Questions from Weekly Quizzes

Sully is a student of lepidopterology (the science of butterflies and moths). As part of his studies, he explores the countryside around his home and captures wild butterflies, which he then transports in traps back to his home laboratory to study. One day, immersed in his butterfly chasing, Sully unintentionally trespasses onto Tran's property. While on Tran's property, Sully captures a particularly rare butterfly, which he transports back to his home laboratory. Ulla, a competing lepidopterologist, observes this incident from the road, where she had been looking for butterflies. Ulla follows Sully back to his property, and when she observes Sully go inside and leave the butterfly in the trap unattended, Ulla intentionally trespasses onto Sully's property and takes the butterfly out of the trap and puts it into her own trap and takes it back to her lab. Which of the following is an accurate statement of the property rights of the various parties in the butterfly? Answers: a. Tran owns the butterfly, because he is deemed to have constructive possession of wild animals on his land, and that is not negated by Sully's trespass. b. Sully owns the butterfly, because his trespass was unintentional and Tran lost any claim to the animal when it left his land. c. Ulla owns the animal, because the rule of capture applies and she is the party in actual possession of the animal. d. No one owns the butterfly, because of the doctrine of ratione soli.

(a) is the correct answer. Under the doctrine of ratione soli, when a wild animal is on private private, the property owner is deemed the owner because he or she is said to have constructive possession of the animal. If the wild animal leaves the property, the doctrine no longer applies; however, if the wild animal is captured on the property by a trespasser - whether the trespass is intentional or unintentional - the doctrine is not negated by the trespass, which is a wrongful action. Thus, Tran is the owner of the butterfly. (b) is incorrect because it does not matter whether Sully's trespass was intentional or unintentional. Because he was a trespasser, he has an inferior claim of ownership than Tran does. (c) is incorrect because the rule of capture is not determinative in this situation, since it involved a wild animal on private property, not a wild animal on a commons. (d) is incorrect because it is an incorrect application of the doctrine of ratione soli. The butterfly did not leave the property as a wild animal; rather, it was captured on Tran's property by a trespasser who removed it from the property (making the trespassor's claim of title to the butterfly inferior to Tran's).

Barbara inherited her family estate, Blueacre, in fee simple absolute when she was 10 years old. She is now 35 and lives in a city on the opposite side of the country. She rarely spends time at Blueacre, but she occasionally rents it out on a short-term basis to third parties for weddings and other events and has hired a local property manager to oversee the property. Bruno is a transient who snuck into the property's rarely used hay storage barn and has been in hiding there continuously for the 10-year statutory period for adverse possession. The age of majority in the jurisdiction where Blueacre is located is 21. Which of the following statements about Blueacre is accurate? Answers: A. Bruno has not adversely possessed any part of Blueacre. B. Bruno has adversely possessed at least the hay storage portion of Blueacre. C. Bruno has not adversely possessed any part of Blueacre unless he can claim under color of title. D. Bruno has not adversely possessed any part of Blueacre because Barbara was under a disability when she inherited the property.

A is the correct answer. One of the requirements for adverse possession is that the occupier's possession be open & notorious, such that a reasonable owner on notice. Here, the hypo indicates that Bruno "snuck" into the property to a rarely used hay storage barn where he was "in hiding." Such possession would fail to satisfy the requirement that the APer's actions be open and notorious. B is incorrect because Bruno's actions fail to satisfy the open and notorious element, whether for the hay storage barn portion of the property or the entire property. C is incorrect because it conflates claim of title (one of the elements of AP) and color of title (a type of AP when a party is claiming through a defective written document). Bruno does not need to claim AP through color of title to succeed: If Bruno had actually satisfied all of the elements of adverse possession, including open and notorious (which he did not - see above), he would have had a successful claim of adverse possession, regardless of whether he made a claim under color of title or not. D is incorrect because a disability must be present at the time the adverse action accrues in order for it to toll the statute of limitations against the would-be adverse possession. Here, the hypo indicates that Barbara is 35, and that Bruno has occupied the property for the 10-year stautory period, meaning that Barbara was 25 at the time the adverse possession action accrued (ie, the time when Bruno actually entered the property). Thus, at the time the cause of action accrued (i.e., when Bruno actually entered the property), Barbara was no longer under a disability because of her age, and there are no other facts in the hypo indicating that she was under any other type of statutory disability at that time. Thus, if Bruno had actually satisfied all of the elements of adverse possession, including open and notorious (which he did not - see above), he would have had a successful claim of adverse possession and disability would not have barred his action from being successful.

Ali, while on real property owned by Bri, finds a diamond ring. Ali shows it to Bri, who admits she never saw it before, but asserts that she owns it because it was found on her property. Ali counters that she owns it because she found it. Which of the following sets of facts, if true, would best support Ali's claim of ownership? Answers: A. The property is a cafe owned by Bri, and Ali was a customer in the cafe and found the diamond ring on the floor under the table she was sitting at. B. The property is Bri's home, and Ali was an employee of a painting company Bri had hired to repaint the walls of her living room, where Ali found the ring when moving furniture away from the walls to paint. C. The property is a cafe owned by Bri, and Ali was a customer in the cafe and found the diamond ring on bathroom counter next to the sink when she went into the bathroom to wash her hands. D. The property is Bri's home, and Ali was a hiker who had inadvertently trespassed onto Bri's backyard, where she found the ring beside some rocks.

A is the correct answer: "The property is a cafe owned by Bri, and Ali was a customer in the cafe and found the diamond ring on the floor under the table she was sitting at."

In December 2015, Zane, owner of Greenacre, conveys Greenacre to Yara, who pays valuable consideration. Yara does not record, nor does she move into Greenacre. In February 2016, while Greenacre is still unoccupied, Zane conveys Greenacre to Xander, who pays valuable consideration. Xander does not record. In April 2016, Yara records her deed. In May 2016, Xander records his deed. The jurisdiction where Greenacre is located has a race-notice statute. Who owns the property? A. Yara, because she had notice of the subsequent conveyance B. Yara, because the conveyance to her was first in time C. Xander, because he was a bona fide subsequent purchaser who did not have notice of the conveyance to Yara D. Xander, because he recorded his deed

B is the correct answer. The question indicates it a race-notice jurisdiction. In a race-notice jurisdiction, the rule is that a subsequent party will be protected against prior unrecorded instruments only if subsequent party is a (1) purchaser (2) is w/o any of the types of notice of the prior conveyance at the time of the conveyance to him and who also (3) records first. To apply the rule, ask whether the subsequent party (here, Xander) satisfies these requirements and thus would qualify for protection under the race-notice act. The question tells you he is a purchaser, so the first requirement of a race-notice act is satisfied. From the facts in the question, you know that he was w/o any of the types of notice of the prior conveyance to Yara at the time of the conveyance to him (February 2016). He does not have actual notice, because the question indicates the property was unoccupied at that time and there is no other indication that he had actual knowledge of the Zane-Yara conveyance at that time. He also does not have constructive notice, because the question indicates that Yara did not record her deed until April 2016, so Xander would not have been on constructive notice at the time of the conveyance to him (Feb. 2016), since nothing was recorded in the public records at that date. So the second requirement of a race-notice act is satisfied. However, the third requirement of the race-notice act is not satisfied here: Xander did NOT record first. Therefore, he fails to qualify for protection under the applicable recording act in the jurisdiction. Therefore, you revert to the common law and ask which grantee was conveyed to first in time chronologically: here, it was Yara (Dec. 2015). Therefore, she owns the property. A is incorrect, because although Yara owns the property, it is NOT because she had notice of the subsequent conveyance. It is because Xander failed to qualify for protection under the applicable recording act, and therefore the outcome is determined by reverting to the common law and asking which grantee was conveyed to first in time chronologically. Whether Yara had notice of the subsequent conveyance is irrelevant. C is incorrect, because although Xander is a bona fide subsequent purchaser who did not have notice of the conveyance to Yara, that is only two of the three requirements for a subsequent purchaser to win under a race-notice recording act: he must also record first, which here, he did not. D is incorrect, because recording his deed is not enough for a subsequent purchaser like Xander to qualify for protection under a race: as noted above, in a race-notice jurisdiction, a subsequent party will be protected against prior unrecorded instruments only if subsequent party is a (1) purchaser (2) is w/o any of the types of notice of the prior conveyance at the time of the conveyance to him and who also (3) records first.

Bo tells his cousin Lydia that since he (Bo) is moving to Australia, he wants Lydia to have his motorcycle, and they shake hands on it. A few days later, after Bo has moved to Australia, Lydia sees Raven driving the motorcycle around town. Lydia tells Raven to turn the motorcycle over, since Bo gave it to her. Raven refuses, saying she bought it from Bo. Assuming Raven did in fact purchase the vehicle from Bo, what result? Answers:A. Raven wins, if she recorded the registration to the motorcycle. B. Raven wins, because Lydia did not receive a valid gift from Bo. C. Lydia wins, because Bo intended to make the gift to her. D. Lydia wins, because Bo is estopped from changing his mind.

B is the correct answer. This is an unenforceable promise, not a valid gift, because the element of delivery is not satisfied. There was no actual delivery of possession the motorcycle; no constructive delivery of something that would provide access to possession of the motorcycle (such as a key); and no symbolic delivery (such as a writing). A is incorrect because registration by Raven would not matter if there had been an valid gift made to Bo with all three elements of a gift shown (which there wasn't - see above); in such a case, Bo would be the owner and Raven's registration would be irrelevant. C is incorrect because present intent to make a gift is only one of the three elements required to establish a valid gift. Even if Bo did have the present intent to make a gift, the element of delivery was not shown (See above) and therefore there is no valid gift here. D is incorrect because estoppel is irrelevant to the legal question of whether a valid gift was made. To distinguish an unenforceable promise from a valid gift, the three elements of a gift must be shown: present intent, delivery of possession, and acceptance.

In 2017, Owner sold Blackacre to Ali for valuable consideration and Ali immediately moved onto the land. Intending to live off the land, Ali built a cabin, an outhouse, a water wheel, and windmill. Ali did not record the deed. In 2020, Owner, aware that Ali had not recorded the deed, sold Blackacre to Cheri, for valuable consideration, who was an investor and living outside of the country at the time of the sale. Cheri immediately recorded the deed. The jurisdiction has a notice recording act. In a subsequent lawsuit between Ali and Cheri to quiet title to Blackacre in one of them, who prevails? Cheri, because she had no notice of the prior conveyance. Ali, because Cheri had notice of the prior conveyance. Cheri, because she recorded her deed and Ali didn't.

B is the correct answer: "Ali, because Cheri had notice of the prior conveyance." To be protected under a notice statute, a subsequent purchaser must pay valuable consideration and not have any of the three types of notice. Here, Cheri, the subsequent purchaser, does not qualify for protection of the recording act because she would be held to be on inquiry notice, since a reasonable inspection would have revealed Ali's presence: cabin, outhouse, water wheel, and windmill. Inquiry notice is an objective standard, as to what a reasonable purchaser would have observed, so the fact that Cheri subjectively did not observe Ali's possession of Blackacre because she was out of the county is not relevant. Consequently, Cheri does not qualify for protection of the notice recording act. Thus, reverting to the common law rule of first in time chronologically, Ali wins as the first chronological purchaser. A is incorrect because Cheri did have one of the three types of notice; as discussed above, Cheri would be held to be on inquiry notice, which is an objective standard, not subjective. C is incorrect because in a notice jurisdiction, a subsequent purchaser does not need to record their deed to qualify for protection of the recording act. Cheri's recording of her deed is irrelevant in this scenario, since in a notice jurisdiction, as the subsequent purchaser, she needed to show she had none of the three types of notice to qualify for protection of the recording act and as noted above, she would be held to be on inquiry notice.

Looking at the TX AP statute,. notice that there are a range of different statutory periods for different types of AP claims in various sections of the statute. The shortest statutory period is three years, for an owner to bring suit to recover real property held by another in peaceable and adverse possession under title or color of title (Sec. 16.024). Why is this type of AP claim subject to the shortest statuory period? Answers: A. Because a party who is claiming possession under color of title has already satisfied the hostile and claim of title element of AP and the shorter statutory period reflects that. B. Because a party who is claiming possession under color of title has relied on a defective document conveying title to them, and the shorter statutory period reflects a balancing of their reliance interest and the record owner's interest. C. Because a party who is claiming possession under color of title has no disability and the shorter statutory period reflects that.

B is the correct answer: "Because a party who is claiming possession under color of title has relied on a defective document conveying title to them, and the shorter statutory period reflects a balancing of their reliance interest and the record owner's interest.

O conveys Blackacre "to A, B, and C as joint tenants." Subsequently, A conveys his interest to D. Then B dies intestate, leaving H as his heir. What is the state of title? Answers: A. C, D, and H are TIC with separate undivided interests in the whole (1/3 share each). B. C and D are TIC with separate undivided interests in the whole (2/3 share in C and 1/3 share in D). C. C and D are JT with equal undivided interests in the whole property.

B is the correct answer: "C and D are TIC with separate undivided interests in the whole (2/3 share in C and 1/3 share in D)." Go step by step. Step 1: Hypo tells you the initial conveyance is from O to A, B, and C as JT àA, B, and C each have JT interest. Initial conveyance = A, B and C are joint tenants (assuming these words of conveyance are deemed sufficient by court to create JT). Step 2: Then A conveys to D à What is D's interest? Since D does not share the 4 unities w/ the other JT's (no unity of time or title), D is not a JT. Instead, D is a TIC. What are B and C's interest? B & C remain JT w/r/t each other, and are TIC as to D. Thus: B and C have an equal undivided 2/3 interest in property as JTs w/r/t each other, D has a 1/3 interest as a TIC. Step 3: Now B dies intestate (w/o will), leaving H as his heir. [Q] What does H get? Nothing. B and C are still JTs w/r/t each other. Since C survives B, C gets B's share (right of survivorship means C now has the entirety of that formerly shared interes). C now has 2/3 share and is TIC with D (1/3 share). Answer to State of title: C and D are TIC with separate undivided interests in the whole (2/3 share in C and 1/3 share in D) What if B had died leaving a will devising his interest to H? Same result. Can't devise your share of a JT. You can only convey it during life. Right of survivorship to remaining JTs immediately takes effect upon your death. JT interest does not convey at death by will or intestacy laws.

Desmond, the owner of Redacre in fee simple absolute, conveys Redacre to "Ella, but if alcohol is sold on the property within the next five years, then to Fitz." Which of the following statements accurately describes the parties' interest in Redacre at the time of the conveyance? Answers: A. Ella has a possessory estate in fee simple determinable and Fitz has an executory interest. B. Ella has a possessory estate in fee simple subject to an executory limitation and Fitz has an executory interest. C. Ella has a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent and Fitz has a right of entry. D. Ella has a fee simple determinable and Fitz has a contingent remainder.

B is the correct answer: "Ella has a possessory estate in fee simple subject to an executory limitation and Fitz has an executory interest." Ella's possessory estate is a fee simple subject to an executory limitation because the limitation on her fee simple (no alcohol being sold on the property for the next five years) uses words of condition ("but if") and is placed grammatically after the punctuation (here, a comma) signaling the end of the description of Ella's estate. Fitz's future interest is an executory limitation because he is a third party grantee whose interest follows a possessory estate subject to an executory limitation.

O conveys Grayacre by general warranty deed to A who pays valuable consideration in 2015 and who immediately reocrds. In 2019, O conveys Grayacre by general warranty deed to B who pays valuable consideration. B doesn't record. In a subsequent lawsuit between A and B as to who owns Grayacre, A wins (this would be the result whichever of the 3 types of recording acts the jurisdiction has - make sure you understand why). In light of this, which statement below is accurate? (assume all applicable statutes of limitation are unexpired) A. Since B failed to record her deed from O, B has no recourse against O. B. Even though B failed to record her deed from O, B can sue O for breach of the deed covenant of seisen (as well as potentially for other torts, such as fraud). C. Even though B failed to record her deed from O, B can sue O for breach of the covenant against encumbrances (as well as potentially for other torts, such as fraud).

B is the correct answer: "Even though B failed to record her deed from O, B can sue O for breach of the deed covenant of seisen (as well as potentially for other torts, such as fraud). " Recording acts and the recording system determine the validity of competing claims to the same property. But recordation is not necessary for a deed to be valid as between the grantor and grantee: a deed is valid against the grantor without recordation (assuming the deed satisfies all other requirements for validity and delivery). Thus, the recording acts determine the outcome of the claims of competing grantees to the Grayacre (I.e., A and B). But the recording acts do not determine the potential claims of the losing competing grantee (B) against her grantor; those claims are based on the deed the grantor conveyed to grantee (as well as possible additional tort claims) and a deed between is valid between grantor and grantee regardless of whether it is recorded and regardless of whether that grantee has lost to a competing grantee under the recording acts.. Here, when O conveyed Grayacre by general warranty deed to B in 2019, O was no longer seized of the property (having previously conveyed it to A in 2015). The O-B deed was a general warranty deed, which means it contained a covenant of seisen. Since that deed is valid as between O and B (regardless of the fact that it was unrecorded) and since the statute of limitations are unexpired, B can sue O for breach of the covenant of seisen contained in that general warranty deed (as well as possible tort claims, such as fraud). A is incorrect because as noted above, recordation is not necessary for a deed to be valid as between the grantor and grantee: a deed is valid against the grantor without recordation and a grantee like B can potentially make a claim against their grantor like O based on breach of deed warranties. C is incorrect because although B can sue O for breach of the deed covenant of seisen as discussed above, there is no basis for B to sue O for breach of the covenant of encumbrances here: there was no encumbrance on the property when O conveyed to B; rather O simply did not own the property at all when he conveyed to B. Lack of outright ownership by a grantor is not an encumbrance; it is a lack of seisen, and thus the relevant deed covenant that O the grantor breached was the covenant of seisen, not the covenant against encumbrances.

Owner enters into a written contract for the sale of Blackacre to Buyer. Further, Owner promises to deliver marketable title. At closing, Buyer accepts a special warranty deed. Two years later, Company established that it holds interest in the coal underneath Blackacre which was conveyed to Company by a prior owner of Blackacre before Owner acquired their ownership in Blackacre. Buyer sues Owner. What result? A. Owner, because no warranties were made of any kind with regard to title B. Owner, because the promise related to title merged into the deed C. Buyer, because Owner breached the covenant of marketable title D. Buyer, because Company claimed an interest in Blackacre.

B is the correct answer: "Owner, because the promise related to title merged into the deed " In a special warranty deed, the seller warrants that no title defects have occurred during his ownership of the property. However, the seller does not warrant that there are no defects in the chain of title from which he derived title. A special warranty deed contains a series of promises or covenants, which are divided into present and future covenants. Moreover, covenants in a contract for sale merge (i.e., disappear) at closing, including the promise to convey marketable title. If the buyer discovers a problem with the title acquired from the seller after closing, the buyer cannot sue the seller for breach of the implied covenant of marketable title, because that covenant (part of the sales contract) no longer exists because of merger at closing. Instead the buyer must sue on the basis of a breach of any covenant of title contained in the deed, and here, because buyer got a special warranty deed which only protects against defects in title that occurred during the seller's ownership of the property., and the issue regarding Company's ownership occured prior to then, there are no breaches of the deed covenants that buyer can sue seller for. A is incorrect because this answer choice describes a quitclaim deed, not a special warranty deed. C is incorrect because Owner's promise to deliver marketable title merged into the special warranty deed and so cannot be sued on. D is incorrect because as discussed above, the grantor of a special warranty deed is not liable for a title defect that arose before the grantor took title and here the facts indicate Company acquired its interest prior to seller's ownership of the property.

Zane loans their computer to Yanni for Yanni to use while taking an exam. Which of the following statements about this situation is accurate? Answers: A. This is an involuntary bailment, with Zane being the bailor and Yanni being the bailee. B. This is a voluntary bailment, with Zane being the bailor and Yanni being the bailee. C. This is a voluntary bailment, with Yanni being the bailor and Zane being the bailee. D. This is neither a voluntary or involuntary bailment, since Yanni is not the rightful owner of the property.

B is the correct answer: "This is a voluntary bailment, with Zane being the bailor and Yanni being the bailee."

A dog walker executes a binding sales contract for the purchase of a home from a cat groomer. The cat groomer had lived in the home for 4 years. The contract provides that the dog walker must pay the purchase price within 30 days of execution of the sales contract. Simultaneous with payment of the purchase price, the deed will be executed and possession of the home will be given to the dog walker. Unfortunately, in between when the sales contract was executed and the deed was signed, there was a huge earthquake that almost completely demolished the home. The dog walker now refuses to pay the purchase price. If the cat groomer sues to compel performance on the contract of sale, who will prevail? (assume the jurisdiction follows traditional common law approach with regard to risk of loss) A. The dog walker, because the seller is no longer able to provide marketable title now the house is nearly destroyed. B. The cat groomer, because under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the risk of loss is on the buyer between when the contract of sale has been signed and closing. C. The dog walker, under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the risk of loss is on the seller between when the contract of sale has been signed and closing.. D. The cat groomer, because now that the property is destroyed, the covenant of quiet enjoyment has been breached by the seller.

B is the correct answer: The cat groomer (the seller) will prevail, because under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the risk of loss is on the buyer between when the contract of sale has been signed and closing. This is the traditional common law view, based on the doctrine of equitable conversion. Only a minority of states still retain the traditional common law view that risk of loss is on the buyer between signing of the sales contract and closing. Most states now split between either the modern CL view (risk of loss is on the seller between signing of the sales contract and closing) or the UPVRA ( risk of loss in between signing of sales contract and closing is on the party in possession (which is usually the seller). A is incorrect because the seller's duty to provide marketable title only pertains to the legal quality of the title the seller is conveying, not to the physical condition of the property. C is incorrect, because as discussed above, the traditional common law view (now the minority view) is that risk of loss is on the buyer and C reflects the modern CL view that risk of loss is on the seller. D is incorrect, because the sale has not closed here and thus no deed - and no deed warranties - exist that the seller could be in breach of.

T, a month-to-month tenant, gives notice on Nov 16 that she is going to vacate on Nov 30; she then does vacate and pays no more rent. LL exerts reasonable efforts and then finally relets the following April 1. The jurisdiction has no applicable statute for how to terminate month-to-month. LL sues T for rent for the months of December through the following March. What result? (Problem 2, pg. 282)

Because a month of notice is required for termination of a periodic tenancy with a one month period, T is liable for the full amount of rent for the month of December. The correct answer is B. A month of notice is required for termination of a periodic tenancy with a one month period. So when T gave notice on Nov. 16 about Nov. 30 departure, that wasn't enough notice to satisfy 1 month requirement . Because the Q tells you the jurisdiction has no applicable statute for how to terminate month-to-month, the CL approach applies: under the CL, if notice is given in the same month in which the quit is to take place, the notice is effective as of the end of the month following the month in which the short notice was given. So here, notice was given mid-November and T quit the premises at the end of November; thus, under the CL, her notice would be effective as of the end of the following month (i.e., Dec. 31) and she is liable for December rent in entirety. (In some jurisdictions, this CL approach may be modified by statute, and notice given mid-month would be effective one month later, i.e., Dec. 15). In all jurisdictions, LL would lose his claim to rent for the months of January - March. Courts do not subject T to unlimited and continuing liability for faulty notice, or require T to resubmit notice or only recognize effective notice if given on the exact date equal to the required period (here, on Nov. 30). If T gives notice like this T did, and it isn't effective for the month it was given, it just automatically is treated as effective for the next month. Notice may have been short for purposes of ending tenancy in November, but it was effective for ending tenancy in December.

L leases to T for term of 3 years at monthly rent of $1000. One year later, T "transfers, subleases, and assigns" to T1 for a period of one year date. Neither T or T1 pays rent. What rights does L have against T and T1? (Problem 4(a) , pg. 300)

Because this is a sublease, L is in privity of contract and privity of estate with T and can sue her for the rent due, but L does not have either privity of contract or privity of estate with T1 and therefore cannot sue her for the rent due. Response Feedback: B is the correct answer. To determine L's rights, the first step is to identify whether the conveyance is an assignment or sublease. Here, it is a sublease, because T is transferring only some rights, still has reversion of 1 year for remainder of lease term . Since it is a sublease, T and L are in privity of estate AND privity of contract. So L can sue T. But since it is a sublease, that also means that L has no privity of estate with T1, because T holds reversion, not does L have privity of K with T1, because no contractual agreement between them. So L can't sue T1. The problem in the casebook goes on to ask what if in the sublease T1 had agreed to explicit promise to pay the rents in the main lease? Could L sue T1 then? Jurisdictions would split on this, but the majority would probably rule that this language triggers a third party beneficiary theory between L and T1, so LL could sue T1. In any of these scenarios, L is entitled to only a single recovery - i.e., even if L legally entitled to sue either T or T1, whoever L sues, L's recovery is limited to the single recovery of the rent due.

L leases to T for term of 3 years at monthly rent of $1000, but T must obtain permission to sublet or assign. T obtains permission and transfers to T1 the balance of the term. T1 pays rent to L, then defaults. L sues T. What result? (Problem 4(b) , pg. 300)

Because this is an assignment, L is in privity of estate with T1 and can sue her for back rent, and L is in privity of contract with T and can alternately sue her for back rent. A is the correct answer. This is an assignment, not sublease, because T transferred all of T's interest to T1. So L does have privity of estate with T1 and can sue her for back rent. However, L also continues to have privity of contract with T and can alternately sue her for back rent. L continues to have privity of contract with T because L didn't release T from T's obligations under the contract by giving permission for the assignment. Giving permission to the assignment doesn't constitute a release - a T must get express release ("novation") from L if original T wants to get out of all obligations under the original contract.

In which of the following scenarios would the continuity element of AP be least likely to be satisfied by Lee, a party who is asserting adverse possession of the property? (assume all other elements are satisfied) Answers: A. Lee camps every summer on the property and practices leave no trace principles. The property is a vacant lot in a rural wooded area where some lots are built on with cabins and other lots are non-developed but camped on by their owners during the summer. B. Lee occupies the house on the property every summer. The property is located in a rural area served by a seasonable forest service road that is only accessible by vehicle during summer months and other houses in the area are also occupied in the summer only. C. Lee occupies the house on the property every summer. The The property is located in a rural area served by a seasonable forest service road that is only accessible by vehicle during summer months and requires snowmobile use or a 10 mile hike in the winter months, which many property owners in the area do to access their properties year-round.

C is the corect answer: "Lee occupies the house on the property every summer. The The property is located in a rural area served by a seasonable forest service road that is only accessible by vehicle during summer months and requires snowmobile use or a 10 mile hike in the winter months, which many property owners in the area do to access their properties year-round." Generally speaking, the continuity requirement is satisfied if the adverse possessor uses the land as would a true owner., so this scenaio would be the least likely to satisfy the continuity requirement, since Lee is failing to use the property as true owner would.

How should the following statement be revised so that it accurately states the law? (see also note 1 on page 122): "The title of the finder is good as against the whole word except the true owner . . . " Answers:A. The statement does not need to be revised, since it accurately states the law. B. "The title of the finder is good as against the whole word except the true owner, unless the finder wrongfully obtained the item." C. "The title of the finder is good as against the whole word except the true owner or any prior possessor."

C is the correct answer. "The title of the finder is good as against the whole word except the true owner or any prior possessor."

Peaches owns Parcel A and Mochi owns Parcel B, adjacent properties. They have entered into a written agreement that allows the owner of Parcel B to use a driveway than runs through Parcel A "for ingress and egress to the house on Parcel B." Oak trees grow along the entire length of the driveway, which provide a shady and beautiful canopy over the driveway. Peaches, however, has decided to cut down the oak trees because she doesn't like the acorns falling on her car when she drives through. Mochi claims that Peaches has no right to do this. What result? Answers:A. Peaches cannot cut down the trees, because as the servient estate owner she cannot take any actions which affect the appearance of the easement. B. Peaches cannot cut down the trees, because an easement by estoppel has been created for Mochi to use the driveway with the canopy of trees intact C. Peaches can cut down the trees, because cutting down the trees does not interfere with the purpose of the easement D. Peaches can cut down the trees, because she owns the dominant estate and can therefore alter the easement's appearance however she chooses

C is the correct answer. As owner of the servient estate, Peaches cannot take actions that interfere with the purpose of the easement, but the dominant estate owner (Mochi) is also not entitled to interfere unreasonably with the servient estate owner's use and enjoyment of their property. Here, the purpose of the easement is ingress and egress; cutting down of the oak trees by the servient estate owner does not interfere with that purpose, it merely affects the appearance of the servient estate (the trees are located on "along" the driveway, thus on the servient estate, not the easement). Whereas if Mochi were to prevent Peaches from cutting down the trees, based on the facts provided in the question, that would be an unreasonable interference by the dominant estate owner with Peaches' use and enjoyment of her own property. A is incorrect because as noted above, a servient estate holder cannot take actions that interfere with the purpose of the easement, which here is ingress and egress. The appearance of the easement is not the same as the purpose of the easement. B is incorrect because nothing in the facts supports an argument of easement by estoppel. The facts indicate that the parties have signed a written agreement, which is an express easement. An easement by estopple is an implied easement that only arises if the requirements for easement by estoppel are satisfied (see Holbrook), which they are not here.

A and B are JT in Grayacre. B conveys her interest in Grayacre from herself as a JT to herself as a TIC in a deed, without telling A. She tells her daughter, then puts the deed in a drawer. Subsequently, A dies and B destroys the deed. What is the most likely result in a jurisdiction that follows the Riddle approach and allows unilateral severance of JT? (question 3 on page 252) Answers: The deed effectively unilaterally severed the JT and therefore B has a TIC interest of 1/2 in the property and A's heirs have a TIC interest of 1/2 in the property. Telling the daughter about the deed effectively unilaterally severed the JT and therefore B has a TIC interest of 1/2 in the property and A's heirs have a TIC interest of 1/2 in the property. Neither the writing of the deed nor telling the daughter about the deed was effective to unilaterally sever the JT, and therfore B has a fee simple absolute interest in the entire property as a result of being freed of A's interest in the JT at A's death.

C is the correct answer. Even in a jurisdiction that allows unilateral severance of a JT by one JT conveying her interest from herself as a JT to herself as a TIC, there must be an effective delivery of that interest. Normally, when A conveys a property interest to X as in a normal real estate transaction, delivery is almost always shown, because A gives the deed to X (or X's lawyer or some other 3rd party). But when a co-T is trying to change the nature of her own property interest, she essentially is delivering from herself to herself, from A to A. So the question is whether on its own, just execution of the deed from A to A is an effective delivery, or whether that combined with A telling her daughter about the deed is an effective delivery. Most courts require some external objective act (such as recording the deed, or executing it in the presence of a neutral third party, such as a lawyer who holds it for safekeeping) to establish the requirement of delivery from A as a JT to A as a TIC, in order to avoid concerns about fraud and collusion.

In Pierson v. Post, Post chases the fox all day and was on the verge of capturing the animal when Pierson arrived, killed the fox, and walked away with the carcass. Who is awarded title to the fox and why? Answers: Post, because he is more likely to use the dead fox in a way that maximizes overall welfare of society. Post, because he expended so much effort and labor in chasing the fox, while Pierson put in minimal labor. Pierson, because he reduced the fox to his possession by mortally wounding it. Pierson, because he had superior fox-hunting equipment.

C is the correct answer. The majority in the case held that wild animals are common property until reduced to possession - and possession requires more than mere pursuit; possession requires that you must actually possess or mortally wound the animal.

Assume we are in a jurisdiction that allows the creation of JT without the use of a strawman. O executes a deed giving to O and A as JTs (the deed is signed by the grantor O, but not by A, as customary). Subsequently, A wants to transfer her interest to her son B, and wants to save the cost of the recording tax, so she whites out her name and replaces w/ his (i.e., now the original deed shows the grantees as O and B as JT). Deed is recorded, O dies. Who owns Blackacre? (problem 2, pg. 366, second hypo) A. B owns it in fee simple absolute, because A effectively transferred her interest to him, and so now he is the surviving JT and now that O has died, B owns the property in its entirety, freed of O's interest. B. B and O's heirs as TIC each with 50% interest, because A effectively transferred her interest to him, but in doing so while she was alive, it destroyed the 4 unities and converted her interest to a TIC, so O and B became TIC. C. A owns it in fee simple absolute, as the surviving JT, since A did not effectively transfer her interest to B by whiting out her name and replacing it with his on the original deed, since A never signed the original deed nor signed at the time of the whiting out and she would need to have signed any conveyance from A to B to comply with the SOF.

C is the correct answer: "A owns it in fee simple absolute, as the surviving JT, since A did not effectively transfer her interest to B by whiting out her name and replacing it with his on the original deed, since A never signed the original deed nor signed at the time of the whiting out and she would need to have signed any conveyance from A to B to comply with the SOF." A conveyance of property owned by O and A as JT to O and B as JT needed to be signed by O and A as the grantors (i.e., the party to be bound); O had signed the original deed, but A hadn't and the facts indicate she didn't add her signature when she did the whiting out. So the conveyance does not satisfy the SOF and is legally invalid, and thus the original JT between O and A remained unbroken, and when O dies, A owns the property in fee simple absolute as the last surviving former JT. Once again, note that the fact that the whited-out deed was recorded is irrelevant as to the SOF issues.

Sam and Coco own Blackacre as joint tenants in fee simple absolute. Without telling Coco, Sam drafts a will in which he devises his interest in Blackacre to his niece, Willamina. A few months later, Coco, who has racked up significant gambling debts, sells her interest to Jake. Sam then dies. Which of the following best describes the state of the title in Blackacre? Answers: A. Because Sam's will severed the joint tenancy, Willamina has a tenancy in common interest. B. Because Coco's conveyance transferred a joint tenancy interest with right of survivorship to Jake, after Sam's death Jake has a fee simple absolute in Blackacre. C. Because Coco's conveyance severed the joint tenancy, Willamina has a tenancy in common interest. D. Neither Sam's will nor Coco's conveyance severed the joint tenancy with right of survivorship, so after Sam's death Coco has a fee simple absolute in Blackacre.

C is the correct answer: "Because Coco's conveyance severed the joint tenancy, Willamina has a tenancy in common interest."The holder of a JT interest can unilaterally destroy the JT during life by conveying property, which will transform their interest into TIC. A is incorrect because a will devising a JT interest will not destroy the JT. A party cannot devise his or her share of a JT because of the right of survivorship inherent in a JT. B is incorrect because when a JT conveys their interest during life to another party, the interest does not get get transferred to third party as a JT w/right of survivorship. Rather, conveying it to third party destroys the JT, and third party gets a TIC interest (which has no right of survivorship associated with it.) D is incorrect because Coco's conveyance did destroy the JT (see above).

Donald conveys his New York City co-op as follows: "To Betty for life, then to Sally if Sally has not become an actress." What interests does each party hold? Answers: a. Betty has a life estate; Sally has a vested remainder in fee simple absolute; Donald has a reversion in fee simple absolute. b. Betty has a life estate; Sally has a vested remainder in fee simple absolute; Donald has nothing. c. Betty has a life estate; Sally has a contingent remainder in fee simple absolute; Donald has a reversion in fee simple absolute. d. Betty has a life estate; Sally has a contingent remainder in fee simple absolute; Donald has a right of entry.

C is the correct answer: "Betty has a life estate; Sally has a contingent remainder in fee simple absolute; Donald has a reversion in fee simple absolute." The other answers are incorrect because of the reasons explained below. To reach the correct answer, use the chart in Edwards to work through and identify each of the party's interests as explained below: First: Identify the possessory estate: Using columns 1 and 2, identify that Betty has life estate (column 1); the next estate is in a 3rd party grantee and Betty's life estate will end naturally, so no added terminology to her estate (column 2). Therefore, Betty's interest is a "life estate." Second: Identify Sally's future interest: Using Columns 3&4, identify that the first future interest is in a 3rd party grantee, Sally, so it is labeled a remainder. Now, decide if it is a vested or contingent remainder - recall the rules for distinguishing the two types: It will be vested if (1) it is in an ascertained person AND (2) the words creating it do not contain a condition precedent (other than the natural termination of the preceding estate). Here, the remainder is (1) yes, in an ascertained person and (2) does contain a condition precedent (recall that a condition precendent is an unmet condition set out within description of particular estate that must be satisfied before estate can become possessory - here, there is a condition set out within the description of Sally's estate (Sally can't have become an actress) that must be satisfied before estate can become possessory - i.e., Sally won't even get to own this property if she has become an actress. Therefore, since there is a condition precedent here, it does not satisfy both requirements to be a vested remainder and therefore is a contingent remainder. If Sally does come into possession in the future, she will be in possession of the fee simple absolute. Therefore, the full label for Sally's interest is "contingent remainder in fee simple absolute" Third: Identify any other future interests: Because Sally's interest is a contingent remainder, there must be an alternative future interest, since if her interest fails to become possessory (i.e., if she has become an actress), then someone must become the owner of the property. Here, that will be Don, the grantor. Using columns 2, 3, and 4 again, identify what Don's interest is: Don's interest follows life estate (Betty) than will end naturally, so look at column 2 and follow arrow across to column 3, and you see that his interest called a reversion. If Don does come into possession in the future, it will be to the fee simple absolute, therefore, the full label for his interest is "reversion in fee simple absolute."

Owner A purchases Lot 1 and receives a deed with the proper description. Owner A then puts up a fence that inadvertently encroaches ten feet onto Lot 2, owned by Owner B. The ten-foot encroachment was unbeknownst to either Owner A or Owner B.Twelve years later, Owner B sells to Owner C. Owner C does a survey and realizes that the fence is on her property and demands that Owner A take down the fence. Owner A refuses and Owner C sues them. The statutory period for adverse possession in this jurisdiction is ten years. The jurisdiction follows the objective (neutral) approach for state of mind in AP claims. What result? Answers: A. Owner C, because Owner A does not have color of title. B. Owner C, because Owner A has not adversely possessed the fenced area for the statutory period. C. Owner A, because the fenced area has been in her possession for more than 10 years. D. Owner A, because she knew the property in the fenced area was not hers and claims it regardless.

C is the correct answer: "Owner A, because the fenced area has been in her possession for more than 10 years." Under the objective/neutral majority view, the state of mind element of AP is satisfied regardless of what the AP'er's subjective mindset was, as long as there is objective evidence (like the erection and maintenance of the fence) that the , thee possessor intends to claim the land as their own.

A teacher owned Blackacre, a parcel of land that adjoined Whiteacre, which was owned by a musician. Seeking an easier route for access to Blackacre, the teacher agreed to purchase from the musician use of a strip on land on the north edge of Whiteacre. The deed of conveyance, which did not specify where the easement was to be located, stated that the musician granted to the teacher "a right-of-way for egress and ingress to Blackacre." The teacher then constructed a driveway on a portion of the strip of land across Whiteacre for ingress and egress to Blackacre, which he used on a daily basis. Ten years later, the musician sold Whiteacre to her brother. The teacher continued to make daily use of the driveway. A few months later, the brother notified the teacher that he wished to more greatly develop Whiteacre by constructing a room addition onto the existing house on Whiteacre. The room addition would occupy a good portion of the strip on the north edge of Whiteacre. The brother offered to allow the teacher to construct a new driveway for ingress and egress on a strip of land on the south edge of Whiteacre. Teacher declined this offer and brought an appropriate action against the brother to obtain a definitive adjudication of the respective rights of the parties. At trial the brother argued that the location of the easement created by the deed from the musician to the teacher was governed by reasonableness, and that the brother's proposed solution was reasonable. What result? Answers: A. Brother's argument will be successful, because the brother's proposal was reasonable under the circumstances B. Brother's argument will be successful, because the servient owner is entitled to select the location of a right-of-way if the grant fails to identify a location with specifity. C. Brother's argument will not be successful, because the location of the easement was established by the acts of the teacher and the musician and cannot be changed unilaterally by the servient estate holder. D. Brother's argument will not be successful, because the location of the easement had been fixed by prescription.

C is the correct answer: Brother's argument will not be successful, because the location of the easement was established by the acts of the teacher and the musician and cannot be changed unilaterally by the servient estate holder. The original deed that created the easement failed to specify the exact location of the easement across Whiteacre. In such a situation, if the parties establish an easement by use and acquiesce in it, this will fix the location. Therefore, the construction of the driveway by the teacher without objection from the musician would fix the location of the easement and it cannot later be changed unilaterally by the servient estate holder. A is incorrect because the reasonableness of the brother's proposal is irrelevant. The position of the easement was fixed by use and acquiescence. The brother cannot now unilaterally decide that the easement needs to be relocated. B is incorrect because although it is true that the original deed that created the easement failed to specify the exact location of the easement across Whiteacre, the location of the easement was fixed by the parties through use and acquiescence. D is incorrect because this was an express easement (created through a written document), not an implied easement by prescription.

Which of the following scenarios would be least likely to satisfy the requirement of actual entry in a claim for adverse possession? Answers: A. Ani enters a vacant lot of farmland and plants and regularly tends to a garden that spreads across the entire lot marked by stakes and other gardening equipment. B. Bo enters a vacant lot comprised entirely of a large sand and gravel pit, and once a week for several years, he fills up his trucks with sand and gravel to use for construction jobs he works on. C. Cooper enters a vacant lot of farmland and uses 10% of it for grazing for his cows (the cows remain night and day for several months, and Cooper checks on them every few weeks). D. Dezi enters a vacant lot comprised entirely of a large sand and gravel pit a few times a year to search for (and occasionally find and collect) fossils.

D is the correct answer: "Dezi enters a vacant lot comprised entirely of a large sand and gravel pit a few times a year to search for (and occasionally find and collect) fossils." Actual entry must be use of the property in the manner that an average true owner would use it under the circumstances, such that neighbors and other observers would regard the occupant as a person exercising true dominion. Thus, not all acts of trespass will be actual entry for purposes of AP. It is a fact specific inquiry as to what qualifies for actual entry and will differ depending on the particular facts and characteristics of the property at issue.

O, the owner of Grayacre in fee simple absolute, conveys Grayacre to "A for life, then to B." Which of the following statements accurately reflects the interest of the parties in Grayacre? Answers: A. B has an executory interest in fee simple absolute. B. B has a reversion in fee simple absolute. C. If B dies before A, Grayacre will revert to O. D. O retains no interest in Grayacre.

D is the correct answer: "O retains no interest in Grayacre." O's conveyance creates a possessory interest in life estate in A, and a future interest of a vested remainder in fee simple absolute in B. Once A dies, B will own a fee simple absolute (i.e., there is nothing that O retains).

Zeke owned a house that he agreed to sell to Rolo for $500,000. Closing occurred on November 1, 2017 by general warranty deed. In late November 2017, temperatures plummeted and a pipe burst in the basement, causing extensive damage the basement itself as well as to Rolo's extensive taxidermy collection, which he stored there. The contractor who Rolo hired to repair the property said that the water pipe that exploded was seriously corroded. Rolo sues Zeke to recover the costs of the repairs to the property. The parties agree that Zeke was unaware of any problems with the pipe when he owned the property. What result in a jurisdiction that follows majority rules regarding seller's duty to disclose defects? A. Rolo wins, because this is a material problem that would affect a reasonable buyer's decision about whether purchase the property for the purchase price B. Rolo wins, since this is a breach of the deed covenant of quiet enjoyment and a general warranty deed provides protection to the grantee under these circumstances regardless of when the defect was created C. Zeke wins, unless a court determines the pipe problem amounts to an actual or constructive eviction and is therefore a breach of the implied warranty of habitability

D is the correct answer: "Zeke wins, since his failure to tell Rolo about the pipe problem did not breach his duty to disclose. ". The question tells you that you are in a jurisdiction with the majority rule for a seller's duty to disclose: that rule is that a seller must disclose known, latent, and material physical defects. Here, the question tells you that the parties agree that Zeke did not know about the pipe problem. The majority rule requires that the physical defect be objectively known to the seller (in addition to it being material and latent) for the seller to be liable for a breach of the duty to disclose. Since the defect was not known to Zeke, Zeke's failure to disclose it did not breach his duty to disclose. A is incorrect because although the defect would indeed be considered material, that is only one of the requirements under the seller's duty to disclose. As noted above, it must also be known, and here it was not. B is incorrect because this is a physical defect, not a defect in quality of title. Therefore the deed warranties are irrelevant. C is incorrect because the implied warranty of habitability is a doctrine applicable to leases and imposes an obligation on landlords. The doctrine is not applicable to real estate conveyances or grantors under a deed, and is therefore irrelevant.

A owned a piece of oceanfront property. Although A never gave permission for anyone to cross over his property to reach the ocean, A knew that their neighbor B who lived on the other side of the road regularly walked across A's property to reach the ocean. A did not want to cause problems with their neighbor, so didn't object to the neighbor's use of the property. Fifteen years later, B moved out of the area but retained ownership of their property and listed it on Airbnb. Over the next few months A noted several people who had rented B's property walking across A's property to reach the ocean. A sued to stop such use. If the applicable statute of limitations in the jurisdiction is ten years, what result? Answers:A. A will be successful in stopping the renters from walking across A's property property , because the use by the renters was not continuous for the statutory period B. A will be successful in stopping the renters from walking across A's property property , because A did not ever object to the neighbor walking across A' s property. C. A will not be successful in stopping the renters from walking across A's property property , because the use of A's property by the neighbor and renters to reach the ocean was strictly necessary D. A will not be successful in stopping the renters from walking across A's property property , because the use by the neighbor was open and notorious, and continued uninterrupted and continuous for the statutory period.

D is the correct answer: A will not be successful in stopping the renters from walking across A's property property , because the use by the neighbor was open and notorious, and continued uninterrupted and continuous for the statutory period.. Since the neighbor used A's property continuously in an open and notorious fashion for fifteen years, neighbor B acquired an easement by prescription. That easement would attach to the neighbor B's property and anyone using B's property would be entitled to use the easement, so when the neighbor B rented the property the renters would also be entitled to use the easement. A is incorrect because it is the neighbor's use that created the prescriptive easement, not the renters' use . B is incorrect because the fact that A did not object to B's use of the land does not make the use of the land permissive. Thus, B's use satisfied the requirement for prescriptive easements that it be without permission of the owner: to constitute permissive use the permission must be communicated to the user. C is incorrect because strict necessity is not an element of a prescriptive easement .

Tenant is upset because the common hallway of hisapartment building is always full of boxes and trash -making it quite difficult for Tenant to reach his apartment door. Which statement below is accurate regarding the T's and LL's rights and duties in this situation?

If the boxes and trash create a public health hazard, Landlord may be in violation of the implied warranty of habitability, regardless of whether the boxes and trash belong to the Landlord. Response Feedback: B is the correct answer: If the boxes and trash create a public health hazard, Landlord may be in violation of the implied warranty of habitability, regardless of whether the boxes and trash belong to the Landlord. Conditions in the common property that make the housing substantially unsafe/unhealthy can trigger a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, even if those conditions are not within the unit leased by the tenant or are not the direct result of Landlord's actions. A is incorrect because one of the required elements of a cause of action for constructive eviction is that the T move out in a timely manner. C is incorrect because if the trash and boxes do rise to the level of a substantial interference with the T's use and enjoyment and T notifies LL who fails to remedy and T then moves out, then T will have shown all elements of a cause of action for constructive eviction and LL will not only not be able to retain T's security deposit, but LL may be liable to T for damages. D is incorrect because as noted above, LL may be liable for a breach of implied warranty of habitability (and if T moves out, constructive eviction) regardless of whether the boxes and trash are the LL's.

Brad is a tenant in an apartment owned by Louie the landlord. Brad's lease is for a 1-year term and permits sublets/assignments with the landlord's consent. Six months into the lease, Brad decides he's going to try his luck in Hollywood, and tells Louie that he's moving out. He also informs Louie that he has found a new tenant, Angie, who has a perfect credit history and positive references. Louie rejects Angie as a tenant, and for the next six months, the apartment remains empty. At the end of the original 1-year lease term, Louie sues Brad for the last six months rent. Assume the jurisdiction follows majority rules. What result?

Louie cannot recover any of the amount due under the lease, unless he shows that he satisfied his duty to mitigate damages . Response Feedback: D is the correct answer. The majority rule for residential leases (Kriedel) is that when a tenant abandons, a landlord has a duty to mitigate damages. A landlord who fails to mitigate damages cannot recover amounts due under the lease, whereas a landlord who satisfies his duty to mitigate damages can.

An owner owned a two bedroom townhouse. The owner occupied one of the bedrooms, but the other bedroom was vacant. In need of funds, the owner rented the unoccupied bedroom to a teacher for a period of one year at a monthly rental obligation of $500. The rental agreement allowed the teacher to access the common areas of the townhouse. It also allowed the teacher use of one of the parking slots in the attached garage. Six months later, while the teacher was at work, the roof of the garage collapsed, preventing the teacher from parking her car in the parking slot. It was determined that the cause of the roof collapse was improper maintenance by the owner. The teacher, who continued to occupy the bedroom, was forced to rent a parking spot at a nearby garage for the remainder of the lease. The teacher complained to the owner about this, but the owner stated that he could not afford to fix the roof on the garage. The teacher now wishes to withhold all rent (while remaining in possession) until the garage is repaired. Is the teacher entitled to do so? (assume the jurisdiction follows the majority approach regarding partial evictions)

No, but the teacher is entitled to a rent abatement Response Feedback: C is the correct answer. This is a constructive partial eviction. It is partial, not entire, because T's use and enjoyment of only a portion of the leased premises (the garage) was substantially interfered with as a result of the actions of the owner. It is constructive, not actual, because LL did not physically remove or affirmatively keep T out (by changing locks on garage, for example) but rather substantially interfered with T's use and enjoyment so as to effectively "evict" T from that porition of the property. Under the majority approach, in cases of constructive partial eviction, T is not relieved from liability for all rent but is entitled to a rent abatement (see Note 4, page 333). Compare to cases of actual partial eviction (i.e., LL changing locks on the garage), T would be relieved from liability for all rent, notwithstanding T's continued occupation of the rest of the premises. A is incorrect, because as noted above, it is only in cases of actual partial evictions that T is relieved of liability for all rent. B is incorrect, because as noted above, LL's failure to maintain the garage created the constructive partial eviction, but a T is not released from liability for all rent in constructive partial evictions, only in actual partial evictions. D is incorrect, because a T does not have to move out of the entire premises to be entitled to a rent abatement (in the case of a constructive partial eviction, as here) or release from liability for all rent (in the case of an actual partial eviction, if, for example, the landlord had changed the locks to garage/refused to allow T entry).

O executes and delivers a deed of Blackacre to A as a gift. Deed is not recorded. O changes mind, asks for the property back, and A hands the deed back to O and says "this land is yours again." Deed is torn up. Who owns Blackacre? (Problem 2, pg. 366, first hypo) A. O owns Blackacre, because even though the first transfer (from O to A) complied with the SOF, its subsequent destruction nullified its legal effect. B. O owns Blackacre, because the first transfer (from O to A) was not recorded, and therefore fails to satisfy the SOF. C. A owns Blackacre, not O, because the second transfer (from A back to O) didn't comply w/ SOF, and neither exception to the SOF applies based on this set of facts.

Response Feedback: C is the correct answer: A owns Blackacre, not O. The first transfer (from O to A) complied with the SOF and therefore was effective to vest ownership in A. The second transfer (from A to O) does not comply with the SOF, and neither exception to the SOF applies to this set of facts. (The fact that deed for the first transfer was not recorded has no effect on the validity of the original transfer from O to A. We'll spend couple days on recording acts next class, and talk about why it's a very good idea to record your deed when you purchase property, but a conveyance of land that satisfies the SOF is valid as between the grantor and grantee without being recorded).

On October 1, L leases Whiteacre "to T from year to year, beginning October 1." On following Sept 30, T moves out w/o giving LL any notice. What are L's rights? [Problem 1, pg. 282]

Since this was a periodic tenancy, and T failed to provide the required notice, L can hold T liable for the amount of rent due for the next period (i.e., one year's worth of rent). A is the correct answer. Here, the lease is a periodic tenancy from year to year. T has to give notice to terminate. So since T failed to give the required notice, the periodic tenancy renews automatically for another period (one year) and the parties are in another year long lease - and T is obligated to pay rent for that period. As to how much notice T should have given to end this lease: at CL, b/c this lease had a one year long period, 6 months notice was required; modern rule by statute in many states would be 30 days, or whatever specific period for notice was specifically stated in the lease (though in most states, for residential leases, the contractually agreed notice requirement would not be permitted exceed the CL notice requirement of 6 months).

On October 1, L leases Whiteacre "To T, for one year, beginning October 1" On the following September 30, T moves out without giving L any notice. What are L's rights? [Problem 1, pg. 282]

Since this was a term of years, no notice of termination was required and T is not liable to L. B is the correct answer: "Since this was a term of years, no notice of termination was required and T is not liable to L." T had a term of years that expired by its own terms on September 30th. So L has no rights to assert against T.

If you were representing a client in Missouri (where Eyerman is binding precedent) who wanted their home destroyed after their death, which of the following approaches would be most likely to achieve this result? Answers: A. Your client's house is only valued at half the value of the house in Eyerman. B. Your client's house is not historic, nor is it located in a historic neighborhood. C. Your client's house is located in floodplain, so destroying it will allow the area to be restored to its natural state and better align with flood management plan for the area.

The Eyerman court held that the request to destroy the house in that case was against public policy (which it noted is not capable of specific definition but drawn for the interests of society at the time, and may be reflected in the Constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions) and that no benefits were present in the Eyerman case that balanced against the injuries that would be caused by destroying the house. Thus, if Eyerman is binding precedent, your client should try to frame their reason for destroying their house as not being against public policy and being something that the benefits of destruction would outweigh the injuries. Of the choices provided, the destruction of a house located in a floodplain is most likely to satisfy a court taking this approach.

What is the source of legal support for the court's holding about whether the actions of the defendants in State v. Shack were trespass? Answers: A. Common law B. U.S. Constitution C. State statutes.

The Shack decision primarily rests on common law ("under our state law the ownership of real property does not include the right to bar access to governmental services available to migrant workers"). It also relies to a lesser extent on federal statutes.

T devises Blackacre "to A and B as joint tenants for their joint lives, remainder to the survivor." What interests are created by this devise? (problem 2 pg. 247) Answers: A. A and B are JT with equal undivided interest in the whole property. B. A and B have a possessory estate in life estate (measured by the life of the first to die) as TIC. A has a future interest of an alternate contingent remainder in FS absolute (if B dies before A). B has a future interest of an alternate contingent remainder in FS absolute (if A dies before B). O has a future interst of reversion in fee simple absolute (if A and B die simultaneously). C. The heirs of whomever is the last to die of A and B owns a fee simple absolute.

The correct answer is B. Grantor was trying to create a concurrent property interest (JT), but instead created consecutive property interests. This conveyance is a failed attempt to create a joint tenancy. The grantor is trying to do create a JT, but instead of saying "with rights of survivorship" he created a possessory estate in life estate and a remainder (a future interest) to the survivor of A and B. Proper way to ensure conveyance is a JT would be: "To A and B as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as tenants in common." A remainder (a future interest) is not the same thing as JT w/right of survivorship. The right of survivorship associated with a JT isn't a future interest, it is inherent part of JT. To illustrate this, consider that if this convyeance had actually been drafted correctly as JT, then if A and B were JTs, B could unilaterally destroy the JT by selling her interest to C. This would destroy any right of survivorship, and the buyer C would own as TIC with A. But with the way it is drafted here, w/possessory estate and future interest, that future interest is created at the time of the conveyance - With a remainder, which is an actual stand-alone future interest, there is no way A or B can unilaterally change the outcome. If B sold her TIC interest to C, all C would have is life estate for as long as A and B were both alive (and the chance to have the future interest if A dies before B) - but if B then died 1st, A would have remainder in fee simple absolute and C would have nothing

An owner held title to a fifty-acre parcel of mountain resort property. The mountain resort was well known for the large lake on which all parcels abutted. The owner severed her parcel into two parcels, and sold to a banker one of the parcels consisting of twenty acres. The owner retained ownership of the other thirty-acre parcel. The owner's parcel consisted of several hundred feet of frontage on the lake, but the banker's twenty-acre parcel had no access to the lake. Since the banker was an avid fisherman, he asked the owner for permission for access to the lake by a footpath through the woods on the owner's parcel. The owner had used the footpath continuously for several years before selling the parcel to the banker, but the owner refused to allow the banker to use the footpath. The banker then filed an appropriate action seeking access to the lake by use of the footpath. The deed the owner delivered to the banker made no mention of use of the footpath. Which of the following arguments would the banker's strongest argument to succeed in his claim that he should have the right to use the footpath? (assume the jurisdiction follows majority common law rules) Answers: A. The banker had an implied easement by necessity to use the footpath, because the easement was strictly necessary for the banker's use and enjoyment of the land. B. The banker had an implied easement by prior existing to use the footpath, because the easement would be reasonably necessary for the banker's use and enjoyment of the land. C. The banker had an implied easement to use the footpath through prescription. D. The banker had an implied easement to use the footpath through easement by estoppel.

The correct answer is B: The banker had an implied easement by prior existing use to use the footpath, because the easement would be reasonably necessary for the banker's use and enjoyment of the land. An implied easement by prior existing use will be found if there was one original owner of both parcels, prior existing use [by original owner] that was apparent, existing, and continuous, and reasonable necessity. Here all three elements are satisfied. B is incorrect because an easement by necessity only arises if the easement is strictly necessary for entry and exist to the landlocked parcel and the facts do not support that here. C is incorrect because the banker never made use of the footpath, let alone doing so for the statutory period. D is also incorrect, since an easement by estoppel begins with a license, which involves permission to use land, and the owner never gave permission to use the footpath to the banker.

O, the owner of Brownacre in fee simply absolute, conveys Brownacre to "A and her heirs, then to B and her heirs." Which of the following statements accurately reflects the interests of the parties' in Brownacre? Answers: A. A has a possessory estate in fee tail, B has a future interest of a vested remainder in fee tail, O has a future interest of a reversion in fee simple absolute. B. A has a possessory estate in fee simple determinable, B has a future interest of an executory interest in fee simple absolute. C. A has a possessory estate in fee simple absolute, B and O have nothing. D. A has a possessory estate in life estate, B has a future interest of a remainder in fee simple absolute, and O has nothing.

The correct answer is C: "A has a possessory estate in fee simple absolute, B and O have nothing." When O conveys to "A and her heirs," that conveys a fee simple absolute to A, i.e., conveys everything O has to A. There is nothing left over to be conveyed to B, so B has nothing and O retains nothing.

Two friends, Bert and Ernie, acquired ownership of Brightacre, a 50 acre parcel of land, as joint tenants. One year later, Ernie began experiencing financial difficulties and, without the consent of Bert, Ernie borrowed money from a lender, Big Bird Bank, and granted a mortgage on Brightacre to secure the loan. One year later, Ernie defaulted on the mortgage, and Big Bird Bank foreclosed. Brightacre was sold at the judicial foreclosure sale to an investor, Oscar. Assuming the jurisdiction in which Brightacre has adopted the rule discussed in Harms v. Sprague approach, which of the following statements accurately describes how title to Brightacre is now held? Answers: A. Bert owns Brightacre, and Oscar has no interest. B. Bert and Oscar own Brightacre as joint tenants. C. Bert and Oscar own Brightacre as tenants in common. D. Oscar owns Brightacre, and Bert has no interest.

The correct answer is C: Bert and Oscar own Brightacre as tenants in common. In Harms, the court treated a mortgage is treated as a lien on property and held that granting of a lien on property owned in joint tenancy does not sever the joint tenancy. Thus, when Ernie took out a loan and granted a mortgage to Oscar, the act of doing so did not sever the the joint tenancy. However, when the property was sold at the foreclosure sale, that action severed the joint tenancy. Recall, during life, a joint tenancy can be severed unilaterally by any JT selling their interest in property, whether the sale is voluntary or involuntary (like a foreclosure sale). (Here, unlike the factual scenario in Harms, the JT whose interest is being sold (Ernie) is still alive, so the JT is severed by the sale of one JT's interest at the foreclosure sale. The purchaser at the sale, Oscar, acquired Ernie's interest and is now a TIC with Bert.

How was the principle of first in time applied by the court to justify the result in M'Intosh? Answers: The Native Americans were the first people to occupy the disputed land, so therefore they (and anyone claiming ownership through their chain of title) had superior title to any other parties. The English were the first non-Native American explorers to discover the disputed the land, so therefore they (and anyone claiming ownership through their chain of title) had superior title to any other parties. Because the Native Americans were the first people to occupy the land but the English were the first non-Native explorers to discover the land, title was split between them and they (and anyone claiming ownership through their chain of title) had co-equal ownership of the land.

The court applied the discovery doctrine to award ownership to the party claiming title through the English. England had title b/c England discovered the land at issue before other European nations. The discovery doctrine is based on the first in time principle, which grants property rights to the party who is the first to possess the property. This may seem like a simple rule, but as this case shows, there can be questions/debates about what "first" means and what constitutes "possession." Here, it was not literally the first to possess (because that would have been the Native Americans who had occupied the land long before the English discovered it); it was the first *person from a non-Native American European country* (not just any person) to possess the land *by discovery* (not just occupation).

A religiously devout landlord places a newspaper advertisement for a room to rent. The advertisement does not contain any language about the landlord's religion or express any preference regarding tenant's religion. However, when interviewing tenant applicants, the landlord asks them about their religious beliefs and chooses to ultimately rent the property to an applicant who belongs to the same religion as the landlord. Which of the following statement accurately reflects the application of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 to these facts? (assume there are no other grounds for landlord's selection of the chosen tenant and rejection of other tenants than religion)

The landlord has violated FHA Sec. 3604(a), unless the landlord falls within the Mrs. Murphy exemption (i.e., 3603(b)). B is the correct answer: "The landlord has violated FHA Sec. 3604(a), unless the landlord falls within the Mrs. Murphy exemption (i.e., 3603(b))." Section 3604(a) prohibits making a sale or rental property unavailable to anyone because of, among other protected grounds, religion. Thus, a landlord who denies rental applicants because of religion is in violation of Sec. 3604(a), unless the landlord falls within the Mrs. Murphy exception, detailed in Sec. 3603(b) ("Nothing in Sec. 3604 . . . shall apply to . . . (1) single family homes sold or rented by owners . . . (2) rooms or units in dwellings containing . . . no more than four [units]" A is incorrect because the facts clearly indicate here that FHA Sec. 3604(c) has not been violated: that provision makes it unlawful for any landlords (including Mrs. Murphy landlords) to publish advertisements expressing preference for any protected category, such as religion, but the facts indicate the landlord's advertisement did not contain any such language, so the landlord is not in violation of this section. C is incorrect because as noted above, if landlord falls within the Mrs. Murphy exception, then landlord will not be in violation of Sec. 3604(a).