4th amendment WARRANT & PROBABLE CAUSE EXCEPTIONS

Taylor, The Skies Won't be safe until we use commonsense profiling

"To be sure, a profile that takes account of apparent national origin might not ... Timothy McVeigh. No profile is foolproof. But that doesn't justify being foolish... crazy to ignore the odds that a Middle Eastern male passenger is roughly 2,000 times as likely to be an Al Qaeda terrorist."

Basulto factors for determining voluntary consent

(1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2) the presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse consent; (5) the defendant's education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant's belief that no evidence will be found. Basulto Holding: consent was given, consent was voluntary and valid. No weapons, he was not under arrest, he opened the doors.

exigent circumstances

1) Hot pursuit 2) Officer/public safety 3) Destruction of evidence The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement allows warrantless entries into constitutionally protected areas when the balance of competing interests at stake in rapidly developing circumstances show that immediate action is necessary to prevent flight, safeguard police or public, or to preserve evidence.

4 arguments about racial profiling

1) Racial profiling is rational, it works, and it should be employed: Weaver, Ramos majority view of courts. 2) Racial profiling is irrational, not the best way for police to catch the bad guys 3) Racial profiling is rational, but it is unAmerican or immoral, and should not be used: Professor Kennedy's view 4) Racial profiling should be used for terrorism/national security, but not for domestic crime: Turley, Taylor, Obama administration

Graham v Connor factors for determining if non-deadly force was reasonable

1) Severity of crime, 2) whether the person poses an immediate threat, 3) Whether person is resisting arrest/trying to flee

California v. Carney (1985)

1) ready mobility is not the only basis for the exception. 2) there is a diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle because they are subjected to governmental regulation on highways. * * * Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office. Even in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception.

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement

1. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest 2. Automobile Exception 3. Consent 4. Plain view 5. Stop & Frisk 6. Hot Pursuit & Disappearing Evidence 7. Special Needs 8.

arguments for and against the exclusionary rule

1.The rule preserves judicial integrity, by insulating the courts from tainted evidence; 2.The rule prevents the government from profiting from its own wrong; 3.The rule is not costly, because it only excludes what should never have been obtained in the first place; and 4.The rule is necessary to deter police misconduct.

US v Montoya de Hernandez

16 hours of detainment is non-routine. CJ Rehnquist, 6-3, "the detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection, is justified at its inception if customs agents, considering all the facts surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal." Non-routine customs searches are constitutional with reasonable suspicion. Routine v non routine border intrusions. Routine does not require suspicion, while non-routine does. Non-routine encounter: looking in body cavities, police searched prosthetic leg, go to a room and take off all clothes Routine encounter: dog sniffing skirt, police pulling over car and looking in trunk, opening and checking luggage, police drilled hole in the deck of yacht

Birchfield v North Dakota (2016)

A breath test is worth the privacy concerns because public needs outweigh the private costs. A blood test is not worth the privacy concern, need a warrant to do a blood test. Blood test cannot be taken incident to arrest, breath test can be taken incident to arrest.

Rodriguez v. United States (2015)

A routine traffic stop "become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission of issuing a ticket for the violation" Terry stop must end when the reason for the stop has ended.

US v Watson (1976)

ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT Police officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony.

Arizona v Hicks (1987)

After Hicks, an officer must have probable cause to seize an item he views during the course of legal activity. Probable cause must be readily apparent.

Atwater v City of Lago Vista (2001)

Atwater was driving with her 5 year old daughter in the front seat of her car. Either was wearing a seat belt. Officer Turek noticed and pulled them over. Officer asked her if she had her license and insurance, she said she did not have them because her purse was stolen. Atwater was cuffed and taken to jail, mug shot was taken, she had to remove her shoes, jewelry, glasses, was placed alone in a cell. allows warrantless arrests for minor offenses, don't want officers to have to determine in the field what they can and can't arrest for If an officer has probable cause to believe someone has committed even a minor criminal offense in their presence, they can arrest the offender, no 4A violation. Police can arrest for petty crimes as long as they have probable cause.

barriers to civil damages recovery

Barriers to proving liability: The two major problems involved in civil actions against police for violation of constitutional rights are first, winning, and second, collecting on the judgment. Governmental immunity is an obstacle Magistrates who issue invalid warrants are immune from suit Officers have qualified immunity Citizen cannot recover unless the law was clearly established at the time of the conduct Barriers to getting damage: Trespass action damages are limited to property loss, award is small. Nominal damages provide no incentive for a citizen to sue Lawyers will not take these cases, no/limited payout

Heien v North Carolina (2014)

Because the officer's mistake about the brake-light was reasonable the stop in this case was lawful under the fourth amendment. reasonable suspicion can be based on a reasonable mistake of law. "One or more other rear lamps." N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-129(g) (2007).

US v Beck (1998)

CA is a source state for drugs and motorist was stopped because he was driving through AK in a car from CA. profile too broad. Profile can be a factor in deciding whether to stop the motorist, but it cannot justify it.

Illinois v Lafayette (1983)

CJ Burger, upheld inventory search of a shoulder bag belonging to a man arrested for disturbing the peace. Police found drugs. Reasoning: government's interests in inventory search at the stationhouse may be even greater than those supporting a search incident to arrest

South Dakota v Opperman (1976)

CJ Burger, upheld warrantless, suspicionless inventory search of a car impounded for a parking violation. Reasoning: search was conducted pursuant to standard police procedures. Search was reasonable means of protecting valuables resting in plain view. They found drugs in the glove compartment. The Court found that three legitimate state interests support an inventory search: 1) protection of the police department from false property claims; 2) protection of the property interests of the owner; and 3) protection of the police and public from dangerous items.

United States v flores-Montano (2004)

CJ Rehnquist, search did not require reasonable suspicion. Does not matter if it was routine because it was the search of a car, not the search of a person like in US v Montoya de Hernandez (1985). Government's authority conduct suspicionless searches at the border includes the right to remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle's fuel tank.

Arizona v Gant (2009)

CURRENT SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST RULE: Can only search incident to an arrest in two situations: when police have reason to believe the passenger compartment contains evidence of offense for which the passenger has been arrested, or if the object is in the grab area. Belton ruling has been widely misunderstood. Belton does not give the police an automatic power to search a car incident to arrest, even though that is what lower courts thought.

Camara Requirements

Camara requirements: a warrant based on either probable cause or demonstrated compliance with some reasonable administrative inspection scheme—to inspections of non-residential commercial structures.

Riley v California (2014)

Can't look at the contents of the phone for a search incident to arrest without getting a warrant. does not extend Robinson to cell phones. Reasonableness analysis: phones contain everything about peoples' lives, high privacy interest, and the government interest is not strong enough No risk of officer safety. Minimal risk of destruction of evidence. (officers could just disconnect the phone). Individual interests are significantly greater in this case! Search incident to arrest does not apply to cell phones.

Civil damages recovery

Common law tort actions of false arrest, false imprisonment, trespass 42 USCA 1983 available when officers, acting under the color of law, violate a constitutional right

Vermonia v Acton (1995)

Court upheld 6-3 the suspicionless drug testing of athletes because there was a demonstrated problem of drug use and students have lesser expectations of privacy due to school's custodial responsibility. Court did special needs analysis. Deterred athletes from using drugs. If they don't use drugs, then other kids won't use drugs. Courts must first determine if there is a special need. Next, they must balance individual privacy interests against the government's interest.

Skinner v Railway Labor Executives

Court upheld a program mandating drug tests for all railroad personnel involved in certain train accidents. Failing the test could result in disciplinary action. No probable cause. No warrant. Special needs exception to the warrant requirement. Testing required by federal regulations. Even though the tests were administered by a private employer, it was acting as a state agent for 4th amendment purposes Drug testing of urine is a search Government's interest in regulating the conduct for railroad employees to ensure safety presents special needs that justify departures from usual warrant and probable cause requirements

US v Sokolow (1989)

DEA agents stopped Sokolow, he bought two airplane tickets in cash, traveled under a name that did not match his telephone listing, stayed in Honolulu for only 48 hours even though the trip took 20 hours, appeared nervous, checked no luggage CJ Rehnquist found reasonable suspicion. Any one of the factors by itself is not enough, but all of them taken together are enough.

US v Ramos (2010)

Defendants seized while parked in a van outside a boston train station, officers could take into account that the occupants of the van appeared to be Middle Eastern. The stops were made shortly after bombing attacks on train in Madrid.

Kentucky v King (2011)

During a drug sting operation at a Lexington, Kentucky, apartment complex, police officers mistakenly went to the wrong apartment to arrest a suspect who had purchased crack cocaine. After smelling burnt marijuana emanating from the apartment, the officers knocked loudly on the door and announced their presence. After hearing the apartment's occupants hurriedly moving around inside and on the belief that evidence might be destroyed, officers kicked down the apartment door and took three individuals into custody, including Hollis King (defendant). King and the others were charged with various drug-related offenses unrelated to the original operation. Prior to trial, King filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized at his apartment, arguing that the contraband was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied King's motion and held that the "exigent circumstances" rule to the Fourth Amendment justified the officers' warrantless entry into the apartment. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, noting that the "exigent circumstances" rule did not apply because the police officers' conduct impermissibly created the exigency which led to entry into the apartment. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review. The exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable

2 reasons why Terry is one of the most important cases in criminal procedure

Establishes the law for what is the most negative contact between police officers and the people. Many more people are stopped and frisked than are arrested Court sets aside the warrant clause, lowers bar. Court claims that probable clause still predominates, but now there is reasonable suspicion. Is probable cause still the standard?

Arizona v Evans (1995)

Evans stopped for a traffic search, officers found an outstanding warrant for his arrest because the database was not updated by clerical workers. Holding: Rehnquist, 7-2, the clerical officers would not be deterred by application of the exclusionary rule Stevens, dissenting: outrageous for a citizen to be arrested, searched because some bureaucrat failed to maintain an accurate database Ginsburg, dissenting: great risk to privacy that could result from errors in the law enforcement databases, people could be wrongfully arrested

Consent exception

Even in the absence of a warrant or probable cause, a search is OK if there is valid consent.

Exclusionary rule

Evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment must be excluded from trial.

Weeks v US (1914)

Exclusionary rule is the only effective means of protecting fourth amendment rights. This only applied on the federal level. Weeks court rejected the notion that the exclusionary rule should apply to violations by state or local police acting on their own accord or must apply in state courts

Dorman v US (1970)

Factors for determining exigent circumstances: Gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be charged Whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed A clear showing of probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime Strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered A likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended The peaceful circumstances of the entry

Illinois v Krull (1987)

Facts: Illinois had a statute that allowed the warrantless search by state officials to insepct records of dealers in automobiles. this was later found to be unconstitutional. Similar logic to Krull. Blackmun wrote for the majority. The presence of an intermediary upon whom the officer could reasonably rely meant that the officer could not be deterred by the exclusionary rule. Legislature made the mistake. O'Connor, dissenting: this creates a positive incentive to pass unconstitutional laws!

Georgia v Randolph (2006)

Facts: Randolph and wife separated, Wife reported that Randolph had taken their son after an argument, there was proof of cocaine in the house. When officers went to the house, both answered. She consented, he did not. Police searched. Holding: even if one occupant consents, a physically present co-occupant's stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him. Consent must be joint.

Minnesota v Carter (1998):

Facts: defendants complained about a search of a premises in which they were visitors, bagging cocaine with the owner Holding: 6-3, Rehnquist, persons temporarily on the premises for a commercial transaction have no fourth amendment rights at stake in a search of the premises. Individual temporarily on the premises as a business guest does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

New Jersey v TLO (1985)

Facts: school official searched the handbag of a student with reasonable suspicion that there were cigarettes in the purse. Could not be justified under Terry (not a cursory search for a weapon) Holding: Justice White, court upheld the search because it served special needs separate from the ordinary criminal law enforcement. Students have diminished expectation of privacy. Reasonable suspicion standard sufficient to protect students diminished expectations of privacy in school, balanced with teachers interest in safe and orderly environment. Requiring probable cause would force school officials to wait, not stopping disciplinary problems as they arise

Illinois v Rodriguez (1990)

Facts: third party was Fischer, who had lived in Rodriguez's apartment but had moved out a month before the search and had retained a key. She said she was assaulted by Rod. she went to the apartment with officers, gave them a key, unlocked the door, gave them permission to enter. Called it "our apartment." officers observed drugs in plain view Holding: Scalia, no actual authority to consent, but the entry was valid if the officers reasonably believed that she had authority to consent. Reasonableness should govern the question of authority to consent

standing

For a defendant to be entitled to exclusion of evidence, he must establish that his own personal rights were affected by the government's search or seizure

Minnesota v Dickerson (1993)

Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of evidence discovered through the sense of touch in a lawful search.

Camara v Municipal Court (1967)

Government safety inspectors are not required to have probable cause that a dwelling was in violation of the code. Question is whether an inspection complied with a reasonable administrative scheme that was itself calculated to vindicate a demonstrated public health or safety concern. The structure of the scheme vindicates the probable cause requirement. Government does not need probable cause to get a warrant. The general standard describes when a warrant can be issued.

Culpability test

Herring v US To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.

consent given in custody cases

Hidalgo: consent voluntary even though SWAT members broke into his house, forced him to the ground at gun point Duran: consent voluntary even though the suspect was under arrest in the police station

National Treasury Employees v Von Raab (1989)

Holding: court upheld urinalysis of certain Customs service employees, which were made a condition of employment for 3 types of customs positions: those involving drug interdiction, those requiring the employee to carry a firearm, and those in which the employee would handle "classified documents." The employee was allowed to produce the sample privately, but to protect against adulteration, "a monitor of the same sex as the employee remains close at hand to listen for the normal sounds of urination." Upheld for drug interdiction and positions carrying handguns because it was the employee's decision to apply for a covered position and state interests outweigh privacy interests. Purely preventative measures! No data on customs service employees doing drugs.

Hot Pursuit

If officers are in hot pursuit of a suspect when he enters a constitutionally protected premises, then the officer may be permitted to continue their pursuit without a warrant. Warden v Hayden (1967): hot pursuit case. Officers pursued robbery suspect to home, officers knocked, suspect's wife answered the door, officers then entered the house to look for the suspect. Hot pursuit doctrine cannot apply where the suspect is unaware that he is being pursued by officers. Welsh v Wisconsin (1984): officers notified that a car had been driving erratically before driving into a ditch. Officers went to the home listed on the registration and arrested someone for driving while drunk. Hot pursuit did not apply because suspect was not aware he was being pursued, and therefore concerns of him seeking to escape or destroy evidence were not present. Lange v California (2021): no hot pursuit rule applies when the suspected crime is a misdemeanor. Case by case approach here for balancing officer interests and privacy interests.

risk of the destruction of evidence (exigent circumstance)

If the evidence will be destroyed in the time it takes to obtain a warrant the warrant requirement is excused.

Differences between Sitz, Martinez-Fuerte, Edmond

In MF, court employed the Terry reasonableness standard. No special needs analysis here, making the permanent checkpoint constitutional. Same in Sitz, reasonableness test used instead of the special needs, primary purpose test. In Edmond, court employs the primary purpose test.

Professor Amar's attacks of these justifications

Integrity and fairness are threatened by excluding evidence that will help the justice system reach a true verdict cheaters—or murderers or rapists, for that matter—should not prosper. When the murderer's bloody knife is introduced, it is not only the government that profits; the people also profit when those who truly do commit crimes against person and property are duly convicted on the basis of reliable evidence. In many situations, it is far from clear that the illegality of a search is indeed a but-for cause of the later introduction of an item found in the search. if deterrence is the key, the idea is to make the government pay, in some way, for its past misdeeds, in order to discourage future ones. But why should that payment flow to the guilty? Under the exclusionary rule, the more guilty you are, the more you benefit.

Michigan Department of State Police v Sitz (1990)

Intrusiveness of sobriety checkpoint was limited. Heavy government interest in eradication of drunk driving. Roadblocks constitutional and effective. Important that the checkpoint is placed by state or local officials. Court employs a reasonableness analysis. Minor individual interest, but a big government interest, therefore this is reasonable! Not a special needs analysis

New York v Burger (1987)

Junkyards are a "closely" regulated industry. Closely regulated industries have a different expectation than private individuals in their homes. The state has a "substantial interest in regulating" it because the threat of "motor theft", and "regulation of the . . . industry" can control "the receiver of, or market in, stolen property." That statute provides a "constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant" by informing the operator "that inspections will be made on a regular basis." Warrant not required for the search of this junkyard. Warrantless inspections of a commercial entity are permitted if the entity is part of a "closely regulated industry", is a "substantial government interest", the inspections are "necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme', and the inspection provides "the two basic functions of a warrant" the government can use administrative and penal laws to address a major social problem. They have different methods of addressing the problem. The administrative code ensures that vehicle dismantlers are legitimate business people. Penal code merely punishes.

Ferguson v City of Charleston (2001)

Justice Stevens, the Court struck down a state hospital policy requiring drug testing of pregnant mothers suspected of cocaine use. The Court held that the drug tests were not "special needs" searches because "the central and indispensable feature of the policy" was fulfillment of the State's law enforcement goals. In the school test cases, the students were not arrested if they tested positive. In this case, the results are turned over. School test cases were suspicionless cases. This is not a suspicionless case. Primary goal of special needs searches cannot be penal.

US v Matlock (1974)

Matlock arrested in front yard of a house. Mrs Graff admitted the police to the house and told them she shared the house with Matlock. She consented to a search. reasonable search because Mrs. Graff had actual authority to consent to the search. Any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right

Floyd v The City of New York (2013)

NYPD made 4.4 million stops between Jan 2004 and June 2012. Over 80% of the population stopped were black or hispanic people. More than half of the time the police subjected the person to a frisk. A weapon was found in only 1.5% of frisks conducted. White people were more likely to have guns than black and hispanic people. Plaintiffs argue that NYPD's use of stop and frisk violated their constitutional rights in two ways 1) stopped without legal basis in fourth amendment, 2) targeted for stops because of their race in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The stop and frisk must be reformed to be based on reasonable suspicion, and must be racially neutral. Need an accompanying narrative explanation for a stop more than just general checked boxes for showing reasonable suspicion. Race of crime suspects is not an appropriate benchmark for measuring racial bias in stops. Court analyzes the UF-250, forms officers are required to fill out after stops. But these reports are one-sided, do not require officers to explain basis of suspicion.The reports only require officers to check boxes like high-crime area, suspicious bulge, or other, which are not individualized enough to demonstrate reasonable suspicion.

US v Robinson (1973)

No fear of physical harm or destruction of evidence, officer said he was searching because it was police procedure, so this was not a Terry search Search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. Two formulations of this exception: 1) search may be made of the person of the arrestee, 2) search may be made of the area within the control of the arrestee. Search after an arrest can be expansive, you don't need probable cause or reasonable suspicion. could be a reason for police to arrest/stop people

inventory search, special needs excpetion

Not based on probable cause that evidence will be found justified by the caretaking function of the government.

standards for stop and frisk

Officer can only frisk if he has reason to believe the subject is armed and dangerous. Officer can stop if he has reasonable suspicion to believe there is criminal activity afoot.

California v Acevedo (1991)

Officer in CA was sent a package of marijuana confiscated in Hawaii for shipment to someone in CA. Officer took the package to the post office, watched a man pick it up. The police watched as a man entered his home carrying a package they had probable cause to believe contained marijuana. Before a search warrant could be obtained, Acevedo (defendant) arrived at the house and left after about ten minutes carrying a bag that was the same size as the package. Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and drove away. Fearful of losing the evidence, the police followed him, pulled him over, opened the trunk and looked inside the bag, finding marijuana. No longer need a warrant to search closed containers in cars. Police may search a car and a closed container within it if they have probable cause to believe contraband is contained. Chadwick-Sanders rule (need probable cause to search container in a car) only provides minimal privacy protection. Overrule Chadwick-Sanders, now there is no privacy interest differences between a car and a container within the car.

Mapp v Ohio (1961)

Officers forced open a door to Ms. Mapp's house, kept her lawyer from entering, brandished what the court concluded was a false warrant, then forced her into handcuffs and canvassed the house for obscenity. Holding: applied exclusionary rule to all states. Without the exclusionary rule, the fourth amendment is just words on paper.

Samson v California (2006)

Parolee's expectation of privacy is substantially diminished because his very liberty is conditional.

Chambers v Maroney (1970)

Petitioner was riding in a blue station wagon that matched the description of a vehicle associated with a robbery when it was stopped by police. Secondary to that stop, officers observed other details linking the car and some of its occupants to the robbery, including items of clothing. Petitioner and his associates were arrested and the car was driven to the police station. In the course of a thorough search of the car at the station, the police found weapons and evidence linking petitioner to the robbery. If police have probable cause to believe the car has evidence of the crime, they can search the car without a warrant. Mobility of the car does not matter. Court has public policy rationale for why Carroll doctrine is good public policy.

Automobile exception

Police may search an automobile without a warrant so long as they have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of criminal activity.

Turley, using profiling judiciously

Profiling is necessary. It is going to happen, let's think about ways to regulate it so that it is not abuse.

Majority rule on race and reasonable suspicion

Race cannot be the only factor, but coupled with other factors, race is sufficient for reasonable suspicion. Race can be a factor in totality of the circumstances analysis for reasonable suspicion.

Kennedy, Suspect Policy

Racial profiling is not usually racist because it is rational Moral argument: profiling creates societal tensions, it is immoral/unamerican to judge people on the basis of their skin color

Rakas v. Illinois (1978)

Rehnquist: A passenger in a car belonging to someone else does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car or in items found in the car that do not belong to him and thus may not challenge the search of the car or seizure of the items as unconstitutional. White, dissenting: decision declares an open season on automobiles. However unlawful stopping and searching a car may be, absent a possessory or ownership interest, no "mere" passenger may object, regardless of his relationship to the owner.

Herring v US (2009)

Roberts, When police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, the exclusionary rule does not apply. This was different from Evan because the police officer made the clerical error. Establishes the culpability test: The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct. Ginsburg, dissenting: majority leaves Herring without a remedy to the violations of their rights, police forces have incentives to maintain up to date records

US v Arvizu (2002)

SCOTUS rejected as contrary to its teachings a rigid, formalistic, quantitative approach to assessing reasonable suspicion. Rehnquist emphasized the totality of the circumstances test, authorizing officers to use their discretion

Terry v Ohio (19680

STOP AND FRISK EXCEPTION: Warrant clause does not predominate here because of the urgency of the situation. Reasonableness analysis here because probable cause is not a reasonable standard for a stop and frisk. Reasonableness is a government interests/privacy interests balancing test.

Scott v Harris (2007)

Scott's actions were reasonable because Harris' driving posed a deadly danger to the public.

Elkins v US (1960)

Silver platter doctrine knocked down, prohibited admission in federal courts of evidence seized illegally by state agents

Chimel v California (1969)

Spatial limitations of the search incident to arrest rule: Only reasonable to search area within arrestee's immediate control or in arrestee's possession during an arrest (1) to make sure there are no weapons and (2) make sure there is no evidence being destroyed Police can search the "grab area" Room where the arrest took place = grab area

special needs searches

Special needs searches generally do not require a warrant. These are searches that are conducted by state agent for purposes of vindicating administrative regulatory interests

Wolf v Colorado (1949)

Supreme Court decision in which the Fourth Amendment was applied against searches by state and local police officers, but the exclusionary rule was not imposed as the remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment by these officials. created the silver platter doctrine, by which state employees could obtain evidence illegally and give it to federal officers.

Horton v California (1990)

The "plain view" doctrine is often considered an exception to the general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but this characterization overlooks the important difference between searches and seizures. If an article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy. Item that is seized must 1) have an incriminating characteristic that is immediately evident. 2) Officer must be lawfully located where she has the right of access to the object.

Chandler v Miller (1997)

The Court considered a Georgia statute providing that "each candidate seeking to qualify for nomination or election to a state office shall as a condition of such qualification be required to certify that such candidate has tested negative for illegal drugs." Within 30 days of qualifying for nomination or election, candidates were required to submit a certificate from an approved laboratory documenting negative urinalysis. Ginsburg, unconstitutional. The deterrent special needs are not substantial. Georgia did not identify public interests at stake. Skeptical that the testing would be effective in identifying or reducing drug use. Candidates receive 60 days advance notice, which is too much. Special needs process is 2 step. 1) Is there an interest that is not a criminal one. 2) is the government interest reasonable?

People v Simpson

There are exigent circumstances that justify a limited search, and that is what happened in this case. Court denies motion to suppress the evidence of the blood spots on the driveway, blood stain from the Bronco, the glove. Police acted reasonably under the circumstances to believe there was someone who could have been hurt on the property (ie, live in maid).

Jeffery Bellin, the inverse relationship between Constitutionality and effectiveness of NYC Stop and Frisk

Thesis: aggressive policing, unparalleled drop in crime, lower incarceration rates all connected Aggressive tactics good for reducing crime, but not consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

Earls (2002)

Thomas, upheld suspicionless drug testing for all students engaged in extracurricular activities, even though they were not routinely in physical examinations/communal undress. Different from Vermonia because there were different privacy interests. Higher student privacy interests, even higher government interests. Step 1: Is there a special need? Yes. Step 2: Terry balancing test.

Forrester v City of San Diego (1993)

To determine whether force was reasonable, must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake (reasonable use of force in light of all the relevant circumstances?) Court finds that yes, 1) the police acted reasonably in using pain compliance techniques. Force consisted of physical pressure, less significant than most claims of force. 2) city clearly had a legitimate interest in quickly dispersing and removing anti-abortion lawbreakers with the least risk of injury to police and others.

Whren v US (1996)

Vehicle Searches: officers may stop suspicious vehicle and then search if probable cause develops. pretextual stops are constitutional. Problem with this: Statistics show that while 15% of motorists who broke speeding laws were black, 35.6% of the race identified stops involved vehicles with black occupants

Arkansas v Sanders (1979)

Warrant required to search a suitcase placed in the trunk of a car.

Maryland v King (2013)

When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Court is persuaded there is a need outside of criminal penalty.

Maryland v. Buie,

When police have a reasonable belief that a serious danger exists, they are allowed to carry out a protective sweep. Protective sweep could be justified by an officer's reasonable suspicion "that the area swept harbored an individual posing danger to the officer or others." According to Justice White, the reasonable suspicion standard was an appropriate balance between the arrestee's remaining privacy interest in the home and the officer's interest in safety.

Good faith exception for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant that is later found to be invalid, US v Leon (1984)

When police rely on objective good faith on a warrant, and that warrant is later determined to be unconstitutional, that evidence need not be excluded. Goal of exclusionary rule is to deter officer, magistrates who grant warrants cannot be deterred by the exclusionary rule. Consequence of the ruling: message sent that police conduct will be protected from further judicial review. Stevens, dissenting: seizure and search cannot be reasonable and unreasonable at the same time.

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)

a defendant had "automatic standing" to challenge the legality of the search that produced the very drugs that he was charged with possessing at the time of the search. The Court in Jones also stated that a search could be challenged by anyone "legitimately on the premises where a search occurs." Fourth amendment rights are personal rights that may not be asserted vicariously.

Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993)

a frisk cannot be used to search for evidence. Justice White: police officer overstepped the bounds of the strictly circumscribed search for weapons allowed under Terry. Terry frisks only justified for protective purposes

Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974)

a plurality of the Court explicitly rejected the contention that mobility of the car before it is seized makes a difference: "The fact that the car in Chambers was seized after being stopped on a highway, whereas Lewis' car was seized from a public parking lot, has little, if any, legal significance."

Caniglia v. Strom (2021)

a unanimous Court held that the "caretaking function" language in Cady does not create a "standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home." officers went into Caniglia's home under guise that they wanted to search for weapons to protect him from suicide.

US v Cortez (1981)

created the totality of the circumstances standard. The "whole picture must be taken into account." based on that whole picture, the officers must have "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."

City of Indianapolis v Edmond (2000)

decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime. We have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. * * * [E]ach of the checkpoint programs that we have approved was designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth Amendment.

reasonable suspicion

established in Terry as the standard for making a stop. must be particularized and objective

19 Solid Waste Dept. Mech. v City of Albuquerque (1998)

even if the privacy interest is virtually non-existent, the special need requirement prevents suspicionless searches where the government has failed to show either that it has a real interest in testing or that its test will further its proffered interest.

Illinois v Wardlow (2000)

flight + presence in a high crime area = reasonable suspicion

St. Paul v Uber (Minnesota 1990)

found that race was not a relevant factor to warrant reasonable suspicion. Officer assumed the only reason a white man would be in this neighborhood is for something bad, this is not a fair assumption.

plain view and plain touch seizures

if officers have a right to be in a particular place and come upon evidence that they have probable cause to believe is subject to seizure, then they may seize it.

Apparent authority to consent

if the officer reasonably believes he has been given consent to search by a third-party. Distinguished from actual authority to consent.

third-party consent

if you are sharing a space with someone, you are assuming the risk that privacy expectations are less.

rakas test for standing

individual has standing to object if she has a subjective expectation of privacy in the area that is searched, and that is a reasonable expectation of privacy. (same as Katz test for a search). Court says the passengers of a car do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car that is not theirs. Discrepancy with Carpenter v US cell site location case: Thomas, dissenting, how could a customer have standing to challenge a request for business records belonging to a provider given that fourth amendment rights are personal? Roberts, majority: CSLI is different from business records

Adams v Williams (1972)

informant known to the officer tipped that williams had narcotics and a gun on his waist. the gun was not visible to the officer from outside of the car. Officer asked Williams to roll down the window, reached into the car and removed the gun from williams' waistband. officer acted justifiably, responding to an informant's tip. The informant was known to the officer, had provided information to the police in the past. Totality of the circumstances test: informant known to cop, high crime area, late at night, sitting in the car by himself = reasonable suspicion

Professor Slobogin's alternative

monetary alternatives like liquidated damages for unconstitutional actions, state paid legal assistance for those with Fourth Amendment claims

US v Chadwick (1977)

movable containers. The mobility of a footlocker justified its seizure upon probable cause, but a warrant was required to search the footlocker unless emergency circumstances rendered a seizure insufficient to protect state interests (if the footlocker was ticking)

US v Knights (2001)

no more than reasonable suspicion is required to search a probationer's home. Court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law abiding citizens Probation as a salient circumstance under the totality of the circumstances analysis

Michigan v. Long (1983)

officers had a legitimate concern that Long might gain access to a weapon and use it on officers once he returned to him car. Permissible then for officers to do a cursory inspection of areas in the car from which a weapon could be quickly obtained after the stop was over protective searches can go beyond the person

Carroll v US (1925)

police can search a car when they have probable cause there is criminal activity. Blanket rule. A warrant could not reasonably have been demanded in light of the mobility of the vehicle. Under Carroll, the police can search the trunk as long as they have probable cause that it contains evidence of the crime. Gant is a narrower rule.

Wilkins v Maryland State Police

pulled over for speeding and car was searched, no drugs found, sued police due to search based on race. resulted in a consent decree that required the Maryland State Police to record and report data relating traffic stops including the race of those stopped.

US v Weaver (1992)

race cannot be the only factor supporting a stop, but it can be considered together with other suspicious factors. Racial profiling OK as long as race is not the only basis for the stop. Only African American male on a flight from LA to Kansas City stopped on suspicion of drug trafficking. Officer had knowledge that young black gangs were headed to Kansas city with cocaine. Race, coupled with other factors, made this reasonable suspicion.

Kansas v Glover (2020)

reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is fundamentally indeterminate. It is neither quantifiable nor amenable to assessments based on abstract rules. It is, instead, a context-sensitive, qualitative, commonsense assessment.

City of Los Angeles v Patel

regulations on hotels were not sufficiently pervasive and intrusive to render the hotel industry closely regulated. Unlike other cases that require no reasonable expectation of privacy, a hotel possesses no clear and significant risk to public welfare, not as much of a state interest at play here because criminality is not as pervasive. Claims to be an application of Burger. DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE A FAITHFUL APPLICATION OF PRECEDENT. Figure out whether a business is pervasively regulated by looking at regulations on businesses.

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006)

seemed to find § 1983 actions to be a viable alternative to the exclusionary rule. In Hudson the court seems to think that existing damages remedies provide a sufficiently effective alternative to exclusion

Brigham City v. Stuart (2006)

subjective standard is not relevant here. Officer intentions do not matter as long as objective, reasonable circumstances justify the entry. Officers may enter a house if they have objectively reasonable basis for believing the public may need help/someone is threatened with injury.

administrative sanctions

taking money out of paycheck, taking away vacation time; this would deter illegal police searches and seizures

United States v. Watson

the Court found that the absence of consent warnings or of proof that Watson knew he could withhold consent was not controlling where the defendant "had been arrested and was in custody, but his consent was given while on a public street, not in the confines of the police station." The majority added that "to hold that illegal coercion is made out from the fact of arrest and the failure to inform the arrestee that he could withhold consent would not be consistent with Schneckloth." Watson used to uphold consent in custodial situations

Delaware v. Prouse

the Court held that an officer could not, in the absence of reasonable suspicion, stop an automobile and detain the driver in order to check his license and registration.

Bumper v. North Carolina

the Court placed the burden of proving that consent "was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given" on the government, and declared that "[t]his burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." Standard is preponderance of the evidence.

Griffin v Wisconsin (1987)

the Fourth Amendment could not be read to require a warrant to search a probationer's home without probable cause. Generally, a warrant must be based on particularized probable cause.

US v Hensley

the court held that Terry was not confined to prospective crimes; the power granted by Terry may also be exercised to investigate completed crimes.

The Belton Rule (arrest power applied to automobiles)

the passenger compartment of an automobile constituted the grab area of the car, and therefore officers arresting someone in the car were permitted to search the car incident to the arrest, and also to open any containers that are found in the passenger compartment. Court has an automatic right to search the passenger compartment of a car incident to arrest because they could grab weapons within. Defines the grab area in the car, defining Chimel in relation to car.

Schneckloth v Bustamonte (1973)

the question of whether consent to a search is voluntary or coerced is a totality of the circumstances test. Government doesn't have to establish knowledge of right to refuse. six men in a car, driver had no license, one man produced a license. Officers asked to search the car, they complied, after two additional officers arrived. The man opened the trunk for the officer after responding "sure, go ahead." The officer did not tell Bustamonte that he did not have to consent to the search. Search produced three stolen checks Justice Stewart concluded that the proper test in consent search cases is not whether there was a waiver of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, but whether consent to search was voluntary under the totality of circumstances. Brennan, dissenting: how can a citizen be said to waive something they are not aware of? Government should bear the burden of showing knowledge.

Thornton v US (2004)

the search power granted by Belton applied whenever the person arrested was a recent occupant of the car to be searched

Tennessee v Garner (1985)

under the 4th amendment, deadly force may not be used to prevent the escape of a felon unless 1) it is necessary to prevent the escape and 2) the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of causing death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. The reasonableness requirement governs the government use of force.

Safford Unified School District v Redding

unreasonable search of a 13-year old's bar and underwear for drugs because no reason to suspect the drugs presented a danger or were concealed in her underwear. Content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion. Assistant Principal suspected student was distributing OTC naproxen and ibuprofen.

Frazier v Cupp (1969)

upheld the search of a duffle bag when his cousin, joint user of the back, consented. Cousin must have assumed the risk he would consent to let others see inside

United States v. Mendenhall

valid consent found. Facts: officers encountered Mendenhall in the airport, suspected she was a drug courier, asked her to accompany them to a private room. She agreed. Mendenhall agreed to a strip search and search of her purse. Narcotics found on her person. Holding: she voluntarily consented to accompany agents, to have her purse and person searched. Reasoning: she was told twice she could decline.

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976)

where the Court, invoking Terry principles, approved suspicionless stops at permanent checkpoints removed from the border. The Court emphasized that suspicionless stops were necessary to implement the state interest in regulating the flow of undocumented individuals and noted that the fixed checkpoint was minimally intrusive.