CH 9: Cause In Fact

Capps v. Brashear (La. App. 1987)(489)(trampoline)

Aunt and uncle (D) have trampoline, and they gave niece permission to use it. Should've had fence, spotters, supervisor. No L -> NCIF. NLML. none of the alleged untaken precautions would have prevented the plaintiff's trampoline injury because she was just bouncing in the normal way. she didn't fall off. (ex anti)

Saisa v. Lilja (1st Cir. 1935)(525)(abandoned street race)

D agreed to race with another car driver, abandoned race, and then other car driver, still racing, struck and killed P's deceased L -> CA. doesn't matter if he abandoned the race, there was a common plan [following Summers v Tice]

Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel (Cal. 1970)(no signage in motel swimming pool)

D deliberately omitted numerous precautions at its motel swimming pool, P's drowned when they were in pool when they couldn't swim. D is ignoring statute about either having sign or lifeguard, and had been cited 3 times, so they knew. jury instructions were confusing, so D in j.trial (bcz sign wouldn't have helped) - on remand, jury was instructed to think about what a LIFEGUARD could've prevented (radical jury instruction because of DUC) L -> DUC, because they knew they were not complying and did nothing, so they need incentive, so harsh rule. (UOS)

Radley v. Knepfly (Tex. 1911)(480)(poorly maintained fire escape)

D failed to keep fire escape in good repair, and P died from fire) No L -> P could not have reached it any way, as he couldn't get out of his room into the hall. NCIF. also NLML

Mitchell v. Gonzales (Cal. 1991)(491)(paddle boards)

D failed to supervise P's child while he was swimming, when she knew he couldn't swim, let them rent paddle-boards, and he drowned; L -> UPWHPI. trial court instructed jury on "but-for" test of cause in fact instead of more easily understood "substantial factor" test; jury found negligence but no cause in fact reversed bcz jury properly instructed on more understandable "substantial factor" test could find cause in fact against all defendants UOS

Kirincich v. Standard Dredging Co. (3d Cir. 1940)(479)(no lifesaving rope)

D lacked buoyant lifesaving rope, and P's deceased drowned after several ineffectual attempts to save him; court inferred from throws of less buoyant rope that more buoyant rope would have saved P's deceased L -> Good throwers, better swimmer, could've saved him with buoy. Creates cause in fact. UPWHPI Also WACSR, bringing barge w/o buoy.

Gardner v National Bulk Carriers (498)(didnt turn back)

D's captain deliberately failed to return to search for plaintiff's deceased after he had fallen off ship, bcz he fell a while ago and they couldn't know where he fell L -> DUP, his life would be worth more than the cost of delay, even if only a small chance of finding him [ex. HMO tries not to find lung cancer in patient when they knew its would be a small chance of recovery] [Grimstad, d: no strategizing with buoy, the injurer knows too much here, he is trying to strategize against the rule] (LML in bench trial)

Summers v. Tice (Cal. 1948)(522)(both shot at same time)

Ds novice shooters, hire helper, both negligently shot gun at the same time; one hit P in eye, cannot tell who hit him. Cause in fact problem. L -> CA. Alternative causation = if you take away one, you aren't sure whether the injury goes away. Simultaneous action takes away the evidence of which breach of duty caused the injury. so burden passed to Ds to exculpate themselves, joint liability (UOS)

Taylor v. Trimble (Cal. App. 2017)(496)(grandfather didnt supervise)

P alleged that his child drowned because D (the homeowners, not the grandfather) failed to supervise him and D's pool was defective, but evidence indicated boy's grandfather agreed to supervise boy and that alleged pool defects had nothing to do with boy's death; Ds moved for summary judgment No L -> NCIF. D didn't fail to watch, he gave the responsibility to his grandfather (a fireman) so no breach of duty; and pool defects had no cause in fact. [could've sued grandfather, TCPWC]

New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad (2d Cir. 1920)(477)(no life buoy)

P fell off boat, couldn't swim, no life buoy, but he went straight to bottom so life buoy would have done no good No L -> NCIF. a floatation device wouldn't have saved him, no time to get it, no guarantee he wouldve caught it/wouldve saved him

Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co. (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(532)(defective saber)

P poked through face mask by a saber that one of two defendants made. one was negligent in manufacturing saber, but no evidence the other was. No L -> no CIF [d: summers v tice bcz there both Ds were negligent following Burton v Waller]

Jackson v. Ray Kruse Construction Co. (Mo. 1986)(487)(hit by bike)

P struck by bike in D's parking lot that lacked speed bump, where teenagers were known to ride down the hill into lot very quickly; L-> court allowed jury to infer that a speed bump would have been placed in a position to prevent accident. Close case. UPWHPI (where would it have been placed? close case in CIF) (also UOS)

Reynolds v. Texas & Pacific Ry (La. 1885)(482)(dark station steps)

P would probably not have fallen if defendant had lighted its station steps L -> HPUP. precaution was so obviously productive, not just a small defect. (also UOS)

Stacy v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (Wis. 1893) (488)(horses on thin ice)

P's horses drowned when they were spooked and ran onto thin ice, dragged ice cutter onto ice and it broke. D failed to erect fence (which is a statute) and to use other precautions (failed to notify, and had no horse saving equipment), but even if these precautions had been used P's horses would still have drowned No L -> horse saving equipment was no duty, failure to notify was maybe breach of duty butt wouldn't have made any difference because they were out of control, fence also wouldn't have stopped this "wouldve been bu gossamer before the powerful horses frantic with fright"

Paine v. Gamble Stores, Inc. (Minn. 1938)(483)(fallen husbnd)

P's husband's body found in position that looked like he had fallen because of D's missing railing L -> DNCCP. There were a few alternative versions of the story, but it seemed likely in a couple of different versions that the injury happened when he reached for a rail and fell. (also UOS) [extends De La Torre case, not much of a relationship w/ D, even though he was just passing by and claiming defect in the land, also SRP case]

Burton v. Waller (5th Cir. 1974)(532)(38 shooters)

Ps shot by several of thirty-eight defendants, only seven of whom fired negligently and rest in self-defense, No L -> P failed to prove CIF (EF) [ss to Summers]

Smith v. Americania Motor Lodge (Cal. App. 1974)(505)(trespassing in motel swimming pool)

Ps sued for the death of their children who were trespassing in defendant's motel swimming pool that possessed sign warning of absence of lifeguard but lacked safety rope and buoys separating deep from shallow end No L -> NCIF. negligence here was not so deliberate, dividing lines wouldn't necessarily have helped. Trespassers [Haft, d: more deliberate negligence, invitees not trespassers] (EF)

Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. (Wis. 1927)(508)(two fires)

Two fires coming for Ps property, same size, NE + NW, don't know how one started. D's negligently started one of these fires joined with other. Probably the other was another railroad origin; each fire by itself would have been sufficient to destroy plaintiff's property L -> CSC. concurrent sufficient causation. Worried about collusion. Maybe no liability if the other fire was started some natural way, like by lightening

Novak Heating & Air Conditioning v. Carrier Corp. (Iowa 2001)(533)(damaged air conditioner)

defendant manufacturer shipped air conditioner to plaintiff via defendant common carrier, and it arrived damaged; either manufacturer or common carrier could have caused damage) No L -> only one of them breached duty, assuming it was only dropped once. so not all Ds were negligent, we cant know which... [like Garcia] (NLML)

Maddux v. Donaldson (Mich. 1961)(536)(second impact on highway)

driver struck P's car and stalled it on active highway; then "second- impact" defendant struck it; injuries happened because of both impacts L -> first driver cause injuries of first impact and created the risk of the second impact, second car only liable for second impact injuries. But first impact driver is insolvent (dismissed). Hard to tell which injuries came from which driver. If second impact driver injuries are separable from evidence, then jury must do that. court held jury would be allowed to allocate all of the damage to "second-impact" defendant [Outlier] (UOS)

American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court (Gregos) (Cal. 1978)(511)(inexperienced racer)

inexperienced P hurt in defendants' race, court inferred that accident would have been prevented if either motorcycle association OR parents (D cross complained) had used their respective untaken precautions L -> UPWHPI, parents contributory negligence OR motorcycle ass could have given suff instructions. Two "But, For" causes. (UOS)

Frye v. City of Detroit (Mich. 1932)(539)(car than street car)

plaintiff's decedent struck first by auto, then by defendant's streetcar; jury allowed to infer that auto caused death. sued auto. No L -> the usual rule [unreliable] same as in Maddux, opposite results

Orser v. Vierra (Cal. App. 1967)(527)(3 duck hunters)

three Ds getting ready to go duck hunting, shot toward plaintiffs' deceased, two taking turns with a single pistol and one with a rifle; P killed by a pistol bullet. L -> CA. court held all three shooters liable. Conventional cause in fact would fail, but he is encouraging he others (UOS) [Cuppy v Bunch: under this CA rule, probably would have been L, common plan would've created a duty] [extends Summers]