Affirmative Action

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Affirmative Action in Employment Arguments

1. it is okay if adopted by a government trying to eliminate the effects of discriminatory actiosn in the past, whether by government itself or by private employers. 2. Societal discrimination, but this was a weak argument, 3. Diversity justification was also limited.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)

Facts of the case Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race. Question Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school? Conclusion No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action. --OPINIONS-- Brennan Marshall, White, and Blackmun found the quota fvalid and despite saying that they were employing some for of heightened scrutiny, they signaled that any affirmative action program was constitutional. 4 Republicans found the program violated the civil rights act (and so they failed to reach the constitution). Powell split the decision and found the AA program unconstitutional, but the need for a diverse student body so compelling an interest that affirmative action programs which avoided a strict quota would be constitutional (think of the substantive basis). He rejected the argument that race could never be used in admissions decisions and concluded that universities could use affirmative action to achieve the educational benefits flowing from having a diverse body.

Furman v. Georgia (1972)

Facts of the case Furman was burglarizing a private home when a family member discovered him. He attempted to flee, and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that he was carrying went off and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death (Two other death penalty cases were decided along with Furman: Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. These cases concern the constitutionality of the death sentence for rape and murder convictions, respectively). Question Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Yes. The Court's one-page per curiam opinion held that the imposition of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. In over two hundred pages of concurrence and dissents, the justices articulated their views on this controversial subject. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall believed the death penalty to be unconstitutional in all instances. Other concurrences focused on the arbitrary nature with which death sentences have been imposed, often indicating a racial bias against black defendants. The Court's decision forced states and the national legislature to rethink their statutes for capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner.

Richmond v. J.A. Croson

Facts of the case In 1983, the City Council of Richmond, Virginia adopted regulations that required companies awarded city construction contracts to subcontract 30 percent of their business to minority business enterprises. The J.A. Croson Company, which lost its contract because of the 30 percent set-aside, brought suit against the city. Question Did the Richmond law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that "generalized assertions" of past racial discrimination could not justify "rigid" racial quotas for the awarding of public contracts. Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that the 30 percent quota could not be tied to "any injury suffered by anyone," and was an impermissible employment of a suspect classification. O'Connor further held that allowing claims of past discrimination to serve as the basis for racial quotas would actually subvert constitutional values: "The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs." She also stated that affirmative action programs have to be narrowly tailored to meeting a compelling state interest Scalia thought no affirmative action program could ever ben constitutional Thomas thought affirmative action had a destructive impact n the individual and our society because they stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are entitled.

Grutter v. Bollinger (LawSchool)

Facts of the case In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical mass" was the functional equivalent of a quota. Question Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Conclusion No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Justice O'Connor wrote, "in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants."

Missouri v. Jenkins

Facts of the case In order to combat segregation in public schools in compliance with court directives, the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) sought to enhance the quality of schools and to attract more white students from the suburbs. The KCMSD's ability to raise taxes, however, was limited by state law. After determining that the District did not have alternative means of raising revenue for the program, federal district judge Russell G. Clark ordered an increase of local property taxes for the 1991-92 fiscal year. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision, but ruled that the courts should enjoin state tax laws that prevented the District from raising the necessary funds and allow the state to set tax rates. Question Did the court order to increase property taxes violate Article III, the Tenth Amendment, or principles of federal/state comity? Conclusion The Court held that the District Court "abused its discretion" by imposing a specific tax increase. The Court also held, however, that the modifications of the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals satisfied "equitable and constitutional principles governing the District Court's power...." The majority found that court orders directing local governments to levy their own taxes were "plainly" judicial acts within the powers of federal courts. When a constitutional justification existed, courts had the authority to order tax increases despite statutory limitations. The Court reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise would fail to take account of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them." -- Jenkins did this for two reasons: getting white's to move into the new and improved urban schools from the suburbs. The second, that African American children in Kansas City couldn't get an education equal to that available in integrated districts, and so should get something else to compensate for that lack.

Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado

Facts of the case Petitioners proved that for nearly ten years since 1960 the Denver, Colorado school system implemented an unconstitutional policy of racial discrimination by operating a segregated school system. The defense argued, and the District Court held, that even though one part of the Denver system was guilty of segregation, it did not follow that the entire system was segregated as well. Question Did the segregation in Denver involve all of the city's schools and violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Basically did what Swann did for the north and extended the benefits of busing. If de jure segregation existed in any capacity or form at any level in the school system, then the whole school system was complicit in the segregation. The Court modified and remanded the lower court decision and held that when part of a school system is found to be segregated, a "prima facie case of unlawful [systematic] segregative design" becomes apparent. The school district involved assumes the burden of proving that it operated without "segregative intent" on a system-wide basis. This case is significant because it represents one of the first instances in which the Court identified segregation in northern schools.

Gratz v. Bollinger (undergrad)

Facts of the case The University of Michigan's Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) considers a number of factors in its evaluative process, such as high school grades, standardized test scores, curriculum strength, alumni relationships, geography, and leadership. The OUA also considers race and admits virtually every qualified applicant from certain groups determined to be "underrepresented minorities." Beginning in 1998, the OUA used a point system in which students were awarded an additional 20 points for being a member of an underrepresented minority, and beginning in 1999, the University established an Admissions Review Committee to provide an additional level of consideration. In 1995, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied for admission to the University of Michigan' College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) as residents of the state of Michigan. Both are of Caucasian descent. Both were denied admission and told that, although they were qualified, they were not competitive enough applicants to be admitted on first review. In October 1997, Gratz and Hamacher filed a class action suit against the University, the LSA, Lee Bollinger, and James Duderstadt. They argued that the admission procedure discriminated against certain racial and ethnic groups in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that the respondents had shown that a racially and ethnically diverse student body produced significant academic benefits but that the admission policies of 1995-1998 were problematic because they amounted to "holding seats" for certain minority groups. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the petitioners with respect to the admissions policies for 1995-1998 and for the respondents with respect to the policy that began in 1999. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard this case the same day as Grutter v. Bollinger, a similar case, and upheld the University's admission policies in that case. The petitioners in this case then asked the Court to grant certiorari, despite the lack of opinion from the lower court, to resolve the issue. Question Did the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Conclusion Yes. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the OUA's policies were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the strict scrutiny standard. Because the policy did not provide individual consideration, but rather resulted in the admission of nearly every applicant of "underrepresented minority" status, it was not narrowly tailored in the manner required by previous jurisprudence on the issue. In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that the record showed that the only individualized consideration in the admissions process came through the Admissions Review Committee. Because the Committee played only a small part in the overall admissions process, it was not sufficient to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he argued that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits any racial discrimination for the purposes of higher education admission. The admission policy in question failed because it did not allow for sufficient consideration of non-racial factors in determining the admissibility of a candidate from an underrepresented minority group. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that, in cases dealing with the Equal Protection Clause, the Court should distinguish between policies of inclusion and policies of exclusion because the former are much more likely to prove consistent with the intent of the Clause. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, because neither of the petitioners could receive any benefit from the relief being requested, precedent required that the case be dismissed. While they are entitled to relief for past wrongs, they cannot seek injunctive relief to prevent future harms to other parties. Justice David Souter joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Souter wrote that, by making race only one of a number of factors to be considered, the admissions policy meets the requirements established by previous Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. Because the point system and the Admissions Review Committee operate in conjunction with each other, there cannot be the "holding of seats" phenomenon that the majority opinion fears. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which she argued that, because there is no evidence that the OUA policies attempt to limit or decrease enrollment by any particular racial or ethnic group and there is no evidence of saving seats, the policies do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Racial information about an applicant can be useful in admission considerations because it often serves to show what a student has accomplished and why the student is worthy of admission. Justice Souter joined in the dissent.

Brown v. Board of Education

Facts of the case This case was the consolidation of four cases arising in separate states relating to the segregation of public schools on the basis of race. In each of the cases, African American minors had been denied admittance to certain public schools based on laws allowing public education to be segregated by race. They argued that such segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were denied relief based on the precedent set by Plessy v. Ferguson, which established the "separate but equal" doctrine that stated separate facilities for the races was constitutional as long as the facilities were "substantially equal." In the case arising from Delaware, the Supreme Court of Delaware ruled that the African American students had to be admitted to the white public schools because of their higher quality facilities. Question Does the segregation of public education based solely on race violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Yes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that "separate but equal" facilities are inherently unequal and violate the protections of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the segregation of public education based on race instilled a sense of inferiority that had a hugely detrimental effect on the education and personal growth of African American children. ------- Facts of the case After its decision in Brown (1) which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced Constitutional principle. Given the embedded nature of racial discrimination in public schools and the diverse circumstances under which it had been practiced, the Court requested further argument on the issue of relief. Question What means should be used to implement the principles announced in Brown I? Conclusion The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. They were to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them "with all deliberate speed."

The Philadelphia Plan

Required construction unions in the city to establish goals and timetables to increase their minimal African American Membership. Universities adopted the same policy to increase their minority enrollments.

The Sharon Taxman Case

Taxman was a white business school teacher who was fired over his black counterpart, so when she was rehired two years later at a lower pay rate. The court initially favored Taxman with the argument that she had let go solely because of her race. She was the "perfect victim" of affirmative action and conservatives leaped to publicize it.

Washington v. Davis

The Court held that a claim of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause required a showing of intentional discrimination by the government. This case also rejected the disparate impact test (policy that looked good on paper but discriminated on a mass scale) because it would be too far-reaching and there was too much shit wrong with society. This case marked the end of using the 14th amendment to create an integrated America. Facts of the case After the applications of two blacks were rejected by the District of Columbia Police Department, the two men filed suit against Mayor Walter E. Washington. The men alleged that the Department's recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test, discriminated against racial minorities. They claimed that the test was unrelated to job performance and excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants. Question Did the recruiting procedures violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the procedures and written personnel test did not constitute racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the Clause was designed to prevent official discrimination on the basis of race; laws or other official acts that had racially disproportionate impacts did not automatically become constitutional violations. The Court reasoned that the D.C. Police Department's procedures did not have discriminatory intent and were racially neutral measures of employment qualification.


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