Chapter 10 ■ Incident Response and Recovery ExamQ
As an SSCP, you're a CERT team member at your company. At a team meeting, some of the team members seem confused as to whether they have a role in disaster recovery or business continuity. How would you answer their question? (Choose all that apply.) A. Since even a disaster starts with an incident, and we're the first responders, we quickly have to figure out how disruptive the incident could be; the more disruptive, the greater the impact on our ability to keep doing business. We don't execute those other plans, but we do have to call our bosses and let them know what we think. They decide whether to activate those other plans. B. Since all incidents have the potential for disrupting business operations, the BCP should cover everything and provide us the framework and scope to respond within. It also covers the DRP. C. Those other plans focus primarily on people issues, facilities, and cash flow kinds of problems, and those don't concern the CERT. D. Those other plans mostly handle legal, regulatory, and shareholder notification requirements, so we're not involved with those.
A, B. Option D is false; the business continuity plan (BCP) and disaster recovery plan (DRP) should start with the broad strategic goals and flow them down into all activities necessary to keep the business operating, and to help it recover from a major disruption, respectively; this certainly includes the actions of the computer emergency response team (CERT) and the systems they support. Option C is true as far as it goes, but since all of those depend on continued use of business processes, which depend on the IT systems, the CERT plays a pivotal support role to those plans and the people who execute them. Options B and A are correct.
Which of the following information about networks and infrastructures should be readily available for information systems security incident responders to consult during an incident response? (Choose all that apply.) A. Networks and systems designs showing data, control, and management planes B. OSI reference model design descriptions of networks, systems, and platforms C. Organization charts and staff directories, including contact information D. Systems requirements documentation
A, B. Option D would not normally be useful during incident response, as the responders are dealing with abnormal behavior of as-built systems; the requirements that drove the design of these systems usually aren't helpful at that point. Option C is also not correct; what the team needs is more of a focused directory of key users and managers for different applications platforms or systems. Options A and B may prove valuable as the team tries to identify, characterize, and then deal with an attack or abnormal behavior. These both can guide choices about containment, eradication, and restoration tactics and priorities.
You've suggested that your CSIRT should create its own timeline of an incident, as part of their efforts to understand and assess it. Other team members say that this is what correlating event logs should take care of. Which statements would you base your reply on? (Choose all that apply.) A. Our timeline is how we capture our assessment of the cause and effect relationships between events; the systems logs show us only events that happened. B. Event logs need to be annotated to show relationships between events, and if we had the right set of security information and event management tools, that would be all we need. C. Event logs only show when the hardware, operating systems, or applications saw an event and logged it; they don't cover actions taken by us or by other staff members. D. We have to explain to management, in simple terms, what happened and when; they don't want to see hundreds of events in a log, which are nothing more than the evidence that led us to conclusions about what happened.
A, C, D. Option B is incorrect; not only does it miss the actual value-added purposes of having the team do its own timeline analysis, but it also confuses the role of detailed evidence with broader cause-and-effect relationships (as in Option A). Option C is correct, as is Option D, in justifying the use of timeline analysis in incident investigation and response.
Several months ago, your company suffered from a serious information systems security incident, which crippled its production operations for days. As a result, the CSIRT and other managers have seen the need to make a number of changes to a number of information security procedures, including those for incident response and continuity of operations. As CSIRT team chief, they've asked you what else they should consider, and why. Which of the following might you recommend? (Choose all that apply.) A. Exercise the new procedures to verify that they work and deliver the improvements we need. B. Increase our penetration testing activities to see if our new procedures help us detect and respond better. C. Train the key team members, managers, and leadership on the new procedures. D. Keep the news about the new procedures very low-key; most of our employees don't have a need to know about them, and letting them become widely known may inadvertently disclose other vulnerabilities.
A, C. Option D is incorrect; even if most employees won't need to know the details of new procedures, the fact of learning the lessons from the most recent, painful event will restore confidence in the "IT wizards" and in management. Option B is incorrect, or at least not strongly advised; it does not provide a strong link between pen testing, failure to detect and respond, and the new procedures. Option A should be a part of any procedural change process (how do you know the change did what you were promised it would?). Option C is critical to preparing these key people to respond properly when the next incident occurs.
Which of the following sets of information would not be useful to a CSIRT during an incident response? (Choose all that apply.) A. Contracts with service providers, systems vendors, or suppliers B. Information systems baseline information C. Information technology baseline information D. IT hardware maintenance manuals
A, D. Option A is not normally useful; what the CSIRT does need at their fingertips is the emergency contact information for technical support, or information security incident coordination, with such organizations. Option D is also not normally useful, because the computer security incident response team (CSIRT) will more than likely work at the systems and networks level (data, control, and management planes), and if a hardware unit is not responding properly, they'll just isolate it, flag it for later maintenance, and move on. Option B captures business logic and translates it into major information flows or processes, akin to Layer 7 (Applications) in the OSI model. Option C is vital to problem analysis and correction.
Which of the following are not legal or regulatory issues that a CSIRT would have to be concerned with? A. Incidents caused by employee negligence or accident B. Incidents caused by misuse of systems by an employee C. Incidents that may involve competitors attempting to access company proprietary information D. Incidents that disrupt normal business operations
A. Option A usually does not have a legal or regulatory obligation that the CSIRT must respond to (although there may be requirements for the organization to report statistics on such incidents to regulators or other authorities). Option B could lead to disciplinary actions or firing the employee involved, which could result in litigation. Option C may be criminal trespass or violation of other criminal laws. Option D may, depending on the nature of the business and its activities, require safety, security, or investor and consumer protection reporting and notification actions by the organization, regardless of cause.
What role, if any, does an incident response team play in supporting any subsequent forensics investigation? (Choose all that apply.) A. None. The investigators have their own procedures to follow, and it's best if the incident response team just cooperate but stay out of their way. B. Since any information security incident might lead to a follow-on forensics investigation, the team needs to make sure that any of the data they collect, or systems they restore or rebuild, are first preserved and cataloged to meet chain-of-custody requirements as evidence. Thus, the responders also need to be trained and certified as investigators. C. As the first responders, the team should take steps to control the scene of the incident, and keep good logs or records of the state of systems and information throughout their response activities. These records need to be retained in case there is a later investigation. D. Management needs to make sure that the procedures used by the response team will preserve the incident scene and information gathered during the incident response in ways that will meet rules of evidence; if that cannot be done without interfering with prompt incident response and recovery, management has to take responsibility for that risk.
B, C, D. Option A is incorrect. Note that the question asks regarding a subsequent investigation; the team has to act in ways that don't make such an investigation pointless by destroying the evidence the forensics investigation may need. Thus, Options B, C, and D spell out what the responders should be mindful of and take due care to do, while management has the responsibility to strike the balance.
What are some of the key tasks to consider as part of containment of an information security incident? (Choose all that apply.) A. Suspending processes related to applications platforms B. Disabling network traffic at the points of presence with ISPs C. Disabling connections to servers or hosts suspected of having been attacked D. Notifying external users of extranet or other shared resources and requesting that they suspend activities
B, C. Containment looks to isolating systems that have been infected by a causal agent such as malware, or whose software and data may have been corrupted, so as to prevent either the causal agent or the damage from spreading. Thus, Option A wouldn't achieve containment, since an infected or corrupted application could have many service requests already sent to systems services, any of which could be a vector to spread the damage to other systems. Option D does not contain anything; the attack agent or damaged software and data can still flow from the affected systems to others. Shutting down that link, however, would contain the causal agent (by shutting down two-way traffic). Option B isolates the organization's LAN from the Internet, which is effective containment of the incident to the organization's systems. Option C addresses segmenting the organization's systems into infected (and thus contained or isolated) and not infected systems. Whether there's enough connectivity between the "believed healthy" systems to function as a network, or whether they are only capable of being islands of automation, will be determined by the network design and the incident's effects.
You're the only SSCP in your small company's four-person IT team, and you've just been part of an emergency response team that's spent six nonstop days of overtime dealing with a major malware incident. The chief operating officer (COO) wants to skip the post-recovery phase, both to save costs and to get you and the other team members back onto your regularly assigned job tasks. Which statements would you base a reply to the COO on? Choose the statements that best support your reply. A. Although it's recommended that we produce a lessons-learned file from this and every incident, we can do that as a part-time, background task, over the next several weeks or months, so we won't miss anything important. B. Right now, the data we gathered as we investigated the incident is just in working files, notes, and such, and if we need to retain any of it, for any reasons, we've got some housekeeping to do before we're done. C. The labor days we'd spend doing proper post-recovery procedures review, update, and process improvement will have us much better prepared for the next time something like this happens. D. Since we don't really know how the malware came into our systems in the first place, we might want to continue that investigation now, while it's still fresh in our minds.
B, C. Option A is incorrect; delaying a post-event debriefing allows human memory to fade, and important insights can get lost very quickly. Option D may be true in this circumstance, but this is not strictly a post-recovery phase activity. It may very well be a great task for your many-talented IT team to take on, but just not as a CSIRT task. Option B addresses due care and due diligence, since there are many reasons why data from such incidents needs to be retained and kept secure. Option C is also a sound investment strategy, which will need to be weighed against the lost opportunity costs of your team continuing to fall behind on routine work tasks.
. What are some of the key steps or processes in the recovery phase of responding to an information security incident? (Choose all that apply.) A. Documenting lessons learned B. Restoring, rebuilding, or reloading servers and hosts with clean backup images or distribution kits C. Restoring databases and network storage systems to backup copies made prior to the incident D. Setting filters and rules on network traffic, and inspecting suspicious packets, streams, or addresses to check that containment and eradication have been successful
B, C. Option A, documenting lessons learned, is a critical part of post-recovery activities and thus is incorrect. Option D is incorrect; verification of complete containment and eradication should be done as part of containment and eradication, prior to starting recovery tasks. Option B, restoring or rebuilding systems, and Option C, restoring databases and storage systems, are correct.
You're the only IT person at a small tool and die machine shop, which uses a LAN and cloud-hosted platforms to run the business on. Your boss is not worried about the business being the target of a cyberattack and doesn't want you to spend time preparing the company to respond to such an incident. What would you advise your boss to consider? (Choose all that apply.) A. Since we don't handle consumer-level payment cards, and we don't have any proprietary information, we probably don't have to worry about being a target. B. We do share an extranet connection with key customers and suppliers, and an attack on our systems could lead to an attack on theirs; whether we'd be liable for the damages or not, it could cost us our relationships with those companies. C. Our cloud systems hosting company provides most of our security, and as long as we keep our systems on the factory floor and the workstations our staff use properly updated, we should be okay. D. Since we've not really done even a basic vulnerabilities assessment, we don't know what risks we could be facing. Let's do that much at least, and let that tell us what the next step should be. Soon.
B, D. Although Option A may be true, it is naïve and incorrect; the air conditioning company that serviced Target stores didn't handle retail (credit card) sales either, yet attackers found it to be an ideal entry into Target's payment processing systems. Option C is also incorrect; your cloud hosts will protect their systems, and their platforms, from malware attacks from your connections, but attackers who spoof bogus, privileged accounts into your systems can still destroy your business's presence in those cloud systems. Option B points out a real business risks; Option D offers the boss a sensible first step.
You're part of the CSIRT for your organization; during an incident, you take a call from a rather upset production manager who demands you put their systems back online right away. You explain that the team hasn't finished containment activities yet. He insists that their systems were working fine until you pulled the connections to everything and that production activities could continue while you're doing that. Which statement or statements would best support you in your reply? (Choose all that apply.) A. We could assume that your systems were not contaminated by the attack, and let you run on them. We'd take them down and inspect them later, when you're not using them. B. We cannot run the risk that whatever caused the attack isn't dormant in your systems and that it wouldn't spread to our other systems or back out onto the Internet if we did that. C. We have to comply with our policies that tell us how to handle incidents like this, and so, we can't do that. D. Yours are not the only systems affected by this attack; we've had to shut down most of our IT operations to make sure that our critical data and systems are protected.
B, D. Option A is incorrect; this is a very high-risk strategy, as it allows the attacker to roam freely around some of your systems for an indeterminate period of time. Although Option C is probably true, it won't help defuse the production manager's frustration very much. Options B and D clearly explain the risk and put it in the context of impacts across the organization.
The CSIRT team members are discussing incident detection. They seem convinced that it's almost impossible to detect an information security incident until it's already started to disrupt business operations. They're trying to find actions they can take now to help deal with this. They ask your opinion. Which of the following statements would you not use as you reply? (Choose all that apply.) A. Most incident precursors are so general that they provide broad warning, but nothing specific you can act on. B. We miss the most important incident precursors because we've set our IDS alarm thresholds too low. C. Many indicators of a possible attack can also be indicators of routine and legitimate business activities or network traffic; since we cannot investigate them all, we just have to hope that the first damage an attack causes is small enough not to hurt badly, but visible enough that we'll see it in time to react. D. Actually, this is because we've designed our networks wrong. We can fix this, but it will take time, money, and effort.
B, D. Option B has the alarm thresholds described backward: setting them low would let many more alarms through, setting them high filters more alarms out, passing fewer reports up to the security operations or response team. Option D may be correct—taking more of a zero trust approach and re-segmenting the network, for example, might be worth considering—but it won't help the response team today. Options A and C are correct statements regarding precursors (such as email threats claiming to be from activist groups) and indicators (such as changes to access control and accounting settings on a subject or object).
Which statements about the role of end users in detecting information security incidents are correct? A. Most end users may have significant experience with the routine operation of the business systems and applications that they use, but they really cannot produce useful precursor or indicator information regarding possible information security incidents. B. Most end users and their first-level supervisors have the best, most current insight as to the normal business rhythm and flow, and therefore normal loads on the systems and their throughput. They will most likely see anything abnormal quickly as a result. C. Users think that they know a lot about business normal, but we need to rely more heavily on well-instrumented intrusion detection systems, access control, and other monitoring capabilities. D. Since most APT kill chains use low and slow attack methods to reconnoiter and gain access, by the time users see things behaving abnormally, it's too late.
B. Option A is incorrect; it's actually rather dismissive of the knowledge that most line workers have when it comes to how business actually gets done every day. Users may need better training as to what to do when they think they see a problem, but that's not addressed by this answer. Option C is incorrect, demonstrating a narrow vision that only sees the technological solutions as useful. Option D is incorrect, notably that it is never too late to sound an alarm. Option B correctly expresses the value of knowledge and experience. Harnessing this insight in real time as part of an intrusion or anomaly detection process, however, is another story.
Why is escalation part of the detection and analysis phase of an incident response? A. It will require additional resources, such as IT staff, to begin carrying out the next phases of the response plan, and this would require management approval and action. B. Management and leadership need to know that an information security incident may have occurred and that investigation continues. Depending on the nature of the incident as understood thus far, management may need to take additional action. C. Most organizations are unwilling to delegate authority to an incident response team leader and thus need to control every action in order to exercise due diligence. D. This is required by NIST SP800-61 Rev. 2 and in regulations that apply to the particular business or organization.
B. Option A is incorrect; this may be a consequence of the way that the team's detection, response, and recovery responsibilities are defined and supported, but it's not generally the case. Option C is incorrect; though this might be true in some organizations, it is not related to due diligence and misstates that concept. Option D is incorrect; NIST publications provide guidance, while federal regulations can make them obligatory on federal and other government activities, they do not in general dictate what the private sector must do. Option B is correct; management and leadership may have legal, regulatory, or business reasons for knowing immediately that an incident might have occurred or might be occurring, but they cannot fulfill those obligations if no one on the response team tells them about it.
Which statement about precursors and indicators is most correct? A. Precursors are events that prepare the way for an attack, such as an intrusion, to take place. B. Precursors are the observable signals from an event, which may suggest that an information systems security event may happen later. C. Indicators are the observable signals from an event, which may suggest that an information systems security event may happen later. D. Indicators are events that are part of an information security incident kill chain; warnings are the observable effects that we can detect, that tell us of the occurrence of the indicator.
B. When it comes to incident detection, a precursor is an observable signal or result of an event, which may suggest to us that an event of interest (such as a security-related event) may happen in the near future. Precursors do not, in themselves, suggest that the incident is currently happening. Thus Option A is false. Option C mistakes indicators for precursors. Option D confuses events with the observable signals from them (such as the changes they make to target systems, which we can observe). "Warnings" in this context has no meaning—that is, our IDS or IPS technologies detect indicators and issue alarms. Thus, Option B is most correct.
Which set of plans and procedures should define how the organization makes backups of systems, applications, device settings, databases, and other data, for use during the recovery phase of an information systems security incident response? A. Information security incident response plans and procedures B. Disaster recovery plans and procedures C. Business continuity plans and procedures D. Information technology configuration management plans and procedures
C. Option A is false; the response team should only need to know how to find and use such backups and should not be responsible for their initial generation or routine update. Option B is false; the DRP would address options spelled out in the BCP as to alternative processing locations, contingency plans, and so forth, all of which need the backups that the BCP directs be made. Option D is false; configuration management is the decision process that allows or prevents changes to hardware, software, or key data items or structures, but it doesn't manage backups. Option C correctly links the purpose of backups—continuing to get business done in the face of accidents, systems failures, attacks, or natural disasters—with the need for a specific set of resources, such as backups.
Which of the following kinds of events might not be part of an advanced persistent threat attack? A. Inquiries or requests for employee or staff contact information B. Anomalies in applications behavior C. Recurrent problems with data corruption in database entries D. Routine ping or other ICMP packets coming to your systems
D. Option A could be social engineering or other attempts to gain entry into your systems. Option B could be caused by malware, corrupted data entered by a user in attempting to exploit a vulnerability in the application. Option C could be the result of bogus data being entered in via an exploited vulnerability in a process or application, or it could indicate a corrupted application task (malware infected or otherwise exploited). Option D could be from any number of sources, most of which are not attackers.
Which statements about containment and eradication are most correct? A. Containment and eradication are separate and distinct tasks; once containment is complete, the incident response team moves on to eradication of the causal agent(s). B. Containment and eradication usually involve the same tools and procedures, and so they often are performed simultaneously. C. Malware quarantine operations are an example of containment and eradication achieved with the same task. D. Containment primarily addresses shutting down connectivity between networks, subnets, systems, and servers. Eradication addresses locating the causal agents (malware, bogus user IDs, etc.) and removing them from each system.
D. Option A is incorrect; containment may occur system by system or host by host as the networks are segmented and isolated, and thus the eradication specialists can start cleaning systems as they are isolated (or the causal agents on them are contained). Option B is incorrect, since different tools are needed to disable network connections than you'd use to scan systems for malware, as an example. Option C is incorrect; malware quarantine is more an example of eradication combined with recovery. Option D correctly explains isolating systems and then cleaning them.
You've suggested to the IT team that all systems and servers, and all network devices, have their clocks synchronized and that synchronization checked frequently. One of their team members says this is not necessary. Which of these statements would be best to support your reply? A. When we see a device whose clock is not in sync, it's probably because of a spoofed Wi-Fi access point, but if we don't have the clocks synchronized by policy, we can't see this. B. This should be easy to do; just have every device initialization script make network time service calls. C. Clocks that aren't synchronized properly might indicate anomalies on that system or device, which could be a precursor of an information security incident. D. In the event we're investigating an anomaly or an incident, having all systems event logs using the same time standard will make them a lot easier to correlate and analyze.
D. Option A might conceivably be true, but it's doubtful this could be a good indicator of an incident. Option B is technically correct, but it doesn't offer a justification for making clock synchronization be required. Option C, like Option A, might theoretically be true, but it's not clear this can easily be an indicator or precursor of a security incident. Option D correctly states the simple justification; networks with hundreds of devices, each producing dozens of event logs, will quickly overwhelm any manual attempts to bias the clocks in each log file to get things to collate together usefully.
