Con Law week 16 reading quiz

Gregg v. Georgia (1976) Result

*No*. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders.

Glossip v. Gross (2015) Result

*No*. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that there was insufficient evidence that the use of midazolam as the initial drug in the execution protocol entailed a substantial risk of severe pain, compared to known and available alternatives, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because capital punishment has been held to be constitutional and some risk of pain is inherent in execution, the Eighth Amendment does not require that a constitutional method of execution be free of any risk of pain. Instead, a successful Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claim must identify a reasonable alternative that presents a significantly lower risk of pain, which the petitioners in this case were unable to do. Because the district court is entitled to a high degree of deference in its determination, the petitioners would have to prove that the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous in order for the Court to overturn the ruling. In this case, the medical testimony supports the district court's determination that the use of midazolam did not create a substantial risk of severe pain, particularly in light of the safeguards the state imposed on the process. In his concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the Constitution expressly contemplates the death penalty when it considers the possibility that someone may be "deprived of life," and therefore capital punishment cannot be unconstitutional. The arguments that it is arbitrary and unreliable, and therefore cruel, deal with the concerns about conviction, not the punishment itself, and are dangers inherent in the jury trial process. The decision of whether to impose the death penalty encompasses the type of moral calculus that should remain in the hands of the jury, as the Constitution provides. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate concurrence in which he argued that the studies cited in support of the arbitrariness of the imposition of the death penalty are themselves unreliable because they require that the moral reasons to execute someone be reduced to a metric by academics who were not present at trial. Justice Scalia joined in the concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that the constitutionality of a punishment must be evaluated based on currently prevailing social and legal standards; therefore, the death penalty is no longer constitutional. Justice Breyer pointed to studies that show that the exoneration rate is disproportionately high with capital crimes, which reflects both cases in which the defendant was actually innocent and cases in which there was procedural error; therefore, the death penalty is not reliably applied to cases in which the defendant has been properly convicted of crimes that society harshly condemns. Additionally, studies have shown that factors other than the egregiousness of the crime—such as the races and genders of the defendant and the victim, the location of the crime, and political pressures—influence the imposition of the death penalty, and such arbitrariness results in the punishment being unconstitutionally cruel. Because the imposition of the death penalty requires additional procedural safeguards, there are often long delays between sentencing and execution, if the execution happens at all, which is cruel in and of itself and also divorces the punishment from its punitive purposes of deterrence and retribution. Justice Breyer also argued that the nation has consistently been moving away from the use of the death penalty, to the point that it is used so rarely as to be considered "unusual" for the purpose of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent. In her separate dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the district court erred in holding that the use of midazolam did not create a substantial risk of severe pain. Instead, the scientific evidence supports the view that, while midazolam can induce unconsciousness, it is not sufficient to maintain unconsciousness through the effects of the rest of the execution cocktail. Because the petitioners sufficiently demonstrated that the risk of severe pain was substantial and that the state's safeguards do not appropriately mitigate that risk, the use of midazolam violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Sotomayor also argued that there is no requirement that petitioners for relief under the Eighth Amendment provide a reasonable alternative, because a cruel method of execution does not become constitutional simply due to a lack of alternatives. Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.

Roper v. Simmons (2005) Result

*Yes*. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that standards of decency have evolved so that executing minors is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death penalty among state legislatures, and its own determination that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for minors. Finally the Court pointed to "overwhelming" international opinion against the juvenile death penalty. Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Clarence Thomas all dissented.

Atkins v. Virginia (2002) Result

*Yes*. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Since it last confronted the issue, the Court reasoned that a significant number of States have concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. Moreover, the Court concluded that there was serious concern whether either justification underpinning the death penalty - retribution and deterrence of capital crimes - applies to mentally retarded offenders, due to their lessened culpability. "Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender," wrote Justice Stevens. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia filed dissenting opinions. Justice Clarence Thomas joined both. "This newest invention promises to be more effective than any of the others in turning the process of capital trial into a game," argued Justice Scalia.

Furman v. Georgia (1972) Result

*Yes*. The Court's one-page per curiam opinion held that the imposition of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. In over two hundred pages of concurrence and dissents, the justices articulated their views on this controversial subject. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall believed the death penalty to be unconstitutional in all instances. Other concurrences focused on the arbitrary nature with which death sentences have been imposed, often indicating a racial bias against black defendants. The Court's decision forced states and the national legislature to rethink their statutes for capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner.

Gregg v. Georgia (1976) Facts

A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a "cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Roper v. Simmons (2005) Facts

Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court stayed Simmon's execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally disabled. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally disabled (or "mentally retarded" in the vernacular of the day) violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case. Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at "evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.

Atkins v. Virginia (2002) Facts

Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial, the defense relied on one witness, a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally disabled (or "mentally retarded" in the vernacular of the day). The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified, but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded.

Roper v. Simmons (2005) Question

Does the execution of minors violate the prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" found in the Eighth Amendment and applied to the states through the incorporation doctrine of the 14th Amendment?

Furman v. Georgia (1972) Question

Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Glossip v. Gross (2015) Question

Does Oklahoma's use of midazolam as the initial drug in the execution protocol, the same initial drug used in Clayton Lockett's execution, violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment?

Furman v. Georgia (1972) Facts

Furman was burglarizing a private home when a family member discovered him. He attempted to flee, and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that he was carrying went off and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death (Two other death penalty cases were decided along with Furman: Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. These cases concern the constitutionality of the death sentence for rape and murder convictions, respectively).

Atkins v. Virginia (2002) Question

Is the execution of mentally retarded persons "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?

Gregg v. Georgia (1976) Question

Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment?

Glossip v. Gross (2015) Facts

On April 29, 2014, Oklahoma executed Clayton Lockett using a three-drug lethal injection procedure. The procedure went poorly; Lockett awoke after the injection of the drugs that were supposed to render him unconscious and did not die until about 40 minutes later. Oklahoma suspended all subsequent executions until the incident could be investigated and subsequently adopted a new protocol that placed a higher emphasis on making sure the injection was done properly. The new protocol also allowed for four alternative drug combinations, one of which used midazolam as the initial drug, as did the protocol used in the Lockett execution. Charles Warner and 20 other death row inmates sued various state officials and argued that the use of midazolam as the initial drug in the execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Warner and three other plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Oklahoma from moving forward with their executions. A federal district court denied the injunction and held that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence that they would prevail on the merits of their claims and that they had failed to identify a "known and available" alternative to the drug in question. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. On January 15, 2015, the Supreme Court declined to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, and Charles Warner was subsequently executed. Richard E. Glossip and the other two death row inmates petitioned the Court again.