forward objectiosn objections: a)naturalism (ie only scientifically quantifiable things exist) if true then true in meta-ethics, non-nat response, reject the idea that science is exhaustive, also basic facts aren't natural just derivative, pain is bad vs kicking a cat, moral properties supervene on natural ones, non-nats mostly dont deny just explain supervenience b)how can we know anything about moral facts, seems odd to have epistemic access to them, response is to pressure idea of epistemic access, partners in guilt like a priori faculties, EDA argument does pose a challange, no good way to beat it without asserting a faculty as a jumping off point c)motivational worries, bullfighting is common vs wrong seem motivationally different, non-nats can accomodate or deny the relation of motivational link, also raises grip worry, why care? most non-nats seek to challenge the inteligibility of this argument d) moral disagreement, response, try and explain it or deny its scope, maybe decrease confidence in views f)Seriously do you believe that there are these truths out there??? hard to respond, not much spookier than any view accepting apriori faculties What is the view again? harder to tell as people have accepted minimalistic versions to truth, minimalist quasi-realism has strength of realism without epistemic and metaphysical baggage what is natural? if it is what is causally effective then truths are causally inert, use prior proposal of non nat these facts aren't grounded in in other non-moral facts or properties or objects, though this isnt exhaustive Postive arguments 1)moores open question if implausible to attribute sameness of meaning to moral an natural words then the openness is due to absence of an a priori relationship closing it 2_ if all meta ethical views have first order implications then those of realism score it plausibility points 3) deliberation is like quantification in mathematics, dispensability confers respectability on ontological commitments

Direction of fit

The direction of the relation between mind and world. In one direction, the mind 'fits' the world, as in belief. We change our beliefs to fit the facts. In the other direction, the world 'fits' the mind, as in desire. We act on our desires to change the world to satisfy our desires. The grass is green, mind to world fit I want a hamburger, world to mind fit Has implications for Non-cognitivism and Humean theory of motivation

Non-cognitivism

The theory that claims that moral judgements express non-cognitive attitudes. Moral judgements do not make claims about reality and are not true or false (they are not fact-stating). declarative--> x is/has property F NON-Descriptivism Hume thought moral talk and thought are not for representing or describing the world. NON-cognitivism: moral thought and talk is for expressing "passions" states with world to mind fit murder is wrong = I disapprove of murder non-cog expresses speakers feelings, not saying we have them "I'm bored" can be both an expression and a description this expression of passion allows us to see how they might be inherently motivating A.J Ayer's Emotivism: -Boo! stealing, Boo! you just stole that money -no commitment to wrongness, its motivating because we think its wrong point of moral language is to vent Hare's Prescriptivism: -saying murder is wrong is actually saying don't murder -moral talk is issuing commands -moral sentences are imperative ones -motivating as it's imperative Hare advanced from ayer in that expressing isn't venting (a cookbook isn't venting) Expressivism: -contemporary theory -when saying stealing is wrong is an expression of disapproval towards stealing -grass is green is expressing belief grass is green -the statement and its meaning are related through the expression relation -to explain meaning of grass is green, grass is green if it is green -to explain meaning of stealing is wrong, relate it to which non-cognitive state it expresses Most Non-cogs are anti realist, agree with error theory, they believe ethical thought doesn't even aim to represent world. This is a theory of meaning and is investigated by phil of language and linguistics Hume is a non-cognitivist Strengths: explains motivational-internalism doesn't rely on suspicious moral properties weaknesses: frege-geach problem

Higher order attitudes

These make up Simon Blackwell's response to Frege-Geach problem 1. Stealing is wrong 2. if stealing is wrong then killing is wrong 3. killing is wrong non-cogs not focus on whether each premise is true, as they don't rely on truth values, they rather wonder whether each premise is rational to accept one can have a higher order attitude, ie if one disapproves of stealing they can disapprove of disapproving of stealing and not disapproving of killing making in this notation 1. Dis(stealing) 2. Dis(Dis(stealing) & not Dis(killing) 3. Dis(killing) making it irrational to accept both premises and not accept conclusion, as you would disapprove of your own mental state however this has several problems, one can disapprove of their own mental state relatively often, like both wanting and not wanting to smoke and this doesn't solve Frege-Geach problem, just the conditional statement one, struggled with and, no, might, must etc

Supervenience

a relation between properties at different levels in which there can be no change in a higher-level property without a corresponding change in a lower-level property For example, the gender ratio of St. Andrews supervenes on the students who attend the A facts supervene on the B facts--there can't be any change in the A facts without a corresponding change in the B facts

acquaintance principle

aesthetic knowledge must be acquired through first‐hand experience of the object of knowledge and cannot be transmitted from person to person

Problem of Relativism for Constructivism

constructivism can capture: -1. Calling an action wrong is saying something about what the action is like -2. Some of these claims are true -but remember the third aspect of commonsense meta-ethics -3. Morality is to a significant degree objective -some relativistic responses -accept rampant, individualistic relativism

aesthetic anti-realism

there are no such things as aesthetic properties and our aesthetic ascriptions are based on non-aesthetic perceptible properties

aesthetic realism

there are such things as aesthetic properties and we make aesthetic ascriptions on the basis of them