Civil Procedure Cases

Worthington v. Wilson

(Amending Pleadings) · RoL: An amended complaint relates back to the time of the original complaint's filing if the defendant had notice of the suit within 120 days of its filing, the amended complaint arose from the same conduct as the original, and that there was some kind of mistake on the part of the plaintiff. · Facts: Richard Worthington (plaintiff) was arrested on February 25, 1989 by two officers of the Peoria Heights Police Department. While being arrested, Worthington's already injured left hand was re-injured by the officers, causing several bones to be broken. Two years after the incident, Worthington filed suit against the Village of Peoria Heights (defendant) as well as "three unknown named police officers," the officers who injured him. The suit was filed within the statute of limitations period for suits of this type. Approximately five months later, on June 17, 1991, Worthington amended his complaint, naming Dave Wilson (defendant) and Jeff Wall (defendant) as the officers who broke his hand. The amended complaint also omitted any claim against the Village of Peoria Heights. Wilson and Wall filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the amended complaint violated the statute of limitations for this type of suit.

Krupski v. Costa Crociere

(Amending Pleadings) · RoL: Relation back under Rule 15(c) does not depend on the amending party's knowledge or timeliness. · Facts: On February 21, 2007, Wanda Krupski (plaintiff) was injured while on board a cruise ship operated by Costa Crociere S.p.A. (Costa Crociere) (defendant). Krupski's ticket listed Costa Cruise on the front of the ticket but identified Costa Crociere as the carrier on the back of the ticket. On February 1, 2008, Krupski brought a suit in negligence against Costa Cruise. The statute of limitations expired three weeks later. After the expiration of the statute of limitations, Costa Cruise alerted Krupski to Costa Crociere's identity as the proper defendant on several different occasions. Costa Cruise ultimately moved for summary judgment on grounds that it was not the proper defendant. Krupski cross-moved to amend her complaint to add Costa Crociere. The Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida (District Court) denied Costa Cruise's motion for summary judgment and granted Krupski's motion for leave to amend. Krupski and Costa Cruise then stipulated to dismiss Costa Cruise from the action. Krupski filed an amended complaint against Costa Crociere on July 11, 2008. Costa Crociere thereafter filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Krupski's amended complaint did not relate back to the date of her original complaint and that, therefore, Krupski's suit was outside the statute of limitations. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro

(An Important Decision) · Rule: The United States Supreme Court has stated that a defendant's placing goods into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers within the forum State may indicate purposeful availment. But that statement does not amend the general rule of personal jurisdiction. It merely observes that a defendant may in an appropriate case be subject to jurisdiction without entering the forum - itself an unexceptional proposition - as where manufacturers or distributors "seek to serve" a given State's market. The principal inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the defendant's activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign. In other words, the defendant must purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Sometimes a defendant does so by sending its goods rather than its agents. The defendant's transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State. · Facts: Respondent injured his hand while using a metal-shearing machine that petitioner British manufacturer produced in England. Petitioner's company is incorporated and operates in England. Respondent filed a consumer's products-liability suit in a state court in New Jersey, where the accident occurred. Petitioner sought to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction. Respondent's jurisdiction claim was based on three primary facts: A U.S. distributor agreed to sell petitioner's machines in the US, its officials attended trade shows in several States, albeit not in New Jersey, and no more than four machines (the record suggests only one), including the one at issue, ended up in New Jersey. The state court entered judgment for respondent. On appeal, the court reversed.

Will v. Hallock

(Apellate Jurisdiction) · RoL: A refusal to apply the judgment bar of the Federal Tort Claims Act is not appealable. · Facts: Federal authorities seized Susan Hallock's (plaintiff) computer equipment, software, and disk drives pursuant to a warrant. In the process, several disk drives were ruined and all of Hallock's stored data, including trade secrets and account files for her business, was lost, forcing Hallock out of business. Hallock brought suit against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), claiming negligence on the part of the federal authorities that seized her property. While that suit was still pending, Hallock filed a separate suit against Will, et al., the individual federal agents (defendants). The district court dismissed Hallock's FTCA suit, finding an exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity. The defendants then moved for judgment in this suit, citing the judgment bar in the FTCA, which stated that any judgment on an FTCA claim based on sovereign immunity was a complete bar to any action coming about under the same subject matter against the government employees whose conduct gave rise to the FTCA claim. The district court denied the defendants' motion, refusing to apply the judgment bar because the dismissal of Hallock's FTCA claim was on procedural grounds. The defendants appealed and the court of appeals agreed to hear the appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals had the jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.

(Appellate Jurisdiction) · RoL: (1) An appeal may be taken from a lower court's interlocutory ruling that conclusively determines a disputed issue that is separate from, and collateral to, the merits of the action and would be effectively unreviewable after a final judgment in the action. o (2) A statute requiring that a bond be posted before a shareholder brings a derivative suit is both constitutionally permissible and sufficiently substantive to be applied by a federal court sitting in diversity. · Facts: A shareholder derivative action is a lawsuit in which a shareholder of a corporation alleges that the corporation is being managed in a way that benefits the management, not the shareholders. The shareholder must make a demand to the company that it recoup its losses from the managers who took benefits beyond what they should have received, and if the company does not comply with the request, the aggrieved shareholders can sue the company. Because this litigation can be very cumbersome to the corporation, New Jersey adopted a law providing that if a plaintiff in a shareholder derivative suit owned less than 5 percent of the shares of the corporation being sued, that shareholder must post a bond to institute the litigation. If the shareholder did not win, the shareholder was required to pay the corporation's attorney's fees. Cohen (plaintiff) owned approximately .0125 percent of Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. (defendant), which did business in New Jersey. Cohen believed that Beneficial's management was enriching itself at the expense of the corporation and brought suit in federal district court. The district court held that it was not bound to follow the New Jersey statute requiring a bond because, under the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the statute was merely procedural. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a bond to be posted. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

La Buy v. Howes Leather

(Appellate Jurisdiction) · RoL: A court of appeals has the power to issue a writ of mandamus compelling a district judge to vacate his order referring an antitrust case for trial before a master. · Facts: Two antitrust actions were filed in the district court. They involved multiple plaintiffs and defendants and were "burdensome" on the district judge, Judge La Buy. Due to the burden and complexity of the cases, along with the congestion in his court, Judge La Buy entered orders referring the cases for trial before a master. Petitions for mandamus subsequently were filed seeking writs of mandamus ordering La Buy to vacate the orders. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued the writs under the All Writs Act, ordering La Buy to vacate his orders and hear the case. La Buy appealed.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel

(Appellate Jurisdiction) · RoL: A finding of liability that does not finally dispose of the plaintiff's prayers for relief is not appealable to the court of appeals. · Facts: Wetzel (plaintiff) brought suit against Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (Liberty) (defendant) in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that Liberty's insurance benefits and maternity leave regulations violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Wetzel requested injunctive relief ordering Liberty to cease its discriminatory practices and establish non-discriminatory practices and damages including back pay and exemplary damages. The district court found for Wetzel but granted none of the requested relief. Liberty appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed the district court's judgment, and then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.

Atlantic City Electric Co. v. General Electric

(Appellate Jurisdiction) · RoL: Pre-trial leave to appeal applications should only be granted when the filing party will not have a full opportunity to assert its rights on appeal of the final judgment. · Facts: General Electric Co. (GE) (defendant) asked Atlantic City Electric Co. (AC) (plaintiff) certain interrogatories seeking to discover whether AC shifted relevant damages on to their electric customers. AC objected to the interrogatories and the district court sustained the objections. GE filed an application for an interlocutory appeal.

United States v. Heyward-Robinson

(Counterclaims) · RoL: For a counterclaim to be compulsory it must have a logical relationship with the original claim. · Facts: The Heyward-Robinson Company (Heyward) (defendant) hired D'Agostino Excavators, Inc. (D'Agostino) (plaintiff) as a subcontractor for two construction jobs. One job was the construction of Navy barracks for the federal government (Navy job); the other job was a non-federal job for construction of a plant for Stelma, Inc. (Stelma job). The subcontracts were separate, but Heyward had the right to terminate both of them if D'Agostino breached either one. In addition, progress payments made by Heyward were not for one job specifically, but were made as a lump sum for both jobs. D'Agostino brought a federal suit against Heyward, seeking to recover payments due on the Navy job. Heyward counterclaimed for alleged overpayments on both the Navy job and the Stelma job. D'Agostino then filed a reply counterclaim to recover payments allegedly due on the Stelma job. The jury found in favor of D'Agostino on both jobs. Heyward appealed on the grounds that the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut had no jurisdiction over the counterclaims on the Stelma job because it was not a federal contract and there was no independent basis of federal jurisdiction.

Walker v. Armco Steel

(Erie Doctrine) · RoL: Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not toll a state statute of limitations or preempt state tolling rules. · Facts: Walker (plaintiff) filed a products liability suit against Armco Steel Corp. (Armco) (defendant) in Oklahoma federal district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The complaint was filed before the Oklahoma statute of limitations had run on the claim, but service of process was not actually made until after the statute of limitations had run. An Oklahoma state law did not deem an action to commence for purposes of the statute of limitations until process was served on the defendant. Based on the running of the statute of limitations without commencement of an action, therefore, Armco filed a motion to dismiss. Walker admitted that his claim would be dismissed under the state law, but argued that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governed when an action is commenced and thus preempted the Oklahoma state law. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons

(Discovery) · RoL: A state court judgment does not preclude a later suit based on federal law if the federal suit could not have been brought in state court. · Facts: Dr. Marrese (plaintiff) and Dr. Treister (plaintiff) were two orthopaedic surgeons practicing in the Chicago area. They both applied for membership in the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (the Academy) (defendant) and were denied admission. Neither doctor received a reason for the denial, nor was a hearing to challenge the denial available to them. Both doctors sued the Academy in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. The doctors alleged that the Academy violated the right to associate provided in the Illinois Constitution. They did not claim any violations of state antitrust laws. The Academy moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the doctors failed to state a cause of action. The Illinois court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. After the doctors had exhausted their state appeals, they filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that the Academy violated federal antitrust laws. The Academy filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the previous state action based on the same set of facts precluded the doctors from bringing a subsequent case in federal court. The district court denied the motion. The Academy appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which reversed the district court. The doctors appealed.

Mas v. Perry

(Diversity Jurisdiction) · RoL: A party is domiciled in the state where her true, fixed, and permanent home is located. · Facts: Mr. and Mrs. Mas (plaintiffs) were graduate students at Louisiana State University (LSU). Mr. Mas was a French national, and Mrs. Mas was from Mississippi. They married at Mrs. Mas's home in Mississippi before returning to LSU for two years; then, they moved to Illinois for approximately four months, after which they moved back to Louisiana. While the couple lived in Louisiana, their landlord, Perry (defendant), watched them through a two-way mirror in their bedroom, without the Mases knowledge or consent. The couple filed suit against Perry in federal court in Louisiana, and Perry challenged the court filing, alleging that Mrs. Mas was not diverse from him. The district court held that Mrs. Mas was a resident of Mississippi, and Perry appealed.

AFA Tours v. Whitchurch

(Diversity Jurisdiction) · RoL: Before dismissing a federal diversity suit on the grounds of insufficient amount in controversy, a court must allow the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to show that the claim amount was made in good faith. · Facts: A.F.A. Tours, Inc. (AFA) (plaintiff) brought a diversity suit in federal court against Desmond Whitchurch (defendant), a former AFA employee, for misappropriation of trade secrets. AFA sought an injunction and damages "in an amount which [wa]s not . . . ascertainable, but which [wa]s believed to exceed the sum of $50,000.00." AFA also sought punitive damages for at least $250,000. Whitchurch filed a motion to dismiss and at the oral argument of that motion, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York raised sua sponte the issue of amount in controversy. AFA claimed that a single tour could "easily generate more than $50,000." However, at the close of those oral arguments, the court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that AFA would not be able to prove damages equaling more than $50,000. At the time, the amount in controversy needed to exceed $50,000 to maintain federal diversity jurisdiction. AFA appealed.

Erie v. Tompkins

(Erie Doctrine) · RoL: A federal court sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law, whether statutory or common law. · Facts: While walking along the railroad tracks, Harry Tompkins (plaintiff), a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured by a train owned by Erie Railroad Co. (Erie) (defendant). Tompkins sued Erie, a New York company, for negligence in New York federal court. At trial, Erie argued that Tompkins was a trespasser and, under Pennsylvania state law, the company was not liable unless its conduct was wantonly negligent. Tompkins argued that federal general law should apply and determine Erie's duty and liability. The trial judge applied the rule from Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), holding that federal courts were only bound to apply state statutory and customary law, not state common law. Thus, the trial court applied the general law. Because the majority rule was that railroad company owed a duty of ordinary care to travelers like Tompkins, the district court granted recovery for Tompkins. The circuit court affirmed judgment for Tompkins claiming that federal courts could use their discretion on matters of general law. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Guaranty Trust v. York

(Erie Doctrine) · RoL: A federal court, exercising jurisdiction based strictly on diversity of citizenship, must abide by any state legal rule that would be outcome determinative if held in state court. · Facts: York (plaintiff) sued Guaranty Trust Co. (Guaranty) (defendant) for alleged breach of trust. The suit was a federal diversity action and New York substantive law governed. Guaranty claimed the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. York argued that since the action was "in equity," the federal court was not bound by the statute of limitations. The court of appeals agreed and permitted the suit to continue. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Hanna v. Plumer

(Erie Doctrine) · RoL: If a plaintiff serves a defendant properly under the federal rules, the plaintiff can proceed with a state-law claim that requires a different method of service for establishing liability. · Facts: Two drivers crashed cars. Hanna (plaintiff) survived, but the negligent driver died. Hanna filed a lawsuit in federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction, against the other driver's estate. As required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Hanna served a summons and complaint on the executor of the estate, Plumer (defendant). But Plumer was away from home, so the process-server handed the paperwork to Plumer's wife. That approach was perfectly fine under the federal rules. But Hanna did not know that a substantive statute under Massachusetts estate laws provided that executors could not be liable unless they were served with court papers personally. Plumer moved for summary judgment. He admitted that the service satisfied the federal rules but raised the affirmative defense created by the Massachusetts statute, noting that he had not been served personally. Thus, Hanna's service of process satisfied the federal procedural rules, but prevented the estate from being liable under Massachusetts's substantive law. The district court judge dismissed the case. The First Circuit affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Swift v. Tyson

(Erie Doctrine/overruled) · RoL: The Rule of Decision Act does not bind federal courts to state common law. · Facts: George Tyson (defendant), a New York resident, bought land from Nathanial Narton and Jairus Keith. Tyson paid for the land with a bill of exchange. A bill of exchange is similar to a promissory note; it's a promise to pay a certain amount at a later date. And like a promissory note, it's negotiable, meaning it can be transferred to others. Narton and Keith gave the bill of exchange to John Swift (plaintiff), a Maine resident, to pay off a previous debt they owed him. However, Narton and Keith never actually owned the land they claimed to sell to Tyson. The sale was a ploy to defraud Tyson. Thus, when Swift presented the bill of exchange for payment, Tyson refused to honor it. Since Swift resided in Maine and Tyson lived in New York, Swift sued Tyson in the Federal Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, invoking the federal court's diversity jurisdiction. Tyson argued that since Narton and Keith obtained the bill of exchange fraudulently, it was invalid and he didn't have to honor it. Swift responded that he was a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of the fraud, so he took the bill of exchange free of the initial fraud. Tyson countered that a pre-existing debt didn't qualify as valid consideration for the bill of exchange. So Swift wasn't a bona fide purchaser, and Tyson didn't have to pay him. New York State's constitution and statutes didn't address whether pre-existing debt qualified as valid consideration, but New York state courts had ruled that pre-existing debts didn't qualify. The trial court applied New York common law, held that Swift wasn't a bona fide purchaser, and entered judgment for Tyson. The Supreme Court accepted the case.

Osborn v. Bank of US

(Federal Question) · RoL: Federal courts have original jurisdiction over any matter that involves a federal question. · Facts: In contravention to the holding of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), which confirmed Congress's power to incorporate a national bank and prohibited the states from taxing it, Ohio imposed a levy on the Bank of the United States (Bank) (plaintiff). The Bank commenced an action in a federal circuit court for a temporary injunction against the tax's collection by Ohio's state auditor (defendant). The injunction was granted, but the auditor disregarded it, taking $120,475 from the Bank by force. The circuit court ordered Ohio officials (defendants) to return the money. They appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the grounds that the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Mottley

(Federal Question) · RoL: For a suit to arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States, giving a federal court jurisdiction to hear the case, a plaintiff must allege a cause of action based upon those laws or that Constitution. · Facts: In 1871, the Mottleys (plaintiffs) were injured in a railway accident. The railroad, Louisville & Nashville Railroad (defendant), settled the Mottleys' claims with a lifetime pass for free transportation on its line. In 1906, Congress passed an act forbidding passes granting free transportation. In 1907, the railroad refused to renew the Mottleys' passes. The Mottleys brought suit in federal district court, seeking specific performance of their settlement agreement with the railroad. The Mottleys alleged that the act did not apply to their free pass and that, if the law is construed as prohibiting such passes, it deprives them of their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The railroad demurred to the Mottley's complaint. The trial court overruled the demurrer and entered judgment in favor of the Mottleys. The railroad appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Pan American Fire v. Revere

(Interpleader) · RoL: Interpleader is available even if the multiple claims to be brought together are not mutually exclusive. · Facts: A truck collided with a school bus carrying children. The accident killed the bus driver and three children and injured 23 others. Various parties started to bring multiple actions against the truck's insurer, Pan American Fire & Casualty Co. (Pan American) (plaintiff). Pan American instituted an interpleader action seeking to combine all of the claimants into one proceeding. Pan American deposited a $100,000 bond, the maximum amount of its policy, with the court. When one of the claimants challenged the propriety of allowing the interpleader action, the court considered whether interpleader was available to Pan American.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire

(Interpleader) · RoL: Use of interpleader to confine a litigation to a single forum and proceeding is appropriate if there are multiple claimants to the same fund and a stakeholder must acknowledge liability to either of the claimants. · Facts: A Greyhound bus transporting over 30 passengers collided with a pickup truck while traveling early one morning in Shasta County, California. Two of the passengers were killed, and 33 individuals were injured. The injured included Ellis Clark, who was driving the pickup truck, and Clark's passenger, who owned the pickup. Four of the injured passengers brought suit in California state courts, seeking over $1 million in damages from Greyhound, the bus driver, Clark, and Clark's passenger. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (State Farm) (plaintiff) brought an interpleader action in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon before any of the suits went to trial. State Farm had an insurance policy with Clark, under which State Farm agreed to be liable for bodily injury up to $10,000 per person and $20,000 total per action, as well as for Clark's attorneys' fees pursuant to that action. State Farm paid into the court $20,000 and filed a complaint requesting, in part, that the court require all plaintiffs to establish their claims against State Farm in a single proceeding. The court issued an order requiring all the parties to show why they should not be restricted to bringing their claims in the same court pursuant to the same proceeding. The district court eventually issued an injunction requiring that all suits against Clark, State Farm, Greyhound, and the bus driver had to be prosecuted in the interpleader proceeding. The court of appeals reversed on interlocutory appeal, finding that use of interpleader was improper in the case. State Farm appealed, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.

(Opportunity to be Heard) · RoL: Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state government must provide notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the taking of property. · Facts: Family Finance Corporation (FFC) (plaintiff), a collection agency, instituted a wage-garnishment action against Christine Sniadach (defendant). As part of the proceeding, FFC froze Sniadach's wages. Under a Wisconsin statute, freezing of wages was permitted prior to trial on the merits or any hearing on the collection claim. Sniadach filed a motion to dismiss the garnishment proceeding on the ground that, absent an opportunity to be heard, freezing her wages violated her due process rights. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States

(Intervention) · RoL: A party not originally part of the lawsuit may intervene as a matter of right if its interests lack representation by the current parties to the case and if the results of the litigation would practically impair the intervenor's rights. · Facts: The United States government (plaintiff) was informed by the Atlantis Development Corp. (intervenor) that a set of islands off the coast of Florida were being used were being used by certain other companies (defendants) for building. After conducting a survey of the islands, the United States decided that such islands were part of United States sovereign territory and that they would require permits in order to build there. The United States then sued the defendant companies, arguing this point and that the companies were illegally building on the lands. Atlantis, recognizing that the adjudication of these islands as part of United States territory could affect its desire to build there, filed a motion to intervene in the case as a matter of right. The district court denied the motion to intervene. Atlantis appealed.

Smuck v. Hobson

(Intervention) · RoL: Intervention is appropriate when the moving party has an interest in the outcome of the case, that outcome may impair the party's ability to protect its interests if it does not intervene, and the party is not otherwise adequately represented in the case. · Facts: Parents (plaintiffs) of black and poor students brought a class action discrimination suit against the District of Columbia School District Board of Education (Board) (defendant). The plaintiffs won in the district court. The Board voted not to appeal the judgment and ordered Dr. Carl Hansen, the superintendent, not to appeal. However, Hansen and Carl Smuck, a dissenting member of the Board, filed notices of appeal and motions to intervene. In addition, twenty parents (parents) who disagreed with the district court's decision also filed motions to intervene. Subsequently, Hansen left his position as superintendent. This court held the appeals in abeyance and remanded the motions to intervene to the district court. The district court granted the motions to intervene.

Dusenbery v. United States

(Notice) · RoL: Adequate notice under the Due Process Clause requires the government to make a reasonably calculated effort to apprise interested parties of a pending forfeiture of property. · Facts: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) seized cash and a car in the course of a search of the home where Dusenbery (plaintiff) was arrested. The FBI sought administrative forfeiture of the property under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The FBI sent written notice of the pending forfeiture by certified mail to Dusenbery, care of the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in Milan, Michigan, where he was housed. In addition, the FBI mailed notice to the address where Dusenbery was arrested and the town where his mother lived. Notice was also published in the newspaper. When no one asserted a claim to the property, the FBI declared forfeiture in 1988. In 1993, Dusenbery sought the return of all seized assets under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The motion was denied, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court then conducted discovery. An FCI mailroom officer explained that he signed the certified mail receipt for the letter sent by the FBI, at which point he would have logged the letter and turned it over to Dusenbery's "Unit Team," who would sign for it and then deliver it. Unfortunately, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) only maintains logbooks for a period of one year. Dusenbery and the government (defendant) motioned the court for summary judgment. The lower court entered judgment on behalf of the government. The appellate court affirmed. Dusenbery petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank

(Notice) · RoL: Notice must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. · Facts: Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company (defendant) established a common trust fund, which pools multiple small trusts into one large fund for easier administration. Central Hanover petitioned the court for settlement of its first account as trustee. Beneficiaries of the trust were given notice by publication in a local newspaper in compliance with the minimum requirements of New York banking law. The court appointed Mullane (plaintiff) as special guardian of beneficiaries of the trust who had not appeared in response to the notice, and he objected that the notice was inadequate to provide due process. Nonetheless the court entered a final decree accepting the accounts, and Mullane appealed.

Jones v. Flowers

(Notice) · RoL: When a state is attempting to serve a citizen with process, it must take reasonable steps to serve the notice if service by mail is ineffective. · Facts: Gary Jones (plaintiff) owned a house at 717 North Bryan Street in Little Rock, Arkansas. Beginning in 1997, he began to fail to pay property taxes on the house. After three years of delinquency, the Commissioner of State Lands, Mark Wilcox (defendant) sent a letter via certified mail to Jones' address, informing him of his delinquency and that he had two years to pay his back taxes or the property would be sold. The letter was returned as "unclaimed." Two years after the letter was returned, Wilcox published a notice of public sale in the Arkansas Democrat Gazette. The advertisement did not receive a response, so a private sale of the property was arranged with Linda Flowers (defendant). Prior to the completion of the sale, Wilcox sent another letter to Jones, which was also returned as "unclaimed." Flowers then purchased the house and personally served a detainer notice on the property, which was accepted by Jones' daughter. Jones was notified and sued in Arkansas state court, arguing that the form of service employed by Wilcox was a constitutionally inadequate form of notice. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Flowers and Wilcox, which was affirmed by the Arkansas Supreme Court.

Fuentes v. Shevin

(Opportunity to be Heard) · RoL: Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard, and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. · Facts: Fuentes (plaintiff) purchased a gas stove and later a phonograph from Firestone represented by court officer Shevin (defendant) under separate payment plans. Under the payment plan contract Firestone retained title but Fuentes could possess the property until she defaulted on payments. Following a dispute over maintenance of the stove, Firestone brought a repossession action in state court for Fuentes failing to make the monthly payments. Firestone instituted an action in small claims court for repossession and obtained a writ of replevin. The sheriff seized both the stove and phonograph from Fuentes's home even though Fuentes had not yet received the summons to answer Firestone's complaint. Fuentes had no notice of the writ. The Florida statute at issue makes no requirement of the applicant to make a "convincing showing" prior to seizure of the goods in question. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the Fourteenth Amendment issues.

Dioguardi v. Durning

(Pleadings) · RoL: A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. · Facts: Dioguardi (plaintiff) attempted to import medicinal tonics from Italy. He got into a dispute with his shipper as to how much he owed for the shipment and as a result, the Collector of Customs at the Port of New York (Durning) (defendant) held the tonics for one year and then sold them at public auction pursuant to federal law. Dioguardi brought suit, asserting in his "home drawn" complaint that (1) the Collector sold the bottles to another party for $10 less than the plaintiff bid at the auction, and (2) three weeks before the sale, two cases of the tonics disappeared, presumably at the fault of the Collector. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The plaintiff appealed.

Denny v. Carey

(Pleadings) · RoL: The requirement of Rule 9(b) is met when there is sufficient identification of the circumstances constituting fraud so that the defendant can prepare an adequate answer to the allegations. · Facts: The plaintiff brought a class action suit against defendants on behalf of all individuals who purchased First Pennsylvania Corporation (First Penn) securities. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants made false and fraudulent statements in an attempt to hide First Penn's financial condition. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that First Penn: included as income interest accruals when borrowers had already defaulted; sold foreclosed properties at not arm's length terms to avoid reporting a loss on the properties; failed to account for certain uncollectibles in real estate loans; and hid loan defaults by entering into modifications with borrowers. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the 9(b) standard is a "rigorous" one. Rule 9(b) provided that when a plaintiff alleges fraud or mistake he must plead the circumstances of that fraud or mistake specifically, but may plead conditions of the defendant's mind such as intent or knowledge generally.

Bell Atlantic v. Twombly

(Pleadings) · RoL: To state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the complaint must contain enough factual material to suggest that an agreement existed between the defendants. · Facts: Twombly (plaintiff) issued a complaint alleging that Bell Atlantic (defendant) violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits conspiracy for the purposes of restraining trade. The complaint alleged that Bell conspired with other local telephone companies by means of "parallel conduct" to inhibit the growth of upstart telecommunication companies and eliminate competition with each other. The alleged purpose of the conspiracy was to allow each local telephone company to have dominance over a specific market. In district court, Bell Atlantic moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted this motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the dismissal. The United States Supreme Court granted review.

Aschroft v. Iqbal

(Pleadings) · RoL: Under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a complaint will only survive a motion to dismiss if it alleges nonconclusory facts that, taken as true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. · Facts: Javaid Iqbal (plaintiff) was arrested and detained during the investigation of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Iqbal claimed that the conditions of the custody violated the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and sued former United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert Mueller, and other officials (defendants) in district court. The complaint accused Ashcroft of being the "principal architect" and Mueller of being "instrumental" in the implementation of a discriminatory policy of confining individuals in harsh conditions based solely on their "religion, race, and/or national origin." Ashcroft and Mueller claimed qualified immunity and moved to dismiss Iqbal's complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court refused to dismiss the case, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the ruling on interlocutory appeal. Ashcroft and Mueller petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.

Galloway v. United States

(Post-trial motions) RoL: A directed verdict does not violate the Seventh Amendment · Facts: Galloway (plaintiff) served in the military intermittently between 1917 and 1922. He claimed to experience severe psychological problems as a result of the period of time he served in France, from 1917 through 1919. Many years later, he applied for total disability benefits from the Veterans Administration, but he was not granted total disability. Galloway, through his wife, filed suit, and at the close of evidence in the trial, the district court granted the United States' (defendant) motion for a directed verdict. The court of appeals affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore

(Preclusion) · RoL: A litigant who was not a party to a prior judgment may nonetheless use that judgment offensively to prevent a defendant from relitigating issues resolved in the earlier proceeding, provided that (1) the plaintiff could not easily have joined in the earlier action and (2) use of the judgment will not result in unfairness to the defendant. · Facts: Shore (plaintiff) brought a stockholder's class action against Parklane Hosiery Co. (Parklane) (defendant), alleging that Parklane had issued a proxy statement that contained materially false and misleading information and statements, directly in violation of federal securities laws and the regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Before the case went to trial, the SEC also sued Parklane, likewise alleging that the proxy statement Shore complained of contained materially false and misleading information and statements. Following a nonjury trial, the district court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the SEC, finding that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. Shore then moved for partial summary judgment against Parklane, asserting that Parklane was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether the proxy statement contained materially false and misleading statements, as was determined in the SEC lawsuit. The district court denied the motion on the ground that such an application of collateral estoppel would deny Parklane its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial only with respect to issues of fact not already adjudicated in a prior proceeding. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Rios v. Davis

(Preclusion) · RoL: If findings of fact in a prior action are not essential to the judgment, then a later action, which is based on those facts, is not subject to collateral estoppel or res judicata. · Facts: In an action prior to this one, Popular Dry Goods Company (Dry Goods) sued Davis (defendant) for property damages, which resulted from an automobile accident. In the same prior case, Davis alleged contributory negligence and joined Rios as a third party defendant. The jury in that case found that Dry Goods, Davis, and Rios were negligent. Dry Goods was denied recovery from Davis, and Davis was denied recovery from Rios. Rios (plaintiff) then instituted the present action against Davis. Davis alleged contributory negligence and objected to the action on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel, asserting that the present action was based on facts already presented and subject to findings in the prior action brought by Dry Goods. The district court held that the present action was barred on the basis of res judicata, and Rios appealed.

Rush v. City of Maple Heights

(Preclusion) · RoL: Where a person suffers both personal injuries and property damage as a result of the same wrongful act, only a single cause of action arises. · Facts: Rush (plaintiff) owned a motorcycle. Her husband ran the motorcycle into a hole in the road, injuring Rush and damaging the motorcycle. Rush sued the City of Maples Heights (defendant) in municipal court on the ground that the city was negligent in not repairing the road and that such negligence was the proximate cause of her accident. The municipal court awarded damages to Rush in the amount of $100 for the damage to the motorcycle. The state court of appeals and state supreme court both affirmed. Subsequently, Rush commenced a new action to recover damages for the personal injuries she suffered in the same accident. The trial court enforced the previous judgment as to negligence and proximate cause against the city. On the issue of damages, the jury awarded Rush $12,000. The court of appeals affirmed.

Cromwell v. County of Sac

(Preclusion) · RoL: Where a second action is between the same parties and involves the same transaction or occurrence as an initial judgment, that judgment does not bar the second action if the second action is upon an issue that was not adjudicated in the initial action. · Facts: The County of Sac (County) (defendant) issued bonds and coupons for interest, maturing at four different times, so that a courthouse could be built. The courthouse was never built. Samuel Smith, on behalf of Cromwell (plaintiff), had previously brought suit against the County, seeking to recover on early-maturing coupons. Cromwell had possessed the coupons, but did not prove in this previous suit that he had given value for them before they reached maturity. Therefore, the Court ruled in that case that Cromwell could not recover upon the coupons. Subsequently, Cromwell brought this suit against the County, seeking to cash in four different bonds and coupons for interest. Cromwell sought to introduce evidence in this case that he had paid value for the bonds before they reached maturity. The lower court ruled that Cromwell could not introduce that evidence because the previous judgment estopped him from doing so. Cromwell appealed.

Burnham v. Superior Court

(Presence for Jurisdiction) · Rule: A court can take jurisdiction based on physical presence alone. A state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction satisfies the Due Process Clause if it does not violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Deviations are permissible, but only with respect to suits arising out of an absent defendant's contact with a state. · Facts: A married couple who had for some years resided in New Jersey decided to separate. The wife moved to California with the couple's two children, while the husband continued to reside in New Jersey. The husband subsequently traveled to California on business and to visit the children. While in California, he was personally served with process in a divorce action filed in California state court by his wife. Appearing specially in the California Superior Court, he moved to quash the service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because his only contacts with California were a few short visits undertaken to conduct business and visit his children. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal's affirmed the superior court's decision. The case was elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Bowles v. Russel

(Procedural Defaults) · RoL: A court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal filed after the statutory period but within the period allowed by the district court's order. · Facts: Keith Bowles (defendant) was convicted of murder. He had 30 days to file an appeal but did not do so. He then filed a motion to reopen the window in which he could file an appeal. The motion was filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure under which district courts can extend the period for filing an appeal for 14 days. The district court granted Bowles's motion, but rather than 14 days, the court's order gave him 17 days within which to file his appeal. Bowles filed his notice of appeal within 17 days of the order, but not within 14 days as was required by Rule 4(a)(6). On appeal, the court of appeals found that Bowles's appeal was not timely and so it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Bowles appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Bowles argued that the Court had previously granted an "excusable neglect" exception to the 14-day window for parties that had undergone great hardship.

Pennington v. Fourth National Bank

(Property for Jurisdiction) · Rule: An action for divorce and alimony, where there is property within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, is both an action in personam and in rem, and is quite different from a real action, which involves real estate only. · Conclusion: In sustaining the demurrer, the court held that even though the customer, a nonresident of Ohio, did not receive personal service in the divorce proceeding against him, service by publication was sufficient to give that court jurisdiction over him because his bank account was within jurisdiction of that court.

Harris v. Balk

(Property for Jurisdiction) · Rule: It ought to be and it is the object of courts to prevent the payment of any debt twice over. · Facts: Plaintiff sought review of the appellate court's decision denying the effect of a Maryland judgment for plaintiff in plaintiff's action to recover a debt from the defendant owed to plaintiff. Plaintiff attached the debt owed by the garnishee to defendant. Plaintiff personally served the garnishee, a non-resident of Maryland, with notice of suit for the debt to be tried in Maryland. Defendant claimed that the debt owed by the garnishee in North Carolina did not follow the garnishee when the garnishee travelled to Maryland and that Maryland courts could not gain jurisdiction over the garnishee. The United States Supreme Court reversed.

Shaffer v. Heitner

(Property for Jurisdiction) · Rule: The relationship among a defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the states is the central concern of the inquiry into the constitutionality of an exercise of personal jurisdiction. · Conclusion: On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment. In support of its ruling, the Court held that the minimum contacts test of International Shoe should have been applied to assertions of in rem as well as in personam jurisdiction. The Court noted that defendants' seized property did not have sufficient contacts with the state to support Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction over defendants./ The Court further held that defendants had neither purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the state, nor had any reason to expect to be brought before a Delaware court.

Seattle Time Co. v. Rhinehart

(Protective Orders) · RoL: Where a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause, is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment. · Facts: Seattle Times Co. (Seattle Times) (defendant) published articles critical of the Aquarian Foundation (Aquarian), a religious group. Rhinehart (plaintiff), the spiritual leader of the Aquarian Foundation, brought suit against Seattle Times for defamation and invasion of privacy. The trial court allowed broad discovery, ordering Rhinehart, for purposes of the trial, to identify donors to Aquarian as well as how much they donate, and to produce a list of Aquarian's members. However, the court also issued a protective order prohibiting the Seattle Times from publishing the information. Both sides appealed and the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed, finding that dissemination of the donor and member information would result in "annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Hertz Corp. v. Friend

(Removal) · RoL: A corporation's principal place of business, for federal diversity jurisdiction purposes, refers to the place where the corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the company's activities. · Facts: Friend, an employee with Hertz Corporation (Hertz) (defendant), and a number of other Hertz employees (collectively Plaintiffs) filed a class action suit against their employer alleging that the rental car company had failed to conform to California's wage and hour laws. Alleging that the Plaintiffs and it were from different states, Hertz sought to remove the case to federal court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1441(a). Plaintiffs argued that Hertz's principal place of business was located in California because it derived more revenue from that state than from any other state and the majority of its business activities were conducted in California. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs and found Hertz to be a citizen of California. Hertz appealed and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett

(Summary Judgement) · RoL: A party making a motion for summary judgment does not need to provide affirmative evidence in the form of affidavits to support its motion. · Facts: Catrett (plaintiff) sued a number of asbestos manufacturers including Celotex Corp. (defendant) in district court, claiming that her husband died from exposure to the manufacturers' asbestos. Celotex moved for summary judgment on the ground that Catrett failed to present any evidence showing that her husband had been exposed to Celotex's products. In objection to the summary judgment motion, Catrett submitted three documents that suggested the decedent had been exposed to Celotex's products. The district court granted summary judgment, because Catrett lacked sufficient evidence to show her husband had been exposed to Celotex asbestos in the District of Columbia or anywhere else. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that Celotex had not offered any evidence to support its motion. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs

(Supplemental Jurisdiction) · RoL: A federal court can exercise pendent jurisdiction over state and federal claims if the federal and state claims are the type that would be expected to be heard at a single hearing and are "derive[d] from a common nucleus of operative fact." · Facts: In the spring of 1960, the Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company laid off 100 miners from one of its mines. The workers were members of the United Mine Workers of America's (UMW) Local 5881 (defendant). Later that summer, Grundy Company, a subsidiary of Consolidated, opened a mine nearby and gave Paul Gibbs (plaintiff) a contract to haul coal from the mine to the railroad. Many of the jobs at the new mine were given to members of the Southern Labor Union. Not long after work began, members of UMW prevented work from occurring, often resorting to physical violence against workers. They believed that the jobs at the new mine had been promised to members of their union. Gibbs lost his haulage contracts and claims that he was unable to obtain other hauling contracts as a result of a UMW plan against him. He sued the UMW's international parent in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. He claimed violations of § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act as well as Tennessee common law. The jury found for Gibbs under both federal and state law and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court eventually set aside the award of damages under the federal claim. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling.

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson

(Torts & Contracts) · Overview: New York residents purchased a new car from petitioner retailer. While driving through Oklahoma to a new home in Arizona, the purchasers' car was struck in the rear by another vehicle, causing a fire, which severely injured them. The purchasers brought a products-liability action in an Oklahoma court against petitioners, among others. Petitioners, which were incorporated in New York and did business there, entered special appearances, claiming that, because they had no minimal contacts with the state, Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over them would violate their rights under the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Oklahoma trial court rejected petitioners' claim, and petitioners sought a writ of prohibition in the Oklahoma supreme court to restrain respondent, a state trial judge, from exercising in personam jurisdiction over them. The state supreme court denied the writ, holding that personal jurisdiction was authorized by Oklahoma's long-arm statute. · Outcome: Finding that petitioners had no contacts, ties, or relations with the State of Oklahoma, the Court reversed the state supreme court's denial of a writ of prohibition.

Burger King Corp. v. Ruzewicz

(Torts & Contracts) · Rule: Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully establishes minimum contacts within the forum state, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice. · Issue: Did the Florida federal district court have personal jurisdiction over the franchisees under Florida's long-arm statute? (YES)

Calder v. Jones

(Torts & Contracts) · Rule: The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant in any state with which the defendant has certain minimum contacts such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend tradition notions of fair play and substantial justice. · Facts: The California resident brought a libel action against a national magazine based in Florida and against its reporter and magazine's editor, individually. Both reporter and magazine's editor were served by mail in Florida. They both moved to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction. The lower court granted the motion. On appeal, the state appellate court reversed the lower court order and found jurisdiction. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal. · Conclusion: The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was proper based upon the effects of their intentional conduct in California. Respondent's career was centered in California, the article was drawn from California sources, and the harm was suffered in California. The Supreme Court noted that petitioners were not charged with untargeted negligence, but rather their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California, and under the circumstances, petitioners must have reasonably anticipated being sued there. The Supreme Court held that petitioners' status as employees did not shield them from jurisdiction, because their individual contacts with California were sufficient.

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.

(Torts & Contracts) · Rule: The victim of libel, like the victim of any other tort may choose to bring suit in any forum with which the defendant has certain minimum contacts such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. · Conclusion: Respondent's regular circulation of magazines in the forum State is sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine. New Hampshire has clearly expressed its interest in protecting such persons from libel, as well as in safeguarding its populace from falsehoods. Its criminal defamation statute bears no restriction to libels of which residents are the victim.

Curtiss v. Loether

(Trial by Jury) · RoL: The Seventh Amendment entitles either party to demand a jury trial in an action for damages under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. · Facts: Julia Curtis (plaintiff), an African American woman, brought suit against the Loethers (defendants), alleging that they had refused to rent her an apartment because of her race in violation of § 812 of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. In addition to requesting damages, Curtis filed for a preliminary injunction to prevent the Loethers from renting the apartment pending disposition of the trial, and the court granted the motion. When Curtis found housing five months later, she allowed the court to release the injunction. In the Loethers answer, they demanded a jury trial, and the court denied that demand, holding that jury trials were neither authorized by Title VIII nor required under the Seventh Amendment. At trial, the court found that the Loethers had violated Title VIII and awarded Curtis $250 in punitive damages, but no actual damages or attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed on the jury-trial issue, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Piper Aircraft v. Reyno

(Venue) · RoL: A plaintiff may not defeat a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of the present forum. · Facts: In 1976, a small commercial aircraft crashed in Scotland, killing the pilot and five passengers. The deceased were all Scottish citizens and residents. The plane was manufactured in Pennsylvania by Piper Aircraft Co. (defendant), and the propellers were manufactured in Ohio by Hartzell Propeller, Inc. (defendant). Gaynell Reyno (plaintiff), the administratrix of the passengers' estates, filed wrongful-death actions against Piper and Hartzell in California state court, alleging negligence and strict liability. Reyno admitted to filing the action in the United States because its laws were more favorable to her case than those of Scotland. Piper and Hartzell removed to federal district court in California and then sought a transfer to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The California district court granted the motions. After both cases were moved to federal district court in Pennsylvania, Piper and Hartzell sought to dismiss the case on grounds of forum non conveniens. The Pennsylvania district court granted the motions, citing the discretion courts have to dismiss a case if an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the case and if trial in the chosen forum would be burdensome to the defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on the ground that dismissal for forum non conveniens is not appropriate if the law of the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Walden v. Fiore

(Venue) · RoL: Personal jurisdiction may not be exercised over a nonresident civil defendant if the defendant's sole contact with the forum state is knowledge that the defendant's tortious conduct committed outside the forum state has an effect on the plaintiff in that state. · Facts: Gina Fiore and Keith Gipson (plaintiffs), residents of both California and Nevada, were detained at an airport in Puerto Rico by Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents. The TSA agents discovered nearly $97,000 in cash in one of Fiore's carry-on bags. The plaintiffs explained that they were professional gamblers and had won the money at a San Juan casino. The plaintiffs were subsequently cleared for departure to Atlanta, Georgia, but law-enforcement officials in San Juan alerted a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) task force at the Atlanta airport to the plaintiffs' impending arrival. Anthony Walden (defendant), a police officer, was a member of the DEA task force. Upon the plaintiffs' arrival in Atlanta, Walden and the task force approached the plaintiffs, questioned them about the source of the money, and used a drug-sniffing dog on Fiore's bag. Although the dog did not find any narcotics on Fiore's bag, Walden seized the cash despite Fiore's gambling explanation. Eventually, the money was returned to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed suit against Walden in federal district court in Nevada, seeking damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The district court granted Walden's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over Walden. The plaintiffs appealed. A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review.

Hoffman v. Blaski

(Venue) · RoL: The power of a district court to transfer an action to another district depends not upon the wish or waiver of the defendant but, rather, upon whether the transferee district was one in which the action might have been brought initially by the plaintiff. · Facts: Blaski (plaintiff) brought a patent infringement suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (Texas District Court) against Howell and a Texas corporation (defendants). The defendants filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer the suit to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Illinois District Court). Section 1404(a) stated that a transfer may not be made unless it is for the convenience of the parties, in the interest of justice, and is a venue where the suit "might have been brought." The Illinois District Court lacked original venue over the action, but the Texas District Court nonetheless granted the defendant's motion to transfer because it was "in the interest of justice." Blaski appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the transfer. When Judge Hoffman of the Illinois District Court was assigned the case on transfer, Blaski filed a motion to remand the suit back to the Texas District Court. Hoffman denied the motion. Blaski then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, seeking a writ of mandamus forcing Hoffman to reverse his ruling. The court granted Blaski's writ and the defendants appealed.

Gulf Oil v. Gilbert

(Venue) · RoL: Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. Facts: Respondent-plaintiff, Virginia resident, and public warehouse operator brought a tort action in New York alleging that the petitioner-defendant, in violation of the ordinances of Virginia, so carelessly handled a delivery of gasoline to his warehouse tanks and pumps as to cause an explosion and fire which consumed the warehouse building, caused injury to his business, and burned the property of customers in his custody under warehousing agreements. Petitioner-defendant oil company is a Pennsylvania corporation, qualified to do business in both Virginia and New York, and it has designated officials of each state as agents to receive service of process. When sued in New York, the defendant, invoking the doctrine offorum non conveniens, claimed that the appropriate place for trial is Virginia, where the plaintiff lives and defendant does business, where all events in litigation took place, where most of the witnesses reside, and where both state and federal courts are available to plaintiff and are able to obtain jurisdiction of the defendant

Atlantic Marine v. U.S. District Court

(Venue) · RoL: When parties have entered into a valid forum-selection clause that designates a federal venue, the case should be transferred to the designated district unless extraordinary circumstances exist that are unrelated to the convenience of the parties. · Facts: Atlantic Marine Construction Co. (Atlantic) (defendant) contracted to construct a child-development center. Atlantic entered into a subcontract with J-Crew Management, Inc. (J-Crew) (plaintiff) for a portion of the work. The subcontract included a forum-selection clause designating either the circuit court in Norfolk, Virginia or the federal district court in Norfolk, Virginia as the forum for any disputes under the contract. J-Crew sued Atlantic in the Western District of Texas over a dispute about payment under the subcontract. Atlantic moved to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), based on the forum-selection clause. The district court denied the motions. Atlantic appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed. Atlantic then sought review from the Supreme Court of the United States.

Bates v. C & S Adjusters

(Venue) · RoL: In an action brought under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, venue exists in a district in which the debtor resides and to which a collection agency's demand for payment was forwarded. · Facts: Phillip Bates (plaintiff) received a debt-collection notice from C & S Adjusters, Inc. (C & S) (defendant). Bates had incurred the debt while he lived in the Western District of Pennsylvania. The creditor, whose principal place of business was also in the Western District of Pennsylvania, referred the matter to C & S, which was a Pennsylvania corporation. C & S mailed the collection letter to Bates's Pennsylvania address, but Bates had subsequently moved to the Western District of New York. C & S did not mark the collection letter with instructions that it should not be forwarded, so the U.S. Postal Service forwarded the notice to Bates's New York residence. After Bates received the letter at his New York address, he filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Act). C & S filed a motion to dismiss the case because of improper venue. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York granted the motion to dismiss based on improper venue. Bates appealed.

Hickman v. Taylor

(Work Product Protection) · RoL: Opposing counsel must demonstrate necessity, justification, or undue prejudice for access to counsel's written statements, private memoranda, and personal recollections. · Facts: On February 7, 1943, the tugboat "J.M. Taylor" (defendant) sank while helping to tow a car float belonging to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. Five crew members died in the accident. J.M. Taylor's owners and underwriters of the company hired attorneys to prepare defenses against potential suits of the deceased and to seek damages against Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. Fortenbaugh, one of the hired attorneys, privately interviewed four survivors of the accident after each had testified in a public hearing about the incident. Fortenbaugh interviewed other witnesses and memorialized his findings. Of the five estates of the deceased, only one estate, Hickman (plaintiff), filed suit in federal court against the tugboat owners and the railroad company under the Jones Act. In preparing a defense, opposing counsel asked for exact copies of all written statements and summaries of all information taken orally. Fortenbaugh declined on the basis of privilege taken in the course of preparing for litigation. The district court ordered him to comply. Taylor appealed.

International Shoe Co. v. Washington

(personal jurisdiction) · Rule: At any time after the commissioner of the department of unemployment compensation and placement shall find that any contribution of the interest thereon have become delinquent, the commissioner may issue a notice of assessment specifying the amount due, which notice of assessment shall be served upon the delinquent employer in the manner prescribed for the service of summons in a civil action, except that if the employer cannot be found within the state, said notice will be deemed served when mailed to the delinquent employer at his last known address by a registered mail. · Issue: Did the superior court err when it found International Shoe liable for contributions? (NO)

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown

(personal jurisdiction) · Rule: Opinions in the wake of the path marking International Shoe decision have differentiated between general and specific jurisdiction. A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so "continuous and systematic" as to render them essentially at home in the forum State. Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, depends on an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forums state and is therefore subject to the state's regulation. In contrast to general, all-purpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction. · Issue: Could North Carolina exercise jurisdiction over the case? (NO)

Hess v. Pawloski

(personal jurisdiction) · Rule: A state's power to regulate the use of its highways extends to their use by nonresidents as well as by residents. A state may declare that the use of the highway by a non-resident is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom the process may be served. · Issue: Did the Massachusetts Court properly acquire personal jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania resident? (Yes)

Pennoyer v. Neff

(personal jurisdiction) ▪ Rule: the validity of judgement against people who have not been personally summoned or had notice of the proceeding may be directly questioned and their enforcement restricted, on the ground that it would not constitute a Due Process Clause ▪ Issue: Can a state court exercise personal jurisdiction against a non-resident who was not personally served with process within the state but simply by a publication in a newspaper. (NO)