All Cases

Davis v. California St. Cable T.T. (Cal. 1894)

D city constucting cable car system left a 28ft rail on sidewalk for 4 weeks, only one end under street lamp. P was aware of rail. Statute required D to light rail with latern, but failed. P rushed out of house to investigate shouts of "fire", and tripped on rail.

Dunn v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. (La. App. 1970)

D store left whiskey boxes in its supermarket aisle. P regular shopper noticed the boxes, and the got distracted talking to clerk about sale on Vienna sausage. She momentarily forgot about the whiskey boxes, stepped back, and tripped over the boxes.

British Columbia Electric Ry. v. Loach (P.C. Can. 1915)

D's train was knowingly sent out with defective brakes, and it was unable to stop when engineer saw P's horse-drawn wagon negligently stuck on track at crossing. P passenger on wagon did not take reasonable precaution to make sure track was clear, nor did he jump off the wagon before train crased into it.

Bradford v. Robinson Rentals, Ltd. (Devon Assizes 1967)

L - D employer insisted that P employee embark on a cross-country trip in an unheated car during heavy snow and exceptionally cold winter. P took every reasonable precaution but got frostbite. (Duty & breach: AA of sending him on trip, employer/employer, NIT, RFH) [DF Blyth v. Birmingham (SS: severe winter, foreseeability of harm, new tech)]

Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp. (9th Cir. 1989)

L - D employer instructed P employees to clean up toxic mess after attempts by specialists failed (D knew and was warned about toxicity). Ps did not have protective clothing and were poisoned. Court: Ps not limited to workers' comp b/c D had deliberate intention to injure them.

Black v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. (Mass. 1907)

L - P, a blackout drunk passenger on D's train, fell down stairs after being assisted off a train by D's employees. Court: AA (D's employees placed P in risky situation), undertaking (took him off train, and abandoned him in precarious position), and common carrier / passenger.

Davis v. Feinstein (Pa. 1952)

NL for contributory negligence - Blind P, using cane to find his way, fell into D's open cellar door adjacent to sidewalk. P exercised due care considering his circumstances. [DF Kerr v. Connecticut (here P was taking precaution, and was completely blind not just hard of hearing)]

Cuppy v. Bunch (S.D. 1974)

NL - D and friend got drunk on fishing trip and drove their separate cars back, D was driving recklessly and crashed in to P's car. Court: no duty to control 3rd person unless special relationship. [DF Ocotillo West (SS: enabling drunk drivers, less control over P in this case)]

Reed v. Ford (Ky. 1908)

NL - D assaulted Ps' neighbor in loud and boisterous manner, and Ps' heard incident through thin walls causing P wife to miscarry.

Rubio v. Swiridoff (Cal. App. 1985)

NL - D blew off his estranged girlfriend in a cloud of exhaust and drove off at high speed. She passed him speeding even faster and collided with the P's deceased. (IIT) [DF Weirum (SS: encouraging unsafe driving, responsisble adult vs. EFR)]

Thing v. La Chusa (Cal. 1989)

D driver negligently struck P's son; she heard about accident, rushed to scene, and saw her unconscious son's bloody, broken body. What is missing here: she wasn't at the scene, she was closely related, but she wasn't really aware - mom learned about accident after. Chadwick: the Ps didn't actually witness event, but diff is the extent of Chadwick. Also, there is an incentive issue: he did the right thing in chadwick and we wanna icentivize that. mom needs no incentive.

Schneider v. Macari (Ariz. 1975)

D driving car 5-10mph on street, and saw P boys running towards street. She thought they would slow down, but theyran right into her car.

Ford v. Gouin (Cal. 1992)

D friend was driving speed boat towing P who was water-skiing barefoot and backwards. P experienced skier selected the site, a 120ft-wide channel, and was wearing protective neck brace. D was driving too close to the river bank, and a P's head struck a tree limb and he was seriously injured. Voluntary assumed risk. Resolved bc it was just a sport. This is extended the Knight v. Jewett case.

Kahn v. East Side Union High School District (Cal. 2003)

D high school swimming coach promised P student (afraid of shallow racing dives and had no experience or training) that she could participate in meet by starting in the pool on relay. D at last minute told P she needed to dive, and that she would not be allowed to participate if she didn't. P was practicing, and on 3rd dive broke her neck. Koryo: distinction - she didnt wanna do it. and coach made her do it. coach drastically increased the risk to her. this was not an inherent risk of relay racing bc they didnt train her. duty: coach-pupil. Helms: both made act dangerously.

Jansen v. Children's Hospital (Ct. App. 1973)

D hosptial failed to diagnose P's daughter who died of massive GI hemorrhage caused by ulcer. P had to watch her die in hosptial slowly. She didn't witness the actual event. This was not as bad as Kately.

Wilks v. Hom (Ct. App. 1992)

D landlord provided house with defective propane system, and P mother was in adjacent room (still zone of danger) when large explosion severely burned daughters, one later died. P partially burned pulled daughter's burned body from house. Defective propane system - Neg; She's the immediate cause kinda - she asked to pull cord. Williams v. Bennett: here, this actually happened.

Soileau v. South Central Bell Telephone Co. (La. 1981)

D left temporary telephone wire (flat black) unburied for six months despite P's complaints, but 6 mos later P forgot and tripped over wire on dark night.

Christensen v. Superior Court (Cal. 1991)

D mortuary harvested Ps' decedents organs, mutiliated their dead bodies, removed jewelry, and cremated bodies en masse. Ps restricted to close relatives who were aware of services to be performed by D. Sued for emotional distress. Weren't present when this occurred, but this was so extreme. Campbell v animal quarantine: MALICE and willful. gotta deter.

Lindley v. Knowlton (Cal. 1918)

D negligelnly allowed his chimpanzee to escape, and it entered P's home and attacked P's children, choking one of them severly. P heriocally battled chimp, was not physically injured but feared harm to herself and kids. After the incident she became hysterical. Dulieu: extreme things you wouldnt expect; there was home invasion by chimp, like home invasion by horse.

Dulieu v. White & Sons (1901)

D negligently drove horse-drawn van into public house. The horses came very close to P's head, who feared immediate personal injury, was shocked, fell ill and had premature birth of mentally disabled child. No physical injury to P. It's like Steinhauser -P distrubed himself, no injuries, but after there was effects (schizo).

Christy Brothers Circus v. Turnage (Ga. 1928)

D negligently made dancing circus horse back toward P seated guest, and the horse evacuated bowels into P's lap causing humiliation and embarassment. Direct impact of poop.

Dillion v. Legg (Cal. 1968)

D negligently ran down and killed child while Ps, mother and sister, watched. P mother was not in the zone of danger. But P sister - they were not sure. Factors: -near the scene of the accident? -relationship to injured? -witnessing or learning about accident? CN: all of the elemnts of negligence required. Asmelah: sisters were walking to school and P was able to recover for emotional. close relationship - witnessing family member. from actual damages POV, Asmelah was an easier case cuz sister was right next to sister, and, here, the momw as not next to daugther.

Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co. (2d Cir. 1939)

D oil company sent P high school chemistry teacher fake kerosene under promotional deal for teachers. P tried to perserve sodium metal in the fake kerosene (colored water), and reaction caused terrific explosion.

Williamson v. Bennett (N.C. 1960)

D pulling out of her private drive way negligently collided with P who heard a grinding sound that gave her a false flashback to accident in which her brother-in-law had killed a child. The incident triggered P's neurotic condition. Steinhauser: car accident that causes emotional impact; BUT, here, bringing a lot of baggage and the neurosis is not as bad as schizo

Chadwick v. British Railways Board (Q.B. 1967)

D railroad negligently caused massive train wreck, and P's deceased who lived nearby came to rescue and worked through the night crawling into small places to help victims and administer morphine shots. P became psychoneurotic and had to go to mental hospital. P's wife sued D railroad. Dillon extending it bc. not closely related, but also the P in Chadwick is crawling in wreckage and giving morphine shots. the horror is subtituteing for the missing prongs in Dillon. DIFF: Williamson v. Bennet: This obj more horrific experience, better clinical definition of disease, there was an actual accident (she was creating the experience in her own mind in will v benn) Adams case: morality issue here is stronger

Clomon v. Monroe City School Board (La. App. 1986)

D school negligently supervised and failed to escort 4-year-old special needs child when alighting from school bus, and P ran over child causing emotional distress. This is purposeful negligence. Willful +wanton/malice. Kately: setting up as the ostensible cause of the death of the child. (Not as horrible though)

Monzon v. Southern California Regional Transportation Authority (Cal. App.)

Ds willfully left railroad tunnel in park in an apparently abandoned state (illegible warning signs, no fencing). Ps family were hiking in park and were in tunnel when Ds' train came and killed Ps' deceased wife and sister, respectively, in Ps' presence. Although P did not see her sister get hit by train, she knew the injury was occuring. wilks : extending it cuz in this case she didnt get hit by train and still got damage. here, p was just near... there, p was in the accident. Duty: running the train/occupying land; breach: not labelling // Thing v. La Chusa: both moms didnt see the accident at all, but, here, sister was closer. Wilks: was 100% sure children hurt, here not sure so therefore extends Wilks.

Lubin v. Iowa City (Iowa 1964)

L (SL) - D city left deteriorating water main beyond inspection and maintenance, knowing it would inevitably fail. Pipe burst and flooded P's basement. Court: SL Blackburn, water not normally ultrahazardous can be inherently dangerous. D city is a good risk spreader.

Luthringer v. Moore (Cal. 1948)

L (SL) - D exterminator's lethally poisonous hydrocyanic acid gas escaped from client restaurant's basement to next door pharmacy where P worked, who was injured upon arrival in AM. Court: ultrahazard, SL evenwith reasonable care.

Koos v. Roth (Ore. 1982)

L (SL) - D farmer burned his field with reasonable precaution after harvest, but fire accidentally spread to P's adjacent field, causing damages. Court: D created substantial risk even after exercising due care. Inherent risk of fire yields SL. DF Vaughan (larger inherent risk, no stat. auth., less common activity)

Vosburg v. Putney (Wis. 1891)

L - After teacher called class to order D (12) student, deliberately kicked P, his classmate. Kick aggravated prior injury and caused disability. Court: wrongdoer L for all directly resulting injuries whether or not forseeable by D (Eggshell P rule)

Rylands v. Fletcher (H.L. 1868)

L (SL) - D hired independent contractors to build resevoir, who discovered old mining tunnels but did not investigate (tunnels connected to P's coal mine) and did not inform D. When resevoir filled, water flooded and damaged P's coal mine. Court: Blackburn's Rule - D who collects anything on property likely to do harm if it escapes is SL for damages naturally resulting from escape. [DF Vaughan (opporunity for victim precaution, stat. auth.)] NB: only employees vicariously liable not independent contractors.

Bunyak v. Yancey (Fla. App. 1983)

L (SL) - D operated a dairy farm and collected large quantity of liquid manure in a lagoon, which leaked into P's fishing pond. Court: SL Blackburn, collection of manure was abnormally dangerous. [A2 Carstairs (trespassory invasion from resevoir of feces)]

Coxhill v. Forward (Q.B.D. 1986)

L (SL) - D's car was retrofitted with a LPG system, which exploded in a garage, caused fire that spread to P's adjacent garage and detroyed P's car. [A2 Musgrove, Guille (newly-invented ultrahazard techs)

Langan v. Valicopters, Inc. (Wash. 1977)

L (SL) - D's crop duster was srpaying insecticide on client's fields, and started pass over P's adjacent organic farm. Contaminated, and presence of chemical led to revocation of P's organic certification.

Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co. (Cal. 1967)

L (SL) - D's large rocket test caused powerful vibrations that permanently compromised D's drinking water well. Court: ultrahazard [A2 Caporale]

Davis v. Niagara Falls Tower Co. (N.Y. 1902)

L (SL) - D's observatory tower near waterfalls collected water spray that formed ice, repeatedly fell onto and broke the skylights of adjacent P's museum. Court: D failed to take necessary precaution [DF Delano (trespassory invasion vs. collection of water on property; falling ice more hazardous)]

Bennett v. Mallinckrodt (Mo. App. 1985)

L (SL) - D's radiopharmaceutical processing factory emitted radiation onto Ps' adjacent homes, causing injuries. Court: Blackburn applies to radiation.

Powell v. Fall (Q.B. 1880)

L (SL) - D's traction engine (newly invented steam-powered road vehicle) pulling a train of cars emitted sparks that burned P's haystack. No evidenceof D's negligence. Ps sued under a SL theory, citing legislation barring use of locomotives on highways. Court: Blackburn [DF Vaughan (SS: spark-emitting vehicles, new road vehicle vs. more common train); A2 Guille (new, hazardous inventions)]

Guille v. Swan (N.Y. 1822)

L (SL) - D'shot air balloon descended uncontrolably into P's garden causing minor damages. On approach, D called for help and crowd of people entered P's garden and caused trashed it. Court: SL for crowd damages, dangerous activity. [A2 Koos (inherent risk) DF Vaughan (higher risk with uncontrollable aircraft vs. train)]

Sullivan v. Dunham (N.Y. 1900)

L (SL) - Ds dynamited the roots of a tree to remove it, throwing a section of the stump 400ft that landed on P who was walking on a public highway. She died from injuries. Court: aff'd SJ for P, ultrahazardous activity. [DF Losee (intentional dangerous activity vs. normal boiler)]

Siegler v. Kuhlman (Wash. 1972)

L (SL) - Ds' gas tank trailer disengaged from truck, flipped over spilling thousands of gallons of gas onto highway. P's deceased unwittingly drove through pool of gas that ignited and huge fire killed her. Court: no negligence, but ultrahazard. No opportunity for victim precaution. [A2 Sullivan (ultrahazard) extends Rylands to mobile resevoirs; DF Losee, Crist, etc. (no ultrahazard)]

Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. (Alaska 1978)

L (SL) - In order to hide evidence of earlier theft, thieves broke into Ds' large explosives magazine and caused massive explosion that harmed Ps' nearby buildings. Court: storing explosives ultrahazard. [A2 Rainham Chemical]

Rainham Chemical Works, Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co. (H.L. 1921)

L (SL) - Massive explosion at Ds' munitions factory on gov't K damaged P's adjacent premises. [A2 Sullivan (explosive trespassory invasion); DF Vaugan (SS: Ds had stat. auth. But larger inherent risk and no opporunity for vicitim precaution)]

Musgrove v. Pandelis (C.A. 1919)

L (SL) - P lived in apt above D's garage, chauffeur started newly-invented car and explosion ignited leaking gas from fuel tank. Chauffer negligently did not shut off gas, and fire spread to P's premises. Court: Blackburn (newly invented cars considered ultrahazard)

West v. Bristol Tramways Co. (C.A. 1908)

L (SL) - P market gardener sued D tramway for damage caused to plants by creosote (wood preserving chemical) fumes escaping from wood pavement laid by D on tram tracks adjacent to P's property. [DF Vaughan (SS: Ds had stat. auth., stat. required wood but did not specify creosote whereas D in Vaughan had full auth. & opportunity for victim precaution)]

Tenant v. Goldwin (K.B. 1705)

L (SL) - P's cess pit leaked through a wall into P's cellar and destroyed P's coal and beer. P alleged that D failed to repair the wall. [A2 Rylands (Blackburn's Rule: flooding, trespassory invasion)]

Caporale v. C.W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc. (Conn. 1961)

L (SL) - P's plumbing showroom and building was damaged by D's pile driving using high power steam hammers during construction of nearby highway. Court: pile-driving ultrahazard [DF sound/vib NL Madsen (no intervening cause), Rogers (pile-driving ultrahazard)]

Mucsi v. Graoch Associates Limited Partnership #12 (Wash. 2001)

L - 5 days after a snow storm, P tenant and family/guests were leaving apt complex owned by D landlord. Snow was cleared from sidewalks and main hallways, but P used side exit that was still covered in snow. P slipped, fell and sustained injuries. Court: snow hazard was a known risk [DF Yania (defect vs. no defect, P not at fault vs. reckless, voluntary act])

Richard v. Mangion (La. App. 1988)

NL - D (14) repeatedly struck and kicked P (13) after P showed up at rope swing to fight D. Court: P consented to the fight. [DF Hudson (not an illegally organized prize fight)]

Sapp v. United States (W.D. La. 1957)

L - Air Force B-47 bomber crashed and burst into flames within few feet of Ps' trailer home, burning the home and injuring P. Plane had engine trouble, and unexplainably crashed on approach to airfield. The weather was fair and no reports of turbulence. (exclusive control, accident of this nature does not ordinarily happen if due care has been exercised proper maintenance, inspection, competent pilot etc.) [DF Walston 697 level of technology and risk avoidance procedures] [didnt check gas, or they fell asleep, or maintenance problem?][Walston v. Lambertsen: diff bc many alternative innocent causes. ]

Ellis v. D'Angelo (Cal. App. 1953)

L - D (4) violently pushed and knocked P adult to the floor. (modern CA statute makes parents jointly L for children's torts)

Garratt v. Dailey (Wash. 1955)

L - D (5) deliberately moved P adult's intended chair knowing (with substantial certainty) that she would strike ground.

D'Anna v. United States (4th Cir. 1950)

L - D Navy's plane after steep dive, fuel tank detached and crashed into P's fruit stand in a market. The tank was fastened beneath the plane onto bomb racks by hooks. The hooks sheared and failed. Most recent inspection did not notice anything wrong. Evidence was destroyed. (hook under D's exclusive control) [A2 Byrne (no possible other instrumentality, activity more inherently dangerous)] Thing speaking of the D's negligence: the issue with the pin. Bryne v. Boadle: didnt take the proper care. heavy object getting)

Stagl v. Delta Airlines, Inc. (2d Cir. 1995)

L - D airline maintained disorderly baggage claim area at which P, an old woman, tried to retrieve her bag when another passenger grab his bag, which hit another bag that fell on P and she broke her hip. (D had full dominion and control over area, invitor / invitee thus D was required to take all reasonable safety measures) [DF Gray (SS: Ps injured at airports, baggage claim vs. ticket counter)]

Wills v. Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co. (Wisc. 1925)

L - D amusement park operated baseball field with no screen behind plate, line drive foul ball hit P child who was spectating for nearby road. (B<PL, untaken precautions: no screen, locating baseball field somewhere without people milling around i.e. at an amusement park) [A2 Salevan 361 (Ds knew that foul balls could have hit passers-by and did not take any precautions to prevent injury); DF Pitre (SS: baseball, risk of harm higher here)]

Wlasiuk v. McElwee (N.J. Super. 2000)

L - D and P lost in a dangerous part of town. D driver invited a hitchhiker into the car to give them directions in exchange for a ride, despite P's protest. Hitcherhiker held them up shot P. (AA created foreseeable risk of harm) [A2 Weirum (encouragement and enabling of dangerous persons); DF Richards (SS: enabling criminals, but car thief not foreseeablely negligent driver)]

Manning v. Grimsley (1st Cir. 1981)

L - D baseball pitcher who was warming up in bullpen, aimed baseball at hecklers, but accidentally hit P, who sitting behind wire mesh fence. Court: D L for battery b/c intent to cause imminent apprehension of harmful contact, and contact occurred.

Mathis v. Granger Brick & Tile Co. (Wash. 1915)

L - D brickyard operated unguarded blasting pit where D's worker habitually left blasting caps. The pit was near a school and children frequently played in it. Two boys (13 and 14) found caps (one knew what they were) and took them to school. Cap fell out of boy's pocket and P (11) picked it up and took home. P's mother found cap but thought it was pencil ferule. P tried to pick dirt out and it exploded, severely injuring hand. (NIT or EFR, mother's conduct not IIT b/c mistaken belief was reasonable)

Guzy v. Gandel (N.J. Super. 1967)

NL - D (4) impulsively gave P babysitter an affectionate hug while she was holding infant sister, and she fell down sustaining injuries. Court: no intent to cause harmful contact.

Matthews v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Ariz. 1995)

L - D bus company's driver (who had a prior history of negligent driving and falling asleep at wheel not adequaetly investigated by D and contractor) swerved off highway, lost control and crashed bus. P injured passenger contends D fell asleep at wheel, who claims sunlight blinded him. (negligent as a matter of law, claim of being blinded by the sun is not a valid excuse)--[he shouldn't have been blinden by sun- that wasnt a good excuse bc he was a professional driver and should have taken more precaution w glasses] [Zabunoff: totally involutary and there was no precuation that he could have taken.]

Hughes v. Lord Advocate (H.L. 1963)

L - D city maintained open manhole in street with shelter tent, paraffin warning lamps at corners. D's employees left site unmanned on tea break, P boy and another boy took lamp and a ladder into tent to explore. Boy tripped over a lamp which fell into manhole. The paraffin escaped, vaporized, ignited and exploded, vacuum sucked P boy into the manhole and he was burned. Court: although the exact mechanism of the accident was not reasonably foreseeable, general burning accident was foreseeable. (EFR, RFH) [DF Doughty (scientists did know that paraffin lamp could leak and explode)]

Gibson v. Garcia (Cal. App. 1950)

L - D city operated streetcar system and maintained wooden poles near sidewalks. Negligent driver crashed into one of the poles, which broken and fell on and serverely injured P. Subsequent investigation discovered that wooden pole was rotten. (DCE) The actor's conduct was a sub factor in bringing harm. Concurrent efficient causes: D breach of duty: not properly maintingi the pole; apportionment of resp: American Motor Cycle Association (reread plz)

Barker v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. 1955)

L - D city's trash truck driver unaccountably ran over large piece of brown wrapping paper in gutter in which P's deceased and another child were hiding. The driver was nearly back to truck garage and knew that area of city was full of children playing. D noticed wrapping paper, tried to avoid it, but failed. [A2 Fuentes v. Consolidated Rail - drivers failed to look/check at radiator/paper] [This is a purple one.] [Mackey: forgetting. Here, it was mere clumsiness. ]

Kirincich v. Standard Dredging Co. (3d Cir. 1940)

L - D company failed to equip its barge with lifesaving floatation devices. P deckhand fell overboard and crew were not able to rescue him by heaving lines, P failed to grasp line. Drifting out in ebb time, he called back "Good-bye, fellows!" (if crew had floatation devices P would have been rescued) [The life ring would have made a difference.]

DeHaen v. Rockwood Sprinkler Co. (N.Y. 1932)

L - D contractor managing building project built a hoistway for lifting materials through elevator shaft, but failed to install statutorily-mandated barrier to prevent items from falling in shaft. Worker left radiator 1 ft from from unprotected hoistway, another worker accidentally knocked it over and it fell down through the shafting killing P worker. (DCE, RFH, Chief object of statute was to protect workmen from the hazard of falling, but this type of accident was within "zone of apprehension") [A2 Osborne, Martin; DF DiCaprio (P in protected class vs. parents not livestock owner), Gorris v. Scott] duty: statute + affirmative act; breach: not building the guards; cause in fact: the fall of the radiator; proximate cause: DCE /RFH. Diff Gorris v. Scott: statute here intended to protect from what happened. gorris, no.

Parker v. Asher (D. Nev. 1988)

L - D correctional officer pointed taser gun at P inmate and threatened to fire it (imminent apprehsenion of harmful contact)

Osborne v. McMasters (Minn. 1889)

L - D drugstore sold poison to P's deceased without labelling it "poison" as required by statute. P ignornantly drank it, and died. (NIT, RFH - the statute was designed precisely to prevent the type of harm to class of person of which P was a member) [A2 Martin v. Herzog - statute was designed for what happened; DF Gorris v. Scott - the opposite]

United Novelty Co. v. Daniels (Miss. 1949)

L - D employer negligently permitted it's employee (P's deceased) to clean its vending machine with gasoline, even though the room was filled with fumes and contained a lighted gas heated. P disturbed rat with gas-soaked fur that ran from under machine, hid behind gas heater, ignited and ran back to machine which exploded killing P. Court: no distinction btw explosion by means of animal vs. normal type reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances (NIT- rat doesnt count, RFH - gas is flammable ) [A2 Ridley, In re People; DF Davidson, Amica - the causal chain here was bizarre, but not complicated; ridfall - explosion was foreseeable]

Michael R. v. Jeffrey B. (Cal. App. 1984)

L - D encouraged another boy to shoot marble at P, blinding him. (misfeasance) [A2 Weirum (D's speech encouraged dangerous behavior and unreasonable risk); DF Yania (victim took risk upon himself and was an adult)]

Russo v. Grace Institute (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989)

L - D erected scaffold next to building in which Ps rented an apartment. Ps assaulted when robbers used D neighbor's scaffold for access. [DF Einhorn (SS: 3rd party increased criminal risk in apartment buildings, misfeasance erecting scaffold vs. nonfeasance failure to repair)]

Theisen v. Milwaukee Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. (Wis. 1963)

L - D exhausted high school play actor was driving friends including P home at 3am after cast party. D fell asleep at wheel, passengers tried to wake him, but car crashed into tree stump. Court: no justification for falling asleep at the wheel therefore D was negligent as a matter of law. [Zabunoff: DF bc it was involuntary, here, you can predict your fatigue]

Ocotillo West Joint Venture v. Superior Court (Ariz. 1993)

L - D golf course's employee gave back to drunk P's deceased car keys that other employees had taken from him for his own protection. P crashed his car and was killed. Court: undertaking of withholding keys from P created duty, also AA of giving P keys. [A2 O'Toole (same case for AA, faciliating drunk driver), Zelenko (taking charge of helpless person and making the situation worse)]

U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co. (2d Cir. 1947)

L - D harbormaster improperly tied Anna C cargo ship to pier after moving ship to dock a barge. Anna C broke free, collided with tanker whose prop punctured Anna C's hull under waterline. Damage not detected quickly enough and ship sunk. P's bargee was supposed to be on board at time of accident but was AWOL. Hand: D was negligent for improperly docking Anna C. P was contributorily negligent b/c bargee did not exercise reasonable care when leaving the ship unattended during working hours.

Baxter v. Roberts (Cal. 1872)

L - D hired P to remove a fence between D's flooded lot and a shanty (knowing that shanty inhabitants were armed and would resist, with telling P of risk). P was shot at. (Duty: AA or employer / employee) [A2 Wlasuik (Ds put Ps in danger); DF Burks (here D knew of specific danger)]

Nigg v. Patterson (Cal. App. 1990)

L - D hired a juvenile criminal to staff late night shift at laundromat through a state-licensed drug treatment program. Juvenile severely beat P customer with a hammer. D never asked program about juvenile's background. Court: D owed a duty of care to its customers to investigate his background. [A2 Johnson, Tarasoff; DF Davidson]

Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (Cal. 1985)

L - D hospital failed to protect P doctor employee from being shot by a mugger. Parking lot was a high crime area (similar priors), and hospital had made decision to disarm its security guards (AA). Untaken precaution (rearming security guards) would not have been burdensome.

Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co. (Neb. 1954)

L - D hotel was hosting bingo game, and D's employees responsible for furnishing event and supervision. P paying player got folding chair for Ds took it mothers table, sat in it for 20-30mins before it collapsed injuring her. Later discovered that bolt on one side of chair was missing. (D had ownership, possession and control of chair and duty to maintaine it in a reasonably safe condition) [DF Schroerlucke] D had exclusive control of chair bc she was using it as a chair. This accident wouldnt happen unless D was negligence.

Louis v. Louis (Minn. 2001)

L - D installed a slide in the shallow end of his pool, and P licensee suffered a spine injury going down it head first. D thought it was dangerous to dive (warning sign), but did not think sliding head-first was dangerous.

Bowman v. Home Life Insurance Co. (3d Cir. 1957)

L - D insurer's field underwriter falsely claimed that he was a physician and performed consensual and intimate examination of Ps. Court: consent cannot be obtained by fraud.

Lordi v. Spiotta (N.J. 1946)

L - D invited P and son to stay at his summer home. D incorrectly turned off gas valve on water heater, and later asked P to light the stove. P struck match causing explosion that injured himself and killed his son. Court: guests must "take place as he found it" but doesn't make D NL for harm caused by unknown danger created by D's negligence (analogous to trap). Licensees owed duty for nonfeasances if D has knowledge of danger.

Yazzolino v. Jones (Cal. App. 1957)

L - D landlord failed to fix dangerous railing on rear stairway of two-story apartment, and tenant's child's guest (P) leaned against railing which failed and P fell and was injured. Court: P considered invitee (not licensee) b/c D has a business interest in use of property by guests of tenants. D owed P an affirmative duty to maintain the premises in a safe condition.

Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc. (Cal. App. 2004)

L - D landlords failed to replace glass window pane ($15 fix) in apt's front door through which estranged former boyfriend entered and fatally stabbed her. Ps submitted numerous requests to D to replace pane because of security risk. P's brother made temporary fix with plywood, also similar prior. [DF Saelzler (less burdensome untaken precaution); Sharon P (Id, similar prior)]

Yu Fang Tan v. Arnel Management Co. (Cal. App. 2009)

L - D landlords of large apt complex failed to implement minimal security improvements (minor enhancements to security gates) and P tenant was shot during attempted carjacking when he was looking for parking outside gated area. (similar priors, improvements not burdensome) [DF Saelzler, Sharon P]

Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co. (E.D. Mich. 1918)

L - D manufacturer negligently shipped a loaded air rifle to a retail store and did not warn distributors. P employee of retail store was injured when a customer handling rifle pulled the trigger (DCE) [A2 Village of Carterville, Elbert] [Flip to Donahue: if customer had loaded it himself.] [Analogy: here, more obvious case bc original act of neg is more extreme.]

Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel (Cal. 1970)

L - D motel's pool lacked a lifeguard, warning signs and several safety devices required under Cal. Health & Saf. Code. D had been previously warned by inspectors. During off-season, P's deceased husband and 5-year-old son could not swim well, and drowned in unattended pool. Sole witness saw them approaching deep end, then discovered bodies 30mins later. (D failed to satisfy mandatory safety requirements, untaken precautions, that would have saved Ps) [DF Stacey (precautions would not have prevented harm)]

Robison v. Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc. (Cal. App. 1998)

L - D operated a parking lot with picnic area in the center. There were no barriers between lot and picnic area. A man and mentally disabled woman were trying to jump start their car, and she lost control, crashing into Ps sitting at picnic table. (DCE, even though the precise set of facts were not reasonably foreseeable, there was a foreseeable risk of injury to picnic-area guests from a runaway car) [A2 Bigbee 366] Untaken precaution: not putting up a wall. [Snyder: the D was overcrowding car, but there was a supervening tort which cut off the original liab. here, doesnt cut off liability but there the breach of duty is unlcear, but here, it is obvious that they didnt take precaution.]

Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Abeles (Ark. 1910)

L - D phone company, following industry standards, failed to ground surge protector on overhead wires. Lightning struck wire causing loud noise that partially deafened P. D's failure to ground surge protector breach of duty despite industry standards. Lightnings strikes foreseeable. [DF Cooley v. (grounding a surge protector less burdensome than insulating all wires or constructing catcher baskets)].

Garibaldi & Cuneo v. O'Connor (Ill. 1904)

L - D piled stacks of bananas and boxes on public sidewalk, obstructing path for pedestrians, including P forced into narrow passageway, and slipped on a banana causing injury. (Duty & Breach: AA) [DF Selger (SS: hazard on sidewalks, misfeasance vs. nonfeasance)]

Collins v. Wilcock (Q.B.D. 1984)

L - D police officer, disobeying rules of arrest, grabbed P's arm in order to restrain her, simultaneously accused her of soliciting men. Court: D's acting outside stat. auth. grabbing was beyond generally acceptable conduct.

Chase v. Washington Water Power Co. (Ida. 1941)

L - D power company constructed power lines along highway abutting P's ranch with preexisting barbed wire fence. Pole was supported by uninsulated guy wire (custom) that was touching wire fence. Fighting chicken hawks completed 28in circuit between high voltage lines and guy wire, starting fires in dry grass along fence that burned down P's barn. P introduced evidence that bird-caused power outages had previously occured, and hawks abounded. ( unusal and extraordinary but not unforeseeable, NIT, RFH-moving the fence would be the first thing you'd do to prevent the accident) (Duty: AA of running power line; breach: did not separate fence from wire, did not insulate )

Bahan v. Green Bus Lines, Inc. (N.Y. App. 1983)

L - D pulling into bus stop at 5mph with unobstructed vision ran over what appeared to be a white bleach bottle, which exploded and sprayed Ps waiting passengers with acid causing severe injuries. Court: foreseeable that crushin such bottle might spray dangerous substance. (Duty: affirmative act of driving the bus, breach: not avoiding bottle, NIT, RFH) [A2 Barker, Dellwo 481; DF Marenghi]

Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (Cal. 1975)

L - D radio broadcast contest that predictably induced teens to race on highways to catch DJ awarding prizes. Two teens ran P's deceased off the freeway. (Duty & Breach: AA of broadcast increased risk to D's class. Dangerous, commercial speech not protected by 1st Amendment.; EFR, concurrent efficient causation)

Robertson v. Le Master (W. Va. 1983)

L - D railroad forced laborer to work 27 hours straight clearing a wreck and then allowed him to drive home despite extreme tiredness, and he crashed in to P. (AA, employer/employee) [A2 O'Toole; DF Cuppy]

Fuentes v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1992)

L - D railroad's crew were running train through litter-strewn tracks and knew area frequented by homeless. D's crewman saw object ahead but did not radio engineer for emergency stop, train collided with stack of radiators that fell on and injured sleeping homeless P. (D's untaken precaution of failing to stop unburdensome. Risk reduction high b/c several worse foreseeable consequences.) [A2 Davis]

Betancourt v. Manhattan Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)

L - D rented car to P and deceased husband with history of overheating problems ( twice reported by previous renters but D failed to fix leak in radiator). Ps were driving on icy, unlit highway at night when car overheated, P's husband pulled over onto narrow shoulder, got out to check and was struck by dogtailing rear wheels of tractor trailer, killing him. Court: P was forced by D's negligence into a foreseeably dangerous situtation. (Duty: AA of renting defective car, Breach: not fixing, Cause in fact, DCE, RFH) [A2 Hairston 790, Jackson 455] Direct consequences: DCE;; reas foresight: would not giving the D a defective car, first or last thing? FIRST.

Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co. (Colo. 1972)

L - D store operated a high traffic pizza counter off main aisle of store, selling thousands of pizza slices on wax paper to customers. Food mess on terrazzo floors was cleaned often by staff. P shopper slipped. Court: dangerous condition was created by store's method of sale (affirmative act) and D recognized danger (constant cleaning). Breach of duty: selling pizza under dangerous conditions. [DF Blyth (apparent vs. non-apparent risk). Blyth was not foreseeable]; invitor-invitee; untaken precaution: rug that creates friction

I. de S. v. W. de S. (Assizes 1348)

L - D struck hatchet on Ps' tavern door close to woman P's head.

McGuire v. Almy (Mass. 1937)

L - D suffering from mental illness, deliberately struck P nurse in the head with broken lowboy leg. Court: although crazy, D capable of intent to cause harmful contact.

Chi Yun Ho v. Frye (Ind. App. 2007)

L - D surgeon failed to remove surgical sponge when closing incision in P's abdomen, which became infected and required additional surgery. D argued that he relied on a miscount of sponges by nurse. (res ipsa, D cannot avoid L by delegating task of sponge count to nurse) (This is a true red: neg as a matter law); Pitre: here, risk was more foreseeable.

In re People ex rel. von Schaick (Guardian Casualty Co.) (N.Y. 1938)

L - D taxicab company employed D taxi driver who was speeding, collided with D driver. Both drivers negligently not maintaining proper lookout. Taxi crashed hard into the stone steps of Ps' laundromat, dislodging stone and imbedding into steps. Police called P's deceased down to examine damage. 20mins later as tow truck was pulling cab out, and P standing at safe distance, another stone loosened by crash dislodged and fell on P killing her. (Duty: AA of speeding, breach: speeding and no lookout, NIT, RFH) [DF Palsgraf (causal chain less complicated because physical and not chemical)]

Lopez v. Southern California Rapid Transit District (Cal. 1985)

L - D's bus driver failed to call help to prevent P passenger from being criminally assaulted by a group of juveniles. Driver was notified of altercation but failed to take any precautionary measures. (common carrier / passenger)

Ridley v. Grifall Trucking Co. (Cal. App. 1955)

L - D truck company's driver drove fully loaded truck into steel plant where P worked. D deliberately drove over large, jagged rocks and overly inflated, large tire blew out with a large explosion that threw a rock 50ft and injured P's leg. The tire was worn out and thread-bare, and operated with excessive air pressure. Court: Ds knew or reasonably should have known that conduct might lead to a blow out. (Duty: AA of driving on rocks, breach: not replacing tire and over-inflatingt, NIT, Reasonably foreseeable harm) [A2 Bahan - bleach bottle foreseably dangerious; rocks too., Sharp v. LaBrec crane shoudl not have been put on soft ground, here, truck should not have been put on jagged rocks; exclusive control in both. DF Palsgraf- fireworks not foreseeable, Evans D was driving his truck and pulling his son's trailer. The wheel fell off trailer's axle an P driver collided with it. (D did not have exclusive control) here, there was ex control.] Anjou - gritty banana peel should've been removed. rocks shouldve been removed.

Marshall v. Nugent (1st Cir. 1955)

L - D truck driver negligently cut a corner on an icy highway, forcing the non-negligent driver of an oncoming car (in which P was passenger) to crash into snow bank. D stopped and offered to help tow. P volunteered to go to top of hill and warn approaching cars. As P was walking up hill well to the side of road, approaching vehicle saw obstruction, took evasive action and skidded into P causing injury. (Duty & Breach: AA of cutting corner, RFH, DCE) direct consequences doctrine: would be NIT, or DCE. but under reasonable foresight doctrine: first thing, it's red too.

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill (Ala. App. 1933)

L - D under K to repair P's business' clock. P wife went to D's office, he said: "If you will come back here an let me love you and pet you, I will fix your clock" and reached at P. Court: D's employer NL for assault.

Village of Carterville v. Cook (Ill. 1889)

L - D village maintain 6 ft raised sidewalk that lacked railings. P (15-years-old) was walking non-negligently on sidewalk when another boy inadvertently though negligently jostled P and he fell sustaining injuries. (DCE) [A2 Elbert v. City of Sagniaw (subsequent negligenct acts were innocent)] Why duty? ownership of land by the city, structure on land was negligently constructed, child was an invitee. 2nd boy: he committed tort: his duty was AA of walking. Clear breach of duty: not railing. Make it closer to Central of Georgia: maybe too low of a railing and boy pushed maliciously.

The T.J. Hooper (2d Cir. 1932)

L - D was owner of tug boats towing P's coal barges along NJ coast. D did not provide tug boat captains with radios to receive weather forecasts (not general custom at time). A storm kicked up and barges were lost. (even though not customary, reasonable care requires D to take this precuation. Cost of precaution is very low (Learned Hand) [A2 Southwestern T&T 511( industry standard insufficient), DF Cooley (SS:not custom to have baskets and it is costly and dangerous to pedestrians (untaken precaution increased risk of harm)]

Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc. (N.C. App. 1979)

L - D who crashed small aircraft on which P's deceased was passenger was a civil aviation pilot of ordinary prudence, but possessed substandard training and experience. Court: pilots owe a higher standard of care due to responsibilities and specialist training. [DF Williams v. Hays (SS: captains, reasonable derangement vs. no excuse)]

Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol (Cal. 2001)

L - D's CHP officer directed speeding driver to stop in center median of freeway, and errant driver struck car, severely injuring Ps (all occupants including children). Court: D AA placed Ps in peril and increased risk of harm. [A2 Baxter (AAs increased risk to Ps); DF Davidson (misfeasance vs. nonfeasance)]

Mukthar v. Latin American Security Service (Cal. App. 2006)

L - D's contracted armed security guard was absent from duty when P employee attacked by assailants. P pressed panic button to call D, but no assistance was provided. Court: K created special relationship [A2 Morgan (both Ds promised implied/express to protect/warn P); DF Riss (private security K vs. limited police resources)]

Wagner v. International Ry. (N.Y. 1921)

L - D's crowded train started moving from station up over a bridge and D's conductors did not close the doors. A jolt threw P's cousin from the train, which stopped and P got out an attempted to find his cousin in the dark. It was not clear where cousin fell, but P went up on the bridge, slipped and was injured. (Emergency that D created stripped P of his respsonisbility to act reasonably, DCE) Proper jury instruction: if the D's train was negligent, then they were the proximate cause. This is a liability case uder the assumption that the P was reasonable in going to check since he was understandably upset. [Gillian v. Portland: DCE case too bc D made ]

Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (Cal. 2011)

L - D's driver unlawfully parked big rig truck in dangerous place on dirt shoulder of freeway, and P's deceased fell asleep at the wheel and crashed his pickup into D's trailer. (Duty: AA of parking against regs in foreseeably dangerous location) [DF Richards (more AA b/c D actively parked in foreseeably risky area)]

Johnson v. State (Cal. 1968)

L - D's juvenile parole board placed homicidal minor in foster home, and he attacked uninformed P, foster mother. [A2 Wlasiuk (D's AA increesed risk of harm to P); DF Davidson (P here collaborating with gov't here, also AA vs. nonfeasance)]

Bennight v. Western Auto Supply Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1984)

L - D's manager sent P employee into bat-infested rear section of warehouse (despite her protests) where a bat ultimately came into contact with her, and she was harmed by adverse reaction to rabies treatment. Court: D intentionally placed P in apprehension of harmful contract by bat, and L for directly resulting harm.

Bouillon v. Laclede Gaslight Co. (Mo. App. 1910)

L - D's meter reader tried to barge into P's apartment and argued with P's nurse. D left and entered through basement door. Incident upset P who miscarried. Court: no assault, but L for trespass and any injures arising directly or proximately from it.

Thomas-Kincannon-Elkin Drug Co. v. Hendrix (Miss. 1936)

L - D's pharmacist secretly put Ex-Lax into malt, which pharmacist offered P to drink and which P did drink and became ill. [DF Morgan (D's act beyond generally acceptable conduct)]

Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (Cal. 1976)

L - D's psychiatrist failed to warn P's deceased of death threat made against her by a patient who had been briefly detained by police at request of D psychiatrist. Court: D's special relationship to patient established a duty of care to P (affirmative duties for benefit of 3rd party). Ds were aware of risk and negligently did not warn P.

Morgan v. County of Yuba (Cal. App. 1964)

L - D's sheriff arrested man based on P's deceased's complaint. D promised to warn P immedidately upon prisoner's release on bail because of death theat on P. No such warning was given, P's deceased was killed by prisoner. Court: D's promise led P to reasonably rely and refrain from securing other protection. [A2 Bloomberg, DeLong (reasonable reliance on D's promises; DF Yania, Zepeda (no duty to rescue w/o promise or undertaking)]

In The City of Lincoln (C.A. 1889)

L - D's steam ship collided with P's barque, resulting in loss of compass, charts and log. P's crew tried to navigate to safety with another compass but without log and chart could not dead reckon. They spotted what they thought was light ship, headed for it but ran aground, sinking ship. P's crew were severely incapacitated in their ability to safely navigate as a result of D's negligent collision. (NIT) [A2 Hastie, DF Sinram]

Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. (Wis. 1927)

L - D's train negligently emitted sparks that started fire. Another fire of unknown, but human origin converged with this fire, and the combined fire bore down upon and destroyed P's property, either would have been sufficient to destroy property. (concurrent sufficient causes, burden is on the D to show that his negligently-started fire was not the proximate cause of the damage)

Mullen v. St. John (N.Y. 1874)

L - D's unoccupied building was in disrepair. When P was walking on adjacent street 25ft from rear of building, a brick wall collapsed and injured P. (Buildings don't ordinarily fall on people without some act of negligence) Negligence of D was not tending to wall. wall was prob giving evidence of disrepai and D did nothing. [Morejohn: ther ewere 2 possibilities; here no other possibility but D neg. ]

Marshall v. Ranne (Tex. 1974)

L - D's vicious hog charged across property line and bit neighbor P, who had warned D about hog's dangerous behaviour. Court: P liable on SL theory (escape of dangerous animal onto P's property)

Dellwo v. Pearson (Minn. 1961)

L - D, 12-year-old motorboat driver, crossed P's fishing line, which broke rode and part of reel projected and injured P's eye. Court: D should have been held to adult standard of care because he was operating a potentially dangerous vehicle. Negates gloss from Purtle.

Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equipment Co. (N.C. 1984)

L - D1 car dealer failed to tighten wheel lugs on P's new car and did not conduct customary inspection or test drive before delivering car to P. While P was driving on highway, rear wheel fell off, and P stopped. Good Samaritan parked 20ft behind car, turned on flashers and radioed for help. P was standing in between the cars when D2 truck negligently struck good Samaritan's vehicle and killed P. (DCE) [A2 Jackson 455; DF Sinram (innocent negligence vs. more blameworthy)] [AA act of changing wheels; untaken precaution: not test driving; cause in fact; proximate cause: there was an untervening told but it was just ordinary negligence DCE. ][Village of Carterville: D's breach of duty exposed P to predictable negligence of other ppl] [lutu v. CA highway patrol: kept P in a dangerious place; DCE case too]

Sides v. Cleland (Pa. Super. 1994)

L - Dispute over right-of-way over logging trail through P's property. P chopped down a tree to block trail, and perched himself on it. Ds starting cutting around P with chainsaws, but stopped when P did not move.

O'Toole v. Carlsbad Shell Service Station (Cal. App. 1988)

L - Drunk driver went to D's gas station. D's employees knew she was drunk, made her drink coffee, gave her money to call s.o. to pick her up, encouraged her not to drive, but allowed her to buy gas and drive away, crashed killing P. [A2 Carmona (negligent entrustment, more extreme b/c higher and more foreseeable risk of harm)]

Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. (N.Y. 1981)

L - Lightnight strike caused NY blackout. P supermarket sued for food spoilage and lost business caused by D's gross negligence in allowing electrical blackout to occur. P alleged that D had inexperienced supervisor on duty who failed to "shed load", failed to man gas turbines, failed to properly maintain and inspect relays and circuit breakers, and unaccountably let whole system shut down. [DF HR Moch (privity of K here and gross negligence)]

Ybarra v. Spangard (Cal. 1944)

L - Ds (surgeons, anesthesiologist, and nurses had custody over P) put P patient under general anesthetic for appendectomy, and he came to with sharp pain in his shoulder. The pain worsened, arm and should muscles atrophied and other doctors determined cause was traumatic injury. P had no previous pain or issues with arm. (Ds potentially part of a 'conspiracy of silence' i.e. they all knew who caused harm but tried to protect them by not talking) [DF Garcia, Novak (joint control vs. separate, sequential control; in novak, no person hurt)] [traumatic injury-prob anaesthesiologist] [Summers v Tice: extending it bc in summers both Ds were negligently, here prob not all.]

Brown v. Dellinger (Tex. Civ. App. 1962)

L - Ds 1st graders entered P's garage and decided to build a fire with leaves b/c they were cold, fire ignited canvas entrance door, burn garage and spread to house. Court: Ds jointly L for damages on trespass theory.

Maye v. Yappen (Cal. 1863)

L - Ds and Ps operated adjacent gold mines. Ds mistakenly crossed property line and mined gold off Ps' land. Court: Ds L as a matter of law for trespass.

Mink v. University of Chicago (N.D. Ill. 1978)

L - Ds doctors gave Ps women experimental DES during prenatal care without telling Ps that they were part of clinical trial. DES was known carcinogen but no effort made to notify Ps for > 20yrs. Court: no consent to intentional harmful contact.

Montgomery v. National Trucking & Convoy Co. (S.C. 1938)

L - Ds jackknifed trucks on icy mountain road to save themselves (not a negligent act but still AA creating risk of harm), set warning flares but failed to set flares at top of hill and P's vehicle skidded on ice into truck. [A2 Richardson, Cabral (extends i.e. non-negligent act still AA); DF (SS: untaken precautions; but more AA)]

Richardson v. Ham (Cal. 1955)

L - Ds left large bulldozers on construction site atop mesa. Drunk teenagers were able to start one with a defective improvised lock, and unable to stop it, let it roll down mesa, across highway and into P's house causing major injuries and damages. (Duty & Breach: inadequately securing bulldozers, EFR, RFH) [A2 Weirum (EFR); DF Richards (bulldozer more dangerous and uncontrollable than car)]

Bigbee v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Cal. 1983)

L - Ds maintained a phone booth with a defective door next to a busy street. Drunk driver injured P caller as he tried to escape phone booth. (Extreme L case: AA created risk. Omission, nonfeasance of failing to grease door. Special relationship: invitor / invitee)

Philco Radio & Television Corp. v. J. Spurling, Ltd. (K.B. 1949)

L - Ds mistakenly delivered shipment of highly flammable celluloid scrap without warning indications to wrong address, P's electronics factory. P's employees started to unpack crates, when foreman realized it was celluloid and order employees not to smoke. P's typist jokingly applied lit cigarette to material causing explosion, fire damaging P's factory. (DCE) Did her act cut off the liability? NO. Pittsburg Reducaiton company: extremely dangerous material handling. But in Pittsburg, the mother knew how dangerous it was. Here, didn't know, but it was much more innocent.

Rains v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 1984)

L - Ds psychiatrists coercively persuaded Ps patients to consent to physical violence ("sluggo therapy"). Ds deceived Ps and had improper motive.

Barber v. Chang (Cal. App. 2007)

L - Erratic and dangerous tenant who also did maintenance jobs in D's small apt complex brandished a shotgun and threatened P's partner and her mother, who informed D. D told her to file a police report before he could take any action. P was subsequently assaulted and shot by tenant. Court: D had reasonable and not burdensome duty to contact police. [A2 Delgado; DF Saelzeler (specific individual threatened vs. class of persons)]

Markley v. Whitman (Mich. 1893)

L - High school students D and friends play game of "rush" on P. D stood behind P knowing that other would push him into P, who injured neck.

Vaughan v. Menlove (C.P. 1837)

L - Mentally challenged (idiotic) D pilled up a dangerous hayrick (haystack) on the edge of property adjacent to P's cottages, despite P's warning of fire hazard. D constructed chimney in hayrick that may or may not have caused fire that destroyed P's property. Court: D grossly negligent and should be evaluated under reasonable person of ordinary prudence standard.

Reynolds v. Texas & Pacific Ry. (La. 1885)

L - Obese P and her family were at train station walking with other passengers to departing train, would probably not have fallen if D had lighted its station steps. Ds told passengers to hurry up. [You don't have to prove that the untaken precaution would have prevent the fall 100%, just 51%] [Grimstad: the precaution wouldnt have saved him, here, would have saved her.]

McCue v. Klein (Tex. 1883)

L - On a wager Ds gave P's deceased, a chronic alcoholic, a third pint of whiskey that they knew he couldn't refuse. Court: no consent b/c P was incapacitated, Ds should have known risk of harm/death.

Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications, Inc. (Ohio App. 1994)

L - One of D radio station's on-air hosts encouraged another host to blow cigar smoke into face of P, who was invited anti-smoking spokesperson. (Smoke is particulate matter so counts as contact, offensive in context)

Hudson v. Craft (Cal. 1949)

L - P (18, minor in 1949) nominally consented to illegal prize fight organized by D, and then other fighter struck and hurt him. Court: legislation requires liability, D's act of organizing fight was indirect legal cause of harm [A2 Markley (harmful conduct indirect but intentional)]

Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Co. (Cal. 1967)

L - P (4) ran across busy street, nearly being hit by car, to D's food truck. P asked D to wait while he got money. D agreed, drove up and parked on opposite side of busy street from P's house. D failed to warn P, who ran across street and was stuck by car. (Duty: AA of parking) [A2 Weirum EFR]

Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp. (2d Cir. 1970)

L - P 14-year old girl with latent psychotic tendencies was car passenger on highway with family when D driver negligently struck them. Although no one was injured, the accident and emotional trauma triggered acute schizophrenia. (NIT, RFH) [A2 Vosburg, Hastie (egg shell P)] Duty: AA of driving; she was in the zone of impact.

McComas v. Al. G. Barnes Shows Co. (Cal. 1932)

L - P actress was set to ride on D's elephant for a movie shoot. During rehearsal, trainer attached howdah (saddle) with girths. Noise spooked elephant, which escaped and was re-captured and severely punished by trainer with bull-hook. 20 mins later P mounted elephant, which swayed, and howdah broke loose P falling and 150lb howdah crushed her. Court: howdah under exclusive control of D's trainer who failed to inspect following elephant's escape. Untaken precaution if it were more specific neg: make sure howdah was secured [A2 Reinzi; DF Kohl - both had animals that freaked out and hurt P, but diff cuz in Kohl, the horses were never freaked out and here the elephant had been scared before and they beat it which was worse; Smith v. Caplan: diff cuz tehre nothing was found wrong w/injury, but here many things were found wrong with elephant/howdah]

Gillilan v. Portland Cremation Association (Ore. 1926)

L - P and 4-year old son were visiting mausoleum. While P was placing flowers, her son wandered off and pulled on one of the handles of an open marble shutter (300lb vault doors), which fell on P's son uninjured. P injured herself trying to lift the door off the boy. (accident would not ordinarily occur without negligence, because some failure in design, inspection, installation of shutter) [Assumption of the risk by pulling handle like the P in Adams DF: the D had exclusive control of the handle. Also, here it was a kid.] [Higgins: in both case not enough precaution was taken. how could little kid just touching hangle be struck by 300 lb marble]

Summers v. Tice (Cal. 1948)

L - P and Ds were hunting quail. P had given Ds safety instructions. P went up hill so party were in V formation 75-yards apart. One D flushed bird, that flew low, 10ft, between P and other D. Both Ds shot simultaneously, and P was hit with bird shot in the eye and face. Boths Ds were using same grade bird shot. (burden of proof shifts to Ds to ascertain which shot caused harm); Why owed duty: AA; Breach of Duty: shot when they were right in front of you; Cause in fact problem: it wasnt clear whose shot it was. This would be a false negative if you exonerated them. [Half v. Lone Palm: it was difficult for P to show what wouldve happened if the life guard had been tehre, for example. They deprived the P from having evidence of cause in fact so they burde of proof shifts to D]

Morris v. De La Torre (Cal. 2005)

L - P and friends were eating D's restaurant attacked by gang members, one went inside the restaurant, got a knife and then stabbed P. P and friends fled, and attacker caught up with P and stabbed him again. Incident lasted 7-8mins and D's employees did not call police, claiming phone did not work. Court: calling 911 minimally burdensome [DF Sharon P]

Reinzi v. Tilyou (N.Y. 1929)

L - P and wife participated in steeplechase horse ride at D's amusement park. Ps insisted to ride on same horse. P's wife's metal stirrup broke and Ps fell off horse and were injured. (D had a duty to frequently inspect stirrups) [Colclough (less dangerous, less duty to inspect)] D had exclusive control cuz it was their ride and have to inspect it. only the stirrup breaking could. P requested to ride separately. [Stoskin v. Prensky: took duty of care, but here its wayy more dangerous and did not meet the standard of care.]

Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (Cal. 2005)

L - P and wife were in bar and P exchanged hostile stares with group of men. P's wife expressed concern to security guard, who recommended they leave. Guard on duty in parking lot was not present. P was jumped outside bar. Court: D had actual notice of impending assault. [DF Sharon P (AA, notice of danger, active secuirty vs. burden of providing security)]

Burdette v. Marks (Va. 1992)

L - P arrived on scene of car accident and saw assailant beating another driver. Assailant attacked P with shovel. P tried to protect his infant child while assailant attacked and seriously injured P. D police officer witnessed both attacks but did not assist P. Court: P voluntarily helping in police matter, so police had a reciprocal duty. [A2 Schuster; DF Riss, Davidson]

La Russa v. Four Points at Sheraton Hotel (N.J. Super. 2003)

L - P bartender at D's hotel slipped in pool of water near beer cooler, snow/water was tracked inside by D's delivery person. [DF Haynesworth (SS: slip on ice, misfeasance vs. nonfeasance, pre-existing danger])

Brosnahan v. Western Air Lines (8th Cir. 1989)

L - P boarded flight on D airline, and took his seat. Boarding process was conducted in a disorderly fashion. Passenger struggled to fit bag in overhead compartment, which fell and severly injured P. (Common carrier / passenger) [A2 Lopez (on vehicle); DF Gray (SS: airlines, vehicle vs. common area of airport)]

Glanzer v. Shepard (N.Y. 1922)

L - P bought beans and paid for them based on D public weighers sheets. D verified weight in writing to P and seller. P upon resale attempt, discovered that actual weight was less and sued D for difference overpaid. (seller had K with D, P did not have K with D therefore no privity of K) Court: getting proper weight to P was the end and aim of K. [DF Winterbottom (SS: no privity of K, misfeasance vs. nonfeasance, here end and aim was weight issued to P whereas safety of coach beneficial to coach driver was not end and aim of K)]

United States v. Lewis (Ct. Military Rev. 1990)

NL - D ,arine told police officer that if didn't stop calling him racial names "I'll kick your ass". Court: conditional threat insufficient for battery.

Robinson v. Post Office (C.A. 1974)

L - P carpenter slipped of D employer's negligently maintained ladder and scraped his shin. P went to doctor who administered anti-tetnus injection without first administering a proper test injection. P had a latent, but serious reaction to the tetnus shot, contracted encephalitis and suffered from brain damage. Although doctor failed to administer a proper test injection, P's reaction was so latent that the test would not have been efffective (i.e. no cause-in-fact and therefore NIT) [A2 Hastie 751] [untaken precaution: not administering a test shot; duty: workers comp; doctor owed duty: took charge of patient; no cause in fact by the doctor, so there is no intervening tort so liability with post office]

Brasseaux v. Stand By Corp. (La. App. 1981)

L - P checked into D hotel and was attacked by bees in the shower. He slipped and injured his wrist. D knew about beehive near room and unsuccessfully tried to have it removed the day before incident. D failed to warn P of presence of bees. (inn-keeper / guest)

Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. (Minn. 1875)

L - P child was playing on railroad tracks when his leg was caught in turntable, injured and had leg amputated. The tracks were unfenced and close to P's home. (trespasser, attractive nuisance constituted trap) [DF Cleveland Electric (foreseeability of harm to trespassers)]

O'Brien v. Everfast, Inc. (Va. 1997)

L - P customer at D's fabric store was walking near a table when a 50lb bolt of fabric that had been leaning up against the table slid off and crushed her foot. It was against company's safety policy to lean multiple bolts of cloth on tables. Unclear whether salesperson or other customer was responsible for this oversight. (PP: salesperson was in exclusive control over bolt)

Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (Cal. 2001)

L - P customer at D's supermarket slipped on a puddle of milk adjacent to refrigerator. P testified that he did not know if milk was cold/warm, freash/odorous. Unclear how long milk had been on floor. D admitted that although employees were trained, and probably walked in aisle every 15-30mins, milk could have been there for 2 hours. [A2 Anjou 537] [DF Winn Dixie: they could prove they cleaned recently; no admission of possibility of negligence.]

Howe v. Seven Forty Two Co. (Cal. App. 2010)

L - P customer at IHOP sat down on counter stool, which immediately collapsed injuring P. The chair fell of its base because wooden screws attaching the two parts broke. D's employees conducted regular visual inspection of the stools. No previous similar incidents had occurred. The chair was dangerous. [A2 Rose v. Melody Lane (same case -barstools of internal damage, but more suprising because it was not dark in the IHOP), DF Raimondi]

Sinn v. Farmer's Deposit Savings Bank (Pa. 1930)

L - P customer was waiting in line at D bank. Bank robber with dynamite slipped a note to teller demanding $ quietly. Bank did not warn customers, eventually security tried to disarm robber who detonated device killing himself, several others, and injuring P. [DF Davidson (SS: opporunity to warn, AA vs. nonfeasance)]

Portillo v. Aiassa (Cal. 1994)

L - P delivery guy was bitten by D liquor store owner's vicious dog on D's leased premises. Dog was regularly on premises; warning signs clearly posted. D landlord renewed lease and inspected premises just before attack. Court: D owed duty to inspect commercial property and remove or restrain tenant's dangerous animal.

Ingham v. Luxor Cab Co. (Ct. App. 2001)

L - P diabetic and disabled passenger of D's taxi was told to get out after driver overshot destiniation. P pleaded and said she couldn't make it back up hill. She paid and exited, no other buses or taxis, she began walking but became exhausted and fell breaking hip. (NIT). Cause in fact: not taking her directly to the clinic. NO intervening tort case (IIT). Direct causation

Taylor v. Olsen (Ore. 1978)

L - P driver was injured when her car hit a fallen tree blocking a busy road adjacent to D's property. D was logging extensively on property including area adjacent to tree. Court: D had duty to inspect, would have disclosed hazardous condition. [DF Pulka (SS: harmful escape from property, opportunity to discover defect vs. control 3rd party)]

Franconia Associates v. Clark (Va. 1995)

L - P employee in pursuit of a robber ran and pushed open an automatic glass door that slammed rapidly on his foot and ruptured his Achilles' heel. Postal worker testified that he had noticed problems with door for more than two weeks. D's maintenance worker testified that he carried out repairs on door prior to the accident and check it twice a week. (Ds had constructive knowledge that door closed to fast) [DF Lyvere v. Ingles 512 (hidden vs. obvious defect)]

Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc. (N.J. Super. 1951)

L - P fell and broke her arm at D's roller rink. D's employee aided her to first aid room. She asked if he was a doctor; he said he had been a prize fight manager. D applied traction to P's arm and applied a split after P protested. P had to undergone numerous operations. Court: no consent to painful (offensive/harmful) contact.

Lyttle v. Denny (Pa. 1908)

L - P guest at D's hotel was sleeping in room on foldaway bed. The 300lb backboard fell forward on P, striking his head. (even though D was not in exclusive control of instrumentality, D had duty to inspect safety of bed becuase foldaway beds are dangerous; high level of duty inn-keeper/guest); exclusive control - D was the one who installed the system and are supposed to set it up to work well...no evidence tampered with it. P didnt have the opportunity to be Neg with the bed. Coughclough: here, more inspection was necessary. Shopping cart does not need to be inspected often.

Maher v. Voss (Del. Super. 1951)

L - P guest at Ds' house who greeted her and put her coat in what seemed like a closet. When leaving, P went to get her coat, opened "closet" door and fell down open, unlighted stairway to basement where Ds' had hung coats but did not warn Ps about hazard (trap) [A2 Lordi]

Hastie v. Handeland (Ct. App. 1969)

L - P had degenerative disc disease, but was unaware and only had occassional pain in shoulder. D negligently caused a fender bender with P, which aggravated his pre-existing condition. Doctors performed spinal surgery, and P died of septicemia. Infection was contracted while in hospital, and considered inherent risk. (If doctor was negligent DCE (defendant compliance error), if not NIT). If it there was negligence, then it was "innocent" negligence, e.g. not washing hands by the doctor. No intervening tort. NIT. Flip into a case with NIT: drop the patient, super dirty hands, etc. Pittsburgh: intervening cause as the parents didnt take the cap away from teh child.

Mohr v. Williams (Minn. 1905)

L - P had given consent to operation on right ear. When P under GA, D surgeon realized that left hear more diseased, indicated to P's family physician, and performed successful surgery on left ear. Court: battery, express consent required.

Higgins v. White Sox Baseball Club, Inc. (7th Cir. 1986)

L - P invitee at D's baseball stadium was injured on the way back to his seat from the restroom when concession stand's door flap fell from its open position and struck P on his head. (D was in exclusive control over instrumentality that caused injury, and direct evidence concerning cause of injury primarily within the knowledge and control of Ds). Error was in jury instruction: res ipsa loquitur re knowing about the presence of the faulty hook. Purple one. Wims v. Chevron: they had taken precaution and no damages, here there were no precautions taken and clear damages. Jasko: pizza parlor would get busy and would fall and have to be vigilant. here, rowdy stadium and latch was flimsy- was foreseeable.

Mackey v. Allen (Ky. 1965)

L - P salon customer went to check on salon employee across street at D's clinic. Two doors on building were similar, P opened one that D should have locked and fell down unlit stairs into basement and was injured. Another person had previously fallen down stairs. (Allen had a breach of duty as a matter of law.) P was a sort of invitee. Burden of putting up sign, very low (Learned Hand). AA: opening the door; forgot to shut it: compliance error. [DF Ellimna v. Gombar (SS: tresspassers injured by property defect, but here P is more of an invitee because she came to tell s.o. to a invitee)] [DF: Mackey v Allen: there, P was a licensee; here, P was licensee.] [Hauserman v. Garrett: diff here, he knows he forgot. Hauserman didn't forget - he checked.][][]

Kesewaa v. Key Food Supermarket (N.Y. Sup. 2006)

L - P invitee at D's supermarket was getting frozen vegetables out of a freezer when wheeled shopping carts stored on top of the freezer fell on top of and injured her. The D was responsible for keeping premises safe. (D exclusively controlled instrumentality, no customers could step up and access carts) [DF Colclough (there no breah of duty, i.e. shopping carts' wheels do not require inspection)] Byrne v. Boadle (L): nothing could have caused the falling barrel, but neg, both heavy objects. DUTY: licensee-licensor; speaking loudly of negligence. Seglier v. Kuhlman: ultrahazardous; high level precaution. Norfolk v. Anderson/morejohn v. Rais: blight or herbicide (alternative cause), but here just one possible cause. D'anna v. US: fuel tank/shopping cart both heavy objects falling. Jasko: both duty to keep premises safe. here more extreme.

Allen v. Hannaford (Wash. 1926)

L - P landlord arrived at D delinquent tenant's apartment. D pointed a gun at P's head and said if he moved her stuff she would shoot him. Gun was unloaded. Court: even though unloaded, no way for P to know and was put in reasonable apprehension. [DF Haines (reasonable fear vs. knowledge of practical joke)]

Holcombe v. Whitaker (Ala. 1975)

L - P mistress confronted D estranged lover who told her: "If you take me to court, I will kill you". D threatened her numerous times, broke into her apt. Courts: words alone not sufficient for assault, but taken together with can may constitute assault.

Fox West Coast Agency Corp. v. Forsythe (9th Cir. 1942)

L - P obese moviegoer's seat collapsed underneath her weight, causing injury. Obesity was obvious to ticket vendor and ushers. Theater was too dark for P to ascertain strength of seat. Court: D owed a duty of care to seat her safely. [DF City of Boca Raton (invitee vs. licensee/trespasser)]

Mangan v. F. C. Pilgrim & Co. (Ill. App. 1975)

L - P old woman lived alone in apartment owned by D, infested with mice, and numerous tenant complaints showed and D made no effort to exterminate them. P opened oven, a mouse jumped out, she jumped back, fell and broke her him and subsequently died of the injury. Housing Code prohibited rodent infestation of dwelling units. (Also L under common law duty, statute was mainly designed to prevent disease, reasonable interpretation that safety issues might also have been considered by legistature) statute was interpreted broadly to include public safety. here. Selger: more opportunity to take care walkin down the stret, but, here, mouse just jumped out - less chance to take care. Also, here, there is an intentionally to the accident - D was told many times about mice.

Haasman v. Pacific Alaska Air Express (D. Alaska 1951)

L - P passenger on D's commerical aircraft disappeared without a trace on a flight from Alaksa to Seattle. No icing or storm conditions prevailed on route at time of accident. Co-pilot was not FAA-certified for mutli-engine aircraft. [Kohler - clear non negligent reason for fall; here, there was negligence re license.] FLIP this to KOHLer: pilot certified and there was bad weather that would cause the plane to crash w/o negligence of pilot. [A2 Nelson v. AA; DF Kohler]

Nelson v. American Airlines, Inc. (Cal. 1968)

L - P passenger on D's commerical aircraft was injured by being thrown around plane during a sudden maneuver. Plane's autopilot malfunctioned, plane nose dived and passengers were injured in the rear of plane where motion was violent. Aircraft log showed history of problems with the autopilot, including an incident of porpoising and two complaints. A component had been replaced as a safety precaution. (regular maintainence does not exclude possibility of negligent maintenance) [A2 Swisshotel, D'Anna 633]

Gee v. Metropolitan Ry. (Exch. Ch. 1873)

L - P passenger on underground train was moving in the car. He placed his hand and weight on small brass bar covering window on door, and the door immediately flew open. P fell out of the moving train and was injured. (would not normally occur without negligence, high risk of harm/death if window unexpectedly opened)

Herrick v. Wixom (Mich. 1899)

L - P sneaked into D's circus without buying a ticket (trespasser), and took a seat in audience. Clown detonated firework that shot debris 30ft and struck P in the eye, injuring him (trespasser does not nullify D's duty of care to auidence members) [DF Elliman v. Gombar (expected invitees, vs. unannounced visit by trespasser)]

Maytnier v. Rush (Ill. App. 1967)

L - P spectator at baseball stadium knowingly sat in area w/o protective screen. D pitcher threw a wild pitch from bullpen that struck P in the head.

Salevan v. Wilmington Park, Inc. (Del. Super. Ct. 1950)

L - P struck in the back by a baseball while walking on street adjacent to stadium owned by D. 2-3 foul balls landed regularly on the street per game. [DF Bolton v. Stone (escape of foul balls foreseeable vs. rare cricket shot)]

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (N.Y. 1916)

L - P sued D auto manufacturer, with whom P had no contract, after car's wooden wheel failed, collapsed and P was thrown from vehicle at speed, injuring him. Court: D aware of foreseeable danger, duty to inspect for latent defects (breach). Privity of contract not required. L not confined to immediate buyer, but persons or class of persons for whom use is intended.

Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co. (Cal. App. 1956)

L - P sued D mattress manufacturer (no K). After approx. 1 year of use, P and husbands noticed soft spot and lumping in center for mattress. 5 years after purchase, spring penetrated through mattress stabbing P in her buttocks. P argued that she relied on warranty label on mattress and ads (express warranty) [Overrules Field, A2 Lyttle v. Denny (Res Ipsa bed case)]

Lavender v. Kurn (U.S. 1946)

L - P sued Ds railroad companies under Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) for death of railroad switchman, who opened switch for incoming train, failed to close the switch and was found dead near the switch with skull fracture caused by blow to back of head by small, round fast-moving object. P argued that deceased was killled by D1's train's protruding mail hook because he was on D2's mound of dirt near track. D theorized that P was murdered by hobo. Court: reasonable basis in the record for inference that P was struck by mailhook and therefore Ds both L.

American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court (Gregos) (Cal. 1978)

L - P teenager with parents consent participated in novice motorcross race managed by Ds and was injured. P alleges Ds failed to give safety instructions, failed to segregate participants into classes of equivalent skill, and failed to limit number of entrants (D's untaken precautions all concurrent efficient causes). D argued that parental consent and their knowledge of P's skill level was negligence and proximate cause of injury (P's untaken precuation: not giving their consent, also concurrent efficient cause). Court: D is entitled to obtain partial indemnification from P's parents on a comparative fault basis. ---- Lee was reating comprative negligence. They are allowing relative negligence among mulitiple tortdeaasors in this case. The allowance of the cross complaint is novel in thtis case.---4 different causes in fact (according to Grady): AMA di not give contestants adequate instructions; AMA allowed too many entrants; AMA did not segregate constestands by ability class; Parents signed consent form (cross complaint); joint liability - you have to make up for the insolvent; several liability - the opposite. the solvent ppl dont ahve to make up for the insolvent. indemnification as a matter of law - when you get all the money back from your co-tortfeasor. what theyre doing here, partial indemnification:

Davis v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (7th Cir. 1986)

L - P train inspector had crawled undernearth car but did not hang flag to indicate inspection, D's crew ordered to move train cars, did not blow horn or ring bell, and P was caught and his legs severed. Court: D's burden of signaling with whistle or bell was minimal, costless and risk of injury was high since crew could not see end of train. [A2 Fuentes] [if davis had been deaf, the blowing horn would have failed in cause in fact.]

Anjou v. Boston Elevated Ry. (Mass. 1911)

L - P train passenger disembarked and while being led on narrow platform to another train, slipped on dirty, girtty banana peel in D's train station. (Untaken precaution: not cleaning platform effectively. Res Ipsa is presence of banana peel demonstrating breach of duty and cause in fact) [A2 Jasko 470, Stagl 261; DF Gordan 470- piece of wax paper was clean and white]

De La Cruz v. Ock Wee Leong (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)

L - P truck driver crashed into vehicle in front of him. D truck driver was tailgating behind P, and therefore was unable to stop in time and rear-ended Ps vehicle. (Statute requires drivers to maintain safe distance, Rule: if tailgating then "any rear-end collision establishes a prima facie case of negligence") [DF Alarid (no justification or excuse)] [Negligence as a matter of law] [DF Alarid v. Vanier: there was no justification. Here, the Learned Hand formula could not trump statute.]

Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. (Cal. App. 1993)

L - P truck driver forced to pull-over because of electrical failure, and struck & killed by passing motorist when he got out of truck. D was contracted by P's employer to maintain truck fleet. Longstanding electrical problem not adequately repaired by D. (misfeasance) [DF Winterbottom (chronic problem vs. latent defect)]

Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale (N.Y. 1935)

L - P vagrant took shelter vacant house under construction owned by D. Both P and nightwatchman asphyxiated by gas leaked from a broken public gas main off property. P's deceased sued property owner and city (Ds). City built draining pipe encasing gas main that allowed gas to enter property. Court: although P was a tresspasser, D's encasing of gas main was a misfeasance, active negligence.

Fitch v. Adler (Ore. App. 1981)

L - P was a dinner guest a Ds' house, which was still under construction. She walked out at night onto a partially constructed deck without guardrails and fell. Court: deck constituted a trap, imposing affirmative duty to warn. [DF Baer (SS: Ps walked dark thresholds, common knowledge that doors lead to stairways and decks usually have guardrails)]

Rose v. Melody Lane of Wilshire (Cal. 1952)

L - P was a patron at D's bar, and before she had anything to drink, sat down on a bar stool that collaped and she fell. Failure was caused by progressive fatigue fracture in the pin holding the stool's legs to the seat, and that defect could not be detected. D's employees claimed to have regularly checked stools. Accident signature: broken pin. Jasko: if what he says its true, you should nt have a chair like this. like if even if youre patrolling for pizza and its still occurring, then you shouldnt have that business model

Rowland v. Christian (Cal. 1968)

L - P was a social guest at D's rented apartment. P cut his hand on a broken porcelain faucet. D was aware of broken faucet, which was not obvious (in light of PP), and did not warn P. Court: D was aware of danger of concealed condition and failed to warn P. (abolished distinctions between invitee, licensee, trespasser in CA, held that L depends primiarily on foreseeability)

Satcher v. James H. Drew Shows, Inc. (Ga. App. 1970)

L - P was at D's amusement park, and got into bumper car. Group of 15 mental patients on day-trip arrived with nurse supervisor, got in bumper cars and coverged on P, crashing into her at top speed from different angles. At end of ride, P needed assistance to get out of car and her neck was injured. (EFR) [A2 Weirum-EFT; Wlasiek - EFT.] [Pittsburg: NCP bc parents knew it was dangerous. here, EFR - leaving power on]

Hackman v. American Medical Response (Cal. App. 2004)

L - P was disoriented and speech-impaired following car accident. Ds, private paramedics, conducted a brief assessment and concluded no need for further care and departed when P declined treatment. P subsequently collapsed and was hospitalized. Court: paramedic / patient special relationship was established by undertaking [DF Zepeda, Miller v. Arnal Corp., Wanzer (SS: emergency assessment, actual treatment here)]

Martin v. Herzog (N.Y. 1920)

L - P was driving car at speed limit just after dusk, and drifted across center line (violation) when taking a curve. P suddenly crashed into D's buggy that was not equipped with running light (required by statute). Contributory negligence bc it was passed for the protection of both travelers. [Limited Selger- duty was created to city, not individual person. The statute was not a safety statute.] [Red on CN]

Williams v. Swissotel New York, Inc. (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)

L - P was injured when elevator at D's hotel suddenly plunged 9 stories and abruptly stopped, throwing him onto floor and against wall from which he sustained injuries. P's expert witness fled court, P requested time to find another witness, rejected by judge. [A2 Gee 661, D'Anna 633; DF Smith v. Caplan 655] [DF Hutchinson: no exclusive control of fire; here, ex control of elevator; flip williams into hutchinson if there was a fire.]

Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel (Minn. 1959)

L - P was leaving D's hotel at midnight and was hit in the face and eye with a mud-like substance that fell from hotel. The hotel was hosting a riotous convention (absolute bedlam) and sutained major property damage, but made no complaints about their behavior. (D hotel had an affirmative duty to take futher precautions i.e. call police to protect the public from foreseeable risks associated with disorderly convention) [DF Larson] The D has exclusive control. [East Tex. - Diff bc the crazies were identifiable.]

Marsalis v. LaSalle (La. App. 1957)

L - P was shopping in D's store, and was scratched by D's cat. D promised to keep cat inside until rabies test completed, negligently allowed cat to escape. P had to undergoe rabies treatment, was severly allergic and suffered injuries. Court: applied R2T rule about voluntary undertaking to care for or to afford relief or assistance to injured or distressed persons. [DF Van Houten (SS: cat attack, no undertaking)]

Byrne v. Boadle (Exch. 1863)

L - P was walking on a street adjacent to D's shop where workers were moving barrels of flour with ropes and a jigger-hoist. P was struck by a falling barrel, lost consciousness and had no recollection of the accident. No direct evidence of negligence, witnesses did not clearly see the accident occur. D argued that one of its customers could have caused accident. Court: the barrel could not have rolled out and fallen from D's shop without negligence. Doctrine: "the thing itself speaks," speaking of the D's negligence bc the barrell are heavy; dangerous activity. Seglier v. Kuhlman: ultrahazardous; high level precaution.

Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co. (5th Cir. 1972)

L - P while adding antifreeze to car with hood open, was injured when a fan blade broke off and struck him in the fact. P sued D car manufacturer. P had expert witness who showed evidence that steel used to make blades was low quaility (high number of inclusions), an identifiable defect that was proxmiate cause of injury. D argued that bent fan blades caused by front-end collision or rough handling were cause of fracture. Court: low quality of steel was the proximate cause of fan blade's fracture.

Sorichetti v. City of New York (N.Y. 1985)

L - P wife divorced alcoholic and violent husband. Court issued protective orders against husband, but also granted visitation rights with P's daughter. Husband made death threats to P and daughter, which P reported to D's police. Husband stabbed and maimed daughter. Court: police knowledge and conduct led to P's reasonable expectation of protection, special relationship created by protective order.

Sharp v. LaBrec, Inc. (Ind. App. 1994)

L - P worked as a pipe-fitter for contractor dismantling and removing old heavy boiler from a school. Contractor subcontracted with D to furnish and operate crane to hoist boiler from basement. The crane was set up on soft ground, was not level, and boom was not properly centered. P was properly placed in boileroom. Boiler was lifted and held steady for several mins. Suddenly the crane outrigger sunk, load shifted, and boiler bumped P injuring him. (D had exclusive control over the crane and boiler. A boiler held stationery for several mins by a crane does not ordinarily suddenly change position in absence of neligence) [A2 Sapp 699; DF Stoskin 652] [diff: Norfolk v. Western: not RIL but cuz specific negligence. this here is so dangerous that they should have taken the precaution - neg as a matter of law ]

MacDougall v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Pa. 1933)

L - P worker was doing drain repair on roof of house on rainy day. D power company's electric pole's arm extended toward roof. Neutral wire to fuse box was wet therefore hot. P accidentally grazed his head on wire, was shocked and fell sustaining injuries. (Customary usage not a valid excuse when activity is inherently dangerous and high risk) [Ellis v. Louisville: didnt know that there was a risk; here, risk was obvious.]

Goode v. Walt Disney World (Fla. App. 1987)

L - P's 4-year-old son got away from his parents and drowned in D's inadequately protected moat surrounding Cinderella's Castle. Court: fence surrounding the moat was unreasonably low. P was an invitee (business visitor), owed full duty of care.

Johnson v. Harris, (Ariz. App. 1975)

L - P's 7-year-old son drowned in D's backyard swimming pool. The fence surrounding pool was not built to municipal code specs, and gate's latch was not working consistently. There was inadequate supervision of pool on the day of drowning. P's deceased was found dead with sandwich poolside. Not clear whether he entered through open gate, climbed over fence, etc. (5 options 2/5 L) [A2 Paine v. Gamle Stores 566]

Biakanja v. Irving (Cal. 1958)

L - P's brother died, left property to P. D notary public botched formalities and P heir received far less than what she was legally entitled from his brother's estate. [A2 Glanzer (both Ps "end and aim" of transaction)]

Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Association (Cal. 1986)

L - P's condo was burglarized. P and other residents petitioned D (HOA) to upgrade lighting. After requests denied, P installed lighting herself but D made her turn off lights due to HOA regulations. P was subsequently robbed and raped. (AA of disarming P) [DF Donnell (on property vs. off property)]

Elbert v. City of Saginaw (Mich. 1961)

L - P's deceased 2-year-old son drowned in unguarded, water-filled trench dug by D city's contractor half-block from elementary school. Children had been playing near ditch and concerned woman warned city of risk. P ran off while mother was hanging up laundry, she immediately went after him, could not find him in neighbor's houses, found him dead in water. (DCE) NIT - perhaps mom was negligent but prob not...Breach of duty: not fencing the hole; the cause in fact √. Question: mother neg is letting child run in street? Schwartz v. Helms: here EFR and the driver knew there was danger for the child, here, they should have known as well. FLip case in Pittsburgh: if mother knew the hazard was there and told the child to go anyway.

DeLong v. County of Erie (N.Y. 1983)

L - P's deceased called 911 reporting buglary and requested urgent help. D's dispatcher sent police to wrong address. After police could not find house, dispatcher "cleared the call" and took no further action. 8 mins later neighbor saw P collapse on sidewalk and called police, who arrived 1 min later. P died from stab wounds. (D's express promise caused P's reasonable reliance) [A2 Bloomberg (express promise & reliance); DF Zepeda, Riss, Wanzer (no promises)]

Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros. (N.Y. App. Div. 1935)

L - P's deceased collapsed on D's sales floor, and D isolated her, untreated, in infirmary. Court: D's undertaking isolated P from other assistance [A2 Bloomberg (both undertakings, D isolated P vs. P relied of D's promise); DF Miller v. Arnal (affirmative undertaking w/ isloation vs. no undertaking)]

Bloomberg v. Interinsurance Exchange (Cal. App. 1984)

L - P's deceased passenger in stallled car on side of highway, used callbox. D Auto Club promised to send emergency assistance. Tow truck never located the stalled car. 1 hour later car struck by a drunk driver, killing P. Court: Ps relyed on the promised assistance (express undertaking, DCE, RFH) [DF Belhumeur (more reliance here)]

Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc. (4th Cir. 1962)

L - P's deceased seaman fell overboard D's WWII-era oil tanker near FL Keys sometime between 6:30pm - 11:40pm on moonless night. Crew noticed he was missing at midnight. D's captain decided no reasonable possibility of success in finding him and continued on course. (Breach of duty was not attempting rescue, works under Hand analysis. But cause in fact analysis breaks down because the liklihood of rescue was so remote, P has to prove by 51% that untaken precaution would avoid the loss)

Gomez v. Superior Court (Walt Disney Co.) (Cal. 2005)

L - P's deceased tourist rode the Indiana Jones ride at Disneyland in violently shaking jeep-style vehicle, and suffered a brain injury leading to death. (common carrier / passenger) [DF Gray (degree of control over area)]

Schuster v. City of New York (N.Y. 1958)

L - P's deceased volunarily provided D's NYPD with information leading to the arrest of notorious criminal. P received death threats, reported to D who declined to provide P with any protection. 3 weeks later P was shot and killed. Court: duty to protect citizen cooperating with police. [DF Riss, Davidson (no police cooperation)]

Schulz v. Pennsylvania R.R. (U.S. 1956)

L - P's deceased was a dock worker at pier charged with handling tugboats. He was last seen on his way to change into work clothes and perform tasks on tugboats. He was found dead, half naked in the water 3 weeks later. It was nearly freezing, and boats were icy. The area was not adequately lit. The pier was undermanned. [A2 Reynolds 565]

Newing v. Cheatham (Cal. 1975)

L - P's deceased was a passenger on D amateur pilot's single-engine aircraft. The plane crash near Tijuana and the clocked was found to have stopped at the precise time when the plane would have run out of gas. P nor the other passenger were liscened pilots. (Running out of gas would not ordinarily occur without negligence) [DF single vs. divided control] [In Campbell, plane was rented. Here, not rented (unification of piloting and maintenance). Plus, here, specific negligence: could've looked at gas meter.] [Piñata case - teacher todl everyone to be careful and took all precautions; here, no proof precautions] [Mackey v. Allen/ parallel to this case: when its clumsiness, the courts are harsh. here, the pilot forgot to check the fuel gage.]

Pridham v. Cash & Carry Building Center (N.H. 1976)

L - P's deceased was buying paneling at D's building supply store. D's clerk pulled out a sheet of paneling and remaining sheets feel on P severely but not fatally injuring him. P was loaded into an ambulance, and the driver had a heart attack while driving, crashing into a tree resulting in P's death. Court: ambulance crash result of a normal effort of 3rd persons in rendering aid. (Duty: invitor/invitee or AA of stacking lumber, breach: pulling out sheet, NIT, RFH) [A2 Hastie v. Handeland - analogy: both Ps were ill when an alleged intervening cause caused death: dr/ambulance drive...but doesn't cut off Liability, Palsgraf-diff bc there, the fireworks were not foreseeable, but here putting panels in dangerous place is foreseeable, Wagner v. International- the intervening act doesnt cut off liability (ambulance heart attack/P going to search for cousin):] s

Paine v. Gamble Stores, Inc. (Minn. 1938)

L - P's deceased's body was found "legs folded over head" at the bottom of stairs in D's open pit basement. The iron gate fencing off basement was missing its top rail. Police noticed accumulation of dust on stairs had not been disturbed. (Evidence indicates that P fell into pit head over heals, and cause in fact was missing railing) [DF Wolf v. Kaufmann (SS: uncertainty about cause in fact, most likely causes here cut off by fixing the railing which was the untaken precaution)] [Hanton: dispute as to weather the P started boarding before or after, but there was a witness who was saying NL, but here there was no witness] [madhef v. boca raton: ]

Langridge v. Levy (Exch. 1837)

L - P's father purchased a defective gun from the D who fraudulently claimed that the gun was made by a famous gunsmith and was a "good, safe and secure gun." When P fired gun, it failed and blew up in P's hand, injuring him. (misfeasance, defective firearms are inherently dangerous and therefore harm was foreseeable)

O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960)

L - P's husband having heart attack refused care at the emergency room b/c of inadequate insurance. Doctor discussed P's symptoms over phone, and recommended that P go home. P protested but left, and died at home. Court: Doctor who undertakes to examine or treat a patient and then abandons him L for malpractice (doctor/patient relationship). [A2 Hackman (Ds made negligent prognosis); DF Hurley (no undertaking)]

Jackson v. Ray Kruse Construction Co. (Mo. 1986)

L - P, 4-year-old, was struck by young bicylist in the parking lot of D's apartment building. P was guest of tenant i.e. invitee to landlord. Evidence that neighborhood boys often rode bicyles fast down a hill and into parking lot. Untaken precaution: installing a speed bump. (Not convincing, what if boys used speed bump as jumping ramp?) [DF Radley 563 Radley v. Knepfly (probably vs. not likely to prevent harm)]

Palka v. Servicemaster Management Services Corp. (N.Y. 1994)

L - P, a hospital nurse, sued D maintenance contractor, which had undertaken to maintain hospital where a wall-mounted fan failed and fell on P, injuring her. Court: duty notwithstanding lack of privity of K. D should have known of foreseeability of harm to P (member of small class of beneficiaries) as a result of reasonable reliance by hospital on D's duties under K. [DF Eaves Brookes (SS: ongoing executory contracts, but property damages (less predictable risk) vs. personal injury (homogenous level of risk)]

Maddux v. Donaldson (Mich. 1961)

L - Ps driving on highway in rain with D following at reasonable distance and speed. Another driver skidded out-of-control colliding into P, and D subsequently crashed into P. Other driver insolvent. (remanded to determine seperability of injuries caused by successive impacts and reasonable allocation to D and other driver. If indivisible, D and other driver jointly liable. If reasonable means to apportion, damages on comparative fault basis) [successive causation] [cant tell which injuries came from which collision. Court says that it's good to compensate P anyway cuz it would take the incentive to be careful away. They should be jointly liable; but there was sole causation by D1. Causal apportionment was not possible though. ]

McGonigal v. Gearhart Industries, Inc. (5th Cir. 1986)

L - Ps military trainers conducting hand grenade exercise were injured when grenade prematurely exploded. Ps sued D1 (fuse manufacturer) and D2 (grenade assmbler). D1 settled. D2 was under K with USG to inspect every fuse before asssembly, and did so with x-ray photography and redundant trained readers. It was shown that determining defectivness of fuse was reliably ascertained by x-ray. [A2 Nelson v. American Airlines 694]

Calkins v. Cox Estates (N.M. 1990)

L - Ps' deceased, a young boy, lived with grandparents (Ps) in apartment complex owned by D landlord. Ps' deceased was playing in apartment playground, and escaped through hole in deteriorated fence. He was killed by car on nearby road (invitee) [DF Brooks (SS: invitees, undertaking vs. pure nonfeasance. Here playground was inviting children to play near hazardous area)]

Cohen v. Smith (Ill. App. 1995)

L - Ps, husband and wife, told D hospital's doctor that because of their religion they did not want wife's unclothed body to be seen or touched by any male, but despite instructions D's male nurse both saw and touched P wife's unclothed body. Court: no consent to offensive touching.

Asmelash v. Braga (Cal. App. 2003)

L - Teenage P and twin sister on way to school walked into crosswalk, looking both ways. D was driving 35 in 25mph speed limit, unjustifiably did not see P and sister, and ran over sister. P sued D for NIED, arguing negligence per se because D violated Vehicle Code re rights of pedestrians in crosswalks, i.e. drivers should yield right-of-way to pedestrians in crosswalks. Court: CA negligence per se. D breaches duty if (1) violates statute (2) violation is proximate cause of injury (3) injury results for occurrence that statute was designed to prevent. [DF Alarid (no justification or excuse)]--[this is N, per se] [DF: Tedla v. Ellman: She didnt have a good reason to ignore the statute]

Carmona v. Padilla (N.Y. App. Div. 1957)

L -Boy (9) was dangerously playing with bow and arrow near P infant and social guest of family. Boy's father warned him and hid bow. D grandmother showed him where it was hidden, despite P's mothers objections. Boy fired arrow into P's eye. Court: AA, negligent entrustment.

Jewell v. Beckstine (Pa. App. 1978)

L for contributory negligence - P milk hauler (also a dairy farmer) arrived at Ds' dairy farm for pick up. D asked him to wait at end of milk parlor, and P slipped on mixture of manure and water on concrete stairs. P should have known that stairs could be slippery given his knowledge and experience, no excuse for not minding surroundings.

Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman (U.S. 1927)

L for contributory negligence - P's deceased driving his truck was approaching railroad crossing and had no view of D's train approaching at 60mph, he slowed but did not stop and was stuck, killed by train. Court: P had a duty to "stop, look, and listen" when he is unsure if there is a dangerous train approaching, therefore P was liable for negligence as a matter of law. [Martin v. Herzog: tyring to set out a rule that will help everyone]

Kerr v. Connecticut Co. (Conn. 1928)

L for contributory negligence - P's deceased, near deaf, was walking close to D's trolley tracks. D's driver saw that P was too close, warned him with gong and hit the brakes, but P did not move and was struck and killed. (reasonable deaf man would have taken precautions by not walking close to tracks)

Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co. (6th Cir. 1933)

L- D owned and operated barge docked on river. The barge had just been used to haul oil, and D failed to clean out hold so that dangerous gases would not form (against custom). D hired Ps' deceased independent contractors to do a welding job. While workers were on board, a thunderstrom came up, lightnight struck the barge, igniting gas that exploded killing everyone. Court: failure to remove gases created a continuous menace. Any number of foreseeable circumstances could have caused explosion.(Duty: AA of loading the ship with oil or invitor/invtee, Breach: not evacutating gases. NIT, RFH) [A2 Village of Carterville; DF Sugar Notch; Cunillera (LT-MSR)] Cleaning out gases is the first thing youd do.

Vietnamese Fishermen's Association v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan (S.D. Tex. 1981)

NL - D KKK members brought cannon and other firearms onto shrimp boat to intimidate Ps immigrant shrimp catchers, but D's boat not in close enough proximity to commit battery on Ps. (not imminent apprehension of harm)

Bridges v. Kentucky Stone Co. (Ind. 1981)

NL (SL) - 3rd party stole explosives from the D's storage facility and maliciously blew up P's house, who sued D on SL theory for storing explosives. Court: supervening crime cuts off D's L. [DF Yukon (explosion occurred on site)]

Bolton v. Stone (H.L. 1951)

NL (SL) - Cricket player hit ball well, which landed unusually far from D's cricket ground and struck P on adjacent residential street. [A2 Losee (cricket and boiler not ultrahazardous); DF Sullivan tree stump blasting more inherently dangerous than cricket)]

Edwards v. Post Transportation Co. (Cal. App. 1991)

NL (SL) - D delivered sulfuric acid to mistakenly labelled empty tank, which had chemical residue and water. Reaction caused poisonous fumes to escape and severely injured P worker. Court: no SL b/c reasonable care would have avoided accident. [DF Luthringer (SS: poisonous gas escape, but ordinary care did not prevent harm)]

Transco p.l.c. v. Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council (H.L. 2003)

NL (SL) - D housing estate's water pipe developed leaked. D tried to repair leak, but enough water escaped to cause a landslide that exposed and undermined P's gas main, necessitating repairs. Court: no inherent or abnormal risk. [DF Rylands (limits to facts, pipes vs. resevoirs)]

Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather p.l.c. (H.L. 1993)

NL (SL) - D leather manufacturer used solvent as a degreaser, which reguarly spilled and seeped into aquifer, contaminating P's water supply 175mi away 9 mos later. Court: No Blackburn b/c harm unforeseeable (proximate cause issue). [Overrules West v. Bristol Tramways, limits Rylands to foreseeable harm]

Warner v. Norfolk & Western Ry. (W.D. Va. 1991)

NL (SL) - D maintained grade crossing at which its train struck P's passing truck. Court: crossings common and accidents can be eliminated by due care. [A2 Vaughan, DF Siegler]

Miller v. Civil Constructors Inc. (Ill. App. 1995)

NL (SL) - D operated firing range in gravel pit from which bullet ricocheted, escaped and struck P who was riding on a truck on nearby road. P argued that discharging of firearms ultrahazardous activity. Court: shooting ranges dangerous but not ultrahazard

Fowler v. Lanning (Q.B. 1959)

NL (SL) - D shot P. Court: no SL for gunshot [DF Sullivan (SS: both Ps were hurt by explosive device, guns less hazardous than explosives if used with ordinary care)]

Boynton v. Fox Denver Theaters, Inc. (Colo. 1950)

NL (SL) - D theater's employees burned trash in metal drum in back alley. Fire spread to P's adjacent garage causing damage to property. Court: Ds negligent but no SL. A2 Vaughan (both Ds used reasonable precaution) DF Koos (SS: intentional burning; but more controlled, drum vs. open field, less inherent risk)

Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co. (Utah 1942)

NL (SL) - D was dynamite blasting when working on repairs of irrigation canal 100m from P's mink farm. Sound/vibration caused highly sensitivie minks to kill kittens. Court: intervening cause was kitten killing [A2 Carstairs (both intervening causes were animals)]

Crist v. Civil Air Patrol, Inc. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967)

NL (SL) - D's airplane crashed into P's lawn, killing pilot, passengers and causing property damages and personal injuries to P and family. Court: Pilot negligent but no SL. [DF Guille (modern aircraft less inherently risky vs. uncontrollable balloon)]

Maximin v. Rivera (V.I. 1990)

NL (SL) - D's contractor was hauling asphalt in a truck, forgot to yield and struck P injuring her. Court: hauling asphalt not ultrahazard, same result w/ any cargo. D was negligent. [FLIP Siegler (D carrying cargo of gas that spilled and burned P)]

Great Lakes Dredging & Dock Co. v. Sea Gull Operating Corp. (Fla. App. 1984)

NL (SL) - D's giant rock-crushing machine operating to produce sand on public beach disturbed P nearby hotel's guests. Court: no physical danger, only annoying sound [A2 Rogers]

W.H. Smith & Son, Ltd. v. Daw (C.A. 1987)

NL (SL) - D's sewage pipe burst and flowed into P's premises, a neighbor. Court: No Blackburn b/c pipe in building vs. resevoir. [A2 Rickards (bursting pipe w/in property); DF Tenant (pipe vs. cess pit / resevoir)] NB: resevoirs associated w/ SL

Walker Shoe Store v. Howard's Hobby Shop (Iowa 1982)

NL (SL) - D's store heated with an oil furnace. Oil tank leaked into D's basement, and ignited by pilot of hot water heater. Fire spread to and damaged P's property. D checked heater regularly. Court: (1) D used ordinary care maintaining tank (2) escape of oil was neither expected nor inevitable. [DF Lubin (see 1&2, 3 D was not as good of a risk spreader as city)]

Vaughan v. Taff Vale Ry. (Exch. Ch. 1860)

NL (SL) - D's train emitted sparks that burned down P's woods. No previous record of fires, but woods in dry season fire prone and not maintained by P. D took every reasonable precaution to prevent train from emitting sparks. Train had statutory authorization.

Albig v. Municipal Authority (Pa. Super. 1985)

NL (SL) - D's uninspected public reservoir leaked and flooded Ps' basements. Leak caused by subsidence of coal mines operated by other D (supervening cause) [DF Rylands (SS: flooding resevoirs, public vs. private, supervening cause cut off D's L)]

Losee v. Buchanan (N.Y. 1873)

NL (SL) - Ds' steam boiler exploded and sent shrapnel into P's adjacent premises causing property destruction. Court: boiler not ultrahazardous [A2 Vaughan (extends b/c NL even though no opportunity for victim precuation) DF Rylands (SS: hazardous trespassory invasion; boiler vs. resevoir)]

Central Trust & Savings Bank v. Toppert (Ill. App. 1990)

NL (SL) - P bank sued deceased constuction worker's employer (D) for wrongful death in blasting operation at quarry. Too much dynamite was set by other worker and P in same bore hole, and explosion killed P. Court: P's deceased had direct control over dangerous aspect of job (victim precaution, contributory negligence) [DF Sullivan (worker in hazardous job vs. bystander)]

Palumbo v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission (Fla. App. 1986)

NL (SL) - P college student at D's recreation park swam out towards boats in lake and was attacked by an alligator. P ignored signs warning against swimming and feeding alligators.

Carstairs v. Taylor (Exch. 1871)

NL (SL) - P leased gound floor of D's warehouse to store rice. A rate ate through D's rain barrel, which flooded warehouse and destroyed P's goods. Drainage system was inspected 4 days prior to incident. Court: No Blackburn's rule. Drains built for benefit of P and D, no evidence of negligence. [DF Rylands (less trespassory invasion, drain mutually beneficial)]

Rickards v. Lothian (P.C. Austrl. 1913)

NL (SL) - P renting commerical space from D. Trespasser sabotaged D's plumbing system, flooding P's inventory of schoolbooks. Court: D not L for wrongful acts of 3rd party, no reasonable precaution available. [A2 Carstairs (both intervening cause, limited escape of water i.e. within property)]

Delano v. Mother's Super Market, Inc. (Mass. 1960)

NL (SL) - P slipped on ice formed by rain drainage off D's roof onto D's parking lot. Court: no esacpe of water from property, and low inherent risk. [DF Rylands]

Kent v. Gulf State Utilities (La. 1982)

NL (SL) - P's deceased working on highway construction, dragging rake w/ 30' handle over wet concrete. D's uninsulated power lines were 25' above ground and clearly visible. P tried to avoid wires but rake contacted, electrocuting and killing P. Court: no SL and D not negligent [A2 Central Trust & Savings (Ps controlled dangerous aspect of job); DF Sullivan (P worker vs. P bystander)]

New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Power Co. (Wash. 1984)

NL (SL) - Phone Co.'s independent contractor breached D's gas main, which leaked for 7 years. P while lighting oil stove ignited accumulated gas from leak several blocks away, explosion destroyed house and injured P. Court: running gas through pipes not ultrahazard [A2 Cambridge (leak occured slowly over long time), DF Siegler (pipe vs. resevoir of flammable liquid, slow vs. instant escape and harm)]

In re Chicago Flood Litigation (Ill. 1997)

NL (SL) - Ps (businesses connected to the Loop, underground freight tunnel system) were economically harmed when river flooded basements. Ps sued D city and contractor that was pile driving in wrong location while working on bridge repair, which caused breach in Loop tunnel. Court: although ultrahazard, harm occured b/c of negligence. [DF Caporale (SS: pile-driving, wrong place so cause of harm was mistake not activity itself)]

Thomalen v. Marriott Corp. (D. Mass. 1994)

NL (SL) - Ps actors performing at D hotel were injurred when P attempted a fire-breathing act, lit himself on fire and other P actor tried to save him, also burned, kicked can of lighter fluid that spilled across stage, and burned P hotel guest. Court: no trespassory invasion.

Rogers v. Elliott (Mass. 1888)

NL (SL) - Sunstroked P recovering in house across the street from D's church. P's doctor and father asked church not to ring bells, but D rang anyway, which caused P's violent convulsions slowing recovery. Court: P was unusually sensitive and opporunity for victim precaution [A2 Madsen (sound/vibration not associated with SL)]

A.C. ex rel. Cooper v. Bellingham School District (Wash. App. 2004)

NL - At off-site birthday party, D's teacher let piñata bat slip from her hands and it flew hitting P, a first-grade student, in the face causing injury. D's teacher had taken all reasonable safety precautions in planning and during party. However, she specifically warned children to firmly grip handle, and she owned the bat and had extensive piñata experience. (momentary mistake i.e. inadvertent negligence); purple one: jury is allowed to exculpate; [Mackey: forgetfulness; here, clumsiness.] [Barker: trying to miss it, but driver misjudged-clumsiness.]

City of Boca Raton v. Mattef (Fla. 1956)

NL - Before K to paint D city's water tower, P's deceased (bare licensee / trespasser) climbed D's tower to begin job without approval. A steel ladder rung broke and P's deceased fell do his death. Court: P was a bare licensee, had not reached status of invitee because no K. D had no knowledge of danger.

Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (N.Y. 1931)

NL - Business hired D accountant to prepare and certify an end-of-year balance sheet. D knew that business was heavily indebted and would use balance sheet in financial dealings. In reliance on D's audit, P made loans to business, which was discovered to be insolvent. D failed to discover that business' books were falsified (finding a duty would expose accountants to indeterminate liability, adverse selection) [DF Glanzer (SS: erroneous certification relied upon in a financial transaction i.e. a misfeasance, but here D did not know the precise "end and aim")]

Mahone v. Birmingham Electric Co. (Ala. 1954)

NL - D bus driver deposited P passenger on street instead of crub marked as a bus zone, as mandated by city ordinance, and P slipped on a banana peel, fell and was injured. (OSR, LT-MSR i.e. incidental relationship between letting off passenger and banana slip) here, the intent of the statute was not intending (unlike DaHaen) [A2 DiCaprio, Lua, Sugar Notch]

Hosein v. Checker Taxi Co. (Ill. App. 1981)

NL - D cab company failed to install protective partition in P's deceased cab, and two robbers shot and killed P's deceased. (employer / employee relationship did not create duty, nonfeasance)

Williams v. Hays, (N.Y. 1899)

NL - D captain of cargo S/V reasonably became exhausted and deranged after 48hrs at helm in storm, after refusing offers to tow (untaken precaution), then rested and took quinine, ship ran aground. P ship owners sued for negligence, D claimed insanity as defense. Court: D exercised reasonable care until it was impossible given his condition.

Coste v. Riverside Motors, Inc. (Conn. App. 1991)

NL - D car dealer refused to allow P mechanic to leave work early b/c approaching snowstorm. D required P to stay and finish assigned duties. P left at 5:30pm and crashed into P. [DF Robertson (finishing duties vs. misfeasance of forcing 27 hr shift)]

Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (Cal. 2004)

NL - D childcare center's playground next to street was surrounded by weak 4ft high chain link fence. A homicidal maniac intentionally crashed his car through fence killing P's 2 children and injurying others. There was prior incident in which a runaway mail truck crashed through the fence, but nobody was injured. (IIT, violent criminal assaults not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on D) [A2 Ann M , Donehue; DF Robinson] [the violence of the driver was unforseeable,] [Duty: the kids were invitees and AA of putting playground near busy street. brech of duty: not putting up a strong fence.] [Bigbee v. Telephone: drunk driver was not a supervening cause, but here he was bc it's more prob that someone will be drunk driiving, not someone maliciously driiving into the school.] [Snyder: both parties were malicious, attempting murder. bigbee, not as bad - just drunk driving.]

City of Piqua v. Morris (Ohio 1918)

NL - D city operated hydraulic dam with series of ponds to collect surplus water, one adjacent to P's farm. D failed to clean off grates covering openings from embankment, which burst and flooded P's farm during exteme rainfall. Court: vis major of extraordrinary rainfall was cause in fact of the flooding, which would have happened regardless of untaken precautions. [DF Krincich (potential success of untaken precuation)] [Nichols v. Marsland - no liability cuz its a force majeure]

Madden v. D.C. Transit System, Inc. (D.C. App. 1973)

NL - D city's bus regularly emitted oily fumes that came into contact with the body of P, a pedestrian. Court: no showing of intent.

New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad (2d Cir. 1920)

NL - D did not equip barge with lifesaving floatation device. P's deceased, unable to swin, fell overboard. His wife saw him struggling, went below to get a line, but he had dissappeared when she returned. P was not in a position to be saved for very long.--[SR: employee-employer; breach of duty: absence of the life rings] [FLIP Weirum: if there was no proof if the kids hadnt been listening to the radio but were still going fast; the breach of duty still would have existed bc some kids would still be listening it.]

Morgan v. Pistone (Utah 1970)

NL - D doctor angrily touched P neighbor, who had called him a quack, and told her he did not like that name. D claimed touch was to get P's attention (facts in favor of D). [DF Collins (D's act generally acceptable conduct)]

Alarid v. Vanier (Cal. 1958)

NL - D driving 20mph approached intersection, tried to brake 200ft from stopped cars, but brakes completely failed and D rear-ended P. The car was <10 yrs old, maintained, and D had been driving and successfully using brakes earlier in the day Court: negligence per se from violation Vehicle Code rebuttable by evidence of valid excuse. D exercised reasonable care in maintaining car. [A2 A.C. ex rel. Cooper (inadvertent negligence after all reasonable precautions); DF Martin (no excuse there)] [Flip Martin v Herzog: if the lights had turned off without warning due to battery power; would be an excuse] [This is a purple case.]

Bryant v. Glastetter (Cal. App. 1995)

NL - D drunk driver was pulled over by CHP and arrested for DUI. CHP called P's deceased tow truck driver to tow D's car. While he was worked on shoulder of highway, another driver struck and killed him. (Duty & Breach: AA of driving drunk, DCE, LT-MSR because tow truck driver would have been on the job and exposed to same risk regardless of D's sobriety) [A2 Sugar Notch; Cunillera, Richards v. Stanley; DF Betancourt] [direct consequences case? was there an intervening cause? YES. DCE.] [Reasonable foresight? yes. Driver did not increase the risk of the ] cunillera v. randall: the speed had nothing to do with,

Romero v. National Rifle Association (D.C. Cir. 1984)

NL - D employee at NRA building in DC kept unregistered pistol locked in his office. Thieves burglarized office and stole D's pistol, using it 4 days later to shoot and kill victim in robbery. Court: D keeping gun at office was not negligent per se according to DC Firearms Act because purpose of statute not to prevent harm from stolen guns. -- He had not registered his gun, but statute was aimed to give guns to proper people. Contrasted the statute with regards to retail gun stores: they now how to legislate re: theft. [DF Martin v Herzog: statute was trying to prevent exactly the issue in question.]

Yania v. Bigan (Pa. 1959)

NL - D enticed and inveigled P's deceased to jump into a water-filled ditch, P did so, and D failed to rescue him as he drowned. Court: words of encouragement and enticement not sufficient to create a duty of care to rescue P. (Assumption of the risk) [DF Weirum (voluntary encounter of risk vs. EFR)]

Bolsenbroek v. Tully & DiNapoli, Inc. (N.Y. 1961)

NL - D excavated street ditch to install utility conduits, and placed lighted smudge pots along side of ditch as warning to traffic. Children had been and were playing in excavation (D's watchman was not on duty). Boy ignited oily rag on smudge pot flame, and another boy removed burning rag with stick, twirling it, flaming rag flew off into P boy's face injuring him. (IIT not EFR b/c boy's acts beyond reasonable expectations, and not a scarce opporunity) [A2 Donehue v. Duvall 705 (same case), Brewster v. Rankins 503; DF Hughes, Elgin, Richardson (D not supervising and FRs caused foreseeable harm)]

Doughty v. Turner Manufacturing Co. (Q.B. 1964)

NL - D factory maintained vat filled with superheated molten cyanide. Employee knocked asbestos/cement cover into vat, but they did not think it was dangerous. 1-2mins later molten liquid errupted from vat injuring bystanders including P. The cover material had a chemical reaction with the molten liquid that created steam and caused explosion. (Duty: employer/employee, breach: allow cover to slip into vat (possibility of splash) NIT, SDK) [A2 Wagon Mound; DF Barker, Ridley (unknown chemical vs. pneumatic explosion)] [Grifall: diff: tires were overinflated, scientists did know that tires were overinflated and run over rocks, they could blow up]

Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (Exch. 1856)

NL - D failed to clean ice off fire plug (wooden fire hydrant) during a unusually severe winter, pipes froze and burst, flooding P's property. Untaken precaution: not removing the wooden plugs to clear ice that would have prevented bursting. Court: D reasonably ignornant b/c new technology and lack of awareness of proper precautions necessary in rare extreme weather. [DF Vaughan v. Menlove (here a reasonably person in D's position would not have realized the risk)]

Haskins v. Grybko (Mass. 1938)

NL - D farmer and landowner was out hunting woodchucks that were destroying his squash crop, when he accidentally shot P's deceased and discovered the body the next morning. Court: P was a trespasser so D NL for mere negligence (not intentional injury from willful, wanton and reckless conduct)

Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co. v. Matlock (Cal. App. 1997)

NL - D gas station clerk sold cigarettes to underaged 17-year-old (in violation of statute). Boy was hanging out with other boys in a warehouse filled with stacks of telephone poles. One boy accidentally pushed another, whose lit cigarette fell between poles and on to bed of sand. He tried to extinguish it by spitting, but was unsuccsesssful. 20 mins later fire started damages poles and warehouse. (OSR - illegal sale of tobacco unrelated to fire supression)

Hennessey v. Pyne (R.I. 1997)

NL - D golfer hit shot that veered and struck P neighbor (condo regularly hit but golf balls), but D did not see P or intend to hit her.

Lyvere v. Ingles Markets, Inc. (N.C. App. 1978)

NL - D grocery store failed to move rug near exit of store that was blowing around in strong winds. P and check-out lady noticed child struggling therefore existence of danger. P tried to exit and carpet blew and took out her legs, P fell and was injured. (no duty b/c P noticed obvious defect, contributory negligence); She had equal opportunity to use precaution; rug is for productive use. Cooley: taking the rug away was the same as taking away basket (both can have positive, but more negative consequences)

Stacy v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (Wis. 1893)

NL - D hired P's horses to cut ice on frozen lake. While attempting to hitch horse to scraper, horses spooked and galloped off through snow onto thin ice, broke through and drowned. P argued untaken precautions were failing to erect a fence at edge of thin ice and failing to have ropes availble to rescue horses. Court: unlikely that untaken precautions would have prevented harm. [Davis v. Consolidated Rail: riniging the horn was a low burden, but here, none of the three would have effective in avoiding harm]

Rose v. Morris (Ga. App. 1958)

NL - D hooked golf ball and neglected to shout 'fore', and ball struck P at different hole 125 yards away at 17 degree angle from D's position. (P assumed risk by playing golf at the club)[No negligence as a matter of law][This is Learned Hand, no negligence] [A2 Greene v. Sibley: "untaken precaution" was not a useful.]

Tuberville v. Savage (K.B. 1669)

NL - D insulted P who placed hand on his sword and said to D, "If it were not assize time, I would not take such language from you." (NL b/c no intent to touch P)

Pitre v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. (La. App. 1970)

NL - D insurer of fair that operated ball toss. Player while winding up struck P's deceased child in temple, killing him. Fair did not separate area where players were throwing and spectators. (probability of harm low, not foreseeable enough to justify roping off throwers or more stringent monitoring of the area. D's expert witness said never seen carnival rope off throwers)

Aguirre v. Adams (Kan. App. 1991)

NL - D landlord did not fix hot water in P's bathroom despite repeated complaints and in violation of building code. P infant's mother had to carry in buckets of boiling water from kitchen to bathroom to bathe P. While doing so, mother left P in front of TV. After 2nd bucket load was put in bath and mother went back for last one, P jumped into boiling bath and suffered severe burns. (Hot water WAS in tub, negligent supervision. Causality is too attenuated to be legally cognizable) [A2 Lua, Selger; DF Mangan] There was cause in fact (because if they had provided hot water, this incident wouldnt have happened), but there was also an IIT by the mom who wasn't supervising the child. SELGER: this statut was for health and welfare of ppl, like in Selger health and welfare statute. MANGAN: public health statute too, but there was NIT.

Nichols v. Marsland (C.A. 1871)

NL - D manor's ornamental pools overflowed during a severe storm causing flood that destroyed P county's bridges. [DF Rylands (SS: water collection on D's land; but supervening vis major cause of flood and diversion of natural water source vs. manually filled reservoir)]

Pittsburg Reduction Co. v. Horton (Ark. 1908)

NL - D mining company employed D general foreman who discarded tin box of dynamite caps on path regularly used by school children. 10-year-old boy picked up box, took it home for a week and played with caps in presence of parents who denied knowing nature of items but father worked in mining and mother picked up and put away caps several times. Boy traded caps to P's 13-year-old son who tried to pick dirt out of a cap when it exploded, severely injuring hand that was amputated. (NCP). Parents didnt take protective precaution--COMPANY duty: AA by co who threw out the blasting caps; untaken precaution: not throwing near school; cause in fact: no, cuz the mom was the intervening tort. MOM: AA: not taking caps; and Not taking cpas away from childs NCP; concurrent efficient causes. CARMONA PADILLA: AA/Cause in fact: gving arrow to the child to grandchild cuz he was dangerous shooter - Ecourage free radical EFR.

Laidlaw v. Sage (N.Y. 1896)

NL - D moved P, his clerk, into position where P would be human shield against explosion about to be set off by extortionist bomber. Court: No evidence that D intentionally put P in harm's way.

Milligan v. Country Line Liquors (Ark. 1986)

NL - D negligently sold a minor a six-pack of beer in violation of statute. The minor got in his car, and lost control of the car while attempting to open one of the bottles, colliding in to P's deceased car. (OSR, LT-MSR) [A2 Cunillera, Mahone; DF Osborne, DeHaen] doesnt matter that it was beer, coulda happened with coke. here, statute not designed to the type of accident that occurred.

Pulka v. Edelman (N.Y. 1976)

NL - D operated city parking garage from which motorist exited and struck P, a pedestrian walking on the sidewalk. D omitted precaution of installing safety mirrors. (nonfeasance) [FLIP Weirum: cash prize for 1st driver to exit garage]

Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Town of Vestal (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)

NL - D power company left tree branches untrimmed which blew down onto power lines during a storm. The powerlines fell onto a metal speed limit sign that conducted electricity into ground and arced onto a natural gas main, puncturing it. Gas escaped through hole, collected in house 50ft away and eventually exploded destroying house. (CTC transformation of energy) [A2 Palsgraf][DUty: AA of putting up powerlines; breach: failing to trim branches near the powerlines] [Pridham: was also a complicated chain, but there was liability in pridhm bc the rescue did not count since it was what you naturally do when there is an emergency. here, no rescue.]

Belhumeur v. Zilm (N.H. 2008)

NL - D promised to remove wild bees that had nested on his property but failed and P neighbor was attacked. D did solicit bids from contractors to cut down the tree. Court: soliciting bids not enough of an affirmative undertaking to create a duty. [DF Marsalis (SS: animal attacks and D promised, but here P did not detrimentally rely on D's promise); A2 Haynesworth (nonfeasances)]

Ellis v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. (Ky. App. 1952)

NL - D railroad employed P to maintain sanding apparatuses on train, frequently exposing P to inhalation of dust. D failed to provide P with protective mask that many years later would have prevented silicosis. Trade custom was not to provide such masks. [DF TJ Hooper (SS: Ds failed to provide tool to P to prevent risk, which was uncustomary (similarity), here there was no knowledge of occupational risk, no one knew of silicosis - was not foreseeable)]

DiCaprio v. New York Central R.R. (N.Y. 1921)

NL - D railroad neglected to fence off tracks, as required by statute to prevent livestock from being stucked by trains. P farmer previously received compensation after train hit cow. P's 2-year-old son momentarily escape, wandered on to tracks and was struck and killed by train. (OSR - legislative intent was to prevent livestock from being hit by trains, not children) [Tingle v. Chicago 542]

Garcia v. Paramount Citrus Association (Cal. App. 2008)

NL - D ranch owner failed to post sign on his private road that intersection with public road was near by, and trespasser on this road collided with P workers traveling on public road. Court: no duty arising from nonpermissive, negligent use of properpty by trespassing 3rd party. Harm was not foreseeable, and burden of precaution would be great on farming community. [A2 Pulka (3rd party driver exiting D's property)]

Cornell v. Aquamarine (Ohio App. 1983)

NL - D resort hotel allowed P, a guest, to play racketball with improper shoes and she fell and broke her leg. Court: insufficient evidence that D actually knew that P was wearing improper shoes. [DF Brasseaux (SS: inn-keeper / guest, P brought risk with her vs. dangerous defect on property), Fox West Coast (SS: failure to warn, both Ps bringing risk to land, but in Fox Ds knew of the risk)]

Stiver v. Good & Fair Carting & Moving Inc. (N.Y. 2007)

NL - D safety inspection station failed to notice defect in car it certified for state-mandated vehicle inspection, and later this car had a massive drivetrain failure causing the car to stall on highway. P rear-ended the stalled car and was injured. Court: breach of K obligation not sufficient to impose L for injuries to noncontracting 3rd parties. Policy: court unwilling to require D to insure against indeterminate risks (adverse selection)

Brewster v. Rankins (Ind. App. 1992)

NL - D school and teacher entrusted 9 year old with golf club, providing safety instruction, and allowed child to take club home, who accidently struck P's child in the head while practicing a swing. [DF Carmona (more willfull negligent entrustment)]

Widlowski v. Durkee Foods (Ill. App. 1990)

NL - D spice manufacturer's employee entered to clean industrial tank filled with nitrogen gas, failing to wear protective gear or purge tank. He was overcome by gas, oxygen deprivation, and became restless, incoherent and delerious. At hospital in state of delerium, he bit off portion of P nurse's finger. (Duty: employer L for negligent acts of employee within scope of employment, breach: allowing entry into tank w/o gear or purge, CTC, IIT, respondeat superior weakened because employee outside control of D) [A2 Davidson; DF Pridham, Robinson]

Morgan v. Loyacomo (Miss. 1941)

NL - D store's manager falsely accused P of shoplifting and grabbed package that P was carrying under her arm. Court: not necessily to contact body directly, rude or insolent indirect contact sufficient.

Houserman v. Garrett (Ala. 2004)

NL - D surgeon conducting delicate abdominal microsurgery failed to remove sponge before closing P's surgical incision. Ds performed visual check, sponge count, but manual check was ineffective due to delicacy of procedure. [DF Chi Yun Ho v. Frye (procedure extremely delicate which prevented thorough manual check)]

Brooker v. Silverthorne (S.C. 1919)

NL - D told P operator over phone, "If I were there I would break your damned neck", P was afriad and becaome nervous wreck. Court: D's language was threat but not sufficient to put a person of ordinary reason and firmness in fear of bodily harm.

Seith v. Commonwealth Electric Co. (Ill. 1909)

NL - D utility ran powerlines over busy street without guard wires or device to prevent wires from falling. Two live wires with worn out insulation broke, fell to the ground and were exposed, threads loose and hot. P unwittingly was leaving an apartment building as a police officer used club to flip up wire in P's direction, who instinctively caught the wire and was severely injured. (IIT) [A2 Synder, DF Philco (SS: intervening intentional act, highly dangerous and commonly understood risks vs. playful ingorance) Herman v. Markham Air Rifle (blameworthiness of intervening actor is diff. here, deliberate negligence.)]

Fuller v. State (Tex. Ct. App. 1903)

NL - D walked up to P and made a kissing gesture at her twice.

Blaak v. Davidson (Wash. 1975)

NL - D was driving gas truck on highway when dust storm suddenly kicked up and completely obscured his visibility, he slowed to <10mph but crashed into P's car at 2-3mph. (D had justification for driving at slow speed rather than stopping because he was carrying hazardous cargo (gas) and did not want to get rear-ended)--[Cooley: the D should have put baskets, but was held not a breach of duty bc that would have been more dangerous to pedestrians; here, more dangerous too.]

Evans v. Heard (Ga. 1994)

NL - D was driving his truck and pulling his son's trailer. The wheel fell off trailer's axle an P driver collided with it. (D did not have exclusive control) [DF Siegler v. Kuhlman (in that case D owned the gas truck and employed it driver)] [Campbell: He didnt own the airplane.]

Ballew v. Aiello (Mo. App. 1967)

NL - D was sleeping passenger in car. Driver pulled car onto shoulder to avoid oncoming car in middle of road. D roused from sleep, grabbed steering wheel causing car to crash into P. Court: half asleep and reacted instinctively and instantaneously to situation, therefore act was involuntary (stretch) similar to fainting spell. [Similar Zabunoff: involuntary act; this case extends Zabunoff]

Allen v. Slim Pickens Enterprises (Wyo. 1989)

NL - D western movie star extended open invitation to P cowboy singer on his RV honeymoon to D's cabin. While looking for key, P slipped on long grass and severely injured his eye. Court: Even if P was invitee, no liability because obvious danger. [DF Lordi (there AA)]

Wise v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 1990)

NL - D wife, without warning neighbors, deserted her dangerous husband (drug abuse, mental illness, wild animals and arsenal of firearms). Husband mounted a sniper attack on highway from their home's rooftop, severely injuring motorists including Ps. (nonfeasance) [A2 Hansa; DF Tarasoff (SS: special relationship psychiatrist:killer::D:killer, but wife not professional predictor of violence)]

Buchanan v. Rose (Tex. 1942)

NL - D with a nonoverloaded truck broke a bridge on rural road, creating hazard. A motorist caught up with driver and told him what he had done. D refused to return and put up a warning sign. 6 days later Ps drove into the defect and were injured. [DF Montgomery (normal use vs. jackknifing, gov't responsible for bridge maintenance)]

Walt Disney Productions v. Shannon (Ga. 1981)

NL - D's Mickey Mouse Club TV show encouraged viewers to attempt dangerous sound effects stunt involving shaking BBs in inflated balloon. In recreating stunt, P (11) put out his eye. Court: speech was protected b/c it did not create a "clear and present danger" [DF Weirum (risk of harm less foreseeable)]

Van Houten v. Pritchard (Ark. 1994)

NL - D's cat that showed no disposition toward biting or being abnormally dangerous wandered into P's garage, urinated, and as P tried to take it outside, bit his finger. [DF Marshall (cat w/ no propensity to violence vs. vicious hog)]

Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co. (Ala. 1993)

NL - D's employee inadvertently left gun behind counter of gas station.Next day employee on shift's friend P visited the station. While employee was sweeping, P went behind counter, found gun and shot himself in the head. No indication of suicidal tendancies. (supervening cause) [DF O'Toole (less foreseeable harm)]

Alexander v. Allen (Fla. App. 1989)

NL - D's friends, including P, were socializing when 2 armed men appeared on porch, forced everyone inside and told everyone to be quiet, D started screaming and gunmen opened fire shooting and severely injuring P. Court: no AA b/c involuntary, caused by fear and panic. [A2 Laidlaw; DF Weirum]

Kohl v. Disneyland, Inc. (Cal. App. 1962)

NL - D's horse pulling surrey (stage coach) spooked, ran away dragging the surrey and P invitee passengers with it. Wheel hit a curb, tipped over injuring Ps. Took precautions/due care: D's drivers were tested before hiring, and horses selected for their manageability. Driver did not know what caused horse to spook, perhaps presence of ladder and man working on gaslight, but no similar priors. (D excerised due care and unforeseeable accident was not due to their negligence) [A2 Smith v. Caplan; DF Reinzi - horse rides]

The Kathryn B. Guinan (2d Cir. 1910)

NL - D's scow (sailing barge) was moored bow in to pier adjacent and tied to P's scow. D's scow's captain was sleeping but no night watchperson was abroad, and suddenly sank early in the morning, taking P's scow with her. Court: untaken precaution was not customary (costly). [DF Carroll (burden of untaken precaution about the same, risk reduction less here b/c captain on board and freak accident)]

Kahle v. Glosser Brothers (W.D. Pa. 1971)

NL - D's security guard grabbed P's deceased arm, threateningly and asked 'Where is butter and cheese? You are shoplifting', which caused P to suffer a heart attack and die.

Tingle v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. (Iowa 1882)

NL - D's train engineer ran over P's cow on a Sunday, a day when state statute prohibited the running of trains. (violation of statute not proximate cause of collision, cow could have been there any day) [DF Martin v. Herzog (safety statute vs. "blue law" i.e. not to prevent harm to cows but to encourage people to go to church)] [Selger: statute not a safety purpose] [Martin v Herzog: it was a safety statute]

Shipman v. Boething Treeland Farms, Inc. (Cal. App. 2000)

NL - D's tree farm employee was driving station wagon on property's dirt road to collect belongings after eye injury, when he crashed into P trespassing ATV driver. (NL b/c CA recreational use statute) [Extends Ornelas (statute includes active negligence of D's employee driver)]

Dunn v. Teti (Pa. App. 1979)

NL - D, 6-year-old, carelessly swung stick injuring P, also 6 years old. Court: Held for D, applying categorical gloss for minors of different ages: 0-7 no liability, 7-14 presumed no liability but maybe as minor approaches 14, 14-18 capable of negligence. (More generous rule for children vs. intentional tortL)

Lobert v. Pack (Pa. 1939)

NL - D, a sleeping passenger, kicked car seat against P, the driver, causing car accident. (no voluntary act)

Ornelas v. Randolph (Cal. 1993)

NL - P child tresspassed with group of kids on to D's farm, and was playing near old farm equipment. Another child was playing on old machine when a metal pipe dislodged, and fell on P. Court: no L b/c CA's recreational use statute.

Harper v. Herman (Minn. 1993)

NL - D, an experienced boatman, took guests on a pleasure cruise on lake. He anchored the boat knowingly in shallow water but where bottom was not visible. P guest dove overboard without talking to D, broken his neck. (not common carrier) [DF Baxter (opportunity for victim precaution, more foreseeable harm)]

Knight v. Jewett (Cal. 1992)

NL - D, in touch football game, intentionally ran over P and accidentally stepped on her finger. D was playing aggressively and had been warned by P, but did not intend to step on her hand.

Acosta v. Fuentes (N.Y. Super. 1991)

NL - D-restaurant's waiters carried choking P's deceased customer outside onto sidewalk, called 911, bystanders tried to help, and ambulance arrived 30mins later. P died 2 weeks later in hospital. Court: Ds' removal of P did not worsen condition (no AA) [DF Zelenko (no isolation from assistance)]

Novak Heating & Air Conditioning v. Carrier Corp. (Iowa 2001)

NL - D1 (Carrier) manufacturer shipped air conditioning unit wrapped in shrink-wrap and packed between wooden pallets to P via D2 (Yellow Freight) common carrier, and it arrived damaged at P's store. D2 did not inspect or unpack unit while in possession. P sued Ds in small claims for cost of repairs. Unlikely that both Ds dropped the unit. (Without proof that D1 and D2 were negligent, burden on P to prove who caused damage) [A2 Garcia same case] [DF: Summers you get joint liability cuz they both breached the duty; ]

Selger v. Steven Brothers (Cal. App. 1990)

NL - Dog feces often accumulated on sidewalk outside D's store, whose employees customarily swept the sidewalk in the mornings. D failed to clean sidewalk one morning (violated municpal code), and P slipped on feces and injured. (D owed duty only to city, not to pedestrians. Although nonfeasance, duty imposed by statute, but not to P's class of persons; OSR)

Menu v. Minor (Colo. App. 1987)

NL - Driver involved in accident abandoned vehicle blocking lane on highway and was picked up by D's cab driver. P crashed into abandoned car, and sued D for failing to notify authorities of crash hazard. [DF Carbal, Montgomery (nonfeasance vs. misfeasances)]

Nevarez v. Thriftimart, Inc. (Cal. App. 1970)

NL - Driver struck and killed P's 3-year-old child who was running across street from house to amusement park that D grocery store set up in parking lot. (Untaken precaution: not holding fair, too burdensome) [DF Schwartz v. Helms Bakery (whole class of children neighbors vs. specific AA and specific child)]

Freedman v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 1989)

NL - Ds OBGYNs told P mother in labor to request Pitocin from hospital to prevent infection when they knew it was labor inducer. P's hard contractions harmed baby. [DF Rains (no independent or improper motive)]

Bixby v. Eddy (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)

NL - Ds delinquents were harassing Ps couple at zoo and ominously followed their motorcycle. P crashed motorcyle on curve partially because he was looking out for Ds. (Ds did not intend harmful contact)

Madden v. Ceglio (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)

NL - Ds high school students were playing piggback on wet city sidewalk and fell against store front window crashing through it. Police arrived with P store employee, 30-45 mins later the P was staning 3-4 ft from broken window when a large shard of glass fell on her arm injuring her. Court: subsequent injury too remote or attenuated from any foreseeable risks created by Ds' piggyback ride. (NIT, CHC) [DF In re People] [duty: piggy back; ]

Hansra v. Superior Court (Magana) (Cal. App. 1992)

NL - Ds inlaws of Ps' deceased, disliked her and disapproved of their marriage. Ds isolated Ps' deceased, destablilized violent and mentally ill husband, prompting him to murder Ps' deceased. [A2 Wise (Ds conduct not AA that created the risk (but here provocative conduct); DF Tarasoff (family not as special as doctor / patient, family not pro predictors of violence, more oppprtunity for victim precaution)]

Richards v. Stanley (Cal. 1954)

NL - Ds left car unattended, unlocked on street with key in ignition (violation of municipal code), which was stolen by a car thief who crashed car into P motorcylist. Court: although D's AA increased the risk of theft, not foreseeable that thief would be incompetent or reckless driver. (IIT, OSR - purpose of statute not to prevent car accidents) [A2 Selger (nonfeasances, statutes did not create duty to Ps)]

Haines v. Fisher (10th Cir. 1996)

NL - Ds police officers staged pretend robbery of 7-11 where P was clerk and even fired blanks from M16, but P recognized the shooter as a friend before he shot. P sued for assault. Court: no immediate apprehension of bodily injury.

Cullen v. Ramberg (Cal. App. 2012)

NL - Ds surgeons performed posterior cervical fusion on P who was intubated with a tracheal tube by D anesthesiologist. When P came to, his throat was sore and his voice was hoarse, difficulty swallowing and breathing. 2nd opinion that he had vocal cord paralysis, but symptoms worse than anatomical findings. Ds presented undisputed evidence conclusively establishing that surgery not cause of injury. [DF Ybarra-limiting it. was also not totally clear who committed the trauma. here, they know the surgeons could not have done it; there was sequential operations (anesthesiologist-->surgeon) left anesthisiologist as sole tortfeasor. 704 (SS: Ps injured while under GA, here Ds provided sufficient evidence to exculpate themselves)]

Cucinotti v. Ortmann (Pa. 1960)

NL - Ds threatened Ps that unless they vacated their premises, they would beat them, and showed them blackjacks. Court: no showing that blackjacks were produced with show of force as to place Ps in immediate fear of harmful contact.

Wims v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Cal. App. 2002)

NL - Ds were transporting large Styrofoam billets short distance on highway, which they secured with rope. Styrofoam broke off from one of the billets and shattered in to pieces as it hit pavement. Ds stopped to collect pieces. P hit a piece with his car, and it jammed under the car. Ds removed the piece lodged under vehicle. [DF Kesewaa (falling shopping carts more dangerous than Styrofoam)] This accident

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Van Benshoten (Ohio 1929)

NL - Ds' employees were laying an underground conduit on D's property. Employees set up a makeshift outhouse over a manhole leading to a sewer. P tried to use the outhouse, lit a cigarette that ignited sewer gas, causing explosion and injury. (Trespasser, not foreseeable that he would light a flame in the outhouse)

Strauss v. Belle Realty Co. (N.Y. 1985)

NL - During NY Blackout, P's water supply was shutoff and fell down stairs on way to basement to get water. Lighting was provided in staircase under contract between D landlord and D utility. (no privity of K and no reckless or wanton negligence) [DF Food Pageant]

H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. (N.Y. 1928)

NL - Fire started in a building in spread to P's adjacent warehouse. Efforts to extinguish fire failed due to inadequate water pressure at hydrant. P sued D water utility (under K with city) for negligently failing to maintain water pressure during fire fight (D was notified). Court: failure to maintain pressure was a nonfeasance and allowing duty would create unlimited L during a major fire (correlated losses) D not able to insure against value of goods in warehouse (adverse selection) [DF Glanzer misfeasance vs. nonfeasance]

Gomes v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. (Conn. 2001)

NL - Guests at D's hotel informed desk clerk about potential burglary of next door P's gas station, and although clerk promised to call 911 and assured guest that P had an alarm system, clerk did nothing even after other guests warned of fire that destroyed P's gas station. (no special relationship or undertaking) [DF Bloomberg (no promise); Zelenka (no prevention of 3rd party assistance)]

O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co. (Mass. 1861)

NL - In order to clear immigration, P waited in line for small pox vaccine. She protested saying she already had vaccine, but held out arm and D administered. P suffered adverse reaction. Court: implied consent by conduct (waiting in line).

Lynch v. Rosenthal (Kan. App. 1965)

NL - Mentally challenged (retarded) P was helping D operate a mechanical corn-picker. D instructed P to walk in between the picker and following wagon and to pick up any discarded husks. D knew it was dangerous for P to get close to picker, but failed to clearly warn him. P's arm was caught in picker and injured. (P contributorily neglient); they cut the P some slack here because it was an "obvious" defect. Idea of fairness at play: the P was benefitting D financially.

Lilpan Food Corp. v. Consolidated Edison (N.Y. Super. 1985)

NL - NY Blackout knocked out street lights and P's supermarket was vandalized as a result. P sued D utiltiy for negligently failing to prevent blackout. Court: no privity of K. Street lights were for whole public not just supermarket. [A2 Strauss; DF Food Pageant]

Smith v. Lampe (6th Cir. 1933)

NL - On a foggy day, P operated a tug boat and barge and arranged with harbor to guide them in by fog horn. D lakeside resident heard horns and thought boat was going to run aground, made warning signals that inadvertedly guided tug towards shore instead of harbor. Tug realized and turned around but barge crashed and was damaged. (D exercised reasonable care)

Kohler v. Aspen Airways (Cal. App. 1985)

NL - On flight over Lake Tahoe, D's commercial aircraft dropped 500 feet in two seconds due to unexpected clear air turbulence, and P passenger sustained neck injuries. Weather forecast was clear with moderate turbulence. Pilot kept seat belt light on during entire flight as precautionary measure. P was wearing her seatbelt. (turbulence encoutered was unpredictable and unavoidable i.e. ordinarily occurs without negligence) The pilot had ordered for seatbealt to be fastened; if he had not, maybe some liability. [DF Swissotel - both machines falling, but elevators dont fall 9 stories, but easy for a plane to fall 500 ft. ]

Alexander v. Town of New Castle (1888)

NL - P (appointed special constable) arrested a street gambler, who pushed P into unfenced pit next to sidewalk and escaped. P sued city for negligently maintaining the unfenced excavation next to the sidewalk. (Criminal was independent intervening human agency that cut of D's liability, IIT, LT-MSR) [A2 Central of Georgia Ry. ( intervening negligence destroyed systematic relationship between Ds and injury to Ps)]

Elliman v. Gombar (Ohio App. 1949)

NL - P (bare licensee or trespasser) went to D's house at night to inquire about friend's whereabouts, thinking friend still lived there. He fell through a hole in D's porch that had been dug for repairs. (no trap, obvious danger)

Cunillera v. Randall (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)

NL - P 10-year-old and other children were playing with an open fire hydrant in the street. Another child pushed P in front of the stream of water that propelled P rapidly and forcibly into the street. Just at that moment D was speeding down street in her car, and P slammed into rear side panel of car sustaining injuries. (if D had been going faster the P would not have hit the car. No systematic relationship between speed of car and injury, LT-MSR); She owed duty by AA of driving, the untaken precaustion was going to fast; cause in fact: her speed; no intervening tort (questionable); changing the speed of driver woud be the last thing youd think of to prevent accident; Flip to L: if he was pushed into stream of water, and kid was pushed in front of the car (not ot the side).

Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (Cal. 2001)

NL - P FedEx delivery lady was assaulted and nearly raped at Ds' extremely dangerous apartment complex, claiming that if Ds had provided security guards on premises in the day (when the attack occurred) in addition to at night, then the attack would have been thwarted.

Harpster v. Hetherington (Minn. 1994)

NL - P agreed to go to D's house and feed their dog while they were away. P let the dog out of garage into fenced-on backyard, but dog escaped through broken gate that D failed to repair latch. P searching for dog walked to front porch where she slipped on ice that had accumalted during day when D were gone. (Duty: invitor/invitee, breach: latch (not ice on porch), NIT, CTC or LT-MSR) [A2 Palsgraf - it's a "last thing" case or MSR between accident and latch, Central of Georgia]

Leuer v. Johnson (Minn. App. 1990)

NL - P and Ds were hunting deer together. Ds returned to car and then went looking for P who was persuing a wounded deer. As defendants approached P (both seeing P and P seeing both Ds), both Ds also thought they saw a deer, fired simultaneously, and one bullet hit P. Bullet never found, no body knew which D fired the shot that hit P. [DF Summers v. Tice (Ds shot deliberately, knowing that P was potentially at risk, willful and wanton negligence)] ["We're not using Summers"] [theoretically, there should be a way to find a way to find who shot bc of the bullet].

Todd v. Dow (Cal. App. 1993)

NL - P and adult cousin were engaging in mock hand-to-hand combat with rifles afixed with bayonets. P's cousin's rifle discharged and severely injured P. P sued assailant's parents (Ds) because they knew of adult son's possession of firearms but did not confiscate them. (no special relationship between parents and adult children) [DF Carmona (no negligent entrustment)]

Minder v. Cielito Lindo Restaurant (Cal. App. 1977)

NL - P and wife ate lunch at D's mexican restaurant and contracted shigella. Doctor testified that source of infection was probably contaminated food but conceded that the infection could have happened before the meal or through contact. No other patrons had contracted bacteria, and no previous complaints against D's restaurant. (food poisoning cases difficult because of causation analysis)

Bennan v. Parsonnet (N.J. 1912)

NL - P asked D surgeon to operate on his left groin, but after P was under general anesthetic D instead operated on P's right groin, which was dangerously, life-threateningly diseased. Court: no battery b/c implied consent. [DF Mohr (implied consent due to risk of death i.e. reasonable person would have consented)]

Hill v. Lundin Associates, Inc. (La. 1972)

NL - P babysitter was hanging laundry in back of D's house who had D contractor previously working who left ladder in yard. Although aware of position of ladder, P tripped and injured trying to prevent D's child from injury. (P contributorily negligent,risk of harm from leaving ladder was not foreseeable)

Adams v. Bullock (N.Y. 1919)

NL - P child was swinging wire on pedestrian bridge over street and D's trolley tracks. P's wire contacted D's trolley wires, and P was injured (untaken precaution of somehow protecting wires was high and unfeasible and risk of harm was low because freak accident) [DF Davis v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (burden of untaken precaution higher)]

Brower v. Ackerley (Wash. App. 1997)

NL - P civic activist sought enforcement of billboard regs, Ds began campaign of harassing phone calls, including specific theat to find out where P lived and cut him in his sleep. Court: words alone do not constitute assault.

Tucker v. KFC National Management Co. (D. Md. 1988)

NL - P customer got in fight at KFC (D) with another customer. When assailant brandished knife D's employee called police. After assailant stabbed P, police arrived and arrested him. P argued that D should have had security. Court: no duty to provide secuirty guards (burdensome untaken precaution)

Gorris v. Scott (L.R. 1874)

NL - P delivered sheep to D for transport by ship. Statute required animals brought to UK by sea be placed in pens with footholds to prevent overcrowding and be able to keep their feet in pens (purpose was to prevent disease). D's ship without footholds encountered rough storm and P's sheep were washed overboard. (OSR). The intent of the statute was different than the accident that occurred. Martin v. Herzog: Contri Neg - both non-compliane with the statute...but the injured parties were protected by the statute ; but here, the harm that the statute did not protect the sheep, but rather the sheep owner. Selger v. Steven Bros: both cases the statue was not designed to prevent the type of harm that occurred.

Camp v. State (Cal. App. 2011)

NL - P drunk passenger injured spine in a car accident. D's CHP officer w/ EMR training managed accident scene, assessed P's medical condition (moaning and couldn't walk, but declined ambulance) and ordered everyone to leave the site. When passengers moved D, her injury was aggravated. Court: D's managing accident scene not sufficient to create a duty. No misfeasance and no evidence of P's detrimental reliance. [DF Zelenko (no isolation), Hackman (SS: incorrect diagnoses, police vs. private EMR)]

Wright v. Pritchard Industries (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2011)

NL - P employee / invitee worked at city-owned building leased to D. P was injured when a heavy, metal bathroom stall door came loose and fell on her hand. (D did not have exclusive control over door - tons of ppl using bathroom using) [DF Lyttle v. Denny (ordinary door vs. unusual dangerous bed)] Higgins: falling flap was more suggestive of neg bc it was more dangerous, secured loosely. here, was just a door. Little v Denny: was more dangerous bc he was lying down and also much heavier. here, he was prob standing up just pulling door.

Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co. (Cal. App. 1978)

NL - P engaged in college fencing match injured when opponent's defectively thin and sharp saber pierced his mask and stabbed him in the eye. Evidence showed that defective blade could have been made by D1 or one other supplier D2. (P was not able to show that either of the Ds breached their duty) [A2 Burton v. Waller (only some of the Ds breached duty); DF Summers (both Ds def. breached)] [It was not both of the Ds who were plaintiff; in Summers, both did. It is very unlikey that both had breached a duty. ]

East Texas Theatres, Inc. v. Rutledge (Tex. 1970)

NL - P exiting D's movie theater was struck in the head by a bottle thrown from balcony by unidentified person. During movie, rowdy patrons on full balcony were hollering and throwing paper cups. P argued untaken precaution was ejecting rowdies or showing force of employees or police. (no "but for" causation between D's failure to eject rowdies and P's injury. No evidence that bottle thrower was a rowdy. Argument that show of force or kicking out rowdies would deter bottle thrower speculative, may have even encouraged)

Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History (N.Y. 1986)

NL - P fell down stairs after slipping on fresh wax paper litter from food stand operated by D's concessionaire at the entrance of museum. P sued D for negligently failing to notice trash and dispose of it (duty). Court: no evidence that anyone saw wax paper before accident, nor was the paper described by P as being worn or dirty (signifying extended duration, Duty: invitor/public invitee, Untaken precaution: not regularly cleaning stairs and removing hazards. (Df: Jasko: Here, there was no untaken precaution. Jasko, issue was quantity.)

Pena v. Women's Outreach Network, Inc. (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)

NL - P fell from stairs while exiting D's medical van where she had undergone a mammogram. P's shoe got struck on the stairs and she lost her balance. P's expert pointed out several unsafe conditions (worn treads, inadequate handrails, etc.) No evidence of why her shoe got struck in stairs, P did not know how it happened. (None of the unsafe conditions mentioned by P's expert could explain why her shoe got stuck) [A2 Capps 572; DF Kirincich 562]

Hulsey v. Safeway, Inc. (Cal. App. 2005)

NL - P helped D store's manager trying to retreive stolen goods from a shoplifter's moving car (against store policy). No express request for assistance. P was thrown to the ground after holding onto the door of the moving vehicle. Court: D NL to a patron injured by the intentional act of a 3rd party. [DF Burdette, Schuster (SS: Ps collaborated with security, D not police)]

Miller v. Arnal Corp. (Ariz. App. 1981)

NL - P hiker stranded in a storm on mountain near ski area owned by D. Other hikers reached ski patrol seeking help. Ski patrol wanted to initiate rescue but other D employees said using the ski lift was too dangerous and rescue was aborted. Court: rescue never started so no undertaking, no prevention from anyone else rescuing. [DF Marsalis (no promise vs. promise that induced forbearance)]

Casteneda v. Olsher (Cal. 2007)

NL - P hit in back by stray bullet in gang shoot-out. P sued D park owner for negligently allowing gang members to live in park. P's grandmother and other tenants previously complained to D about presence of gangs but no similar prior incidents. Court: gang membership not foreseeable risk of harm for duty to evict. [A2 Saelzler (burden), DF Isaacs (AA), Delgado, (foreseeable risk)]

Knottnerus v. North Park St. Ry. (Mich. 1892)

NL - P injured when roller coaster car derailed. D did not own or operate the specific roller coaster at amusement park, but owned a nearby constuction site. The derailment may have been caused by a wood chip blowing from D's construction site on to tracks or defective work performed by ride's owner. (no cause in fact because causation argument speculative. Failure to prevent wood chips from flying in the wind is not a breach of duty)

Hutchinson v. Boston Gas Light Co. (Mass. 1877)

NL - P injured when she jumped from burning building. On that morning, large gas explosion occurred near the building that started the fire. D gas company was allegedly negligent, but the explosion occurred one day after great fire of Boston in 1872 that destroyed much of city. (gas mains weren't under exclusive control of D because fire had prevented their control. Type of accident could happen without negligence because the fire was so bad and disrupted D's ability to exercise due care) Blyth: similar bc the situation was so unforeseeable to them. Gillian: here, D lacked control. Flip building damage case into this if there was a force majeure here.

American Guaranty & Liability Insurance Co. v. Federico's Salon, Inc. (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)

NL - P insurer of clothing store sued D upstairs tenant renovating salon on 5th after toilet on 4th floor allegedly used by D's independent contractors clogged with construction rubbish wrapped in white paper overflowed and ruined $2 million of P's inventory. D did not control any portion of 4th floor, but was occassionally allowed access when elevator or stairwell was left unlocked (no exclusive control) [A2 Powell v. Hardee's (overflow cases w/o exclusive control]

Donnell v. California Western School of Law (Cal. App. 1988)

NL - P law student was stabbed on way to his car in attack at night outside D law school. D's building had no exterior lights and no patrolling security guards in high crime area. [DF Isaacs (attack was on public property vs. D's property. AA of disarming guards in Isaacs)]

Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co. (N.Y. 1985)

NL - P lenders suffered economic loss because of error in D accountant's negligent audits of 3rd parties with whom Ps had no K. D was aware that end and aim of the audit was to provide P with required financial info to make loan. Gloss: accountants only L to non-Kparties if (1) accountants aware that info to be used for particular purpose (2) for known party (3) conduct linking accountants to party shows accountant's understanding of party's reliance.

Winterbottom v. Wright (Exch. 1842)

NL - P mail-coachman sued D coach supplier and post office contractor whose responsbilities under K with post office included maintenance of mail-coaches. P was driving coach when latent defects and general dangerous state caused vehicle to sudden break down, injuring P. Court: no duty b/c no privity of contract between D and P.

Miles v. Hicksville Union Free School District (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)

NL - P middle school student was injured when as she sat down in a desk, scraped her leg against jagged metal rod that somehow detached from book basket under desk. (D did not have exclusive control because desk was accessed by numerous students) [A2 Dermatossian (apparatus open to lots of people who would predictable abuse them); DF Rose (there more dangerous and less visible)] [Kiswewaa: there, the AA of putting carts on top of was super negligent/here, not a big chance of scraping leg]

Einhorn v. Seeley (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)

NL - P moved into her fiancé's apartment. Front door of building was broken, and landlord hired D locksmith to fix it. P alleges that D's negligent repair allowed assailant to enter building and assault her. (nonfeasance, end and aim of K between D and landlord was not protection of P, guest of tennant. No special relationship between D and P. Not pure nonfeasance. Finding L would expose locksmiths to indeterminate liability, adverse selection problem)

Prado v. City of New York (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)

NL - P old man tripped over D city's delivery man's foot as he was pushing a large, heavy cart on NYC sidewalk. Court: D could not reasonably anticipate that a pedestrian would ignore presence of large cart and not take reasonable precaution. P in NYC has a duty to look where he is going. [Blue as a matter of law] [Greene v. Sibley - similarity: tripped over leg, reasonably changing position; here, leg was outstretched bc it was so heavy - that is a reasonable thing to do.] [Mackey v. Allen: pharmacist forgot; here, he dealed with heavy load in a reasonable way.]

Schroerlucke v. McDaniel Funeral Home, Inc. (Ky. 1956)

NL - P old woman was a guest at funeral arranged by D. P's son asked D's employee to take P's wheelchair from the the back of their car to the church. D transported the chair erect and did not touch or tamper with mechanism, and it collapsed when he placed P in it. (Inspection of the wheelchair was not the duty of D nor within his exclusive control) [DF Benedict v. Eppley Hotel- both chairs collapsed under Ps. It was the P's chair in this case - why did he rely on someone else to inspect it?]

Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. (The Wagon Mound (No. 1)) (P.C. 1961)

NL - P operated wharf and was repairing ship. D negligently spilled furnace oil into harbor, which drifted and accumulated under P's wharf. D made no attempt to disperse oil. P's manager was aware, asked D, and made judgment to continue work thinking oil would not be flammable on surface of water. Molten metal from welder ignited oil and conflagration damaged ship and wharf. Scientist testified that D could not know that oil would have caught fire. (Duty: AA of bringing oil into harbor, Breach: spill and not dispersing, SDK)

Texas & Pacific Ry. v. McCleery (Tex. 1967)

NL - P passenger in truck that collided with D's train at crossing. Train was travelling at 25mph in violation of 12mph limit. Train activated warning signal that P's driver never saw, who slammed on brakes and skidded into the train. Despite obstructions reducing field of vision, P's driver should have been able to see train. (Duty: AA of operating train, Breach: train speeding, cause in fact, NCP because driver did not look out for train, LT-MSR because train's speed did not affect driver not looking out and direct hit) [A2 Sugar Notch; Cunillera] Speed of train is not a big factor in this type of collision.

Dermatossian v. New York City Transit Authority (N.Y. 1986)

NL - P passenger on D's city bus was injured when standing up and striking his head on defective grab handle projecting straight down instead of customary angle. (D did not necessarily have exclusive control over the grab handle (other passengers could have created unsafe condition could have tampered.) [A2 Ballard v. SRMC (in both cases Ps injured by handrails, which are not dangerous); DF Higgin (exclusive control, more hazardous, less opportunity for victim precaution)] [Rose v. Melody - exlusive control. the P had no ex control of chair, D had more control cuz it was indoors restaurant]

Central of Georgia RY. v. Price (Ga. 1898)

NL - P passenger on D's train that passed by her stop through D's conductor's negligence and she was carried on to other town, accompanied to hotel by conductor who paid her expenses. P left kerosene lamp on after going to sleep and it exploded, burned her hands. (no IIT (independent intervening tort - the train was the alst thing youd think of causing the harm.), LT-MSR) ...But for was satisfied; concurrent efficient cause: hotel giving lamp. IIT

Adams v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. (C. P. 1869)

NL - P passenger on D's train was sitting next to door of car. The door's lock was defective (due to D's negligence) and the door kept opening as the train was moving. P repeatedly closed door. 4th time P tried to hold door shut and lock it, but fell out of moving train sustaining injuries. Judgement as a matter of law: P was in control of the door, so D didnt have exclusive control. (P voluntarily encountered risk of accident. P was partially in control of door because he was slamming it) [DF D'Anna (fuel tank case - P didnt voluntarily encourter of the risk cuz it just fell on her, and D had more exclusive control), McComas v. Barnes (exclusivity of control, it wasnt P's job to deal with howda/elephant)]

Stoskin v. Prensky (Md. 1970)

NL - P passenger sued for injuries that she sustained when she slipped on a Coke bottle that fell from the D's stationwagon when P was exiting car. D had stored loose empty bottled under passenger seat. (Nothing inherently dangerous about placing empty bottles i.e. could have occured without D's negligence (freakish, low-risk accident). P may have contributed to the accident. Bottles not under exclusive control of D) True Blue. P could have been more careful when exiting car [DF Higgins] [Anjou v. Boston: slipping; in Anjou there was a duty to keep floor clean. and it was gritty so harder to see than coke bottle]

Powell v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc. (4th Cir. 1995)

NL - P patron of D's fast food restaurant entered men's bathroom and slipped on a pool of water. Water was not visible from outside restroom and no warning signs had been posted. D claimed there had been overflow problems but not during preceding week, but employees checked every 30mins. (no exclusive control: just as likely that another customer had spilled water on floor immediately before P entered, alternative causation - true blue) [A2 Winn-Dixie (adequate supervision, not necessarily exclusive control)][Rose v. Melody - the scenario for inspection ws more plausible; also, the hazard was more visible to P.] [Jasko: dangerous business vs. here, has to have a bathroom.]

Veltri v. Stahl (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)

NL - P pedestrian on sidewalk injured by glass storm window that fell from D's apartment building. (D did not have exclusive control because he leased apt. to tenant and played no role in installation and cleaning of windows) [DF Summers v. Tice (who caused harm? vs. both shot) similar: two ppl that might have caused something to happen. but here, not clearer AA. Novak: only one of the two commited act.]

Larson v. St. Francis Hotel (Cal. App. 1948)

NL - P pedestrian on sidewalk just stepped out from under marquee of D's hotel, when an armchair fell on and injured him. It was V-J Day (end of WWII) and hotel guests were overzealously celebrating. (D's lacked exclusive control over hotel furniture because guests could have thrown chair) [A2 Veltri, East Texas; DF Nicollet Hotel] [Analogy to Hutchin: lack of exclusive control.] [Byrne v. Boadle: falling object from premises, but in Byrne had exclusive control]

Lua v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (Cal. App. 1992)

NL - P pedestrian waited for train that was blocking the road to move for 10-15 mins. He started to climb over the train when it started moving and he was injured. Statute mandates that grade crossing must be opened within 10 mins to ease traffic congestion, public convenience and necessity, and safety or rail operations. (OSR - P in protected class, but not this type of injury) [A2 DiCaprio, Gorris; DF Osborne, DeHaen - you can infer from statute that hte legis had intened the statute to cover ppl as well as objects to fall in the shaft. here, statute was meant for public convenience, not personal safety.)

Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Realty Corp. (N.Y. 1990)

NL - P provider of theater costumes rented commercial space from a building that contracted with Ds to inspect sprinkler and fire alarm system. System failed, flooding building and costume inventory was damaged. (no privity of K, nonfeasance, adverse selection issue: building was in better position to insure against property damage)

Brown v. Poway Unified School District (Cal. 1993)

NL - P repairman was delivering computer to D's school. P slipped and fell in in the school hallway, a fresh slice of baloney was found stuck to the sole of P's foot. (Slips and falls do ordinarily occure without. Not clear that D was had exclusive control over baloney) [DF Anjou (grittiness); Rose v. Melody (easy to look where you're walking vs. unsafe condition was undetectable)]

Farber v. Olkon (Cal. 1953)

NL - P schizophrenic had undergone 80 electroshock treatments before being paroled to D's private mental hospital. There D doctor and nurses performed electroshock treatment, causing convulsions which led to P breaking his femurs, necessitating lengthy treatment and permanently deforming him. (Type of injury normall occurs without negligence. Bone fractures are common hazard and even a calculated and expected result of electroshock treatment) Ybarra: diff cuz it wasnt type of accident that occurred w/o neg. here, fractures are to be expected. FLIP: ybarra into Farber: if in ybarra was a normal accident given circumstances.

Danielenko v. Kinney Rent A Car, Inc. (N.Y. 1982)

NL - P security company rented cars from D rental company, P's employees picked up car, collected cash, and when driving to airport a bomb underneath passenger seat exploded, severely injuring occupants and destroying money. (unforeseeable harm, untaken precaution: increase security, but D did have employees on duty); Carroll Towing: there, the burden of precaution was lower and risk more foreseeable;

White v. Southern California Edison Co. (Cal. 1995)

NL - P severely injured on his moped in a car crash at darkened intersection at which D's lights had failed. Court: in absence of a K between utility and consumer, public utility owes no duty for personal injury as a result of interruption of service. [A2 Winterbottom (both public contractors); DF Glanzer (nonfeasance vs. misfeasance, privity of K, diffuse class of people would benefit from street lighting vs. specific customer)]

Colclough v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (N.C. App. 1968)

NL - P shopping at D's grocery store was pushing shopping cart, wheel jammed, and jammed P's little finger. P found dirty string wrapped around inside of wheel, resembled a dirty mop string. (D did not have exclusive control over cart, P was using it) [DF D'Anna (SS: failure to inspect. there exclusive control & inherently dangerous)]

Bouton v. Allstate Insurance Co. (La. App. 1986)

NL - P shot and killed D's deceased trick-or-treater because D's deceased allegedly assaulted P by appearing in realistic military fatigues and holding plastic gun. Court: P must prove intentional act by Ds that would have person in reasonable apprehension of battery.

Taylor v. Hesser (Okla. App. 1998) (

NL - P signed D's release of liability and then was struck and hurt at D's paintball field after P removed his goggles in violation of D's rules. Court: no SL b/c not ultrahazardous, P harmed only b/c he removed goggles. [DF Gulden, Bennight (P here was aware of risk/rules, voluntarily encourtered it, and negligently violated rules]

Selger v. Steven Brothers, Inc. (Cal. App. 1990)

NL - P slipped on dog feces that accumulated on sidewalk outside D's store. Ordinance imposed duty on D owed only to city, not to pedestrians. City has primary responsibility for maintaining public sidewalks. (Usual result in slip and fall cases where P seeks damages from property owners abutting sidewalks) [DF Martin v. Herzog (health vs. safety statute)]

Smith v. Caplan (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1968)

NL - P somehow hurt her foot while getting on D's merry-go-round. Cause of injury totally unclear (No accident signature, P may have contributed to the accident) [DF Reinzi (broken stirrups were speaking to negligence vs. no accident signature) also Reizi, is more dangerous]

Field v. Empire Case Goods Co. (N.Y. App. Div. 1917)

NL - P sued D bed manufacturer (no K) after bed collapsed with her on it while she was delivering a child, and she was injured. P had used bed for nearly a year without any issues prior to the accident. [BF MacPherson (bed less dangerous than car, harm less foreseeable), Langridge (bed vs. gun)]

Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (Cal. App. 1989)

NL - P tenant lived with her child son in large apt complex. P's son walked off un-fenced premises and was hit by a car trying to cross a busy street. D had issued bylaws and liability waiver to all tenants. [DF Goode (SS: fences, here open hazard, parents knew about hazard) Brooks (here no attractive playground)]

Riss v. City of New York (N.Y. 1968)

NL - P was being terrorized by rejected suitor, and contact police multiple times fully explaining threat and pleading for help. No action was taking by police, P was attacked with lye and suffered chemical burns leading to blindness. Court: nonfeasance, police protection limited by resources and priorities. [A2 Zepeda (not duty for gov't to render aid)]

Gray v. America West Airlines (Cal. App. 1989)

NL - P was checking in for a flight on D airline, turned around and tripped on a box that had been moved by another passenger. P also sued airport. Court: common carrier duty doesn't apply in common area of airport. [DF Lopez (SS: 3rd party harm, common area vs. in vehicle); A2 Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr (P tripped on D's employee at store counter)]

Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Parker (Va. 1990)

NL - P was customer in D's grocery store and slipped and fell sustaining injuries. On the floor she saw a snap bean under her foot. She did not see the bean before falling. (Bean was not within the exclusive control of Ds. No evidence as to how long the the bean had been lying on floor) [DF Jasko - the method of doing business was already inherently dangerous, Anjou 537] [SIM: Rose v. Melody: the chair had been inspected/the area had been swept, but here NL because in Rose the harm was high so they should have been checking more often. Plus, the P could have seen the been himself here.]

Troisi v. Merit Oil Co. (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)

NL - P was filling car up with gas at D's station and the gas hose burst, spraying P with gas. (No exclusive control because gas hose was continuously available for use by the D's customers. Also, type of accident does occur absent negligence) Hoses dont give warning that they are going to break; can break w/o negligence [Dermatossian - both had no exclusive control] [A2 Ballard (sudden, unexpected failure and difficult to inspect the integrity of apparatus)]

Di Ponzio v. Riordan (N.Y. 1997)

NL - P was filling up his car at D gas station. Another driver pulled in and started filling up but without turning off engine (statute required warning signs). While driver was inside paying, his car rolled into P, pinning and fracturing his leg between the two cars. P alleges that D's attendant's should have told D to turn off his engine. (OSR - statute's purpose was to safeguard against the hazards of fire and explosions, not collisions with pedestrians) DeHaen v. Rockwood: failing to put barrier in shaft is first thing youd think of to prevent. here, turning off engine is not the first thing, maybe not last thing either; Pulka v. Edelman: why bring

Swift v. American Mutual Insurance Co. (Mass. 1987)

NL - P was sandblaster and died from exposure to silica dust at worksite. D insurance company failed to warn P of risk it had discovered at worksite. Court: (policy) if D is L for not informing P of risk bad incentive for insurers to stop voluntary safety inspections. [DFMarsalis (promise & reliance vs. no promise)]

Donehue v. Duvall (Ill. 1969)

NL - P was hit in eye by hard clod of dirt thrown at him by another minor who took dirt from pile in D's backyard. P claimed there was broken glass in pile and clod was hard and as large as baseball. (Minor trespassor, duty? Breach of duty?, IIT) [DF Richards v. Stanley (both IIT)] The alleged breach of duty was that the construction company had left the pile of dirt (weak); Carmona v. Padilla: boys causing mischieft, distinct, D encouraged free radicals in Carmona. In Donehue the behavior was not encouraged. FLIP to Carmona: If construction company put a hand grenade in dirt.

Davidson v. City of Westminster (Cal. 1982)

NL - P was in laundromat under survaillence by D's police because of recent cases of women being stabbed. Ds identified likely perp but did not warn P, who was stabbed. Court: no special relationship btw police and assailant (visual identification not sufficient) and no special relationship between police and P. [A2 Zepeda, Eastburn

Raimondi v. New York Racing Association (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)

NL - P was injured when his low seat in grandstand of D's racetrack collapsed. (No exclusive control because thousands of other patrons at D's racetrack could have damaged the seat) [DF Rose v. Melody Lane (bar stool more dangerous than grandstand seat, more exclusive control over a bar because fewer patrons, easier to supervise their behavior)]

Hailey v. Otis Elevator Co. (D.C. App. 1994)

NL - P was injured when she fell down on her knees on an escalator at a department store. P sued D maintenance contractor. P and husband testified that the escalator made "a little funny jerk" that threw the P off-balance. Several other people were on escalator and did not fall. Escalator had been inspected at beginning of year and two days after incident, it was operating properly and had never required repairs. (not clear that escalator exhibited a severe or unusal motion, P may have contributed to the accident herself) [A2 Smith v. Caplan - there was no accident signature, like here nothing linked D to accident; DF Swissotel - the elevator fell and that was a clear accident signature.][FLIP into Williams v. Swisshotel: the escalator started going really fast and everyone got hurt]

Burks v. Madyun (Ill. App. 1982)

NL - P was paid to babysit D's teenage sons. D told P that boys had trouble in school, but not that they were having trouble with gangs. 3rd parties broke into house and shot P. Court: invitor-invitee special relationship, but absent D's knowledge of danger, no duty of reasonable care to guard against attacks by 3rd parties. [DF Baxter (SS: employee/invitee shot at, no asymmetry of info here)]

Fredericks v. Castora (Pa. App. 1976)

NL - P was passenger in D's bus whose driver attempted U-turn on highway and was struck by following D truck. Court: Truck drivers are not held to a higher standard of care than regular drivers. [DF Health v. Swift Wings (no specialized knowledge could have helped them predict a random car accident)

Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (Cal. 1997)

NL - P was riding his horse on bridle path adjactent to restaurant parking lot. D's employee was conducting normal trash collection operations, shaking can with fork lift, which spooked P's horse, which threw him causing injury. Although D knew about path, he did not see P. (various untaken precautions would inappropriately burdensom on trash collection, a necessary social function). True blue case bc TC did not err in granting summary judgment bc no evidence that D has seen P, and no SR; no negligence as a matter of law. FLIP Into Fuentes: he actually saw the P and the horse.

Snyder v. Colorado Springs & Cripple Creek District Ry. (Colo. 1906)

NL - P was standing near door of D's crowded train car. D's conductor pushed through the crowd, angering another passenger who lifted himself up and pushed P, who fell over another passenger sitting on steps behind him, and was thrown off moving railcar. No way to foresee the anger. [Village of Carterville: inadvertently negligent. here, it was intentional. Also, here, the breach of duty is unclear.] IIT

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. (N.Y. 1928)

NL - P was standing on platform of D's railroad. Approx 25-30 ft away, a man carrying a newspaper-covered package filled with fireworks was trying to board a moving train. D's guard on the car reached forward to help him in and another guard on platform pushed him from behind, dislodging the package which fell to the ground, exploded and shaking knocked down scales onto P injuring her. (Duty: common carrier/passenger, breach: allowing package to fall, cause in fact? NIT, LT-MSR or CTC because of 5 step causal chain) untaken precaution - taking to little care re packet? there was causin in fact bc if they had taken more care with packet, accident wouldnt have happened. no one can predic this under the ex-ante approach.

McClure v. Allied Stores (Tex. 1980)

NL - P was walking through crowded shopping mall when a shoplifter collided with and knocked her to the floor causing injuries. Shoplifter was being pursued by D security guards who had attempted peaceful arrest, were pushed by shoplifter, and proceeded to chase them on foot through mall. Shoplifter acted as he did due to D's unsuccessful attempted arrest and hot pursuit through crowded mall. (EFR) [diff: seith v commenwealth: police is more of an IIT]

Carter v. Kinney (Mo. 1995)

NL - P was walking to Ds' house for a Bible study group, and slipped on a patch of ice in Ds' driveway, breaking his leg. (licensee) [A2 Slim Pickens (both natural hazards)]

Ballard v. Southern Regional Medical Center, Inc. (Ga. App. 1995)

NL - P with broken toe went to D's medical building, fell and was injuring because D's hallway handrail pulled out of the wall and collapsed. The defect was not apparent and D's employees frequently patrolled hallways, but after accident, other loose handrail was tightened by maintenance staff. (D had no duty to discover a defect that is not manifested until the incident causing injury, would be impracticable. Handrails can fail and create unsafe condition without negligence) [DF Rose v. Melody-was an inherently dangerous stool; Yazzolino v. Jones-2nd floor railing more dangerous vs. just normal height railing] [Hearties-Public had access to both of these.] [True blu and hard to explain. its like the snap bean case.]

Davidson v. Miele Sanitation Co. (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)

NL - P worked at trash transfer station owned and operated by D. P was guiding a trash truck into a truck bay (seperated by guardrail). Driver hooked fender on guardrail, P directed driver to turn wheel and pull forward to disengage. Neither P nor driver knew guardrail was sharp, and it pierced tire that exploded and blew small aluminum sign 15ft injuring P. Couer: intervening events were extraordinary and unforeseeable. (Duty: employer/employee or invitor/invitee, Breach: having a sharp guard rail, NIT or DCE, CTC) [A2 Wagon Mound; DF Barker, Ridley]

Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (Cal. 1993)

NL - P worked in shop in D's shopping center, attacked and raped in early AM. Transients loitered in D's center and crime rate was high in area, D did not provide security (also did not have records on prior criminal incidents). Another employee was allowed to bring guard dog on property for self-protection. Court: crime not sufficiently foreseeable to impose security duty. [DF Isaacs (crime history, similar priors, less special relationship because P was not an employee of D)]

Sinram v. Pennsylvania R.R. (2nd Cir. 1932)

NL - P's barge was being towed in snow storm by D's tugboat, and another of D's tugs collided with barge. P's bargee was present and aware of intensity of impact that broke some planks and almost capsized barge. Bargee tried to inspect damaged but barge covered in ice. At dock, bargee did not inspect down below, and took on 450 tons of coal. Barge sank. [A2 Pittsburg Reduction (NCP, original wrongdoer relieved of liability because a responsible, duty-bound third party should have been aware of risk and taken precaution to prevent harm), DF Carroll Towing] The D owed a duty bc of the AA of running the barge, breach: not doing it well, AA2: adding more coal. Diff: Mathis v. Granger: there was no duty bc she didnt know, here there was duty bc the bargee knew of hte hole.

Capps v. Brashear (La. App. 1987)

NL - P's daughter broke ankle while jumping on trampoline in D's backyard. P was jumping normally and did not fall off trampoline at time of injury. She had parent's consent to jump, and was unsupervised. Court: None of the untaken precautions (fence to restrict access, spotters and supervision) would have prevented harm.

Smith v. Americania Motor Lodge (Cal. App. 1974)

NL - P's deceased 11 and 10-year-old children left home unaccompanied to do laundry, and were found dead in D's pool. Pool had a warning sign re no lifegaurd and no unsupervised minors in compliance with regs. No safety line with buoys seperating deep end (violation of saferty reg). Ps had swimming gear, supporting idea that Ps were surreptriciously sneaking into pool to swim. (Ps contributorily negligent and no evidence that absence of safety line was the cause in fact of their deaths) [DF Haft (trespassers v. invitees)]

Morejohn v. Rais Construction Co. (N.Y. 2006)

NL - P's deceased alleged that he was employed to deliver boxes to D's contractor's worksite at house, and that a roll of roofing material fell and hit him on the head. P did not seek medical treatment for 2 mos, informed D 2mos later. D denied the incident ever took place, alleging P was dismissed several weeks earlier b/c his extreme headaches posed safety problem. Homeowner testimony supported D's version of the facts. (dispute of facts, inference created o weak that D did not have burden to exculpate himself) [A2 Norfolk & Western Ry... possible other cause] Factual dispute Purple- because its being sent back.

Baer v. Van Huffell (Ore. 1960)

NL - P's deceased and husband were social guests at Ds' house. P was directed by Ds to hallway to use the bathroom. She walked into wrong door and fell down basement stairs. A similar incident happened before, and Ds installed a latch that was not in place at time of accident. Court: duties to licensees (1) no willfull, wanton or intentional injury (2) no injury through AA (3) duty to warn of any trap avoidable by reasonable care. Door not trap, reasonable care includes looking in room before entering. [DF Maher (SS: confusing stairs, nonfeasance vs. AA of deception)]

Hurley v. Eddingfield (Ind. 1901)

NL - P's deceased became violently ill and requested D doctors services, informing D that no other doctor was available. D refused to aid P not giving a reason. P died from illness. (nonfeasance, no special relationship between doctor and individual requesting medical care) [A2 Yania, Zepeda (no promise, no undertaking, no special relationship); DF Hackman, Morgan (no promise vs. undertaking / promise)]

Wanzer v. District of Columbia (D.C. App. 1990)

NL - P's deceased died of stroke after D's 911 dispatcher negligently failed to dispatch ambulance at his request. (No special relationship, municipalities NL for negligence in the performance of a gov't function including EMR) [A2 Zepeda (nonfeasances, but extends b/c here dispatcher took charge of P's care but failed vs. no aid); DF Sorichetti (no special relationship)]

Radley v. Knepfly (Tex. 1911)

NL - P's deceased sleeping on 3rd floor of D's lodging house died in fire. The building had two fire escapes, and P attempted to get to further escape and was burned in backdraft. P could have escaped using closer fire escape. (failure to have additional escape of the side of the building where P was sleeping was not cause in fact of death) [Kirincinch: if they had supplied the buoys, they may have been saved, but here if the fire escape had been in repair, it woulnt have made a difference.]

Walston v. Lambertsen (9th Cir. 1965)

NL - P's deceased was crab fisherman who disappeared without a trace with D's crab boat on day with good weather forecast. Other boats did not notice anything unusual or out-of-line with boat's loading or maneuvering. (Because the ocean is inherently hazardous for vessels, thus type of accident can ordinarily occur without negligence. No evidence that boat was unseaworthy) [DF Haasman (less advance technology)] no RIL bc this is they type of thing can just happen out at sea; This is a purple case (could returned for the plaintiff - boat not equipped with a lifeboat); Kisewaa v. Key Foods, diff bc the D hadnt stacked the carts (cause in fact), here there are no cause in fact facts.

Wolf v. Kaufmann (N.Y. App. Div. 1929)

NL - P's deceased was found dead at the foot of flight of stairs on D's property. The stair case was unlighted in violation of a local statute. The evidence was inconclusive whether P's fall occurred at night when there would be no natural light. [DF Reynolds v. Texas & Pacific Ry]

Boyd v. Racine Currency Exchange, Inc. (Ill. 1974)

NL - P's deceased was in D currency exchange. Robber held a gun to P's head and demanded that D's teller behind bullet-proof glass open door / hand over money or he would execute P. D's teller fell to floor. Robber shoot's P in the head. Court: no duty to anticipate criminal acts of 3rd parties. [DF Sinn (SS: Ds did not protect P. No time to warn vs. ample time to warn P), Nigg (nonfeasance vs. misfeasance i.e. hiring JD)]

Zepeda v. City of Los Angeles (Cal. App. 1990)

NL - P's deceased was shot in the neck and even though D's paramedics were in no apparent danger and parked very close to injured P, they refused to treat him until police arrived, and he died. Court: no general duty to render aid, D did not create risk, increase risk, or undertake care (nonfeasance) [A2 Miller v. Arnal]

Frye v. City of Detroit (Mich. 1932)

NL - P's deceased was standing in safety zone waiting for D city's streetcar, when insolvent driver negligently stuck him, throwing P on to tracks. D's streetcar then negligently struck P a second time. P was severly injured and died shortly thereafter. (Not clear which injury caused death, overruled sub silento by Maddux)

Seaber v. Hotel Del Coronado (Cal. App. 1991)

NL - P's deceased was using crosswalk in front of D's hotel, stuck and killed by 3rd party motorist. Cal Trans maintained crosswalk, had removed previously due to safety concerns, but reinstalled it explicitly on D's request. Court: no duty b/c D lacked effective control over crosswalk. Requesting reinstallation not AA.

Padilla v. Rodas (Cal. App. 2008)

NL - P's son drowned in D's swimming pool. P and D were supervising kids in front yard, D took a phone call and P knew he was no longer supervising. P went inside for a few minutes, leaving kids unsupervised, and son was missing, found dead in pool. Unclear whether son entered pool area through gate or through house. [DF Johnson (IIT = lack of supervision)]

Rozz v. Village Auto Body Works Inc. (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2010)

NL - P's son was driving his car on N-bound lane of highway, swerved to avoid a piece of debris and crashed into concrete divider. He swerved to avoid license plate later determine to belong to vehicle that crashed 6 days earlier on S-bound lane. P sued D tow truck company for failing to clear debris (mandated by statute) Court: no visible debris at initial accident scene, two collisions too remote in time and attenuated for there to be any finding of causality. P also swerved unecesssaily (IIT or contributory negligence); Selger: it's extending it because that was a public health statute and saying that she is not liable under the statute. DIFF, montgomery: failed to warn motorists about blockages. here, there was a negligent act on her part. as a consequence, the debris got on highway ; pulka v. edelman: more extreme than pulka cuz there was no statute in pulka. the driver was in a best position to avoid accident.

Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Anderson (Va. 1966)

NL - P's tomato crop withered after D sprayed herbicide on and around railroad right of way. P argued that D srayed when it was windy, and spray drifted, exposing tomato crop that was damaged. D argued that there was no wind, spray was reduced near P's crop leaving 18ft buffer, and that exposure would have completely killed plants. D argued cause was unrelated blight. (no res ipsa, issue of fact whether the damage was caused by blight or D's herbicide) Res ipsa was a wrong instruction (PURPLE ONE) bc D said it was tomato blight, not herbicide

Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co. (N.Y. 1931)

NL - P, department store customer, tripped over D's store employee who had just got down on his knees to repair cash register. P saw D's employee standing up, but did not see him get down, and tripped on his foot. (P negligent for not minding her surroundings)

Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd. (Cal. 1999)

NL - Passaulted and raped in D's commercial parking lot with bad lights. CCTV in place but was not functioning. No record of prior similar incidents on property, only bank robberies next door and 2 rapes over year within 50 blocks. Court: no reasonably foreseeable risk of crime for security duty. [A2 Ann M (burdensome untaken precaution); DF Isaacs (nonfeasance vs. misfeasance, better crimes stats and priors there)]

Davies v. McDowell National Bank (Pa. 1962)

NL - Ps deceased paying a social visit to D's step-father and found him unconscious, called a doctor who revived D's decedent, and decided to stay with him. All died from carbon monoxide poisoning because furnace vent had rusted shut. D had been warned by doctor to inspect furnace. Court: Social guests licensees, D is L if knowledge of dangerous condition and fails to warn P. No knowledge demonstrated.

Church ex rel. Smith v. Callanan Industries (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)

NL - Ps motorists' infant son was severely injured when P driver fell asleep at wheel and car careened into concrete anchor because D subcontractor on public construction project failed to install proper guiderails on public highway. (obvious defect, class of potential P virtually limitless, no reasonable temporal proximity between D's performance and accident, and no detrimental reliance) [DF Palka v. Servicemaster (adverse selection), Cabral (parking more AA, closer temporal proximity, here public entity so less need for tort law)

Akiona v. United States (9th Cir. 1991)

NL - Ps were injured when a assailant threw a grenade into restaurant parking lot. Grenade was determined to have been manufactured between 1967-9 and shipped in possession of D USG, but no records or evidence of how the assailant acquired it. (insufficient evidence that D had exclusive control over instrumentality, 20 year gap)

Dragoo v. Niland Fire District (Cal. App. 2011)

NL - Ps' deceased was disabled and being attacked by bees. Ds dispatched an under-equipped and inadequate response (allergies, no protective gear), even though neighboring town's EMRs were better equipped. Rescue failed and D was killed. Court: D did not create or add to danger, no duty to rescue. [A2 Hackman (SS: EMR, negligent treatment vs. failed attempt to rescue)]

Campbell v. First National Bank (D.N.M. 1973)

NL - Ps' deceased were passengers (mining engineers and geologists) on a rented single-engine airplane piloted by D's deceased, an experienced commerical pilot with >2000 hrs flight time. The crash was unexplained, and the wreckage was completely destroyed. (Because plane was rented, the pilot was not in exclusive control. Accident is one that would ordinarily occur without negligence) [D Nelson v. AA (exclusivity of control)]; two potential causes of the crash: pilot did something wrong OR owner misservice. Summer v. Tice: there was probably only one negligent cause. This case is more like Novak.

Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (Cal. 2003)

NL - Ps, minor child and her parents, sued public entities (D) that failed promptly to dispatch medical care after child (3) was electrocuted suffering permanent, debilitating injuries. Court: EMR immune from L (following Zepeda) "unless the action taken was performed in bad faith or in a grossly negligent manner"

Melton v. Boustred (Cal. App. 2010)

NL - Ps, party guests, sued D, social host, for throwing a rager and too indiscriminately inviting other guests (via a public Myspace announcement). Ps were attacked, beaten and stabbed upon arrival by a group of unknown individuals. (no duty b/c no special relationship nor misfeasance. Assault not foreseeable. No priors. Precautionary measures: security (rejected Wiener, Ann M, Sharon P) limiting invitees (high social cost to D)) [DF Delgado (class of persons vs. specific threat to specific individual)]

Clagett v. Dacy (Md. App. 1980)

NL - Ps, purchasers at auction of house in foreclosure, sued D attorneys conducting the sale (no K) after the sale was set aside because of Ds' error. (no privity of K) [DF Biakanja (end and aim of auction was to get the money to creditors, not sell property to P)]

Fiala v. Rains (Iowa 1994)

NL -D's digruntled and violent boyfriend broke into her home and kicked P guest/suitor in the face causing severe head injuries. Court: nonfeasance, no special relationship, insufficient evidence showing forseeability of violence against P. [A2 Rubio (bad relationships encouraged dangerous behavior); DF Wlasiuk (SS: D exposed P to danger, there more foreseeable and AA) Tarasoff (special relationship)

Muslow v. A.G. Edwards & Sons (La. App. 1987)

NL -D's stock broker, finger extended, jumped across desk toward P calling him an SoB and liar. P ducked.

Cooley v. Public Service Co. (N.H. 1940)

NL - Storm knocked down D ulitity's uninsulated power lines, one contacted intersecting phone line. High voltage caused loud noise in phone receiver, traumatizing P. P alleged that D failed to insulate power lines or construct some type of catcher baskets, but court found the cost of precaution to be greater than risk of harm of injury. Insulating wire could have been hazardous because twisted could prevent operation of circuit breaker, and therefore downed line would be dangerous to pedestrians. Likelihood of this happening was small; they were focusing about increasing the risk after putting in - burden that would be borne by pedestrians - the risk for them would be death. Davis v. Consolidated RR: the burden of the untaken precaution here was higher.

Cole v. German Savings & Loan Society (8th Cir. 1903)

NL - Strange boy loitering in D's office impersonated attendant to play practical joke. Knowing that elevator was on upper floor, boy opened door and ushered P into open elevator shaft. She fell into shaft suffering injuries. Court: D could not foresee or reasonably anticipate that strange boy would tresspass and commit wrongful act. (IIT) [A2 Donehue v. Duvall (mischievous boys, high burden of the untaken precuation)] [Village of Carterville: in that case, not providing the rail is inherently dangerous. here, its not the same. Here, it's intentional wrongdoing.]

Haynesworth v. D.H. Stevens Co. (D.C. App. 1994)

NL - Tenant called D, building's plumber, to report leaking boiler and ice formation in alley. D temporarily repaired broken pipe, and noticed that the water leak. D did not report leak to either the property owner or tenants. Six days later the P slipped on the ice. Court: D did not add to pre-existing dangerous condition, not hidden from the general public's vie (nonfeasance, no duty to warn) [DF Montgomery (SS: ice injuries, time elapse & there AA created risk)]

Stangle v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. (Cal. App. 1988)

NL - Thief stole P's ring at meeting in D's building, and receptionist refused P phone to call the police.

Smith v. Stone (K.B. 1647)

NL - Third parties carred D onto P's land where he was injured (involuntary act)

Burton v. Waller (5th Cir. 1974)

NL - Two died and three injured when Ds 38 police officers opened fire in the direction of a sniper during a college campus riot. Evidence at trial showed that 7 Ds fired negligently (excessive force) and remainder fired nonnegligently. Not possible to determine which shots fired caused the injuries. Court: numerical disparity between those Ds who fired negligently vs. nonnegligently and inability of Ps to relate gunfire of Ds to the vicitims. No cause in fact. [DF Sumers (both shots negligent vs. indeterminate)] [Most of them were not negligent]

Purtle v. Shelton (Ark. 1971)

NL - Two teenage minors went deer hunting with high-power rifles and one D shot and killed P's deceased. Court: minors should be held to adult standard when (a) dangerous activity and (b) normally engaged in only by adults. Children normally hunt in Ark.

Zabunoff v. Walker (Cal. App. 1961)

NL - When driving into intersection governed by yield sign, D looked one way but sneezed and was unable to look the other direction, missing P's oncoming vehicle and they crashed. (sneezing is a reflex action, involuntary, that cannot be reasonably anticipated, therefore sneeze was intervening cause) [A2 A.C. ex rel. Cooper (involuntary mistakes][Here: involuntary; Bellingham: voluntary] [Alexander v. Allen: both involuntary acts]

Smith v. Gowdy (Ky. 1922)

NL - While pounding on door, D told P, "I'll nail you in", started hammering in nails and boarding up door but stopped on P's request.

Hanton v. Pacific Electric Ry. (Cal. 1918)

NL -Disabled P tried to board D's train at station. With one foot on step of car, train started moving and P fell under train, which crushed his foot. Witness testified that P was hurried and started boarded when train was moving - did untaken precaution happen? (P negligently tried to board moving train) [Duty: common carrier-passenger] [Breach of duty: starting train when his foot was on it] [Purple: jury was asked to deliberate]

Pokora v. Wabash Ry. (U.S. 1934)

NL for contributory negligence - P driving truck approached railroad crossing, looked in one direction, the other direction blocked by string of box cars. He listened, hearing nothing proceeded and was struck by train from direction with blocked view. (In order to meet standard imposed by court in Goodman, P would have had to exit vehicle and reconnoiter the scene which is an uncommon practice and therefore not reasonable)--was an issue for the jury, not judge. [Baltimore v. Goodman: it was a lot safer in that case; factually distinct; the precautions were not as useful here.]

Berry v. Borough of Sugar Notch (Pa. 1899)

NL for contributory negligence - P motorman was driving through D town above the speed limit during a violent wind storm, and a large chestnut tree collapsed onto P's car injuring him. P's speeding was the alleged contributory breach of duty that was cause in fact of harm, but not proximate cause. (LT-MSR). The proximate cause issue is P's contributory negligence. His alleged breahc of duty: driving too fast. but that wasnt the cause in fact of him hittign the tree. was there an intervening cause? no. it was a direct. his own neg was direct cuase of his harm, but still, the contrib neg fails bc of the reasonable foreseight doctrine.

Tedla v. Ellman (N.Y. 1939)

NL for contributory negligence - Ps were walking and transporting junk alongside highway at dusk, walking on less-trafficked but statutorily incorrect side of highway (i.e. with direction of traffic). D passing motorist struck Ps, injuring one and killing other. Court: Ps were not negligent for because they had a justification. [This was not negligent per se bc the actions of the Ds actually prevented the risk; Learned Hand formula trumped Statute.] [Blue on CN]

O'Donnell Transportation Co. v. M. & J. Tracy, Inc. (2d Cir. 1945)

NL for contributory negligence- P chartered barge to D, who was moving the barge with a tugboat when it collided with another barge, puncturing hull below the water line (not visible). Later P's resident bargee checked bilge twice and saw no signs of flooding, went ashore for few hours, and returned to find 7ft of water. P's bargee tried to salvage boat, but too late and sunk.

Rodrigo v. Koryo Martial Arts (Cal. App. 2002)

P adult enrolled in taw kwon do class knowing that she might be injured due to the nature of the sport. 4 mos later she and other students were conducting a drill with master D to kick a pad he was holding one at a time. As P was preparing to kick, she felt "something" on her leg, and believed someoen kicked her. Her Achilles tendon was ruptured. Knight v. Jewett: analogy-co-participant. Rodrigo v. Koryo is more radical for NL bc tae kwon do is inherent dangerous - you're signing up for getting kicked.

Public Service Co. v. Elliott (1st Cir. 1941)

P 6ft tall student was on field trip to D's power plant. Group was escorted through facility. Some warning signs but no sign on door of high-tension room, and no sign on transformer. Exposed live parts were about 7ft from ground, P pointed at one part and received high voltage shock, severly injured.

Boltax v. Joy Day Camp (N.Y. 1986)

P adult experienced swimmer gained access to pool (not filled to capacity) by trespassing and dove head first off lifeguard chair into shallow end, sustaining injuries. P claimed D was negligent for placing lifegaurd chair at shallow end and maintaing dangerously low water level. Knight v. Jewett: no distinction. this would extend Knight bc there was no co-participant.

Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (Cal. App. 1995)

P advanced skier was on groomed, hard-packed run that he had skied 50-100 times at D's resort. It was a sunny day and ski lift tower visible from 200yrds. P lost control, lost a ski and slid into tower sustaining severe injuries. P argued tower's padding was not at snow level and inadequate. The pads realyl has no relationship to the risk of harm. Extending Knight v Jewett. Extends Ford - D had control. but Ford was tree. The P was not hurt by co-participant (ski co). the harm is not delivered by co-p. Yancey: under their reasoining, in neither case P harmed by co-participant. but here, no duty whatsover to pad. not willful/wanton (like existed in yancey)...yancey was projectile. here, non-projectile.

Handley v. Halladay (N.M. 1978)

P and D teenagers leaving party. P insisted on riding atop D's car, and D repeatedly tried to get him down. D started driving slowly, and took a turn. P was spinning himself on the roof, fell off and was injured.

Yancey v. Superior Court (Neal) (Cal. App. 1994)

P and D were participating in community college PE class. P threw discus and went to retrieve. D up next failed to check field, failed to warn P, and carelessly threw discus which struck and injured P. Much more dangerous activity - projectile. Anyone could have been hurt, not just partcipants. .. Rafter v. Dubrock's riding academy: both recreational, but rider was not riding with.

Feng v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority (N.Y. App. 2001)

P and mother at train station. While waiting for train to arrive, P was standing directly adjacent to tracks with his back to oncomigng trains. P was struck by D's arriving train and pushed onto mother.he was contri neg. non-sports issue. Boltax: extnding boltax.

Markwell v. Swift & Co. (Cal. App. 1954)

P car hop at drive-in restaurant knew that D contractor had removed glass pane of restaurant, but momentarily forgot when she stepped back and fell through hole.

Aiken v. Holyoke St. Ry. (Mass. 1903)

P child jumped onto D's moving streetcar, clinging to a lower step, called out to D driver to stop, who accelerated to knock him off even though D knew P was in danger.

Avila v. Citrus Community College District (Cal. 2006)

P community college student-athlete was player in baseball game against D community college. P's pitcher hit D's batter, and in next inning, D's pitcher threw a beanball, hitting P in the head and cracking his helmet. P claimed D failed to prevent retalioatory or reckless pitching. Yancey: anyone could have been hit by the discus, here, the only person who could be hit is a player.

Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (Cal. 1975)

P driving took an unsafe left turn across 3 lanes into gas station 70ft before intersection. D speeding taxi driving in opposite direction crested hill, ran through yellow light, and crashed into P's right rear end causing injuries to P.

Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center (Cal. App. 1985)

P enrolled in parachuting course, signed release, acknowledged that D instructor informed him of risk of breaking leg and instructed him on canopy control. P exited aircraft normally, but failed to steer towards target area and collided with power lines, saw a bright flash, and regained consciousness on the ground with a broken wrist. KAHN: diff cuz the coach increased the risk, here didnt increase the risk cuz what happened was an inherent risk.

Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC (Cal. App. 2009)

P festival goer at D's Burning Man voluntarily approached the huge bonfire to burn a picture, knowing that being in close proximity to the fire posed a risk of burn. After throwing the picture into the fire, he took a few more steps forward and tripped on an unidentified object (perharps support cable) and fell in, severely burning his hands. Feng v MTA: standing close to train tracks/fire. Although could still distinguish FENG: not recreational activity, but here it was a recreational activity. Knight: because building such a huge fire is so dang, then it might be a more dang activiy than sports.

Amezcua v. Los Angeles Harley-Davidson (Cal. App. 2011)

P motorcycle enthusiast with expereince in group rides participated in D's group motorcyle ride but failed to register or sign the release form. On highway, towards the rear of pack of 200 motorcycles, P was struck by van who rearended a car and swerved into the lane P was riding. P and wife injured in accident. Lowe v CA: you can have sports w/o mascots. the dist is that the mascot as added. but here, you have to have a lots of motorcycles for a tow ride.

Adams v. Elgart (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)

P nurse sued P doctor after his patient, suffering from delerium tremens, attacked P. Patient exhibited violent behavior twice in prior three days, and P reported patient's violent tendancies to D. P sued for D's failure to transfer patient to psych unit or warn her. no L bc the policy of the hospital: recovering addict in hospital not spsychiatric ward. Neighbarger: the policy of maintenace crew was not to ccause fire, but here, Dr was acting normally. In Neighbarer were part-time FF. here, she was 100% dedicated nurse. and it was part of her job. Nurse also kenw of violent behavior too.

Kately v. Wilkinson (Ct. App. 1983)

P parents sued D boat manufacturer and D boat driver, after steering column locked on ski-boat which circled, crashed into and severely injured and mutilated girl water skier. They pulled her on boat, which continued to circle, and P's daughter watched her friend die. It was a horrific and gruesome death. P's daughter suffered traumatic emotional distrubance. Chadwick: both are equally horrible accidents.

Butterfield v. Forrester (K.B. 1809)

P rode horse extremely hard on road, and although he should have been able to see pole/obstruction that D left in road, he did not and the horse tripped on the pole causing injury to P.

Marquez v. Mainframe (Cal. App. 1996)

P security guard making rounds at D's building entered darkened generator room and slipped on a puddle of standing water. D employed contractor to occassionally mop floor in room, and D had prior notice of standing water. FF rule did not apply to P. Part of his job was to report water puddles, so the dist with bryant v. glasstater bc towtruck was primary resp, here only part of his job. neighbarger: fighting fires was 1 part of their job.

Lowe v. California League of Professional Baseball (Cal. App. 1997)

P spectator at D's baseball stadium sitting in stands next to D's dinosaur mascot, whose tail touched P. P was distracted, turned towards the mascot, and then turned back to the game and was hit in the face by a foul ball. D argued that spectators are accustomed to interacting with mascots. Mascot to inherent to game. Connelly: diff cuz falling w/ skis is part of skiing. Here, this is a projectile case.

Thurmond v. Prince William Professional Baseball Club, Inc. (Va. 2003)

P spectator at D's baseball stadium. Warning signs posted and warning on ticket though P did not have possession of ticket. Reserved seats behind screen for fearful spectators. P and friends sat high in bleachers. P remained attentive during game, but line drive foul ball hit her directly in the face causing severe injury. Under Knight v. Jewett: it is a sports-related activity. but maybe no breach of duty

Martin, Wise & Fitzhugh v. Texas & Pacific Ry. (Tex. 1894)

P stored unpacked cottonnon the platform some distance from train tracks, waiting to get compressed for shipment. D failed to have an adequate spark arrester, and sparks escaping from the train ignited and burned the cotton.

Flynn v. City of New York (N.Y. App. Div 1984)

P superindendent was taking out garbage, was avoiding group of people and view partially obstructed, fell into hole in sidewalk caused by D's garbage trucks driving up on sidewalk. P did not see it immediately prior to accident, but knew it was there previously.

Barker v. Kallash (N.Y. 1984)

P teen was building a pipe bomb using materials from his father's workshop. He asked D1 teenage brothers to purchase firecrackers from D2 9-year-old. D1 purchased made purchase, extracted gunpowder and gave it to P. As P was assembling bomb, it exploded and injured his hands. Knight v. Jewett: this would be a radical extension of it. How would the case come out under Li? There, there was N on both sides. here, was much more serious crime.

Davies v. Mann (Exch. 1842)

P tied up donkey on the side of road; D came down an incline at a "smartish pace" on his horse and wagon, failed to see it and negligently bumped into it.

Rafter v. Dubrock's Riding Academy (Cal. App. 1946)

P totally inexperienced rider rented horse from D stable and was out on a slow ride with group. D adjusted girth after mounting P. The saddle starting slipping, the horse bolted, and both P and saddle fell off. Res Ipsa Case. Ford Gouin: not a sport. not as much participation. Analogous: when the batter throws his bat, but if the stadium doesnt have the screen.

Eriksson v. Nunnink (Cal. App. 2011)

P was a 17-year-old experienced rider trained by D, her coach, for eventing competitions. Although D knew P's horse had been severely injured in a prior race, D allowed P to ride the horse in a cross-country event. D had P and her mother sign liability release before the race. The horse fell on P killing her. The coach had a resp not to increase the risk. It's very much like KAHN.

Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc. (Cal. App. 1995)

P was a regular golfer at D's course. P had previously noticed that tree protected golfers at 5th tee from errant drives from 4th tee, but D removed the diseased tree. P was struck by ball at 5th tee that was hit from 4th tee, not afforded protection of tree. Connelly: paying a sport on D property. but here, not inherent risk of golf. Yancey: projectile case too.

Eldon v. Sheldon (Cal. 1988)

P was in a car accident with his cohabitating girlfriend who was ejected from the vehicle and died, sued D. Issue of relationship. Kately: there was no legal relationship. Kately was aber SO horrible. Here, not as bad cuz P didn't witness accident as much as Kately.

Artrip v. E.E. Berry Equipment Co. (Va. 1990)

P wearing proper snow boots climbed over high snow bank not removed by D, cup of coffee in hand, to get to work. She was being cautious but slipped and fell. Many other people crossed snowbank without incident.

Macy's California v. Superior Court (Ct. App. 1995)

P while trying on jacket at D's department store P stuck finger on hypodermic needle in pocket of jacket, and had to get an HIV test. She was told only 1/200K chance of contracting HIV, but became emotionally distressed. Williams v. Bennett: P thought that she had ran over child - problem was in her mind too. Lindley v. Knowlton: invasion of house, risk high, here, there was never any risk. Steinhauser: the schizo is worse than emotional distress.

Knight v. Jewett (Cal. 1992)

P woman and D man were playing a co-ed game of peewee football. No rules discussed before game. D ran into P, who told him not to play so rough. Next play, D jumped to intercept a pass and in coming down collided with P, knocking her down and stepping on her hand. After 3 failed surgeries, P's pinky was amputated. SUmmers v. Tice: did this case overturn summers? cuz summers were engaging in sports game.

Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (Roettgen) (Cal. App. 1996)

P's deceased novice rock climber was student in D universtiy's climbing class. Two rope anchor systems were set up that day on rock face by instructors. One of the systems was improperly anchored, and released rope when a large piece of mointain face shifted. P fell 90ft to his death. Inherent risk in climbing.

Williams v. Harrison (Va. 1998)

P's deceased son was racing his car through the suburbs with the D and friends. P crested a hill braked hard, D following crested hill, braked and pulled into center lane to avoid P who simultaneously turned into center lane and D collided with and killed P. No evidence that P was unaware of the danger.

Ochoa v. Superior Court (Cal. 1985)

P's son in D's juvenile hall suffered and died of pneumonia and P mother suffered emotional distress in seeing him suffer, trying to get him medical attention but was ignored and asked to leave by D's employees. Here, she's witnessing the malpractice. There's also a willful and wanton. The Ds are willfully ignoring the V. It's not an inadvertent error: "youre at juvi - too bad for you." Also, there are no other options here (unlike in Jansen) cuz he's stuck there.

Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries (Cal. 1994)

Ps private safety employees were supervising work at oil refinery. D's contractors were doing work and one used a sharp instrument to dislodge blockage in valve in violation of industry safety standards, and valve spewed liquid petroleum. Ps thougth the leak was escaping water vapor, went to close valve when petroleum ignited and burned both of them. here, the p was no responsible for being therer.

Campell v. Animal Quarantine Station (Haw. 1981)

Ps' dog, while quarantined by D, was left in unventilated van in the sun, and the dog died. Ps' family preoccupied with death of dog for weeks and suffered emotional distress.

Nalwa v. Cedar Fair

bumper cars would be no fun with bumping. State wants recreational for ppl. So NL. Kahn v. East Side: