Con Law Quiz 1

A defendant was convicted in state court on drug charges resulting from a search pursuant to a traffic stop that resulted in the discovery of a large amount of narcotics in the car. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the stop and the search violated his constitutional rights. The state Supreme Court concluded that the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The court also held that the search violated similar state constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. The state petitions the U.S. Supreme Court to review the case. If the Court declines to address the merits, what is the likely reason?

- The state court decision rested on adequate and independent state grounds. Rationale: If the Supreme Court declines to reach the merits of the state court's decision, it is likely because the facts indicate the state court's decision rested on adequate and independent state grounds. The facts state that the court held that the search violated both the Fourth Amendment and the state's own similar constitutional protections. Therefore, C is the best answer. A is incorrect; the Court will review state decisions that apply the U.S. Constitution. It will not review state court decisions that involve questions of purely state statutory or state constitutional law. B is incorrect because there is nothing about the case that makes it nonjusticiable. D is incorrect because while the Court defers to a state high court's interpretation of state law, the Court does not defer to state court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution.

President Adams promises Marbury that he will appoint him to the next vacant judgeship in his administration. When the vacancy opens, it is that of the Chief Justice of the United States. Adams decides to appoint Marshall instead to become Chief Justice. Marbury sues in federal court claiming that the President promised him the next vacancy. A reviewing court should find for:

Adams, because the Constitution gives the President the power to make appointments in his discretion, and exercise of that discretion is not reviewable by the court. The correct answer is C. The court in "Marbury v. Madison" made a careful distinction between the judicial power to remedy violations of vested rights and its power to police exercises of discretion committed to political actors by the Constitution. The Constitution gives the President the power to make appointments; while Adams might be a cad for welching on his promise to Marbury, the latter had no right to the position and the court has no role in supervising the President's exercise of his power. Therefore, A is incorrect. Whether Marbury relied on Adams's promise or not has no bearing on whether the President's failure to appoint Marbury can be reviewed by a court, so B is incorrect as well. While the President does have some judicial immunity from civil suits for official actions, it is incorrect to say, as D does, that the President has some kind of blanket immunity from any and all lawsuits.

Which of the following is a reason given for adopting originalism as a preferred method of constitutional interpretation?

All of the above are cited reasons for using originalism.: - Originalism limits judges' discretion. - Originalism ensures that decisions are based on something other than judges' notions of sound policy. - Originalism minimizes the "countermajoritarian difficulty." Proponents of originalism would say, D, that each is a reason to prefer it to other interpretive methods. The argument for originalism goes something like this: The exercise of judicial review involves the setting aside of policy preferences of democratically-elected officials by officials who are neither elected nor accountable in any direct sense to voters. It is, in that sense, "countermajoritarian," in Alexander Bickel's phrase. The danger is that the popularly elected branches' preferences will be set aside in favor of nothing more than the judge's (or a majority of the Supreme Court). In order to minimize the countermajoritarian nature of judicial review, judges should apply the law of the Constitution as the Framers and ratifiers understood it. Not only does that ensure that the judge is applying "the law," it preserves plenty of space for the popularly elected branches to express their policy preferences. By applying the Constitution as the Framers and ratifiers understood it, moreover, a judge's ability to allow her own preferences to intrude is arguably kept to a minimum.

Which of the following provides a textual basis for federal judges to invalidate statutes that violate the Constitution?

All of the above. - The Article III Arising Under Clause. -The Article III Vesting Clause. -The Article VI Oath Clause. The correct answer is D. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall cites several constitutional provisions that provide legal support for federal judges to assert the power of judicial review. Specifically, he cites Article III's vesting of "judicial power" in federal courts (which he suggests includes the power to "say what the law is"), the federal judiciary's Article III authority to decide cases "arising under" the Constitution (which he suggests includes the power to invalidate federal statutes that conflict with the Constitution), and Article VI's requirement that federal judges take an oath to "support" the Constitution (which he suggests includes the obligation to invalidate unconstitutional laws).

In 2012, Congress enacted the Safe Toys Act, which gives American citizens the ability to sue toy manufacturers in federal court for money damages arising from accidents involving defective toys that have traveled in interstate commerce. The statute also grants foreign toy manufacturers an affirmative defense if the accident involves a toy that was made outside the United States. In 2018, a group of parents filed a lawsuit under the Act against GB Play, a British-owned toy company, after several children were injured playing with toys made by GB Play. In response, GB Play filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the Act's affirmative defense for foreign companies. While GB Play's motion to dismiss was pending before a federal judge, Congress amended the Safe Toys Act to remove the affirmative defense for British corporations. At the time the Act was amended, the GB Play case was the only Safe Toys Act action pending in federal court that involved a British company. GB Play responded by arguing that Congress violated the Constitution's separation of powers provisions when it enacted the 2018 amendment by effectively deciding the merits of a pending case. A reviewing court will most likely hold that the amendment is:

Constitutional, because Congress can amend legal standards in ways that affect the outcome of pending cases without improperly infringing on the judiciary's constitutional powers. The correct answer is C. In Bank Markazi v. Peterson, the Court held that, in similar circumstances, Congress can amend existing federal law and make the newly amended law applicable to pending federal cases without infringing on the constitutional prerogatives of the judicial branch. A is incorrect because while Article III prohibits Congress from telling a court how to apply preexisting law in a particular case, here Congress amended preexisting law that applies to all cases involving British companies without dictating a rule of decision in a particular case. B is incorrect because Bank Markazi holds that Congress can require courts to apply new law to pending cases without violating separation of powers. D is incorrect because while some constitutional disputes involving foreign affairs are considered non-justiciable political questions, the Court has reached the merits of countless cases involving federal statutes that affect the rights of foreign corporations.

Despite being videotaped in public punching his wife, Frank, a member of the House of Representatives, defiantly refuses to heed calls that he resign. His colleagues vote to expel him from the House by a two-thirds vote, pursuant to Article I, section 5, clause 3 of the Constitution. ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.") Frank sues the Speaker of the House and the House majority leader in federal district court claiming that his expulsion was actually for blowing the whistle on corruption in the House. The judge hearing the case should:

Dismiss the case, because the text of the Constitution commits to each House alone the discretion to expel members with a two-thirds vote. The best answer is C. This is a variation on "Powell v. McCormack." Recall that in that case the Court held that the political question doctrine did not apply to the House's decision to refuse to seat Adam Clayton Powell. Though the Constitution makes each house the judge of the qualification of its members, the Court held that it did not empower either house to add to the qualifications (age, citizenship, residency) that the Constitution specified. But note that the Constitution also gives to each house the power to expel a member with a two-thirds vote. This seems like a textually demonstrable commitment of power to another branch and the provision does not seem to specify limitations (aside from the two-thirds vote) on that power that could furnish judicially discoverable or manageable standards. Under "United States v. Nixon," then, Frank's expulsion looks nonjusticiable. A is incorrect because a party can have standing but the case still not be a justiciable one. B is incorrect because it assumes the matter in question. D is incorrect because the case is not moot; Frank still has an interest in being restored to his seat.

Following a close vote in Congress resulting in its narrow passage, a law that authorizes electronic surveillance of those suspected of having ties to terrorist groups is signed by the President. A representative who voted against the bill alleging it was unconstitutional files suit in federal district court seeking a declaration that the act is, in fact, unconstitutional. The government's response asks the court to dismiss the suit because it lacks jurisdiction. The judge should:

Dismiss the lawsuit, because the congressman lacks standing. The judge should dismiss the lawsuit because the congressman lacks standing. Contrary to the suggestion of C, members of Congress enjoy no exemption from Article III's requirements. A is incorrect because the merits of the suit would involve the usual process of constitutional adjudication. D is unsupported by the facts, which do not give any indication that the representative has suffered a concrete, particularized injury that is actual or imminent. Moreover, in addition to injury-in-fact, the harm must be fairly traceable to the defendant and be redressed by a favorable judicial ruling. That leaves B, which is the best answer.

In order to encourage citizens' vigilance in the defense of constitutional liberties, Congress passes a statute that authorizes suit in federal district court by "any person" who asserts a "credible claim" that any act of Congress or action of any executive official violates the Constitution. After reading a newspaper account of a "kill or capture list" of suspected terrorists that allegedly contains the names of American citizens, Rand sues in federal district court under the new statute. A reviewing court should:

Dismiss the suit, because Congress cannot authorize courts to hear cases in which the plaintiff lacks a concrete injury. The best answer is D. Standing requires that individuals assert a concrete, particularized injury that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Merely asserting an interest in having officials follow the law or an interest in not having them violate the Constitution is not sufficient; it is, in the Court's words, a "generalized grievance" insufficient to sustain standing unless the plaintiff himself has suffered a concrete injury. Because injury-in-fact is part of standing's constitutionally irreducible minimum, Congress is not at liberty to alter those standards or relax them. A is not correct for that reason; recall "Lujan." You might have been drawn to B, but the procedural right mentioned in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in "Lujan" would be like Congress requiring a regulated industry to file an environmental impact statement before constructing a new facility. Nearby landowners are concerned about the effects of the new facility on their land. Construction begins without the required statement being filed; the landowners sue to stop the facility, claiming that the required statement is missing. The landowners can get into federal court because the company hasn't complied with the statute and the landowners can seek to enforce it. The "procedural right" created in the question isn't really a procedural right at all, at least for Rand, who doesn't have any real injury-in-fact. C is not the best answer because the problem isn't so much the need for additional facts as it is the statute purporting to allow those with mere generalized grievances to bring suit in federal court.

After a federal judge is convicted on impeachment charges by a majority vote in the United States Senate based on sexual harassment allegations by former law clerks, the judge files suit in federal court asserting that his impeachment conviction was unconstitutional because the harassment was not a "high crime and misdemeanor" under Article II. A court reviewing the suit is most likely to:

Dismiss the suit, because the case is non-justiciable. The correct answer is B. In cases like Nixon v. United States, the Court has indicated that legal challenges to impeachment proceedings are non-justiciable political questions. A is incorrect because cases that involve politics are not necessarily non-justiciable political questions—federal courts decide the merits of cases involving politics all the time. C is incorrect because the text of Article II makes no mention of a federal judicial remedy for impeachment convictions. D is incorrect because the Court has invoked political question doctrine in other disputes involving impeachment, suggesting that Congress has the final say about what the words "high crimes and misdemeanors" mean.

After the President orders American troops into combat in Central America without a formal declaration of war from Congress, Erika, an anti-war activist and American citizen, files a suit in federal court alleging that the military action violates the Constitution because the President has exceeded her commander-in-chief powers under Article II. In response, the President files a motion to dismiss. A reviewing court is most likely to:

Grant the motion to dismiss, because Erika's case is non-justiciable. The correct answer is A. The sole basis for Erika's injury is her status as a citizen and a taxpayer, which would be considered a generalized grievance under cases like United States v. Richardson. Because generalized grievances are not a sufficient basis to establish standing, a court would deem Erika's case non-justiciable. In addition, even if Erika did have standing, a court would likely grant the motion as non-justiciable under the political question doctrine. B and C are incorrect because a reviewing court would not reach the merits of a non-justiciable dispute. D is incorrect because Erika's injury is a generalized grievance, and she therefore lacks a constitutionally cognizable injury.

James is a New York resident who was subject to a police search while he was on vacation in Nevada that he believes was motivated by racial profiling. Subsequently, James filed a suit in federal court seeking an injunction forbidding the Nevada state police from engaging in racial profiling at any point in the future. During discovery, James acknowledged that he had only been to Nevada once and did not have plans to return. The State then filed a summary judgment motion seeking to have the case dismissed. A reviewing court is most likely to:

Grant the motion, because James' injury is insufficient to establish Article III standing. The correct answer is A because in order to receive injunctive relief, James is must show, under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, that there is a substantial likelihood that he will be harmed again in a similar way. Here, James has no plans to return to Nevada, which the Court found significant when it denied the plaintiffs' standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. Therefore, under Lyons and Lujan, James lacks an injury sufficient to establish Article III standing. B is incorrect because while James would have standing to assert a damages claim (based on his past injury), the availability of damages is not relevant to determining whether he has an injury sufficient to maintain standing for injunctive relief. C is incorrect because plaintiffs in race discrimination cases are not entitled to a lower standard for establishing injury sufficient to meet Article III standing requirements. D is incorrect under both Lyons and Lujan.

After the U.S. Department of Transportation issued a new regulation allowing automakers to opt out of federal airbag requirements for certain vehicle models, the state of Idaho filed suit in federal court seeking to enjoin the regulation as a violation of the federal Administrative Procedure Act. Idaho's complaint alleges that the state will incur millions of dollars in additional medical costs if the rule is allowed to go into effect. In response, lawyers for the agency filed a motion to dismiss the suit, arguing that Idaho lacks Article III standing. A reviewing court is most likely to:

Hear the case, because Idaho has Article III standing. The correct answer is C. A is incorrect because Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that states like Idaho are entitled to "special solicitude" in standing analysis, and that the threshold for establishing a constitutional cognizable injury is lower for state plaintiffs than it would be for individual plaintiffs. B is incorrect because Idaho's claim of injury is based on specific costs to the state treasury, not a general obligation to comply with the law. D is incorrect because Idaho is asserting standing based on direct harm to its own state treasury, not based on injuries to third parties or Idaho residents.

What modality of constitutional interpretation best describes Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland in which he holds that Maryland has no power to tax the Second Bank of the United States?

Structural interpretation The correct answer is B. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion is largely an inference from structure. Having concluded that Congress could charter a bank in the first part of the opinion, he then explained why Maryland couldn't tax it. While the power to tax includes the power to destroy, the power to create implies the power to preserve. This brought Maryland and the United States into conflict. Because Maryland was a part of the whole Union, and because the Constitution was the Supreme Law of the Land, Marshall argued that to permit Maryland to tax an institution created by representatives of the whole United States would be to make a part supreme over the whole. The usual restraint on abuses of the taxing power—the voters—was insufficient security, moreover, because the Bank wasn't represented in Maryland by those who would look out for its interests. Note that Marshall didn't really point to text that prohibited Maryland from taxing the bank, nor did he make an appeal to the intent of the Framers, nor was there a prior case on point that dictated the outcome. Therefore, A, C, and D are incorrect.

Ames City in the State of Ames recently barred the sale and possession of ammunition within the city limits. A homeowner challenged the ban in a suit filed in Ames district court. If the reviewing judge enjoined the law, it would likely be because:

The law violates the Second Amendment, as incorporated by the Due Process Clause. Heller held that—subject to some limitations—the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense. In McDonald, a plurality held that the Second Amendment was incorporated against state governments via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court placed the ability to engage in armed self-defense at the core of the Amendment. It is likely that indirect attempts to make that impossible would be frowned upon by a court. Therefore, the correct answer is C. Because Heller explicitly rejected a rational basis test for evaluating the District's gun regulation, D is incorrect. A is not the best answer because there is an explicit amendment on point that has been incorporated against the state, and thus there is no need for courts to rely on the more open-ended substantive due process fundamental liberty test. B is incorrect because only Justice Thomas thought that the Second Amendment applied to states by dint of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

Federal law prohibits domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing firearms. A plaintiff with a decades-old conviction for misdemeanor domestic violence is barred from purchasing a handgun and challenges the law in federal district court. Which of the following statements is likely true?

The law would be upheld if the state demonstrates that the law is substantially related to an important governmental interest. Heller and McDonald were opaque as to the standard of review to be applied to firearms regulations, though the Heller majority did reject a rational basis test. Therefore, C is likely incorrect. Lower courts, however, have inferred from the Supreme Court's treatment of both the District's and Chicago's laws that a form of intermediate—as opposed to strict—scrutiny applies to laws that impinge on Second Amendment rights. As between B and D, then, D is the better and correct answer. While Heller did mention some presumptively lawful restrictions, like those barring felons from owning firearms, laws barring domestic violence misdemeanants were not mentioned and are of relatively recent vintage. While the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the question, lower courts reviewing the federal law that bars those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from firearms ownership have done so under intermediate scrutiny. A is incorrect because a law restricting the ownership of firearms clearly implicates the Second Amendment.

Worried that federal judges lack the specialized expertise necessary to correctly decide cases involving new technology, Congress creates the federal Court of Technology, staffed with judges who are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate and who otherwise are like federal district court and courts of appeals judges. Cases denominated "technology cases" in the statute must be filed in the new court. Appeals from the trial courts go to a new "Court of Technology Appeals" and are heard by panels of three Technology Appeals judges nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. In addition, the legislation creating these new courts removes technology cases from the appellate docket of the U.S. Supreme Court. Is the legislation constitutional?

Yes, under Article III Article III, section 1 gives Congress the power to establish inferior federal courts. The Supreme Court has held that the power to create those courts implies a power to control their jurisdiction. Therefore, B is incorrect. In addition, Article III, section 2 gives Congress the power to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which would mean A is incorrect. While there is some debate whether Article III requires some federal judicial forum be available to hear cases listed in Article III, section 2, in this case there would be two: the Court of Technology and the Court of Technology Appeals. Nothing requires that the Supreme Court hear the case. D is incorrect because Congress's ability to create the courts and alter the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is a power given in Article III; it does not depend upon Article I for its exercise. That leaves C, which is the best answer.