Constitution Clauses & Related Cases Quizlet

Article I, Section 5, Clause 4

Adjournment Text: "Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting." Summary: Neither House is allowed to adjourn for more than three days without the consent of the other, nor meet in any other place, i.e.,. the capital, without that consent as well. Analysis: The idea behind this clause was to put each House on equal footing with one another, so once house could not stop the legislative functions of the other. Article II, Section 3, Clause 1, which allows the President to adjourn Congress, was added so that one House could not hold the other hostage and unable to adjourn. This power has not needed to be used.

Article I, Section 9, Clause 7

Appropriations Clause Text: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." Summary: No money will be taken from the Treasury unless it has been appropriated, and a statement of receipts and expenditures of all public money will be published from time to time. Analysis: Since Congress has the power to appropriate funds, specifically the House of Representatives, the clause essentially says that the government cannot use funds from the treasury, unless it has been appropriated to them, further protecting legislative "power of the purse," which was seen as a check on the power of other branches. Related Cases: United States v. Klein, (1871) United States v. Lovett, (1946) Reeside v. Walker, (1850) Knote v. United States, (1877) Hart v. United States, (1886) Campagna v. United States, (1891) Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, (1937) United States v. Dickerson, (1940) Richardson v. United States, (1974) United States v. MacCollom, (1976) National Ass'n of Regional Councils v. Costle, (D.C. Cir. 1977) United States v. Will, (1980) Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, (1990) Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, (1992) Rochester Pure Water District v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, (D.C. Cir. 1992) Legal Service Corp. v. Velazquez, (2001) United States v. Bean, (2002) *Note: See Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 for more details on Congressional "power of the purse."

Article I, Section 8, Clause 12

Army Clause Text: "To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years" Summary: Congress has the power to raise and support armies by appropriating money, but it has to reappropriate funds to support or raise an army at least every two years. Analysis: At the Convention, there was a serious debate as to if there should be a standing army because many of the Framers thought that a standing army led to tyranny. For examples of this, they looked to Cesar's dissolution of the Senate in Rome and Cromwell's suspension of Parliament in England. However, because of external dangers that were still active after the Revolution, that being Spanish and British activity in the colonies, and recent events like Shay's Rebellion, the Framers, also saw a need for a standing army in times of emergency. Their remedy to this conflict of security vs. liberty was the vesting of the power to allocate funds and create a standing army with Congress, the body most closely linked democratically with the people, and its conduction with the executive. However, many still did not support the measure and saw a standing army in times of peace to be an easy source of potential tyranny (See E1). Evidence: E1: Brutus, one of the most influential anti-ratification writers wrote that standing armies "are dangerous to the liberties of a people...not only because the rulers may employ them for the purposes of supporting themselves in any usurpation of powers, which they may see proper to exercise, but there is a great hazard, that any army will subvert the forms of government, under whose authority, they are raised, and establish one, according to the pleasure of their leader." Related Cases: Selective Draft Law Cases, (1918) Witmer v. United States, (1955) United States v. Seeger, (1966) Hart v. United States, (1968) Holmes v. United States, (1968) United States v. O'Brien, (1968)

Article IV

Article Four of the United States Constitution outlines the relationship between each state and the others, and the several States and the federal government.

Article I, Section 9, Clause 3

Bill of Attainder(1) & Ex Post Facto(2) Text: "No Bill of Attainder [1] or ex post facto Law shall be passed [2]." Summary: Congress cannot pass an ex post facto law (2) or a bill of attainder (1). Definition of a Bill of Attainder: An act of a legislature declaring a person or group of persons guilty of some crime and punishing them, often without a trial. Definition of Ex Post Facto Law: A law that retroactively changes the legal consequences (or status) of actions that were committed or relationships that existed, before the enactment of the law. Analysis: These two rights are the only rights that were originally protected from both state and federal government infringement, underscoring their significant importance to the Framers at the time (See E1 & E2 & E3). The Framers saw both of these types of legislative acts as subversive to democracy, and a source of legislative tyranny that the English Parliament employed, and they subsequently wanted to rid the colonies of. After the Revolutionary Way, many states enacted ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder, which further prompted the Framers to forbade both state and federal governments from these acts. 1 - Bill of Attainder: There was some confusion as to if Bills of Attainder only applied to a person life or property as well, although, in Fletcher v. Peck, Justice John Marshall contended that, "a Bill of Attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both." 2 - Ex Post Facto Law: These types of laws stemmed from the fundamental virtue of "nulla poena sine lege," or that there can be no punishment without law (See E4). Ex Post Facto laws subsequently subverted this virtue and had been a common practice in English Parliament, which had even been practiced by some states after the Revolution. Evidence: E1: Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 E2: Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 E3: James Madison said in The Federalist No. 44, "Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation." E4: In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton noted that "the subjecting of men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law" is among "the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny." Related Cases: United States v. Klein, (1871) Marbury v. Madison, (1803) Fletcher v. Peck, (1810) Cummings v. Missouri, (1867) United States v. Lovett, (1946) United States v. Brown, (1965) Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, (1977) Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, (1984) Cummings v. Missouri, (1867) Calder v. Bull, (1798) Satterlee v. Mathewson, (1829) Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, (1855) Ex parte Garland, (1867) Cook v. United States, (1891) Johannessen v. United States, (1912) Frank v. Magnum, (1915) Malloy v. South Carolina, (1915) Mahler v. Eby, (1924) Lindsey v. State of Washington, (1937) Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, (1952) De Veau v. Braisted, (1960) Dobbert v. Florida, (1977) Weaver v. Graham, (1981) Miller v. Florida, (1987) United States v. Halper, (1989) Collins v. Youngblood, (1990) California Department of Corrections v. Morales, (1995) United States v. Ursery, (1996) Kansas v. Hendricks, (1997) Lynce v. Mathis, (1997) Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, (1998) United States v. Bajakajian, (1998) Carmell v. Texas, (2000) Rogers v. Tennessee, (2001) Smith v. Doe, (2003) Stogner v. California, (2003) Modern Day Connection: Interesting how similar the idea of Ex Post Facto Laws could apply to the modern day in such ways as Yale taking the name "Calhoon" off of their building because he owned slaves.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 2

Borrowing Clause Text: "The Congress shall have Power To... borrow Money on the credit of the United States" Summary: Congress has the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States. Analysis: The need to borrow is in important power for any national government looking to defend itself. The colonies borrowed heavily throughout the American Revolution, and subsequently after that. It is important for a government to be able to borrow quickly to raise revenue to defend itself, however, it was understood at the time that Congress would balance their budget so that revenues exceeded expenditures for the United States to be able to pay back its debt. At the time it was largely expected the government would only borrow in times of emergency, raising other revenue through taxes and keeping a budget surplus for minor excess needs (See E1). Evidence: E1: Washington Farewell Address 1796 Related Cases: McCulloch v. Maryland

Article I, Section 2, Clause 4

Executive Writs of Election or Writs of Election Text: "When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies." Summary: Clause 4 of Section 2 of Article 1 established that if a seat in the House of Representatives is vacated before their term in office is expired, it is up to the state, not the House, to fill the respective seat. It also states in the concept of "Writs of Election" that a special election must be called. The Governor cannot appoint a representative (See: E1). Evidence: E1: Jackson v. Ogilvie(1979) Related Cases: Jackson v. Ogilvie (7th Cir. 1970) United States Term Limits v. Thornton (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ACLU of Ohio v. Taft (2002)

Article I, Section 8, Clause 5

Coinage Clause (1)& Weights and Measures Clause (2). Text: "To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin [1], and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures [2]" Summary: Congress has the power to coin money and determine its value(1) as well as decide the national units of weight and measurement such as inches, feet, or pounds.(2). Analysis: 1 - Coinage Clause: Under the Articles of Confederation, the states had the power to coin their currency, but not to set its value. Since the ability to coin currency was seen as a symbol of state sovereignty, there was much debate during the Convention as to if Congress or the states should retain this power. It was decided that Congress should have complete authority to coin money and set its value to promote uniformity of currency, promote economic growth and stability, and reduce the hardships of each state making different currencies, easing monetary movement. This power is also restricted from the states in Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, which shows that the Framers had no intention of this power being shared. This subsequently erased the problem of states changing the valuations of their money, creating economic discontinuity within the U.S. 2 - Weights and Measures Clause: Under the Articles of Confederation the national government had the sole authority to determine the units for weight and measurements and Congress retained that authority with the advent of the Constitution. Related Cases: Craig v. Missouri, (1830) Bronson v. Rodes, (1868) Veazie Bank v. Fenno, (1869) Hepburn v. Griswold, (1870), overruled in part by (Knox v. Lee), (1871) and (Julliard v. Greenman), (1884) Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, (1926)

Article II, Section 2, Clause 1

Commander and Chief (1), Commander of Militia (2), Opinion Clause (3), and Pardon Power (4). Text: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States [1], and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States [2]; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices [3], and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment [4]." Summary: The President is the commander and chief of the army, navy (1), and active militias (2). He may get advice from other members or officers of executive departments on any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices (3). He also has the power as commander and chief to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment (4). Analysis: 1 - Commander and Cheif: The Framers were careful to distribute war powers to a singular executive because of the potential for that executive to be tyrannical. Therefore, they carefully split the power between Congress and the President (See Article I, Section 8, Clause 11). Thus, they gave the power to conduct war to the President, and the power to declare it to Congress. While contemporary it is widely accepted that the President does have the power to conduct war, there is question as to whether Congress is necessary to start hostilities with another nation, or if the President can do that himself. Since 1941, Congress has never actually declared war even though it has been engaged in conflicts like the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the War on Terror in Iraq. 2 - Commander of Militia: At the Convention in Philadelphia, it was mostly agreed that the President should have control over the federal military because in order for decisive and quick decisions on war to be made, and singular person would need to have control, given that the enemy will not wait for the deliberation required of Congress, but there was much debate over whether or not the President should have control over militias.(See Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 & 16). Since militias were made of up local citizenry, called fourth in times of crises, they were seen as a powerful check on the power of the government, as seen in the 2nd Amendment. Thus, states believed that their retention over the militias could act as a check on the power of the Federal government, and would be a powerful indicator that they retained their sovereignty as governing bodies (See Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 & 16 for further analysis of control over militias). 3 - Opinion Clause: There was much controversy during the ratifying convention as to whether or not the President should be solely in charge of the executive, or if he should need to have some decisions accepted by an advisory counsel, or privy counsel. The Framers saw problems with the English system, where the monarch devolved much of their power to his lower ministers, thus if he made a mistake, he could blame one of them and do no wrong. Therefore, the Framers wanted to ensure an energetic executive and allow them to make executive decisions without having a binding counsel, yet allowed a series of advisors which have now become the President's cabinet, and they can advise the President on policy (See E2). 4 - Pardon Power: This is one of the least restricted powers vested in the President, and enjoyed a long history with many state governors and the English Monarchs. While many delegates thought this could lead to the President giving executive privilege to some, destroying the foundation of the rule of law, or pardoning people he coerced to commit a crime for him, the majority thought that it would temper justice with mercy, especially in cases where more evidence was found afterward that showed the prisoner not guilty. It was also thought that if the President overused this power, Congress had the power to impeach the President, which would stand as a check on the President's power. Evidence: In Federalist No. 70, Alexander Hamilton wrote that he wanted "[e]nergy in the executive." E2: Charles Pinckney, one of the delegates at the convention said, "The President shd. be authorized to call for advice or not as he might chuse. Give him an able Council and it will thwart him; a weak one and he will shelter himself under their sanction." Related Cases: Campbell v. Clinton, (D.C. Cir. 2000) Doe v. Bush, (1st Cir. 2003) O'Connor v. United States, (10th Cir. 2003) Martin v. Mott, (1827) Perpich v. Department of Defense, (1990) Luther v. Borden, (1849) Dukakis v. Department of Defense, (1st Cir. 1988) Marbury v. Madison, (1803) United States v. Germaine, (1879) United States v. Klein, (1871) Ex parte Garland, (1867) United States v. Wilson, (1833) Biddle v. Perovich, (1927) Schick v. Reed, (1974)

Article I, Section 8, Clause 3

Commerce Clause (Commerce with Foreign Nations (1), Commerce Among the States (2), Commerce with Indian Tribes (3).) Text: "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations [1], and among the several States [2], and with the Indian Tribes [3]" Summary: Congress has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations (1), between the states (2), and with Indian tribes (3). Analysis: 1 - Commerce With Foreign Nations: Since the national government was the linking institution of the several state governments, and the national face of the nation, it made sense that it should have the power to deal directly with foreign nations in the regulation of commerce, rather than the states doing it separately. It would also be quite difficult to have one unified national or foreign policy if the states could separately deal with foreign entities on their own. This was the case under the Articles, and the states could states could raise tariffs against other states or foreign nations, which created many complications and tensions among the states (See E1/E2). 2 - Commerce Among the Several States: There has been a lot of debate and controversy as to the scope of this section of the Commerce Clause. Strictly interpreted, the term "to regulate" would extend to facilitating the free flow of goods among the states, and only in cases of emergency prohibit the trade of a good. However, contemporary, Congress's commerce clause powers have largely been interpreted to cover economic activity as a whole, giving the basis for the power of Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Gibbons v. Ogden greatly extended the meaning of commerce to include "commercial intercourse" rather than just "traffic" (See Gibbons v. Ogden). This interpretation allows Congress to regulate both trade and the manner in which it is carried on. 3 - Commerce with Indian Tribes: Along with the Treaty Clause (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2) gave Congress exclusive power to regulate Indian affairs. During colonial times the colonies shared jurisdiction with the Crown over Indian affairs, and under the Articles, the states and national government also shared jurisdiction. Therefore, during the convention it was agreed upon that there needed to be some concurrency between the state and federal government as to the regulation of trade with Indian tribes, giving way to the Indian Commerce Clause. Evidence: E1: James Madison once said that giving the states the power to regulate commerce created, "rival, conflicting, and angry regulations." E2: Federalist No. 42 Related Case: Brown v. Maryland (1827) Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Board of Health (1902) Buttfield v. Stranahan (1904) Brolan v. United States (1915) Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United States (1933) Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages (1976) Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady (1977) Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles (1979) Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board (1983) Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston (1993) A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1851) United States v. E.C. Knight Co. (1895) Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States(1899) Champion v. Ames (1903) Swift & Co. v. United States (1905) Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States (1911) Hoke v. United States (1913) Shreveport Rate Case (1914) Caminetti v. United States (1917) Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) Stafford v. Wallace (1922) Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co. (1935) Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) United States v. Darby (1941) Wickard v. Filburn (1942) H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond (1949) Dean Milk v. Madison (1951) Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964) Katzenbach v. McClung (1964) Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (1970) Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. (1976) Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977) Philadelphia v. New Jersey (1978) Reeves, Inc. v. Stake (1980) Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware (1981) Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. (1981) South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke (1984) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America(1987) Tyler Pipe Industries v. Department of Revenue (1987) United States v. Lopez (1995) Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison (1997) United States v. Morrison (2000) Gonzales v. Raich5 (2005) Johnson v. McIntosh (1823) Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) Worcester v. Georgia (1832) Ex parte Crow Dog (1883) United States v. Kagama (1886) Talton v. Mayes (1896) Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903) United States v. Creek Nation (1935) Seminole Nation v. United States (1942) Williams v. Lee (1959) McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona (1973) Morton v. Mancari (1974) Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978) Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) United States v. Wheeler (1978) United States v. Mitchell (1980) Montana v. United States (1981) United States v. Mitchell (1983) California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987) Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima (1989) Nevada v. Hicks (2001)

Article I, Section 10, Clause 3

Compact Clause Text: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay." Summary: Analysis: To further solidify the idea of the national supremacy of foreign affairs, this clause works with the foreign affairs powers of Congress and the president, as well as the State Treaties Clause, to ensure that the federal government would be the only body able to make treaties with foreign states. Thus, the Framers decided also to pass an expressed negative against the states in foreign affairs dealings. This clause also solved the problem many Framers saw in states potentially making pacts amongst each other for cooperation, which may hinder the federal government from operating, creating factions amongst the states. Finally, it further ceded war powers of the states to the federal government by not allowing them to engage in war unless attacked, a restriction many Framers though necessary to the preservation of the union. Related Cases: Virginia v. Tennessee, (1893) U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, (1978) *Note: See Commerce With Foreign Nations Clause, Commerce Clause, and State Treaties Clause.

Article II, Section 1, Clause 8

Compensation Clause Text: "The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them." Summary: During the President's time in office, he will receive compensation for his services to the country which cannot be changed during his presidency, and he cannot receive any other reward during that time. Analysis: There was disagreement about whether or not the President should receive compensation. People who did not think he should claim that it allowed the President to be independent of Congress. Opponents to the idea thought that if they did not give the President compensation, then only rich people could afford to run for office, not allowing poor people a shot at becoming the President. The opponents won the battle, and it was decided the President should receive compensation. Related Cases: Griffin v. United States, (D.D.C. 1995)

Article I, Section 6, Clause 1

Compensation Clause (1), Privilages and Arrest Clause (2), and Speech and Debate Clause (3). Text: "The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States [1]. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same [2]; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place [3]." Summary: Senators can set, by law, their own compensation, or payment for being in the House, and that payment will be issued by the Treasury*(1). Except for cases of treason, felony, and breach of the peace, members of either House can not be arrested while in session, or going to/returning from session (2). Members of either House cannot be sued for slander occurring during Congressional debate, and a speech made by a member of Congress cannot be for the objective of criminal prosecution. (3). Analysis: 1 - Compensation Clause: The first section of the clause is referred to as the Compensation Clause, or Ascertainment Clause. This part dealt with the incentives behind Congress. It was decided that Congress should be able to change their own wages as to give them more independence and not allow other branches of government from becoming despotic by taking away the monetary incentives behind people becoming a member of either House. It was also decided that the level of government paying the federal representatives would be the Feral government. This was contrary to the previous system they employed under the Articles of Confederation where the states had the power over paying their representatives for participating in the Federal government. The idea was that the Federal legislature, like it needed to be independent of its fellow branches, also needed to be divorce from state influence so that if a state's representatives voted a certain way, they would not need to worry about their state lowering their pay (See E1). Some people opposed a federal salary for representatives at the time, but they decided to create one thinking that if paid, representatives would not need to resort to corruption in order to get money (See E2). An auxiliary reason for a federal salary was to prevent a plutocracy from forming, given that only wealthy individuals would be able to become representatives if there were no salary. 2 - Privileges and Arrests Clause: This clause uses almost the exact wording as the English clause that gives its Parliament privilege from arrest. The courts have determined this to extend to all civil crimes (See E2). The Privileges and Arrest Clause only applies to civil arrests while Congress is in session. 3 - Speech and Debate Clause: The Framers thought that the freedom of speech was necessary for any member of Congress, and necessary for the proper functioning of a democratic government and legislature. They wanted to ensure that members felt like they could speak out against government action without punishment (See E3). This privilege is found in the English Bill of rights as well as the Articles of Confederation. England made the distinction between the location of where the speech was made. If a Member of Commons said seditious language outside of Commons, they could be prosecuted (See E4). However, the Framers wanted to ensure this would not be the case, and that representatives speech was protected at all times, thus they wrote in that wherever the representative, they would enjoy that privilege (See E5). Unfortunately, the courts have limited the scope of this clause to apply only to speech that is "clearly a part of the legislative process" (See E6/E7). Although the courts have broadly defined this, it is not consistent with the historical intensions of the clause. Evidence: E1: Edmund Randolf said, "[I]f the States were to pay the members of the National Legislature, a dependence would be created that would vitiate the whole system." E2: Williamson v. United States (1908) E3: James Wilson, one of the primary drafters of the constitution, said, "In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick to discharge his publick trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence." E4: In his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Justice Joseph Story wrote that in England the privilege was "strictly confined to things done in the course of parliamentary proceedings, and [did] not cover things done beyond the place and limits of duty." E5: Justice Joseph Story then added "the same principles seem applicable to the privilege of debate and speech in congress." after the quote in E4. E6: United States v. Brewster (1972) E7: Gavel v. United States declares that activits included in the legslative process include, "an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House." Related Cases: Pressler v. Simon (D.D.C. 1976) Pressler v. Blumenthal (1978) Humphrey v. Baker (D.C. Cir. 1988) Williamson v. United States (1908) Long v. Ansell (1934) Powell v. McCormack (1969) Coffin v. Coffin (1808) United States v. Johnson (1966) Gravel v. United States (1972) United States v. Brewster (1972) Doe v. McMillan (1973) Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund (1975) United States v. Powell (1975) Helstoski v. Meanor (1979) Hutchinson v. Proxmire (1979) United States v. Helstoski (1979) *Note: Changed by the 27th Amendment to not allow members of the House to change their own compensation, and if they do change it, it will take effect after the next election.

Article I, Section 3, Clause 1

Composition; Election of Senators Text: "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote." Summary: Establishes that the Senate will be composed of 2 members per state, which are chosen by the state legislature*, every six years, and each shall have one vote. Analysis: To promote state sovereignty and equality, the Senate used equal proportion instead of proportional(popular) representation. This allowed the bigger states more of a say in the House, which was based on proportional representation, and the smaller states an equal say in the Senate to be able to protect their interests. This compromise of a bicameral, equal and proportional representational federal legislature, was needed for the Constitution to be ratified by 9 of the 13 states (See: Article 1, Section 2, Clause 1). This design also protected the sovereignty of the states since the Senators would need the approval from their state legislatures to get reelected, which would in turn act as a check on the federal government because the Senators would act in their states best interests (See: E1). The fact that state legislatures would be deciding the Senators is not entirely undemocratic since the people are indirectly electing them; however, it is less directly democratic than the way the House was designed. This was intentional. The Framers feared a direct democracy which they thought would lead to majority tyranny. Many years prior, Aristotle noted that in a direct democracy, the commoners could rise up out of self-interest and take the belongings and power of the rich, which will continue a self-defeating cycle. Therefore, the Framers established a system to purposefully restrict the democratic ability of the people in order to keep power within the elite. The Senate, the upper house, was one way to accomplish this. The Bill of Rights, and Electoral College were two other ways the Framers went about achieving this goal. The admission of new states and their impact on the Senate was debated, some thinking that new states should not get as many Senators as preexisting ones, but that argument was eventually beaten, and new states were granted equal status to those of preexisting ones. (See: E2) Evidence: E1: During the New York ratifying convention, Alexander Hamilton supported the concept of the composition of the Senate saying that, "When you take a view of all the circumstances which have been recited, you will certainly see that the senators will constantly look up to the state governments with an eye of dependence and affection. If they are ambitious to continue in office, they will make every prudent arrangement for this purpose, and, whatever may be their private sentiments or politics, they will be convinced that the surest means of obtaining reelection will be a uniform attachment to the interests of their several states." E2: Northwest Ordinance of 1787 *Note: Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution switched the election of Senators from the state legislatures to a direct election by the people.

Article I, Section 10

Constitutional restrictions upon the states.

Article I, Section 9, Clause 5

Export Taxation Clause Text: "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." Summary: Congress cannot establish a tax on exports. Analysis: At the Convention, there were many arguments for the inclusion of this provision, and many southern states saw it as a needed addition to the Constitution before they would ratify the document. Since southern states by far exported most of the good from the United States, any tax on exports would disproportionately affect these states, potentially being a way for the North to eradicate slavery, or stifle southern economies. Even some northerners agreed that this provision should be added because of the detriments to industry an export tax would create. Related Cases: Turpin v. Burgess, (1886) Fairbank v. United States, (1901) Cornell v. Coyne, (1904) Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v. United States, (1915) United States v. Hvoslef, (1915) W.E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, (1918) United States v. IBM Corp., (1996) United States v. United States Shoe Corp., (1998)

Article I, Section 8, Clause 6

Counterfeiting Text: "To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States" Summary: Congress has the power to determine the punishment for the crime of counterfeiting U.S currency. Analysis: It is interesting that this power is included in the list of enumerated powers since the Necessary and Propper Clause with the Coinage Clause would seem to cover this power (See E1). However, because the English use to pass bills of attainder to condemn those who counterfeited, the delegates of the Convention wanted to ensure the national government retained the power to punish those who counterfeited. The Framers also wanted to ensure all foreign-affairs powers were in the hands of the national government. This clause goes along with others like the Bankruptcy Clause which aims to create a more uniform economic environment by giving the national government many powers towards commerce and monetary policy (See E2). Evidence: E1: Commentary on The Constitution, Justice Joseph Story E2: Federalist No. 42 Related Cases: State v. Tutt, (1831) Fox v. Ohio, (1847) United States v. Marigold, (1850) United States v. Arjona, (1887) Sexton v. California, (1903) Baender v. Barnett, (1921) Regan v. Time, Inc., (1984)

Article III, Section 2, Clause 3

Criminal Trials Clause Text: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed." Summary: Except in cases of impeachment, all trials of crimes will be by jury, and the trial will be held in the state where the crime was committed. When not committed in a state, the trial will be held where Congress, by law, directs. Analysis: Trial by jury is a right traced back to the Magna Carta in 1215, and has a strong tradition in English law. Thus, once the Virginia Company received its charter in 1606 to settle in America, giving all colonists the "rights of Englishmen," this practice of trial by jury was transferred to America. The idea behind trial by jury is that only a citizens community peers could determine his guilt of a crime. Not the government, who may have a vested interest in seeing the person detained indefinitely. Once the trial determines guilt, the judge then determines the sentencing by law. One of the most notable cases of jury trial being used to protect against government abuse is Crown v. John Peter Zenger. Related Cases: Sparf and Hansen v. United States, (1895) Patton v. United States, (1930) Duncan v. Louisiana, (1968) Apprendi v. New Jersey, (2000)

Article I, Section 5

Deals with Congressional procedures.

Article I, Section 4

Deals with the process and procedure of elections.

Article II, Section 1

Deals with the structure, election, and powers of the President and Vice-President.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 10

Define and Punishment Clause Text:"To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations" Summary: Congress has the power to set punishment for piracy and offenses within the United States to the laws of other nations. Analysis: This clause was another clause which established the federal government as the representative head of the United States when dealing with foreign nations. Punishing piracies and felonies was not a controversial issue, and piracy was well defined in international law before the enactment of the Constitution. What the clause prevented, was different states giving different punishments which could then anger foreign powers. If a foreign diplomat was assassinated, and Congress did not have the power to "define and punish... offenses against the Law of Nations," then one state could allow the assassin to get off easy, provoking a war (See E1). Evidence: E1: Edmund Randolph said at the ratifying convention that without the define and punishments clause, states "could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to be punished [and]: that particular states might by their conduct provoke war without controul..." Related Cases: United States v. Arjona, (1887) United States v. Smith, (1820) Ex parte Quirin, (1942) Reid v. Covert, (1957) Boos v. Barry, (1988)

Article II, Section 2

Describes the powers of the President of the United States and the duties he is required to perform.

Article II, Section 3

Describes the responsibilities of the President has as President.

Article II, Section 4

Describes the standards of impeachment for the President and other federal officers.

Article I, Section 9, Clause 4

Direct Taxes Text: "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken."* Summary: No direct tax shall ba passed unless it is in proportion to the population of the United States. Analysis: The Framers knew that the new Constitution needed to give Congress more of power to tax, at least more than just asking the states for contributions which was the process under the Articles of Confederation, but they disagreed on the extent of the power. They saw the power to tax as a potential source of legislative tyranny, supported by numerous historical examples of Kings or Monarchs levying excessive taxes on their subjects, or by the English Parliament implementing oppressive taxes on the colonies (See E1). Therefore, the Framers drew a distinction between direct and indirect taxes, mostly allowing indirect taxes, but placing restrictions on Congressional power to levy direct taxes. The main restriction against the power of Congress in levying direct taxes was the apportionment rule, which forced the direct tax to be levied in proportion to the population. This made it politically unfeasible for Congress to levy direct taxes because they then inherently affected larger states more than smaller states, and larger states had more power in the House of Representatives, the chamber which held power to tax. However, this difficulty was intentional because direct taxes were not meant to be, not had been, the main source of revenue for the United States. Evidence: E1: See Stamp Act, etc... Related Cases: Veazie Bank v. Fenno, (1869) Hylton v. United States, (1796) Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, (1869) Scholey v. Rew, (1875) Springer v. United States, (1881) Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (1895) Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance Co., (1934) *Note: This clause was superseded by the 16th Amendment, which reads, "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."

Article I, Section 4, Clause 1

Election Regulations Text: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." Summary: There are two parts to this clause. The first is that the main level of government which held the responsibility of determining the time, place, and manner of holding elections of federal representatives was the states and more specifically the legislatures of those states. Second, is that Congress can influence some of these regulations, and places the power to regulate elections in the legislature of the state and federal government, not the executives nor judiciaries.* Analysis: Note, that it was the states who held the majority of the power in regulating elections at the start of the nation. Up until the passage of the 15th Amendment, the states had almost complete autonomy in regulating elections, as long as they adhered to other aspects of the constitution regarding elections. In that, they could not change the number of total representatives they got and so on. Once the 15th Amendment was passed, its enforcement clause allowed Congress much greater domain in regulating elections, although they did have some power previously. Acts such as the Enforcement Act of 1870 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are prominent regulatory acts concerning elections. This was largely a shared power, with the states having a bit more responsibility. The Anti-Federalists protested this section of the Constitution because they thought that if Congress could regulate their elections, then they would implement rules allowing them to stay in office forever, leading to tyranny. The Federalists countered that if Congress could not regulate its elections, the states could come together and effectively destroy Congress by failing to make rules for the election of its members. Related Legislation: Enforcement Act of 1870 Voting Rights Axt of 1965 Tilman Act 1907 Federal Election Campaign Act 1971 Related Cases: Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) Karcher v. Daggett (1983) Oregon v. Mitchell (1970) United States v. Reese (1875) United States v. Cruikshank (1876) Wood v. Broom (1932) Smith v. Allwright (1944) South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966) Beer v. United States (1976) Buckley v. Valeo (1976) Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) Shaw v. Reno (1993) Miller v. Johnson (1995) Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003) McConnell v. FEC (2003) *Note: The division of responsibilities between the state and federal governments of regulating elections has consequently been changed with the introduction of the 15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments.

Article II, Section 1, Clause 4

Electoral College Text: "The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President."* Summary: Electors will meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for two candidates, one of which cannot be from the electors home state. After voting, their votes should be listed for each person voted for and the number of votes they got, which will then be sealed and addressed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate will read the votes aloud in the audience of the Senate and House of Representatives. If a person gets a majority of the votes, they will become the President of the United States. If there is no majority reached, or there is a tie, then the members of the House of Representatives will choose by ballot, one of the candidates to become President, and if a majority is not reached, the members of the House will vote on the top five candidates on the last ballot until a majority is reached. However, when the House votes, each state has one vote, and a quorum is equal to 2/3rds of the states, and a majority of the states is necessary for a choice. After the President is chosen, the candidate with the second most votes will be the Vice-President, and if two have equal votes, the Senate will vote by ballot to choose between them. Analysis: Many of the delegates of the Convention through that having all the electors meet in one central location, the capital, would lead to too much collusion and intrigue, therefore, the delegates decided to hold the meetings of electors in their respective states, further decreasing the chance of vote buying/selling. There was also much debate over how the President and Vice-President should be selected. The Framers did not want a direct democracy, seeing how it could become tyrannical under Aristotlean theory, therefore they wanted to create a mix of direct democracy and republicanism in voting in the President and Vice-President. The direct democracy came from each states inhabitants voting for who they wanted to be the President and Vice-President, but the actual votes that counted were the states elector's votes, and the electors were chosen by the state legislatures. The Framers also did not think political parties would become as pervasive as they are today nationally, therefore they did not think a majority of electors would choose a single person, thus allowing the House of Representatives to decide the president, like in the election of 1824. In many ways, the Framers wanted to control against the popular will of the people by creating the electoral college, as well as other mechanisms like the voting process for Senators, to keep important decisions, like that of the President or Senators, out of the citizens direct hands, so they could be decided by the educated elites. This created a shared system where the people still held ultimate sovereignty because they could indirectly or directly elect all elected government positions, however, it also allowed some elected officers to make decisions without worrying as much about public opinion on the issue. *Note: The 12th amendment superseded this clause, after the election of 1800 in which Thomas Jefferson and his running mate, Aaron Burr, received identical votes and both claimed the office. After many votes, the House of Representatives chose Jefferson, and soon thereafter the amendment was speedily approved.

Article I, Section 9, Clause 8

Emoluments Clause Text: "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State." Summary: The United States cannot grant any titles of nobility, and no person holding public office can accept a gift from a foreign state without the approval of Congress. Analysis: This clause originally came from Article IV of the Articles of Confederation, which prohibited Congress from granting any titles of nobility, thus trying to shield the republican character of the United States against corrupting foreign influences. This clause is reaffirmed as a prohibition against state governments in Article I, Section 10, as well as in the Republican Guarantees Clause of Article IV. Republicanism was the basis of the United States, which, in The Federalist No. 39, James Madison defined as "a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during good behavior." Therefore, giving titles of nobility would have been a sign of aristocracy not compatible with republicanism because it assigned one person as being inherently better than his peers.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 17

Enclave Clause (1)& Military Installations(2). Text: "To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States [1], and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings [2]" Summary: Congress has the power to establish a district, separate from the states, for the seat of government of the United States (1). Congress also has the power to buy land from the states and exercise independent authority over that land, for the use of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings (2). Analysis: 1 - Enclave Clause: Many of the Framers thought that, as a simple extension of the existence of a federal government in a federal system of government, the federal government should have its area of sovereign land, under the authority of the federal government, to conduct its operations. Many supporters of this clause pointed to an incident in 1783, where a large group of former continental army soldiers went to the capital in Philadelphia and harassed Congressmen because they had not received pay. The State of Virginia declined multiple requests from Congress for help, and eventually, the Congressmen fled to nearby New Jersey to escape the ex-solders. Therefore, the Convention decided that the federal government should have its district, which, with much controversy, was moved from Philadelphia to between Virginia and Maryland, in the south. 2 - Military Installations: Like the Enclave Clause, this power to create separate federal installations was pursuant of the goal to separate federal and state sovereignties (See E2). This power is also important because it allows the federal government to independently buy land from states to create agencies or facilities to assist the federal government with its duties. It was also thought that in the area of war, the federal government should not need to rely on the states to give them access to forts or land, thus the federal government can create their own. Evidence: E1: James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 43 that, "The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of Government carries its evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every Legislature of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings be interrupted, with impunity; but a dependence of the members of the general Government, on the State comprehending the seat of the Government for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable to the Government, and dissatisfactory to the other members of the confederacy." E2: In Justice Joseph Story's "Commentaries on the Constitution," he wrote that, "The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, and the nature of the military duties, which may be required there, all demand, that they should be exempted from state authority. In truth, it would be wholly improper, that places, on which the security of the entire Union may depend, should be subjected to the control of any member of it. The power, indeed, is wholly unexceptionable; since it can only be exercised at the will of the state; and it is therefore placed beyond all reasonable scruple." Related Cases: Phillips v. Payne, (1875) Albaugh v. Tawes, (D.C. Md. 1964) Evans v. Cornman, (1970) Adams v. Clinton, (D.D.C. 2000) Banner v. United States, (D.D.C. 2004) Seegars v. Ashcroft, (D.D.C. 2004)

Article IV, Section 1

Establishes that actions of one state are equally as crediable as the actions of the others.

Article III

Establishes the Judiciary branch of government and its corresponding powers, structure, and responsibilities.

Article I, Section 6

Establishes the compensation, privileges, and restrictions involved in holding office.

Article I, Section 2

Establishes the rules, procedures, and voter qualifications for the House of Representatives.

Article II, Section 1, Clause 9

Executive Oath Text: "Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:--'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.'" Summary: Before the President enters the presidency, he will recite the oath of office which reads, "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." Analysis: This is the only oath clause which gives specific wording as to what the oath will be. It is important to recognize the language the Framers used which says that the President will "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." This language is the basis for the long-held understanding that Presidents will only veto legislation they thought as unconstitutional, not just because they disagreed with it. This was a common practice and an unwritten rule starting with President Washington but nowadays is not adhered to.

Article II, Section 1, Clause 1

Executive Vesting Clause Text: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." Summary: The power of the executive will be in the President of the United States of America. Analysis: Similar to the Legislative Vesting Clause (Article I, Section 1, Clause 1), and the Judicial Vesting Clause (Article III, Section 1, Clause 1), the Executive Vesting Clause sets the executive branch as a distinct branch of government, with its own separate and shared powers and responsibilities. Related Cases: Nixon v. Fitzgerald, (1982) Clinton v. Jones, (1997) Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, (1952) Myers v. United States, (1926) Humphrey's Executor v. United States, (1935) United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., (1936) United States v. Nixon, (1974) Morrison v. Olson, (1988) American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi, (2003)

Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3

Fugitive Slave Clause Text: "No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due."* Summary: No person held in service or labor by law in one state will be discharged from the service or labor by escaping into another state, but they will be delivered back to the party which they are in service or labor to. Analysis: At the time, slavery was a contentious issue in the states, but it was largely a settled issue that slavery was okay in the south, but would not be expanded in the north (See E1). Therefore, like the Interstate Rendition Clause, the Fugitive Slave Clause aimed to quell potential future problems that could arise between states from fleeing slaves and allow rendition on those slaves, returning the slaves to their original owner. This was largely precedent at the time noting that the Northwest Ordinance also have a fugitive slave provision, and was passed by Congress six weeks prior to the addition of the Fugitive Slave Clause. Evidence: E1: Northwest Ordinance of 1787 prohibited slavery in the territories it covered. Related Cases: Prigg v. Pennsylvania, (1842) Moore v. Illinois, (1852) Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1857) Ableman v. Booth, (1859) *Note: This clause, applicable to fleeing slaves, is now obsolete.

Article IV, Section 1, Clause 1

Full Faith and Credit Clause Text: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Summary: Each state must give full faith and credit to public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. Congress has the power to regulate how these items will be proved and their effect. Analysis: This clause was one of the clauses that James Madison listed in Federalist No. 42 that "provide for the harmony and proper intercourse among the States." The main objective of this clause was to ensure that court decisions in one state would be respected by the other states, thus eliminating the need for retrials in different states, costing time and money. A secondary objective of this clause was to for state courts to recognize other states insolvency laws and eliminate the problem of debtors fleeing the state to another if they could not pay their debts, although there is some disagreement as to if this was an intention of the Framers. Related Cases: Huntington v. Attrill, (1892) Fauntleroy v. Lum, (1908) Fall v. Eastin, (1909) Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. George, (1914) Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, (1914) New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge, (1918) Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, (1939) Williams v. North Carolina, (1945) Hughes v. Fetter, (1951) Crider v. Zurich Insurance Co., (1965) State of Nevada v. Hall, (1979) Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, (1981) Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, (1985) University of Tennessee v. Elliot, (1986) Sun Oil v. Wortman, (1988) Baker v. General Motors Corp., (1998) Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, (2003)

Article I, Section 9, Clause 2

Habeas Corpus Clause Text: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." Summary: Congress cannot suspend the writ of habeas corpus unless in cases of rebellion or invasion when the public safety may require it. Definition of Habeus Corpus: An order by a common-law court to require a person holding a prisoner to demonstrate the legal and jurisdictional basis for continuing to hold the prisoner. If there is no legal basis for detention or incarceration, the court orders the release of the prisoner. Analysis: Originally, the Writ of Habeas Corpus came from the English, and the English origins are in the Assize of Clarendon, an act passed in 1166 by Henry II of England that began the transformation of English law, granting people more rights. The Writ of Habeas Corpus had been a major right the English government afforded to its citizens, and thus the colonists, who did not officially receive that right, put it in their Constitution (See E1 & 2). There was much debate over whether or not Congress should even have the ability to suspend the right, albeit in dire circumstances (See E3). However, the Convention concluded that the right needed to have some leniency, especially when it could interfere with the safety of the public. Evidence: E1: Sir William Blackstone described the right to Habeus Corpus in his Commentaries on the Laws of England as "the glory of the English law." E2: In The Federalist No. 84, Alexander Hamilton stressed the importance of the writ of habeas corpus to protect against "the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny." E3: Luther Martin argued that the power would be "an engine of oppression" that could be used by the federal government to declare any state opposition to federal law, "however arbitrary and unconstitutional," an act of rebellion. Related Cases: Ex Parte Merryman, (C.C.D. Md. 1861)

Article I, Section 8

Lists all the powers of Congress

Article I, Section 9

Lists restrictions on the power of Congress

Article I, Section 2, Clause 1

House of Representatives & Elector Qualifications Text: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." Summary: Sets elections for the House of Representatives to occur every two years, by the people, thereby fixing the length of each term for a member of the house at two years. Also, this allows states to determine the qualifications of voting separately*. However, citizens that can vote in state elections must also be able to vote in federal ones. (See: E2&3) Analysis: The debate between equal and proportional(popular) representation was vigorous during the convention, and the words "By the people," instill the value that representation was based on population in the House. (See: Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3) In reference to the second half of the first clause, the Framers intentionally decided to force people who could vote in state elections to be eligible to vote in federal ones, for the sake of uniformity. (See: E3) Evidence: E1: In Federalist No. 52, Madison refers to Article 1, Section 2, Clause 1's elector qualifications when saying, "To have left it [the definition of the right of suffrage] open for the occasional regulation of Congress, would have been improper...." Here he clearly shows the intent of the framers that the states should hold the authority on deciding voter qualifications. E2: Hamilton reaffirms Madison thoughts on elector qualifications when he write in Federalist No. 60 that, "The qualifications of the persons who may choose or may be chosen...are defined and fixed in the Constitution; and are unalterable by the [national] legislature." E3: James Wilson, one of the framers of the constitution noted in the convention that," It would be very hard & disagreeable for the same persons, at the same time, to vote for representatives in the State Legislature and to be excluded from a vote for those in the Natl. Legislature." Related Cases: Baker v. Carr (1962) Lucas v. 44th General Assembly of Colorado (1964) Reynolds v. Sims (1964) Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) Swann v. Adams (1967) Avery v. Midland County (1968) Gaffney v. Cummings (1973) Mahan v. Howell (1973) Ball v. James (1981) Karcher v. Daggett (1983) *Note: In regards to elector qualifications, through amendments, primarily the 14th Amendment, the federal government has had increasing control over state elector qualifications.

Article I, Section 10, Clause 2

Import-Export Clause Text: "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress." Summary: No state can, without the consent of Congress, levy any duties on imports or exports, except when absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws. Revenue made from any duties on imports or exports will go to the Treasury of the United States, and any laws of this nature are subject to the revision and control of Congress. Analysis: Under the Articles of Confederation, there were many contradictory laws from different states regarding commerce and its regulation, which made interstate trade especially difficult. Thus, the Framers intended the Import-Export Clause to complement congressional power to raise revenue and regulate interstate commerce by restricting the states' ability to tax commerce entering and leaving their borders, ending future complications in interstate trade. Together, these two clauses make Congress the ultimate arbiter of interstate trade regulation. Related Cases: Brown v. Maryland, (1827) Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, (1976) Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston, (1993) Almy v. California, (1861) Woodruff v. Parham, (1869) Low v. Austin, (1872) Zschernig v. Miller, (1968) Kosydar v. National Cash Register, (1974) Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, (1997) *Note: See Commerce Clause

Article IV, Section 2

Lists the rights that citizens of states have and how extradition works.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 13

Navy Clause Text: "To provide and maintain a Navy" Summary: Congress has the power to appropriate funds to provide for and maintain a Navy. Analysis: Unlike an army, standing navies were not thought of as having the same level of potential tyranny as that of armies. Historically, navies were not the preferred tools of tyrants to seize power. They were also important, given the colonies geographic location, in supporting trade and naval commerce efforts within the United States, which were active. Therefore, the Navy Clause was not given the same two year time restriction as the Army Clause, allowing the government more freedom and ease to provide for a consistent standing navy.

Article I

The first article of the Constitution, it set out the structure, function, powers, and restrictions on the Federal legislature.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 9

Inferior Courts Text:"To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" Summary: Congress has the power to organize the federal judiciary under the level of the Supreme Court. Analysis: While this power would have been understood to be included under the Necessary and Propper Clause, given the language in Article III, the delegates at the convention felt that this power should be specifically given to Congress. It largely allowed Congress to determine the jurisdiction that the lower courts had, since the terms "inferior" and "superior" at the time referred to the jurisdiction that the courts had rather than its appellate abilities. Related Cases: Chisholm v. Georgia, (1793) Sheldon v. Sill, (1850) Ex parte Yerger, (1869) Beckwith v. Bean, (1878) Lockerty v. Phillips, (1943) Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., (1995)

Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2

Interstate Rendition Clause Text: "A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime." Summary: One charged in a state with treason, felony, or other crime and is found fleeing and in another state, can be delivered to the state where he fled from on the request of the executive. Analysis: This clause came from the Articles of Confederation, and was meant to promote unity among the states and reduce interstate disagreements whereby, criminals would flee one state and be protected by that state. Rendition is different from extradition in that rendition is state to state and extradition of from a foreign state to the home state. Although there is no express power granted to Congress to govern rendition, Justice Joseph Story regarded it as implied from the moral duty of Congress to carry into execution the duties imposed on the federal government by the Constitution (Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842)). Related Cases: Prigg v. Pennsylvania, (1842) Kentucky v. Dennison, (1860) Taylor v. Taintor, (1872) Roberts v. Reilly, (1885) Lascelles v. Georgia, (1893) Munsey v. Clough, (1905) Appleyard v. Massachusetts, (1906) Strassheim v. Daily, (1911) Michigan v. Doran, (1978) Puerto Rico v. Branstad, (1987) New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed, (1998)

Article I, Section 8, Clause 15

Militia Clause Text: "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions" Summary: Congress has the power to call a state militia to carry out or enforce the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. Analysis: There was much contention during the Convention as to if this power should be delegated to Congress or be held by the states. Since, at the time, militias were made up of local male citizens, many states considered the power to raise their militias to be a check on the power of the national government (See E1). However, this clause was left in the Constitution, and it became a part of the war power delegated to Congress, and increased Congress's ability to quickly call forth armed forces, which was seen as necessary for defence. Evidence: E1: Luther Martin, an avid anti-federalist, wrote in his book "Genuine Information," that, "As it now stands, the Congress will have the power, if they please, to march the whole militia of Maryland to the remotest part of the union, and keep them in service as long as they think proper, without being in any respect dependent upon the government of Maryland for this unlimited exercise of power over its citizens." Related Cases: Selective Draft Law Cases, (1918) Meade v. Deputy Marshal, (C.C.D. Va. 1815) Houston v. Moore, (1820) Martin v. Mott, (1827) Texas v. White, (1869) Tarble's Case, (1872) Dunne v. People, (1879) Cox v. Wood, (1918) Perpich v. Department of Defense, (1990)

Article III, Section 2, Clause 1

Judicial Power (1), Treaties (2), Ambassadors (3), Admiralty (4), Federal Party Clause (5), Interstate Disputes Clause (6), Citizen-State Diversity Clause (7), Diversity Clause (8), and Land Grant Jurisdiction Clause (9). Text: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States [1], and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority [2];--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls [3];--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction [4];--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party [5];-- to Controversies between two or more States [6];--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States[8];--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States [9], and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects [7]."* Summary: The jurisdiction of power of the judiciary extends to all cases in law under the Constitution and laws of the United States, treaties made or which will be made, cases affecting ambassadors or other public ministers, to cases of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, controversies to which the United States is a party, controversies between two or more states, between state and citizens of another state, between citizens of different states, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, between a state or the citizens thereof, foreign states, and citizens or subjects. Analysis: 1 - Judicial Power: This is one of the clauses which the unenumerated power of judicial review comes from, and gives the Court a large jurisdiction (See E1). That jurisdiction being inherently tied to acts of the legislature, which is law, and also the Constitution (See E2). Since the Supremacy Clause places the Constitution as higher law, Justice John Marshall thus inferred the power of judicial review in the case of Marbury v. Madison. 2 - Treaties: It was widely thought that the Supreme Court should have jurisdiction over treaties as the highest court in the land, and provisions extending the judicial power to these areas were in both the New Jersey and Virginia proposals (See E3). It was thought that it was important for the court to have jurisdiction over treaties since they were considered higher law and binding on the United States. 3 - Ambassadors: In keeping with the federal government's power over foreign affairs, it was widely thought that the Supreme Court should thereby hear cases involving foreign ambassadors, less a state court provoke a hostile international response on its own. This power was even included in the New Jersey Plan which was more states rights orientated than its counterpart, the Virginia Plan. 4 - Admiralty: In England there was a separate court system for maritime law, however, because prize courts broke many treaties in their decisions of naval prizes, most all the delegates decided that the Supreme Court should have the final say over maritime law, placing it under its jurisdiction. 5 - Federal Party Clause: This clause merely went to enumerate the power that the federal courts had jurisdiction in cases when the United States or federal government is a party. It was quite an obvious clause and did not encounter any opposition (See E4). 6 - Interstate Disputes Clause: This clause shows the change of mind the Founders went through when transitioning from the Articles of Confederation to the new Constitution. One of the main reasons the Framers wanted to depart from the Article of Confederation was the difficulty of solving interstate disputes. There was a previously convoluted process under Article IX of the Articles, which led to many problems and disagreements among the states. Thus, the delegation accepted that the federal government would solve disagreements among the states, showing the move from a confederal to a federal division of power. 7 - Citizen-State Diversity Clause: There were many disagreements over this clause, which was thought to allow private individuals to sue state governments. Many states did not like this idea because it infringed upon the common law practice of state sovereign immunity. Madison and Hamilton, the proponents of this clause, argued that states sovereign immunity would remain intact, and this clause would merely allow states to be plaintiffs in federal court (See E5). However, in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), the Supreme Court decided that the clause did allow states to be sued, making the fears of many states, especially the Anti-Federalists, a reality. 8 - Diversity Clause: The intent of this clause was mainly to protect out of state litigants from being discriminated against by state courts by giving jurisdiction to the Supreme Court (See E6). This would mitigate the possible issue that a state court would be partial to a plaintiff that was from their state if brought citizens of another state into their court. Shows the thinking of the time, which was that people were largely citizens of their states and not federal governments. 9 - Many problems arose from conflicting land claims from the states, one of which being that Maryland waited four years before accepting the Articles of Confederation, because of a land dispute with Virginia. Therefore, the delegates thought that placing land disputes under the jurisdiction of the federal courts would allow them to be impartial, and keep peace and harmony among the states (See E7). Evidence: E1: George Mason could find no "limitation whatsoever, with respect to the nature or jurisdiction of [the federal] courts." E2: James Madison said that "the judicial power [of the national government] should correspond with the legislative." E3: Alexander Hamilton explained the provision in The Federalist No. 80, stating that the federal judicial authority should extend "to all those [cases] which involve the peace of the confederacy, whether they relate to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, or to that between the States themselves," E4: In Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton wrote on the Federal Party Clause saying, "any other plan would be contrary to reason." E5: Alexander Hamilton acknowledged the states' fundamental immunity from such suits in The Federalist No. 81, stating that "[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent....[T]he exemption...is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States." E6: Alexander Hamilton's belief in Federalist No. 80 was that "the reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases in which the state tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself." E7: Justice Joseph Story described, an impartial federal tribunal in matters where "a state tribunal might not stand indifferent in a controversy where the claims of its own sovereign were in conflict with those of another sovereign." (Town of Pawlet v. Clark). Related Cases: Cohens v. Virginia, (1821) Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, (1824) Mesa v. California, (1989) Geofroy v. Riggs, (1890) Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, (1816) Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, (1809) Smith v. Maryland, (1810) Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New Haven, (1823) United States v. Arredondo, (1832) Gill v. Oliver's Executors, (1850) New York Indians v. United States, (1898) Jones v. Meehan, (1899) Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, (1940) Clark v. Allen, (1947) Maximov v. United States, (1963) Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, (1982) Air France v. Saks, (1985) United States v. Stuart, (1989) Osborn v. Bank of the United States, (1824) United States v. Ortega, (1826) Ex parte Gruber, (1925) Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, (1930) Farnsworth v. Sanford, (5th Cir. 1940) Chisholm v. Georgia, (1793) Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, (1794) United States v. McGill, (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) De Lovio v. Boit, (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776) United States v. Wiltberger, (1820) Waring v. Clarke, (1847) New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston, (1848) Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,(1852) People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, (1858) The Moses Taylor, (1866) The Daniel Ball, (1870) The Lottawanna, (1874) Ex parte Easton, (1877) The Abbotsford, (1878) The Paquete Habana, (1900) Martin v. West, (1911) Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, (1917) North Pacific Steamship Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Railway & Shipbuilding Co., (1919) Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, (1920) Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, (1921) Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, (1922) Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, (1924) Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., (1924) Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., (1924) Langnes v. Green, (1931) Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, (1932) United States v. Flores, (1933) Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., (1941) Davis v. Department of Labor & Industries, (1942) C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, (1943) O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., (1943) Madruga v. Superior Court of California, (1954) Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., (1959) Kossick v. United Fruit Co., (1961) Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., (1962) Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., (1963) Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, (1969) Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, (1971) Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, (1972) Sun Ship v. Pennsylvania, (1980) Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, (1982) Sisson v. Ruby, (1990) Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, (1991) American Dredging Co. v. Miller, (1994) Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., (1995) United States v. Locke, (2000) Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., (2001) Calder v. Bull, (1798) Cohens v. Virginia, (1821) United States v. Sherwood, (1941) Dugan v. United States, (1818) United States v. Clarke, (1834) Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, (1940) Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, (1816) Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, (1838) State of New Jersey v. People of State of New York, (1931) New York v. United States, (1992) New Jersey v. New York, (1998) Nebraska v. Wyoming and Colorado, (2001) Chisholm v. Georgia, (1793) Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, (1996) Cohens v. Virginia, (1821) Hans v. State of Louisiana, (1890) Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, (1985) Alden v. Maine, (1999) Hepburn v. Ellzey, (1805) Strawbridge v. Curtiss, (1806) Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, (1809) Swift v. Tyson, (1842) Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., (1853) Dodge v. Woolsey, (1856) Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, (1938) Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Manufacturing Co., (1941) Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, (1945) Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, (1954) Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, (1964) Carden v. Arkoma Ass'n, (1990) New Jersey v. New York, (1998) Town of Pawlet v. Clark, (1815) United States v. Sayward, (1895) Stevenson v. Fain, (1904) Schroeder v. Freeland, (8th Cir. 1951) Port of Portland v. Tri-Club Islands, Inc., (D. Ore. 1970) *Note: A portion of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 was changed by the 11th Amendment.

Article III, Section 1, Clause 1

Judicial Vesting Clause (1), Supreme Court (2), Good Behavior Clause (3), and Judicial Compensation Clause (4). Text: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court [2], and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish [1]. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour [3], and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office [4]." Summary: The power of the judiciary in the United States is vested in one supreme court (2) and inferior courts that Congress establishes (1). The judges on these courts can hold their offices during good behavior (3), and at times states, receive compensation for their services which will not be diminished during their time in office (4). Analysis: 1 - Judicial Vesting Clause: Like the Legislative and Executive Vesting Clauses of Article I, Section 1, Clause 1, and Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, the Judicial Vesting Clause establishes the judicial branch with its subsequent powers of using the law to decide cases of controversy. It uses almost identical language used in the other two vesting clause, further creating the horizontal separation of branches of the federal government. While the judiciary in England was a part of the executive, the Framers wanted to ensure judicial independence from the other branches of government and the people so that justices could apply the law objectively, without concern for possible repercussions from Congress or the people. 2 - Supreme Court: There was much debate in the Convention halls as to whether or not a national judiciary was needed. Many members thought that state courts could adequately judge federal law. However, because of the weakness of the national government under the Articles of Confederation, James Madison foresaw the multitude of possible conflicting decisions my state courts and won the argument that an ultimate arbiter, the Supreme Court, was needed to give final say to how the laws should be expounded. 3 - Good Behavior Clause: Although not explicitly stated, there is overwhelming evidence that Good Behavior Clause implied life tenure to Supreme Court justices, as long as they display "good behavior." Thus, this clause firmly establishes the judiciary as independent from the other branches, and especially independent from the people. The only way to remove a Supreme Court justice is through impeachment, which has only happened to one Supreme Court Justice, Samuel Chase. Although he was not convicted, it is an important event because it set the precedent that Congress cannot impeach a justice just because they disagree with their decisions. 4 - Judicial Compensation Clause: Since the Good Behavior Clause implicitly granted justices life tenure, the delegates of the Convention wanted to ensure that the judicial independence they established with life tenure could not be marred by Congress controlling the judiciary through their salaries. Thus, the delegates decided to fix the salaries of the Justices, so that Congress could not get made at the justices and lower their salaries, thus possibly influencing some justices to accept the wants of Congress. Related Cases: Wayman v. Southard, (1825) United States v. Klein, (1871) Baker v. Carr, (1962) Powell v. McCormack, (1969) Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1857) Bush v. Gore, (2000) Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, (1992) Hayburn's Case, (1792) United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, (1812) Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, (1816) Cohens v. Virginia, (1821) Osborn v. Bank of the United States, (1824) Murdock v. City of Memphis, (1875) Lochner v. New York, (1905) West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, (1937) Coleman v. Miller, (1939) Brown v. Board of Education, (1954) United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, (1966) Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, (1967) United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, (1980) Marbury v. Madison, (1803) Hayburn's Case, (1792) United States v. Will, (1980) United States v. Hatter, (2001) Williams v. United States, (2002)

Article I, Section 4, Clause 2

Meetings of Congress Clause Text: "The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day." Summary: Congress will meet at least once a year, and the meeting will be on the first Monday in December,* unless Congress decided to meet a different day. Analysis: There were various arguments over the date when Congress should mandatorily meet. Some thought May would be better because it was after the European governments met, which would allow the Americans to act in response. It would have also been easier for people to get to the capital in May because of the weather. However, December was decided because it would be better for business because winter was slow and would not hamper agricultural productivity. Edmund Randolph brought up the point that a December date would also coincide better with state elections, thus December was the date. There was also much discussion on whether or not Congress should have to meet once a year at all. Many delegates at the convention thought that there would not be enough legislative needs to warrant annual meetings. However, the Founders saw how the British Parliament operated, where the monarch needed to call Parliament to meet for them to meet, which severely reduced their power. Therefore, the delegates decided to have one mandatory meeting, but allow Congress to decide if they want to meet more (See E2 & 3). The executive can also call Congress to special sessions under specific circumstances. (See E1.) Evidence: E1: Article II, Section 3 E2: Congress inability to meet on its own accord, and the fact that it could be dissolved, was a grievance listed in the Declaration of Independence where Jefferson wrote that, "He has called together legislative bodies at places, unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the repository of the public records; that he had dissolved representative bodies, for opposing his invasions of the rights of the people; and after such dissolutions, he had refused to reassemble them for a long period of time." E3: Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1790, that Conbgress had a "natural right to meet when and where it should think best." *Note: The date of the first Monday of December was changed to the 3rd day of January due to the ratification of the 20th Amendment.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 14

Military Regulations Text: "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" Summary: Congress has the power to make rules in terms of military law, regarding the regulation of land and naval forces. Analysis: This clause mainly relates to Congress power to establish military law, or laws regulating the actions of land and naval forces, although that has come to include air forces as well. This clause further establishes the separation of powers regarding the military. The Framers did not think the executive should have the power to make law, which was the job of the legislature, especially in regards to the military. Therefore, Congress, the body most representative of the people, was given the power. This power was seen as an incident of the preceding powers of Congress to declare war, fund the military, and regulate captures (See E1). Evidence: E1: See Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution section on this clause. Related Cases: Ex parte Quirin, (1942) Reid v. Covert, (1957) Dynes v. Hoover, (1857) Ex parte Vallandigham, (1864) Ex parte Milligan, (1866) Dow v. Johnson, (1880) Duncan v. Kahanamoku, (1946) In re Yamashita, (1946) United States v. Clay, (1951) Burns v. Wilson, (1953) Toth v. Quarles, (1955) Grisham v. Hagan, (1960) United States ex rel. Kinsella v. Singleton, (1960) United States ex rel. McElroy v. Guagliardo, (1960) United States v. Jacoby, (1960) United States v. Tempia, (1967) O'Callahan v. Parker, (1969) Parker v. Levy, (1974) Middendorf v. Henry, (1976) Rostker v. Goldberg, (1981) Solorio v. United States, (1987) Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, (2004) Rasul v. Bush, (2004) Rumsfeld v. Padilla, (2004)

Article I, Section 8, Clause 4

Naturalization Clause(1) & Bankruptcy Clause(2). Text: "To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization [1], and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States [2]" Summary: Congress has the power to make rules regarding Naturalization and the regulation thereof (1), as well as laws having to do with bankruptcies throughout the United States(2). Analysis: 1 - Naturalization Clause: Under the Articles of Confederation, each state had the power to determine its naturalization laws. This resulted in many problems pertaining to its practices, and the incohesive nature of different state laws (See E1/E2). Therefore, it was decided that that federal government would have jurisdiction over all laws relating to regulating naturalization, that being who is a citizen and the standards/requirements for citizenship. This is an area of policy where the Framers though the contradictory state policies could hamper the success of the union, thus giving Congress the expressed right to rule over the states on this matter. 2 - Bankruptcy Clause: Under the Articles of Confederation, state laws governed debtor-creditor regulations, which led to many contradictory policies. The Bankruptcy Clause was another area that the Framers thought Congress should be able to regulate to promote a uniform and cohesive national policy (See E3). Evidence: E1: James Madison's remarks in Federalist No. 42 E2: Alexander Hamilton writes about the necessity of the Federal government to determine rules regarding citizenship in Federalist No. 32. E3: Federalist No. 42 Related Law: Naturalization Act of 1790 Related Cases: Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac (1817) American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (1828) Boyd v. State of Nebraska (1892) MacKenzie v. Hare, (1915) Nishikawa v. Dulles, (1958) Perez v. Brownell, (1958) Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, (1963) Schneider v. Rusk, (1964) Afroyim v. Rusk, (1967) Rogers v. Bellei, (1971) Vance v. Terrazas, (1980) Sturges v. Crowninshield, (1819) Ogden v. Saunders, (1827) Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, (1902) Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, (1935) Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., (1982)

Article I, Section 8, Clause 18

Necessary and Proper Clause Text: "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof" Summary: Congress has the power to make any law which it deems necessary and proper for the execution of the previously listed powers, the powers in the Constitution, and any department or officer. Analysis: At the convention, this clause had two main functions. First, to create laws allowing the Constitution to be a functioning document, especially in regards to setting up the judiciary. Second, to allow Congress to make laws which were needed to execute the previous seventeen clauses in Section 8 (See E1). However, there were many critics of the clause, those being anti-federalists, which thought that it would give Congress carte blanche power to create any law they wanted, no matter how tyrannical (See E2). Evidence: E1: Federalist No. 33 E2: In Brutes' writing, he said that the Necessary and Proper Clause "leaves the national legislature at liberty, to do every thing, which in their judgment is best." Related Cases: City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1866) Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871) Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) Addyston Pipe & Steel v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) Southern Railway v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925) United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953) United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) New York v. United States, 488 U.S. 1041 (1989) Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)

Article I, Section 8, Clause 16

Organizing the Militia Text: "To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress" Summary: Congress has the power to provide funds for the organizing, arming, disciplining, and governing of the militia, as they are employed in the service of the United States. The States will have the power to appoint officers, and the power to train the militia according to how Congress prescribed they should be. Analysis: The war powers of Congress as a whole pitted federalists against anti-federalists. Under the Articles, the national government was seen as not having enough sovereign authority with war powers, which thus put the people of the colonies at risk. The main function of this clause was to further the power of Congress in regulating militias in the way they saw fit and most necessary to defend the nation. However, the States thought that, by simply not appropriating funds, Congress could allow the state militias to intentionally atrophy, destroying the ability for states having militias at all, further putting the liberty of the citizens at risk (See E1). Since the Federalists got their way with Congress retaining power over state militias, anti-federalists fought for individual citizens right to keep and bear arms, which was seen as a check on power that should have been through the states control over militias, but could also be done through the right of citizens to "keep and bear arms" as seen in the Second Amendment. Many states also instituted provisions in their own Constitution which gave citizens the individual right to keep arms (See E2). Evidence: E1: Patrick Henry, an anti-federalist and Virginia Senator, said during the Virginia ratifying convention that, "The militia is our ultimate safety... We can have no security without it. The great object is that every man be armed....Every one who is able may have a gun." E2: In the state Constitutions of Pensylvania and Vermont, it was asserted that, "the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state...." Related Cases: Houston v. Moore, (1820) Tarble's Case, (1872) Dunne v. People, (1879) Cox v. Wood, (1918) Perpich v. Department of Defense, (1990) Meade v. Deputy Marshal, (C.C.D. Va. 1815) The Selective Draft Law Cases, (1918)

Article III, Section 2, Clause 2

Original Jurisdiction Clause (1)& Appellate Jurisdiction Clause (2). Text: "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction [1]. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make [2]." Summary: 1 - Original Jurisdiction Clause: Cases affecting ambassadors or other public ministers or cases in which a state is a party, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction (1). In all other cases, the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, exceptions and with regulations which Congress makes. Analysis: 1 - Original Jurisdiction Clause: There are few and specific areas where the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, whereby, they are the first court that hears the case. The first area is cases affecting ambassadors, which goes to further the idea found in Article III, Section 1, Clause 1, that state governments nor courts should have an influence in foreign policy on behalf of the United States. Thus the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction on this matter. The second area of original jurisdiction the Supreme Court has is in disputes between two states. This was to prevent disharmony among the states and prevent state courts from acting biased on behalf of their home state (See E1). In the case of Marbury v. Madison, the court unequivocally held that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could not be expanded by Congress. 2 - Appellate Jurisdiction Clause: Although it may seem that this clause gives Congress unlimited authority to regulate appeals courts and jurisdiction, there are still the fundamental areas of jurisdiction federal courts have in the previous clause. Therefore, this power gives Congress the broad power to regulate the appeals process but not jurisdiction. Evidence: E1: In Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton writes on the jurisdiction of the federal courts that, "Whatever practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States are proper objects of federal superintendence and control." Related Cases: South Carolina v. Katzenbach, (1966) Cohens v. Virginia, (1821) New Jersey v. New York, (1998) Nebraska v. Wyoming and Colorado, (2001) Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, (1884) Kansas v. Colorado, (1902) Maryland v. Louisiana, (1981) United States v. Klein, (1871) Ex parte Yerger, (1869) Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., (1995) Ableman v. Booth, (1859) Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., (1856) Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, (1992) Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, (1816) United States v. More, (1805) Wiscart v. D'Auchy, (1796) DuRousseau v. United States, (1810) Ex parte McCardle, (1869) United States v. Padelford, (1870) The Francis Wright, (1881) United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, (1980)

Article I, Section 7, Clause 1

Origination Clause Text: "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." Summary: Establishes that all revenue bills need to originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate can propose any other type of bill and amendment any type of bill, including revenue bills. Analysis: The Framers wanted to ensure that the house most representative of the people would have the power of taxation. Before the 17th Amendment, Senators were chosen by the state legislatures of their respective states. The Senate also had equal representation, where each state got the same number regardless of population. These two factors made the Senate much less representative and responsible to the people than the House of Representatives. In England, money bills needed to be heard in Commons first because it was also most representative of the people. Weary of the idea of taxation without representation, the Framers wanted to ensure that the power to tax was linked with the house most responsible to the people (See E1). This allocation of the power to create revenue bills in the House of Representatives was a part of the great compromise. Since the larger states in the union had much more influence in the house, since its based on population, they would have much more control over revenue than the smaller states. In turn, the smaller states got the benefit of equal representation in the Senate. Evidence: E1: The Federalist No. 58: "The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support of the government....This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect, every just and salutary measure." Related Cases: Millard v. Roberts (1906) Rainey v. United States (1914) United States v. Munoz-Flores (1990)

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8

Patent and Copyright Clause Text:"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries" Summary: Congress has the power to enforce exclusive rights of an inventor to their work, for a limited amount of time. Analysis: This is another economic uniformity clause, which aims to ensure that protections for peoples' discoveries and creations. Enforcing these protections incentivised artists and scientists to work to discover, because they then had an enforceable right to their work. Related Cases: In re Trade-Mark Cases, (1879) Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, (1884) Graham v. John Deere Co., (1966) Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, (1985) Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., (1991) United States v. Moghadam, (11th Cir. 1999) Eldred v. Ashcroft, (2003)

Article I, Section 9, Clause 6

Port Preference Clause Text: "No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another." Summary: No law of Regulation of Commerce or Revenue shall prefer a port of one state over the port of another, nor shall any vessel going to or from a state be forced to enter, clear, or pay duties in another. Analysis: Like the Uniformity Clause and Export Taxation Clause, the Port Preference Clause was meant to limit the power of Congress to tax or show preference to one state over another financially. This would help reduce potential economic interests of Congress or a majority of decreasing the economic capabilities of their rivals or a minority. Related Cases: Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., (1856) South Carolina v. Georgia, (1876) Augusta Towing Co., Inc. v. United States, (1984) United States v. Lopez, (1995) *Note: See Uniformity Clause & Export Taxation Clause

Article I, Section 8, Clause 7

Post Office Text:"To establish Post Offices and post Roads" Summary: Congress has the power to establish post offices as well as post roads, or roads used for delivering postage. Analysis: Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had the power to establish post offices, and so that power was transferred without much debate. The power was also expanded to allow Congress to establish post roads, which would allow uniformity and remove the possibility of contradicting state laws. Related Cases: Searight v. Stokes, (1845) Ex parte Jackson, (1877) In re Rapier, (1892) Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, (2d Cir. 1917) Roth v. United States, (1957) United States v. Reidel, (1971) United States v. Handler, (D. Md. 1974) Brennan v. United States Postal Service, (1978) United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, (1981)

Article I, Section 7, Clause 2

Presentment Clause (1)& Pocket Veto (2). Text: "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law [1]. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law [2]." Summary: If a bill passes both the House and the Senate, it will go to the president to review. If he signs it, the bill will become law. If he does not sign it, he must state his objections to it and send it back to the house which the bill originated. The president's objections will be recorded in the house journal and if the house manages to get two-thirds of its members to agree to pass the bill, the bill will be sent to the other house. If that house also agrees to pass the bill by a two-thirds vote, it will become law. All votes after the bill is returned to the house of origin will be determined by yays or nays, and the names of the people voting for and against the bill will also be recorded in the journal.(1) If the president does not return the bill to Congress within ten days, excluding Sunday, the bill will become law. If Congress adjourns any time within the ten days after it sends a bill to the president for approval, it will not become law (2). Analysis: 1 - Presentment Clause: This is one of the most specific and lengthy clauses in the Constitution because here the Framers spell out the process for Congress to pass legislation. This clause is even reaffirmed by the clause succeding it, which reinforced the presidential veto power. The Framers thought that Congress could potentially interpret this clause broadly, or not adhere to it, therefore they wanted to explain the process in detail to avoid misunderstanding. To try to prevent the legislature from taking control of the executive, and prevent hastily or not well thought out laws, the Framers thought the power of the presidential veto to be important. 2 - Pocket Veto: In order to protect against nonaction by the executive from indefinitely holding legislation, it was ruled that if the president did not return a bill, signed or not, within ten days of receiving it, then it will become law. It also protects against Congress deciding to adjourn before the President can take actions by killing the bill of Congress does, forcing them to reintroduce the bill if they adjourn during the 10 days. Related Cases: Mistretta v. United States (1989) In re Debs (1895) Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) I.N.S. v. Chadha (1983) Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise (1991) Clinton v. City of New York (1998) The Pocket Veto Case (1929) Wright v. United States (1938) Kennedy v. Sampson (D.C. Cir. 1974) Kennedy v. Jones (D.D.C. 1976) Barnes v. Kline (D.C. Cir. 1985)

Article I, Section 3, Clause 5

President Pro Tempore Text: "The Senate shall chuse [sic] their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United States." Summary: This clause provides for a President pro tempore as well as other officers that the Senate deems necessary to establish. Analysis: Contrary to what the Constitution suggests, the President pro tempore is chosen even in the Vice-President's presence, and it is customary, although not constitutionally directed, that the President pro tempore be a member of the Senate.

Article II, Section 1, Clause 3

Presidental Electors Text: "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector." Summary: Each state legislature will appoint electors that are equal to the number of Senators and members of the House of Representatives their state has, but no elector can be a member of Congress or a federal official. Analysis: The delegates at the Convention struggled with many proposals as to how to elect the chief executive. They ranged from a direct popular vote to keeping the entire election process in the hands of Congress. The Framers decided on an electoral college system, which would allow states to appoint electors dependent on the number of Congressional representatives they had. This gave smaller states a little more say that larger states in choosing the president, yet not as much as they had in the Senate. This appeased the small states who worried that they would not have enough of a voice and was also acceptable for the larger states who did not want their input diminished to the point where they were equal with smaller states. States are also allowed to decide their way of choosing electors. Many states have a proportional representation system, and some have a proportional representation system. Maine and Nebraska stand out because they allow their congressional districts to split their electors, resulting in a more democratic process. Related Cases: McPherson v. Blacker, (1892) Ray v. Blair, (1952) Williams v. Rhodes, (1968) Anderson v. Celebrezze, (1983) Bush v. Gore, (2000) Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, (2000)

Article II, Section 1, Clause 7

Presidental Seccession Text: "In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected."* Summary: If the President is removed from office, or dies, or resigns, or is unable to carry out the necessary tasks the Presidency requires, those duties will fall on the Vice-President. Congress can decide the succession of officers if both the President and Vice-President face death, removal, resignation, or inability to perform duties of office, and that office will carry out the duties of the office until the disability is removed, or a President is elected. Analysis: This clause sets up the line of succession of the President, allowing Congress to legislate it past the Vice-President. In 1841, when William Henry Harrison died in office, John Tyler, his Vice-President, claimed he was not only a Vice-President acting like a President but a President. This drew criticisms from many and became orthodoxy. *Notes: The 25th amendment superseded this clause regarding presidential disability, vacancy of the office, and methods of succession

Article II, Section 1, Clause 6

Presidential Eligibility Text: "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States." Summary: To be able to become president of the United States, one must be a natural-born citizen, or a citizen at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, 35 years or older, and a resident of the US for 14 years or more. Analysis: The minimum age for one to become a member of the House was set at 25, for the Senate, it was set at 30, and for President, it is 35. This gradual increase in age eligibility echoed the Framers belief that as one got older and gained more experience, they should be able to hold a more diverse range of public offices, with more responsibilities in each. To contrast from the eligibility clauses for the House and Senate, for president, the term "resident" is used instead of "inhabitant" (See Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 & Article I, Section 3, Clause 3). While inhabitant meant that one had to have a legal residence in a place, the term resident would mean the person had a more permanent domicile in that area. Thus, the Framers wanted to ensure the President was a resident of the United States so that he had continuous experience living in it, and knew the controversies of the country. The natural born citizenship requirement was more stringent than that of seven years for the House, and nine years for the Senate, to ensure all candidates for President had undivided loyalty to the United Sates, and would not use the office to further foreign objectives, which could easily create conflicts of interest. Related Cases: United States v. Wong Kim Ark, (1898) United States ex rel. Guest v. Perkins, (D.D.C. 1936)

Article II, Section 1, Clause 2

Presidential Term & Vice-President Clause Text: "He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows" Summary: The President and Vice-President will hold a term of four years. Analysis: There were many arguments at the Convention at the length and term limit the president should have. It was concluded that four years would be an adequate length per term, although proposals ranged from three to twenty. The Framers thought that four years would give the executive enough time to implement good policies without becoming tyrannical (See E1). There was also a lot of debate about if the president should have a second term. The Framers did not decide to place a restriction on the term limit of the president and thought that if the president needed to seek reelection by the people, then he needed to act in the best interests of the populace. Although it was thought that the term limit would be two terms, and that was common practice among presidents, after Franklin Delano Roosevelt ran for an unprecedented four terms, the 22nd Amendment was passed which limited the number of terms a president could have to two. There were also many proposals to have the president reappointed by the legislature, instead of the people. After much deliberation, it was decided that the president should not be reappointed by the legislature because that would corrupt the separation of government, and the ability of the executive to be independent. Evidence: E1: Federalist No. 78

Article I, Section 7, Clause 3

Presidential Veto Text: "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill." Summary: Every order, resolution or vote which is agreed by the majority of the Senate and House, except for adjournment, will be presented to the President. The president will either approve, and the bill becomes law, disprove, and the bill will be resubmitted to Congress for a two-thirds vote in each house needed to pass the legislation. Analysis: The Framers wanted to ensure that Congress could not just rename a "bill" a "resolution" and thus avoid the presidential veto, thus they created this clause to further specify which bills or votes should go to the president and which should not (See E1). Today, it is considered that any bill which makes a law needs to be reviewed by the president, but other actions that require votes, that do not create law, do not need to be reviewed. Voting to adjourn, and voting for amendments are among these exemptions. Evidence: E1: Justice Joseph Story, writing in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States says, "[C]ongress, by adopting the form of an order or resolution, instead of a bill, might have effectually defeated the president's qualified negative in all the most important portions of legislation." Related Cases: I.N.S. v. Chadha (1983) Hollingsworth v. Virginia (1798)

Article II, Section 1, Clause 5

Presidential Vote Text: "The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States." Summary: Congress has the power to determine the time that states choose their electors and the day which they will vote. That day will be uniform throughout the states. Analysis: The first part of this clause gives a time range to the states for choosing electors, but the second two give specific days those tasks must be accomplished. This is because the Framers wanted to limit state statute confliction in the area of choosing electors and casting votes, in order to mitigate the possibilities of states not choosing electors, or collaborating on votes.

Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1

Privileges and Immunities Clause Text: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Summary: Citizens of each state are entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in other states. Analysis: There are many different interpretations of this clause, and there are vast disagreements among legal scholars. This clause's wording gave rise to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment, which was aimed to apply the Bill of Rights to the state governments. Therefore, one can deduce that this clause gave citizens of the states certain rights which were to be enjoyed in every state. Many scholars disagree on what these rights are, many think that they are those in Article I, Section 9, which grant citizens things like Hebaus Corpus, and the Supreme Court in the case of Corfield v. Coryell said those rights were, "protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life and liberty ... the right of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in any other State, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the State." Related Cases: Tyler Pipe Industries v. Department of Revenue, (1987) Costin v. Corp. of Washington, (C.C.D.C. 1821) Corfield v. Coryell, (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) Bank of Augusta v. Earle, (1839) Paul v. Virginia, (1869) Ward v. Maryland, (1870) Slaughter-House Cases, (1873) United States v. Harris, (1883) McKane v. Durston, (1894) Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, (1920) Toomer v. Witsell, (1948) Mullaney v. Anderson, (1952) Vlandis v. Kline, (1973) Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission, (1978) Hicklin v. Orbeck, (1978) United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden, (1984) Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, (1985) Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, (1988) Barnard v. Thorstenn, (1989) Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, (1998) Saenz v. Roe, (1999)

Article I, Section 3, Clause 7

Punishment for Impeachment Text: "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law." Summary: If an official is impeached, the only consequence that will come to them from that conviction will be their removal from office and inability to hold any other public office in the future. The person convicted does, however, remain liable to be tried in a court of law, and if convicted again, could face further punishments. Analysis: The Framers made sure to distinguish between the proper punishments for impeachment of public officials. In British Parliament, officials were often impeached and sentenced to death at the same time, which the Framers did not think was the function of the legislature. Thus, they allowed the Senate to impeach and remove from office, while the courts could decide further civil or criminal punishment, illustrating a clear example of the separation of powers or sharing of powers, between the legislative and judicial branches. Related Cases: United States v. Isaacs (1974) United States v. Nixon (1974) Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982) Clinton v. Jones (1997)

Article III, Section 3, Clause 2

Punishment of Treason Clause Text: "The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted." Summary: Congress has the power to declare the punishment of treason, but cannot harm innocent people related to the person by confiscating property or not allowing property to be inherited. Analysis: Under English law, when someone committed treason and was found guilty, they were dead in the eye of the law, even before they were sentenced to death. Therefore, the Crown would confiscate the property of the convicted person regardless of will and testament, inflicting punishment on family or friends of the person to prevent further acts of treason. The Framers thought that this was an overreach of the Crown and that people who were not guilty of a crime should not be punished. Becuase there was "corruption of blood," the family of the convicted were also punished in that they could not inherit the person's stuff. Thus, the Framers thought Congress should have the power to determine what treason was, so as not to have confusion among the states, it could not punish innocent people for the crime, excluding "corruption of blood or forfeiture."

Article I, Section 5, Clause 1

Qualifications and Quorums Text: "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide." Summary: Allows each House to judge the outcome of elections and the returns and qualifications of its members. It also states that a majority equals a quorum or the minimum amount of people needed for the House to go into session. If that number was not met, the House could either decide to adjourn or force absent members to participate in the proceedings. Analysis: Allowing each House to judge elections, returns, and qualifications were common practice of the day. Many state constitutions allowed it, and it was common practice in England. It was thought that if the House did not have this authority, it would not be able to be independent. There was some argument over what a quorum should be in the convention, but a simple majority was decided upon so as not to have a minority of members making legislation if the quorum was set lower. The delegates also saw how burdensome the need for a 2/3rds quorum was under the Articles of Confederation, thus they wanted to lower it. There was a lot of discussion over factions in relation to this clause, and the House did not want minority factions to be able to effectively veto legislation, thus it was decided that if not enough members for a simple majority were in attendance, then members could be "compelled" to attend. In practice, if not enough members of each House are in attendance, the sergeant of arms can go out and force unwilling members to be in attendance. Related Cases: Powell v. McCormack (1969) United States v. Ballin (1892) Reed v. County Commissioners (1928) Barry v. United States (1929) Roudebush v. Hartke (1972) Morgan v. United States (. 1986)

Article I, Section 2, Clause 2

Qualifications for Representatives Text: "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." Summary: This clause establishes three qualifications a person needs to meet to be a member of the House of Representatives. First, one must be at or above the age of 25. Second, one must be a citizen of the United States for seven years or more. Third, one must be an inhabitant of the state of which they were elected. Analysis: The idea behind the first qualification was that people elected to the House would have a sufficient amount of life experience to influence their decision making by 25. The idea behind the second qualification was to ensure that foreign people with alien allegiances would not occupy seats in the House. In the third qualification, the term "inhabitant" was used, rather than resident, so that potential representatives could have more flexibility. Resident requires more time being physically present in a state, while inhabitant allows the person to leave for extended periods of time. Questions over whether or not Congress could add qualifications was raised, but it was decided that Congress did not have the constitutional authority to add, subtract, or alter any of the qualifications. (See: E1&2) Evidence: E1: United States Term Limits v. Thorton E2: Powell v. McCormack Related Cases: Powell v. McCormack, (1969) United States Term Limits v. Thornton, (1995)

Article I, Section 3, Clause 3

Qualifications for Senators Text: "No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen." Summary: This clause sets requirements which need to be met to one to become a Senator of the Federal government. The requirements are as follows; the person needs to be 30 years or older, a citizen for nine years, and must be an inhabitant of the state they are elected to represent. Analysis: Inhabitant vs. Resident (See: Article 1, Section 2, Clause 2) In comparison to Article 1, Section 2, Clause 2, the qualifications for a Senator are more restrictive than those for the House. This is because the Senate is considered to be the more prestigious house, thus deserving more stringent requirements (See: E1). These more stringent requirements also serve to protect against Aristotle's pure democracy (See: Article 1, Section 3, Clause 3). Evidence: E1: In speaking on the qualifications of Senators, James Madison or Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist 62 that, "Senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires at the same time that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages." Related Cases: Powell v. McCormack (1969) United States Term Limits v. Thornton (1995) Davis v. Adams (1970)

U.S Constitution

Ratified on June 21, 1788, it was primarily authored by James Maddison on Virgina. It set the framework for the modern, post-Articles of Confederation, government based on a distinct federal government with a stronger central government than there was under the Articles of Confederation. It also set out the basic power and functions of government, restrictions on those power, and an amendment process.

Article II, Section 2, Clause 3

Recess Appointments Clause Text: "The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session." Summary: During recesses of the Senate, the President may appoint officers, but their commissions expire at the end of the Senate's next session. Analysis: This provision was easily passed at the Convention to prevent governmental paralysis, and the need for the Senate to be constantly in session. Times the Senate was not in session could last from six to twelve months, which would hinder the ability of the executive to do its duties if he needed to wait until the Senate met again for him to confirm some of the nominees. Therefore, the executive has the power to appoint a commission, but that commission expires if the Senate does not accept the commission within the time of their next session. Related Cases: United States v. Allocco, (2d Cir. 1962) Staebler v. Carter, (D.D.C. 1979) United States v. Woodley, (9th Cir. 1985) Mackie v. Clinton, (D.C. Cir. 1994) Swan v. Clinton, (D.C. Cir. 1996) Wilkinson v. Legal Services Corp., (D.C. Cir. 1996) Evans v. Stephens, (11th Cir. 2004)

Article I, Section 5, Clause 3

Record of Proceedings Text: "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the desire of one fifth of those present, be entered on the Journal." Summary: Each House of Congress must keep a journal of its proceedings, which it makes public by publishing. They can also decide which parts, if necessary, they do not want to publish, and to stay secret. If 1/5th of the member's votes for the votes of each member to be entered into the journal, they will. Analysis: The idea of the journal was to allow the public to be aware of House proceedings so that members of the House were more accountable to their constituencies (See E1.) The secrecy clause part to the clause became a major topic of contention in both the Philadelphia Convention and the individual state ratifying conventions. It was thought that the respective Houses would abuse this power, destroying the need for a journal in the first place (See E2). Evidence: E1: Justice Joseph Story commented in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, that "The object of the whole [Record of Proceedings] clause is to ensure publicity to the proceedings of the legislature, and a correspondent responsibility of the members to their respective constituents." E2: Patrick Henry said, in reference to the secrecy provision, during the Virginia state ratifying convention that, "The liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure, when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them." Related Cases: Field v. Clark (1892) Gregg v. Barrett (1985)

Article I, Section 5, Clause 2

Rules and Expulsion Clause Text: "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a member." Summary: Assuming there is a quorum, the House can determine its rules, and punish its members. By a 2/3rds vote of a House, a member of that House can be expelled. Since there is no language that tells how and when each House may change its rules, it largely up to the respective Houses to do so. Analysis: Allowing each House to determine its rules and punish their members strengthens the independence of the Legislative Branch and allows it to be more autonomous from the Judicial or Executive branches. The delegates at the convention decided a supermajority vote was needed to expel a member of a House as a safeguard against faction tyranny. Expelling a member is the only constitutional way a member of either House can be removed from office and is analogous to impeachment. By a majority, a House can vote to punish a member. Punishments include censorship, fine, removal as chair, removal from subcommittee, denouncement, and others. A modern day example of this provision being used was when the Republican-dominated House voted to punish Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachuttes, not allowing her to read a letter by Coretta Scott King during the hearing of Jeff Sessions for Attorney General. Related Cases: Powell v. McCormack (1969) United States v. Ballin (1892) In re Chapman (1897)

Article III, Section 2

Section 2 delineates federal judicial power and brings that power into execution by conferring original jurisdiction and also appellate jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. Additionally, this section requires trial by jury in all criminal cases, except impeachment cases.

Article I, Section 3, Clause 2

Senatorial Classes and Vacancies Clause Text: "Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies." Summary: Article 1, Section 3, Clause 2 establishes a three-tiered graded system of Senatorial elections, wherein, elections happen every 2 years, but only 1/3rd of the Senators will be up for reelection for that election, thus they can all serve their six-year term, but 1/3rd of the Senate is up to change every 2 years. If there were a premature vacancy, the state legislature would reelect a new senator, or if it was not in session, the Governor could appoint a new one until the legislature could reconvene.* Analysis: Establishing a tiered election system solved the problem that because a Senator's term length is so long, they could become out of sync with the people's wants/needs. Because 1/3rd of the Senate would be up for change every two years, the Senate would be able to adapt to the changing concerns of the state legislatures, and indirectly, the people*. However, Senator's term lengths were much longer so that they could counteract immediate and sudden passions(a faction) of the people by creating a stable base which was reelected every six years (See: E1). The length of Senatorial terms also combated potential factions which were thought to arise much more frequently in the House of Representatives. Evidence: E1: In Federalist 63, Alexander Hamilton or James Madison discusses the use of lengthy Senate terms when by saying, "Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a well-constructed Senate only as they relate to the representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by prejudice or corrupted by flattery as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn." *Note: The Seventeenth Amendment changed the Senate from being elected by the state legislatures to a direct popular vote. Because of this, if a vacancy is created, the Governor needs to call a special popular election, unless the state legislature allows the Governor to appoint a new Senator. If the state legislature gives the Governor this power, then he/she can appoint a new Senator. This ability of the Senate was implemented to allow some protections of a pure democracy, and allow the elites to keep the power of choosing a replacement in their own hands.

Article I, Section 7

Sets procedures and rules for Bills passed by Congress.

Article II

Sets up the structure, powers, and operational capabilities of the executive branch of government.

Article I, Section 6, Clause 2

Sinecure Clause (1)& Incompatibility Clause (2). Text: "No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time [1]; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office [2]." Summary: Establishes that Congressmen cannot leave Congress for a newly created position or a higher paying position (1), or hold their office as a representative and another civil office simultaneously (2). Analysis: 1 - Sinecure Clause: These two clauses work together to protect the legislature from executive overreach. At this time in England, it was common place for the monarch to "buy" members of parliament. He would do this by either creating a new office and appointing them to it, forcing the member to vote how the monarch wanted, or by raising the pay of a particular office when the king wanted to influence a member of parliament. Wanting to limit corruption and preserve the independence of Congress, the Framers decided not to allow members to be appointed to another office which had been newly created or granted a higher pay (See E1). There have been historicals examples of this clause coming into play; a famous one includes the appointment of Senator Hugo Black to the Supreme Court. 2 - Incompatibility Clause: This clause drew on similar provisions in state constitutions as well as the Articles of Confederation, which prevented a member of the legislature from holding two offices at once. This is intended to preserve the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government, as well as reduce corruption stemming from House members having a conflict of interest. This is a stark difference from the British Parliamentary system of government, where members of Parliament were the only people who could fill cabinet positions of the prime minister. Evidence: E1: James Madison said that "the unnecessary creation of offices, and increase of salaries, were the evils most experienced, & that if the door was shut agst. them, it might properly be left open for the appointt. of members to other offices as an encouragmt. to the Legislative service." Related Cases: Marbury v. Madison (1803) United States v. Hartwell (1868) McLean v. United States (1912) Ex parte Levitt (1937) McClure v. Carter (D.C. Idaho 1981) Mistretta v. United States (1989) Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War (1974)

Article I, Section 9, Clause 1

Slave Trade Clause Text: "The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person."* Summary: Congress cannot prohibit the importation of slaves until 1808, and it cannot tax each slave more than 10$. Analysis: This clause is important for many reasons, the first among them being that it was the first provision in the Constitution that restricted Congressional power prior to that of habeas corpus. Second, it marked the second major disagreement between northern and southern states over slavery. It was an important compromise between the north and the south, who feared Congress would try and use the Commerce Clause to restrict their primary source of wealth and economic drive, that being slavery, by outlawing or restricting it. Thus, the Convention decided on including the provision, without which, states such as Georgia and South Carolina would not have ratified the Constitution without. Related Cases: The Amistad, (1841) Prigg v. Pennsylvania, (1842) Jones v. Van Zandt, (1847) Moore v. Illinois, (1852) Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1857) Ableman v. Booth, (1859) Osborn v. Nicholson, (1871) *Note:* This clause was rendered null as of 1808.

Article I, Section 2, Clause 5

Speaker of the House; Impeachment Text: "The House of Representatives shall chuse [sic] their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment." Summary: Clause 5 of Section 2 of Article 1 allows the House to decide its speaker and officers internally. Also gives the House the "sole" power of impeachment, which includes the ability for the house to determine what an impeachable office is. Analysis: Alexander Hamilton saw the Houses ability of impeachment as a check on the power of the Presidency and Judiciary. (See: E1) Evidence: E1: Hamilton said that the people would find 'Republican" safety in the President "being at all times liable to impeachment." Related Cases: Nixon v. United States (1993)

Article II, Section 4, Clause 1

Standards for Impeachment Text: "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Summary: The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States will be removed from office on impeachment for the conviction of Treason, Bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Analysis: Impeachment is the constitutionally specified means for removing an official from office. This clause gives the grounds those officers may be impeached and convicted on. Because "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" was a term of art used in English impeachments, a plausible reading supported by many scholars is that the grounds for impeachment can be not only the defined crimes of treason and bribery but also other criminal or even noncriminal behavior amounting to a serious dereliction of duty. Related Cases: Nixon v. United States, (1993) United States v. Nixon, (1974) Clinton v. Jones, (1997) Note: For more information, See Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 & Article I, Section 3, Clause 6.

Article I, Section 10, Clause 1

State Treaties Clause (1), State Coinage Clause (2), State Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Law Clause (3), Obligation of Contract Clause (4), and State Title of Nobility Clause (5). Text: "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal [1]; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts [2]; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law [3], or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts [4], or grant any Title of Nobility [5]." Summary: No state can enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque and reprisal, coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver a form of payment of debt, pass any Bill of Attainder, Ex Post Facto Law, or a law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any titles of nobility. Analysis: 1 - State Treaties Clause: A departure from the ability of states to make treaties with foreign states with the consent of Congress (See E2), this restriction on the states furthers the principle that the federal government, as a representative of the states, should be the only level of government able to make foreign treaties. Therefore, this restriction on the states is merely pursuant to the many powers of Congress and the president to handle treaties with foreign states found in Section 8 and Article II, Section 2, respectively. 2 - State Coinage Clause: Like the State Treaties Clause, the State Coinage Clause was a restriction on the states to ensure there was no conflicting laws of states and of the federal government in the realm of economic regulation. Many of the enumerated powers of Congress found in Section 8 were aimed to create economic uniformity among the states, and therefore, this restriction of the states to coin their own money or emit bills of credit was a natural consequence of the enumerated powers of Congress. 3 - State Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Law Clause: See Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 (See E1). 4 - Obligation of Contract Clause: This provision was proposed by Rufus King who called for, "a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts." This idea of his relied heavily on a clause in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 (See E1). The purpose of the clause was to ensure that states would not retroactively infringe upon contracts that citizens had already made with other states. 5 - State Title of Nobility Clause: See Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 Evidence: E1: Justice Samuel Chase noted in Calder v. Bull (1798), the Framers applied the prohibition to the states "[t]o prevent such and similar acts of violence and injustice." E2: See Article IV of the Article of Confederation E3: The Clause King refers to in the Northwest Ordinance reads, "[I]n the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud, previously formed." Related Cases: Holmes v. Jennison, (1840) Craig v. Missouri, (1830) Veazie Bank v. Fenno, (1869) Deering v. Parker, (P.C. 1760) Byrne v. Missouri, (1834) Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, (1837) Griffin v. Thompson, (1844) Gwin v. Breedlove, (1844) Darrington v. Bank of Alabama, (1851) The Legal-Tender Cases, (1884) Poindexter v. Greenhow, (1885) Chaffin v. Taylor, (1886) Houston & Texas Central Railroad v. Texas, (1900) Calder v. Bull, (1798) Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, (1998) Sturges v. Crowninshield, (1819) Ogden v. Saunders, (1827) Fletcher v. Peck, (1810) Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, (1819) Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, (1837) West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, (1848) Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, (1934) United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, (1977) Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, (1978) Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., (1983) Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, (1983)

Article II, Section 3, Clause 1

State of the Union (1), Recommendations Clause (2), Convening of Congress (3), Ambassadors (4), Faithful Execution Clause (5), and Commissions Clause (6). Text: "He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union [1], and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient [2]; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper [3]; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers [4]; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed [5], and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States [6]." Summary: The President will from time to time give Congress information on the state of the Union (1), and recommend measures that he judges necessary (2). In extraordinary circumstances, he can convene Congress, or either House specifically, and decide the time of adjournment if Congress cannot agree on one (3). He will also receive ambassadors and other public ministers (4), ensure the laws are faithfully executed (5), and commission all officers of the United States (6). Analysis: 1 - State of the Union: James Madison promoted "partial agency" between branches of government, so as to work together for the common good of the Union (See E1). Therefore, since the President knew more detailed information on how laws were working, since the executive enforced them, and foreign affairs, military, and other matters, it was decided that the executive should give a report to Congress "from time to time" in order to fill them in on the "state of the Union," being the only elected representative of the United States that was representative of the nation as a whole (See E2 & 3). 2 - Recommendations Clause: The recommendations clause also gives weight to Madison's idea of "partial agency" wherein, the President can propose "recommendations" to Congress by legislation, which Congress can either pass or reject (See E4 & 5). This gives the executive an important role in the workings of the legislature, whereby he can propose legislation himself, although not being a member of the legislative branch. Congress, on the other hand, does not need to give a presidential proposal any increased weight, and may simply reject it with a majority vote. 3 - Convening of Congress: Although there was much concern with the executive being able to convene Congress, (See Article I, Section 4, Clause 2) there were some circumstances when the Framers admitted that it would be necessary for the functioning of the nation. Since Congress had long sessions in recess, if there was a national emergency when Congress was not in session, the President has the power to call them into session in order to solve the problem at hand, Since 1948 when Harry S. Truman called a special session, around the time or air travel, and Congress began meeting yearly because of ease of access to the capital, the President has never convened a special session of Congress. 4 - Ambassadors: In Article IX of the Articles of Confederation, Congress has the sole power "of sending and receiving ambassadors." While the federal government still retained control over foreign relations under the new Consitution, it was decided that the President instead be the person to meet with foreign ambassadors and diplomats, securing his position as head of state, or foreign affairs for the government (See E6). 5 - Faithful Execution Clause: By virtue of an executive, the President is supposed to execute the law, and this clause qualifies that power by ensuring that the execution is "faithful" to the laws Congress makes. The idea here is that the Congress does not make a law and the President just ignore the law and not enforce it, or enforce it in a way that is unfaithful to the text or idea of the law. 6 - Commissions Clause: The granting of a commission solidifies a successful appointment, but as seen in Marbury v. Madison, a commission is not necessary to effectuate an appointment. In this way, the Framers set up the appointment system to be a shared power between the legislative and executive branches, Congress making the positions the executive fills, that aren't directly under the executive, and the executive being able to nominate higher officers with the approval of the Senate and appoint inferior officers. Evidence: E1: Federalist No. 46 E2: Alexander Hamilton said in Federalist No. 70 that, "The President at the beginning of every meeting of the Legislature as soon as they shall be ready to proceed to business, shall convene them together at the place where the Senate shall sit, and shall communicate to them all such matters as may be necessary for their information, or as may require their consideration." E3: Justice Joseph Story wrote in his Commentaries on the Constitution that the President needed to give information on the state of the Union because. "[t]here is great wisdom, therefore, in not merely allowing, but in requiring, the president to lay before congress all facts and information, which may assist their deliberations; and in enabling him at once to point out the evil, and to suggest the remedy." E4: See Federalist No. 47 E5: See Federalist No. 77 E6: See Federalist No. 69 Related Cases: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, (1952) Clinton v. City of New York, (1998) Ass'n of American Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, (D.C. Cir. 1993) United States v. Belmont, (1937) United States v. Pink, (1942) Goldwater v. Carter, (1979) United States v. Ortega, (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) In re Baiz, (1890) Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, (1938) Marbury v. Madison, (1803) Myers v. United States, (1926) United States v. Tingey, (1831) Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, (1838) United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, (1854) Mississippi v. Johnson, (1866) Cunningham v. Neagle, (1890) Train v. City of New York, (1975) Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, (1992)

Article I, Section 8, Clause 1

Taxation Clause(1), Spending Clause (2). and Uniformity Clause(3) Text: "To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises [1], to pay the Debts and provide for the common defence[note 1] and general Welfare of the United States [2]; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States [3]." Summary: Congress has the power to tax the people through taxes, duties, imposts, and excises(1) for the purpose of raising money for defense, to pay debts, and for the "general welfare" of the United States (2). However, all taxes must be uniform and not affect one State or group of people over another (3). Analysis: 1 - Taxation Clause: There was much debate within the ratifying convention about the scope of Congress' power to tax and the restrictions that would be in place on it. Today, the clause has been interpreted to be almost limitless but back in 1787 many of the Framers thought there should be restrictions. Since the Articles of Confederation only allowed the government to seek "requisitions" from the states, most of the delegates at the convention thought Congress needed to separate power to tax (See E1). Many delegates also though the power of Congress to levy direct taxes would eventually lead to "universal and unbound power" (See E2). At the time the Federalists claimed that Congress would not need to levy direct taxes, mainly imposing duties and tariffs to pay for the upkeep on the union, and only implementing direct taxes in times of national emergency. The New Jersey plan was more liberal with taxing power than the Virginia plan, which is interesting because the Virginia plan was more in line with federalist values. Direct taxes are distinct from indirect taxes, indirect taxes being the primary intended mode of taxation of the federal government. 2 - Spending Clause: The Spending Clause acts as a restriction on the power to tax, by allowing Congress to tax for two purposes only. First being to pay off debts of the United States. This power was important given the large debt the US was in after the revolutionary war. Second, Congress could levy taxes for the "common defense and general welfare." Spending powers can also be found in the "Necessary & Propper Clause" (Article 1, Section 8) and the Territories and Properties Clauses (Article IV). In the modern day, Congress has nearly unlimited power to tax for whatever purposes they want, many pointing to the words "general welfare" to allow Congress to spend for nearly anything. However, there were many proposals for different powers of Congress to spend in the convention, and ones such as the power to tax for internal improvements was rejected by the convention. To Hamilton's dislike, James Madison thought that Congress did not have unlimited spending power, but just the power to spend to further the ends specifically enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution. 3 - Uniformity Clause: The power of taxation would significantly increase the power of the federal government in relation to the powers it had under the Articles, the newly strengthened national government might abuse its powers by oppressing politically weaker groups, strangling the economic activity the Framers hoped to promote. It originally came after the Post Preference Clause (Article I, Section 9, Clause 6), which was another clause which helped restrict Congressional power to tax. Because of the increased power of Congress, the Uniformity Clause & Post Preference Clause aimed to limit economic discrimination. The initial rule that the court has employed is that a uniform tax must "operate with the same force and effect in every place where the subject is found" (See Edye v. Robinson). This reading correctly interpreted the purpose, which was mainly to curb geographic discrimination, by giving one state a competitive advantage over another intentionally. Since all direct taxes inevitably effect one state more than others, the tax needs to be overtly discriminatory in its language for it to not be uniform. Later, in order to clarify the uniformity of the "subject" which was previously vague because Congress could then, under the previous rule, pass a tax that was uniform in a single tax, like a tax on wheat in Arkansas, the court decided a uniform tax needs to define the subject in nongeographic terms, and if the subject does include geographic terms, it must be scrutinized for "actual geographic discrimination" (See United States v. Ptasynski). Due to the unrestrictive nature of these clauses, with no clearly defined limits, presently there are very few restrictions on Congress power to tax. Evidence: E1: Alexander Hamilton called the power to only ask for "requisitions" from states "ignis fattus in finance" in Federalist No. 30. E2: Read "The Dissent of the Minority" in the "Pennsylvania Packet" Related Cases: United States v. Butler, (1936) South Dakota v. Dole, (1987) Edye v. Robertson, (1884) Knowlton v. Moore, (1900) United States v. Ptasynski, (1983)

Article I, Section 3

The sections of Article I which explains the powers and procedures of the Senate.

Article III, Section 3

This section defines treason and its punishment.

Article I, Section 2, Clause 3

Three-Fifths Clause, Enumeration Clause, & Allocation of Representatives Text: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons (Three-fifths Clause). The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct (Enumeration Clause). The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse [sic] three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three (Allocation of Representatives)." Summary: The first section of the third clause, the Three-fifths Clause, establishes that in order to determine the degree of representation and direct taxation by population by state, each person would count as one, however, slaves would count for 3/5ths a person*, excluding non-taxed native Americans. Next, the Enumeration Clause, tasks Congress with taking a census of all eligible people to count towards the aggregate representation in Congress, three years after the first Congress. After that initial census, every ten years another must be conducted in order to determine the number of representatives each state gets depending on population. Finally, the last part focuses on the allocation of representatives to the respective states, wherein, there cannot be more than 1 representative for every 30,000 people per state or nationally. Analysis: In regards to the Three-fifth's Compromise, there was serious debate within the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention as to whether or not slaves should be counted toward the number of representatives each state can send to the House of Representatives. The northern state, who had less slaves, did not want slaves to count as people so they could have more representation (See: E3). On the other hand, the southern states wanted their slaves to count as people so they could have more representation. Also known as the Great Compromise, it was decided that slaves would count as 3/5th of a person for the purposes of determining representation. It was also decided that Congressional popular representation would be determined this way, but also the tax liability of the different states. This way of appropriating taxes adds a negative effect for blacks being counted as a full person, thereby eliminating the potential gain by the southern states if blacks were counted as people, and giving the North the benefit of reduced taxes, and the South the benefit of increased representation. (See: E1&6) During the ratification of the Constitution, debate ensued about whether or not the census could be done off of state estimates(Virtual Enumeration) or by counting individual people(Actual Enumeration) (See: R4) As the population grew, there was an increasing need for more and more members of the House of Representatives so that there could be one for every 30,000. Eventually, in 1913, the House was 435 members large. In 1929, Congress enacted the Reappointment Act of 1929, which set the maximum number of House representatives at 435, which is the size it is today (See: E4). At the convention, there was much debate over the amount of constituents a delegate should represent. Federalists thought that a House representative could represent more people and Anti-Federalists wanted each representative to represent fewer people, making the House larger, and theoretically making each representative more in touch with his constituency (See: E5). Evidence: E1: James Madison, primary author of the Constitution, wrote in regards to the decision to add taxation to the Three-fifths Compromise that it would, "lessen the eagerness on one side, & the opposition on the other, to the share of Representation claimed by the [Southern] States on account of the Negroes." E2: Dred Scott v. Sandford E3: Representative Elbridge Gerry from Massaccuttes said in an argument against counting blacks as full persons, "shd. the blacks, who were property in the South, be in the rule of representation more than the cattle & horses of the North?" E4: Reappointment Act of 1929 E5: James Madison recounts the arguments made my the Anti-Federalists in Federalist No. 55 that, "[F]irst, that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents; thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citizens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few on the depression of the many; fourthly, that defective as the number will be in the first instance, it will be more disproportionate, by the increase of the people, and the obstacles which will prevent a correspondent increase of the representatives." E6: In reference to the addition of the Three-fifths Clause, James Madison wrote in Federalist 54 that, "The States should feel as little bias as possible to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers....By extending the rule to both [taxation and representation], the States will have opposite interests which will control and balance each other and produce the requisite impartiality." Additional References: R1: Department of Commerce v. Montana(1970) R2: The "Huntington-Hill" Method for representation R3: Franklin v. Massachusetts(1992) R4: Utah v. Evans(2002) R5: Dred Scott v. Sandford(1858) R6: Missouri Compromise(1820) Additional Cases: Franklin v. Massachusetts (1992) United States Department of Commerce v. Montana (1992) Wisconsin v. City of New York (1996) Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives (1999) Utah v. Evans (2002) *Note: Three-fifths Clause was cited in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, however, it was nullified by Section 2 of the 14th Amendment.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 11

To Declare War, Marque and Reprisal Clause, and Capture Clause. Text: "To declare War[1], grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal[2], and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water[3]" Summary: Congress has the power to declare war (1), grant permission to persons or groups to seize the property of foreign nations to redress a previous injury (2), and makes rules for the distribution, disposition, and confiscation of captured property (3). Analysis: 1 - To Declare War: While the executive has the power to conduct war under Article II, Congress has the power to declare it, adding an important restriction on the power of the executive. At the Convention, it was widely debated as to where war power should be allocated. It was decided that the executive should not be able to initiate war, but once a war is initiated by Congress, the executive, being the commander in chief, can conduct it (See Prize Cases). However, when the United States is invaded, the president does not need to wait for a Congressional declaration but can act on its own to repel the invasion (See E1, 2 & 3). 2 - Marquis and Reprisal Clause: The term "Marquis" is a French term which means the same thing as the English term of "Reprisal," thus the phrase "Marquis and Reprisal" is understood as a single phrase and not two distinct and separate powers. The only controversy the clause creates is if Congress can only grant letters to private enterprises or the U.S military as well. 3 - Capture Clause: This clause comes from Article IX of the Articles of Confederation which gives Congress the power "of establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes were taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated." This it can be construed that Congress has the sole authority to make rules governing the circumstances where wartime "captures" will be considered lawful "prizes." Evidence: E1: In The Law of War and Peace (1646), Hugo Grotius write that, "By the law of nature, no declaration is required when one is repelling an invasion." E2: James Madison said, "leav[e] to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." E3: The majority opinion in the Prize Cases said that, "the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force...without waiting for any special legislative authority." Related Cases: Prize Cases, (1863) Orlando v. Laird, (2d Cir. 1971) Mitchell v. Laird, (D.C. Cir. 1973) Brown v. United States, (1814)

Article III, Section 3, Clause 1

Treason Text: "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court." Summary: Treason against the United States consists of levying war against the US, or helping enemies of it. No person will be convicted of treason unless two witnesses testify the person committed the act or the confession of treason in open court. Analysis: To protect from government abuse, which had been witnessed in English courts, the Framers wanted to ensure there was a clear and concise definition of treason, which was not to broad that government could charge anyone for it. Therefore they created this clause, which gives definition to the crime. Related Cases: Ex parte Bollman, (1807) United States v. Burr, (No. 14,693) Cramer v. United States, (1945) Haupt v. United States, (1947) Kawakita v. United States, (1952)

Article II, Section 2, Clause 2

Treaties Clause (1), Appointments Clause (2), and Inferior Officers Clause (3). Text: "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur [1]; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law [2]: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments [3]." Summary: The President has the power to make treaties with 2/3rds consent and advice of the Senate (1). He also has the power to nominate ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not already provided for and will be established by law (2). For all other inferior officer appointments, Congress can vest, by law, the power in the President, the Courts, or Heads of Departments (3). Analysis: 1 - Treaties Clause: While the federal government is explicitly given all foreign relations powers, the President, as the head of state, is given the power to make and enforce treaties. The Senate was also tied into the treaty process in that they need to pass by a 2/3rds vote any treaty the President proposes to them. The Framers thought this protected from a treaty being adopted, given that it was considered supreme law of the land and binding, without forethought (See E1). Therefore, the Framers made it so that the Senate, the body least responsible to the people, were needed when accepting treaties, because they were the more prestigious house, and thus more apt to make a decision without haste and the worry of popular opinion. 2 - Appointments Clause: Today, the appointments clause translates into the Senate's ability to accept or reject nominees the President presents to them for his cabinet, ambassadors, or judges. This is an example of the sharing of powers, where the Senate confirms each nomination with a simple majority vote, which prohibits the executive from filling all government offices, especially in the judiciary, with people loyal to him, so as to maintain a check on the power of the executive. 3 - Inferior Officers Clause: While the Framers thought that Senate confirmation for high-level officers was an important check on executive power, forcing the Senate to confirm all necessary appointments of the President would put an excessive workload on both the President and the Senate, and would greatly slow the functions of government with nominee hearings. Therefore, it was decided that the President would have sole authority for appointing people to inferior offices, without the need for Senate confirmation. Evidence: E1: Federalist No. 75 Related Cases: Marbury v. Madison, (1803) Reid v. Covert, (1957) Printz v. United States, (1997) Geofroy v. Riggs, (1890) State of Missouri v. Holland, (1920) United States v. Belmont, (1937) United States v. Pink, (1942) Goldwater v. Carter, (1979) Dames & Moore v. Regan, (1981) Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, (1996) Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, (11th Cir. 2001) American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi, (2003) Myers v. United States, (1926) Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, (1989) Weiss v. United States, (1994) Buckley v. Valeo, (1976) Printz v. United States, (1997) Morrison v. Olson, (1988) United States v. Germaine, (1879) Edmond v. United States, (1997) United States v. Maurice, (C.C.D. Va. 1823) Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (1991)

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6

Trial of Impeachment Text: "The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present." Summary: The Senate has the "sole" power in trying impeachments, which determines if the person being tried is convicted or acquitted. It also forces the Senators to take an oath or affirmation before the trial. During the trial, the chief justice of the Supreme Court will preside over the Senate, wherein, two-thirds of the Senators need to vote to convict for one to be convicted. Analysis: The difference between House and Senate impeachment is that the House needs to initiate the impeachment proceedings, and if my a simple majority they initiate the proceedings, the Senate makes the ultimate decision by a two-thirds vote of conviction or acquittal. The intention behind this system is that the House was thought to be composed of more members with less experience, therefore they could start the proceedings. However, because of the more stringent qualifications for senators, (See: Article 1, Section 2, Clause 2) they were though to have more wisdom and experience than House members, so they should be the ones making the final decision. If the Senate decides to impeach by 2/3rd vote, the official under consideration will be immediately removed from office. The Senate, instead of the judiciary, was the body which was designed to hold impeachment trials because the process would be less complex and less intertwined in the executive branch of government, removing potential conflicts of interest, and further separating the powers of the three branches of government. The chief justice of the Supreme Court was also decided to preside over the impeachment trials to further remove conflicts of interests that could stem from the Vice-President presiding over the trial. Related Cases: Powell v. McCormack (1969) Nixon v. United States (1993) Hastings v. United States (D.D.C. 1992), revised and remanded Order No. 92-5327 (D.C. Cir. March 2, 1993); 837 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1993)

Article I, Section 1

Vesting Clause Text: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." Summary: Congress will be composed of a House of Representatives and a Senate, and will have all legislative powers. Analysis: Section 1 grants the legislative power of the Federal government exclusively to Congress. This section, with section 1 of Article 2 & 3, together create the distinct separation of powers between the three branches of the Federal government. Because of the separation of powers and looking at the text of the Constitution, Congress cannot delegate their powers to any other branch of government. This is known as the Delegation Doctrine. Related Cases: Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States (1813) Wayman v. Southard (1825) United States v. Klein (1871) J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States (1928) A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935) United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936) Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (1980) Mistretta v. United States (1989) Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. (2001)

Article III, Section 1

Vests the judicial power of the United States in federal courts, requires a supreme court, allows inferior courts, requires good behavior tenure for judges, and prohibits decreasing the salaries of judges.

Article I, Section 3, Clause 4

Vice President as Presiding Officer Text: "The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided." Summary: Clause 4 provides that the Vice-President is also the President of the Senate, and if there is a tied vote, they get the deciding vote. Analysis: Other than tallying the President's electoral votes, this is the only regular duty of the Vice President enumerated within the Constitution. Nowadays, the Vice-President rarely presides over the Senate except in ceremonial matters and usually delegates those responsibilities off to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.