Phil325

What is Presentism?

o Only present events and objects, past did exist and future will exist • Example: o Socrates does not exist and neither do future events exist o They may have existed in the past or the present. They did exist but they don't exist now o Paris exists, but it does not exist here o Ancient Egypt does exist, but not at this time

What is the The Divine Foreknowledge Argument and seven solutions?

• "If God knows what we are to do before we do it, then our actions are not free." Therefore, divine foreknowledge is incompatible with free will. • The Argument, in more detail: • Assumes PAP • Suppose that tomorrow you will get out of bed exactly 7 minutes after you wake up. o If God is omniscient, then he knew yesterday what you would do tomorrow. o If you have free will, then you are able to make what God knows false or change the past o You cannot do either of those o Therefore, divine foreknowledge is incompatible with free will. • Eternalist (Boethian) Solution o God is outside of time, so strictly speaking he doesn't have foreknowledge. o God sees all of past, present and future history as present. Just as your seeing that I raise my arm (as present) is compatible with my free will, God's seeing what I will do (as present) is compatible with my free will. • Aristotelian Solution o God does not have foreknowledge because the future does not exist and so there is nothing about the future for God to know. (In particular there are no future contingent truths.) • Frankfurtian Solution o One very simple account of free will doesn't require alternate possibilities for free will: X had free will in action A iff A was what X wanted to do. o E.g. If I want to stay in the room and I do stay then I acted with free will even if the door was locked (and we don't know). o The fact that God knows you will do X does not take away free will if you desire to do X • Ockhamist Solution o God can know that a proposition about the future is true, even though the state of affairs in virtue of which it is true is not yet settled or actual. o Softs facts which are partly about the future "The bride-to-be is trying on her wedding dress" is grammatically present-tense, but its truth depends in part on the future, on what she may freely choose. It's a soft fact. Similarly, "God has known that P" is grammatically past tense but depends in part on the future, on what I may freely choose. So it doesn't partake in the necessity of the past. It's a soft fact. o Hard facts are not even partly about the future o It may be in my power to change the soft facts, because they are partly about the future. o (Could it be that our free acts cause God's past beliefs, by backwards causation?) • Molinist Solution o Knowledge of necessary truths, his own will and middle knowledge - what people choose to do o Middle knowledge requires that there are true counterfactuals of freedom (counterfactuals of the form "If A were in circumstances C, she would freely do X") prior to God's creative will. o God uses his middle knowledge in deciding what to create. By combining his Middle Knowledge with what he decides to create, God knows the entire history of the world. o Quote from Adams o "there does not normally seem to be any uncertainty at all about what a butcher, for example, would have done if I had asked him to sell me a pound of ground beef, although we suppose he would have had free will in the matter." • Open God Solution o God has neither infallible foreknowledge nor middle knowledge. o (They argue that the reason for accepting foreknowledge is to account for God's providence. But foreknowledge, without middle knowledge would be useless for providential purposes. And it's implausible that God has middle knowledge, so we have no reason to believe in foreknowledge either.) • What is the Logical and Theological Fatalism response [Warfield]? o Assume God is necessarily existent and essentially omniscient. Then (1) is logically equivalent to (2): It was true in 50 A.D. that Plantinga will climb Mt Rushmore in 2000 A.D. God knew in 50 A.D. that Plantinga will climb Mt Rushmore in 2000 A.D. o Since almost everyone rejects logical fatalism, they must agree (1) is consistent with Plantinga will freely climb Mt Rushmore in 2000 A.D. o It follows that (3) is constistent with (2)

What is Zeno's Paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise?

• Achilles must catch a tortoise • Achilles runs 10 time faster than the tortoise • If the tortoise is 100 yards ahead of Achilles • If A runs 100 miles, the turtois will be 10 yards ahead • If 10, then 1 • If 1, then 0.1 ... • Therefore, nothing moves • Objection: o A contemporary objected by just walking o Standard mathematical answer: The sum of an infinite series can be a finite number 100=10=1=.1=.01 Is 111. 1 repeater 111 1/9 yards Sum of a convergent geometric series 10 ys for A and 1 ys for T, difference equals 9 A and T 0 100/9 = 11.11111repeater Max Black argues that they havn't solved the problem that they could meet (as they haven't shown it is possible to complete an infinite series) but that they show where they will meet, if they meet. They have just defined the sum of an infinite series as what it is getting nearer to

What is the standard definition of free will?

• An action is influenced by free will if it can be done otherwise • Some things are up to or determined by nothing but the individual

What are six different positions on the free will/determinism debate?

• DETERMINISM: Every event is determined by past events together with the laws of nature. • SOFT DETERMINISM: We have free will and determinism is true. • HARD DETERMINISM: We don't have free will but determinism is true. • LIBERTARIANISM: Free will requires indeterminism. Furthermore, we do have free will and indeterminism is true. • COMPATIBILISM: Free will and determinism can both be true... • Incompatibilism: Free will and determinism cannot both be true

What is some of the evidence against determinism?

• Free will and incompatibilism and irreducible probabilities of quantum indeterminacy

According to Kadri Vihvelin, what is incompatibilism, impossibilism and how might one argue for impossibilism?

• Incompatibilism ("is usually understood as"): free will and determinism are incompatible (cannot both be true). • Impossibilism: we have no free will. It is (logically) impossible for us to have free will. • Vihvelin claims that there are two reasons impossibilism can be true. (1) Free will is an incoherent concept: the concept of free will is like the concept of a round square, or a liquid wine bottle. (2) Free will is incompatible with some necessarily true proposition, such as the law of excluded middle. E.g. Those who use the fatalist argument to argue that we don't have free will.

What is John Fischer's semicompatibilism?

• Moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, but free will is incompatible with determinism.

What is substantivalism and relationism about space?

• Substantivalism (or absolutism) about space: Space does exist independently of objects and events in space. Like an empty container • Relationism about space: Space does not exist independently of objects and events in space. Space is just a system of relations between objects and events - space does not exist independently of them

What is the Growing block and Dynamic eternalist view?

• The Moving Spotlight Theory of Time/dynamic eternalist - Current time is like a bug moving up the axis Static eternalism + say where the current time is • Growing block view: Past and present exist: future does not exist

What is another Defense of PAP?

Fischer's Response Reject "ought implies can"... "Ought implies can" (Haji, Widerker, Copp) (1) If an act is blameworthy then it must be wrong, (2) If it is wrong then it must be the case that the agent should have done something else instead (or refrained from acting at all). (3) But "ought implies can": if the agent should have done something else instead, then he must have been able to do something else. (4) Therefore, an act being blameworthy requires alternate possibilities (PAP).

What is Frankfurt's distinction between a free action and a free will?

Free action: Your choice determines your action. Free will: your choice determines your WILL. (That is, your choice determines the desire you will TRY to act on). Process - Deliberate about what to will > Form your will (the desire you will try to act on) > Body moves

What is the aim, claim, definition and plan of Kadri Vihvelin's Paper?

Her Aim: Defend compatibilism from the standard arguments. Vihvelin's claim, p. 215: "The incompatibilist may be a libertarian [we have free will, determinism is false]... or she may be a hard determinist [we do not have free will, determinism is true]... However, she is not an impossibilist because she believes that the truth or falsity of determinism is relevant to the question of whether we have free will." Vihvelin is adopting a non-standard definition of incompatibilism: free will and determinism cannot both be true, AND impossibilism is false. (Free will can be true). Her plan: to criticize all the important arguments for incompatibilism and argue that they either fail or turn out to be arguments for impossibilism.

What is Dainton's Overdetermination Problem?

(1) All actual events have permanent locations somewhere along the static B-series. (2) A-properties are intrinsic properties of events. (3) A-properties are transitory: every event changes from being future to present and then past. (4) Therefore, The A-series is contradictory. • 3 Responses to Overdetermination Problem a. Meta-Time i. At this time it had that property but at another time it doesn't 1. This leads to a vicious regress and solves nothing b. Other Worlds i. Incompatible present properties exist not in one world but in different possible worlds ii. Either those worlds are real of they are not, if they are, that is bizarre c. Reject Spotlight Theory (could still accept Presentism or Growing Block Theory)

What is an argument that all causation is simultaneous which poses a problem for the causal analysis of time?

(1) Causes determine their effects, i.e. if the cause occurs it is impossible for the effect not to occur. (2) If there were a temporal gap between cause and effect, then causes would not determine their effects, for something could intervene in the gap and prevent the effect from occurring. (3) Therefore, There is no gap between causes and effect. (4) Therefore, Causes are simultaneous with their effects.

What is the empty time argument against Relationism about Time (for Substantivalism about Time)?

(1) If relationism about Time is true, then empty time is logically impossible. (2) Empty time is not logically possible. (3) Therefore, Relationism about Time is false.

What is Swinburne's argument for the non-beginning of time?

(1) Let T be the beginning of time. Either there were swans prior to T, or there were not swans prior to T. (2) If there were swans prior to T, then there was a time prior to T. (3) If there were not swans prior to T, then there was a time prior to T. (4) Therefore, There was a time prior to T. Time has no beginning.

What is The 'Thank Goodness that's over' Argument against static eternalism?

(1) Some of our attitudes presuppose changing A-facts. E.g. Utterances of "Thank goodness that's over" express relief that an event is past. (2) Static Eternalism cannot explain why this feeling of relief is inappropriate. (On Static Eternalism, all A talk reduces to B talk. But B facts are fixed and unchanging - they hold at all times. So, it can never be appropriate to thank goodness for a B fact at one time rather than another.) (3) Presentism can explain this, because the painful events no longer exist. (4) Therefore, Presentism is correct. (5) Objection: (1) Spatial analogy (2) Mellor (1) Thank goodness expresses relief but not about a fact being in the past (3) Dr Spock (1) It is inappropriate to have a future bias and static eternalism is true but thank goodness doesn't matter (4) McLaurin & Dyke (1) We are future orientated because we need to plan for the future (2) Evolution by NS makes our minds think about the future

What is the Forking Paths Argument, Vihvelin's criticism and an objection?

(1) We have free will only if we can at least sometimes do otherwise. (2) We can do otherwise only if choosing between actions is like choosing between forking paths: that is, only if more than one action is a lawful continuation of the actual past. (3) If determinism is true, then only one action is a lawful continuation of the actual past. (4) Therefore, If determinism is true, we don't have free will. Her criticism: this is an argument for incompatibilism, but it's not a good argument, because we don't have any reasons independent of incompatibilism to accept premise (2).

What are Markosian's arguments against the flow of time?

- Dimension arguments 1. If time flows, then there must be a second dimension with respect to which toe flow of time is to be measured. 2. If that's the case, then there must be another dimension and so forth. 3. This is absurd. 4. Therefore, time does not flow. • Objections o It is not absurd o Time can be measured against itself o We measure the flow of banks against the banks and we measure the flow of time against super time - Passage argument 1. If time flows, the it makes sense to ask "how fast does it flow or pass." 2. If 1, then there is a coherent answer to the question. 3. There is no coherent answer 4. Therefore, it does not make sense to say that • Objections: o There is a coherent answers - one second per second, like acceleration being one metre per second o From relativity theory, we know time passes at different rates. Hence it is coherent. o Arthur Prior's Answer It's very simple. Time flows at the rate of one second per second.

What are some problems for Frankfurt's account of free will?

1) (Wantonness w.r.t. higher-order volitions) If someone can lack free will because he hasn't reflected on his first-order volitions, why can't he lack free will because he hasn't reflected on his 2nd-order volitions? 1) Infinite regress is solved by a commitment to a higher order desire 2) Does Frankfurt have a good answer to what happens when someone has conflicting 2nd-order volitions? 1) Responds to objection 2 - Gary Watson states that someone is free if their values (valuational system) control their desires (motivational system) 3) Suppose the source of the 2nd-order volitions is external to the agent. E.g. the willing addict's brain is being manipulated into having his second-order volition, or it is a side-effect of the drugs. Then intuitively he doesn't have free will. 4) Why should 2nd-order desires count for more than 1st-order desires?... Some Problems "Suppose a friend begs you never to give her any cigarettes even if she should ask for them and you agree. The next day she comes and asks you to disregard her previous instructions and to give her a cigarette? What should you do? Where does your friend's real self lie? (What if your friend is your lower-order self?)

What is the Argument against Extracosmic Space against Substantivalism about space? [p. 42-3]

1) If an object could have existed in a different place, then there must be an explanation for why it is where it is. 2) If the universe is surrounded by empty space, then it could have existed in a different place. 3) Therefore, If the universe is surrounded by empty space, then there must be an explanation for why it is where it is 4) But, since empty space is completely uniform there could be no explanation of why the universe is where it is. 5) Therefore, The universe is not surrounded by empty space. o First premise is untenable: why does there need to be an explanation o Objects within the universe need and explanation since they could have been otherwise (other objects could have influenced that object) but this does not apply to the universe as a whole since there is no other object to influence the position of the universe o Substantivalist can accept the conclusion with no implications as the there is not empty space because the boundaries of absolute space coincide with the universe or the universe is infinite and so to is space so there is no empty space

What is Kant's lone hand argument?

1) There is an objective difference between a universe containing only a left hand and one containing a right hand. 2) If is an objective difference between a universe containing only a left hand and one containing a right hand, then this is determined by: (a) relations between that object and other objects, or (b) relations between the parts of that object, or (c) relations between that object and absolute space. 3) The difference is not determined by (a), as there are no objects besides the hand, or by (b), as these relations are the same in the two universes. 4) Therefore, the difference must be determined by (c). 5) If the relations between that object and absolute space determine the difference, then absolute space exists. 6) Therefore, Absolute space exists. • Objections: o Could a disembodied observer know it was right? o Could a well-formed hand be neither right nor left o Deny 3, It could be that the dimensionality of our space is defined only once other objects are introduced o Could move the thumb around, if you can rearrange the relations between the properties to make it a right hand, then it handedness depends on the relation between the properties o Flatlander objection: • Fourth dimension to space is possible - Chap 4 • Because we can flip a hand through a fourth dimension, LH cannot be an intrinsic property

What is the Clarence Darrow argument and Vihvelin's criticism and an objection and rebuttal for the argument?

1) We have free will only if we are entirely self-made selves - that is, only if we have complete control over the kind of persons we are. 2) We are not entirely self-made selves 3) Therefore, we don't have free will. Her criticism: this is an argument for impossibilism, not for incompatibilism (unless it's possible, in a possible world in which indeterminism is true, for us to entirely make ourselves).

What is the Consequence Argument? Vihvelin's response and an objection?

1) You have free will only if you could have done otherwise. 2) If determinism is true, then the laws of nature together with the past logically entail every event. 3) You could not have broken the laws of nature. 4) You could not have changed the past. 5) Therefore, free will and determinism are incompatible. Another version: (1) There is nothing I can do to change the remote past or the laws of nature. (2) Necessarily, if the remote past and laws are what they are, my present actions occur. (3) Therefore, there is nothing I can do to change the fact that my present actions occur. (4) Therefore, I must do what I do; I cannot do otherwise. • Replies: o Vihvelin: this is an argument for incompatibilism but it is not valid. o Commits the fatalist fallacy by supposing that a fact about what one will do means that they could not do otherwise, it is just a fact about the past and the laws. o If the laws and the past were different, then you could have done otherwise. o Could have done otherwise. Just that what would have caused you to do otherwise was a different in the laws and the past.

What is the Dilemma Defense of PAP against the Frankfurt counter-examples?

1. Either determinism is true or indeterminism is true. 2. First Horn: Suppose determinism is true, then an incompatibilistMR will not accept any counterexamples to PAP because she will not judge any cases have MR. 3. Second Horn: Suppose indeterminism is true, then there are no counterexamples to PAP (Frankfurt counter-examples don't work), because prior sign cases do not remove all alternate possibilities. 4. Therefore, there are no counterexamples to PAP. The First Horn (again) 1. Suppose determinism is true. 2. For a counterexample to PAP we need (Pû MRü). 3. But an incompatibilistMR will expect there to be no moral responsibility (MRû), unless given further argument. 4. So, on the assumption of determinism, any alleged counterexamples to PAP beg the question against the incompatibilistMR. The Second Horn (again) 1. Suppose indeterminism is true. 2. For a counterexample to PAP we need (Pû MRü). 3. But to remove all alternate possibilities (to get Pû), Frankfurt-style counterexamples require prior signs to determine subsequent behavior. 4. So, on the assumption of indeterminism, any alleged counterexamples to PAP fail.

What is the Nowhere Argument and two objections?

1. If someone time travels, she travels to the past or future 2. If presentism is correct, the past and future do not exist 3. On cannot travel to what does not exist 4. Therefore, if presentism is true, time travel is impossible • Objection: o Objection that if you get there and it exists, not that it has to exist when you start travelling - e.g. building an amusement park which you are travelling to o N&K proves to much response: i.e. it proves something we do not accept - If presentism is plausible, then the nowehere argument is not plausible since presentism presupposes that the present is travelling toward a non-existtent future

What is the Bilocation Argument?

1. Some cases of time travel involve a person being in 2 places at the same time - e.g. old and young Jennifer 2. But this is impossible, according to presentism 3. Therefore, time-travel is impossible for the presentists • Objection: o PERDURANCE: Jennifer-age-84 ≠ Jennifer-age-14 o RELATIVIZER ENDURANCE: Jennifer has the property of being white-haired-at-age-84 and the property of being black-haired-age-14. These are not incompatible. Relativised to age or personal time - I have this property at this time. This is the same solution to the paradox of change - The leaf is green-in-Spring; the leaf is orange-in-Autumn o NON-RELATIVIZER ENDURANCE: Black-haired Jennifer and white-haired Jennifer cannot exist at the same time. Cannot solve bilocation problem.

What are four problems for presentism?

1. Truthmakers for Statements about the Past (1) Presentism entails that no past objects exist, and hence that there are no truth makers for statements about the past. (2) Hence, Presentism entails that all statements about the past is false. (3) But some statements about the past are true e.g. Fred had a wild party last night. (4) Hence, Presentism is falseCompatibility with Special Relativity 1. Response: 1. Bite the bullet (insist that all statements about the past are false). 2. Use traces as truthmakers 1. Events which leave no traces do not exist 2. Problem of traces changing so past truth changes 3. Some may not leave traces 4. Confuses evidence for fact with the fact 3. Use irreducible tensed facts as truth makers 1. Facts themselves exist now and are irreducible 2. Einsteins theory of relativity (1) Presentism entails that there is an absolute present. (2) If there is an absolute present, then there is such a thing as absolute simultaneity. (3) Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (STR) entails that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity. (1) Train moves toward a lightning bolt and away from another - light from behind with arrive after the first one for cei (2) Ed sees both strike at the same time (3) Thus, time goes slower when you (4) The speed of light is he same for all inertial observers (4) Therefore STR entails that Presentism is false. (5) If (4), then Presentism is false. (6) (6) Therefore, Presentism is false. (1) Replies (1) Distinguish: (1) STR+ (1) STR with philosophical baggage built in. It does entail that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity (2) STR- (1) A philosophically austere version of STR that does not entail that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity. (2) "Although there seems to be a great deal of empirical evidence supporting STR+, that same empirical evidence supports STR- equally well." 3. Understanding causation & other relations 1. For it to be true that one event causes another, both events must exist. 2. For it to be true that one event causes another, the first must occur earlier than the second. 3. But, according to Presentism, only the present time exists. 4. Therefore, according to Presentism, it is never true that one event causes another. 5. But one event does cause another 6. Therefore, Presentism is false. 4. Triviality (1) Presentism states that there is only the present time. (or that "The only things that exist are the things that exist at present.") (2) There are only three options for reading the 'is': present-tensed "is" - SE would agree with it, eternal 'is' - can't be that because it is false, or timeless 'is' - 2+2=4 is a timeless fact . (3) On all these interpretations, Presentism is trivial. (4) Therefore, Presentism is trivial. (1) Response: (1) It only says Presentism is trivially true or trivially false

What is Van Inwagen's "Mystery Argument" and a critique?

Forking Paths Argument about indeterminism: 1. Suppose determinism if false, 2. If it is false, then nature will present me with forking paths which are consistent with what went before it 3. If this is the case, then my prior deliberations do not determine my choice 4. If that is the case, then chance determines my choice 5. If that is the case, then I have no free will 6. Therefore, if indeterminism is true, then I have no free will Consequence argument about determinism: 1. You have free will only if you can do otherwise 2. If determinism is true, then only one future path is compatible with the past and the laws of nature 3. If one could do otherwise, then they must be able to change the laws or the past 4. One cannot change the laws or the past 5. Therefore, if determinism is true, then we have no free will Deliberation argument about free will: 1. Everyone deliberates. 2. If everyone deliberates, then they must believe they have free will. 3. Therefore, everyone must believe they have free will Mystery argument: 1. Either determinism or indeterminism is true. 2. Metaphysical freedom is incompatible with determinism or indeterminism. 3. Therefore, there is no metaphysical freedom. 4. But well all know that there is metaphysical freedom. 5. Therefore, 6. Metaphysical freedom is a mystery.

What is a paradox, how can one solve one, and what is the paradox of the surprise exam?

Paradox: • Seemingly absurd or impossible conclusion reached from seemingly acceptable premises and reasoning • Solving a paradox involves either: 1. Rejecting at least one premise 2. Finding an error in the reasoning 3. Accepting the conclusion Surprise exam: • Suppose, for the sake of argument, that (i) there will be an examination, and (ii) that it will be unexpected in the sense that on the morning of the day in which it is given, the class will not know that it will occur that day. • Step 1: It will not be on Friday, because then I would know on Thursday evening that it would be on Friday, because it would not have been on Monday through Thursday, so it could not be unexpected in the relevant sense. • Step 2: It will not be on Thursday. Because if it were on Thursday it would not be unexpected. We would know by Wednesday evening that it was not on Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday, and also we would know that it could not be on Friday from step 1. • Step 3: It will not be on Wednesday... • Step 4: It will not be on Tuesday... • Step 5: It will not be on Monday. • Therefore, there will not be an unexpected examination.

What is O'connor's libertarianism and some replies?

What is O'connor's libertarianism and some replies? • Argues against Kane's notion that free will results from probability as probability does not give any extra control • Agent causation: o Agent causation is (and free will requires) us being the beginning of a causal chain - nothing causes the agent to form this intention - end-of-the-line causal initiator o Agent causation differs from mechanistic causation as the properties of the agent do not suffice to determine the effect but enable the effect to be determined o "Whether, when and how such a capacity will be exercised is freely determined by the agent himself" o Effect is the intention (the action and the reason for the action) • O'connor's replies to his objections: o Timing objection (major objection) The properties of the agent must have caused the action and there must have been an event responsible for when those properties came into being which explains the timing of the effect. This means the decision was determined. Reply: • "Whether, when and how such a capacity will be exercised is freely determined by the agent himself" actualised is freely determined by the agent • The properties of the agent (such as reasons or desires) enable him to freely act but are not sufficient to determine that he acts at a given time • Agent = cause, and intention (reasons+intent-action) = effect, but the effect explains that timing o I freely intend to watch the news at 7pm for x reasons o Contrastive objection Reasons to which one points wont explain why the agent acted in one way rather than another way Reply • You shouldn't expect contrastive explanation in every case of indeterminism (quantum decay) but the explanation of the occurrence (causal factor) is sufficient o Random objection If the agent causation is undetermined and uncaused, then it is random Rebuttal • This objection demands that there needs to be something controlling the controlling, otherwise it is random. But this is absurd and would require an infinite regress • There is a basic form of control, and this is the formation of the intention o Unmoved movers like God He argues that we are not unmoved We are influenced by causes but not sufficient causes o Epistemological objection Agent causation is undetectable so why should we believe in it O'connor agree it is scientifically undetectable He is not attempting to adduce scientific evidence His claim is that, in order to have free will, it would have to be like this Additional rebuttals • Non-scientifically detectable • Scientific causation is not that easily detectable but just inferred o Unique free-will Absurd that stones or particle don't have free will but complicated particle arrangements do have agent causation

What are the thermodynamic, psychological, and causal arrows? Can we define the arrow of time in terms of the causal arrow?

o Thermodynamic arrow "Event A is earlier than event B iff the universe is, when B occurs, in a higher state of entropy that it is when A occurs." o Psychological arrow; "A is earlier than B iff A is the content of a memory at the same time that B is the content of a perception." o Causal Analysis: The Basic Causal Analysis of Time Order [p. 218] • A is before B iff A is a cause of B. • Not universal order as not all early A's cause B The Modal Causal Analysis of Time Order • A is before B iff it is possible for A to be a cause of B. The Augmented Causal Analysis of Time Order • A is earlier than B iff A is simultaneous with a cause of B.

What is fatalism?

o We have no free will

What is the Objective Attitude according to Strawson?

• "To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy, as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment, as managed or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided..." • We can temporarily choose to adopt the objective attitude to other agents too: o "as a refuge from the strains of involvement." o if our job requires it (e.g. as a psychotherapist). o out of intellectual curiosity.

What is a simple definition of moral responsibility?

• A person is morally responsible for an action if and only if she is deserving of moral condemnation or approval for performing that action. And let's keep the notions of approval and condemnation separate from the notions of reward and punishment, in this definition. Even if someone is deserving of condemnation, it may be inappropriate to publicly condemn or punish her... (There is a lot of disagreement about which actions are morally good, bad or indifferent. Let's agree not to worry about this here.)

What is the A and B series and A and B properties?

• A series - A way of oprdering events according to whether they are past, present or future. The serious of positions in time running from past present or future. Past, present future axis • B series - Locating events relative to other events rather the event to the current time - Serious of events running from earlier to later. - Later-simultaneos with-earlier axis • A properties - being past or future • B properties - being earlier etc.

What is an A or B theorist?

• A theorist - A properties are fundamental - Presentist and moving spotlight theory • B theorist - A properties are derivative from B properties, not fundamental - Static eternalist

What is the geometric statement argument against relationism?

• Absolutist could argue that truths about distances and unoccupied points only make sense within an Absolutist framework • Relationist can argue that abstract geometrical truths make the distances true without there necessarily being an actual unoccupied point - Eternal truths of pure geometry + Relations between objects in the world = truth of geometric statements about objects in the world • Objection: o However, there is not a single true geometry within which to measure distances, such as Euclidian or non-Euclidian geometry. Truths about distances and empty space must apply to reality itself and not abstract realms, since they differ. o Even if there were a true geometrical system aside from Euclidean, elliptic, or hyperbole geometry, it must be facts about absolute space that make it true that one pure geometry describes the world better and not another

What is Frankfurt's rationality account of Free Will, an example and a critique?

• According to Frankfurt, X has free will in doing A if and only if his second order volition determines his will. - (i.e. X has free will only if X is "free to have (in charge of) the will he wants to have") • First and second-order desires: o Frankfurt thinks that deliberation about what to will ought to involve forming SECOND-ORDER DESIRES... o A first-order desire is a desire about how to act. The will is one of the first-order desires. It is the first-order desire that I end up trying to act on. o A second-order desire is a desire about a first-order desire. • Volition - A second-order volition is a type of second-order desire. It is a desire about which first-order desire one wants to be one's will. Preference about desires o (A third-order desire is a desire about a second-order desire). • Example: o Unwilling Smoker Desire1: I desire not to smoke a cigarette now. Desire2: I desire to smoke a cigarette now. Desire4: I desire that I don't try to act on desire2. - Second order volition. o Wanton Smoker: Desire1: I desire to smoke a cigarette now. I don't have any second-order desires. I don't think about stuff like that. • The "wanton smoker" (who has no second-order desires at all) lacks free will. • The "unwilling smoker" lacks free will. (As Frankfurt puts it he is "helplessly violated by his own desires".) • The "willing smoker" may or may not have free will depending on whether or not he would be able to resist temptation. So IF he had conflicting desires, his second-order volition would determine how he acted • Victims of brainwashing, victims of hypnosis, kleptomaniacs, those with psychological scars from abuse or trauma, those who have weak wills ... may or may not have free will (depending on whether or not they would be able to overcome these obstacles).

How does the Principle of alternate (alternative) possibilities relate to moral responsibility?

• Agent X is morally responsible for action A only if X could have done otherwise than A. • PAP only states a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This needn't be a sufficient condition. (There may be other necessary conditions...)

What are some varieties of Libertarianism and the common thread?

• All believe in free will and that it requires indeterminism • Agent causation o Free will is only in agent causation o Agent causation = Agent causes an event rather than another event causing an event - agents causation is not prior determined o Event is a seen as an object acting - not just an object o O'connor Intention is caused by agent Content of intention is "I act in x way for y reasons" - reason is a part of the detention Intention formation is the free action o Randy Clarke's intedeterminism Free actions are also indeterministically event-caused by prior reasons of the agent • Causal indeterminism o Reasons for an action on provide a prior probability of an outcome o Reason causation is probabilistic o When you act for your own reasons, even if there is a probability of failure for the reasons to guarantee the action, you still act for your own reasons • Simple indeterminism - Carl Ginet o An agent has free will iff their action is undetermined and has the right phenomenal quality (the right feeling - this actish quality) o The agent is the subject of the action - he performs it and doesn't cause it o Identity and causation People out of jobs causes is unemployment Free act is not caused by the agent but is performed by the agent Pressing three keys does not cause a chord, it is a chord

What is Watson's response to Strawson and the case of Robert Harris?

• Applying Strawson's view: the case of Robert Harris • Case of Robert Harris: o Harris's mother's testimony of his awful childhood gives pause to our reactive attitudes. But can Strawson explain why the reactive attitudes are sensitive to the story? o Harris was not "open to moral dialogue", and we didn't need to hear historical circumstances to realize this. • Watson [in "Responsibility and the limits of evil"] suggests that exempted individuals are outside the moral community and not open to moral dialogue. If reactive attitudes are "invitations to moral dialogue", then psychopaths like Robert Harris aren't appropriate objects of these attitudes. • Hard Question for Strawson [see Watson]: o How do we determine whether persons like Harris are inside the "moral community" so that they are fit subjects for the reactive attitudes like blame, resentment etc? Are all evil people exempted?! o Exempting Conditions are sensitive to historical circumstances. Why? o We don't want to exempt everyone who is evil, independently of their backgrounds. • Complaints from Watson o Exempting conditions involving historical circumstances seem to give some support to the incompatibilistsMR. o Moreover, "If our reactive attitudes are sensitive to historical considerations, and we are largely ignorant of these, then it would seem that most of our reactive attitudes are hasty". [p. 180] o So, although Watson largely agrees with Strawson, he thinks that Strawson is "inordinately optimistic about our common ways". • Some of Watson's points o Sympathy and antipathy o Moral luck o Determinism and ignorance o Objectivity and isolation We are ignorant of what led people to do what they did If we base our moral system on reactive attitudes, these are hasty If we did enquire, then we might not have these reactive attitudes Strawson is inordinately optimistic about our common ways

What does it mean to say that time is asymmetric and that time has an arrow?

• Arrow of time: used in connection with the idea that time has a direction, in a way space does not • Future and past are not completely symmetric • Alphabet has an asymmetric order but no direction • Flow is different from direction - flow moves • Asymmetric table but it has no direction

What is the Fatalist Argument and two objections?

• Called fatalist because it sounds fatalist to believe there is no free will • Richard Taylor defends it • That there is a fact about every event entails we have no free will • Principle of bivalence - every (tenseless) proposition is either true or false for all time - (standard view of tenseless proposition which some presentists reject) • Richard Taylor incorrectly said it was the law of excluded middle • Argument 1. Every proposition about future event is true or not true - Bivalence 2. For each of us, there exists a set of true propositions about our lives 3. It is impossible to change this 4. If this is the case, then we have no free will 5. Therefore, we have no free will • Objections: o Bivalence does not hold for future events o Distinction between could and will, necessity/actuality/possibility (pair called modality): The fact that a thing is going to happen implies that it is going to happen, not that it is necessary or has to happen Standard reply Taylor is valiant response: • No one has ever rendered false a statement that is try, no matter how much one tries • Although I will do X (actually world), I could have done otherwise (happens in relevant possible worlds) but there is no evidence of people actually doing otherwise

What is a Simple Compatibilist Account, hard and soft facts, two objections to the account and why is it a compatibilist account?

• Conditional modification: o Step 1: "S has free will" means "S could have done otherwise". o Step 2: "S could have done otherwise" means "If S had chosen to do otherwise then she would have done otherwise". o "S has free will" if and only if her own choice determines her action. • Example: o Sam: I chose vanilla. But if I had chosen strawberry, I would have had strawberry. And if I had chosen chocolate, I would have had chocolate... o Cindy: I chose vanilla. But if I had chosen something else, I would still have had to eat vanilla. They make me eat vanilla ice cream here. • Soft and hard facts distinction • We can divide the factors that determine my actions into HARD FACTS (factors external to my self) and SOFT FACTS (factors internal to myself). o Hard facts Locations, laws etc o Soft facts Beliefs, desires o Factors determining my actions • When the soft facts determine my actions then I have free will. When the hard facts determine my actions then I don't have free will. • Objections o Negation of the conditional (Objects to second part: "S could have done otherwise" means if S had chosen to do otherwise then S would have done otherwise.) Drug addict example. Evil scientist example. Do you agree that he does not act freely although if he had chosen to do otherwise he would have? o Negation of PAP or first step (Objects to first part: "S has free will" means S could have done otherwise). • Locked classroom example. Elevator example. • Do you agree that she acted freely, even though she could not have done otherwise? • Free will and determinism are compatible on this account, because ... o It is compatible with every event's being determined by past events together with the laws of nature that an action was determined by one's own past choice.

What is Conventionalism and Objectivism about the metric of time and conventionalism about the units of time?

• Conventionalism about the Units of time: Units of time, a second, an hour and so forth, are convention but there could be an objective truth as to whether one event is longer than another Can argue that some pairs are equivalent or not. • Conventionalism about the Metric of Time: o There is no objective truth of the matter as to whether one event is longer than a subsequent (or earlier) event. o An instrument is accurate if and only if it agrees with the standard. And which standard is the standard is a matter of convention. • Objectivism about the Metric of Time: o There is an objective truth of the matter as to whether one event is longer than a subsequent (another) event.

What is the cyclical history argument against Relationism about Time (for Substantivalism about Time)?

• Definition of circular and cyclical time: o Circular time - beginning of the universe is the same as the end but events don't necessarily repeat o Cyclical time - Everything repeats itself infinitely many times o Cyclical time doesn't make sense to the relationists (1) Relationism about Time entails that cyclical history in linear time is (logically) impossible. (2) But cyclical history in linear time is possible. (3) Therefore, relationism is false (4) Rebuttals: a. Cyclical history is impossible

What is determinism and indeterminism?

• Determinism: Let L be the (real) laws of nature, let Wt be the complete state of the world at time t, and let t0 be some time in the distant past. Then the world is deterministic just in case, for any time (t is greater than t0) t>t0, Wt logically follows from L and Wt0. Wto+L=Wt • Indeterminism: Determinism is false. • (Side note: no one can ever write an exact description of the world so the inaccuracies with create bad predictions - e.g. inaccuracies in the weather. This is relevant to Chaos theory and deterministic chaos.) • A Simpler (though equivalent) Statement of Determinism Only one future path is logically compatible with the (real) laws of nature together with the past. Example of deterministic laws: Newton's Laws of mechanics (arguably) Or are they? For "Space invader" argument that Newtonian mechanics is indeterministic, see Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy entry, "Causal Determinism", <http://plato.stanford.edu> (Or, in other words, the real laws of nature together with a complete description of what happened in the past logically entails a complete description of what will happen in the future, including how I will act, and the outcomes of my deliberations.)

What are some challenges for relationism about space?

• Explaning references to empty space - put that object over there • Explaining putting things where empty space is • Explain the truths of geometric statements - cannot say that this empty space would make a square

What is the difference between a finite and an infinite set?

• Finite Set: o A set whose number of elements is a natural number. • Infinite Set: o A set which is not finite.

What is Fischer's Response to the Dilemma Defense?

• Fischer's Response to the First Horn o "Even if ...determinism is true, it does not appear to be question-begging to use the cases as part of a two-stage argument (rather than an argument that simply assumes that the relevant agents are morally responsible in the cases.)" [p. 104] • Fischer's Response to the First Horn (again) o An incompatibilistMR should accept the following 2-step argument: Simply by reflecting on Frankfurt-style examples, we can see the truth of the Irrelevance Thesis: alternate possibilities are irrelevant to moral responsibility. Determinism "in itself and apart from ruling out alternative possibilities" does not threaten moral responsibility. Therefore, even on the assumption of determinism, one must accept that the agent is morally responsible in Frankfurt-style examples. • Fischer's Response to the Second Horn o "And if ... determinism is false... it still seems (at least at first blush) to be possible to construct versions of the Frankfurt-type cases in which it is plausible to say that the agent is morally responsible and yet lacks alternative possibilities." [p. 104] • Fischer's Response to the Second Horn (again) o There have been many attempts to modify Frankfurt's examples so that they clearly work under indeterminism. Some of these probably work(!) David Hunt's blockage cases. • Indeterministically chooe to do X but all neural pathways aside from X are blocked. Alfred Mele & David Robb's cases. • Black initiates a deterministic process in bob's brain that he will steal at car at t2 unless bob indeterminstically decides to steal ann's car. He is still morally responsible despite being unable to do otherwise. • Fischer's Traffic Example o Fischer claims that one can have responsibility even when no aletnative possibility is available to be attempted (like walking up to a door to try open it or trying a blocked neural pathway). o He gives the analogy of driving with traffic being stuck on all sides so that one freely moves forward even though they cannot do otherwise.

What is Fischer's Response to the Flicker of Freedom Defense?

• Fischer's Response: o "The mere involuntary display of some sign... is too thin a reed on which to rest moral responsibility" [p. 98] o Flickers of freedom are "insufficiently robust". The flicker lacks "voluntary oomph". They shouldn't count as relevant alternate possibilities... • A Flicker Theorist's Counter-response: o [McKenna] A Flicker of Escape! o Even in the Frankfurt-type cases I still have the alternative of escaping authorship/responsibility for the action. • Fischer's Response: o This flicker of escape also lacks "voluntary oomph". - it is not an alternative possibility which they would be able to choose o I would only be accidentally avoiding responsibility, not voluntarily avoiding responsibility. o And "the mere possibility of a different events' occurring does not entail that the agent has the ability to do otherwise."

What is Van Inwagen's PPA and an example?

• He argues people's omissions should be treated different from people's actions • Principle of Possible Action: o A person is morally responsible for failing to perform a given act only if he could have performed that act • Van Inwagen argues the principle is immune to Frankfurt style counter-examples (e.g. counter-factual intervener) • Case 1: o Sees someone getting mugged outside o Does not call the police because he doesn't want to go to the station or be seen by the robbers o But he doesn't know that the phone lines are down so he can't even call the police o Van Inwagen's thinks he is not morally responsible for calling the police but can be responsible for closely associated actions - being selfish etc.

What is Kane's libertarian view of free will (causal indeterminism) and a critique?

• He doesn't believe in a special type of causation different from agent causation • He believes in a probabilistic causation • Wants to replace condition of AP with alternative possibilities (Necessary condition for free will (but not an account) = Act A results from free will only if the actor could have done otherwise) with the condition of ultimate responsibly • Kane's objection to AP o People have Self Forming Actions (SFA) o An individual can form a good character and then come to a decision where they could not have done otherwise but they still should have free will in that decision o Accepts a version of the consequence argument but replaces AP with UR • UR o UR: "... to be ultimately responsible for an action, an agent must be responsible for anything that is a sufficient reason (condition, cause or motive) for the action's occurring." o In other words... o (UR) An agent has free will in doing X only if o Either he could have done otherwise than X o Or there are some actions {Y} which together provide a sufficient reason for X's occurrence, and for each action Y, the agent could have done otherwise than Y. o Act A results from free will only if the actor is responsible for anything that is a sufficient condition for that action o This entails that you can get into a situation where you could not have done otherwise, and your decision was determined by your prior character and decisions, you can still have free will if you had control over the self forming actions • Causal indeterminism and SFA o Causal indeterminism only holds with SFA o Actions that form who we are and occur when confronted with difficult choices o Must be conflicted and trying simultaneously to do both things • The Luck objection o If a choice is not determined in advance, then it is determined by chance o If it is determined by chance, then the choice is not responsible o Example: Suppose two worlds leading up to a decision are identical J1 lies and J2 tells the truth If J2 truth telling was determined by chance, it seems neither are responsible. • Rebuttal to luck objection o Randomness need not overcome control - can be an obstacle to control but can be overcome o If a individual hits a table and there is a chance that the table will or will not break due to quantum indeterminacy, then if it does smash, we still feel he is responsible for the outcome despite the randomness determining the outcome o Not that there are deliberations and then randomness, but that there are deliberations, conflict in both ways and then randomness o Effort indeterminacy

What is Dainton's compound Presentism?

• He has an overlapping view of time • All exists is the present, but the present moment has duration • This, he claims, addresses problems of causation • He has to make a difference between the events that occur at an instant and the events the are real at an instant - which are located now and which are real now o Static eternalist has to make the distinction too. Ancient Egyptians are real now but do not occur now

What is the undiscoverable facts objection to objectivism about time?

• If objectivism about the metric of time is true, then it seems there would be some undiscoverable fact o Undiscoverable facts: whether or not all processes in the universe just doubled in speed. whether or not a clock is accurate is one undiscoverable fact • This seems to follow if you assume that the only way to measure the accuracy of a clock is with another clock. • Verifiability o A statement is true or false iff it is verifiable - there are a set of possible future experiences that would tend to show that it is true o Since objectivism about the metric of time entails non-verifiable facts, it is a non-verifiable theory, and hence meaningless and neither true nor false o Non-verifiable theories Matrix scepticism - brain in a vat Eleventh-hour creation - Everything came into existence five minutes ago with memories and records Everything doubling in size • Some philosophers reject objectivism on this basis

What is Frankfurt's replacement principle?

• If someone acts only because you could have done otherwise • "A person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise." • An agent is morally responsible for action X only if its not true that x acted because he could not do otherwise than x. • He is responsible because he acted for his own reasons

What is Newton's Bucket argument; what is it supposed to show?

• Imagine a bucket spinning by itself in the universe - bucket and water rotating at the same speed but they must be accelerating in respect to something, space and time itself (1) Centrifugal or inertial forces in a system are due to acceleration. (2) Acceleration is either acceleration relative to absolute space or acceleration relative to other objects. (3) A spinning bucket existing alone would experience centrifugal forces (causing the surface of the water to be curved). (4) There is no acceleration relative to objects involved for a spinning bucket existing alone, so there must be acceleration relative to absolute space. Or V2: Acceleration relative to other objects (e.g. nearby buildings, distant stars) is surely not relevant. The best explanation for the curved surface is acceleration relative to absolute space. (5) Therefore, absolute space exists. (i.e. Substantivalism about Space is true). (6) Critique: o Works well

What is the difference between an Intrinsic and extrinsic property?

• Intrinsic property of an object is a property it has in virtue solely of the way it is itself • Extrinsic property of an object is a property it has at least in part in virtue of the way other objects are

How can Hilbert's hotel be full yet still accommodate more guests?

• It is an infinite hotel • It is full • But he can still accommodate more by moving everyone over from room one to room two and so forth • Everyone goes to twice their room number after coming out • 1 goes to two and two goes to four and three goes to six • All odd numbers are free

What is Keller and Nelson's argument about time-travel?

• K and N's argument focuses on certain time-travel stories which do not involve changing past events • If these stories are compatible with 4-dimensionalism & presentism is at all plausible, then they are compatible with presentism too. Hence, presentists should believe in time-travel.

What are Kane and Wolf-style counter examples to PAP?

• Kane - Where someone gets themselves into a situation where they cannot have done otherwise bcause of their self-forming actions • Susan Wolf - If you did a good action and didn't have AP, then you still deserve praise (not the same with blame). "I couldn't help but to tell the truth." - deserves praised. But there is an asymmetry with blame.

What is Lewisian, continuous, discontinuous and counterfeit time travel?

• Lewisian Time-Travel o He is a static-eternalist - Time-travel involves a discrepancy between personal time (time measured by wrist watch is personal time) and external time o E.g. moves back in time by 100 years but his wristwatch (personal time) says that 5 minutes has elapsed o Discontinuous time travel - Gap in the space-time worm o Continuous time - Continuous time travel as a worm • Counterfeit Time-Travel o P1 is person p2 iff p1 has causal connections to p2 o Fred is created at 30yrs old from a demon then dies ... years later, sam developed to the point where he looks exactly like sam and then he vanishes because of the demon o No time travel o How to distinguish time-travel and counter-feit time travel - causal links o Counter-feit time travel means that Sam's being at 30 does not cause Fred's being at 30

What is McTaggart's argument?

• McTaggart's argument shows that the A series is incompatible with a complete and consistent description of reality - • Complete - That is, irrespective of one's position in time, it describes something. • Dummett negates the possibility of complete descriptions as they would imply contradictions • First part: 1. If time exists, then it necessarily involves change (change in time as it passes for example) a. B series doesn't involve now or anything changing b. B series is just a static picture with variation in time c. The only change between events could be the change between future, present and past - this requires the A series 2. If there is change, then this involves the A series 3. Therefore, if there is time, then it involves the A theory • Second part of M's argument: 4. Every event is past, present and future 5. No event can be past present and future 6. Therefore, the a series is contradictory 7. Therefore, time is unreal • Objections: o Negate the first part and live with the B theory o Negate 4 - it is not simultaneously all of those Rebuttal - it leads to the same contradiction again as every event being now present, having been future, and will be past is incompatible Those moments of time will be p, p and f Vicious infinite regress of meta-moments • Vicious - an infinite series which we have reason to think it does not exist • Virtuous - an infinite regress which seems ok

What is Van Inwagen's argument about negative and metaphysical freedom and a critique?

• Negative freedom: o Absence of constraints o Constraint from alternatives o Negative freedom is compatible with determinism o Negative freedom notion of can - I can do x means that there is no obstacle or impediment to me doing x o This is unsatisfying, negative freedom is necessary but not sufficient for free will and maybe not even necessary - Locked room • Metaphysical freedom o Tendentious theory is just holding a view in order to save your case o To say one can do otherwise, there must be something positive

How does Peter Strawson answer the question "should we change our practices of holding people responsible and punishment, if we all came to believe that determinism is true"?

• No. Determinism is irrelevant to issues about moral responsibility and punishment. • His argument for this involves introducing the notions of REACTIVE ATTITUDES, and the OBJECTIVE ATTITUDE. • According to Strawson, moral responsibility is constituted by a complex network of attitudes, feelings and practices. Our attitudes of moral approval and moral condemnation are part of this, but they can be impersonal, cold and detached. • What are more important for understanding moral responsibility are REACTIVE ATTITUDES like resentment.

What is chirality and the chirality argument?

• Object is Chiral iff it has a counter-part which cannot be rotated into itself 1. There is an objective difference between a universe containing only a chiral hand and one containing a non-chiral hand 2. If is an objective difference between a universe containing only a chiral hand and one containing a non-chiral hand, then this is determined by: (a) relations between that object and other objects, or (b) relations between the parts of that object, or (c) relations between that object and absolute space. 3. The difference is not determined by (a), as there are no objects besides the hand, or by (b), as these relations are the same in the two universes. 4. Therefore, the difference must be determined by (c). 5. If the relations between that object and absolute space determine the difference, then absolute space exists. 6. Therefore, Absolute space exists.

What is the Asymmetry of time vs asymmetry of contents of time?

• Price's table metaphor • "It turns out that the interesting questions about temporal asymmetry are mainly about the physical contents of time, rather than about time itself" [Price] • "The B-theorist's explanation will take this general form: time does not flow or pass, but there are nonetheless asymmetries to be found within the contents of time... Whether or not these content-asymmetries suffice to give time itself a direction depends on how we view time [substantivalism or relationism]" [Dainton] • E,.g, If relationism is true, then talking about the asymmetry of events is enough to talk about the asymmetry of time

What is the Flicker and Prior Signs response to the Frankfurt counter-examples?

• Prior Signs o Mr Black (or whoever is the "counterfactual intervener" in your favourite Frankfurt-style case) requires a prior sign in order to guide him in removing the agent's alternate possibilities. o That's how Mr Black can make sure he is only going to intervene if Jones is not about to kick his dog. o Examples of prior signs: a twitch, blush, furrowed brow, neurological pattern. • The Flicker of Freedom Defense of PAP o Even if Mr Black does not have the alternatives of kicking his dog/not kicking his dog, he will always have the alternative of exhibiting prior sign1/not exhibiting prior sign1. o This is called a "flicker of freedom". o The prior sign must be there in order for the alternative choice to be made o Insofar as there are prior signs, there will always be a "flicker of freedom". We will always have some alternate possibilities... o So, there can be no counterexamples to PAP. PAP is true.

What Strawson's Reactive Attitudes?

• Reactive attitudes are our non-detached attitudes towards the attitudes of those we are involved with. • E.g. resentment, forgiveness, gratitude, (some kinds of) love, hurt feelings.

What is Relationism vs. Substantivalism (absolutism) about time?

• Relationism: time does not exist independently of all the events that exist in time. All talk of time can be reduced somehow to talk of events. Time is defined by relation between events or the events themselves E.g. parenthood - cannot be a parent without children. o For example, a time is a collection of all events simultaneous with a given event - relationists may not agree with this • Substantivalism: time does exist independently of all the events that exist in time. It is like an empty container that events can be placed into.

What are the two main objections against SE?

• SE doesn't have the correct picture of the nature of now • Bizarre that all exists o Idea of flow doesn't capture time and doesn't capture causality of the flow - time flows from past to present or the present recedes into the past

What is the difference between a set and a sequence?

• Sets: order doesn't matter o {1, 2, 3}={3, 2, 1} • Sequences: order does matter o á1, 2, 3ñ≠ á3, 2, 1ñ

How do we Situate Strawson in the debate between compatibilismMR and incompatibilismMR?

• Strawson disagrees with both standard compatibilistsMR and incompatibilistsMR... • Both of these are wrong because they understand the practice of holding persons responsible to rest upon a theoretical judgment of their being responsible. - it is a question of emotion and responses, not theoretical • Strawson's Reactive Attitude Theory is a new kind of compatibilismMR.

What is Thomson's lamp argument?

• Suppose the super being can complete an infinite number of switchings of the lamp in a finite time • Then the lamp is neither on nor off after that period • This is absurd • Therefore, no-one can complete an infinite number of switching of a lamp, in fact no-one can complete a super task (an infinite number of different tasks) Thompson's reply to the Achilles paradox showed infinity was impossible • Completing an infinite number of distinct tasks is completing a super task • It is self contradictory to complete a super task (not a task itself) • Take a lamp an switch it every half time - 1 minute, half minute, quarter minute and so on • The questions is whether the lamp will be on or off after two minutes • Objection: o Benacerraf's reply to Thomson's paradox It is only true that every moment before the two minute mark you turn it on or off This only applies to times before the two minutes Superduper task - complete an infinite number of tasks and then do one more - have a last member but no penultimate member - (1, 2, 3... a) Thompson's rebuttal: • You cannot complete a super task without completing a super duper task like you cannot take off your socks without taking off your shoes • A super duper task is impossible • Benacerraf reply: o Vanishing genie o Shrinking genie Shrinks by half his height And vanishes at the end

What is the problem of current time talk for static eternalism?

• The B Theorists owe us an explanation of how A properties are reducible to B relations (a view of how to "detense")... o "Token Reflexive Analysis" Method (Smart's old view) "I am happy now"= "My state of happiness is simultaneous with this utterance". WWII is past" ="WWII is earlier than this utterance". o "Date Analysis" Method (Davidson's view) "I am happy now"= "Cei is happy at noon on 3/8/2012

What is the difference between the Metric and topology of time?

• The METRIC of time concerns comparing time intervals and measuring the duration of time. • The TOPOLOGY of time involves properties of time such as whether or not time has a beginning. (A topological feature is one that is preserved by stretching, bending, twisting.)

How does Strawson reformulate the Question of punishment as these attitudes have been described?

• The objective attitude would require us not to hold people with morally responsible • "Our question reduces to this: could, or should, the acceptance of the determinist thesis lead us always to look on everyone exclusively [with the objective attitude]?" • First Part of the Answer o No as it is impossible for us to adopt this objective attitude for practical purposes o No. "The human commitment to participation in ordinary inter-personal relationships is ... too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted." o It is IMPOSSIBLE for us to adopt the objective attitude all the time. • Second Part of the Answer o We do not hold people responsible because they are responsible. Rather, holding people responsible is constituted by our reactive attitudes, emotions and practices. o And there is no sense in which we could all be wrong about which emotion is appropriate, just as there is no sense in which we could all be wrong about our system of grammar. We made the system. Objection that, for consistency reasons, we might want change our practices o So determinism is irrelevant to answering the question of whether to adopt the objective attitude all the time.

What is Static Eternalism/ Eternalism?

• The past, present and future all exist. Furthermore, the flow of time is not moving as the real picture of space and time is static. • Like a grid with time and space on different axis' and all event somewhere on the axis • All objects exist eternally, not here. Present exists now. • Block view

What are the Frankfurt-style Counterexamples to PAP and a response?

• They are forces present which ensures the agent cannot do otherwise but which do not themselves force, compel or coerce the agent • We can get rid of the alternative possibilities but he is not coerced • No alternate possibilities but moral responsibility • Case 1 - Threat case: o Jones got bitten by a dog, he was about to kill it, and Mr. Green says if you don't kick the dog then I will kill your wife • Case 2 - Counter-factual intervener: o Jones got bitten by his dog, Mr. Black wires up Jones brain (unbeknownst to him so he can read and control the brain), Mr. Black saw that Jones wanted to kick the dog and he doesn't interfere but he could have. Jones could not have done otherwise but Jones should still be morally responsible

What are pleas and three types?

• Things that cancels a reactives attituee • Excuse - that person was not to blame (The agent is still treated as MR). o E.g. he was pushed, he didn't realize, he didn't mean to. Shows that one was not to blame. • Justifications - (The agent is still treated as MR) Shows that one was not to blame. o E.g. he realized what he was doing but it was an emergency. • Exempting conditions - (The agent is judged as lacking MR.) o E.g. he's been under great strain lately, he's a child, he was hypnotized, he's wasn't taking his medication.

What is the physical laws argument for objectivism about the metric of time?

• UTC is based on the laws of physics and not convention of some other clock • According to Poidevin, we can test accuracy of clocks by appealing to the laws of motion which says force=mass x acceleration • This implies: o Discoverability: If laws of physics and acceleration are discoverability and the metric is based on such laws, then objective facts about the metric may not be undiscoverable o Objectivity: If laws of physics and acceleration are objective and the metric is based on such laws, then the metric is objective • Objection: o Scientific Instrumentalism: If physical laws are not objectively true (instrumentalism), then metric based on such laws are not objectively true Instrumentalism: The aim of science is to not to discover true theories, but rather to provide useful instruments or tools to predict observations. (Scientific theories are neither true nor false, and theoretical entities like electrons are useful fictions like Santa Claus.) Contra(Sophisticated) Scientific Realism: "Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true" [van Fraassen]

What is the world-wide freezes argument against relationism about time and five objections?

• World-wide freeze: Suddenly everything comes to a halt, e.g. 100 years of static events • Logically possible - it is coherent, no contradiction involved and doesn't break any laws of logic - i.e. no contradictions • If it is possible that world-wide freeze can occur (no events change but there is still changer in time), then relationism must be false • It is possible that world-wide freeze can occur • Rebuttals: o Experience Objection 1. Nothing changes in a world wide freeze. 2. If nothing changes in a world wide freeze, then we wouldn't experience time passing. 3. If we wouldn't experience time passing, then it is impossible to establish whether or not some contingent statement is true (or likely to be true). 4. If it is impossible to establish whether or not some contingent statement is true (or likely to be true), then that statement is meaningless. 5. Therefore, the statement that there was a WWF is meaningless Rebuttal: • Reject second premise: If you use the phrase and explain something about it, then it must have meaning because you can't explain, understand or state something that has no meaning • Reject premise four that non-verifiability entails meaninglessness o Measurement objection: 1. Time intervals are measured by changes 2. Since nothing happens in a WWF, there is no possible means of determining its lengths 3. If there is no means of determining the length of a time interval, then it can have no specific length 4. Every time interval has a specific length 5. Therefore, the cannot be a WWF • Rebuttal: o Reject premise 3 o Sufficient Reason Objection: 1. If there has been WWF in the past, then there have been times when the change has resumed after a period of no change 2. For every change that occurs at a given moment, there is always an explanation of why it occurred precisely at the moment 3. If 2, then this entails some event preceded the resuming 4. If 3, then this presupposes events which preceded the the preceding event. 5. If 4, then there would have been events all along. 6. Therefore, there have been no WWF in the past Rebuttals: • Can have explanations of why they occur but not why they stop at a time • Presupposes that you cannot have action at a temporal distance - need to have links of direct causations • Possibility of a never ending WWF o WWF is an event with identical events going on o What are first and second order changes objection First-order changes: Changes in objects McTaggartian changes (second order changes or the pure passage of time): events changing from being future to being present to being past A world-wide freeze is supposed to be an absence of all first-order changes but there will still be second-order changes

What is the paradox of change?

• You see a green leaf in the Spring L1 and then you see the very same leaf in the fall L2 and it is red. • L1 is green • L2 is not green • If L1 is perfectly identical to L2, then they have all properties in common (the indiscernability of identities) • Therefore, L1 is not perfectly identical to L2 • Solutions: o Endurance • Properties are relations which an enduring thing bears to times (objects are 3-D). An object is 3D and persists through time by being wholly present at different times o Perdurance (objects are 4-D they exist in time Salami view). Objects are 4D and persist over time by having temporal parts at different times Describing same object (leaf) but different stages of the same object o Presentism. Objects never have incompatible properties. L1 exists and L2 does not exist

What is incompatibilismMR and the consequence argument for it?

• moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism. • New Consequence of Argument about MR 1) You are morally responsible only if you could have done otherwise. PAP 2) If determinism is true, then the laws of nature together with the past logically entail every event. 3) You could not have broken the laws of nature. 4) You could not have changed the past. 5) Therefore, moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible.

What are Some Justifications for Punishment?

1. Isolation Allowing them to avoid future harm 2. Deterrence Deterring others from crime 3. Rehabilitation Making the criminal better 4. Retribution Revenge But what if we all came to believe that there is no-one was morally responsible for his/her actions? Would it still be just to punish someone for a socially useful purpose?

What is Gardner's argument?

1) A hand alone in the universe would not be left or right. 2) But if a human body with severed wrists appears, the hand will only fit one wrist in the proper way. 3) Therefore, it must have been a left hand (say) all along.

What is Archytas's Argument (ch. 6)?

1. Suppose that space is finite. 2. If you were at the edge of space, then there would be nothing stopping you from thrusting your arm through it. 3. But then there must be already space beyond the edge of space. But that doesn't make sense. 4. Therefore, space is infinite.

What is the Autoinfanticide paradox (or grandfather paradox) against time-travel?

1. Suppose that time travel to the past is possible 2. Then a time traveller can travel back to meet her baby self 3. The time traveller can kill her helpless baby self 4. The time traveller cannot kill her baby self. That is logically impossible 5. Time travel is impossible 6. Objections: a. Of course the time traveller (Suzy) will not kill baby Suzy but that doesn't mean she cannot kill baby suzy. - Confusing will and can - modal problem which characterises fatalist argument b. c. Lewis argues that we falsely hold the facts true about the past but - both 3 and 4 are true but not contradictory depending on which facts you hold relevant