International Relations Final

Internationalization and Oil Lecture

- Colgan reads differently - causal mechanism = causal factor? - Klein - intersectionality crises are related in a way - old cartels in oil industry - vitally important center of international economy and site of unending politics - standard oil broken up in 1911 - 1998 Exxon mobile merger $80 billion recreates part of standard oil - oil industry is vertically integrated, high barriers to entry, take profits upstream and downstream - traditional actors not equal to sisters of oil - Exxon, BP mobile - oligopoly facing ruinous competition with each other, created cartel arrangements - other firms - US independent producers, European state-owned firms, state-owned firms of OPEC member states old cartels - before WWII industry shaped by cooperation between west governments and large firms - prime minister Mossadeq of Iran overthrown 1953 with help of CIA - 1950s oil prices fall (substitution led to excess) - 1958 US adopts import quota - 1959 seven sister impose price cuts on oil exporting countries - counter cartel- OPEC - states - Gaddafi defeated seven sisters and rise of OPEC - 1960s market conditions continue to favor producing firms and not producing countries - early 1970s enter Libya's Gadaffi who sees new political possibilities in market shift - with risk of Libyan-occidental deal spreading, majors agree to multilateral negotiations - October 73 oil shock and war (Egypt-Israel) price increases - plays major producers off each other - wants more money than gulf states - 1979 Iranian rev. and another price spike - OPEC had close to monopoly control brought about by Gaddafi - 1970s rev and shifting of powers - corp make much more selling oil at high prices Consequences - Japan and Europe more def. on mideast oil than US, Dif diplomacy - encourages mercantilist tendencies - forces global structural Econ readjustments (Japan and Germany, US inflation and Reagan rev, Latin Am debt crisis, collapse communism in E. Europe and end of SU) - Latin Am debt crisis - oil at preferential prices from SU - socialism doesn't provide for end market econ Consequences of oil price increases - alt sources, natural gas rev, conserv. - new producers - effects of 1970s price increases in substantial - net transfer wealth from rich to poor - enter new dangerous engagements net effect is Middle fast very wealthy, poor people have to make due - OPEC begins to loose power US policy: - failure prices shaped by demand and supply conditions in markets - drop in exploration, know reserves, future pressures on supply v. sense of security - political instability of ME and global efforts of natural gas rev - Russia and pipeline politics to Europe and Russia's pilot to China - high growth Econ affects supply - future Middle East politically unstable, thousands of people affected - Russia is large producer, controls pipeline, Russia now selling oil to China National security - Gulf war I and II and Saudi Arabia - oil is crucial - alliances between House of Saudi and US but not much domestic legitimacy for arrangement - US gives protection and expects responsible OPEC price leadership and continue denomination of oil price and dollars - Iraq war and war on terrorism - oil as byproduct and/or price objective - US plays was to privatize Iraqi oil industry after the war - we protect you if you're responsible protector of oil - keep prices of oil denominated in dollars - Iraq/Iran war 8 years with causalities fought for strategic supremacy - war on terrorism deeply implicated with oil, ISIS relies on oil National Security politics in markets - Caspian Sea and Central Asia as ew center of geopolitical conflict - oil companies are determining which pipelines are being built in period of weak demand - rise of Russia as leading exporter of oil Natural gas rev/hydraulic fracking - fracking natural gas in US as new source of energy - small Houston based oil firm invests for 25 years in develop new tech, decades without results but break through in last decade - generate resources in parts of country - explosion domestic production starting in 07 - huge estimated reserves (100+ years at current consumption). Effect on global politics - policy controversies about environmental impact, distribution, etc. Liberalism, plus realism, plus Marxism - oligopolistic markets of US and UK MNCs get replaced by cartels of state-owned corps - MNCs end up as tax collectors of states - states fight - inside producer culture - Saudi export of terrorism financed by oil to support dom regime, new ruler (crown prince) will jihadism - terrorism, Am national security, energy policy

Globalization and Finance Lecture

- gold standard and 1930s - from fixed exchange rates to flexible exchange rates since 1971-73 - old Bretton woods system, - several devaluations and revaluations by early 1960s - institutions created for crisis management against underlying instabilities of financial system, - export inflation and import capital, US creates unfettered transatlantic market for dollars - we exported a lot of dollars in 1960s, created beginnings of international capital market, huge market but instrument of govt small - debt crisis neither abnormal nor unforeseen - cheap credit, irresponsible lending, govt and individuals consuming not investing, high growth, consumption, prosperity in short term followed by excess trade and current account deficits - creditors get nervous and pull liquid funds out of stock, bond and money market - debt crisis - deregulation of markets is powerful facilitator of global connections - markets aren't natural, re-regulation possible in response to big financial crisis. US and UK opposed, over countries more favorable, they are a creation Crisis : OPEC Recycling and Latin Am Debt Crisis - OPEc and petrodollar recycling - poor countries need to borrow after 1973 to pay for more expensive oil - 1982 crisis starts in Mexico then moves through Latin America - early 1990s growth resumes stimulated by an influx of capital from global markets attracted by trade liberalization and NAFTA Crisis 2: 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and its Fallouts - collapse Japanese real estate bubble in 1990 as primary cause of crisis - central bank lowers interest rate to zero - domestic banks export capital to SE Asia - govt and private corps create bubble, leads to a crisis - IMF meeting in May 1997, Thailand, Indonesia, S Korea, role of politics, regimes fall, IMF spends $150 billion - IMF tries unsuccessfully to dismantle one of most successful types of capitalism - crisis continues and envelopes Russia and Argentina (98-01) wipes out most of Econ gains 1990s Crisis 3: high tech bubble (00) and subprime mortgage crisis (08) - environment and dot.com crisis, market speculation, Fraud, loss of oversight, crash of 00, high tech stock speculation separated from real Econ. Does not stop deregulation movement in Congress. - subprime crisis leads to bank collapse in September 2008 had been building for 5-7 years Crisis 4: sovereign debt crisis in Europe: Iceland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, France - perceived inability of country to pay debt leads to restricted access to international capital markets - bankers tell gov it has to cut spending: dom resistance or rebellion - European banks owned bad Greek bonds in 2010-2012 they had to resider loss on balance sheet for these bonds - connection to US banks is opaque. AM bank exposure much lower than EU exposure. - by 2015 virtually all Greek debt held by states. Germany taxpayers own about $100 billion to every recoup. Very tough political bargaining and deep resistance to further bailouts. Crisis 5: Is the US next? - US banks closely tied to global instabilities. US now potentially source of risk itself. - are budget and trade deficits sustainable - funded by foreign central banks, now holding $3 trillion t-bills and assets - excess savings in world markets, US is good invest in terms of security and risk. Trust is weakening - US politics and crisis management are poisonous and that will affect dynamics of any future crisis - for starts US is going to add 1.5 trillion Who increased debt? - Reagan, compound interest, war, Bush II, economic downturn, Econ recovery measures (no longer), growth has changed in its nature, 1980s Reagan revolution, top 1% doing great, middle not so much - populist resentment and politics of greed. Institutional hollowing out of America - tea party politics and Occupy Wall Street - Trumpism and feel the burn - public v. private sector jobs - private debt = $36 trillion or 260% of GDP (highest except for Ireland in the OECD) public sector debt $16 trillion or 90% GDP - credit card Econ and bipartisan support - monetize the debt-role of Federal Reserve Realism: - US hegemony = print money and thus reduce wealth of creditors for last 50 years - when US power declines its influence in IMF and WB wanes - US decline creates permissive international context that can lead to far-ranging financial instabilities and crises Marxism: - macroeconomic policies in NAM drive system, (80s), and change sin financial capitalism (early 90s) Liberalism: - policies of selective disengagement - deviating from most efficient path unregistered markets, difficult since no clear alternatives - Europe and Asia prudent mixtures of liberal and statist Dom pol: - cause crisis similar, consequence differ because dom pol - different ways of dealing with 1980s and 97-08 crisis - dom politics makes sense how crisis occurs and how to deal with it Construct: - efficiency not only objective but intersubjective, laws Econ partly ideology - risk analysis denies common sense and uncertainty, Econ is denying obvious to build elegant models and make money - Econ is ideology

Global and International Regions Lecture

- more cross-border exchanges (quantity) - close to or above relative levels of exchange for UK foreign investments, oil MNCs were bigger than today -globalization - qualitatively new-space/time have shrunk in previously unimaginable ways - affects more than economic/social exchanges between national economies and corp - re-stratification according to technical knowledge - backlash locals - transform identity of actors (quality) - internationalization (internet) v. globalization (world wide web) - internet invented by defense department - military industrial concerns about survivability - world of connections not divisions - each make different statements about convergence and divergence Convergence (globalization) - corporations in global markets: MNCs v. TNCs - theory rational global capitalism - analytical claim - few businesses centers diffuse new practices - outcome - global homogeneity of culture, Econ, society and politics, rest of world remade in image of west differentiation - states and civilizations in international system - Huntington - enduring contribution not the argument he develops, intuition that after ideological clashes of Cold War, some other set of ideas will frame conflict between states - analytical claim - culture is territorially clearly bound - intellectual lineage - differences in language, religion, ethnicity, caste offer no overlaps - modern tradition - romantic nationalism, racial theories, values "glocalization" - convergence and differentiation combined is a source of tension and adaptation which creates new objects and practices - hybridization across and within collectives via information, migration - fashion food and LA = center of universe analytical claim - cultures part of transnational products and processes - intellectual lineage = mixing languages, cultures, technology - modern tradition - creolization, hybridization, Pomo - outcome - inter-civilizational cross-fertilization, intellectual flows - Americans good at mass-marketing - regions - real, imagined, behavioral - concrete instance of convergence and divergence - material-spatial and traditional geopolitical theory - ideological-ideational and critical geographic theory - behavioral focus on practices - trade and investment intensity - regions can take different inst. forms - regions always act as political creation - regional orgs: EU, ASEAN, NAFTA - America in world of regions - organized around core countries and link to US in different ways - US involvement in region varies - core interests at stake (Europe, Asia, Middle East), no core interests (South Asia, Africa), special case (Americas) because though our sphere of influence learning from history - Germany and Japanese occupations as model for Iraq - learning from history through analogies, identify structural similarities in situations and argue that similarity in structure will lead to similarity in outcomes - two psychological processes - availability heuristic why one analogy not another comparing Asia and Europe: Asia: market integration, flexible rules, MNCs, government is a facilitator Europe: functional/institutional integration, binding agreements, national politicians, government role is a leader - market capitalism in Asia v. legal institutions in Europe - Asia formally much less integrated markets, ethnic capitalism - Europe integration creates customs union early, role of the Euro Asia and Europe - security - different regional mixes of realism, liberalism, and construct. - Asian security affairs stable and traditional, well-captured by realism with bit of lib/construct. - Europe security affairs 1990s exerpeiced rev. upheaval, construct/lib with dash realism. explanatory sketches for outcomes Asia/Europe - differences regional inst. - similarities in openness - analytical eclecticism - domestic politics structure two states very different, Germany has national identity but say European-Germany, identity Japan not changed by war, dominant states v. different conclude: - is the US strong enough to pacify and democratize the world? - only with regional allies

Ukraine and ISIS Lecture

Complex wars: - new-style interventions - complex wars, hybrid - indelible links to finance and oil - within Westphalian system (Ukraine) or attempting to stretch beyond (ISIS and new caliphate) Ukraine: - historically contested/divided by various states and empires - consolidated into Soviet Republic after Russian revolution, independent after 1991 - deep divide in Ukraine between East and Crimea (looking to Russia) and West (Poland and Germany) - 2004: West wins, color revolution - Russia defeats - rule by oligarchs and kleptocrats - 2010 east wins - rule by oligarchs and kleptocrats - 2014: Yanukovych has to choose between EU association or Russia - Maiden uprising, Russia occupies ad annexes Crimea, war in East Ukraine starts - 2015: West-East wins, Poroshenko president - rule by oligarchs and kleptocrats Islamic state: - originally sunni/shia divide - Sykes-picot agreement and spheres of influence (1916) - 9/11, al Quaeda, 2003 US led invasion of Iraq, crumbling of Saddam's Sunni regime - 2011 Arab Spring and Syrian civil war creating power vacuum and opportunity for ISIS to expand - 2013 counter-revolution in Egypt to eliminate Muslim Brotherhood as non-radical alternative - 2014: ISIS declares caliphate state straddling Iraq and Syria Ukraine: Huntington or PK? - pro-Huntington: Ukraine is cleft country marked by civilizational split between East and West - role of church - elections divide East from West Pro PK: - most Ukrainians are bilingual, strong support for united Ukraine in East and pro-Russia policy in West prior to 2013 - Russian intervention consolidated split, bolstered rebels - multiple traditional everywhere, politicians seek to use cultural issues for political gain - Crimea pro-Russian except Cosack minority - Hardening sentiments Ukraine as consequence rather than cause of war ISIS - pro Huntington: - worldwide resurgence - Huntington's map has only one color of Islam and does not account for the divide of Sunni and Shia PK: - clash within civilization, case argument - neither defined only by dogma - current sectarian violence ISIS is horrible, enormous refugee crisis for Sunnis, threatens greater sectarian violence since 05-07 - ISIS wants to destroy cultural and religious pluralism of the Islamic society ISIS compared to al-Qaeda - al-Qaeda accommodates local population and fights enemy abroad (West) - because roots in Saddam's regime, ISIS moved from jihadism to statism quickly and effectively - civilizations operating above nation states, ISIS transnational organization, effective use of social media for foreign fighter recruit Ukraine: - Maiden revolution in Feb 2014, surprise Putin - Putin's decision to intervene rushing back from Sochi olympics - Eurasianism as Russian ideology Geopolitical Eurasianism - tradition started after 1917 as reaction of western theories of socialism, after 9/11 reaction against western theories were neoliberal - old community - drew 19th century German theories that are geo-political, race, sphere of influence. bilateral axis thinking - centered Russia, offers viable alternative vision and US hegemony Civilization Eurasianism - Mongols civilizational other, nested orientalist, antithetical Huntington - pacification/annexation of Crimea in late 18th century. - Crimean war (1853-56). Russia loses to alliance of Ottoman Empire, France, Britain - 19th century Russian pacification and occupation of Central Asia and Siberia - 20th century "New Soviet Man" - political after dissolution of SU returns to Eurasian world order Role of States in New-Style wars - frozen rather than hot wars - Crimea exception - Eurasian ideology generates sphere of influence thinking, former Soviet Union is Russia's natural sphere of influence - US opposed all spheres of influence except its own in Americas (Cuba as exception) - Crimean occupation/annexation is highly skillful - Russian domestic politics reason intervention Ukraine: New Rule? - Russia relies on frozen wars to exert political leverage, validation of clausewitz - previous episodes breakaway ethnic enclaves Sum: - Russi able to play role as mediator in deploying limited military force under conditions of political uncertainty Sum: - Russia was able to play role as mediator deploying limited military force under conditions of political uncertainty - compromising territorial integrity of other states furthers Russia's geopolitical goals and civilizational claims Islamic state: - aims to build unitary state of Arab Middle East, simplistic ideology rooted in salafism - serious engagement of technocrats as long as go along with ISIS ideology - war minorities and women - military prowess, tactical flexibility, learning - influence goes beyond officer corps and includes Baathist ideology - Iraqi army cannot fight without Shiite militia and support Iran, Iraq and ISIS both transnational economies: - Ukraine - trade - Putin's goal: Eurasian economic union - economic imbalance EU creates political opposition and suspicion in central Asia - member states are nervous trade diversion effects while Russia sees barriers against China's influence Ukraine: oil - Russia's economy primacy Eurasia unquestioned, primarily use oil and gas prices and subsidies - Russian railway everywhere Islamic state: - oil central part of Iraqi insurgency after US victory over Saddam, put down by US surge in 07, re-emerges after 09

31. Understanding Change (R. Koslowski and F. Kratochwil)

International system was transformed by rapid succession of mostly nonviolent revolutions that replaced Eastern European communist gov'ts in 1989 + lack of Soviet action to prevent this Revolutions changed international system by changing rules of superpower game Taking the Constructivist approach Change happens when actors through their practices change the rules and norms constitutive of international interaction; beliefs/identities of domestic actors Neorealism is wrong bc their predictions weren't true and their assumptions are wrong; what they say didn't actually happen Neorealists assume autonomous interests, force is most important, distribution of capabilities, predict that bipolar world would remain, regardless of domestic politics Then, Soviet Union disintegrated and it did not happen from hegemonic or system-wide war and it wasn't a matter of military capabilities It was bc Gorbachev repealed Brezhnev Doctrine, allowing revolutions and accepting demise of Warsaw Pact Neorealism fails to explain unilateral concessions Gorbachev actually miscalculated, in an effort to counteract Communist Party's loss of legitimacy in Eastern bloc and in USSR (unrest and civil society forming everywhere) Also, U.S. reaction to Soviet demise proves neorealism wrong U.S. tried to help Soviet stabilize and accepted it into world community This can't be labeled as balancing act; maximization and relative gains is completely absent; u.s. could have exploited Soviet demise but didn't; maybe they wre trying to avoid creating a vacuum But domestic politics considerations were made; effects of potential civil war in Soviet Union would mean mass migration, destabilization of other countries, loss of control of nuclear weapons etc Why did so much change in 1989 happen without much change in distribution of material capabilities? Cold War happened becase Stalin didn't accept previous norms of great-power interaction Just like nationalism, new conceptions of rights, new conceptions of war etc. norms that leaders establish change domestic and international politics Even rational choice theory and economic theories started off assuming what the actor's interests (albeit fixed and exogenous) were Only problem with constructivism ist hat it's not prescriptive; doesn't reduce anything to ultimate foundation that predicts or dictates all future events Gorbachev's Perestroika Ottomanization - enabling unplanned emancipation of constituent states Finlandization - allowing power domestic autonomy, only asking for allegiance in foreign affairs Austrianization - neutrality through great-power agreement i.e. Berlin Beyond Austrianization - Soviet wants less neutrality in favor of joining the European community; better serving security and welfare interests

46. American Power after the Financial Crisis (Kirshner)

Looking at how the global financial crisis of 2008 affected international relations and order Three Changes: Brought down the "second US postwar order"- period of US hegemony after the Cold War associated with its domestic and international financial deregulation- the 1990s repeal of Glass Steagall Act The crisis accelerated the relative erosion of the power and political influence of the US and increased the political influence of other states, including China Brought about a heterogeneity of thinking regarding how to manage domestic and international money and finance Results of new thinking outside of the US- ex: China Second US Postwar Order: -Liberalism Economic theory sees free market forces as efficient and optimal - constructed idea that free market is good for economy Deregulation was seen as good public policy- good for US firms and financial globalization suggest an international environment in which US political power and influence would be enhanced IMF demanded the renunciation of controls on capitalàmore vulnerable to financial crises - if this is known- why does this ideology still exist? 1997 Asian Financial Crisis- illustrated the dangers of too much capital mobility US took advantage of their crisis and took advantage of the political leverage it had in negotiations - furthered an economic divergence with Asia- diminishing the desire to follow through on the way America set forth as the "hegemon"- Realism Heavy emphasis placed on finance- a worthy job for college graduates guaranteeing them financial security—it became too big The 2007/2008 crisis was created by the housing crash; however, it was rooted in the problems within the financial system created by the US in the 2nd postwar order The business model of finance was changing- the system Risk was growing Individual Credit rating agencies (CRAs) were giving out Triple-A ratings to stocks that didn't deserve them because the CRAs were paid by the issuers of the securities Systemic Environment persuading risk taking and firms were counterparties for each other Hard to differentiate between pubic and private sector employment because one usually led to the other- investment bankers getting jobs in the FED or the government Decreasing information on what is systemic risk- not being talked about Unregulated markets are prone to crisis The crisis, centering around the US, raised doubts about the wisdom of the American model- make others turn away from the US model- gives the US less power- Realism States will desire more autonomy from the US market China has started its own way of economic and financial thinking- after the US continually told it to liberalize- dismantle controls and eliminate barrier, free trade China has started promoting its own currency- reducing China's dependence on the dollar and pushing back on the US world order- affecting the international order of power- Realism Many countries find themselves dependent on the growing Chinese market now- US has less power over countries that are less dependent on it For the first time in 70 years, the US is facing external macroeconomic constraints in ways routinely experienced by other states (by the US) The US financial system after the crisis is characterized by greater continuity than change

23. Sources of Soviet Conduct (X)

Roots of Soviet Union = Communist ideology Central system that governs life is the producing and exchanging of material goods Capitalist system is bad b/c it leads to exploitation of working class by capital-owning class and doesn't distribute the goods fairly Imperialism, final phase of capitalism, leads to war and revolution Revolution Appealed to the people at the time because of mood of Russian ppl Was less genuine than it was made out to be—disgruntled people trying to take advantage of the revolution in the name of communism Why totalitarian Communists were minority representation of ppl; they needed iron grip Lots of ppl unhappy with economic interruption due to new communist party Always had internal enemies and opposition Stalin = too insecure, jealous, fierce = uncompromising So, totalitarian. Within the party too. Why hostile toward America? Communist party has been trying to consolidate power forever, and STILL they are absorbed w/ the struggle to make their power secure/absolute Ideology said outside world was hostile/ their duty to overthrow outsiders "Russian history and tradition" Self-fulfilling prophecy, eventually they created enemies that they said they'd be fighting Any opposition = capitalist hostility; blame all internal threats on external "conspiracies" They insisted on external threat b/c they needed it to justify dictatorship Emphasized inherent antagonism between capitalism + communism Resulted in exorbitant expenditures on policing apparatus Again, internally self-fulfilling; ppl inside grew even unhappier Underdevelopment outside of industrial sector domestically How the Kremlin is now Innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism = defines Soviet foreign policy So, Kremlin = secretive, suspicious, liars, unfriendly They're going to be a long-term enemy But there's no hurry about it - they're in no rush because they think Capitalism will destroy itself on its own. Takin their sweet ass timeee Infallibility of Kremlin Infallibility requires discipline which requires infallibility (domestic) Leadership will put forward any "thesis" of action or doctrine at any given point for convenience and will expect total compliance Solidarity = unity of movement "Fortified by lessons of Russian history... centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces..." = caution, flexibility and deception. Sort of racist Russian or the oriental mind. Also racist They will struggle ideologically first; they won't be rushing to risk everything the ybuilt for immediate conquest. Because no rush, they are calculating + strategic, accepting defeat when convenient and conceding when advantageous in long run → this is why they're so formidable Can only be fought by long term policies What we should do Should not lose temper because Russians will exploit it Russians never want to lose their cool, so we shouldn't prod them foolishly or else they'll be force to retaliate in order to save face We should exploit their domestic downfall, declining human quality of life Eventually party will decline since no buttress of population Their succession of power will be shaky Weak structure of gov't + weak nation = they'll get weaker on their own = inevitability of Soviet demise Policy of Containment Constant pressure to keep communism limited to Russia Dissemination of information / propoganda Create strong impression of U.S. / tough front Prove communism wrong by being a successful capitalist country = declining domestic support for communism Eventually pressure will cause the to change or die. They can't fight forever Also, U.S. is all powerful, badass, world power with greatest "responsibility"

24. The Failure of Success (G.F. Kennan)

Cold War happened because we couldn't negotiate or compromise All or nothing attitude, we demanded "unconditional surrender" The price we paid = 40 yrs of unnecessary military expenditures; nuclear age The problem now is, we're so poorly prepared for the future; we only have experience fighting singular and gigantic threats i.e. Nazi, Japan, USSR Everyone wants a new single/grand foreign policy/strategy but THIS is the problem There is no all-compassing set of policies to address the future issues; shouldn't simplify We don't need a single policy; we need a set of principles Principles change to reflect society of the time Accept limitations, and define goals + values + identities; gather domestic morale.

14. Same War—Different Views (P. Katzenstein)

Domestic Politics Different countries have different views on terrorism and terrorist acts, and how these should be handled 9/11: US- act of war that justified a military response Desire fundamental change in Iraq with regime change Germany, Japan, and the rest of NATO don't agree with US's use of preemptive air strikes on Iraq Constructivism- Americans associate national security in military terms- how our country was founded Bush administration saw this act of terror as being posed by evil states and non-state groups, al Qaeda. Manichaean view of the world- shifting the balance in domestic politics away from civil liberties to national security Results from Cold War Germany- a crime that military response would be unsuited to handle, instead it required police cooperation, intelligence sharing, international legal proceedings, and careful attention to the underlying social and economic causes of terrorism Historical connotation linked to extremist groups and terror- Holocaust—constructivismàplaces terrorism in a broader political and social perspective and military force is taboo 1930s and 1940s- German Basic Laws: prohibited the government from banning any faith based group, even one advocating and supporting terrorist activities When France cracked down on terrorism, they moved to Germany Constructivism/domestic politics: after Nazi Germany, necessary that the new government as liberal with their citizens and the citizens feared the old regime so they demanded less government power and control- leading to a lax government with few restrictions, making Germany an easy place for terrorists to live and plan Germany had been a base of operations for al Qaeda, German police were able to make numerous arrests after 9/11 Associated with the US- chancellor announced a change in the German position on terrorism and that Germany was committed to military operations to defend freedom and human rights. Is it only because Germany still needs US as an ally? - domestic politics Japan- a big event that offered opportunity for Japan to show allegiance to the war on terrorism and to prepare Japan for national emergency Traditionally, export the problem of terrorism to others- 1970s successfully pushed the terrorist Japanese Red Army out of Japanàdidn't stop terrorizing people, just left Japan Felt removed from al Qaeda's threats Largely symbolic help- the first time that Japan was playing a regional security role in supporting the US Announced that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) operations would no longer focus solely on the defense of the Japanese home islands- provide refugee relief, humanitarian assistance, grant aid to frontline states, share intelligence, participate in international police cooperation, work with central and commercial banks to restrict funding to terrorist organizations, and help establish a government in Afghanistan with a broad political base- no active military aid

36. Intervention in Vietnam and Central America (N. Chomsky)

Key point: U.S. geopolitical conception depends on a "struggle of good vs. evil" and therefore on "uncovering" and where necessary, "creating" communists everywhere. In reality, decolonized societies were fighting for development and national self-determination, NOT Communism along Soviet lines. -Chomsky identities with a revisionist Cold War reading. And brings in Marxism and constructivism. Level of similarities b/w two areas is the level at which we consider US intervention, its consequences, and its sources in domestic institutions the US intervention was significant and decisive the effects of intervention were horrifying the roots of this intervention lie in a fixed geopolitical conception that has remained the same over a long period of time--deeply rooted in US institutions US global planning deeply rooted in economic control US intervention goes against human rights, democratization, and the raising of living standards "Freedom to Rob" is part of our system American aid→ deterioration of human rights Defined threat of communism: communist powers will have reduced willingness and ability to complement industrial economies of the West US automatically views country that follows this course as enemy/threat US has pattern of creating enemies, drive country into being a Russian base to justify intervention, and thus organize and control more of the world US tendency throughout history to claim "self-defense" in situations in which we are exacting destruction Differences: US has changed over the years very little protest when Johnson escalated attacks in Vietnam Reagan meets considerable popular protest when he attempts to escalate the war in El Salvador

26. Cuban Missile Crisis (G. Allison)

Lays out three models to explain the CMC leans more towards Models II and III but doesn't discredit I--need II and III to fill in gaps of I Model I: Rational Policy Model (Defensive Realism, deterrence) primary historical explanation of the CMC states are unitary and the most important actors bureaucracy implements precisely what the president orders ignores the domestic politics (internal actors, bureaucratic processes) realist explanations for USSR shipments to Cuba: ballistic inferiority, missile gap, US missiles in Turkey Model II: Organizational Process (Domestic Politics) considers general bureaucratic behavior patterns and how they affect state decision making; state is not unitary and state leader(s) does not know everything inherent factors regarding how organizations develop that is independent of who is in charge policies codes of conduct org. processes and traditions organizations are their own entitites Organizational processes during CMC U2 flight schedule Navy carrying out blockade according to their own policies as opposed to ExComm's Air Force/CIA argument over who flies U2 over Cuba Model III: Bureaucratic Politics (Domestic Politics) keeps bureaucratic processes in play but adds in-state actors (people) to the mix people have their own various biases, motivations, opinions, interests, etc. that affect state decision making Naval commander defying McNamara during blockade Robert Kennedy voting against air strike so his brother is not compared to the Japanese Pearl Harbor attacks bureaucracies have separate interests from each other state department likely to be more diplomatic, aim for peaceful resolution Internal politics important in decision making upcoming congressional midterms

Trade and Investment Lecture

Multinational Corporations - order derives from shared interests - political communities to social contracts - markets are not states as basic order - applies to IR: marketization = growing globalization and erosion of sovereignty two outcomes: - material gains - economic benefits derived efficient allocation of resources - loss of state control: international flows affect national policies --> US early 1980s and Mexican debt crisis --> Asian financial crisis (97) contagion to Russia and Argentina --> global financial crisis '08 from Iceland to US and EU Liberalism perspective: Actors: firms, government Aims: individual utilities Cause: outcome depends on interests politics: positive sun prescription: interdependent and competitive cooperation Realism perspective: Actors: states Aims: power and security Cause: outcome depends on relative power Politics: zero-sum Prescription: calibration and power conflict - political foundation in today's world economy - Atlantic charter 1941: principle of equal access to trade and raw materials - lend-lease (UK) 42: UK ends discrimination trade - Marshall plan 47 - rebuild Europe for stability and profits - Bretton woods 44: internationalization New Deal coalition - end of gold dollar standard '71 and adoption of system, of flexible exchange rates world of incomplete openness - perennial US complaints about countries' closure especially China - agriculture in Europe and Japan - service in Japan - third world - manufacturing at times in US - tariffs and visible restrictions v. invisible barriers (gov regulations, social norms) world of complete openness - growth of trade, invest, capital - centers of capital, potential instability - MNCs scale and scope - technology: diffusion, reverse engineering - labor mobility, forced migration, tourism - popular culture - financial crisis: 82, 87, 97-00, 08 - migration crises: US, EU, Syria, Brexit example: foreign exchange markets - 5.3 trillion dollars a day (2013) - governmental interventions: tens of billions of dollars a month - global bond markets at 830 billion a day political evolution of international trade system - 1950s in US relinquishes specific liberal economic objectives for general political ones - EC CAP, export subsidies (VAT) - Japanese protectionism, China trade imbalances - Western bias of system - sectoral exceptions - agricultural and primary products (EC) from low tech to high tech US - for realists, markets relations affect power relations - liberalism, market dynamics can have independent effects on power low power concentration: economic closure - Europe 1873-1914: - Germany's coalition iron and rye, second protectionist founding of Germany interwar years - no full recovery after WWI, 1929 black Monday and Great Depression, world trade comes to hault - competitive currency devaluation, tariff escalation - Nazi Germany new trade policy - vulnerability dependence, diabolically clever high power Econ openness - UK 1846-1873 - industrial revolution, corn laws, Cobden-Chevalier treaty - ex 2: US 1945-1973 - US most powerful nation, 1945 national income is 50% world total - insists on liberalism, low tariffs, convertible currencies, no discrimination = Econ Wilsonianism, not shared by rest of world - variable power concentration: oscillation between economic closure and openness - mid-1970s and through early 1990s - decline in US power and relative closure of trade - US protectionism increases as Japan rises - sectorial consequences from old to new industries in 1990s liberalism (Moran) - product life cycle - MNCs spread through because of markets - product cycle theory: charges firm competitiveness over time - strong support 20-70s, now less clear since globalization has equalized cost structure across markets - more than 50% of total world trade occurs within MNCs - it's not the past but the future which drives systems - expectation for future invest and growth, institutionalized except through Wall Street, MNCs often defensive and try to defend monopolistic or ogliopolistic rents - firms shadow each other Instrumental Marxism: - spread due to underconsumption, surplus capital, decline profit rates Structural Marxism (Hymer) - Japan different cycle, start with small low tech inefficient firms and later on move abroad for political reasons - sovereign wealth funds sort of controlled by governments, rise in global corp. is all over world, saddling of American business Realism: - pax-Americana, freedom of investment - gov policy if make money abroad no taxes - 1950s intl power of US in Europe, subsidaries US MNCs are treated like European nationals - 2017 tax reform (territorial principle taxation) historic and may reshape position in world - no more than partial convergence - raw materials - MNCs act as tax collectors and shift allegiances (oil) - manufacturing - shift low.high skill manufacturing abroad - political economy relies on variety of paradigms and analytical perspectives

33. More Will be Worse (S. Sagan)

Nuclear Weapons- Domestic Politics Opposes Waltz in his belief that the more nuclear weapons will be a stabilizing factor in the world system- defensive realism- assumes states will act rationally- Model I (Allison) 2 central arguments: Professional military organizations- because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests- display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war Strong reasons to believe that future nuclear-armed states will lack the positive mechanisms of civilian control Many of these new countries acquiring nuclear weapons have either military-run governments or weak civilian-led governments—the powerful military organizations can determine the state behavior as opposed to the "objective" interests of, what is best for, the state These states are inward looking- trying to maintain stability within their own state- not as focused on external and security threats Policy is designed to protect the military regime-fear coups- not the nation's security- lack the competence to control a deterrent force Some states- Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan- inherited nuclear weapons before they had inherited the civil-military relations, historical learning experience, or command and control mechanisms for holding such weapons. Organization theory- Model II (Allison): Discredits the assumptions that states act rationally: government leaders intend to behave rationally, but their beliefs, options, and the implementation of their decisions are influenced by forces within the country- Large organizations have a bounded rationality- simplify situations Develop routines that govern behavior- not all situations warrant the same response Often accept the first option, even if only minimally satisfying Biased from past experience, training, current responsibility "Goal displacement": lose sight of the overall objectives and focus on narrow goals Organizations are self-interested and are competitive Narrow and limited organizational interests rarely match state interests Operational requirements of nuclear deterrence between two powers: First state to acquire weapons must not attack its rival in preventative war. Military biases can provoke preventative attacks Military officers see war as more likely than civilian governments- skeptical of non-military alternatives Military officers are trained to focus on military logic- victory means military defeat, not necessarily achieving political goals Cult of Offensive (Schneider)- favor offensive doctrines and decisive operations Military plans incrementally- focus on immediate plans, not on the subsequent problems of the post-war time period Military officers focus on their narrow, short-sighted goal, not the long-term New nuclear powers must build invulnerable second strike nuclear forces: Military bureaucracies are usually interested in having more resources- larger nuclear arsenals. Less interested in spending funds to protect them and would rather make more- less survivable weapons. Routines- protecting weapons is not in their routine- resistant No incentives to pursue building them if the military believes they are likely to be involved in preventative war Even if the technical requirements for invulnerability exist, poorly designed standard operating procedures and military routines (which are inflexible) can undermine survivable military forces. Nuclear arsenals not be prone to accidental or unauthorized use States are boundedly rational-raises doubts about whether any state can build a large nuclear arsenal that is secure from accident. Normal accidents theory- system accidents are likely because it there is high interactive complexity, tight coupling, and they add layers of redundancy to complex systems Ex: US Case: The development of the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and the intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM)- developed against the wishes of the Navy—didn't want to go against what they have already known, their routine. Near accidents: Officers jerry-rigged their Minuteman missiles to give themselves the independent ability to launch missiles immediately without permission from Washington Officers flew a plane loaded with missiles to check the radar- plane could have crashed and missiles would have detonated Critiques of Waltz Near mistakes/accidents in Cuban Missile Crisis Military leaders think that they know better- act now or we lose- see threats everywhere- politicians think of their future elections and take time Military wants more resources Air force- organizational mission- in charge of bombers, not missiles

3. Great Power Politics (J. Mearsheimer)

Offensive Realism Cause of War: States want hegemony Offensive world: hyper insecurity Want to change the status quo to constantly be bettering their position Zero sum-if you win, someone else loses What States Seek: Maximized power The only way to attain permanent security Ultimate aim is to be the hegemon- once the hegemon, have to maintain this position Unlikely for any state to actually achieve global hegemony- perpetual great power competition Power: Military and Economic Relative- need more than the other states To qualify as a great power one need not have the capability to defeat the leading state, one must have enough power to inflict war and leave the dominant state weakened Stable System: Unipolarity -hegemonys What causes states to act in this manner and to fear one another: Absence of a central authority to protect states from one another States always have some offensive military capability States can never be certain about other states' intentions. Sometimes domestic politics causes leaders to act in a certain way in international politics to stay in control

43. Politics of Transnational Economic Relations (R. Giplin)

There are two theories that explain the relationship between the economy and its political organization- what is more important, the nation or the economy? Economic forces create an integrated transnational economy that blurs the traditional significance of national boundaries- stresses production of wealth as the determinant of social and political organization-Marxism and commercial liberalism Citizens are still loyal to their nation-state and the unit of political decision- stresses power, security, and national sentiment- realism Structural Marxism (state has relative autonomy)- the state and the multinational corporations are complimentary and have synergy US post WWII has been driven by the MNCs, and the MNCs have had the ability to expand because of the US government pushing for this (and better technology) Gilpin argues that although the economic and technical substructure partially determine and interact with the political superstructure, political values and security interests are cortical determinants of international economic relations-politics determines the framework of economic activity- realism Each hegemonic state has organized the global economic system in terms of its own interests and purposes Transnational patterns and processes are dependent upon peculiar patterns of interstate relations Criticism of commercial liberalism- security threats are more important to states than their economies Transnational processes are affected by and change due to the rise and decline of nation-states Multinational corporations have been able to exercise effects because the US has created the necessary political framework for this Economic processes are not unique to their own age and the pattern of international economic activity reflects the global balance of economic and military power- dependent on what wars bring about Pax Britannica: Arose from the negotiations after the Napoleonic Wars GB had the strongest military power- their navy- and held a hegemony on military power, which could dominate trade and international relations between countries GB was the first industrialized country and therefore had a hegemony on economic power as well- pursued free trade because they had domination on trading manufactured goods to all nations and all that they imported was raw materials What led to the end of the Pax Britannica was the industrialization of other European countries, particularly Germany, France, the US, and Japan rising to challenge GB's hegemony economically and militarily (control of the seas and denial of rivals access to the globe→ imperializing Africa and Asia→ World War I World War I: INTERMEDIARY PHASE Provoked nationalism and distrust among the nations- nations began to trade domestically and blocs formed. US was isolated. Depression rampaged throughout Western Europe and the US Pax Americana Arose after WWII and fear of being left out of the trading world again Believed that peace would be best promoted by the establishment of a system of multinational trade relations which guaranteed to all states equal access to the world's resources and markets. American emphasis on postwar economic relations represented a tradition of their liberal ideas, the substitution of commercial for political relations between states The US gave economic aid to the Western European (to reconstruct their economy) countries to try to promote the multilateral system of economics Beginning of US-Soviet struggle was the US's trying to incorporate Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, into this system—contributing to US's global empire—revisionist interpretation of the cause of Cold War Gilpin argues that the Cold War originated from the power vacuum created after WWII from eliminated German power in Europe and Japanese power in Asia that US and Soviet were fighting to fill- created a security dilemma (realism)- by each trying to gain control of this power they created a security threat to the other Business corporations have exercised an influence over political developments- as a result of the government, not the state The multinational corporations is partially responsible for the increasing interdependence among national economies- which has increased governmental interference in economic affairs

62. Anti-Americanisms and Polyvalence (P. Katzenstein and R. Keohane)

Two questions: 1) why does such a rich variety of anti-American views persist? 2) Why do these views have such little impact on policy and political practice Answer: the symbolism generated by America is so polyvalent that it continually creates a diversity of material on which to construct anti-Americanism polyvalence of US society different than three popular explanations for anti-Americanism: power imbalances, backlash against globalization, conflicting identities these arguments are insufficient to understand anti-Americanism across the board Emphasis that this argument and subject is very much political; anti-American attitudes and beliefs are always contested or at least contestable--objects of political struggle Power imbalances US by far the most powerful state since end of the Cold War with no serious rivals; hegemony→ opposition US actions have considerable impact worldwide, and American failures often hurt other places more than itself Backlash against globalization spread of American practices and pop culture→ "McWorld," which is widely resented rapid econ. change and the uncertainty from dependence on distant markets and sources of capital→ resentment at the US Conflicting identities anti-Americanism generated by cultural and religious identities that are antithetical to the values being generated and exported by American values e.g.: both secular state as well as have many who are deeply religious Polyvalent argument of PK and Keohane US symbols=polyvalent; embody many values with different meanings to different people conflict between US pop culture and American religiosity Americanization is not just the exportation of American products and processes but it's an interactive system (also importing culture from elsewhere) anti-Americanism very much related to respective lenses of different societies (e.g. Chinese and Japanese would have different views) because there is so much to like and dislike about the US, polyvalence makes anti-Americanism persist

6. The Rise and Demise of the World Capitalist System (I. Wallerstein)

World Systems Theory- Marxism An approach to world history and social change that suggests there is a world economic system in which some countries benefit while others are exploited- these positions can shift Core: strong state, national culture, wealthy, high-end manufactured goods Strong state machinery coupled with a national culture- protects disparities and gives an ideological justification for the maintenance of these disparities Periphery: weak state (leaders' interests tied to core states) Wide economic-disparity among the people- the people who sell the product that is tied to the core, not necessarily tied to the country's economy, are wealthy and the rest of the country lives in extreme poverty Legitimizes the ability of some and exploits the labor of others Nonexistent to low degree of autonomy, weak state Semi-periphery: deflects pressure (help legitimate core culture because they aspire to be core, adopt core features) A world system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Technology- transport and communication- affect the size of the system Culture is linked to spatial location- tends to serve the interest of only a few homogeneous groups The world is made up of conflicting forces Life within this social system is largely self contained and internal The system could function in the same manner if it were cut off from all external forces The systems are the self-contained economies: based on extensive division of labor- range of classes Argues that capitalism has been able to function because of the world systems theory- capitalism absorbs the economic losses into the political entities and the economic gains are distributed to the private hands—unequal distribution of wealth Socialism would be the only alternative world system that could maintain a high level of productivity and change the distribution of wealth Classes always exist- under what conditions do they become conscious of their class When there is conflict this occurs: groups of people ally together- typically no more than three groups Capitalist class claims to be the universal class- cultural sentiment behind this idea Bankers and bourgeoisies have ties to the core states and the economic and social futures of these states- the farmers and working class of the periphery's cooperation is needed to create the core states—core states are threatened by the class consciousness of the workers in the periphery

29. The Long Peace (J.L. Gaddis)

-structural elements of stability: bipolarity independence of the two superpowers from each other (self-sufficiency) domestic politics - prudence on part of U.S. presidents; external caution (despite heated rhetoric) from Soviet leaders -behavioral elements of stability: nuclear weapons reconnaissance revolution ideological moderation rules of the superpower 'game': respect spheres of influence; avoid direct confrontation; use nuclear weapons only as a last resort; prefer predictable anomaly over unpredictable rationality; do not seek to undermine the other side's leadership Great power peace has managed to survive since the end of WWII despite lots of provocation due to an international system of stability--bipolarity largely responsible structure takes precedence over behavior in ensuring stability Structural elements unique in history to Cold War bipolar system realistically reflected the facts of where military power resided post-WWII simple system that did not require sophisticated leadership to maintain it stable alliances b/c of simple system defections from alliances haven't been too significant due to stability of system Argues for US-SU independence rather than interdependence (against commercial liberalism) not economically dependent on each other very dissimilar people→ few opportunities for interaction Argues that domestic influences have not posed great risk for the maintenance of a stable international system The development of nuke has mostly had a stabilizing effect on post-war system discourage escalation forces leaders to confront reality of war and assume responsibility Both US and SU remarkably able to stomach each other's ideology to a certain extent--systemic interests take precedence over ideological interests Rules of the Superpower Game respect spheres of influence avoid direct military confrontation nukes as only last resort prefer predictable anomaly over unpredictable rationality don't seek to undermine opposition's leadership

20. History and September 11 (F. Fukuyama)

9/11 represented major shift for US leading up to 9/11: US was doing great--Communism basically dead, US prospering 9/11→ different outlook; now at war and face serious threats Thesis: modernity will remain the dominant force in world politics and the institutions embodying principles of freedom and equality will continue to spread 9/11=backlash against modern world post-9/11=serious challenge/threat, esp. possibility of anti-Western and anti-American forces having WMDs 9/11 challenges American view that their institutions and values appeal almost universally If politics is based on religion, there will never be peace b/c people will never agree separation of church and state=important part of modernization, meaning that modernization is not just an offshoot of Western Christianity--more of a universal process Islam=the one major world culture that arguably has serious issues with modernity has produced movements that reject religious toleration only one working democracy (Turkey) in Islamic world War on terror is not just a war against terrorists but a war against Islamo-Fascism (radically intolerant and anti-modern doctrine that has arisen in many parts of the Muslim world Two key points in this development going forward US needs to prevail in Afghanistan, Iraq, against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban they won't just collapse on their own Muslim community must make internal changes--have growing acceptance of modernity, religious tolerance

27. Cuban Missile Crisis at 50 (G. Allison)

Allison reflects on CMC decades later and highlights lessons from the incident that can be applied in modern times analytical eclecticism--drawing on multiple theories, ideas, etc. instead of single paradigm elements of CMC can be applied to US's handling of Iran, N. Korea, China Says current US-Iran confrontation is CMC in slow motion: moving toward a showdown US should seek Kennedy-esque option: compromise and move Iran further from a nuke instead of all-out confrontation with them Lesson: if you are not prepared to risk war, even nuclear war, an adversary can get you to back down happened with N. Korea many times where they crossed a red line and we essentially did nothing Defining geopolitical challenge going forward will be relationship b/w hegemon US and rising power China

11. Trading State (R. Rosecrance)

Commercial Liberalism The belief that if there is economic interdependence between countries- the countries are less likely to go to war with each other or attack each other because the economic success of their countries are tied to each other Countries tend to be either militarily inclined or trade inclined- hard to be both Military-Political World or Trading World Specialize in one or the other- comparative advantage- if you specialize in trade you lose the ability to produce as much war and strategic power. Military-Political World: Works more along the basis of defensive realism Desire territorial power Continual recourse to war because constantly fighting for primacy If there already is a hegemon, not worth it to fight it- instead form allegiances and give it support in order to be granted favors. Should only fight if it is a stabilizing force- if there is less destruction than the "evil" the fighting is supposed to prevent Goal is to be self-sufficient- being a larger state helps this Trading World: Nations are differentiated in terms of their function- trade with other states that have the resources that or produce what your state needs and vice versa Because each produce what the others need, rely on each other- gives each state an equality status States can still try to improve their position and access to resources and products, however, it is recognized that they are more likely to be most efficient when there is specialization and division of labor among states, therefore, when one state tries to better their position and access it does not conflict with other states trying to do the same- works because resources are limited War disrupts trade and therefore the states will not have access to the products that the states they are fighting with have- not beneficial After the industrial revolution the ability to be fully autonomous declined leading to more war to conquer the territories that had the resources they needed- this stopped after the creation of the interdependent trading system Shifts in domestic cohesion affect choices between trading and M-P worlds- Domestic Politics Objectives: improve national welfare and the allocation of resources through internal development and trade Interdependence grew with larger populations, industrialization, and the need for resources that states did not have Hybrid: Can have a little of both, pull certain traits from both worlds, but cannot fully master and be successful in both Interdependence is growing- modern technology, transportation, communication, and international sources of energy- putting nations in greater contact with each other Harder to solve problems militarily when nations depend increasingly on products, funds, and security provided by other states. Uncertainty of war: harder to know today who will win (because of technology) and this is an expensive act (economically, emotionally for the citizens, territorially (total warfare)) to have no reassurance that they will win Highly developed economies are more dependent on social cooperation than primitive or transitional economic systems Balance of power system fell after 1918- less likely to go to war over this- no longer a multipolar system Trade can't operate with heavy restrictions- tariffs, exchange controls, quotas, restraints, and competitive devaluation of currencies: need free trade Restrictions reduce world trade and production- all are worse off

56. Beyond Paradigms (R.Sil and P. Katzenstein)

Analytical Eclecticism- realism, liberalism, constructivism The three most popular paradigms/perspectives in the US- different paradigms are more/less popular in different parts of the world In the US rationalism is more popular What can eclecticism contribute? Not all events can fit in one box and the hard lines of the paradigms discourage you from counting events or aspects that are problematic from the paradigm you are supposed to be working with Designed to highlight the intersections and relevance of theories originally constructed within separate paradigms Trace the dialectical and evolving relationship between individual and collective actors in world politics and the material and ideational structure that constitute the contexts within which these actors form and pursue their preferences. Attention to the manner in which external environments shape actors' understandings of their interests, the constraints and opportunities they face, and their capabilities Attention to the manner in which environments are reproduced or transformed as a result of those actors' varying preferences and capacities. The points of intersection on the triangle are points of convergence across paradigms Realism and Liberalism- material interests and resources are unproblematic Constructivism and Realism- emphases on material and ideational factors Liberalism and Constructivism- interplay of ideas, shared knowledge, emergent legal principles and multilateral institutions can reshape actors' identities and preferences, and engender reciprocal understandings and levels of cooperation that cannot be reduced to fix state interests Many analysts tend to identify with the recognizable paradigms/perspectives even while engaging in theorizing that incorporates eclecticism

60. Blowback (C. Johnson)

Blowback- unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret from the American people. What is reported in the press as malign acts of "terrorist" or "drug lords" or "rogue states" or "illegal arms merchants" are actually blowback from earlier American operations. Domestic Politics- people are responding to US actions in their country- retaliation- need to question US's involvement or provocation causing events threatening the US Waste of US resources on weapons systems, Asian economic meltdown, military "accidents," terrorist attack on US installations and embassies- crises that have arisen from America's informal, imperial empire Empire based on projection of military power all around the world and on the use of US capital and markets to force global economic integration on our terms, at whatever cost to others US is dependent on realism- the need to maintain their hegemonic position- interfere in other countries to maintain this Much of this has originated from the Cold War East Asia- gaining economic independence and beginning to challenge the US system of finance- US held dominance on capitalism Sale of weapons to countries- maintain economic dominance CIA plots in other countries of installing or maintaining leadership- maintain dominance and presence in those countries

25. Communist Bloc Expansion (D.J. Macdonald)

Competing views: traditionalism, revisionism, post-revisionism, realism Authors thesis: Soviets had unified and hierarchical Communist bloc; and yes, Westerners were correct to think that Soviet bloc would be expansionist They attacked because we weren't aggressive enough and didn't have a coherent containment policy in plan; we didn't antagonize them; they were expansionist Traditionalists blame Soviet Union for Cold War; they were expansionist, ideologically driven; West was reactive Revisionists insist opposite Post-revisionist say Soviet Union were somewhat responsible, but we were worse Realists say Soviets were reactive due to security dilemma, and they were defensive/cautious New evidence suggest traditionalists were right! 1. It wasn't a purely American construction Other western countries were just as if not more threatened by Soviets; overwhelming consensus Other countries pressured U.S. to address this fear; others confirmed U.S.'s role as world power 2. Were threat perceptions real? In order to answer this, must see how much control Soviets really had over their "bloc" Blocs and alliances emerge from power but also from shared ideology Mao always turned to Moscow for guidance Every time there is shift in Soviet policy, there has been corresponding change everywhere else in the bloc... so, its obvious that Moscow has been mastermind China Either they weren't as independently created or Stalin didn't back only those that he thought he could control Stalin advises China to be careful; China gets ahead and revolutionizes anyway; Stalin pissed b/c defiance; Stalin changes mind, has faith, and aids CCP majority; CCP kinda follows Stalin's advice to cooperate w Nationalist; Stalin admits his first advice was wrong China paired with Soviet not only bc Soviet was powerful, but ideology Other Asian communist uprisings happened upon Soviet "green light" U.S. lack of response to China and expansion that emboldend Soviets to expand even more Korea + Vietnam New evidence supports that Korea was Soviet satellite; China on behalf of Soviet intervened in both Vietnam and Korea Everyone tried to conceal their involvement but now we know Conclusion Realism is wrong; you can't ignore ideology and longterm revolutionary goals Material theory cant explain why communism had so much appeal (constructivist)_ Traditionalists got it right; it wasn't fear of Western expansion or Western provocation but a combo of Western in action, ideology and opportunism Revisionists can't explain coordinated expansion

35. Sex and Death (C. Cohen)

Constructivism A constructed view of violence and weapons has gendered these male People have come to view nuclear weapons on a tame, innocuous level- and have come to view their uses as acceptable because their horrendousness and destructiveness have been taken away "boys with toys"- boys play with nerf guns- look like real guns that kill people, but takes away the danger because they are foamàsupposed professional defense intellectuals doing the same thing Feminist Critique: violence has become naturalized and playful- and gendered male Language: Abstraction, euphemisms- can't touch the reality of what would actually occur Sexual language and imagery Religious, God Planning based on worst-case scenarios

9. Civilizations in World Politics (P. Katzenstein)

Constructivism- Pluralism Critique of Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" The world is pluralist in a global ecumene: Internal (within civilizations) diversity of views Civilizations may have some commonalities, but the differences are also important Not plural because civilizations are not easily separable No civilization is just defined by one characteristic- there is no place where there is only one race, ethnic affiliation, religion, or belief system anymore. Unitary world assumes that civilizations and their identities are unchanging and that the culture is the same throughout the entire civilization Clashes occur within civilizations rather than between (ex: civil war, Syria) Civilizations are embedded in a global context that affects their practices- but there are still distinctions associated with each civilization- "multiple modernities" The pluralism is embedded in an overarching common value- the material and psychological well-being of all humans- all governments claim to be acting for the well-being of their citizens Ex: Religion: Islam in Europe- bridge between both the East and West (Euro-Islam, Afro-Islam) Ex: West is typically seen as one entity, one civilization because it is assumed that they pursue one standard of living- democratic Ex: West is pluralistà Its identity has changed. Incorporated its major ideological enemy of WWII, Germany, into their coalition of Western democracies America: liberal democracy, egalitarian values, but it also contains some racist and republican beliefs- clashes ànot one tradition has shaped the US, but multiple, inconsistent ones. Ex: China: Chinese civilization today has emerged from multiple reinventions of Confucianism and now countries surrounding China, such as Korea, Vietnam, and Japan have adopted some of China's practices that have been more effective than their own- helps that country grow Global trade of ideas and traditions- no part of the world has been untouched- civilizations are constantly meeting and are no longer isolated Defined by transnational relationships- spreading of information, ideas, values, norms, and identities Not all parts of China share the same culture- coastal areas are more cosmopolitan and there is more economic dynamism due to trade, whereas the inland is more patriotic and not as advanced economically. Sinicization: spreading of Chinese traditions and culture Spreading one country's culture to others also helps remake the culture of the original country East vs. West, and other simplifications like this, should not be made- the only time it makes sense and there is a strong desire to simplify is during war, uncertainty, and threat

32. Spread of Nuclear Weapons (K.N. Waltz)

Defensive Ideal: build defenses so strong no one can overcome them Deterrence: maybe no defense, but has such a strong prospect of punishment Coercion: forcing action Nuclear warfare will deter everyone because the consequences are so devastating Assumes rational actors; states will calculate that war is never worth it Military will be even more cautious since uncertainty is so great Small, developing states will be just as cautious, incentive to be cautious Can hide and use tech just as effectively as us States radical at home may not be radical abroad Rulers want to have a country they can rule Induce caution in weaker states; don't wanna get blamed for someone else Preventive strikes unappealing You have to hit them in the first stage of nuclear development or else they'll strike back Even in first stage, you don't know that they won't have future potential to strike What if there's a future Hitler with nukes One man can't start a war; his advisors would probably disagree Unconditional surrender cannot be demanded Requirements of effective deterrent force: Must be able to attack and survive an attack Should not require early firing response to false alarms Weapons not susceptible to accidental unauthorized use Deterrence will reduce arms race since its costly and u only need a little to be effective

10. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (M. Mamdani)

Dislikes the idea that there are only "good" and "bad" Muslims; must also be "good" and "bad" Westerners Questions idea that Islamist politics is an effect of Islamic civilization Dislikes the idea of culture talk political states are territorial; culture is not Islam is a global civilization--fewer Muslims in Mid East than Africa, South and Southeast Asia writing political histories of Islam that read like political histories of Middle East does not make sense Contemporary Islamic politics is not the outcome of an archaic culture; rather, from contemporary conditions, relations, and conflicts terrorism is a modern construction, doesn't originate from premodern culture in modern politics Does not think that we can read people's political behavior from their religion/culture US responsible for embracing and aiding terrorism in late years of Cold War CIA responsible for creating armed jihad (mujahideen in Afghanistan) Identities change and fluctuate, are constructed--one group is freedom fighters one day, terrorists the next day Cold War→ political schism in Islam Terrorism has no military solution

39. Moscow's Choice (M. McFaul) and How the West has Won (S. Sestanovich)

Domestic Politics Critique to Mearsheimer's article Argues that the Ukrainian crisis is largely the result of the changing Russian politics and leaders- blame the entirety of the Ukrainian crisis on Russia The president before Putin, President Medvedev worked closely with President Obama-US and Russia have many common interests and that they need to work together to achieve these- mutually beneficial relations Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan- US argued that this was used to fight terrorists in Afghanistan whom both the US and Russia considered threats- Medvedev convinced the Kyrgyz government to keep the base open Medvedev supported international institutions- abstained from voting, instead of vetoing, the UN Security Council resolutions authorizing the use of force against Muammar al-Qadafi's regime in Libya 2011 Liberalism- worked towards peace and acknowledging each other's political positions In 2012, Putin came to power, new technology and social media helped expose the corrupt government and the fraudulent elections. There were massive protests, the largest since the end of the Cold War. Opposition leaders called for revolutionary change. Putin was fighting for legitimacy and recognition. Obama changed to a confrontational approach with Russia after Putin was elected- abandoned missile defense talks, signed no new arms control treaties, levied sanctions against Russian human rights offenders, and canceled the summit scheduled with Putin for September 2013. He worked with US allies to impose sanctions on Russian leaders and companies, provided assistance to Ukraine, response to Russia's aggression was necessary to preserve democratic values and international norms Domestic Politics- the change in Russian government and different leadership provoked this change in US policy Liberalism- West works based on policies to spread democracy and liberal values Putin led anti-US policy-saying that US was the cause of the unrest in Russia, to discredit his opposition. Dealt with the US in zero-sum terms. Putin viewed the failure of the Feb. 21st agreement, the change of government in Ukraine, and the demonstrations in Russia as the US's fault Believed that annexing Crimea tilted the balance of power in his favor Domestic Politics-The political leaders and the state of Russia affected why they invaded and took Crimea, not because of security threats.

44. The MNC and the Law of Uneven Development (S. Hymer)

If present trends of European and American global production continue, multinationalization likely to increase greatly in the future giants on both sides of the Atlantic will try to penetrate each other's markets and establish bases in underdeveloped countries oligopolistic collusion likely this collusion will produce a hierarchical, vertical division of labor b/w geographical regions multinational corporations are the leaders of this trend due to great financial and administrative strength along with contact w/ new technology Law of Uneven Development: tendency of the system to produce poverty as well as wealth, underdevelopment as well as development Three level of global production I: day-to-day production small and large branch offices and corporate HQs managers in the "periphery" rich in the periphery connected to the core II: Branch office coordinate production more affluent, higher managerial level III: Headquarters big, first-tier US city This system overrides power of national govt--entire production chain=transnational Alternative (this system impoverishes the ⅔ of the world not involved in the system): national production make HQ the national govt and cut out vertical production have officials take charge of level II National govt should help provide aid

54. Trade in Human Body Parts (T. Harrison)

Marxism- comparable to Wallerstein's World Systems Theory Human organ exchange should be looked at in terms of globalization and the system of unequal exchanges of trade between the developed and undeveloped regions Human body parts are being sourced coercively from the young, poor, illiterate, captive, and the infirm from underdeveloped world- if voluntarily selling these organs, still not making much of a profit. Most of the profit goes to those in charge of the operations Much like the world systems theory, the core is the developed world, benefiting the most as they are getting what they need- organs- and then within the periphery, those who are tied to the core, the doctors/the ones selling the organs make the profit and the rest of the country lives in poverty and are at a disadvantage- the ones who lose their organs. As the internationalization of market capitalism began in the developed countries, needing the market and trade from the underdeveloped countries, these countries also began changing- experiencing rapid urbanization, industrialization, proletarianization, and feminizationàpolitical and social unrest Globalization manifests itself in increased interconnectedness and interdependence, but not necessarily unification- leads to the separate worlds Through international trade, objects lose their meaning and are seen in terms of what they are worth economically If the rich need organs to live and they have the means to buy themselves what it takes to save their life, they will do it regardless of whether they know if this organ is coming from a child or someone who was kidnapped When people realized they could make a profit off the sale of body parts- businesses and corporations formed Profit, not patient care was the primary motive- surgeons and middle men taking huge cuts—benefits developed countries economically (or the ones in the undeveloped countries who are tied to the developed countries) All governments employ some types of control over these corporations- most developed countries try to control it through regulations, illegal in the US, in China executed prisoners' organs are sold Libertarian arguments- humans have rights over their bodies which enable them to decide what to do with their own body parts- capitalist Utilitarian arguments- payments lead to increased donations- capitalist

38. Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault (J. Mearsheimer)

Offensive Realism 3 Points: Expansion of NATO- taproot of the issue Incorporating bordering states of Russia into NATO Russian military invaded Georgia in 2008 to protect their interests and prevent them from being incorporated into NATO EU's push eastward EU had an economic deal with Ukraine- President Yanukovych turned down this deal and accepted a Russian counteroffer Upset the Ukrainian public- called for new elections- Yanukovych fled and new interim government was anti-Russian—threat to Russian security having a pro-Western government on Russia's borders Democracy promotion Western powers' policies reflecting liberalism in trying to spread democracy and their liberal policies to Eastern European nations- they believed that after the Cold War geopolitics were no longer an issue Offensive Realism-Russia's fear the "social engineering" of their neighbors and fear that if NATO spreads Russia could become subject to this- need to protect their country Domestic Politics-If Russia was threatened, the people may choose to either support Russian ideas or liberal, Western ideas—the government doesn't want the people to have this option- threat to the regime in power Why Putin invaded Crimea: Offensive Realism- Threat to Russia's security. Living in a hyper-sensitive world- by invading they used military force to protect their own power and their state from threat and were able to put pressure on the new government in Kiev to discourage them from siding with the West and NATO- the threat has been eliminated How should the Ukraine Crisis be handled? Mearsheimer argues that the Western powers should try to make Ukraine a neutral, buffer state between Russia and the West. Not a member of NATO, not a part of Russia. Ukraine is important to Russia and to keep peace with Russia it would not be advantageous to the US to promote an anti-Russian government there. The West needs to publicly rule out the possibility of Georgia and Ukraine becoming members of NATO. Regardless of whether or not Ukrainians want to join NATO. The US needs to realism over liberalism. Ukraine is not a threat to US and having Ukraine as an ally is not crucial to the US, it is not a "core, strategic interest" (pg. 88), which is seen by the West's unwillingness to use military force to aid the Ukraine. Especially since Russia is a declining power—the US needs to do what it is best for its own security and that is dealing with the much larger power, Russia who the US needs to support certain causes, as opposed to giving in to the liberal desires of the Ukraine and causing a feud with Russia. The US needs to employ realist strategies because the US needs Russia's support to quell other threats to the US's security. Including Russia's aid in withdrawing U.S. equipment from Afghanistan through Russian territory, to reach a nuclear agreement with Iran, and to stabilize the situation in Syria

Explanations

Problem 1: alt causes - over-determination of events after fact - empirical solution is imperfect - Dif paradigms lead to diff types of evidence - total truth or partial truth --> no total truth possible, use theories, usefulness depends on context - Dif paradigms lead us to different types of evidence - when explanation doesn't work, exception? anomaly? - usefulness theory depends on context you apply it to Problem 2: alt consequences - under-determination of events before fact, a priori - under-precision - more from general or trite to specific and interesting or descriptions the can't be tested - over-preduction Problem 3: opposite causes - ascribe some outcomes to contradictory explanations - don't hold to inconsistent arguments, specify outcomes and explanations carefully and precisely Problem 4: opposite outcomes - ascribe opposite outcomes to the same explanation Problem 5: generality of outcomes - scope outcomes explained - explaining incidence of war v. incidence big wars, small wars, intra-state, etc Problem 6: parsimony of reasons adduced - indep. variable - parsimonious explanations not well-suited to specific outcomes - rich explanations not well-suited as a general guide - specify outcomes and complex analysis is where and how we and governments tend to make choices Problem alt causes - problem is reach, each explanation is sufficient but none is necessary - problem is false, each is necessary but none is sufficient - combination lock eclectic solution to problem is over-determination - pick and choose depending on the problem ecumenical - those who like analytical eclecticism

57. Unipolar World (W.C. Wohlforth)

Question posed: why has a counterbalancing reaction against US unipolarity not taken place; Answer: neither history nor theory suggest that a counterbalance is likely given today's distribution of capabilities counterbalancing very hard for self-interested states to achieve conditions for counterhegemonic alliances are not present and unlikely to be present for a long time US power too great, comprehensive, offshore, and enmeshed in status quo Great powers must either increase military strength or aggregate capabilities in an alliance in order to counterbalance--neither took place in first decade of unipolarity (post-1991) Three reasons why there is no balancing balancing is inefficient and hard in a system like this concentration of US capabilities→ counterbalancing would be costly for other states balancing is less efficient in the current globally dispersed system Current international system of unipolarity US more capable relative to other great powers than even Napoleonic France US has more material capability than any past European system leader US has already achieved unipolar status US capabilities are offshore and thereby less threatened international system is global and other great powers are clustered around Eurasia Some, like Huntington, downplay US unipolarity or say that it is fading hold unipolar standard too high misleading definition of unipolar state The fact that the US can continue current engagement course globally does not mean it should necessarily continue to do so--e.g. if it threatened more domestic attacks if not threat, however, no real reason not to do so

21. Keeping Saddam in the Box (J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt)

Realism- containment of Iraq Bush administration was pushing for preventative war against Iraq, claiming that containment has failed and that Saddam Hussein is a reckless expansionist bent on dominating the Middle East Arguing that the United States should not go to war with Iraq and that containment is the best policy because there is no evidence or reason to believe that Iraq will become an offensive threat- containment has not failed, it has never been tried In his 30 years in control of Iraq, Hussein only waged two wars. The first was against Iran's revolutionary government in 1980 after Iran had conducted repeated border raids and trying to create unrest within Iraq- not a reckless decision to attack, Hussein was just securing his borders and stopping the security threat- defensive Invaded Kuwait in 1990 after a dispute over oil prices and war debts and occurred only after the US gave Iraq the go ahead to invade In favor of preventative war point to Hussein's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and Iran and fear that he will eventually get nuclear weapons Kurds and Iran could not retaliate in the same manner- Iraq would not use these weapons on the US because of mutually assured destruction, US would use weapons of mass destruction on Iraq. Already evidence of Hussein not using chemical or biological weapons on the US- not during the Persian Gulf war with Israel in 1991 and despite the fact that US has been bombed Iraq repeatedly over the past decade. US sending a bad message- going to war against countries that don't have nuclear weapons (Iraq) and negotiating with countries that do (North Korea)- teaches countries that they need nuclear weapons to defend themselves US claims that if Hussein gets nuclear weapons he will trade some to al Qaeda No evidence of cooperation or ties between Iraq and al Qaeda Osama bin Laden was a fundamentalist and Hussein was secular- didn't favor each other's policies Hussein knew that US would be surveying Iraq and al Qaeda and if he gave the organization nuclear weapons there would be consequences and retaliation Iraq's nuclear program was destroyed between 1991 and 1998- did not rebuild it. There is an embargo and inspectors in Iraq- no nuclear weapons. Preventative war entails costs that are not worth the benefit of the war- financially trying for years' worth of occupation and lives lost. Undermine the war on terrorism- diverting funds, manpower, and attention away from fighting al Qaeda. Further the idea that the US is a "bully" and would jeopardize the international unity necessary for the US war on global terrorism

37. Norms of Humanitarian Intervention (M. Finnemore)

Realist and liberal explanations cannot account for why states sometime intervene for humanitarians without any strategic or geopolitical incentives 1989 Somalia, Cambodia, protecting Kurds Realist/liberal assume exogenous interest but... Norms shape interest which shape action → Constructivist approach Norms can be on a systemic level too since they are intersubjective rather than merely subjective; broad patterns can sweep across the world The evolution of which humans merit protection; definition of "human" De-emphasizes promotion of democracy, little evidence Social norms are constructed and they evolve with social interaction Even if justification isn't always true, it matters since justifications reflect the articulation of shared values and expections of other policy makers and public Humanitarian efforts have always been proclaimed; difference is the scope now and what it entails Decolonization and abolition of slavery, humanitarian intervention, self determination, all these ideas mutually reinforce each other Before 20th Century Only Christians were worthy of saving Humanitarian action was rarely taken when it jeopardized other state goals/interest Was both multilateral and unilateral Expansion of Humanity and sovereignty Abolition of slavery 19th cent, decolonization in 20th cent, new set of norms that universalized humanity But still no one sent troops to fight for slaves... different extent of intervention Also depended on who was committing the wrong; white Christians Colonization/decolonization White man's burden; thought it was white's responsibility to bring civility to savages Then exporting of egalitarian social movements in Europe to other parts of world Colonization started to become more unacceptable Since 1945 Most intervention made on behalf of non-Christians non-Europeans But most states that could have intervened with a justifiable humanitarian reason intervened and did not claim that reason. Why? Because multilateral action with disinterested parties, under UN supervision is now considered appropriate Any unilateral action condemned; no right to meddle

48. The Quiet Coup (Johnson)

The finance industry has effectively captured the US government, and recovery from the financial crisis of 2008 will fail unless the financial oligarchy that is blocking reform is broken Politics in countries of economic crisis is usually the primary cause powerful elites overreach and take too many risks oligarchs need to be squeezed and take a hit in order to recover--only way for recovery US collapse 2008 reminiscent of past financial crises: S. Korea (1997), Malaysia (1998) global investors fear that debt won't be paid back and stop lending, investors usually right, banks unable to pay elite business interests play central role in creating crisis financial industry has enjoyed favored treatment increasingly over past 25 years--bankers now have great political weight; last few presidential administrations strengthen Wall Street-DC connection campaign finance, personal connections, ideology→ numerous deregulatory policies oligarchy and govt policies not solely responsible; also excessive household borrowing, lax lending standards govt has taken extreme measures not to upset interests of financial institutions throughout the crisis The way out of the crisis Nationalization: not permanent state ownership, but govt-managed bankruptcy procedure for banks, wipe out bank shareholders, replace failed management, clean up balance sheets, and then sell banks back to private sector break the oligarchy

2. Reductionist and Systemic Theories (K. Waltz)

Theories are reductionist or systemic Reductionist theories explain international outcomes through elements and combinations of elements at national or subnational level includes individual and internal characteristics of primary actors (states) internal forces produce external outcomes Waltz's take on reductionist theories these theories fail--do not deliver logical and traceable process by which internal elements affect external outcomes actions and policies shaped by states' interactions with each other fail to explain continuity over time--variety of internal actors and their actions over time have not resulted in variety of outcomes Systems Theories causes at the international level structure doesn't affect behavior within the system state interaction and competition affects outcome of the system Explain why different units behave similarly and, despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall w/in expected ranges

34. The Nuclear Taboo (N. Tannenwald)

Thesis: a normative prohibition on nuclear use has developed in the global system, which has stigmatized nukes as unacceptable WMDs might have been more use in history w/o this stigma taboo=normative belief about the behavior, not the behavior itself Causal mechanisms by which the taboo operates: domestic public opinion world opinion personal conviction about beliefs about American values Four nuclear anomalies--need to take into account the stigma to explain these non-use of nukes when there was no fear of nuke retaliation first 10 years of Cold War when US was nuclear dominant nukes have not deterred attacks by non-nuclear states against nuclear states China attacked US forces in Korean War Argentina attacked Britain in the Falklands in 1982 non-nuclear states are not as at risk in nuclear age as realism would predict many states that could have developed nukes have not Three normative effects to analyze the role of the taboo regulative: rationalist approaches to IR; norms constrain constitutive: constructivist perspectives; norms define forms of behavior, roles, identities permissive: unintended consequences of the norm (creates conditions that allow the norms to flourish or not) Norms don't unfold in a vacuum. arise from different norms as well Rational deterrence incomplete argument to explain the taboo Taboo has evolved: beginning to emerge around Korean War, solidly established as unacceptable by 1991 Gulf War Four cases of nuclear (non)use Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945): no nuclear stigma--US bombed Korea (1950-1953): stigma emerging; afraid of public opprobrium against atomic weapons on Chinese cities + US leaders feared it opposed US values Vietnam: political and normative considerations overwhelm any military value of nuclear weapons Gulf War: taboo in place--didn't need or want nukes in this case

28. Constructing National Interests (J. Weldes)

US national interests in CMC are not a fixed process; created, cannot be assumed just from the fact that missiles were in Cuba US policy makers in construction of Soviets as enemies→ missiles= unacceptable threat US officials designate SU as aggressive, expansionist, immoral since beginning of Cold War and had anti-communist rhetoric since Russian Rev policy leaders portray US as peaceful, civilized leader of the free world; have responsibility to protect Western Hemisphere from SU and Cuba US policy leaders equated SU's actions with those of Nazi Germany in the build up to WWII these constructions of national interests by US policy leaders make it so the US has no choice but to respond to the perceived Cuban/SU "threat" and engage in a standoff national interests (anti-communism, anti-Soviet "aggression") become naturalized in society over time