AEB Quiz 5

Why was response to the genocide so slow & uncertain?

1) UN's mandate and role-intelligence was difficult 2) Peacekeeping and intelligence capacity. The UN lacked the capacity to deal adequately with the glut of operations with which it had to contend in the early 1990s. 3) Political considerations. Rwanda was very low on the list of U.S. priorities.

Why was the response to the goma crisis different?

Cholera epidemic Donors were quick to respond There was little to stop former leaders of the genocide from using the refugee camps to re-group and re-arm themselves, effectively using refugees as a human shield. Some agencies pulled operations out of Zaire

Initially proposed by Denmark in 1996, the initiative eventually included five major donors:

Denmark, Sweden, Norway, UK

Lessons from Rwanda & Goma

Humanitarian assistance, both in Rwanda and Goma, was at least partially used by the international community as an alternative to concerted political action. Both the international community generally and the humanitarian community in particular, failed in their analysis of a given crisis in the time when critical decisions had to be made. It is often unclear whether the impartiality of humanitarian action - responding to human needs rather than to political imperatives - is clearly distinguished from impartiality in other kinds of international engagement.

Post-Rwanda Impact on UN peace operations

International community now more focused on conflict prevention Greater integration and more effective peacekeeping are the focus of the Brahimi Report on UN peace operations, published in August 2000.

ICISS was established by the Canadian government in September 2000, in response to:

Kofi Annan's challenge to the world to forge a new consensus on the competing principles of international humanitarian concern and national sovereignty.

Main needs identified by JEEAR (7)

Strengthening human right protection Development of early warning system; Better standards and self-regulation; Improving accountability Improving coordination strategies Improved coherence among policy objectives Direct prevention of genocide.

Main outcomes of JEEAR in the ensuing decade (3):

The Humanitarian Charter and its Minimum Standards for Disaster Response published by Sphere Demands for increased professionalization of the humanitarian sector → Led to the formation of Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP); The debate surrounding accountability in humanitarian assistance was incorporated into the idea of a "humanitarian ombudsman" which eventually resulted in the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) Update: HAP (2003) was humanitarian sector's first international self-regulatory body. It has now merged to form the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) on Quality and Accountability launched by Sphere Project in 2014.

Somalia's impact on HA

U.S. and UN credibility was undermined Willingness of the international community to intervene was immediately in question. Relationship between the political work of resolving conflict and the humanitarian work of addressing acute suffering. The famine did end, and the international relief effort did save some lives, but equally the effort may have prolonged the crisis. Competition among the aid agencies may have fueled the conflict (no coordination strategies, no cluster approach to provide leadership)

Why was Rwanda low on the U.S. list of priorities

UNAMIR was established just two days after 18 US troops were killed in Mogadishu, Somalia Impact on Rwanda Crisis: U.S did not intervene; reluctance by international community to intervene in conflict zones

Pressing Questions from "No More Rwanadas"

Who bears the responsibility to protect innocent victims of humanitarian atrocities like the Rwandan genocide? When may outsiders legitimately suspend another state's sovereignty and use force to intervene in its internal affairs?

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was set up to

address the tension between sovereignty on the one hand, and humanitarian intervention on the other.

Brahimi Report (4)

field-based missions headquarters will now plan operations together, with mission officials joining their counterparts at headquarters. There will be UN stand-by arrangements to ensure that adequate forces are sent to crisis areas when required. There will also be links between mission planners and their human rights counterparts in the UN. Information systems will be improved, and 'lesson-learning' will be strengthened, in terms of analysis, dissemination and understanding.

The 1994 genocide and the ensuing relief operations provoked an unprecedented _ _ _ process

international evaluation collaboration

3 major goals of the responsibility to protect

to change the conceptual language from "humanitarian intervention" to "responsibility to protect"; to pin this responsibility on the state, at the national level, and on the UN Security Council, at the international level; to ensure that interventions, when they do take place, are done properly.