CLPS 0610 Final Study Guide

What is the difference between elaborative and repetitive styles of conservation? What does this difference mean for children's memory development?

(Reese and Fivush et al.) Repetitive conservation consists of asking the same questions repeatedly and switching topics frequently. Elaborative conservation consists of elaborating on the child's partial recall and asking questions to flush out the child's knowledge. Children who were subjected to repetitive conservation tended to recall fewer events than those subjected to elaborative conservation (Reese et al., 1995). This supports the notion that narratives help children form and retain memories.

Describe two empirical examples suggesting that young children do not understand the representational nature of pretending.

1. The Lillard (1993) Moe task showed that young children do not understand pretense as an activity that involves mental representation, but rathe as "acting as if". Moe is hopping up and down like a kangaroo but he doesn't know about kangaroos. Is he pretending to be a kangaroo? About 35% of children succeed by saying he is not pretending. 2. Sobel (2004) task. Sarah is taking a nap. She is deep asleep but not dreaming. She is wrapped up in a way that looks like she's a log floating on a river. Is she pretending to be a log on a river? Only 35% of 4 yo's say no.

------Several researchers argue that there are "foundational domains" of knowledge that children develop: physics, biology, and psychology. How could you test whether children recognize knowledge in these domains is independent or related?

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------What's the difference between a correlation and a causal relation? Describe an experiment that suggests two events can be correlated, but other information is required to make a causal judgement.

A correlation implies a relationship between two variables, but a causal relation implies that the two are related in the sense that one causes the other. experiment?

Narratives clearly help preschoolers remember information, but what about children younger than age 2? Describe an experiment where something that looks like a narrative structure helps children this young remember a sequence of information. Why should this information facilitate memory?

Bauer and Mandler (1989) showed 16 and 20 mo's sequences of action to remember in the following categories: novel causal (each event is necessary for the next), familiar causal (like giving a bath), and novel arbitrary (events could be performed in any order). Infants were asked to recall what should happen either immediately or after a 2 week delay. In the immediate condition, both age groups were better able to reproduce the sequence in the novel causal than the novel arbitrary condition. After a 2 week delay, the 20 mo's were able to recall both the novel causal and familiar causal but struggled with the novel arbitrary condition. 16 mo's had trouble with the novel causal as well. This information should facilitate memory because information in a guided structure or sequence should be easier to recall than information that is not.

Describe three ways a chair is different from a thought about a chair. Describe an experiment that demonstrates how children interpret mental entities as different from objects.

Behavior-sensory evidence, public existence, and consistent existence. Wellman and Estes (1986) cookie experiment showed that the majority of 3 yo and almost all 4 yo's can interpret mental entities. During this experiment, subjects were told that one boy has a cookie and another is thinking about a cookie. They were then asked the following questions: who can touch, see, eat the cookie? (behavioral-sensory evidence); whose mother can see the cookie? (public existence); and if they go out and play, who will still have a cookie? (continued existence).

When do children recognize that intentional action is based on the actor's beliefs about their actions? Use empirical evidence to support your answer. Why might success on this task emerge earlier than success on a standard false belief task?

By the age of 3, children recognize that intentional action is based on the actor's beliefs about their actions. The Moses (1993) showed that by 3 yo, children recognize that there is a relation between desire and action. Experimenters showed 3, 4, and 5 yo's a video of an actor pouring milk onto cereal, but the milk ended up having dirt in it. The children were asked if the actor was trying to pour dirt on the cereal. Success on this task emerges earlier than success on a standard belief task because this is an explanation task as opposed to a prediction task. Also, this test does not involve much inhibitory control, while the crayons/candles test does. Epistemic knowledge might be easy to integrate with intentions in actions.

------ What does conceptual change mean? Using any experiment discussed in class or the readings, demonstrate how a particular concept changes.

Conceptual change is the process whereby concepts, or mental representations, and relationships between them change over the course of time.

When do children develop a concept of another's desires? Does that emerge at the same time as their recognition of the relation between desire and action? Support your answer with empirical evidence.

Children develop a concept of another's desires at 18 mo. The Repacholi and Gopnik (1997) experiment supported their hypothesis that by 18 mo, toddlers have developed a concept of other's desires. At age 2, they understand that other's behavior is desire based. Using the interview technique with 2 yo's shows us that this is understood in terms of its relation to action and desire.

Onishi and Baillargeon suggest that infants have an early comprehension of theory of mind. On this view, why do children not pass standard measures of false belief (like unexpected contents) until age 4?

Children do not pass standard measure of false belief until age 4 because they are still learning to distinguish between beliefs, desires, and intentions. Children younger than 4 are still also in a more egocentric view of the world than other children, and they assume that they knowledge is universal and is shared by everyone else.

------Describe a study in which children's folk biological concepts clearly develops from one age to another.

Children must learn that living things have different origins than artifacts. Living things come from other living things, and living things inherit properties from their species and from their parents. Preschoolers also understand that "like begets like," which shows developmental differences and the need for maturation. For example, Johnny wants his dog to have baby kittens. Can that happen? By age 4, children say no (Springer, 1992; Sobel, 2004). However, when asking 3yo the same question, they are unclear of the correct answer.

What insights to cognitive development can be gained by studying atypical development in general and Williams' syndrome in particular? Describe an experiment that supports your answer.

Children with Williams' syndrome may lack critical metacognitive abilities that enable conceptual change. The Johnson and Carey (1998) experiment hypothesized that children with WS would not struggle with an enrichment procedure and would struggle with a conceptual change procedure. The study included 10 individuals with WS, 10 typically developing children matched on mental age, and 9 younger typically developing children. WS children were impaired on the conceptual change battery. They seemed to lack a "living thing" concept and relied on movement for the concept of "alive".

What is the scale-model task? What can be done to make the scale-model task easier? What can be done to make it harder? What do these manipulations have in common?

DeLoache tested 24, 30, and 36 mo's. The experimenters introduced objects to a model of a room and pointed out the similarity between the objects in a room. They then hid the toy in the same location as in the model and allowed infants to search the room for it. 30 mo's fail, but 36 mo's succeed. 30 mo's cannot remember where the object was hidden in the model. The point is that an experimenter argued that children develop dual representation, meaning that they see an object is an object but can also as a symbol. One way to make the scale-model task easier is to use a photograph because it is a 2D representation and thus harder to think of as objects. Both groups succeed with this. One way to make the scale-model task harder is to increase the salience of an object-based interpretation rather than decreasing it (as in the 2D representation). Experimenters gave the infants the same model but allowed the infants to play with the objects first. After this, 36 mo's fail the scale-model task. Both manipulations use the salience of the object-based interpretation. When you decrease this interpretation, it helps infants at younger ages but when you increase this, it makes it harder to still have dual representation.

What does it mean for a mental state to be recursive? When does this understanding develop? Use empirical evidence to support your answer.

False belief tasks measure what children know about what another person believes. Belief is recursive as it is characterized by recurrence or repetition; contrast thinking about thinking with thinking about thinking about thinking. This understanding of other's beliefs develops by age 7. In an experiment by Perner and Wimmer (1985), a child must represent what one person thinks about another, even if it contrasts with reality. The experiment is as follows: John and Mary are at the park. While they're there, the ice cream man comes. Mary wants to buy ice cream but has no money. The ice cream man tells her that he will be at the park all day, so she goes home to get her money. While she is away, the ice cream man tells John that he will go to the school because there's no one at the park. The ice cream man leaves and John stays. While the ice cream man is driving to the school, he meets Mary walking back to the park and tells her that he is going to the school to sell ice cream. Mary and the ice cream man go to the school. A little while later, John goes to Mary's house and asks for her. Mary's mother tells John that she just left to buy ice cream. Where will John look for Mary, park or school? Children succeed around age 7 here.

What is fast mapping? Do you think this phenomenon is specific to language development? Why or why not?

Fast mapping is when children make inferences based on speaker's intentions and require only one exposure to learn new words. This is shown in the Carey and Bartlett (1978) experiment where 3 yo's were shown a red and olive tray. An experimenter asked the child to give them the chromium tray and the child would give them the olive tray. Children remember this color word at the next testing session a week later. This phenomenon is not specific to language development. Markson and Bloom (1997) showed that fast mapping also occurs with novel facts. This showed that words are not special, and the phenomenon is due to intentional interpretation.

What does it mean to say that children come to recognize that the mind is representational? Provide a piece of empirical evidence that demonstrates when children develop this understanding.

For a child to recognize that the mind is representational means that they understand that cognitive symbols only represent external reality; mental imagery of things that are not currently seen or sensed. The unexpected contents tasks such as the Gopnik and Astington (1988) crayon and candles task demonstrate the development of this understanding. Children were shown a crayon box and were asked what was inside. All said crayons. Children were then showed that candles were in the box. The experimenters put the candles back in the box and closed it. They then asked the children what another person would think is in the box. Most 4 yo's said crayons, while 3 yo's said candles.

What is infant amnesia? Describe a reason why it might occur.

Infant amnesia is the inability of adults to retrieve episodic memories before the age of 3. This might occur not due to the length of time or repressed memories but because of memory reorganization. Children have a different method of storage than adults do, in the nature of symbolic capacity development. Infants have rich, sophisticated memory systems, as shown by Rovee-Collier (1987), and those memory systems are very adult-like, although it may not be as developed in terms of capacity.

What is interviewer bias? Describe two examples of how adults can influence children's recall of episodic events. Make sure that you include how each of these examples affects children's memory using experimental evidence.

Interviewer bias is how adults may bias children when interviewing them. When interviewing children, adults tend to only look for confirming evidence, do not ask source memory questions, do not challenge the authority of the children's report, and do not ask the right questions. Adults can influence children's recall of episodic events in two ways: type of question and repetition of misinformation. Asking specific vs. open-ended questions is when interviewers bias let their own hypothesis interfere with questioning by using specific questions. In an experiment, they interviewed children ages 2-13 after a visit to the ER. They first asked open-questions, then specific ones The results showed children were much more accurate at answering open-ended questions rather than specific ones. Another form of interview bias is repeating misinformation. If children are told about a fictional event repeatedly, they cannot remember the real event. In an experiment that tested 6 yo's, the subjects were interviewed four times about a shot they received. The interviewer used a female pronoun half the time and a neutral one for the rest. By the fourth interview, children reported the doctor was female and confused other events. When the interviewer used neutral terms, the children always provided accurate reports.

Describe one of Keil's experiments on children's understanding of essences. What types of objects have essences? What age were the subjects? What were the stimuli? What were the findings?

Keil's (1989) transformation study explored children's understanding of essences. The experimenters presented a raccoon. Then they painted it black with a white stripe and gave it smelly glands. They gave it the appearance and action of a skunk. The experimenters also presented a coffeepot and gave it the appearance and action of a birdfeeder. 6 yo's judge that natural kinds are resistant to change, while the artifacts are not. Natural kinds will still have their original biological properties. The transformed raccoon will still have raccoon babies. The birdfeeder will no longer make coffee.

-? 46) Which is more important for social learning: judgements about epistemic competence or judgements about the social relationships you have with the informants Justify your answer with an experiment.

Kinzler et al. studies 6 mo infants prefer native tongue, 5 yo rely on native tongue, 4-5 yo trust accurate non native person over inaccurate native person. Therefore judgements about epistemic competence > judgements about social relationships. Epistemic accuracy trumps social groups.

What is the difference between level-1 and level-2 visual perspective taking? When does each develop? Describe an experiment at each level (you must describe 2 experiments to answer this question).

Level-1 perspective taking, which emerges at age 2.5, requires representing whether an object is visible. 2.5 yo's perform at near ceiling here. Level-2 perspective taking, which emerges at age 4, requires representing that an object can be seen differently from two perspectives. Level-1 experiment: Children were shown a screen with pictures on either side. The child sits on one side, the experimenter on the other. The child is shown both pictures then asked what picture they saw and what picture the experimenter saw. Level-2 experiment: Turtle Task (Flavell et al., 1979). The child is shown a picture of a turtle on a table. The child is then asked whether they see it upside down or right side up. Then, they are asked how the experimenter seated across from them sees it. Success emerges at age 4.

What is the difference between recognition and recall memory? Do these two processes develop at the same time or do these two processes develop at different times? Use experimental evidence to support your answer (hint, you might have to present more than one experiment).

Recognition memory is when you recognize that an event is similar, while recall memory is when you recall an exact event. Recall memory is harder than recognition as it involves symbolic representation. The two processes develop at different times. Newborns already participate in forms of habituation, which indicates recognition. At 9 mo, infants can recall events to produce causal action. Meltzoff (1985) studied delayed imitation to understand recall in infancy. 14 mo's were shown a novel event sequence that produced a novel causal event. The infant sees the experimenter hit a panel with his forehead and the panel lights up. The infant is brought back 24 hrs later and is given the panel. Infants will hit it with their foreheads. There is some evidence that infants as young as 9 months will do this (Meltzoff 1988), 9 mo's are recalling events to produce causal action.

-? What is the broccoli-goldfish experiment? How do these data fit into Wellman and Liu's theory of mind scales?

Repacholi and Gopnik (!997) tested 14 and 18 mo's in the broccoli-goldfish experiment. Infants were shown two bowls, one with broccoli and one with goldfish. The infants are given a choice to eat, and all the infants chose goldfish. The experimenter then eats both and prefers broccoli. The infant is then asked to give the experimenter one. 14 mo's give goldfish (self-preference) and 18 mo's give broccoli (other preference). This indicates the beginning of understanding others; mental states in a representational manner. This also poses the question if desire representational in the same way as belief? (world-->mind, or mind-->world)

-? Describe an experiment that suggests scientific reasoning is difficult for children. If causal reasoning is so easy, why is science so hard?

Schauble (1990) presented 9-11 yo's with a computer game about racing cars. The goal was to learn about what made the race car go fast. 5 features were presented (engine size, wheel size, muffler presence, tailfin presence, color); only one variable at a time was manipulated. Children were given 8 sessions (with several trials in each session; they could build cars with any collection of features and compare their speeds in each) to learn the causal relationship between the features. The causal model was as follows: engine size and wheel size influence speed, while color and muffler were irrelevant. Tailfins and engine size interacted; tailfins made the car go slower, and when the engine was large, tailfins made the car go slower, and when the engine was small, tailfins were irrelevant. In terms of results, half of the experiments the children generated were invalid (more than one feature was varied). When children generated valid experiments, they failed to make proper conclusions. Conclusions were also constant with prior beliefs. Even when they made proper conclusions based on observed data, they did not stick to those conclusions. There were some improvement over the 8 sessions, albeit not a lot. Scientific reasoning requires recognizing correlation relations --> implicit mechanism (children are unaware they are engaging in the interference). Explicit mechanisms require two abilities: recognizing conditional probabilities and understanding what data would provide information that would allow you to make a valid conclusion. Do children have the latter?

What is a role of temporal priority in causal perception or reasoning? Describe an experiment that suggests preschoolers prioritize temporal priority over other cues to causality.

Temporal priority is the idea that causes come before their effects. The experiment by Bullock and Gelman (1979) tested 3, 4, and 5 yo's. Infants were shown a ball in tube A, and a jack-in-the-box pops up. Then, they were shown a ball in tube B. The question asked was which one caused the jack to pop up? All infants chose A. Then, the experimenters introduced a gap, but the timing remained the same. Children still chose A. This showed that preschoolers prioritize temporal priority over other cues, like spatial contiguity).

------What is the "acting-as-if" hypothesis with regards to children's understanding of pretending? Describe two different experiments (that could be performed by the same person) that support this approach. What does this hypothesis mean for the child's developing theory of mind?

The "acting-as-if" hypothesis refers to the idea that children do not understand pretense as an activity that involves mental representation; instead, they understand pretense as "acting-as-if". Lillard? Moe task 4 yo

Which do you think influences children's (older than 12 months) conceptual development more: perceptual or conceptual features of objects? Describe an experiment that supports your position.

The Nelson (1974) ball study showed that conceptual features of objects influence children's conceptual development more than perceptual features. In the study, experimenters gave a ball to 15 mo's, as a ball is usually in a child's lexicon by now. They were then given 9 other objects: 3 that bounced but were not balls, 3 that were perceptually similar to balls but did not bounce, and 3 that were not balls and did not bounce. The experimenter then asked the child to give them a ball. Children first gave her the similar functioning objects, then the perceptually similar objects. Infants only gave her the perceptually similar objects on the second trial, after they were familiar with all the objects. Nelson found that function was important for categorization. Older children use functional features over perceptual similarities to extend labels.

Describe an experiment that suggests that how adults talk to children influences children's developing memory abilities.

The Reese et al. (1995) experiment studied 40 and 46 mo's. Experiments examined transcripts of mothers talking to their preschoolers using two different styles: repetitive, where they were asked the same questions while switching topics frequently, and elaborative, where they would elaborate on child's recall and ask questions to flush our child's knowledge. Then they tested the infants 18-24 months later for their memory of the event. Results showed that children with repetitive conversations tended to recall fewer events.

-?Onishi and Baillargeon suggest that infants have an early comprehension of theory of mind. If you reject this view and believe that the development between ages 3-4, observed in the results of standard measures of false belief (like unexpected contents), indicate the emergence of a theory of mind, how do you explain Onishi and Baillargeon's data? That is, what do their data show?

The data from Onishi and Baillargeon shows that there would be a difference between representational and non-representational theory of mind; for example, goal-directed action vs. epistemic knowledge. If you reject their work, you may conclude that infants look longer because nothing is in the box and the infant is wondering why the actor is performing this action. If you agree with Onishi and Baillargeon, you may explain that 3 yo's fail false belief tasks due to language or executive function.

------ What is the enrichment hypothesis in the development of folk biological knowledge? How does it contrast with the conceptual change hypothesis? Describe an example of a task that measures each? What are the results?

The enrichment, or accretionism, hypothesis suggests that children have knowledge of empirical generalizations (e.g. rules), but development is the acquisition of more complex generalizations. The child acquires new categories, such as "aardvark" but not a new classification system. This theory contrasts with the conceptual change hypothesis, which is also known as theory theory. In this hypothesis, some information is learned through accretion, but other knowledge is represented through conceptual structures that change. Development is the development of more complex generalizations and a new categorization system. For example, the child acquires new categories (e.g. dog) and a new way of organizing these categories (e.g. animals vs. living things). The Johnson and Carey (1998) experiment studied 10 Williams' syndrome children on the same verbal mental age as a control group. Probes were divided into 2 batteries based on the hypothesized distinction of: general knowledge consistent with the conceptual repertoire of normally developing preschool children; the folk biological concepts normally acquired between age 6 and 12. People with WS were found to be differentially impaired on the T2-dependent battery. They performed at the level of the older group on the T1/T2-neutral battery but at the level of the 6 yo's on the T2-dependent battery.

What is the shrinking room experiment? What was it designed to show and what did it find?

The idea behind the shrinking room experiment (DeLoache, 1997) is if you tell 30 and 36 mo's the model is the room, there should be no problem with dual-representation. Children are told there is a "shrinking device" which shrinks the room into the model. Then they are shown the model and taken to a room to search for the toy after the "shrinking device" makes the room big again. The results showed that no dual-representation problem was present. This shows that infants were able to realize the model was the same as the room to find the toy.

What is the naming spurt? When does it occur in children whose native language is English? What developmental milestones are related to the naming spurt? How do we know to make this conclusion and not another conclusion general cognitive abilities?

The naming spurt is when infants start to produce a large number of nouns. In native English speakers, this occurs around 18 months. This phase is marked by an increase in object name questions. Infants say 10+ new object names a week for 3 weeks (Mervis and Bertrand, 1994). We make this conclusion because children in naming spurt are more likely to exhaustively sort.

Why does the quality of pretend play matter for the development of theory of mind? Use empirical evidence to support your answer.

The quality of pretend play matters for the development of theory of mind in the type of object use the child engages in. In Overton and Jackson (1973), children pretend one thing is another before age 4, which is object substitution. After age 4, children engage in object representation, which is when they pretend to manipulate objects that are not there. This illustrates developmental progress in a child's theory of mind as it transforms with age.

?- What is the shape bias? Provide a piece of empirical evidence in favor of it. Discuss the merits of this theory and its limitations.

The shape bias is the tendency of children to generalize information about an object by its shape, rather than its color, material, or texture when learning nouns. Landau et al. (1988) found that shape was important for categorization; 2-3 yo's contrasted shape with size and texture. This study did not contrast perceptual and conceptual features. However, Nelson (1974) found that function was important for categorization, which contrasted with shape. There are not really discrepant findings; maybe function is more important than shape and shape is more important that other perceptual features.

What are the Theory of Mind scales? What do they tell us about the way in which theory of mind develops?

Theory of mind scales are the different stages that children achieve as they develop. An example of a theory of mind scale would be intentions (14 mo) to desires (24 mo) to knowledge (36 mo) to beliefs/false beliefs (48 mo) to emotions (60 mo). This tells us that the theory of mind develops in a sequential and chronological manner.

-? Blake and colleagues found that advantageous inequity aversion has different developmental trajectories across different samples. Why might this be?

They share more with ingroup than outgroup.

-? Carlson and Moses (2001) found that there is a significant relation between children's performance on inhibitory control measures and their performance on standard, explicit false belief tasks. This correlation hold true even if you control for age. Why do you think this correlation might indicate a causal relation? Why might it be a spurious association (i.e., not a causal relation)?

This correlation might indicate a causal relation because the results show that there is general development between ages 3-4 and correlations with planning and success on false belief tasks. It could be that children have to inhibit reality state and belief state and it could be the same reason why children are better at false belief tasks as they develop this skill.

Why is it necessary to study children's knowledge of false belief instead of their knowledge of true belief in order to gain insight into their understanding of mental representation? What is another mental state or process that relates to understanding belief? Why and how?

This is an issue of egocentricity; a true belief is just reality. A false belief, in contrast, must be about representation. This shows that children are using mental states and not just using association. Another mental process that relates to understanding belief is pretending. To succeed on a false belief task is to represent the world one way when in fact it is another. To engage in pretend play is also to represent the world one way when it is in fact another.

Describe an experiment that suggest young children understand mental representation in pretense and use that understanding to scaffold their understanding of belief.

Wimmer and Perner (1983) Unexpected Transfer task. Maxi has a piece of chocolate. He puts it in is blue drawer and goes to play outside. While he's out, his mom cleans his room, finds the chocolate, and moves it to the green drawer. Maxi comes back and looks for his chocolate. The question asked to the children is where Maxi will look for the chocolate. Most 3 yo's fail while most 4 yo's succeed.

What is the Dimension Change Card Sort (DCCS)? Describe its procedure and main findings with preschoolers. What conclusions can be drawn using this task?

yes

-? What is advantageous and disadvantageous inequity aversion. Describe an experiment that demonstrates their developmental trajectories in a U.S. sample.

•Cultural similarities and differences (Blake et al. 2015) •Disadvantageous inequity aversion appears across the 7 different cultures investigated (US, Canada, Senegal, Peru, India, Mexico, Uganda) •Advantageous inequity aversion seen to develop in Canada, US, and Uganda (all around age 7), and in Mexico (in teenage years), but not in the other cultures investigated