Phl 354

Trakakis' Response:

•Good parents definitely do not subject their children to painful cures without a second thought, but rather only as a last resort. Parents who subject their children to painful treatments after a second thought feel regret that the treatment was necessary. Others judge the parent not as morally insensitive or in need of forgiveness, but as someone in the throes of tragic circumstances. •The upshot: we cannot attribute perfect goodness to God given the assumption that God is part of our moral community. (Phillips and Trakakis both reject the assumption that God is part of our moral community.)

Hume's definition of 'miracle':

"A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature" (Hume 1748/Bennett 2017: 58).

theodicy

A theodicy is an attempt to tell a story we should think is probable or true. A defense only aims to tell a story that's logically coherent (or true for all we know).

Why testimony is never sufficient to warrant acceptance of a miracle report:

•The people who testify to miracles tend to lack the sufficient good sense and education that would convince us that they weren't merely deluded. (Or, at least, there hasn't been a sufficient number of sensible people testifying to a miracle.) •People testifying to miracles typically don't have sufficient integrity to convince us that they aren't trying to deceive us. •People testifying to miracles typically don't have much to lose by doing so—they don't have sufficient wealth, social standing, etc., to incentivize them not to testify falsely. •The events reported in miracle testimonies haven't been in public and famous enough parts of the world that their falsity is easy to discover.

Moser's Response: main points

•We need to get clear on the nature and intentions of the god we are talking about in the hiddenness arguments in order to properly assess those arguments. •The nature and intentions of the Hebraic God as revealed in Sacred Scripture show that God hides at times for the benefit of humanity. (Why does God hide? What is the goal?) •However, people sometimes experience divine hiddenness as the result of their own inability to perceive God's presence or answer to their prayers. •God's goal for humanity is not mere propositional belief that God exists, but filial knowledge of God that can only be acquired in the context of a relationship characterized by humility and love.

The "Official" Catholic view:

"In no way is God in man's image. He is neither man nor woman. God is pure spirit in which there is no place for the difference between the sexes. But the respective "perfections" of man and woman reflect something of the infinite perfection of God: those of a mother and those of a father and husband" (CCC 370).

Sex & Gender: A Standard View

'Male' and 'female' refer to the sex of an organism. Males of a given species produce small gametes (spermatozoa, pollen) and females produce large gametes (ova). Among humans, males typically carry X and Y chromosomes, while females typically carry two X chromosomes. The traditional view of gender is that it correlates with biological sex: a man is a sexually mature male human; a woman is a sexually mature female human.

Christian doctrines relevant to responding to the Problem of Evil

(A)Adam fell. (N) Natural evil entered the world as the result of Adam's fall. (D) After death, human beings either end up in heaven or hell for eternity, depending on their state at the time of death.

John Hick's soul-making theodicy

(H1) Significant exercise of free will in the enterprise of soul-making is of such great value that it outweighs all the evil in the world. The process by which we develop virtues like patience and courage involves overcoming evils. Those who successfully complete this process enter the kingdom of God, in which there is no evil. The evil in the world (including natural evil) is necessary for soul-making.

Mackie's criticisms of the free will defense:

(I) It's not clear that this is a real solution, given that God created agents with free will. (J) Why couldn't God make free beings who always chose good? (K) If wrong choices are required for freedom, then freedom must mean something like 'randomness', and so the sense of freedom being invoked is incoherent.

Mackie presents the problem of evil in the form of three inconsistent propositions. What are these propositions? What version of the problem of evil does he present?

(i) God is omnipotent. (ii) God is wholly good. (iii) Evil exists. (i) & (ii) obviously presuppose that God exists. Mackie also claims that (i)-(iii) are not formally contradictory and that we need to add two further principles to bring out the contradiction.

The Logical Problem of Evil (Stump's version)

(i)God is omnipotent (ii)God is omniscient (iii)God is perfectly good (iv)There is evil in the world (v)There is no morally sufficient reason for God to allow instances of evil

Two additional principles added by Mackie:

(iv) If something is wholly good, it always eliminates evil as much as it can. (v) If something is omnipotent, it can do anything.

The three most promising theistic responses to the Logical Problem of Evil:

-Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense -Richard Swinburne's Free Will Theodicy -John Hick's Soul-making Theodicy

Stump's Response to the Problem of Evil:

-Because of the Fall, human beings have a powerful inclinations towards evil by a defect in our wills. -This defect in our wills makes it impossible for us to go to heaven, since our wills are set against union with God. -This defect cannot be miraculously fixed by God, nor can we fix ourselves—neither of these remedies is possible. -The only possible remedy for the defect in our wills is for us to freely choose to have them repaired by God. The problem is that people are not inclined to freely choose this remedy because they don't even realize they have a defect. -The best way for us to realize that our wills are defective is to experience suffering, in the form of either (or both) natural or moral evil.

Differences between the Islamic and Christian conceptions of God:

-Christians think that Jesus is God, while Muslims deny that Jesus is God. -Christians hold that God is our Father, while Islam forbids this conception of God—God is not our Father, we are just things God has made (according to the Quran). -Christians think that God is a Trinity, but Islam condemns this view. Instead, Muslims hold the core principle of Tawhid, the absolute oneness of God.

What an omnipotent God couldn't do:

-Create square circles -Create H2O without creating oxygen -Make a rock too heavy for God to lift -Make free beings who are incapable of choosing evil

Free Will Defense as response to Logical Problem of Evil:

-Even an omnipotent God cannot create a world with free beings in it that also contains no evil. -It's logically possible for (an omnipotent, etc.) God to exist and evil to exist (viz., given that God has a reason for creating a world with free beings).

Stump's Response to the Suffering of Children

-First, Stump admits that any response to the suffering of children "must not lessen our pain over that suffering if it is not to become something monstrous and inhumane" and, hence, she offers her own response with "considerable diffidence" (410). -Stump points out that it is consistent with Christian belief to hold that a child's suffering is outweighed by the good for the child that can result from that suffering. -An important point she makes is that death is not the ultimate evil but eternal separation from God is: "what concerns the Christian about death is not that it occurs but that the timing and mode of death be such as to constitute the best means of ensuring that state of soul which will bring a person to eternal union with God" (411). -An individual's suffering isn't justified by some "abstract good" for humankind, but by the good for that person for which God allows the suffering to happen. -Stump uses the Biblical story of Cain and Abel to explain why God intervenes (or fails to intervene) in evils in the way that God does.

Some important features of the story of Cain and Abel

-God warns Cain about the evil he is plotting against his brother and tries to deter him from doing it (without taking away Cain's freedom to act). -God does not intervene to spare Abel from Cain's evil act. -So, God intervenes to help Cain (who is bad, and of whom God disapproves) but does not intervene to help Abel (who is good, and of whom God approves). -God further intervenes to spare Cain from being slain by another person when Cain is worried about the consequences of his evil action. -Why does God intervene on behalf of Cain and not on behalf of Abel? What does this tell us about why God might permit the innocent (e.g. children) to suffer?

Important qualifications regarding natural evils:

-Humans may be responsible for some natural evils by, for example, their attempt to control nature (example of attempts by Army Corps of Engineers to control flooding of Mississippi River). -They may be due to actions of non-human free agents (maybe devils/angels cause some natural evils? Or God?).

Stump's objections to Plantinga's free will defense:

-It doesn't even make an attempt to address (v) in the Logical Problem of Evil (recall (v): "There is no morally sufficient reason for God to allow instances of evil"). It shows that a morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil is possible but it does not present a reason that isplausible or probable. This is because Plantinga's response to the problem of evil is a defense and not a theodicy. (Stump seems to think we need a theodicy—a mere defense is unsatisfying.) -Part of the reason Plantinga's defense fails to deliver a plausible response is the way it handles natural evil. Many philosophers find the account simply incredible. -Plantinga doesn't address the criticism that God could have granted free will to creatures but prevented or minimized the harm that would result from evil choices.

Nabeel Qureshi argues that Muslims and Christians do not worship the same God:

-Qureshi was a Muslim who converted to Christianity as an adult. He was a widely known national speaker on religion. He tragically died of stomach cancer in 2017 at the age of 34. -Qureshi's familiarity with the Muslim faith leads him to claim that Muslims do not worship the same God as Christians. He spoke out publicly about the Wheaton controversy, urging compassion for Professor Hawkins, but also defending the claims of Wheaton that Hawkins was in violation of the statement of faith.

God hides sometimes

-as a judgment on human disobedience and morally significant indifference toward God (Deuteronomy 31: 16-19, 32: 19-20; Psalm 89: 46; Isaiah 59:2; Micah 3:4). (Texts on next slide) -to encourage human focus, longing, and gratitude toward God. -because God wants, not mere belief that God exists, but our love.

The Analogy Argument from Divine Hiddenness

1. A loving mother who could help it would never remain hidden in scenarios (i)-(iii). 2. If God exists, then God is at least as loving as a loving mother. 3. So, if God exists, then God would not remain hidden in scenarios like (i)-(iii) if God could help it. 4. But since, if God exists, then God is all-powerful, God has no reasons to remain hidden in scenarios like (i)-(iii) (i.e. God can help it). 5. But if God exists, God does (apparently) remain hidden in scenarios like (i)-(iii). 6. Therefore, (it's very probable that) God does not exist.

The Conceptual Argument from Divine Hiddenness

1.If God exists, evidence sufficient to form belief in God is available to every person who is (i) capable of personal relationship with God and (ii) not inclined to resist the evidence (call them 'non-resistant'). 2.However, there are non-resistant people who do not believe in God. 3.Therefore, there is not sufficient evidence to form belief in God that is available to non-resistant people. 4.Therefore, God does not exist.

Strongly gendered terms and attributes

A strongly gendered term is a word that applies literally only to members of a particular gender (examples: 'he', 'father', and 'king' apply literally only to men). A strongly gendered attribute is the sort of attribute that would be picked out by a strongly gendered term, one that can be had only by members of a particular gender.

What is the problem of divine hiddenness?

A supremely loving, personal God would want people to have a loving relationship with Him (or Her). But being in a loving relationship with God requires belief in God. However, we find lots of people who are open to believing in God (they are "nonresistant" to belief), but cannot get themselves to believe because of lack of evidence. This makes it difficult to believe that a loving, personal God (such as the God of traditional theism) exists. If God did exist, wouldn't God make Godself available for such a relationship?

God & Biological Sex

According to most traditional, monotheistic religions, God is pure spirit, without a body or any biological characteristics, so God is not male or female. This is the concept of God shared by Judaism, Islam, and Christianity.*

Two types of solution: adequate and fallacious

Adequate solutions actually do avoid contradiction, but encounter other problems. Fallacious solutions have the appearance of avoiding contradiction, but fail to actually do so.

Critique of theodicy:

Basic critique: the very enterprise of offering a theodicy constitutes a failure to take suffering seriously (Nick Trakakis, Kenneth Surin, D. Z. Phillips). The problems with offering a theodicy are moral problems.

The Soul-making Theodicy

Basic idea: God allows evil for the sake of the greater good of soul-making, where 'soul-making' means something like the development of virtue, good character, or heroism.

Phillips' Argument:

Basic idea: if God has to permit evil in order to bring about some ultimate good, then we cannot attribute anything resembling perfect goodness to God.

Schellenberg's Analogy Argument from Divine Hiddenness

Basis of the analogy: three scenarios with a loving mother and her child: (i) Hide-and-seek (ii) The amnesiac seeker (iii) The amnesiac lost in the rainforest

Believing in the same God

Both Muslims and Christians believe that there is exactly one God. (Note that Christian belief in the Trinity does not conflict with this belief: the doctrine of the Trinity holds that there are three persons or hypostases in one ousia (substance, being). There is just one God.) This is logically equivalent to the belief that all Gods are the same God.

What does Hume mean by "uniform experience"?

By "uniform experience", Hume means our consistent experience of certain things happening, and of certain types of events following certain other types of events.

Treating the Problem of Evil like a theoretical problem:

By approaching the problem of evil from a theoretical perspective (as an abstract problem to be solved), theodicists instill a sense of detachment from suffering and evil in both themselves and their readers, but there are moral dangers involved in adopting this sort of detachment.

This is not the situation with Christians and Muslims!

Christians and Muslims have some very different beliefs about God, as Qureshi points out, but they both believe that there is just one God, and that God is all good, all powerful, and all knowing, and that God created the world and sent the prophets, etc. Also, if we say that Christians and Muslims do not worship the same God because of their different conceptions, we will be led to say the same thing about contemporary American evangelicals and Medieval Catholics, who hold vastly different conceptions of God.

Is it possible to violate these laws of nature?

Consider the multiplication of loaves and fishes recorded in the New Testament. This seems to violate the law of the conservation of matter, since new matter (i.e. in the form of extra loaves and fishes) suddenly appears.

Causal closure of the natural order

David's analysis implies that the natural order is not causally closed. The causal closure of the natural order is the principle that every event in nature is caused by something in nature. It's a working assumption of scientists.

Stump's criticism of Hick's soul-making theodicy

Evil doesn't seem to be required for soul-making—we can develop and manifest virtues like courage and endurance by engaging in tasks like training for a marathon or writing a dissertation. Also, if evil were required to manifest good character traits, then no one could manifest them in heaven, but that's what the process of soul-making is supposed to be preparing us for.

The Free Will Theodicy

Evil is a consequence of free will, humans' ability to make morally significant choices. God could not have created genuinely free beings without also giving them the ability to choose evil. This freedom is supposed to be "morally significant, not only providing agents with the capacity to bring about good and evil, but also making possible a range of actions that vary enormously in moral worth, from great and noble deeds to horrific evils" (165). Evil is a consequence of humans' misuse of their freedom. (There are some free will theodicies that also attempt to explain natural evils as a consequence of human misuse of freedom.)

Proper knowledge of God is filial knowledge.

Filial knowledge can only be acquired in the context of a child-parent relationship. Filial knowledge requires propositional knowledge that God exists, but goes beyond it. Filial knowledge also requires one's humbly, lovingly, and faithfully standing in a relationship with God as a child to its parent. God does not want mere propositional knowledge of God from us.

Moral education and free will

Free will is a requirement for genuine love. But since we are free, God cannot force us to love God. So, our moral education by God has no guarantee of success.

The Analogy

God is like the mother described in the three scenarios—God remains hidden from many human beings who seek God but never find God. Analogy with the first scenario: people who lose their faith in God and try to re-establish it, only to find that they cannot bring themselves to believe (and God remains hidden from them). Analogy with the second scenario: people who are open to belief in God, some of whom seek long and hard, but they do not find God. Analogy with the third scenario: people who find themselves in deep trouble and call out to God for help in their pain but are greeted with silence.

A quick point about divine gender and the standard view:

If gender correlates with biological sex, as the standard view holds, then, given that God does not have a biological sex, God cannot have a gender either!

Divine hiddenness and human deficiency

If we experience divine hiddenness, the first thing we should do is check our attitudes. Are we being presumptuous? (Job 38-42) Are we presuming to know how a loving God must intervene in the world, measuring God by our limited and superficial standards? If so, then it's our expectations that need to be transformed. Divine hiddenness is meant to teach us humility.

What about Judaism?

In objection to Qureshi's claim, some have argued that if he claims that Christians and Muslims do not worship the same God he will have to say the same thing about Christians and Jews, since Judaism also claims that God is one and not three in one (as Christianity claims) and does not endorse the divinity of Christ. But it seems absurd to say that Christians do not worship the same God that Abraham worshipped! In response to this objection, Qureshi claims that Christianity is an elaboration of Jewish theology. In contrast to this, Islam is a rejection of Christian theology.

The Logical Problem

It's not logically possible for the following to co-exist: -an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God -evil

Stump's criticism of Swinburne's free will theodicy

Its explanation of the reason for God allowing natural evils is weak. God could give us the knowledge of the consequences of our choices in other ways (without natural evils). "...God could inform [us], directly or indirectly, of the consequences of [our] choices, and it is clear from various Biblical stories that God could do so without infringing the human freedom which Swinburne is concerned to safeguard." (Samuel 23:9-11, 30: 7-8; Jeremiah 42: 1-16; Daniel 8-10)

Ivan Karamazov's Challenge

Ivan's anti-instrumentalism: it is morally abhorrent to say that the suffering of children can be used to serve some higher purpose (i.e. to have an instrumentalist view of the evils inflicted on children and the suffering that results). The "existence of evil is in principle unredeemable and incomprehensible" (177). There is no moral justification for the evils suffered by the innocent.

Miracles that do not violate laws of nature?

Meaningful coincidences: David's example of his mom waking up at the exact moment her brother was in an accident, my husband finding his wedding ring in a parking lot after it was missing for three weeks in a snow mound and the parking lot had been plowed during that time

Miracles and the three conceptions of laws of nature

Miracles are totally compatible with the first conception, but it's not clear in what sense anything would count as a miracle. Miracles are also compatible with the second conception—they'll just be extremely unlikely events (but not violations of the laws). Somewhat surprisingly, Lewis argues that miracles are also possible on the third conception, according to which laws of nature are necessary.

Moral evil Vs. Natural evil

Moral evil is due to the agency of free beings. Natural evil is not (at least not directly) caused by the actions of free (human) beings.

Divine hiddenness & theodicy

Moser thinks that there's no available theodicy as a response to divine hiddenness. However, according to Moser, filial knowledge of God is available to all who seek it with humility and moral seriousness. If you do seek God in that way, you will find God. However, that does not mean you'll understand why God sometimes hides Godself. But "[t]his should be no surprise given the differences between God and humans" (53).

Objections to the Analogy Argument

Objection 1: people seeking God are not like children in scenarios (i)-(iii). Objection 2: Thinking of God on analogy with a loving mother is inappropriate. Objection 3: It's presumptuous to expect God to respond to us. Objection 4: There are other reasons for belief in God that outweigh the reasons against belief articulated in the hiddenness argument.

An Argument for the Equal Gender Thesis

P1. If God is masculine or feminine, then God has strongly gendered attributes. P2. If God has strongly gendered attributes, then God is equally masculine and feminine. P3. Therefore, if God is masculine or feminine, God is equally masculine and feminine.

Objection to Phillips' Argument: the Parent Analogy

Parents permit their children to suffer for the sake of a greater good (e.g. subjecting your child to painful surgery to cure a disease). Good parents would subject their child to painful treatment for the sake of curing them without a second thought. Thus God, like a good parent, can permit evil without a second thought without being callous and insensitive.

Why do people think otherwise, then?

Qureshi acknowledges that he himself used to think that Muslims and Christians worshipped the same God. According to Qureshi, many people think this because it is stated in the Quran that Jews, Christians, and Muslims all worship the same God (the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob).

Rea's argument that Christians and Muslims do indeed worship the same God

Rea claims that, although Christians and Muslims have very different beliefs about God (different enough for them to qualify as separate religions!), they still worship the same God. If we are even capable of disagreeing about something, our beliefs have to both be about that same thing! Compare: suppose I think dolphins are mammals, and Maggie thinks they are fish. Both of our beliefs have to be about dolphins for us even to disagree! If Maggie's belief is not about dolphins, then we can't say she disagrees with me about what dolphins are like, we'd have to say that she uses the word 'dolphin' to mean something different than what I mean!

How proper knowledge of God is attained:

Since proper knowledge of God is not mere intellectual assent to the proposition that God exists, but filial knowledge, we attain it not just by looking at arguments and evidence, but by pursuing a relationship with God. Since God is personal, a who and not merely a what, we can only have real knowledge of God in the way that we have real knowledge of persons.

Swinburne's free will theodicy

Swinburne takes Plantinga's Free Will Defense a step further and builds a theodicy out of it. (S1) Significant exercise of free will with a choice of destiny, with "the opportunity to bring about serious evils or prevent their occurrence," is of such great value that it outweighs all the evil in the world. "God does not prevent human beings from accomplishing the ends of their evil wills, because to do so consistently would be to deprive them of the significant exercise of their free wills and reduce them to the status of pets." (S2) Natural evil is a necessary effect of significant exercise of free will. Without natural evil, we could not know the consequences of our actions.

The Equal Accuracy Thesis & The Equal Gender Thesis

The Equal Accuracy Thesis: masculine characterizations of God are no more or less accurate than feminine ones. The Equal Gender Thesis: God is masculine or feminine only if God is equally masculine and feminine.

In Favor of Traditionalism:

The Old Testament

How miracles can occur even if the laws of nature are necessary

The laws of nature apply ceteris paribus (other things being equal). The striking of a match will cause a spark, but not if the match is wet. One billiard ball that strikes another (with a given velocity) will cause the other to move (at a certain velocity), but not if someone picks up the second ball just as it's being struck.

Why this view stated in the Quran is incorrect:

The similarities between the conceptions of God of Islam and Christianity are superficial: they claim God did some of the same things (created the world), and sent some of the same people (many of the prophets, including Jesus), and has some of the same qualities (power, mercy, etc.). However, there are important differences in their claims about God's nature, God's defining characteristics. These differences outweigh the superficial similarities.

Two types of response:

Theodicy: an attempt to provide a reason that God would permit evil (or perhaps the kinds and amounts of evil we find in our world) that makes God's existence plausible. Defense: an attempt to show that the co-existence of God and evil (or perhaps the kinds and amounts of evil that we find in our world) is logically possible.

The Teleology of Suffering

This is the idea that suffering has some God-given purpose that makes it worth it. How this plays out in soul-making theodicies: the existence of evil provides opportunities for soul-making by giving free agents the occasion to come to the aid of the suffering. The presence of evil and suffering gives us the opportunity to be responsible for each other.

Traditionalism vs. Inclusivism:

Traditionalism is the view that characterizing God in predominantly masculine terms is theologically mandatory. Inclusivism is the view that feminine characterizations of God are just as legitimate as masculine ones.

How should one respond to the problem of evil, then?

Trakakis gestures at an answer: with an embodied Christian life (182, fn. 67).

Plantinga's free will defense

Two main theses*: (P1) Human beings have free will. (P2) Possession and exercise of free will to do more good than evil is a good that outweighs all the evil in the world. How Plantinga's Free Will Defense handles natural evil: (P3) Natural evil is also the result of free will (viz., it's the result of evil choices by malevolent spiritual beings). *THIS IS NOT AN ARGUMENT—JUST A SET OF PRINCIPLES.

Against Traditionalism (cont'd.)

Two reasons for resisting Traditionalism: (i)If God is equally masculine and feminine (if gendered at all), then using predominantly masculine terms to describe God is misleading. (How?) (ii)Furthermore, this practice is misleading in a way that is arguably harmful to women (or any non-men). (How has it been or could it be harmful?)

Cognitive idolatry

We are guilty of cognitive idolatry when "we demand a certain sort of knowledge or evidence for God inappropriate to a filial relationship with God" (48). We have difficulty knowing God because we resist the sort of transformation necessary to have such knowledge.

Stump's Strategy for Responding to the Logical Problem of Evil

We need to avail ourselves of beliefs from our religious tradition, rather than just the resources of "mere theism" (i.e. the sort of conception of God that is shared among different monotheistic religions). If we do so, we will have ways of interpreting the apparently inconsistent propositions that will dissipate the appearance of inconsistency. Stump's religious tradition: Christianity

Are miracles all and only violations of laws of nature?

Well, whether they are violations at all depends on your conception of the laws of nature. Both David and C. S. Lewis argue that miracles are not violations of the laws of nature, but they are disruptions of the causal order. Miracles require that the causal order is not closed.

The Imago Dei doctrine

Women and men are created equally in the image of God. Neither men nor women reflect God "more" or more accurately than the other.

The Larycia Hawkins Case

was a political science professor at Wheaton College. She was the first black woman to be a tenured professor at Wheaton. Wheaton College is an evangelical Protestant college that requires all of its faculty to sign a statement of faith. , a devout Protestant, ignited controversy when she decided to wear the hijab in solidarity with Muslims during the season of Advent in 2015.