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Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces 42 U.S.C. § 1983

-Arrest and Control -4th -On August 18, 2003, the Las Cruces Police Department established a sobriety checkpoint at the corner of Valley Drive and Hayner Avenue in Las Cruces, New Mexico. At approximately 10:10 p.m., John Vondrak approached the checkpoint in his 1994 Mercury Cougar, and an unidentified police officer asked Vondrak if he had consumed any alcohol that evening. Vondrak responded that he bought a beer about three or four hours earlier, and consumed approximately one-third of it. The officer directed Vondrak to pull his car over to the side of the road. Sobriety test done on Vondrak, One-legged stand test, walk and turn test, horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Officer McCants determined that Vondrak had failed the sobriety tests. McCants drove Vondrak to the police station. After they arrived, McCants administered two IR-5000 tests on Vondrak, both of which produced a blood-alcohol content reading of 0.00. She then asked another officer to perform an RBT test, which produced a blood-alcohol content reading of 0.00. After the officers tested Vondrak, they held him for another one-and-a-half hours. During this time, Vondrak made several requests for someone to loosen his handcuffs because his wrists were hurting; all requests were ignored. At some point, a police department employee photographed Vondrak's wrists. In the photographs, Vondrak's wrists appear red, but they do not appear cut or scraped. Eventually, the officers charged Vondrak with Driving While Under the Influence to the Slightest Degree, and they released him on his own recognizance. The charge against Vondrak was later dropped. -The handcuffs and excessive force. The district court was correct in denying qualified immunity to McCants and Krause on Vondrak's claim for excessive force. In some circumstances, unduly tight handcuffing can constitute excessive force where a plaintiff alleges some actual injury from the handcuffing and alleges that an officer ignored a plaintiff's timely complaints (or was otherwise made aware) that the handcuffs were too tight․ We believe that a claim of excessive force requires some actual injury that is not de minimis, be it physical or emotional. Qualified Immunity issue

Baskin v Smith 50 Fed App.731 (6th Circuit)

-Arrest and Control -4th & 14th -At approximately 1:45 am on October 27, 1996, Grand Rapids police officers arrested Ursula Parks and Neicha Patton for creating a disturbance at the Amoco service Station located on the corner of Franklin and Eastern in the City of Grand Rapids. Shortly thereafter, the officers arrested, Robert Baskin, for creating a disturbance during the course of the arrest of Ms. Patton and Ms. Parks. After the jury acquitted the plaintiff (Baskin) of the charges, he filed a civil rights suit against the defendants alleging that defendants illegally searched and seized his person, falsely arrested him and used excessive force during the arrest. -Defendants Smith and White contend that they are entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity, which provides that Government officials, performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. The court granted in part and denied in part. The court ordered that the defendant's summary judgement GRANTED with respect to defendant Office White throwing the plaintiff across the hood of the car and DENIED with respect to use of excessive force in handcuffing the plaintiff.

Gousee v City of Los Angeles

-Arrest and Control -A jury found that both the City of Los Angeles (City) and Budget had been negligent, and awarded $33,224,378 in damages to Dr. Gousse and his wife. Concluding that the damage award was so staggeringly disproportionate to the injuries suffered that the results shock the conscience, the court granted a motion for new trial on the issue of damages. The court denied City's and Budgets motions for a new trial on liability, and their motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Excessive Handcuff issue. -Dr. Gousse, a highly credentialed and accomplished urological surgeon with a specialty in female reconstructive urology, is an associate professor at the University of Miami medical school. He arrived at the Los Angeles airport (LAX) on February 9, 2001, to attend a conference at the University of California - Los Angeles. Dr. Gousse rented from Budget a red Ford Taurus with a license plate bearing the number 4KOU368. California DMV records showed this license plate registered to a beige Taurus,[1]also owned by Budget. Dr. Gousses predicament came about because the beige Taurus had been reported stolen in July 2000. In other words, Budget rented a car to Dr. Gousse that carried the license plates of a stolen car. When Dr. Gousse checked out from the Budget rental lot, the rental agreement showed the plate that was correct in terms of DMV records, i.e., 4KOU370. The plate on the car, however, was 4KOU368. At this point, Budgets procedures required that the customer be sent back to the rental counter to clear up the discrepancy. Instead, the Budget attendant crossed off 70 on the rental agreement and inserted by hand 68. Although there appears to have been some unusual delay in clearing Dr. Gousse, he was eventually permitted to exit the lot. The incident giving rise to this lawsuit began when Dr. Gousse attracted the attention of the police by driving too slowly at about 30-35 miles per hour on the Santa Monica freeway. The police car was being driven by Officer Rojas, who was designated the primary officer. His partner was Officer Mora, who operated the Mobile Digital Transmitter or MDT, which enabled the officers to run license plate checks from the police vehicle. Mora ran the license plate on the car Dr. Gousse was driving. The report came back within a few seconds, about 2:18 a.m., stating that the plate belonged to a 2001 Ford Taurus, color beg, which Mora interpreted to mean burgundy, that had been stolen in San Jose, California. Because they were now dealing with what they believed to be a stolen vehicle and because the slow speed at which Dr. Gousse was driving made the officers suspect that they were dealing with a drunk driver, Rojas decided to effect a high-risk felony prone-out arrest with helicopter assistance. Moras role in this decision, which proved to be critical, is somewhat uncertain. While at trial he testified that it was both of our decisions, in his deposition he testified that he and Rojas did not discuss this decision. In any event, it is clear that Mora agreed with the decision to effect a high-risk felony prone-out arrest. While Dr. Gousse testified that he complained immediately, and repeatedly, that the handcuffs were too tight, City offered the testimony of Officer Oropeza who handcuffed Dr. Gousse; Oropeza testified that he did not use much force in putting on the handcuffs because Dr. Gousse was very cooperative. Oropeza checked the handcuffs for tightness and he double-locked them by activating a button that keeps them from getting tighter.

US V Sokolow 490 US 1

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -4th -Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents stopped respondent upon his arrival at Honolulu International Airport. The agents found 1,063 grams of cocaine in his carry-on luggage. When respondent was stopped, the agents knew, inter alia, that (1) he paid $2,100 for two round-trip plane tickets from a roll of $20 bills; (2) he traveled under a name that did not match the name under which his telephone number was listed; (3) his original destination was Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; (4) he stayed in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round-trip flight from Honolulu to Miami takes 20 hours; (5) he appeared nervous during his trip; and (6) he checked none of his luggage. Respondent was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. -The totality of circumstances can establish a reasonable suspicion, sufficient for officer to make an investigative stop without a warrant

Florida v Royer 460 US 491

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -4th -In January 1978, two undercover officers approached the plaintiff, Mr. Royer, at the Miami International Airport because he fit a drug courier profile: He was a casually dressed, nervous young man carrying heavy luggage. Also, he paid cash for his ticket and filled out his baggage tag only with a name and destination. The officers identified themselves and asked if he would speak with them. He consented and, at their request, produced his airline ticket and his driver's license. He became visibly nervous when the officers noted that the ticket and driver's license bore different names, and then they told him they suspected him of transporting narcotics. Without returning his ticket or license, they asked him to accompany them to a small room off the concourse. He said nothing in response but went with them. Without his consent, they retrieved his luggage and brought it to the room. When asked if he would consent to a search of his suitcases, again he did not speak, but handed the officers a key. When the officers opened the suitcase, they discovered it contained marijuana. -U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with issues involving the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the case establishes a firm line in cases where police conduct search and seizure without a warrant. The court ruled that, while it is legal for authorities to target and approach a person based on their behavior, absent more, they cannot detain or search such individual without a warrant.

Terry v Ohio 392 US 1

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -4th -Officer McFadden observed two men outside of a store walking up to the window then away several times. A third man met up with the initial two and engaged in conversation. The plainly clothed officer developed suspicion that the men may be planning to rob the store. McFadden approached the men and after identifying himself as an officer asked what they were doing. The men mumbled back a response. McFadden then grabbed Terry, turned him around and patted him down to determine if he was armed. The search revealed a gun in Terry's coat pocket. After conducting the same search on the second man, another gun was revealed. Once at trial, the officer testified he thought the men may have been armed. -landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a police officer stops a suspect on the street and frisks him or her without probable cause to arrest, if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime and has a reasonable belief that the person "may be armed and presently dangerous."

Brigham City v Stuart

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -4th -On July 23, 2001, at about 3:00 AM, four Brigham City police officers were dispatched to a loud house party. At the front door, the officers determined that knocking would not be productive and made their way down the driveway alongside the house to investigate. Through a slat fence they saw two minors drinking and entered the backyard, having probable cause to do so. While in the backyard, the officers saw a fight inside the house, which appeared to be four adults restraining a juvenile. At one point, the juvenile broke free and struck one of the occupants of the house in the nose with his hand. Two officers opened the screen door and "hollered" to identify themselves, but the occupants didn't notice. After entering the house, one officer shouted again to identify himself, this time alerting the occupants. The occupants then became upset at the presence of the officers in the residence without permission. The officers arrested the adults and charged them with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, and intoxication. -Exigent Circumstances-Police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threated with such injury

Carroll v US 267 US 132

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -4th -On the 15th of December, some two months later, Scully and Cronenwett, on their regular tour of duty, with Peterson, the State officer, were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia, on the road to Detroit, when Kiro and Carroll met and passed them in the same automobile, coming from the direction of Detroit to Grand Rapids. The government agents turned their car and followed the defendants to a point some sixteen miles east of Grand Rapids, where they stopped them and searched the car. They found behind the upholstering of the seats, the filling of which had been removeterm-23d, 68 bottles. These had labels on them, part purporting to be certificates of English chemists that the contents were blended Scotch whiskeys, and the rest that the contents were Gordon gin made in London. When an expert witness was called to prove the contents, defendants admitted the nature of them to be whiskey and gin. When the defendants were arrested, Carroll said to Cronenwett, "Take the liquor and give us one more chance and I will make it right with you," and he pulled out a roll of bills, of which one was for $10. Peterson and another took the two defendants and the liquor and the car to Grand Rapids, while Cronenwett, Thayer and Scully remained on the road looking for other cars of whose coming they had information. The officers were not anticipating that the defendants would be coming through on the highway at that particular time, but when they met them there, they believed they were carrying liquor, and hence the search, seizure and arrest. -The warrantless search of an automobile is valid if there exist probable cause to believe it contains contraband

Kentucky v King 563 US 452

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -4th -Police officers in Lexington, Kentucky, set up a drug buy outside of an apartment complex using an undercover informant. After the suspect sold the informant crack cocaine, Officer Gibson, who was undercover watching the transaction from a nearby unmarked vehicle, called in uniformed officers to pursue the suspect. The officers pursued the suspect into a breezeway and lost sight of him. They heard a door close but, when they got to the end of the breezeway, they encountered two doors and did not know whether the suspect entered the apartment on the right or the left. Officer Gibson did see the suspect enter the door on the right, but the other officers did not hear his radio transmission because it went to their vehicle. While the officers did not know which apartment the suspect was in, they could smell burning marijuana coming from inside the apartment on the left. Per one of the officers' testimony, the officers began banging on the left door "as loud as [they] could" and announced, "'This is the police,'" or "'Police, police, police,'"[8] after which they heard movements which they believed indicated evidence was going to be destroyed. They announced they were going to enter and kicked down the door. They found Hollis King, the defendant, his girlfriend, and a guest who was smoking marijuana. Upon a further search of the home, they found cash, drugs, and paraphernalia. -Police do not "create" an impermissible exigency when they knock on the door of a residence and announce their presence if they have reasonable belief an exigency exist

Dyar v State

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -4th -The appellant was in a one-car accident in Smithville, Texas, around midnight on New Year's Eve, 2000. The appellant, the lone occupant of the vehicle, was taken to Smithville Hospital before the police responded to the accident scene. After arriving at the scene of the accident, Trooper Thompson observed that the appellant's vehicle had left the road and landed upside down. Trooper Thompson went to the hospital emergency room to speak with the appellant about the accident. The appellant told the trooper that he had been partying in Austin for New Year's Eve and was attempting to drive back to Houston. The appellant admitted to drinking alcohol and driving. The trooper noticed that the appellant had slurred speech, red glassy eyes, a strong smell of alcohol, and that many of the appellant's answers were unintelligible. Based on the above information, coupled with the details of the accident, Trooper Thompson believed that he had established probable cause. Trooper Thompson read the appellant his Miranda warnings and the DWI statutory warning and arrested the appellant for driving while intoxicated. The appellant consented to providing a sample of his blood. The appellant was charged by information with driving while intoxicated. -Any peace officer may arrest, without a warrant: persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony, violation of Title 9, Chapter 42, Penal Code, breach of the peace, or offense under Section 49.02, Penal Code, or threaten, or are about to commit some offense against the laws;․ Thus, the circumstances surrounding his arrest were sufficient to determine that Dyar was in a "suspicious place," as required by article 14.03(a)(1), and "under circumstances which reasonably show that such [person has] been guilty of some breach of the peace."

Brinegar v US 338 US 160

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -4th -The facts are substantially undisputed. At about six o'clock on the evening of March 3, 1947, Malsed, an investigator of the Alcohol Tax Unit, and Creehan, a special investigator, were parked in a car beside a highway near the Quapaw Bridge in northeastern Oklahoma. The point was about five miles west of the Missouri-Oklahoma line. Brinegar drove past headed west in his Ford coupe. Malsed had arrested him about five months earlier for illegally transporting liquor; had seen him loading liquor into a car or truck in Joplin, Missouri, on at least two occasions during the preceding six months, and knew him to have a reputation for hauling liquor. As Brinegar passed, Malsed recognized both him and the Ford. He told Creehan, who was driving the officers' car, that Brinegar was the driver of the passing car. Both agents later testified that the car, but not especially its rear end, appeared to be "heavily loaded," and "weighted with something." Brinegar increased his speed as he passed the officers. They gave chase. After pursuing him for about a mile at top speed, they gained on him as his car skidded on a curve, sounded their siren, overtook him, and crowded his car to the side of the road by pulling across in front of it. -Probable cause is defined by US Supreme Court as more than bare suspicion; it exist when "the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed

Beck v Ohio 379 US 89

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -4th -receiving unspecified "information" and "reports" concerning William Beck and his current whereabouts, policeman in Cleveland, Ohio stopped him in his automobile and placed him under arrest without a warrant on November 10, 1961 for "a clearing house operation, scheme of chance."[1] As incidental to arrest, they searched, firstly, his car and found nothing noteworthy. At the police station, however, they searched his person and discovered, "beneath the sock of his leg," an envelope containing a number of clearing house slips, a then-illegal possession in Ohio for which he was charged in Cleveland Municipal Court. -U.S. Supreme Court held that Ohio police arrested defendant without probable cause, so the criminally-punishable evidence found on his person during an incidental search was inadmissible.

US v Mendenhall

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -4th -On the morning of February 10, 1976, Sylvia Mendenhall was walking through the concourse of Detroit Metropolitan Airport after disembarking a commercial flight returning from Los Angeles. During her walk through the airport, she was noticed by two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents. The two agents grew suspicious, later stating that she appeared to have the characteristics of a person unlawfully transporting narcotics. The agents approached Mendenhall and identified themselves as federal agents. Following procedure, they began to question Ms. Mendenhall; their questions included, "How long were you in California?" to which she responded by stating that hers was a short, two-day trip. The agents later asked her to present identification and an airline ticket. She presented her driver's license and the airline ticket to the agents. The name on the driver's license said "Sylvia Mendenhall", yet the name on the airline ticket was "Annette Ford". Upon questioning, she responded, "[I] just felt like using that name."[6] "Agent Anderson then specifically identified himself as a federal narcotics agent and, according to his testimony, the respondent "became quite shaken, extremely nervous. She had a hard time speaking."[7] The agents requested that the respondent accompany them to the DEA office at the Airport; she did so willingly. At the office, the agents asked for permission to inspect her handbag and her person and informed her of her right to decline. She responded, "Go ahead," while handing her purse to the agent. A female police officer arrived at the office to conduct the search. The officer also proclaimed that the respondent had the right to decline to the search. When asked to remove her clothes, she explained that she had a flight to catch, but was assured that if she had no narcotics on her, that there would be no issues. Without further comments, she began to disrobe. Two packages were found beneath her undergarments and were handed to the policewoman. One package appeared to contain an illegal substance. The respondent was arrested for possession of heroin. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the motion to suppress the evidence. The court concluded that the agents' actions were permissible in investigating suspicion of criminal activity. The respondent voluntarily accompanied the agents to the DEA office. The court convicted Sylvia Mendenhall. The court of appeals reversed the decision, stating that the respondent did not properly consent to the search.

Maryland v Shatzer 559 US 96

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -5th -In 2003, a police detective tried to question respondent Shatzer, who was incarcerated at a Maryland prison pursuant to a prior conviction, about allegations that he had sexually abused his son. Shatzer invoked his Miranda right to have counsel present during interrogation, so the detective terminated the interview. Shatzer was released back into the general prison population, and the investigation was closed. Another detective reopened the investigation in 2006 and attempted to interrogate Shatzer, who was still incarcerated. Shatzer waived his Miranda rights and made inculpatory statements. -Once a suspect invokes his or her Miranda rights, a break in custody of more that 14 days overcome the Edward rule and allows officers to re-contact the suspect for interrogation

Creager v State

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -5th -he appellant was interrogated by the 271st Judicial District Attorney's investigator, who obtained an arrest warrant from a magistrate in Jack County and went to Hobbs, New Mexico, where the appellant was working. After the appellant was arrested, the investigator interrogated him in the Hobbs Police Department's jail. The interrogation was tape-recorded, and the pre-trial evidence included the parties' separate transcripts of the recording of the interrogation. Using a printed form, the investigator read the appellant the warnings that are set out in Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.22, § 2(a). The appellant orally waived his right to remain silent and signed a waiver on the printed form. After the warnings and waivers, the investigator introduced himself as a specialist in child abuse cases. He asked the appellant to look at a doctor's report about the child who was alleged to be the victim. (Later he showed the appellant photographs of the child's bruises.) He told the appellant that he had talked to the witnesses and the child, and that he was very satisfied with what the *853 child told him. Then he said, "Wes, I'm here to try to make things easier for you. I drove all this distance to try to make things work for you on your behalf. OK? [The child] has told me that you abused him. The appellant repeatedly denied his guilt, and the investigator repeatedly insisted that a two-and-a-half year old child could not have been mistaken or have invented such a story. The investigator remarked that the appellant was making it hard on himself and everybody. The appellant said he did not want to make it rough on the child, whom he loved, and asked, "What kind of route can we go if I say that I did this and I get help. Because if I did this, I want help. Because, well it could happen again to some other child if I did this." The investigator gave the appellant some information about the range of punishment, early release, probation eligibility, and plea bargaining. -Investigator had advised the defendant, Creager of his rights prior to questioning and stated "for or against. The District Court ruled that a statement made after a warning that could be used "for or against" a suspect has a statutory basis. CCP 38.22 requires that to be admissible a statement of an accused made as a result of custodial interrogation must show that the suspect was warned, "that any statement he makes may be used against him at his trial." Judge said that "for or against" used by the interrogator is a mutation of the constitutional and statutory requested warning. An interrogator's remarks that explicitly contradict a clause of the preceding warning is as inappropriate as an interrogator's failure to inform a suspect of the required warnings prior to making the confession. The basis of the per serule of inadmissibility is that if the accused is advised that his confession may be used "for or against him" or "for and against him," such is a improper warning, and without more renders the confession inadmissible as a matter of law, because to warn the accused that his confession might be used for him holds out an inducement for making the confession. The defendants waiver of rights is compromised by the interrogator's remarks that the defendant's confession may be used "for or against him." The defendant would not possess the requisite "knowledge" component in order to voluntarily waive his rights prior to confession.

Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -5th & 6th -On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested by the Phoenix Police Department, based on circumstantial evidence linking him to the kidnapping and rape of an eighteen-year-old woman ten days earlier.[3] After two hours of interrogation by police officers, Miranda signed a confession to the rape charge on forms that included the typed statement: "I do hereby swear that I make this statement voluntarily and of my own free will, with no threats, coercion, or promises of immunity, and with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me. However, at no time was Miranda told of his right to counsel. Before being presented with the form on which he was asked to write out the confession that he had already given orally, he was not advised of his right to remain silent, nor was he informed that his statements during the interrogation would be used against him. -Evidence obtained by the police during custodial interrogations of a suspect is not admissible in court to prove guilt unless the suspect was given the Miranda warnings and there is a valid waiver

Johnson v Mississippi 421 US 213

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -Petitioners, six Negroes, who had been picketing and urging boycott of certain business establishments in Vicksburg, Miss., because of their alleged racial discrimination in employment, were arrested with others and charged with unlawfully conspiring to bring about a boycott. -Conspiracy to boycott- Those arrested then sought removal of the prosecutions from state to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1443(1), which provides for removal of state proceedings "[a]against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens," alleging that the conspiracy statutes underlying the charges were unconstitutional, that the charges were groundless, and made solely to deprive those arrested of their federally protected rights, and, more particularly, that their activities were protected by 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968). Section 245(b)(5), inter alia, makes it a crime by "force or threat of force" to injure, intimidate, or interfere with any person because he has been "participating lawfully in speech or peaceful assembly" opposing racial discrimination in employment, but § 245(a)(1) provides that § 245 shall not be construed as indicating Congress' intent to prevent any State from exercising jurisdiction over any offense over which it would have jurisdiction in the absence of § 245. Held: Removal under § 1443(1) was not warranted based solely on petitioners' allegations that the statutes underlying the charges were unconstitutional, that there was no basis in fact for those charges, or that their arrest and prosecution otherwise denied them their constitutional rights. The Mississippi courts undoubtedly have jurisdiction over conspiracy and boycott cases brought under state law, and § 245(a)(1) appears to disavow any intent to interrupt such state prosecutions, a conclusion that is also implicit in § 245's operative provisions, since § 245(b), on its face, focuses on the use of force, and its legislative history confirms that its central purpose was to prevent and punish violent interferences with the exercise of specified rights, and that it was not aimed at interrupting or frustrating the otherwise orderly processes of state law.

Payton v New York 445 US 573

-Arrest, Search and Seizure -The police may not validly enter a private home to make a routine, warrantless felony arrest unless justified by exigent circumstances

City of Waco v Williams 209 S.W. 3rd 216

-City of Waco v Williams -Texas Tort Claims Act -On June 14, 2005, Waco police responded to a call made by Mr. Williams' sister, complaining that Decedent would not leave her property. By the time the officers arrived, the sister was asking Mr. Williams [Decedent] to come back into her home since any misunderstanding had been resolved. As Mr. Williams attempted to walk back towards his sister's house, the officers tackled him, pushing and dragging him to the ground. Mr. Williams did not resist, and in fact simply held his hands up as he lay prone. Suddenly and without provocation, four officers at the scene stood over Mr. Williams as he lay helpless on the ground and negligently began shooting him with Tasers, shocking him over and over with 50,000 volts of electricity. Each of the shooting officers negligently held the Taser triggers for various durations, all the while causing a continuous current to surge through Mr. Williams' body. While an initial Taser blast is designed to last five seconds, subsequent blasts can last as long as officers hold down the triggers. At no time did Mr. Williams resist. During much of this time, he was actually laying prone on the ground. He was shot with the Tasers while he was on the ground, immobilized, compliant, and utterly defenseless. He began to have difficulty breathing. Whether it was the screams of the witnesses, or the realization of what they had just done, the officers eventually stopped shooting him with their Tasers. As he lay on the ground outside his sister's home, his breathing grew more labored, and he passed out. Mr. Williams had stopped breathing by the time the ambulance arrived and medical personnel's efforts to revive him proved fruitless. At no time did any of the shooting officers -Robert Earl Williams, Sr. died as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the City of Waco and its agents, servants, and officers, including in the following particulars: furnishing and use of tangible personal property (Tasers) that were defective, inadequate, and lacking integral safety component(s); negligent implementation of a policy concerning the use of tangible personal property (Tasers); the improper, negligent, careless and reckless use of inappropriate tangible personal property; and undertaking to train and instruct the officers involved in the use of Tasers, but then acting negligently in implementing its policies by failing to adequately train and supervise those officers on the appropriate use of Tasers. The fundamental difference between negligent injury, or even grossly negligent injury, and intentional injury is the specific intent to inflict injury. The Restatement Second of Torts defines intent to mean that "the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it." In the City's fifth issue, the City argues that the Williamses bring claims for negligent supervision and training and for product liability, and that the Tort Claims Act does not waive sovereign immunity for such claims. The Act does not waive sovereign immunity for negligent supervision and training. IT was concluded that suit against the City was dismissed with prejudice.

Okonkwo v Fernandez 2003 WL 22227858

-Force Options -4th -"Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, which shields them from suit as well as liability for civil damages, if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable officer would have known. A defendant official must affirmatively plead the defense of qualified immunity."

Osabutey (Anderson) v Creighton 483 US 636

-Force Options -4th -A federal law enforcement officer who participates in a search that violates the Fourth Amendment may not be held personally liable for money damages if a reasonable officer could have believed that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner, a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, participated with other law enforcement officers in a warrantless search of respondents' home. The protection of a qualified immunity intended only to protect reasonable official action. Nor is there any merit to respondents' contention that no immunity should be provided to police officers who conduct unlawful warrantless searches of innocent third parties' homes in search of fugitives. The court also held that petitioner was not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, since the right he allegedly violated -- the right of persons to be protected from warrantless searches of their homes unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances -- was clearly established. -A federal law enforcement officer who participates in a search that violates the Fourth Amendment may not be held personally liable for money damages if a reasonable officer could have believed that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the "objective legal reasonableness" of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were "clearly established" at the time the action was taken

Tennessee v Garner 471 US 1

-Force Options -4th -At about 10:45 p.m. on October 3, 1974, Memphis police officers Leslie Wright and Elton Hymon were dispatched to answer a burglary call next door. Officer Hymon went behind the house as his partner radioed back to the station. Hymon witnessed someone running across the yard. The fleeing suspect, Edward Garner, stopped at a 6-foot-high (1.8 m) chain-link fence. Using his flashlight, Hymon could see Garner's face and hands, and was reasonably sure that Garner was unarmed. The police testified that they believed Garner was 17 or 18 years old; Garner was in fact 15 years old. After Hymon ordered Garner to halt, Garner began to climb the fence. Believing that Garner would certainly flee if he made it over the fence, Hymon shot him. The bullet struck Garner in the back of the head, and he died shortly after an ambulance took him to a nearby hospital. Ten dollars and a purse taken from the burglarized house were found on his person. -The police may not use deadly forced to prevent the escape of a suspect unless it is necessary and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the office or to others

Hathaway v Bazany 2007 WL 3200413

-Force Options -4th -Bazany testified that when he reached a point approximately eight to ten feet from the front right corner of the Mustang, the vehicle suddenly accelerated towards him, turning first to the right, then back to the left, and then finally back towards the center of the roadway as Bazany attempted to get out of the way. When Bazany realized that he was not going to be able to get out of the Mustang's path, he decided to fire his weapon. The Mustang struck Bazany on the left leg, causing him to spin down the side of the vehicle. Bazany did fire his weapon, though he does not know whether he drew and fired before, during, or immediately after he was struck by the Mustang. The bullet fired by Bazany hit the Mustang's driver, Jon-Eric Hathaway, at a point immediately below Hathaway's lower left shoulder blade, traveled laterally through Hathaway's lungs and heart, and came to rest on the right side of his chest, between his right nipple and armpit. Hathaway died from this wound. The Hathaway's raise two issues on appeal: the exclusion of Harry Hathaway's testimony as an expert witness and the grant of qualified immunity to Bazany. Bazany's failure to remember certain details does not amount to a "well-supported suspicion of mendacity" undermining his credibility. Because Bazany's actions were objectively reasonable, we conclude that he did not violate Jon-Eric Hathaway's Fourth Amendment rights -Qualified immunity, however, was still proper for the officer, since he did not act unreasonably in believing that the potential danger to others justified the use of deadly force under the circumstances..

Estate of Ceballos v Bridgewater, Porrus & Mull

-Force Options -4th -Ceballos moved into the entryway holding a kitchen knife in one hand and a cigarette in the other. Mrs. Ceballos was also inside the apartment. Bridgwater ordered Ceballos to get down and to put down the knife in English; Porras repeated the command in Spanish. Both officers repeated the instruction, in both languages, multiple times. Ceballos did not comply and told the officers to leave. It is undisputed that Ceballos next threw down his cigarette, that Bridgwater twice said, "Don't do it," and that Bridgwater fired one shot at Ceballos, which struck him in the chest and ultimately killed him. -According to the 5th Circuit of Court Appeal, this case on deadly force is clear, an officer cannot use deadly force without an immediate threat to himself or others." (Penal code 9.51)

Morris v Dillard's Department Store 277 F. 3rd 743

-Force Options -4th -On March 13, 1998, Morris and a friend, Maxine Crawley, were in Dillard's. Officer Brown was off-duty that day from his job as a municipal police officer for City of Bossier City ("the City") and working as a private security guard for Dillard's. Brown wore his police uniform while working as a private guard, as required by the City. An employee of Dillard's, Meshell Maxey, reported to Dillard's security that she observed a suspected shoplifter. When Brown responded to Maxey's report, he obtained Maxey's description of what she observed and Maxey's identification of Morris as the suspect. Maxey's account included that Maxey saw Morris conceal a shirt under her jacket and then replace the merchandise during the time Maxey called for security. Officer Brown subsequently followed Morris and Crawley through the store for some time and then out to the parking lot. In the parking lot, as Morris and Crawley sat in their car, Brown copied down the car's license plate number and returned to the store. At no point before Brown returned to the store, did he attempt to confront, question, detain, search, or arrest Morris or Crawley. Morris and Crawley subsequently returned to the store and confronted Brown. Brown then arrested Morris, handcuffed her, and led her through the store to the security office where she was held and subsequently searched by a female police officer called to the scene. Morris was transported to the police station and "booked." Officer Brown filled out a municipal police "Incident Report" detailing the eyewitness account Brown had obtained from Maxey, as well as his following and observing Morris, his notation of the license plate, and the subsequent arrest. -For the foregoing reasons, the district court's summary judgment in favor of Dillard's and Liberty on Morris's claims against them brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1981, as well as on her state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, is AFFIRMED. The district court's summary judgment in favor of Officer Brown on Morris's claim against him brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is likewise AFFIRMED. Morris's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress likewise fails as a matter of law because she fails to point to evidence of the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required to sustain the claim. An emotional distress claim under Louisiana law requires that the plaintiff establish three elements: (1) that the conduct of the defendant was extreme and outrageous; (2) that the emotional distress suffered was severe; and (3) that the defendant desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that such distress would be substantially certain to result from the conduct. Morris's claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution fail as a matter of law because Brown had probable cause to arrest Morris.

Brower v County of Inyo 489 US 593

-Force Options -4th -On October 23, 1984, William James Caldwell died when the stolen car he was driving crashed into a police roadblock. He had been driving at high speeds in an effort to elude the police. The police placed an 18-wheel truck across both lanes of a highway and behind a blind curve so that Caldwell could not see it as he approached.After Caldwell's death, his heirs—including Georgia Brower, the administrator of his estate—sued the police in district court and alleged that such a roadblock constituted excessive force and violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. -Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the police intentionally acquire physical control of a person or possessions. In this case, the violation occurred because Caldwell clearly intended to continue driving, and the police actions intended to forcibly stop his car. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in judgment. He argued that the majority's opinion established a test for Fourth Amendment violations based on police intent. However, since not every Fourth Amendment violation is intentional, this test could not be used to decide all Fourth Amendment cases. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.

Jackson v City of Schertz 2007 WL 4205709

-Force Options -4th -Taser-According to the Plaintiff he drove up on a crime scene and was confronted by several officers who initially pointed guns at him. He was told to get out of the car, but before he could comply he was hit with multiple TASER discharges. -"Here, lithe facts as Plaintiff pled them are true, no reasonable officer could conclude it would be lawful to taser an unresisting person multiple times, in addition to shooting pepper spray in his face and kicking and punching him. Where an individual is belligerent, struggling with police, or attempting to flee, a reasonable officer's reliance on a heightened showing of force becomes more justifiable. But where, as Plaintiff alleges is the case here, none of these factors are present." "Therefore, given the deferential approach due Plaintiff's allegations at this stage of litigation, the Court finds Plaintiff has met the requisite burden to overcome Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. Accordingly, these motions are denied." Officer denied qualified immunity for deploying Taser multiple times on Jackson that was resisting arrest.

Harlow v Fitzgerald 457 US 800

-Force Options -4th -The Supreme Court held that government officials other than the president were generally entitled to qualified immunity. An official can obtain absolute immunity, but must "first show that the responsibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to require a total shield from liability. He must then demonstrate that he was discharging the protected function when performing the act for which liability is asserted. the case is regarded as most important for its revision of the qualified immunity standard that is applicable to government actors more generally. The Court held that "government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." -In an 8 to 1 decision, the court held that government officials other than the president were generally entitled to qualified immunity. An official can obtain absolute immunity, but must "first show that the responsibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to require a total shield from liability. He must then demonstrate that he was discharging the protected function when performing the act for which liability is asserted." the case is regarded as most important for its revision of the qualified immunity standard that is applicable to government actors more generally. The Court held that "government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Saucier v Katz 121 S.CT.2151 533 US 194

-Force Options -4th -The court ruled that if qualified immunity is established by the officer early, then the case should be dismissed and the trial avoided. Thus qualified immunity, once established, immunizes the officer from trial and civil liability. This ruling is significant because it spares officers the burden of having to go through the whole trial once qualified immunity is established early n the case, usually in a motion to dismiss -Saucier was entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court held that qualified immunity analysis must proceed in two steps. A court must first ask whether "the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Then, if a constitutional right was violated, the court would go on to determine whether the constitutional right was "clearly established.

Milstead v Kibler 243 F 3rd 157

-Force Options -4th & 14th -On October 25, 1996, Mark Milstead and his pregnant fiancé, Jill Cardwell, were attacked by an intruder at their residence in Shenandoah County. The intruder, later determined to be Steven Ramey,1 shot and killed Ms. Cardwell as she slept. A gunfight between Mark Milstead and Ramey ensued. After Ramey fled, Mark Milstead called 911 at 12:14 a.m. on October 26, 1996. Milstead informed the dispatcher that he had been shot in the throat and that his girlfriend had been stabbed by Ramey. During Milstead's conversation with the dispatcher, Ramey reentered the house. The defendants, two of whom are deputy sheriffs with Shenandoah County (Chad Kibler and Scott Proctor) and one of whom is a police officer for Woodstock County (Lester Whetzel), responded to the scene. However, due to Ramey's return, the only information from Milstead the dispatcher was able to relay to the officers was that a woman had been stabbed and a man shot in the throat. When the defendants arrived at the scene they had no information regarding who was the victim or the intruder because the dispatcher was unable to give them a description of the intruder. As they were walking towards the house, the officers noted fresh blood on a vehicle parked outside the house. The officers knocked on the door and a voice from inside screamed, "Kick it in! Help!" As the defendants entered the residence, they saw the person later identified as Ramey and Mark Milstead struggling with Milstead in a superior position, kneeling over Ramey. When the defendants yelled "Police!" and approached the combatants, Milstead broke from his superior position and yelled, "He's got a gun!" The defendants immediately found a gun pointed at them by Ramey. Proctor tried to find cover and fired four shots (without effect) at Ramey before he fell backwards out the door onto the deck, losing his eye glasses. The three defendants then positioned themselves outside, in front of and around the residence. This was followed by taunts screamed by Ramey, yelling by Milstead, and Proctor alerting everyone that there was a man with a gun. Milstead shouted "he's getting more ammo" and fled out the front door. Kibler immediately fired upon Mark Milstead without warning as he exited his residence approximately 12 to 15 feet away from Kibler. Milstead was struck in the arm and chest by the bullets from Kibler's gun and collapsed on the deck in front of the open door. He then gasped to Kibler that the intruder was still inside. Kibler apparently had gotten a quick glance at the struggle inside, but thought that the man on top was the aggressor while the one underneath was the female victim. Further, he believed that Proctor had been shot. When Milstead burst through the door attempting to escape, Kibler could not tell whether he had a gun, but states that this person's hands were up in the air, though not exactly sure where. -Police officer preforming a discretionary function enjoy an immunity that shields them from liability for civil damages unless (1) the officers' conduct violates a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time often conduct, such that (3) an objectively reasonable officer would have understood that the conduct violated that right."

Brother v Klevenhagen 28 F. 3rd 452

-Force Options -4th & 8th -The sheriffs department policy is designed "in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline" and not "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Brothers had been arrested for auto theft and had previously escaped from custody. The deputies shouted for Brothers to stop and only fired upon him as he ignored their warnings and crawled under the closing door. They acted quickly and decisively. Furthermore, the county policy allows deadly force only when immediately necessary to prevent escape. It is apparent that the deputies fired at Brothers only as a last resort to prevent the escape. It is also apparent that if they had not fired upon him, Brothers would have escaped. The deputies did not act maliciously or sadistically or in an attempt to inflict punishment, but rather followed a constitutional policy that permits deadly force only when necessary to prevent an immediate escape. The plaintiffs failed to adduce summary judgment evidence to the contrary. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures. Of course, shooting an escapee is a seizure; it stops his forward movement and terminates his freedom. But pretrial detainees lose many individual liberties and do not receive the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the county policy allows deadly force only when immediately necessary to prevent escape. It is apparent that the deputies fired at Brothers only as a last resort to prevent the escape. It is also apparent that if they had not fired upon him, Brothers would have escaped. The deputies did not act maliciously or sadistically or in an attempt to inflict punishment, but rather followed a constitutional policy that permits deadly force only when necessary to prevent an immediate escape. The plaintiffs failed to adduce summary judgment evidence to the contrary. -The "sallyport" is a secure area at the rear of the jail where incoming prisoners are unloaded and escorted into the building for booking. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures. Of course, shooting an escapee is a seizure; it stops his forward movement and terminates his freedom. But pretrial detainees lose many individual liberties and do not receive the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. the pretrial detainee may eventually become an inmate, receiving the protection of the Eighth Amendment. guard or other person authorized to act as a peace officer is justified in using any force, including deadly force, that he believes to be immediately necessary to prevent the escape of a person from a jail, prison, or other institution for the detention of persons charged with or convicted of a crime." "The public interest in prevention of escape by persons lawfully in the custody of penal institutions is regarded by the provision as sufficient to warrant the use of deadly force where the custodian or guard believes that only such force can prevent the escape.")

Fraire v City of Arlington 957 F.2d 1268

-Force Options -4th and 14th -Police Officer James W. Lowery, Jr. (Lowery) and the City of Arlington, Texas (Arlington), for Lowery's alleged use of unconstitutionally excessive force in the shooting death of Fraire. Agreeing with the district court that Lowery was qualifiedly immune, and that the Plaintiffs failed to plead their claims against Arlington with sufficient particularity or to present summary judgment evidence to place material facts in issue, we affirm. The truck was heading right toward the detective and it looked like the driver of the truck was trying to run over the detective with the truck. Officer Lowery acted in self defense when he fired a fatal shot at Fraire. -Under the circumstances of this case, a reasonable police officer could have believed that in firing he was not violating Fraire's constitutional right to be free of excessive force. Consequently, Lowery is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity for his actions in defending his life.

Graham v Conner 490 US 396

-Force Options, Patrol Procedures -4th -On November 12, 1984, Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, had an insulin reaction while doing auto work at his home. He asked a friend, William Berry, to drive him to a convenience store in order to purchase some orange juice to counter his reaction. When they arrived at the store, Graham rapidly left the car. He entered the store and saw a line of four or five persons at the counter; not wanting to wait in line, he quickly left the store and returned to Berry's car. Officer M.S. Connor, a Charlotte police officer, observed Graham entering and exiting the store unusually quickly. He followed the car and pulled it over about a half mile away. Graham, still suffering from an insulin reaction, exited the car and ran around it twice. Berry and Officer Connor stopped Graham, and he sat down on the curb. He soon passed out; when he revived he was handcuffed and lying face down on the sidewalk. Several more police officers were present by this time. The officers picked up Graham, still handcuffed, and placed him over the hood of Berry's car. Graham attempted to reach for his wallet to show his diabetic identification, and an officer shoved his head down into the hood and told him to shut up. The police then struggled to place Graham in the squad car over Graham's vigorous resistance. Officer Connor soon determined, however, that Graham had not committed a crime at the convenience store, and returned him to his home. Graham sustained multiple injuries, including a broken foot, as a result of the incident. -Police officer may be held liable under the Constitution for using excessive force. The test for liability is "objective reasonableness" rather that "Substantive due process" In a unanimous ruling written by Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that claims of excessive force used by government officials are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard. The Court vacated the directed verdict and remanded the case to the district court to be decided by that standard.

Canton v Harris

-Patrol Procedures -14th -Officers of the Canton Police Department arrested Geraldine Harris on April 26, 1978 and brought her to the police station. Upon arrival, the officers found Harris sitting on the floor of the patrol wagon. They asked if she needed medical attention, and she responded incoherently. Inside the station, Harris twice slumped to the floor, and the officers eventually left her lying on the floor. She received no medical care. An hour later, Harris was released and taken to a nearby hospital in an ambulance her family provided. Harris was diagnosed with various emotional conditions and hospitalized.

California v Hodari 499 U.S. 621

-Patrol Procedures -4th -A group of youths, including respondent Hodari D., fled at the approach of an unmarked police car on an Oakland, California, street. Officer Pertoso, who was wearing a jacket with "Police" embossed on its front, left the car to give chase. Pertoso did not follow Hodari directly, but took a circuitous route that brought the two face to face on a parallel street. Hodari, however, was looking behind as he ran and did not turn to see Pertoso until the officer was almost upon him, whereupon Hodari tossed away a small rock. Pertoso tackled him, and the police recovered the rock, which proved to be crack cocaine. -The only issue presented here -- whether, at the time he dropped the drugs, Hodari had been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment -- must be answered in the negative. To answer this question, this Court looks to the common law of arrest. To constitute a seizure of the person, just as to constitute an arrest -- the quintessential "seizure of the person" under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence -- there must be either the application of physical force, however slight, or, where that is absent, submission to an officer's "show of authority" to restrain the subject's liberty. No physical force was applied in this case, since Hodari was untouched by Pertoso before he dropped the drugs. Moreover, assuming that Pertoso's pursuit constituted a "show of authority" enjoining Hodari to halt, Hodari did not comply with that injunction, and therefore was not seized until he was tackled. Thus, the cocaine abandoned while he was running was not the fruit of a seizure and his motion to exclude evidence of it was properly denied.

Maryland v Wilson

-Patrol Procedures -4th -After a Maryland state trooper stopped the speeding car in which he was riding, a nervous Wilson was ordered to step out. As he did, a quantity of cocaine fell on the ground. When arrested for possession with intent to distribute, Wilson challenged the manner in which the evidence against him was obtained. After the Baltimore County Circuit Court ruled to suppress the evidence against Wilson, Maryland appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals - which affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Maryland certiorari. -The Court held that after lawfully stopping a speeding vehicle, an officer may order its passengers to step out. While burdening their personal liberty somewhat, officers must be permitted such authority over passengers if the overriding government's interest in officer safety is to be protected.

Michigan v Chesternut 486 US 567, 108 S Ct 1975

-Patrol Procedures -4th -Observing the approach of a police car on routine patrol, respondent began to run. The police followed him "to see where he was going," and, after catching up with him and driving alongside him for a short distance, observed him discarding a number of packets. Surmising that the pills subsequently discovered in the packets contained codeine, the police arrested him and, after a search of his person revealed other drugs and a hypodermic needle, charged him with possession of controlled substances in violation of Michigan law. -The officers' pursuit of respondent did not constitute a "seizure" implicating Fourth Amendment protections. No bright-line rule applicable to all investigatory pursuits can be fashioned. Rather, the appropriate test is whether a reasonable man, viewing the particular police conduct as a whole and within the setting of all of the surrounding circumstances, would have concluded that the police had in some way restrained his liberty so that he was not free to leave. Under this test, respondent was not "seized" before he discarded the drug packets.

Tennessee v Garner

-Patrol Procedures 4th -These are two consolidated cases against different defendants involving the same incident. During a chase, police officer Elton Hymon shot 15-year-old Edward Eugene Garner with a hollow tip bullet to prevent Garner from escaping over a fence. Garner was suspected of burglarizing a nearby house. Hymon admitted that before he shot he saw no evidence that Garner was armed and "figured" he was unarmed. The bullet hit Garner in the back of the head. Garner was taken to the hospital where he died a short time later. -Yes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote for the majority affirming the court of appeals decision. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of deadly force unless it is necessary to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of violence to the officer or the community. The Tennessee statute was unconstitutional as far as it allowed deadly force to prevent the escape of an unarmed fleeing felon. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that killing a fleeing suspect is a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and such a seizure would only be reasonable if the suspect posed a threat to the safety of police officers or the community at large.

County of Sacramento v. Lewis

-Professional Driving -14th -This case concerned a high-speed chase between Sacramento County sheriff's deputies and two men on a motorcycle: Brian Willard driving and Phillip Lewis as a passenger. The chase wove in and out of moving traffic and reached speeds up to 100 miles an hour, ending when Willard lost control and the bike tipped over. One of the deputies could not stop in time and hit Lewis, killing him. Lewis' parents sued the county's Sheriff's Department, accusing the deputy of depriving Lewis of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to life through deliberate and reckless conduct. A district court ruled in favor of the deputy, the Ninth Circuit appeals court reversed, and then the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in the department's favor. -The question before the Court was: Does a police officer violate substantive due process by causing death through reckless indifference to life in a high-speed chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender? The answer was a unanimous "no." The majority opinion based this on an analysis of the 14th Amendment due process concept and an application of the "shocks the conscience" test. Prior cases have held that the "core" of due process concept is "protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government." In dealing with executive action, only the "most egregious" conduct is "arbitrary in constitutional sense." In this case, the "deliberate indifference" accusation does not make sense, since in a high-speed chase there is no time for deliberation. Furthermore, one must remember that officers are under intense pressure in these situations, where they must "act decisively and show restraint at the same time." Thus the Court held: "High-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment"

City of Lancaster v Chambers 883 SW 2d 650

-Professional Driving -4th -In the early morning hours of Sunday, August 3, 1986, Bradley Chambers was riding on the back of a motorcycle driven by Scott Stiles through the city of DeSoto. After Stiles allegedly ran a red light within view of DeSoto police officer Bentley, Bentley engaged the emergency lights of his squad car and pursued them. Stiles, with Chambers still on board, sped away and a high-speed chase began. Bentley was soon joined by several fellow DeSoto officers, including Ransom, who was monitoring the chase in a back up vehicle. The chase continued on to Interstate 35, where the DeSoto officers, after radioing for assistance, were joined by Powell and Miller of the Lancaster police department. Ultimately, ten police vehicles from five jurisdictions joined the chase. All of the vehicles had their sirens and emergency lights on. Chambers testified that at one point during the chase, which exceeded speeds of 80-100 miles per hour, the police closed to within 5-10 feet, although there was testimony from some of the officers that Stiles continued to pull away from the pursuit. When Stiles ultimately attempted an exit from the interstate, careening down the exit ramp at a high rate of speed, the motorcycle crashed into a sign pole at a gas station, killing Stiles and seriously injuring Chambers. -Today we adopt the following test, which we believe achieves a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. We hold that an officer acts in good faith in a pursuit case if: a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that the need to immediately apprehend the suspect outweighed a clear risk of harm to the public in continuing the pursuit. Although the cases sometimes refer to the doctrine of qualified "good faith" immunity, the test is one of objective legal reasonableness, without regard to whether the government official involved acted with subjective good faith. "[W]e look to whether a reasonable official could have believed his or her conduct to be lawful in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the official at the time the conduct occurred." Thus, qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."

Scott v Harris 127 S CT. 1769

-Professional Driving -4th -Scott v. Harris, was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States involving a lawsuit against a sheriff's deputy brought by a motorist who was paralyzed after the officer ran his eluding vehicle off the road during a high-speed car chase.[1] The driver contended that this action was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The case also involved the question of whether a police officer's qualified immunity shielded him from suit under Section 1983. -In an 8-1 decision, the court sided with police and ruled that a "police officer's attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.

Seekamp v Michaud ME 1997

-Professional Driving -4th -The material facts are not in dispute. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on July 14, 1994, Seekamp left his parents' residence in Scarborough, Maine, for the asserted purpose of picking up the pieces of his former life in Arkansas, where his relationship with a girlfriend and his career in the United States Air Force were abruptly ended by an automobile accident in April, 1993, which left him with a brain injury. The roadblock was set up approximately 800 feet north of the York toll plaza, at the end of a 1500-foot straightaway. First, Trooper McAfee commandeered a flatbed tractor-trailer unit loaded with lumber sheathed in white plastic and directed that it be parked across the three southbound travel lanes, with its cab at the guardrail. Once in place, the tractor-trailer unit extended almost entirely across the southbound travel lanes. McAfee completed the blocking of the southbound travel lanes by parking his police cruiser at the rear of the tractor-trailer unit, with its headlights pointing north in the direction from which Seekamp would be approaching. The entire roadblock area was brightly illuminated by overhead street lights, the lights from Trooper McAfee's cruiser, and the headlights of the commandeered tractor-trailer blocking the southbound travel lanes. As the Monte Carlo approached the roadblock, it appeared to brake several times yet failed to come to a complete stop even though the pursuing police cruisers had slowed to allow Seekamp room to maneuver. Ultimately, it collided with the rear axle of the tractor-trailer unit parked across the southbound travel lanes, causing Seekamp a hairline fracture of the hip and a severe facial laceration. -Did the Roadblock Effect a Fourth Amendment Seizure? The defendants contend that the roadblock did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure because it permitted vehicular traffic to maneuver through the fifty-foot opening designedly left between two of the tractor-trailer units parked in the breakdown lane to the right of the westernmost, southbound travel lane. We do not agree. Even though the district court found the roadblock reasonable without regard to the corridor designedly left to permit safe passage for vehicles traveling at slow speed, its existence, whether or not determinative, is a circumstance material to the reasonableness of the roadblock. Therefore, we need not address the qualified immunity claims.

Travis v City of Mesquite 764 SW 2d 576

-Professional Driving -4th -The suit arose out of a collision between Brenda Travis' car and a car driven by Stephen Adkins. Shortly before the collision, Adkins was driving through the back lot of a truckstop. Mesquite police officers McClure and Ashby, who were working off-duty as security guards for the truckstop, stopped Adkins and approached his car. After asking Adkins and his two passengers for identification, the officers directed Adkins to drive his car to the front lot of the truckstop and wait there for the officers. Adkins drove through the front lot but accelerated out into the street in an attempt to leave the scene. The officers hopped in their car and pursued Adkins while notifying the Mesquite Police Department by radio. Officers Duckworth and McDonald heard the radio call and joined the chase. With the officers following, Adkins turned the wrong way onto a one-way highway access road and continued to flee at a high rate of speed. Cresting a hill, Adkins crashed head on into Travis' car killing Leonel Lozano and injuring Travis and other passengers. One fact appellants consider critical to their case is that they assert that one of the police cars was not using its siren during the chase. However, it is undisputed that at the time of the accident, the trailing police cars were behind the crest of the hill, were not involved in the accident, and none of the officers saw the collision before they arrived at the scene. -We are cognizant of the siren issue raised by appellants. The failure to use the siren, so they argue, deprived Travis of the opportunity to be alerted to dangerous circumstances approaching. However, a siren alerts citizens of the approach of emergency vehicles, not that someone is intentionally driving the wrong way on a one way street. Specifically, in this case the police were trailing the suspect. Whether two sirens could have been heard where one siren could not is arguable, but irrespective of this, the absence of that siren could in no way have contributed to Travis anticipating that over the hill, at a high rate of speed, coming headlong at her, was a fugitive. As a prudent driver, whatever options of evasive action, if any, Travis would have had available to her when faced with Adkins' vehicle, she still had. Nothing about the police officers' conduct limited Travis' opportunity to react to the emergency created by Adkins. Following Dent, we hold that the officers' conduct in electing to pursue the lawbreaker was, without their direct involvement in the collision, as a matter of law, not a proximate cause of appellants' damages. Accordingly, the City of Mesquite and the Mesquite Police Officers were properly granted a summary judgment on appellants' causes of action for common law negligence and for appellants' claims under section 1983.

Bublitz v Cottey

-Professional Driving -4th & 14th -In the summer of 1997, police officers began an automobile pursuit of Kevin James, who had robbed a McDonald's restaurant in Carmel, Indiana. When the Carmel officers first attempted to stop James, he pulled away from their marked police car and began a high-speed getaway on the northwest side of Indianapolis. Lester Bublitz, his wife Rebekah, and his son Nathaniel became tragic, innocent victims in a high-speed police chase near Indianapolis, Indiana. When police officers attempted to stop a fleeing armed robber by using a tire-deflation device, his car veered across the highway, colliding with the minivan in which the Bublitz family was riding. The crash killed Mrs. Bublitz and son Nathaniel. Mr. Bublitz brought suit against the law-enforcement officers involved, claiming that his and his deceased family members' federal and state constitutional rights were violated by the officers' actions in attempting to stop the fleeing robber. -Mr. Bublitz suffered a tragic loss when his wife and child were killed during the police pursuit. He has not, however, provided facts which can reasonably lead to the conclusion that the police conduct that precipitated his loss rose to the level of a constitutional violation under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the defendant officers is AFFIRMED.

University of San Antonio v Trevino 38 SW 3rd 578

-Professional Driving -Pursuit -At about 2:00 a.m. one morning, Kevin Thomas was involved in a fist fight on the University of Houston campus. University of Houston police officers arrived at the scene. Thomas got into his jeep and the officers told Thomas not to leave the scene. But before the officers could identify him, Thomas fled. As Thomas left campus, Sergeant Jon Williams turned his patrol car sideways to try to stop Thomas, but Thomas drove his jeep around Williams' car. Williams pursued Thomas. Williams then saw another University of Houston patrol car in position to intercept Thomas. Williams radioed that car's driver, Officer Matthew Stewart, to stop *580 Thomas. Stewart activated his lights and siren and pursued Thomas. During the chase, Thomas ran a red light and collided with another vehicle, injuring Demetria Clark. -In Clark, we conclude that Sergeant Williams and Officer Stewart conclusively proved good faith and that Clark's summary judgment evidence did not successfully controvert their proof. An officer's good faith should be assessed at the moment pursuit begins, balancing need against clear risk, in light of the relevant Wadewitz factors. Court recognizes, there is an element to a pursuit case that differentiates it from a response case. In a pursuit case, the police officer can't pick the route of travel. Rather the officer only knows the route at the point the pursuit begins; after that, the fleeing suspect dictates the route. For official immunity to have any teeth at all in police response and pursuit cases, we must not re-examine an officer's good faith each time the officer encounters the risks the officer considered in the beginning. That also means that only if the risks in a pursuit case change significantly must the officer reevaluate the situation to determine whether the need to immediately apprehend the suspect continues to outweigh a clear risk of harm to the public. If a reasonably prudent officer could have continued the pursuit in the manner the officer did under the changed risks, the officer continues acting in good faith.

City of San Antonio v Trevino 04-05-00253-CV

-Professional Driving -Pursuit -Jose and Gloria Trevino filed this suit against the City for personal injuries and property damage arising out of an automobile accident in which their Ford F150 pickup truck was hit by a Dodge Neon being driven by Richard Sanchez. As a general rule, a city is immune from suits for money damages. Trevino's allege that, because the accident was the result of a high-speed chase of Sanchez by one of the City's employees, San Antonio Police Officer Tony J. Arcuri. -Because the City's summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that Arcuri acted in good faith and that evidence is not controverted by the Trevino's' summary judgment evidence, the City established its governmental immunity from suit. We therefore reverse the trial court's order denying the City's plea to the jurisdiction and dismiss this cause for lack of jurisdiction.

Wadewitz and City of Waco v Montgomery

-Professional Driving -Pursuit -While investigating a burglary at an insurance office at the corner of North Valley Mills Drive and Greer Drive in Waco, Officer William Wadewitz was dispatched to assist another officer on a theft in progress. Wadewitz proceeded on an emergency basis, using his siren, lights, and air horn. North Valley Mills Drive is a seven-lane road, with three lanes running east and three lanes running west, separated by a central left turn lane. From Greer, Wadewitz tried to make a left turn into an eastbound lane of North Valley Mills by crossing all three westbound lanes of North Valley Mills. A large truck had stopped in the middle westbound lane, blocking Wadewitz's view of the inside westbound lane. As Wadewitz entered the inside westbound lane, his car collided with the Montgomery's' oncoming car. A governmental employee has official immunity for the performance of discretionary duties within the scope of the employee's authority, provided the employee acts in good faith. Id. The Montgomery's do not contest that Wadewitz acted within the scope of his authority or that his actions were discretionary. Thus, the issue is whether Wadewitz's summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes the "good faith" element of the official immunity defense. -Wadewitz' decision to respond to a call on an emergency basis using a route he chose to a fixed location was reasonable in light of the risks. This decision does not become unreasonable solely because he unfortunately encountered one of these risks. Wadewitz established that a reasonably prudent officer could have responded as he did to the call. Accordingly, he was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of official immunity. I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment for Wadewitz.

New York v Belton 453 US 454

-Racial Profiling -4th -A New York State Police trooper stopped a speeding car. No one in the car knew the owner. The officer could smell marijuana, and he saw an envelope on the floor marked "Supergold" which he could see probably contained marijuana. He ordered the occupants out of the car and arrested them. He patted them down and then directed them to stand apart. He searched the passenger compartment and found cocaine in a pocket of Belton's jacket. -The police may conduct a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of a car and of the contents therein if is incident to a lawful arrest.

Maryland v Wilson 519 US 408

-Racial Profiling -4th -After stopping a speeding car in which respondent Wilson was a passenger, a Maryland state trooper ordered Wilson out of the car upon noticing his apparent nervousness. When Wilson exited, a quantity of cocaine fell to the ground. He was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. -An officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop

Ferris v State

-Racial Profiling -4th -It is without dispute that the stop of Ferris by Trooper Smith for exceeding the posted speed limit constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, but that such a seizure was justified by the probable cause possessed by the trooper in having witnessed Ferris's traffic violation. Contrary to the trial court's finding that there was a single, continuous stop and no "end of one stop and the beginning of another stop and seizure. Once that purpose has been satisfied, the continued detention of a vehicle and its occupant(s) constitutes a second stop, and must be independently justified by reasonable suspicion. The test to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, or whether the encounter was simply a "consensual" non-constitutional event is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. The court find the totality of the circumstances present in this case, at the moment Trooper Smith prolonged the encounter beyond the scope of the initial traffic stop, to be more coercive than consensual. We thus conclude that a reasonable person in Ferris's circumstances would have reasonably believed he was neither free to leave the scene nor to ignore and disobey the police officer's "requests." -The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, including seizures that involve only a brief detention. Ferris argues that the initially valid stop evolved into an unreasonable detention. Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention. Trooper Smith's further detention of Ferris exceeded the scope of the traffic stop's underlying justification and constituted a second seizure, in order to be lawful, the continued detention-or second stop-must be supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion.

Graham v State 491 Sept. Term 1997

-Racial Profiling -4th -On the evening of February 28, 1996, at approximately 9:10 p.m., Trooper First-Class Jeffrey L. Kissner, while on drug interdiction patrol assigned to intercept drug couriers, observed the vehicle in which appellant was a passenger exceeding the posted speed limit on Route 81 in Washington County. He also observed that the light illuminating the vehicle's license plate was out. Consequently, Trooper Kissner stopped the vehicle. rooper Kissner had been working as a member of a two-car drug interdiction team, the other vehicle having been operated by K-9 Trooper First-Class Charles Stanford, who employed Dillon, a K-9 qualified and certified as a patrol/attack and narcotics canine. At the inception of the traffic stop, Trooper Stanford and the K-9 were involved in a stop at another location which resulted in at least a twenty minute delay in arriving at the location of appellant's traffic stop. Ordinarily, Trooper Stanford and the K-9 would have arrived within a few minutes. As previously indicated, occasioned by his presence at another traffic stop, Trooper Stanford and the K-9, Dillon, arrived approximately twenty-five minutes after the initial stop. On command, the K-9 circled the vehicle in an effort to detect narcotics, during which Trooper Stanford gave the command "up search," directing the K-9 to the driver's side window which was open. Dillon raised up on his hind legs, put his head in the window of the vehicle, and "alerted" to the presence of narcotics by sitting, after withdrawing from the driver's side window. Appellant was then told to exit the car and, when he did, he was ordered to remove his left hand which had been in his left coat pocket. Upon a second command to remove his hand, one of the troopers reached into appellant's pocket and found fifty vials of what appeared to be cocaine. The substance was later determined to be cocaine whereupon appellant was arrested. -Our analysis of the situation emphasized two points. First, the canine scan occurred during an otherwise valid stop, which was based on reasonable suspicion. At the time that the scan took place, the deputy was still awaiting the results of the license and registration check. Second, we noted that the scan did not prolong the detention. Because the scan was conducted in a public place and did not inconvenience the car's occupants, the scan itself did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. stop of the motor vehicle of course was with probable cause. The arrest of the driver was with probable cause. The momentarily [sic] seizure of the vehicle as the result of the violations of the law by the driver surely is a reasonable expected result. The twenty-five minutes that elapses between the call and the time that the officer arrives with the dog to begin the scan is a reasonable time under the circumstances.

Pryor v State

-Racial Profiling -4th -Sometime in August of 1995, Detective Scott Griffin of the Baltimore County Police Department was told by a confidential informant that appellant was "selling a large quantity of cocaine in the Frederick Road area of Catonsville." The informant provided Detective Griffin with appellant's address as well as the make and model of appellant's automobile, and also said that appellant stored his cocaine in a secret compartment within the dash of that automobile. Detective Griffin verified that appellant was the registered owner of the vehicle described by the informant, and that appellant leased an apartment in the building identified by the informant. On October 31, 1995, Detective Griffin observed appellant and two other individuals exit appellant's apartment building, enter appellant's vehicle, and leave the area. Detective Griffin pursued in an unmarked vehicle and when he observed appellant driving at the speed of forty miles per-hour in a posted, twenty-five mile-per hour zone, he had appellant's vehicle stopped by a uniformed officer in a marked police vehicle. Appellant and his passengers were ordered out of the vehicle and were forced to wait at the scene while a K-9 "drug dog" was summoned. When the dog arrived, it conducted a "perimeter search" of the vehicle and indicated the presence of a controlled dangerous substance within the vehicle. The dog then entered the vehicle and indicated that the substance was somewhere within the dash. A search of that area turned up a *341 hidden compartment in which crack cocaine had been secreted. -The 4th Amendment also permits the forcible stop of a vehicle when there is reasonable attributable suspicion to believe that its occupants are involved in criminal activity. In neither of these situations, however, may the occupants of the vehicle be detained for an extended period of time. In the absence of a justification for continued detention that manifests itself during the period of time reasonable necessary for the officer to (1) investigate the driver's sobriety and license status, (2) establish the vehicle has not been stolen, and (3) issue a traffic citation, the 4th Amendment prohibits a detention in excess of that period of time. In this case, whether the period of appellant's detentions is characterized as a "first" (traffic) stop followed by a "second" (drug investigation) stop or as a single stop that was justifiable for two different reasons, appellant was detained much longer than was reasonable. The evidence derived from the unreasonable detention was acquired in violation of his 4th Amendment rights

Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968)

-Racial Profiling & Patrol Procedures -4th -A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were charged with carrying -Under the fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, a police officer may stop a suspect on the street and frisk him or her without probable cause to arrest, if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime and has a reasonable belief that the person "may be armed and presently dangerous." -

Pennsylvania v Mimms 434 U.S. 106

-Racial Profiling, Patrol Procedures -4th -This case arose when two Philadelphia police officers pulled over the defendant, Harry Mimms, for driving with an expired license plate. After asking Mimms to exit the car, the officers noticed an unusual bulge underneath his jacket. One of the officers searched Mimms and discovered a loaded .38-caliber revolver. Mimms was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon and unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license. -Pennsylvania v. Mimms,, is a United States Supreme Court criminal law decision holding that a police officer ordering a person out of a car following a traffic stop and conducting a pat-down to check for weapons did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.