Con Law MC

T/F: Under the Kahriger Test, Congress may only tax conduct that is within its authority under other textually described constitutional powers.

False echoes Madison's characterization of the Spending Power, but recall that the Butler Court embraced Hamilton's broader conception of the Spending Power, and that while the Taxing and Spending Powers are textually linked, current Supreme Court doctrine does not limit federal taxing authority to the support of textually described powers. In fact, in Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts held just the opposite, allowing Congress to tax individuals for declining to purchase health insurance even though deciding not the purchase health insurance is not reachable through Commerce Clause authority.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, The decision of a farmer to place a certain level of acreage under cultivation, is beyond the scope of federal regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause.

False under Wickard, which pointedly allowed Congress to set quotas for production and total acreage that farmers could devote to particular crops.

T/F: According to Justice O'Conner, the problem with withholding federal highway funds from states that refused to raise the drinking age to 21 was The Commerce Power does not allow Congress to regulate federal highways.

False wrong as a matter of law and quite inconsistent with O'Connor's analysis. The claim that Congress cannot regulate federal highway under the Commerce Power borders on the nonsensical. It is wholly incompatible not only with every post 1937 Commerce Clause case, but with pre 1937 cases such as the Shreveport Rate Cases as well. Moreover, since federal highways are built with federal money, Congress can clearly regulate federal highways directly pursuant to the Spending Power as well.

T/F: An aggrieved taxpayer alleging that "the government is full of fascists and communists." may bring suit in federal court.

False.

T/F: In state court, the state constitution trumps Federal statutes that predate ratification of the state constitution.

False.

T/F: In state court, the state constitution trumps United States Supreme Court case law deemed inconsistent with the state constitution.

False.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court case law, Montana may not Impose a residency requirement for holders of state civil service positions.

False.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court case law, Montana may not Offer a discount to state residents at state parks.

False.

T/F: The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine does not apply to limit the capacity of states to regulate When Congress has consented to state legislation that would otherwise violate the Doctrine.

True. restates the rule that Congress may consent to state legislation that might be subject to judicial invalidation on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds in the absence of congressional authorization.

T/F: Under the Constitution, Congress lacks the power to Regulate by statute what had previously been regulated by federal common law.

False. It is axiomatic in Anglo-American law that a legislature may alter common law rules by statute. Areas in which Congress has altered federal common law rules even after Erie v. Tompkins include foreign sovereign immunity, the Act of State Doctrine, and the law of treaties.

T/F: The Dormant Commerce Clause Subjects the policy-making authority of Congress to close judicial scrutiny.

False. The Dormant Commerce Clause is a judicially enforced (some would say judicially created) restraint on state authority only. It is conceptually impossible to challenge federal law on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds. To attempt to do so illustrates profound misunderstanding.

T/F: Assertions of presidential authority Are not subject to judicial review.

False. While presidents have claimed on various occasions that their actions are not subject to judicial review, the Supreme Court has many times - perhaps most prominently Youngstown Sheet and Tube and United States v. Nixon - made clear that it rejects this proposition.

T/F: Subjects within the Commerce Power, according to Supreme Court majorities, Exclude potential negative effects of state laws on interstate commerce.

False. cannot be reconciled with either the power of Congress to preempt state legislation through assertion of Commerce Clause authority or the judicial enforcement of Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in the absence of federal regulation.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court caselaw, South Carolina clearly may not Offer reduced tuition to state residents attending the University of South Carolina.

False. pursuant to the Market Participant Exception, the State of South Carolina may sell educational opportunity at reduced rates to in-staters.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, the Fair Labor Standards Act May reach only private employers.

False. the Supreme Court's holdings in Darby (on private employers) and Garcia (on state and municipal employers).

T/F: The Constitution describes judicial decisions of state high courts applying the Constitution of the US as "the supreme law of the land"

false

T/F: The Dormant Commerce Clause Has been used by the Supreme Court to invalidate some non-discriminatory state legislation.

True. Under Pike v. Bruce Church, even non-discriminatory state laws are subject to invalidation on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds if they impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. Careful reading of Kassel illustrates that the Court was torn between invalidating the challenged Iowa laws because, while arguably facially neutral, they reflected a legislative purpose of fencing out interstate truckers, or, alternatively, invalidating the Iowa laws because, while genuinely neutral in operation, they imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce. (Reading the challenged statute as neutral or discriminatory depends in large measure on whether the reader focuses on the exceptions privileging various in state users or on the basic operational premise that various classes of large trucks were prohibited whether registered in state or not).

T/F: The Constitution makes the President the Commander in Chief of the Nation.

False

T/F: An assertion of the federal Taxing Power is invalid if it is aimed principally at regulation of conduct rather than generation of revenue.

False

T/F: Article I Section 10 preserves the sovereign powers of the states.

False

T/F: Production is local in character and hence outside the scope of the Federal Commerce Power.

False

T/F: The Constitution allows the states to ban foreign imports when the wish to do so.

False

T/F: The Constitution criminalizes communism.

False

T/F: The Constitution declares English the official language of the US.

False

T/F: The Constitution denies access to habeas corpus for non-citizens.

False

T/F: The Constitution describes Natural law as "the supreme law of the land"

False

T/F: The Constitution does not vest Congress with a specifically described power to levy an income tax.

False

T/F: The Constitution does not vest Congress with a specifically described power to regulate federal territory.

False

T/F: The Constitution requires federal judges to be US citizens.

False

T/F: The Constitution requires the Chief Justice of the US to preside over all impeachment trials in the Senate.

False

T/F: The Tenth Amendment prohibits application of federal law to the states when they perform traditional governmental functions.

False

T/F: The US Constitution grants the SC express power to strike down Acts of Congress incompatible with the Constitution.

False

T/F: The US Constitution limits citizenship to persons recognized as citizens by the gov't of the state in which they live.

False

T/F: According to Justice O'Conner, the problem with withholding federal highway funds from states that refused to raise the drinking age to 21 was Authority over alcoholic beverages is reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.

False In South Dakota v. Dole, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court did not assume that either the Tenth Amendment or the Twenty-First Amendment prohibited Congress from regulating alcohol. That said, Congress had not endeavored to regulate alcohol directly under its Commerce Clause authority. Instead, Congress chose to incentivize state legislation raising the drinking age to 21 by authorizing and instructing the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of the federal highway funding allocated to any state that did not act to raise the drinking age. In deciding the case, Chief Justice Rehnquist set out a four part test for determining whether federal exercises of conditional spending were consistent with the Constitution. While Justice O'Connor took issue with Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis, she accepted that his test accurately and appropriately set out the constitutional requirements governing conditional grants of federal funding to the states. In distinguishing Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, she read the Commerce Power broadly and in line with post 1937 decisions, thereby rejecting any claim that the Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress from regulating alcohol. Thus, choice a. is wrong.

T/F: Under the Kahriger Test, Congress may only tax activity that has interstate dimensions.

False reminiscent of pre 1937 Commerce Clause cases such as E.C. Knight and Schechter Poultry that limited Commerce Clause authority to interstate activity (thus denying the existence of an affectation branch of Commerce Clause authority), but the federal Taxing Power has never been read that narrowly. Excise taxes were applied to conduct (including real and personal property ownership) occurring wholly within state limits by the Washington Administration. Moreover, the text of Art. 1 Sec. 9 cl. 4 clearly contemplates federal taxation of something (property ownership, existence, conduct?) that can be apportioned among the states, making it all but certain that anything that Congress chose to tax "directly" would have been something happening inside states and not over state lines.

T/F: An angry civil servant alleging that Maine has failed to pay her overtime required by federal law and that Maine has unconstitutionally refused to consent to suit against it in federal court. may bring suit in federal court.

False.

T/F: An angry voter alleging that the President does not satisfy the qualifications for office set out in Article II Section 1. may bring suit in federal court.

False.

T/F: In state court, the state constitution trumps Any federal statute held inconsistent with state law.

False.

T/F: In state court, the state constitution trumps Treaties of the United States.

False.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court case law, Montana may not Prohibit South Dakotans from purchasing souvenirs at the government run gift shop in the Montana State Capital Building in Helena.

False.

T/F: Under existing Supreme Court case law, Congress clearly lacks the authority to Require that all broccoli prepared for consumption in restaurants within the United States be cooked by steaming for at least three minutes.

False. As all justices other than Justice Thomas acknowledged in the various opinions in Sebelius, once broccoli is part of interstate commerce or produced or consumed in a manner that affects interstate commerce, it is subject to congressional control under the Commerce Power.

T/F: The Uniform National Standards Test Was condemned but not expressly overturned by the majority in Southern Pacific v. Arizona.

False. Chief Justice Stone's analysis in Southern Pacific focused on the unjustifiable burden that the Arizona statutes imposed on national rail traffic, but he also stated clearly that train length regulation was an area where, if there were to be rules, they must be made in Washington by the U.S. Government setting uniform national standards.

T/F: Under existing Supreme Court case law, Congress clearly lacks the authority to Require all persons using motor vehicles on federal highways to carry insurance.

False. Congress has the power to regulate persons traveling in interstate commerce, vehicles traveling in interstate commerce, and persons or vehicles traveling intrastate on journeys that involve use of the interstate transportation networks (see Shreveport Rate Cases.)

T/F: Under the Constitution, Congress lacks the power to Consent to state regulation previously struck down by the Supreme Court as a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.

False. Congress may also consent to state legislation that would violate Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine were it not for the congressional grant of permission to the states to discriminate against or burden interstate commerce. This is precisely the scenario taken up by the Court in Prudential v. Benjamin.

T/F: Under the Constitution, Congress lacks the power to Pass Statute A repealing Statute B, thereby making inoperative Supreme Court doctrine interpreting Statute B.

False. Congress may repeal a statute at any time through the conventional lawmaking process described in Art. I Sec. 7. If, for example, the Supreme Court interpreted the Affordable Care Act not to reach one class of beneficiaries, and Congress wished that class of beneficiaries to be covered, Congress could pass a statute amending the Affordable Care Act to make clear that the class in question was in fact covered.

T/F: Since 1936, the Supreme Court has enforced the Tenth Amendment to protect claims brought by private individuals To prevent application of federal regulations pertaining to areas traditionally within the states police powers.

False. For nine years following its decision in National League of Cities in 1976, Supreme Court doctrine prohibited Congress from regulating states or subunits thereof in the performance of traditional government functions, but that doctrine was overturned in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority in 1985. That doctrine, even while it existed, did not support claims by private persons resisting assertion of federal authority. The dual-federalist doctrine that areas within the traditional state police powers are wholly off limits to the federal government has not controlled in a Supreme Court decision since Butler. Less absolutistic formulations of dual federalism have figured in the Supreme Court's decision making in recent decades, but there is nothing approaching a holding that the power of states to regulate a subject matter makes that subject matter off limits to Congress since Butler. Rather, consideration of whether states may regulate a particular subject figures as a factor in considering the reach of federal powers in cases like Morrison and Lopez.

T/F: The Supreme Court enforced the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on federal authority in US v. Darby

False. In Darby, the Court upheld application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to enforce minimum wage and maximum hours rules at a lumber yard.

T/F: Assertions of presidential authority May never, according to Justice Felix Frankfurter, be based on implied Congressional consent.

False. In his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Justice Frankfurter actually stated just the opposite, namely that a long and unbroken pattern of congressional acquiescence in presidential assertions of power suggested not only congressional consent, but that the presidential assertion of authority to which Congress had silently consented was in fact constitutional.

T/F: The Dormant Commerce Clause Is staunchly defended by Justice Thomas on grounds of textualism and originalism.

False. Justice Thomas has repeatedly stated his belief that Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is unjustifiable and should be abandoned, precisely because it cannot, in his view, be reconciled to constitutional text as originally understood.

T/F: The Uniform National Standards Test Cannot be reconciled with Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways.

False. Kassel can be reconciled with the National Uniform Standards Test. The Court's discussion of the burdensome effects of Iowa's regulations pointed towards the desirability of congressional intervention to set federal standards for oversized trucks. Indeed, one year after Kassel was decided, the U.S. Department of Transportation promulgated national rules governing truck width and length.

T/F: Under existing Supreme Court case law, Congress clearly lacks the authority to Require NFL players to retire no later than six months after their thirty-second birthdays.

False. Labor conditions in the National Football League are subject to federal control for the same reasons that labor conditions in the steel industry were acknowledged to be within federal authority under the Commerce Clause in Jones and Laughlin.

T/F: Assertions of presidential authority Convey only qualified immunity against civil suit upon the President.

False. Presidents may not vest themselves with any form of immunity, but the Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald determined that structural constitutional considerations dictated judicial enforcement of absolute presidential immunity from law suit seeking damages for conduct within the outer perimeter of the official duties of the presidential office.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court case law, the Constitution clearly allows Alaska to Impose a prohibitory tax on any insurer doing business in the state, unless that insurer maintains an in-state office.

False. Prudential v. Benjamin held that Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine could not be invoked by an out-of-state insurer to challenge state law discriminating against out-of-staters because Congress had expressly consented to state regulation (including discriminatory regulation) of insurance. But Metropolitan Life made clear that Congress did not and could not waive the Equal Protection rights of out-of-state insurers, and struck down a discriminatory Alabama tax scheme that favored in-state insurers over out-of-state insurers. The Alabama scheme invalidated in Metropolitan Life was not nearly as severe as the discriminatory regime described in choice e., since the Alabama scheme did not deny out-of-staters access to the Alabama market altogether. Thus, there is every reason to believe the Alaska scheme set out in choice e. would be invalidated, and there is certainly no clear authority that it is permissible.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court caselaw, South Carolina clearly may not Offer discounts to state residents for admission to state parks.

False. South Carolina may, under the Market Participant Doctrine, sell the opportunity to enjoy natural surroundings or participate in recreational opportunities to in-staters at a reduced rate.

T/F: Since 1936, the Supreme Court has enforced the Tenth Amendment to protect claims brought by private individuals Against federal governmental coercion.

False. State governments may challenge conditions attached to federal spending grants as coercive under Sebelius, but since Butler, no Supreme Court case has supported the proposition that private persons may do so.

T/F: The Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibits all state regulation of subjects within the regulatory reach of Congressional powers.

False. The Supreme Court has consistently let stand state laws in areas subject to concurrent state and federal authority, so long as the state laws in question are not preempted or subject to invalidation on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds or because they violate written constitutional guarantees. To take one prominent example, the state and federal governments have concurrent authority over insurance regulation, and both actively regulate in that field. Congress may reach insurance under its Commerce Clause authority, while states have authority over insurance under their traditional police powers.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, the Fair Labor Standards Act Is facially invalid under the Tenth Amendment.

False. The argument that the Fair Labor Standards Act violated the Tenth Amendment as applied to private employers was rejected by a unanimous Court in Darby. The Argument that the Fair Labor Standards Act violated the Tenth Amendment as applied to state and municipal government employees was embraced by a 5-4 Court in National League of Cities respecting the performance of "traditional government functions," but that holding was abandoned nine years later by a 5-4 Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.

T/F: Since 1936, the Supreme Court has enforced the Tenth Amendment to protect claims brought by private individuals To make autonomous decisions free of federal interference on questions of morality.

False. The old understanding that Congress lacked the power to legislate when its policies served moral rather than economic purposes was controversial and contested in the early 20th century, with the Court ruling one way in Champion v. Ames and another in Hammer v. Dagenhart. Darby emphatically overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart on both Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment grounds, and with that decision repudiated the notion that Congress lacked the power to regulate individual behavior to bring it into conformity with the preferences of Congress on moral questions. Darby remains good law, and that is a profoundly significant point.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court case law, the Constitution clearly allows Alaska to Deny hunting licenses to non-residents of the state.

False. This asks about clear constitutional doctrine. In Baldwin, the Court allowed a Montana law to stand even though that law limited the ability of out-of-staters to hunt elk, and denied out-of-staters the ability to hunt elk on the same favorable terms as in-staters. But Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, stressed that Montana did not deny out-of-staters any ability to hunt elk altogether. Thus, there is no clear Supreme Court authority allowing a state to completely prohibit out-of-staters hunting or fishing while the state does allow in-staters the opportunity to do so.

T/F: To disincentivize use of gasoline powered vehicles, Congress sets a nationwide minimum price for unleaded gasoline at the pump of $5 per gallon. California sets a statewide minimum price for unleaded gasoline at the pump of $6 per gallon. The California law is Invalid only if Congress expressly ordered the states not to regulate in the field of gasoline price control.

False. This assumes that the only way for state laws to be preempted by federal law is for Congress to legislate and expressly preclude states from regulating in a particular field. While this reasoning appeals to Justice Thomas, it ignores the reality that Supreme Court majorities have long been willing to enforce implied preemption doctrine to invalidate state law.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court case law, the Constitution clearly allows Alaska to Require all timber felled in the state to be processed in the state.

False. This discriminates against interstate commerce. In Wunnicke, the Supreme Court invalidated a variation of the rule described here, by which Alaska allowed anyone to purchase timber felled on state lands, but then imposed the "downstream" requirement that the timber be processed in state. Note that the scenario described in a. involves a rule covering not simply timber felled on state government lands, but all timber felled within the state. The rule prohibits the timber felled in state from being taken out of the state without being processed in the state, and this is facially discriminatory against interstate commerce.

T/F: Under existing Supreme Court case law, Congress clearly lacks the authority to Prohibit home growth and consumption of medical grade oregano.

False. This mirrors the facts litigated in Gonzales v. Raich, except that it substitutes oregano for marijuana, which is something dealers in controlled substances were widely rumored to do during my youth.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, in the absence of consent, state sovereign immunity precludes A suit in federal court by United States Senator Lindsey Graham against South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster.

False. Unlike the State of South Carolina itself, Governor McMaster has no sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment or related doctrines. As we will see at the end of the course, he has absolute executive immunity against law suit for decisions made within the outer perimeter of his official duties, but that doctrine would not shield him against lawsuits for torts or other wrongful acts committed before or while in office, as long as those acts or omissions were unrelated to his official duties. To put things bluntly, there is no executive immunity for drunk driving related accidents or for sexual result committed either by a sitting governor or POTUS. Thus, this is incorrect because it extends to broad classes of permissible suits and because it includes suits that, while impermissible, or not impermissible because of Eleventh Amendment doctrine.

T/F: The Uniform National Standards Test Was overturned in Dean Milk.

False. While the National Uniform Standards Test has been subordinated to other modes of analysis, namely the Anti-Discrimination Test and undue burden analysis pursuant to Pike v. Bruch Church, the National Uniform Standards Test has never been disowned by the Supreme Court. Thus, choice a. is wrong. While Dean Milk focused on the Anti-Discrimination Test, the Court's discussion of model legislation and a prominent federal role in enforcement strongly suggests that the Court was considering whether national uniform standards were appropriate for milk sales even as it decided Dean Milk.

T/F: Under the Kahriger Test, Congress may not tax to regulate.

False. accurately states Chief Justice Taft's holding in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, but the Kahriger Court departed from Bailey significantly on this front.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, in the absence of consent, state sovereign immunity precludes A suit in federal court by North Carolina against South Carolina.

False. as Justice Kennedy explains in Alden v. Maine, each state's membership in the Union entails consent to the exercise of federal jurisdiction over suits by one state against another. In those suits, the Supreme Court may exercise original jurisdiction.

T/F: Subjects within the Commerce Power, according to Supreme Court majorities, Do not include trade in refuse and garbage.

False. as the Court held in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, garbage is clearly within the reach of congressional Commerce Clause authority and hence subject to Dormant Commerce Clause analysis when governed by the states in the absence of federal regulation.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, the Fair Labor Standards Act In invalid under National League of Cities.

False. because National League of Cities is no longer good law, and because, even under National League of Cities, the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to private employers without running afoul of the Tenth Amendment.

T/F: Per the Constitution and Supreme Court case law, the President of the United States Possesses absolute immunity against compelled testimony or production of evidence.

False. cannot be squared with the Supreme Court's 8-0 decision in United States v. Nixon, which acknowledged the existence of executive immunity, but went on to determine that President Nixon must produce the Watergate Tapes in response to a subpoena duces tecum issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, because the need for the District Court to consider evidence in a criminal cases outweighed the President's claim of immunity against compelled production of evidence in the case before it.

T/F: To disincentivize use of gasoline powered vehicles, Congress sets a nationwide minimum price for unleaded gasoline at the pump of $5 per gallon. California sets a statewide minimum price for unleaded gasoline at the pump of $6 per gallon. The California law is Invalid because of conflict preemption.

False. complying with both state and federal law is readily possible, and there is no reason to believe that doing so would undermine the federal regulatory objective. A station operator setting a price of $4.95 per gallon would be fully compliant with both state and federal law. There is simply no conflict preemption.

T/F: Under the Kahriger Test, Congress may not tax to incentivize individual behavior.

False. does not reflect Tax Power doctrine. Even the Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Court, which stressed that any permissible use of the federal Taxing Power must be targeted first and foremost towards generating revenue, also acknowledged that, in so doing, Congress could incentivize and disincentivize behavior.

T/F: Per the Constitution and Supreme Court case law, the President of the United States May not be indicted for a criminal offense while in office.

False. does reflect DOJ policy set out in self-serving internal memoranda by the Executive Branch when Presidents Nixon and Clinton confronted impeachment, but the Supreme Court has never come close to endorsing a claim that sitting presidents are immune to criminal charges. In fact, since sitting presidents may be held to account for civil wrongs committed prior to assumption of office according to a unanimous Supreme Court in Clinton v. Jones, there are grounds to suspect that the Supreme Court may well allow a sitting president to be tried for criminal offenses.

T/F: Congress requires all males between the ages of 18 and 25 to register for potential conscription under the Selective Service Act, would be coercion by federal authority and constitutionally prohibited under current Supreme Court case law.

False. follows from Art. I Section 8 clauses 12-13, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Selective Draft Law Cases to reach conscription, which, a fortiori, means Congress may require persons to register for possible conscription.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, in the absence of consent, state sovereign immunity precludes A suit by a claimant against Dorchester County.

False. geographic subunits of states - unlike the states themselves or their agencies - have no sovereign immunity against suit.

T/F: The Dormant Commerce Clause Is interpreted by Chief Justice Roberts to entail a constitutional prohibition against state ownership of enterprises and against other forms of socialism.

False. in the Oneida Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority Case, Chief Justice Roberts made clear that the Constitution permits state and county operation of public monopolies to provide governmental services.

T/F: The Department of Agriculture, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress, requires millions of farmers to take acreage out of cultivation, would be coercion by federal authority and constitutionally prohibited under current Supreme Court case law.

False. involves applications of the Agricultural Adjustment Act upheld in Wickard v. Filburn.

T/F: Per the Constitution and Supreme Court case law, the President of the United States Enjoys immunity from civil suits alleging tortious wrongs committed outside the scope of the President's official duties.

False. it goes well beyond the Court's decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald recognizing absolute immunity only for conduct within the outer perimeter of the official duties of the presidential office.

T/F: Per the Constitution and Supreme Court case law, the President of the United States Must seek the consent of two thirds of the Senate in order to withdraw from a Treaty of the United States.

False. pursuant to the plain text of Art. II.

T/F: U.S. marshals detain an individual named in an arrest warrant signed by a federal magistrate judge, would be coercion by federal authority and constitutionally prohibited under current Supreme Court case law.

False. reflects quotidian reality under the Constitution, involving the augmentation of specifically described powers and implied powers through the Necessary and Proper Clause. Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch and Justice Breyer for the Court in Comstock recognized that Congress could not only use its textually described powers to regulate, but that it could also criminalize interference with the operations of policies legislated into effect via its constitutionally granted powers, and provide further for the arrest, prosecution, and detention of offenders found guilty of infringing against those criminal statutes.

T/F: Since 1936, the Supreme Court has enforced the Tenth Amendment to protect claims brought by private individuals To prohibit the conditional use of federal spending to incentivize individuals to participate in federal programs.

False. reflects the precise holding in Butler, but the Supreme Court reversed itself on that question in 1937 in upholding the old age pension and unemployment insurance provisions of the Social Security Act in Helvering and Steward Machine.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court caselaw, South Carolina clearly may not Prohibit North Carolina residents from voting in state elections.

False. the Art. IV Privileges and Immunities Clause does not require states to allow out-of-staters to vote. The Constitution does protect a right of someone to move from State A to State B and become a resident and hence a citizen of State B with the right to vote, but mere visitors from out-of-state have no right to vote. Case law has established that a one year waiting period for new arrivals to vote is constitutionally impermissible, but that a 30 day waiting period is permissible in order to ascertain the intent of new arrivals to become bona fide residents.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court case law, the Constitution clearly allows Alaska to Require attorneys licensed in Alaska to reside in Alaska at least nine months per year.

False. the Supreme Court in Piper invalidated a similar New Hampshire law require lawyers practicing in New Hampshire to reside in state. That law was held unconstitutional as a violation of the Art. IV Privileges and Immunities Clause because it interfered with the right of out-of-staters to engage in business, or, to use older vocabulary, practice their trade or pursue their calling.

T/F: To disincentivize use of gasoline powered vehicles, Congress sets a nationwide minimum price for unleaded gasoline at the pump of $5 per gallon. California sets a statewide minimum price for unleaded gasoline at the pump of $6 per gallon. The California law is Valid because price control is an area traditionally within the state police powers.

False. this ignores the existence of preemption doctrine. While dual federalist theory in the early 20th century sometimes led to arguments that Congress simply cannot regulate in areas within the traditional state police powers, that reasoning does not reflect the objective reality of the last century, which is that the states and the federal government occupy concurrent authority in a great many areas, including almost all aspects of economic regulation. Where Congress and the states may both act, any state law must be assessed for conflict with federal law to ascertain whether the state law is valid.

T/F: Subjects within the Commerce Power, according to Supreme Court majorities, Include only lawful trade in goods and services not prohibited by law.

False. under Gonzales v. Raich.

T/F: According to Justice O'Conner, the problem with withholding federal highway funds from states that refused to raise the drinking age to 21 was The Constitution does not permit Congress to offer grants to the states with conditions attached.

False. wholly incorrect as a matter of law and not consistent with Justice O'Connor's opinion. Both the Court and Justice O'Connor take for granted that conditions are permissible, provided they satisfy Chief Justice Rehnquist's four-part test and perhaps also the additional requirement that they not be coercive.

T/F: Congress has the power to create exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of SCOTUS.

True

T/F: Congress has the power to levy an income tax.

True

T/F: Congress has the power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the US

True

T/F: Cooper v. Aaron differs from Marbury v. Madison in that Governor Faubus was ordered to comply with the law, but Secretary Madison was not.

True

T/F: Cooper v. Aaron differs from Marbury v. Madison in that Marbury v. Madison involved judicial policing of federal authority, while Cooper v. Aaron involved judicial policing of state authority.

True

T/F: In state court, the state constitution trumps A state statute held incompatible with the state constitution.

True

T/F: The states may not tax instrumentalities of the federal government.

True

T/F: According to current Supreme Court case law, Congress has authority to Prohibit any private use of the internet to process orders for distribution of controlled substances.

True well within the Commerce Power even under pre New Deal cases such as Campion v. Ames, as it involves closing the channels of interstate commerce to products Congress wishes to suppress. Note that it is not necessary to consider the wide reading of the Aggregation Principle embraced by the Court in Gonzales v. Raich respecting narcotics here, because the program described involves regulating channels of interstate commerce (as opposed to intrastate conduct that might substantially affect interstate commerce).

T/F: According to current Supreme Court case law, Congress has authority to Tax individuals for operating motor vehicles that violate federal emissions standards.

True within congressional authority, as it is fully consistent with Kahriger in that it is calculated to generate revenue. To be sure, the program also aims to channel behavior in directions that Congress deems constructive, but that is not problematic even under Bailey v. Drexel Furniture in situations where Congress can reach the targeted behavior through other powers. Here, Commerce Clause authority clearly reaches pollution under the Affectation Doctrine of Darby and the Aggregation Principle of Wickard.

T/F: According to current Supreme Court case law, Congress has authority to Offer block grants of federal money to the states on the condition that the states use that money to purchase automatic and semi-automatic weapons from members of the public so that those weapons can be destroyed.

True within congressional authority, because it meets each of the four requirements set out by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Dole and because it is not coercive in the sense that it does not threaten to penalize states that choose not to participate in the program.

T/F: An irate taxpayer alleging that Congress has allocated $500,000,000 to disperse to religious organizations to fund missionary work in the Developing World. may bring suit in federal court.

True.

T/F: Assuming no constitutional prohibition is violated, Congress can act Pursuant to powers expressly granted in Article I Section 8.

True.

T/F: Assuming no constitutional prohibition is violated, Congress can act Pursuant to powers implied by those described in Article I Section 8.

True.

T/F: Assuming no constitutional prohibition is violated, Congress can act Pursuant to the powers described in Article IV.

True.

T/F: Assuming no constitutional prohibition is violated, Congress can act To implement a Treaty of the United States.

True.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court case law, Montana may not Require lawyers licensed in Montana to reside in state.

True.

T/F: Under the Kahriger Test, Congress may impose any tax that raises some revenue and is not otherwise prohibited by the Constitution.

True.

T/F: Under the Constitution, Congress lacks the power to Authorize violations of the Equal Protection Clause.

True. Congress may not authorize violations of textual commands clearly spelled out in the Constitution. This maxim was central to Chief Justice Marshall's analysis in Marbury v. Madison, and is, as Marshall wrote, essential to give effect to a written Constitution. If the Constitution could be amended by statute, it would be ordinary law and not higher law, and hence, as Marshall reasoned, no constitution at all.

T/F: Congress orders South Carolina to participate in Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act, would be coercion by federal authority and constitutionally prohibited under current Supreme Court case law.

True. Congress may not order states to legislate. Doing so violates the Tenth Amendment, as the Court held in New York v. the United States.

T/F: A Tenth Amendment claim could never be invoked To limit Congressional assertion of authority in federal lands.

True. Even under the broadest reading of the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on federal authority, the text of the Tenth Amendment affirms the ability Congress to exercise powers vested in it by the Constitution. The power of Congress to regulate federal lands is set out in Art. IV Sec. 3 cl. 2.

T/F: A Tenth Amendment claim could never be invoked To limit Congressional assertion of authority to regulate international trade.

True. Even under the broadest reading of the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on federal authority, the text of the Tenth Amendment affirms the ability Congress to exercise powers vested in it by the Constitution. The power of Congress to regulate international trade is set out in Art. I Sec. 8 cl. 3.

T/F: A Tenth Amendment claim could never be invoked To limit Congressional assertion of authority in the District of Columbia.

True. Even under the broadest reading of the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on federal authority, the text of the Tenth Amendment affirms the ability Congress to exercise powers vested in it by the Constitution. The power of Congress to regulate the District of Columbia is set out in Art. I Sec. 8 cl. 17.

T/F: A Tenth Amendment claim could never be invoked To limit Congressional assertion of authority over the United States Army.

True. Even under the broadest reading of the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on federal authority, the text of the Tenth Amendment affirms the ability Congress to exercise powers vested in it by the Constitution. The power of Congress to regulate the United States Army is set out in Art. I Sec. 8 cl. 12 and 14.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court case law, the Constitution clearly allows Alaska to Enforce a hiring preference for current Alaska residents in state civil-service recruitment.

True. In Wunnicke, the Supreme Court discussed the case of White v. Massachusetts Council, is which the Court let stand a Boston policy of setting aside civil contracting opportunities for Massachusetts residents. The Court treated state and municipal hiring and contracting as governmental participation in the labor market rather than regulation, and validated the preference scheme under the Market Participant Exception to the anti-discriminatory branch of the Dormant Commerce Clause.

T/F: According to Justice O'Conner, the problem with withholding federal highway funds from states that refused to raise the drinking age to 21 was The relationship between spending on highway construction and combating drinking among young adults is attenuated.

True. Justice O'Connor agreed that Chief Justice Rehnquist's test was sensible, but on the issue litigated in Dole she disagreed as to whether the third prong of that test, which she called the "germaneness" requirement, was met. For Chief Justice Rehnquist, there was a clear relation between the purpose of federal highway funding (i.e. to facilitate safe and efficient travel on a network of interstate highways) and the condition that states accepting full funding raise the drinking age. For Justice O'Connor, the purpose of federal highway funding was to provide for the construction of roads that were safe and of high quality, and a condition related to the ability of drivers to operate safely on those roads was not sufficiently connected to the safety of the roadways themselves to justify congressional attachment of that condition to the spending program.

T/F: The Uniform National Standards Test Is consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Barnwell Brothers.

True. Justice Stone, writing for the Court in Barnwell Brothers, decided that national uniform standards were not required for "motor trucks" in the 1930s. He also held that the challenged South Carolina laws did not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce, although he did not deploy precisely the same vocabulary that the Court developed four decades later in Pike v. Bruce Church. Today, things have changed, and the South Carolina laws upheld in Barnwell Brothers are now preempted by the DOT regulations issued after Kassel.

T/F: Congress has powers implied but not textually described in Article I.

True. McCulloch and Comstock, make clear Congress is not limited to those powers specifically described in the constitutional text.

T/F: SCOTUS has invalidated State taxation of a federal instrumentality.

True. SCOTUS determined in McCulloch that MD lacked the power to tax the 2nd Bank of the US or any other federal instrumentality.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court caselaw, South Carolina clearly may not Require the Charleston School of Law to charge higher tuition to students enrolling from states other than South Carolina, unless Congress has consented.

True. South Carolina is ordering a third party, non-state actor CSOL, to favor in-staters over out-of-staters. Private entities could choose to favor in-staters without violating the Constitution, but when the state orders them to do so the sate violates the Dormant Commerce Clause absent congressional consent.

T/F: A decision taken by the New Jersey government to close all private landfills in the state Could be preempted by Congressional legislation.

True. The Court in Philadelphia v. New Jersey made clear that Congress possessed ample authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate garbage should it choose to do so.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, in the absence of consent, state sovereign immunity precludes A suit by a claimant against the University of South Carolina.

True. The University of South Carolina is an agency of the state of South Carolina. Thus, the same state sovereign immunity against suit that the Court has read into the Eleventh Amendment since Hans v. Louisiana applies to immunize the University of South Carolina against lawsuit absent consensual waiver of that immunity by the State. Note that under Hans v. Louisiana it does not matter whether the suit against the University of South Carolina is brought by an in-stater or out-of-stater. As written, the Eleventh Amendment would preclude only suits against a non-consenting state brought in federal court by an out-of-stater, but Hans and its progeny have expanded that immunity well beyond the literal commands of the text of the Eleventh Amendment to reach suits against states by in-staters and suits in state courts.

T/F: A decision taken by the New Jersey government to close all private landfills in the state Would not be invalidated for discriminating against out of state economic actors.

True. a state law entirely closing all landfills treats in-staters and out-of-staters identically and discriminates against no one.

T/F: Subjects within the Commerce Power, according to Supreme Court majorities, Include services offered by charitable organizations.

True. accurately captures the Court's holding in Camps Newfound v. Owatonna.

T/F: The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine does not apply to limit the capacity of states to regulate When a reviewing court determines that a state has acted evenhandedly in pursuit of a legitimate state interest and the benefits achieved by that legislation are not outweighed by any burdens it places on interstate commerce.

True. accurately paraphrases the rule of Pike v. Bruce Church under which state policies that do not discriminate against interstate commerce may still be invalidated under the Dormant Commerce Clause if judicially determined to impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.

T/F: Assertions of presidential authority Must, according to Justice Hugo Black, be rooted in constitutional or statutory grants of authority.

True. accurately reflects Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Youngstown Sheet and Tube.

T/F: The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine does not apply to limit the capacity of states to regulate When state or local government is buying or selling in the market.

True. correctly states the Market Participant Exception.

T/F: Per the Constitution and Supreme Court case law, the President of the United States Is vested with authority to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

True. follows directly from the plain text of Art. II.

T/F: To disincentivize use of gasoline powered vehicles, Congress sets a nationwide minimum price for unleaded gasoline at the pump of $5 per gallon. California sets a statewide minimum price for unleaded gasoline at the pump of $6 per gallon. The California law is Subject to invalidation if a court finds that Congress intended to occupy the field of gasoline retail price regulation.

True. it is possible to comply with both the state and federal law, but if a court finds that Congress has occupied the field of retail price regulation for gasoline, there would be no room for state regulation at all. That determination would depend on a close examination of the legislative history and the mechanism for enforcement of the federal program to ascertain whether Congress, without expressly so saying, intended to preclude further state regulation in the field.

T/F: According to current Supreme Court case law, Congress has authority to Set a national minimum wage applicable to private, municipal, state, and federal employers.

True. mirrors the question decided respecting the Fair Labor Standards Act in Darby in so far as private employers are concerned, and in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority as far as public employers are concerned.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, the Fair Labor Standards Act May be applied to most private and municipal employers. None of the above is true.

True. reflecting the Supreme Court's holdings in Darby (on private employers) and Garcia (on state and municipal employers).

T/F: The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine does not apply to limit the capacity of states to regulate When a state has no other non-discriminatory alternatives available to achieve a legitimate legislative purpose.

True. reflects the Supreme Court holding in Maine v. Taylor.

T/F: A decision taken by the New Jersey government to close all private landfills in the state Would likely be upheld if undertaken as part of a temporary quarantine to address a sudden public health or environmental emergency.

True. the Court in Philadelphia v. New Jersey emphasized that the New Jersey invalidated in that case did not involve a quarantine responding to a sudden public health emergency. While the Court appeared to take for granted that states have the power to issue emergency quarantines, the Court did not spell out criteria for determining what circumstances might justify issuance of a quarantine by state or local authorities.

T/F: A decision taken by the New Jersey government to close all private landfills in the state Might be invalidated for imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce.

True. under Pike v. Bruce Church, a court might decide that the New Jersey law, while non-discriminatory, is still invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause because the environmental benefits it achieves cannot justify endeavoring to isolate the state from a nationwide problem. The Court in Kassel reasoned similarly respecting Iowa's attempt to shunt interstate traffic in longer trucks around the perimeter of the state.

T/F: According to SCOTUS, the Guarantee Clause of Article IV Section 4 requires that law making at the state level be done by legislatures, not through voter-initiated referendums.

false

T/F: According to SCOTUS, the Guarantee Clause of Article IV Section 4 requires that states shape electoral districts w/o considering partisan political advantage.

false

T/F: According to SCOTUS, the Guarantee Clause of Article IV Section 4 vests citizens with the capacity to file suit to challenge state gov'tal programs alleged to violate that provision

false

T/F: The Constitution requires that persons being sworn into public office avow a faith in God.

false

T/F: The political question doctrine bars federal courts from reviewing the constitutionality of political acts by state officials.

false

T/F: The Constitution does not vest Congress with a specifically described power to provide for punishment of offenses against the law of nations.

false.

An amendment making naturalized citizens born outside the US eligible to be President would be permissible or impermissible?

permissible

An amendment requiring SC justices to leave office at 75 years of age would be permissible or impermissible?

permissible

The proposed amendment to limit Presidents of the US to a single six year term would be permissible or impermissible?

permissible

T/F: According to SCOTUS, the Guarantee Clause of Article IV Section 4 is not judicially enforceable

true

T/F: Amendments to the Constitution may not be inconsistent with previously ratified constitutional text

true

T/F: In Marbury v. Madison, SCOTUS stated that courts of law may issue writs of mandamus commanding executive officers to carry out duties established by law

true

T/F: The Constitution does not expressly describe a right to marry.

true

T/F: The US Constitution expressly limits the President to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus during declared nat'l emergencies

False

T/F: The political question doctrine does not permit judicial review of a decision by the House to expel a member.

False

T/F: The political question doctrine was enforced by SCOTUS in Baker v. Carr to prevent adjudicating claims brought by Tennessee voters who argued that the state had violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause

False

T/F: In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall held that the federal commerce power reaches vessels towed by draught animals and those propelled by oars or sails, but not those propelled by steam, since the framers did not have steam power in mind when they drafted Article I Section 8 clause 3.

False because Chief Justice Marshall rejected this argument.

T/F: In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall held that congressional power to regulate commerce among the several states begins and ends at the state line

False because Chief Justice Marshall stressed that the power to regulate commerce among the several states "cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state"

T/F: In United States v. Comstock, Justice Clarence Thomas embraced reasoning reminiscent of Alexander Hamilton's during the controversy over the First Bank of the US

False because Justice Thomas's theory of federal power is diametrically opposed to that of Alexander Hamilton. Perhaps no constitutionalist in the history of the US is more closely associated with broad construction of federal powers, both constitutionally described and implied, than Alexander Hamilton. Conversely, no constitutional thinker of recent decades is more closely associated with a narrow construction of federal powers than Justice Thomas, a line of thinking spelled out in Thomas's dissent in Comstock.

T/F: In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall held that Congress may regulate articles of production, but not persons, crossing state lines.

False because the Court rejected Ogden's argument that the power to regulate commerce reached only buying and selling commodities, not navigation.

T/F: In United States v. Comstock, SCOTUS held that the Necessary and Proper Clause operates in and of itself to convey independent powers to Congress

False because the claim that the N&P clause conveys powers unrelated to textually described or implied powers cannot be squared with Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court.

T/F: In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall held that Congress cannot interfere with the power of NY to charter corporations and grant monopolies, since those powers are reserved to the state by the Tenth Amendment.

False because, as the Court wrote, "the acts of NY must yield to the law of Congress, and the decision sustaining the privilege they confer, against a right given by the law of the Union, must be erroneous."

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, The wages paid to staff at a small restaurant in central Texas, is beyond the scope of federal regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause.

False per Darby, upholding application of provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act governing minimum wage and maximum hours to a lumber yards, Katzenbach v. McClung, holding that Commerce Clause authority reaches restaurants serving primarily local customers, and Wickard v. Filburn, allowing the aggregation of the effects of decisions by single actors to determine whether their activity is within federal Commerce Clause authority.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, use of homegrown marijuana for medical purposes, is beyond the scope of federal regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause

False the Supreme Court held in Gonzales v. Raich that Commerce Clause authority does reach home production of marijuana for personal use.

T/F: Congress has power to abolish SCOTUS.

False. Article III Section 1 states the judicial power of the US shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time establish. Congress has discretionary authority to establish lower federal courts, but the text of Article III assumes that a Supreme Court MUST exist.

T/F: In McCulloch v. MD, C.J. Marshall reasoned that the Constitution should be judicially interpreted in the same way that courts apply legal codes.

False. C.J. Marshall contrasted the Constitution to legal codes, stressing that a Constitution intended to endure for ages could not be expected to answer every possible question as might a detailed meticulous code.

T/F: In McCulloch v. MD, C.J. Marshall reasoned that the 10th Amendment must be interpreted to serve precisely the same function as Article II of the Articles of Confederation.

False. C.J. Marshall sharply contrasted the 10th Amendment and parallel language in the Articles of Confederation that limited Congress to powers expressly granted.

T/F: Congress has plenary power to define jurisdiction of the federal courts.

False. Congress may not vest federal courts with jurisdiction exceeding that set out in the Constitution. Article III, specifically the case or controversy requirement sets the outer limits of jurisdiction that may be exercised by the federal courts.

T/F: The Supreme Court enforced the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on federal authority in Champion v. Ames.

False. In Champion v. Ames, the Court allowed Congress to prohibit the interstate shipment of lottery tickets under its Commerce Clause authority.

T/F: The Supreme Court enforced the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on federal authority in McCulloch v. MD.

False. In McCulloch, the Court embraced the argument that Congress had broad implied powers, including the power to charter the Second Bank of the United States, and that the states lacked the authority to tax the federal instrumentality so created.

T/F: The Direct/Indirect Effects Test was applied by SCOTUS to uphold applications of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the Heart of Atlanta Motel and Ollie's BBQ.

False. In upholding the Civil Rights Act of the 1964 as a constitutionally permissible exercise of Commerce Clause authority, the Supreme Court relied on the Substantial Effects Test in both Heart of Atlanta and Ollie's BBQ.

T/F: In McCulloch v. MD, MD argued that the 10th Amendment contemplated broad exercise of implied federal powers.

False. MD did stress the 10th Amendment in McCulloch, but this mischaracterizes MD's 10th Amendment argument. It turns MD's 10th Amendment argument on its head, as MD invoked the 10th Amendment to support the classic states' rights position that the federal gov't possesses limited authority.

T/F: In United States v. Comstock, SCOTUS reasoned that the enumerated powers of Congress must be strictly construed.

False. SCOTUS, per Justice Breyer, broadly construed federal powers, it was Justice Thomas, dissenting, who read federal powers narrowly.

T/F: The Direct/Indirect Effects Test has been applied consistently by SCOTUS to assess the limits of federal Commerce Clause authority since the days of C.J. Marshall.

False. The Direct/Indirect Effects Test was abandoned by the Supreme court in Darby in 1941 and has not returned. While recent decisions such as Lopez and Morrison suggest that the Court is now applying the Substantial Affects Test with somewhat greater skepticism than the Court deployed between 1941 and 1995, the Court has not returned to the Direct/Indirect Effects Test.

T/F: The Direct/Indirect Effects Test uniformly permitted Congress to regulate labor conditions associated with agricultural and industrial production.

False. The constitutional crisis of 1936-37 was engendered by the Court's repeated invalidation of major New Deal programs regulating agricultural and industrial production in opinions relying on the direct/indirect effects distinction, including Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal, striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Bituminous Coal Act respectively.

T/F: The Direct/Indirect Effects Test is spelled out precisely in Article I Section 8 Clause 3.

False. The constitutional text does not contain a word about distinguishing direct from indirect affects on interstate commerce. Rather, the text , per Art. I Sec. 8 cl. 3, vests Congress with authority to regulate commerce among the several states.

T/F: SCOTUS has invalidated Federal licensure of a vessel to traverse all inter-coastal waterways of the US.

False. This misstates SCOTUS's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden. The Court actually held that the federal license was valid, and that it must prevail against a contrary determination under state law.

T/F: According to the text of the Supremacy Clause States may tax instrumentalities of the federal government.

False. This states the position of Maryland in McCulloch v. Maryland that the Court emphatically rejected in that case.

T/F: According to the text of the Supremacy Clause States may opt out of compliance with federal law when the federal law interferes with the exercise of traditional sovereign functions of the state government.

False. While the Supreme Court briefly endorsed a doctrine that sounds rather like that set out here, we will see the Court disowned the short-lived traditional state functions rule. Acts of Congress are supreme law of the land if made in pursuance of the Constitution, and states may not opt out of compliance.

T/F: The Supreme Court enforced the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on federal authority in Wickard v. Filburn.

False. Wickard v. Filburn, the Court unanimously decided that the Department of Agriculture, acting pursuant to authority delegated by Congress under the Commerce Clause, could enforce quotas limiting wheat production against a farmer who did not introduce the wheat grown in excess of his quota into the interstate market.

T/F: Congress has power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus whenever, in the judgment of Congress, the public safety requires suspension.

False. the Suspension Clause, Article I Section 9 Clause 2, permits the suspension of habeas corpus only when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.

T/F: Amendments to the Constitution may not divest the states of equal representation in the Senate w/o the consent of any adversely affected state.

True

T/F: Congress has the power to borrow money on the credit of the US.

True

T/F: Cooper v. Aaron differs from Marbury v. Madison in that President Eisenhower was committed to supporting the Court in 1957, but President Jefferson was skeptical fo the Court's asserted authority in 1803.

True

T/F: Cooper v. Aaron differs from Marbury v. Madison in that the Court asserted the power to enforce the Constitution in order to resolve a conflict of laws in a particular case in Marbury, while claiming the power to settle constitutional questions with finality in Cooper v. Aaron.

True

T/F: If the original seven Articles of the Constitution had not been amended, Congress could vote itself a pay raise with immediate effect.

True

T/F: If the original seven Articles of the Constitution had not been amended, Presidents could be reelected an unlimited number of times.

True

T/F: If the original seven Articles of the Constitution had not been amended, Residents of DC could not vote for President.

True

T/F: If the original seven Articles of the Constitution had not been amended, Senators would be appointed by the states.

True

T/F: In Marbury v. Madison, SCOTUS determined that Marbury's claim did not present a non-justiciable political question.... so the question was justiciable.

True

T/F: In Marbury v. Madison, SCOTUS held that Section 13 of the judiciary Act of 1789 and Article II Section 2 Clause 2 were inconsistent and incompatible.

True

T/F: In Marbury v. Madison, SCOTUS stressed that federal statutes are supreme law of the land only when in pursuance of the Constitution.

True

T/F: The Constitution describes treaties made under the authority of the US as "the supreme law of the land"

True

T/F: The Constitution does not vest Congress with a specifically described power to acquire new territory and incorporate it into the Union.

True

T/F: The Constitution prohibits the use of any religious test as a precondition for holding public office.

True

T/F: The Direct/Indirect Effects Test was applied repeatedly by SCOTUS b/w 1933 and 1936 to strike down major New Deal programs.

True

T/F: The US Constitution empowers Congress to create as many inferior federal courts as it wishes.

True

T/F: The political question doctrine has been applied to deny judicial review following impeachment of a federal office holder for high crimes and misdemeanors in the House and conviction and removal from office by the Senate.

True

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, The decision of consumers to eat or not eat broccoli, is beyond the scope of federal regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause.

True The broccoli hypothetical figured prominently during oral argument in Sebelius, and was discussed extensively in class. Chief Justice Roberts was joined by four other justices in reasoning that Commerce Clause authority does not extend to inaction. It is important to note that once a consumer does decide to buy broccoli, Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause attaches to allow regulation of such matters as price, labelling, and safety standards required of producers, transporters, grocers, and restaurants providing broccoli to that customer. But the initial decision to become a broccoli eater or stay out of broccoli consumption is not within the reach of Commerce Clause authority.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, Congress has authority to Regulate in state economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.

True. In Lopez and Morrison CJ Rehnquist listed the components of congressional Commerce Clause authority. The three components listed by Chief Justice Rehnquist include the power of Congress to regulate (1) channels of interstate commerce, (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3) in state (economic) activity that either on its own, or when aggregated with similar activity around the country, substantially affects interstate commerce.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, Congress has authority to Regulate in state economic acts that in and of themselves assert only a trivial effect on the national economy, but, when aggregated with similar acts throughout the country, exert a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

True. In Lopez and Morrison CJ Rehnquist listed the components of congressional Commerce Clause authority. The three components listed by Chief Justice Rehnquist include the power of Congress to regulate (1) channels of interstate commerce, (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3) in state (economic) activity that either on its own, or when aggregated with similar activity around the country, substantially affects interstate commerce.

T/F: Under current Supreme Court doctrine, Congress has authority to Regulate the channels of interstate commerce.

True. In Lopez and Morrison CJ Rehnquist listed the components of congressional Commerce Clause authority. The three components listed by Chief Justice Rehnquist include the power of Congress to regulate (1) channels of interstate commerce, (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3) in state (economic) activity that either on its own, or when aggregated with similar activity around the country, substantially affects interstate commerce.

T/F: In United States v. Comstock, the majority embraced reasoning reminiscent of Chief Justice Marshall's in McCulloch v. MD.

True. Justice Breyer, writing for the Court in Comstock, reasoned very much like Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch, allowing Congress to regulate in areas several steps removed from powers specifically described in the constitutional text.

T/F: SCOTUS has upheld federal charter of a bank that accepted deposits from both the general public and the federal gov't.

True. SCOTUS held in McCulloch that Congress acted within its constitutional powers in chartering the First and Second Bank of the US

T/F: SCOTUS has invalidated Congressional expansion of the original jurisdiction of SCOTUS.

True. SCOTUS's reasoning in Marbury that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was invalid, because, as read by the Court, it expanded the original jurisdiction of SCOTUS beyond that conveyed in the Constitution.

T/F: In McCulloch v. MD, MD argued that the Supremacy Clause did not subordinate state statutes to federal laws if the federal law was itself unconstitutional.

True. This accurately captures MD's position that, under Marbury v. Madison, acts of Congress exceeding the powers conveyed by the Constitution and, hence, not supreme law of the land. This is a profoundly important argument that you may be able to deploy in other circumstances, even if it did not carry the day for MD in McCulloch.

T/F: According to the text of the Supremacy Clause State judges are bound by the treaties of the United States even if those conflict with the laws or constitutions of the several states.

True. backed up by constitutional text, as treaties of the United States are unqualifiedly supreme law of the land under Art. VI, in contrast to federal statutes which are supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution.

T/F: Amendments to the Constitution must be approved by SCOTUS

false

T/F: Amendments to the Constitution take effect once approved by 2/3 of the states.

false

T/F: The Constitution describes judicial decisions of SCOTUS as "the supreme law of the land"

false

T/F: The Constitution describes state constitutions as "the supreme law of the land"

false

T/F: The Constitution does not address potential conflicts b/w state constitutions and the US Constitution

false

T/F: The Constitution does not vest Congress with a specifically described power to create inferior federal courts

false

T/F: The Constitution provides for the suspension of the Bill of Rights during nat'l emergencies

false

T/F: According to the text of the Supremacy Clause Any act passed by Congress is the supreme law of the land.

false. only laws of the United States passed in pursuance of the Constitution are supreme law of the land. Thus, as Chief Justice Marshall explained in Marbury v. Madison, acts of Congress that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution are no law at all, and certainly not supreme law of the land.

An amendment allocating six Senate seats each to the five most populous states, four Senate seats each to the five next most populous states, and keeping the number of Senate seats at two each for all other states would be permissible or impermissible?

impermissible

By its own terms, the Constitution of the US became effective...

when ratified in the conventions of nine states.