poli sci final

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, 1963) proposed three basic models of political culture based on their cross-national survey research on five democratic countries: Italy, Germany, Mexico, US, and UK Hypothesis is that congruence of political culture and institutional setting reinforces political stability. All countries will eventually converge to be like the US. Political culture determined by three main factors: awareness of government (do we know our local MPs etc.); expectations of government; political participation

Almond and Verba's hypotheses on political culture

The consequences of globalization are contested. There are three positions in the debate: Retreat-of-the-state position: States are losing power and influence. The state-centric position: States have even managed to expand their capacities for regulation and control. Pragmatic position: Process of state transformation. States are winning and losing at the same time. The consequences for globalization are analysed for four aspects of sovereign statehood: Economic basis of the state: Removal of local barriers to trade and the building of a nation-wide infrastructure Political-administrative institutions of government: A centralized system of democratic rules and strong political-administrative capacities within a precisely defined territory. Nationhood and identity: People who build a community of sentiment and a community of citizens Sovereignty: No final political authority outside or above the state Principles of sovereignty are challenged as well: The most important feature of sovereignty - the rule of non-intervention - is challenged in a world of multi-level governance. But it is still the states who do consent to comply with supra-national regulation (though they may not always have a choice). This is best summarized by the idea of multilevel governance: Governing is no longer the monopoly of government. It is increasingly shared with a multitude of other actors: decision-making power is increasingly dispersed. Dispersion may take place upwards, but also downwards and sidewards

Approaches to viewing the state's new role under globalization

The post-industrial revolution: towards new cleavages? Materialism vs. post-materialism cleavage (Ronald Inglehart) Conflict among generations, younger preferring more liberal and non materialistic values ⇒Green parties but also new social movements Following WWII, remarkable economic growth that brought new conditions into advanced industrial societies - the post-war birth cohorts spent their formative years under levels of prosperity that were unprecedented in human history, and the welfare state reinforced the feeling that survival was secure, producing major differences in the priorities of older and younger generations Scarcity hypothesis: Virtually everyone aspires to freedom and autonomy, but people tend to place the highest value on the most pressing needs. Material sustenance and physical security are immediately linked with survival, and when they are scarce people give top priority to these 'materialistic' goals; but under conditions of prosperity, people become more likely to emphasize 'post-materialist' goals such as belonging, esteem, and aesthetic and intellectual satisfaction Intergenerational value change will occur if younger generations grow up under different conditions from those that shaped earlier generations - so that the values of the entire society will gradually change through intergenerational replacement. As the four oldest birth cohorts die off during the four decades following 1970, we should observe a major shift in the motivations of these societies, with post-materialists becoming as numerous as materialists, bringing a corresponding shift away from economic issues toward increasing emphasis on quality of life and expressive issues. Everyone is moving away from a parochial culture Globalization (Kriesi): Cleavage between losers (workers, unemployed) and winners (civil servants, upper class) of globalization ⇒Extreme right or left parties

Cleavages in culture define electoral alignments (modern)

(Austria, Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg) - moderate decommodification: pay into common social pot, if you lose job you are entitled to certain things (unemployment benefits); keep your level of wealth, I will help you from falling in the social ladder; they don't change social structure; ensuring that everybody stays at the level that they came in

Conservative welfare state

Milbrath (1965): political participation ranges from apathy to activism ("gladiators") - divided US population into four different categories Gladiators (about 1 to 7 % of U.S. population): hold electoral office, run as candidate, active member of a political party, actively participates in electoral campaigning. Transitional activities: attending a political meeting, money donations to political parties, entering into contact with political leader (another small share) Spectator (about 60% of U.S. population): has political stickers on car, tries to convince relative to vote for a given candidate, talks about politics, votes, gets informed about politics Verba & Nie (1972) propose 4 models of political participation, that split the "spectator category" proposed by Milbrath. 1. Voting (in all elections): only participatory technology we know of that includes the vast majority of people 2. Campaigning (and donations): going out and convincing people to vote for certain candidates (more demanding than voting - you have to be convinced yourself that your candidate is the worthy; you have to be outspoken/passionate about the candidate) 3. Cooperating and mobilizing at the local level: similar to campaigning 4. Getting in contact with officials for a specific reason: specific problem that you personally have; need to file a request - further you get the more demanding it becomes basically Apathy: no political activity (everybody else)

Different types of political participants

National governments are replaced by forms of multi-level governance of which the most far reaching form is supra-national governance (e.g. WTO dispute settlement system, EU). Nationhood and citizenship are challenged: Creation of identity is increasingly becoming an individual project Globalization reinforces collective identities above and below the nation. There is evidence of an emerging western civic identity but also of resistant identities. It may thus dilute certain types of identities. Civil rights are no longer granted solely by the sovereign state; A set of universal human rights is defined at a global level and international courts.

Effects on the citizen's role in the political sphere (identity; civil rights)

Free-riding: pushing everyone else to do the right thing but running out first yourself - the guy who says "please keep calm" and then runs out before everyone else - hypocrisy Tragedy of the commons (Ostrom): an economic theory of a situation within a shared-resource system where individual users acting independently and rationally according to their own self-interest behave contrary to the common good of all users by depleting that resource

Example of a suboptimal result: free-riding (Olson) and tragedy of the commons (Ostrom)

Main references: Haas (1958), Sandholtz & Stone Sweet (1998) European integration is a process driven by underlying political, economic, and social forces. Once begun, European integration is a self-sustaining process because of spillover effects: "a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which, in turn, create a further condition and a need for more, and so forth" (Lindberg 1963). In this perspective, non-state actors play a central role (both economic actors and supranational institutions)

Explaining European integration: supranational approach

Franklin (2004) claims that 3 consecutive strikes and you're in for life - your first three elections are very important and will determine what you do for the rest of your political life The context of early adulthood political socialization is very important, it has consequences for the whole life cycle (cohort effect). Voting age regulations and closeness of elections during initial socialization are the two key factors. Decline in turnout is explained by the voting age fixed at 18 instead of 21 in many advanced democracies (they changed the voting age in the 1970s): 20-year-olds are - on average - less certain about their future (job, family, politics etc.) than 23-year-olds. In the 1970s at the age of 23, you'd probably met your partner, you were entering a job more securely - made major decisions. At 20, you hadn't chosen profession. By lowering the voting age, you would confront people with more uncertain/difficult situation - they would turn out less than the 23 year old - diminishing turnout could be explained by the fact that there's a constant share of the new voters that will not vote because they're unsure - and this sets a pattern for the rest of their life Generation has now been replaced, however, so this decline shouldn't maintain itself Criticism - his theory doesn't hold up because things haven't remained stable - we will continue spending parents money until 26/27 on university education - much less stable much longer, labor markets have changed/demand for skills have changed - need more skills than in the 1970s so this means that the generation replacement will not result in a stabilization and increase of voter turnout

Franklin's theory on why voting turnout has decreased

Bounded rationality is the idea that in decision-making, rationality of individuals is limited by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount of time they have to make a decision.

H Simon's bounded rationality

Two reactions when there is a confrontation between the state and groups: the principled/fundamentalist view Rousseau's Social Contract: The general will is always right and tends to the public advantage; but it does not follow that the deliberations of the people are always equally correct. Our will is always for our own good, but we do not always see what that is; the people is never corrupted, but it is often deceived, and on such occasions only does it seem to will what is bad. But when factions arise, and partial associations are formed at the expense of the great association, the will of each of these associations becomes general in relation to its members, while it remains particular in relation to the State. [...] It is therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself, that there should be no partial society within the State, and that each citizen should think only his own thoughts. Questions only come when people are unhappy with the status quo; we all meet at the town hall and we live all our other allegiances at the entrance; you cease to be everything but a citizen (but how can you cease to be who you are? This is a more idealistic view) the pragmatic view: cannot durably outlaw them so might as well get along Madison's Federalist Papers: Outlaw factions? "Remedy worse than the disease" - historical context is also important (Rousseau is thinking about Geneva who all share same language/religion/beliefs - therefore these people probably can put off other identities since they share most identities - Madison is dealing with a multinational state; the problems are more difficult) Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.

Historical perspective: fundamentalist and pragmatic views - collective action

The Michigan school provides the first nation-wide study for the US (presidential election of 1948). Party identification becomes the key predictor. Party identification is group identification (reference group), built during early political socialization, and largely inherited from parents. In Europe, concept has been translated as party proximity (instability of party systems,...) but does not convey the same emotional attachment. Risk of endogeneity in surveys (i.e. inducing an answer due to the question). The most proximate functional equivalent in Europe is the left - right position.

However, party identification is the main predictor of voting behavior

We have to look not at states, but we have to look at specific welfare state institutions - there are certain contradictions; made models of five different types of logics of social insurance institutions - targeted institutions (safety net); in the corporatist welfare state, would get some degree of support, but for people outside the model, they will get nothing - get what you put in; basic security model - everyone no matter how rich will get the same security e.g. NHS in UK; additional private insurance system; will have a mix of these models - it is this mix that determines the historical type of welfare state

Korpi and Palme on welfare states

UK and Ireland are liberal welfare states - unemployment insurance will be proportional to what you paid into the unemployment insurance (low deommodification); not supposed to effect social stratification - it's poor relief - not going to help you do better, but if you really can't do anything after you've sold everything etc. once you've spent all other money you had, then I will help you

Liberal welfare state

This theory comes with limits (makes sense intuitively, but in practice we know that countries do not evolve in a linear way.) The study is also permeated with bias since both authors come from the US.

Limits to almond and verba

The theory of Anthony Downs, stating that parties will in the long run converge in order to increase their vote share, is questionable because it implies an end of ideology, or at least a severe weakening of the ideological identities of parties Preferences of voters are assumed to be a function of proximity: the smaller the ideological distance, the smaller the ideological distance, the stronger the preference. Parties are expected to move towards the position of the median voter which cannot be defeated by any other in a majority vote. In doing so, the potential number of voters is maximized. When a party is successful with this strategy it may become a pivot party which occupies a position on the middle of the ideological spectrum Party system convergence: established parties tend to move to moderate ideological positions. No general tendency towards catch-allium in Europe - ideology remains an important tool for most parties to profile themselves

MVT doesn't take ideology into account enough

(Denmark, Sweden, Finland) - doesn't matter how much you pay in, you are entitled to high unemployment benefits - same entitlements if you moved to Sweden six months before you lose your job compared to if you had been paying into the social pot for 25 years - this is idealized; complete decommodification; in terms of stratification, it's ambitious - should help recalibrate life chances/opportunities between different people from different origins - almost a socialist goal; everybody no matter where they came from could achieve anything despite the accidents of life

Nordic social democratic state

1 Discontent: general discontent with status quo, economy, perspectives etc. giving some credibility to terrorist organization's critique. 2 Grievances: there needs to be an ideology that frames discontent into legitimate grievances, suggests the direction of change. In the absence of an ideational blueprint, nothing may happen. 3 Organizing capacity: leaders have to manage to mobilize. This depends on the individual characteristics discussed in lecture 9: socialization, education within pre-existing structures (not deviant ones). 4 Political opportunity: the support or the legitimization of a particular course of action. Some major political event that will accelerate radicalization (repression, coup d'Etat etc.).

Obserschall terrorism and resource mobilization theory

PART A. Financial crises result in far-right sympathies new research shows a strong relationship between financial crises and swings to the right over the past 140 years across the developed world. Three German researchers looked at data from elections between 1870 and 2014. In all, 827 elections were studied in 20 developed economies including the UK, the US, and Germany. (Poland wasn't part of the cohort.) The study concluded that politics takes a "hard right turn" after severe financial crises (not just "normal recessions"). On average, far-right parties boost their vote share by 30% after crises. General political polarization also increases, but leftwing parties don't see nearly as much of a boost as their counterparts on the right. Why? "After a crisis, voters seem to be particularly attracted to the political rhetoric of the extreme right, which often attributes blame to minorities or foreigners," the researchers said. Since the latest global financial crisis, more extreme parties have indeed gained ground. Some have been on the far left, like Greece's Syriza; but Greece has also seen a strong rise on the right in the form of Golden Dawn, a neo-Nazi group. PART B. Case study: Greek crisis For far-right parties across the continent, mismanagement of the Greek crisis is proof positive that the E.U. is a net negative for any country not named Germany. And as extremist parties continue to rise across the continent, Germany's ability to negotiate a compromise with Athens will be further constrained by voices demanding that the E.U. cut its losses and jettison Greece.

PART I. Economic crisis - far-right

PART A. The extreme right as opposition to globalization Extreme right wing parties have proliferated since the mid-1980s. These parties are however of different kinds: anti-establishment, anti-immigration, nationalist,... Explaining their success: Hypothesis on the role of immigration (as a threat to national culture and indentity) Hypothesis on the role of economic crisis and unemployment Hypothesis on interaction between immigration and unemployment Hypothesis on the role of the electoral system (expressive or protest vote only?) Results: immigration, unemployment conditional on immigration, and permissive electoral systems are central explanations. In part, the rise of the far right coincides with fears aroused across Europe by a tidal wave of desperate migrants. At least 550,000 refugees have arrived in Italy and Greece in 2015 alone. By some estimates, Germany could receive 1.5 million migrants this year. In 2013, Germany spent roughly $14,340 to house and feed each refugee in its care. Multiplied by 1.5 million people, that's a bill of roughly $21.5 billion at a time of economic stagnation in much of Europe. Despite all their bluster, the migration crisis is a godsend for Europe's far right: it gives both new and older parties an opening to capitalize on the rising fear of voters that might never otherwise consider supporting them. As ultra-nationalists who want to protect the strong welfare systems their citizens currently enjoy, they frequently couch their criticism of migrants in terms of economic pragmatism, explaining there is simply not enough money and jobs to go around. Though these parties often have extensive histories of racist comments and policy proposals, their economic message now resonates across a continent exhausted by multiple crises in recent years. PART B: Case study: UKIP It became clear in the 2013 Eastleigh by-election that UKIP, rather than Westminster's official Labour opposition, seemed to have become the party of choice for the anti-government vote and the anti-politics vote. UKIP appears to have struck a chord with many voters on the issue of immigration, which was the focus of its European election campaign this year and an issue frequently raised by people saying they were going to vote for them ahead of the Rochester and Strood by-election. It has rejected claims that it is simply "against" foreigners, arguing that it is in favour of a sensible "managed" migration policy, something Mr Farage argues is not possible while Britain remains in the EU. However, the party found itself in hot water over the issue a few days before its Rochester win, when is candidate, Mark Reckless, suggested EU migrants would only be allowed to stay in the UK for a fixed period if the UK left the European Union. The party says leaving the EU is the only way to be able to control who moves the UK from Europe and says it would boost the UK's border force to crack down on illegal immigration. They would also change the law so that those without identifying documents can be sent back to the country they travelled from.

PART II. Immigration crisis - far-right

When it comes to getting news about politics and government, liberals and conservatives inhabit different worlds. There is little overlap in the news sources they turn to and trust. those with the most consistent ideological views on the left and right have information streams that are distinct from those of individuals with more mixed political views - and very distinct from each other. Pew Research center: Overall, the study finds that consistent conservatives: Are tightly clustered around a single news source, far more than any other group in the survey, with 47% citing Fox News as their main source for news about government and politics. By contrast, those with consistently liberal views: Are less unified in their media loyalty; they rely on a greater range of news outlets, including some - like NPR and the New York Times- that others use far less. Express more trust than distrust of 28 of the 36 news outlets in the survey. NPR, PBS and the BBC are the most trusted news sources for consistent liberals.

Partisan polarization is reinforced by media outlets

People move more towards the right when a financial crisis hits New research shows a strong relationship between financial crises and swings to the right over the past 140 years across the developed world. Three German researchers looked at data from elections between 1870 and 2014. In all, 827 elections were studied in 20 developed economies including the UK, the US, and Germany. (Poland wasn't part of the cohort.) The study concluded that politics takes a "hard right turn" after severe financial crises (not just "normal recessions"). On average, far-right parties boost their vote share by 30% after crises. General political polarization also increases, but leftwing parties don't see nearly as much of a boost as their counterparts on the right. After a crisis, voters seem to be particularly attracted to the political rhetoric of the extreme right They found that elections following a financial crisis almost always benefit the far right, resulting in increasing political polarization.

Polarization is also reinforced by the fear of financial crises

Political culture: a set of attitudes and practices held by a people that shapes their political behavior. It includes moral judgments, political myths, beliefs, and ideas about what makes for a good society. A political culture is a reflection of a government, but it also incorporates elements of history and tradition that may predate the current regime. Political cultures matter because they shape a population's political perceptions and actions. Governments can help shape political culture and public opinion through education, public events, and commemoration of the past. Political cultures vary greatly from state to state and sometimes even within a state. Generally speaking, however, political culture remains more or less the same over time. Political culture can develop from a lot of different sources Pre-modern political science thus proposed a deterministic chain of causality between geology, social structures, and political behavior (Siegried) - how geology interacted with social structures and political behavior - depending on soil, either agricultural techniques or urbanization will develop more strongly - agricultural will mean more conservative parties will develop In Corez (department in France): during revolution, big scientific controversy over which farming technique should be used - the northern half disagreed with southern half and they used different techniques - the revolution ended up promoting one of the two, pushing the other out of business - and this created a strong political divide, making the north very pro-revolutionary and the south being counter-revolutionary; this political divide persisted generations after the original division - if differences don't correspond anymore, make new ones up to justify the divide

Political culture

The cultural approach: likelihood of participation is different across countries; depends on culture and institutions. No actual explanation. Could have to do with different value systems The D Term (Gerber, Green and Larimer 2008) Gerber, Green and Larimer try to estimate the importance of voting as a social norm. This norm may be either intrinsic or extrinsic. For example, making it a social event: the whole family goes to vote and then they go for lunch - the children will then take their children to do the same thing They run a fieldwork experiment on 180,000 Michigan households for the primary elections of 2006. Households are divided into 5 groups. No treatment - witness group, same characteristics as treatment groups They receive a postcard that says voting is a civic duty Postcard: same + your vote will be registered and will be studied (Hawthorne effect) - I'll know if you don't go and vote Postcard: same + display of voting history of household over past three elections; you haven't voted last time, I know, and it's very important that you do vote Postcard: same + display of voting history of neighbors over past three elections - all your neighbors have voted; but you haven't - you're lacking Did the same thing in LA but added an ethnic element - reminded the African Americans how the Latinos voted and vice versa The socio-economic model: socio-economic status of individuals determines their attitudes (efficacy, alienation, involvement, obligation); wealth, education and non-minority status lead to higher participation. The rational model: participation is a problem of collective action; private costs vs. public benefits. Collective action needs selective incentives. The mobilization approach: people need to get mobilized to take part in collective action (mobilization conveys information and beliefs); professionalization and organization-building are ways of mobilizing people

Political participants' propensity to vote: approaches that explain voting

Europe: from continuing inter-state war to pacific unification without domination; strongly limited war-making 1948: In the wake of World War II nationalism is out of favour in large parts of continental Europe and support for federalism is high. The European Union of Federalists organises a Congress at The Hague in 1948 in the hope of drawing up a European constitution. 1950: French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman announces a plan for France and Germany to pool coal and steel production and invites other states to join them. His plan is based on the idea that European unity is the key to peace. Solidarity in production he said would make war between France and Germany "not merely unthinkable but materially impossible." 1951: Treaty of Paris establishes European Coal and Steel Community: Six countries sign the treaty France Germany the Benelux states and Italy. It sets up a High Authority to manage the coal and steel industries and a Common Assembly a precursor of the European parliament. The Dutch supported by the Germans also insist on the creation of a Council of Ministers made up of ministers from member states to counterbalance the supranational High Authority.

Post-war & the need for European integration

Thesis: Primarily, it is important to establish the different types of welfare states currently in action. Most welfare states are a patchwork of successive layers of institutions that do not all follow the exact same philosophy, and the redistribution system of each country depends on their electoral system.

QUESTION EIGHTEEN: Are welfare state types converging in Europe?

Thesis: Culture has a huge effect on political attitudes, demonstrated by Almond and Verba's study which delineates three specific political cultures: subject, parochial and participant. These three types of culture influence the citizens' views towards politics, and have different degrees of stability. Political attitudes can also be based on cleavages in society, which have occurred both historically and more recently. For example, there were major social cleavages after the National and Industrial revolutions that created new electoral alignment. And in the modern age, globalization and post-materialism have also influenced the rise of new parties and political attitudes.

QUESTION NINETEEN: How does culture determine political attitudes?

Thesis: Far right parties are often successful in times of turmoil. For example, far right parties are often successful in times of economic crisis. Far right parties have also been successful in response to the refugee crisis spurred on by immigration.

QUESTION THIRTY FIVE: What determines the success of far right parties?

Thesis: Globalization has had a significant impact on politics. Globalization has effected the state, although political scientists hold different views on what the exact consequences are for the power of the state. Furthermore, the identity and civil rights of the citizen have also come under contestation as a result of globalization. There have also been more specific affects. For example, the rise of far-right parties, exemplified by the rise of UKIP in Britain.

QUESTION THIRTY FOUR: How does globalization affect politics?

Introduction: Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines - and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive - than at any point in the last two decades. These trends manifest themselves in myriad ways, both in politics and in everyday life.

QUESTION THIRTY SIX: What explains partisan polarization?

Thesis: European Integration leads to different types of convergence. However, some convergences are stronger than others. Economic, for example, is stronger than social convergence, although economic convergence does come with problems. Furthermore, there are still limits to the extent to which European countries converge, exemplified by the movement in Britain to leave the EU.

QUESTION THIRTY THREE: Does European Integration lead to convergence among member states?

Thesis: There are three major ideal-types of state-society relations: pluralism, Neo-corporatism, and statism. These three ideal-types, though, don't come without their challenges.

QUESTION THIRTY: What are the major ideal-types of state-society relations?

Thesis: People mobilize when they have the power of the group behind them and they mobilize because they are part of a group that feels it has to stand up for something it believes in. There are historical and modern perspectives on the power of groups and why we mobilize in group settings. People engage in collective action when they feel relatively deprived, which plays on the emotional side of mobilization. However, in reality, the reasons for mobilization mobilization are more strongly correlated with the availability of resources than just with the spatial distribution of injustice or grievance.

QUESTION TWENTY EIGHT: Why and when do people mobilize?

Thesis: There are many different kinds of political participants, but the majority of people can be classified as 'spectators.' Spectators are galvanized by different factors, and political scientists have outlined different approaches that explain voting. However, there has been a decrease in voting turnout recently. Franklin believes the decrease in political participation has to do with change in legal voting age. Yet, a decline in political participation in the conventional sense - like voting - doesn't mean there has been an overall reduction in political participation. People have merely changed their modes of participation.

QUESTION TWENTY FIVE: Why do people vote?

Thesis: Downs' median-voter theorem has important implications about parties and politicians and their goals. However, there are limits to the applicability of the theorem. Furthermore, the theorem doesn't take the power of ideology into account enough.

QUESTION TWENTY FOUR: Please explain the importance and limits of the median-voter theorem.

Thesis: A common misconception on radicalization is that people radicalize based upon personal grievances. However, information on terrorist tendencies offers the opposite conclusion: that terrorism is usually a result of radicalization within the social group. Furthermore, with the advent of social media, radicalization has become easier. In this context, social media acts as one giant interconnecting social group. There are two distinct types of social groups that are radicalized: young people and prisoners.

QUESTION TWENTY ONE: Why do people radicalize?

Thesis: Voting for policies is an important factor that determines how people vote, however, party identification is the main predictor of voting behavior. We have established that party alignment determines how the voter will vote. There are two prominent approaches to explaining party alignment: the ecological approach and the class approach.

QUESTION TWENTY SEVEN: Discuss the main explanations of the vote?

Thesis: The electoral system has an undeniable effect on electoral results by influencing the party system and the way the voter approaches the electoral system. Integral to the electoral system is the party system, and party choice is usually the determinant on electoral results. Party choice can be determined from sociological approach, a psychological approach or an economic approach.

QUESTION TWENTY THREE: How and why do electoral systems affect electoral results?

Thesis: The primary assumption of the rational choice theory tells us that if agents are rational, suboptimal outcomes will result e.g. free-riding and tragedy of the commons. Another major assumption of rational choice is that it's defined by our culture. It's based on the preferences of the agent. This can lead to problems, however, since this reasoning promotes unreasonable sociological assumptions.

QUESTION TWENTY TWO: Please explain the main assumptions of "rational-choice" approaches.

Thesis: People hold the political beliefs they hold mostly because of the political socialization they receive. There are many agents of socialization, but the family is the most important one. However, political beliefs are also time and place specific. The beliefs of citizens will be shaped by the time period and the society in which they live.

QUESTION TWENTY: Why do people hold the political beliefs they hold?

Iverson and Soskice have argued that electoral systems generate different types of class alliances, leading to different types of redistributive behavior Assume that lower classes will be left-leaning, middle classes will be centrist and upper classes will be right-leaning In proportional systems, the middle-class party and the lower-class party are likely to coalesce to tax upper classes. In majority systems, the middle class will split between the left wing (lower-class) party and the right-wing (upper-class) party. As it will be afraid of being taxed by a party it does not dominate, the middle class is more likely to vote for the anti-tax (upper-class, right-wing) party. Hence, there should be less redistribution under majority electoral systems. Proportional systems spend a lot more on social policies than other electoral systems. Different view of things: politicians will only redistribute to active political clients (those who vote). Hence, the lower the turn out, the lower redistribution and the higher inequality.

Redistribution is dependent on the electoral system

Robert Pape has compared 188 different suicide attacks between 1980 and 2001. He comes to a certain number of interesting conclusions: Suicide attacks are not (or no longer?) necessarily irrational, nor is the phenomenon restricted to radical Islam (e.g. Tamil Tigers). Focus of attention has to be shifted from individual irrationality to collective goals: from terrorists' characteristics to recruiters' strategies. Pape makes several major findings: 1 Suicide terrorism is strategic and usually coercive. Attacks occur in clusters. 2 Favorite targets are modern democracies to limit their foreign interventions. 3 Suicide terrorism has risen because it pays (!): goals are at least partially attained in most cases. 4 Low and medium level damage is more effective than large damage.

Robert Pape - terrorism

The European Union (European Community) as the first experience of modern regional integration, based on internal free trade area, common external tariff, and supranational expenditure programs (Common agricultural policy and a creation of a common market) - if collected ownership over coal and steel - no country can wage war Further development of supranational institutions and administration, removal of international barriers to cross-border circulation (goods, services, capital, labour), and development of supranational policies (single european currency, common social or environmental policies,...). It remains - by far - the example of regional integration that went farthest.

Specificities of an integrated European community

Extreme right wing parties have proliferated since the mid-1980s. These parties are however of different kinds: anti-establishment, anti-immigration, nationalist,... Explaining their success: Hypothesis on the role of immigration (as a threat to national culture and indentity) Hypothesis on the role of economic crisis and unemployment Hypothesis on interaction between immigration and unemployment Hypothesis on the role of the electoral system (expressive or protest vote only?) Results: immigration, unemployment conditional on immigration, and permissive electoral systems are central explanations. In part, the rise of the far right coincides with fears aroused across Europe by a tidal wave of desperate migrants. At least 550,000 refugees have arrived in Italy and Greece in 2015 alone. By some estimates, Germany could receive 1.5 million migrants this year. In 2013, Germany spent roughly $14,340 to house and feed each refugee in its care. Multiplied by 1.5 million people, that's a bill of roughly $21.5 billion at a time of economic stagnation in much of Europe. Despite all their bluster, the migration crisis is a godsend for Europe's far right: it gives both new and older parties an opening to capitalize on the rising fear of voters that might never otherwise consider supporting them. As ultra-nationalists who want to protect the strong welfare systems their citizens currently enjoy, they frequently couch their criticism of migrants in terms of economic pragmatism, explaining there is simply not enough money and jobs to go around. Though these parties often have extensive histories of racist comments and policy proposals, their economic message now resonates across a continent exhausted by multiple crises in recent years.

The extreme right as opposition to globalization

It became clear in the 2013 Eastleigh by-election that UKIP, rather than Westminster's official Labour opposition, seemed to have become the party of choice for the anti-government vote and the anti-politics vote. UKIP appears to have struck a chord with many voters on the issue of immigration, which was the focus of its European election campaign this year and an issue frequently raised by people saying they were going to vote for them ahead of the Rochester and Strood by-election. It has rejected claims that it is simply "against" foreigners, arguing that it is in favour of a sensible "managed" migration policy, something Mr Farage argues is not possible while Britain remains in the EU. However, the party found itself in hot water over the issue a few days before its Rochester win, when is candidate, Mark Reckless, suggested EU migrants would only be allowed to stay in the UK for a fixed period if the UK left the European Union. The party says leaving the EU is the only way to be able to control who moves the UK from Europe and says it would boost the UK's border force to crack down on illegal immigration. They would also change the law so that those without identifying documents can be sent back to the country they travelled from.

UKIP

Issue voting (Stokes 1963) Issues may be important to explain change in voting behavior if they cut across cleavages, if parties have clear and divergent views on them, and if they are salient. A weaker version of cleavage- and value-based explanations. Spatial models of voting behavior (Downs 1956) Voters choose by choosing the most proximate party to them in the policy space Valence issues have been introduced to compare the quality of candidates on top of positions of candidates

Voting for policies is an important factor that determines how people vote.

Conventional forms of participation have declined over the past few decades, though this decline is neither homogeneous nor systematic. Beyond electoral participation, conventional participation has evolved towards less demanding and less systematic forms of participation. Organizations such as political parties have changed to provide more individualistic opportunities of participation (i.e. one member one vote principle). André Breton, a famous surrealist writer, wanted to join the Communist party in France so assigned him to a cell so he would know what living the real life was like (he was from an upper class background) - wouldn't have this today - if a high-profile figure wants to join a political party they are moved straight to the top Participation in organizations has more generally declined (Putnam: decline of social capital). Yet, we observe new modes and new repertoires of collective action; unconventional forms of political participation have risen. Rise in cause-oriented activism (specific issues, consumption).

Yet, a decline in political participation in the conventional sense doesn't mean there has been an overall reduction in political participation. People have merely changed their modes of participation.

The school is the agency responsible for socializing groups of young people in particular skills and values in society. In all countries, there is some degree of guided socialization through the schools. Schools attempt to mold the citizenry according to the ideals of the state - more or less knowingly. Peer groups refer either to a group of people who are friends or to people of similar age and characteristics (e.g., students in a college class). Peer groups are extremely influential in developing adolescents' tastes and their view of the world but they vary considerably in their political impact. Mass Media include newspapers, magazines, radio, and films, CDs, internet, etc. We are dependent on the media for what we know and how we relate to the world of politics because of the media-politics connection. We read or watch political debates followed by instant analysis and commentary by experts. Other Agents: State, Religion, Political Events, Art...

agents of socialization

This idea was formalized by Duncan Black in 1948, and was discussed extensively by Anthony Downs in his 1957 book An Economic Theory of Democracy. However, the idea that the relative location of "customers" (which we can also think of as voters) and "businesses" (which we can think of as candidates or political parties) did not begin with Black's work - Harold Hotelling's 1929 article "Stability in Competition" made the argument that the location of businesses (retail stores) on a street will attract customers not only due to price, but due to proximity. Hotelling argued that if the price of a good at both stores is the same, customers will patronize the store closest to their home, as they are aware of the cost of traveling to and from the store.

beginnings of median voter theorem

Overfishing (hurts the British market and citizen) Loss of British sovereignty'

brexit

PART A. Challenge: changing cleavages Contesting the state and party politics Contesting the preeminence of the social cleavage Looking for new forms of participation PART B. Challenge: the regulatory state The demise of distributive policies? The rise of regulatory policies: they fix standards - I don't give you the money but I tell you how to do it PART C. Challenge: Europeanization/globalization The EU and interest groups: "transnational pluralism" Feedback to national state-society relations? Which "models" fare best?

challenges to ideal-types

One of the most recurrent themes of analysis is class voting in Europe, i.e. the stable support of workers to left wing parties. This has been measured by the Alford index (Proportion of the working class voting Labour, minus the proportion of the middle class voting Labour.) Class voting is decreasing (dealignment). Objective class vs. social identity (Michelat & Simon). Competing cleavages: religion. In 2004, for 12 out of 17 European countries religion has a significant relation with vote choice (but not in Denmark, Sweden, UK) If you go to church at least once a month, you are more likely to vote conservative Cross-cutting cleavages: gender, race,... Social and economic inequalities are still viewed as important determinants of vote choice. Class voting is decreasing in Europe, except in the UK The socio-economic model: socio-economic status of individuals determines their attitudes (efficacy, alienation, involvement, obligation); wealth, education and non-minority status lead to higher participation

class approach to voting

Rural-urban cleavage Conflicts about trade policies: barriers (farmers) vs. open markets (industrialists) ⇒Agrarian parties Workers-employers cleavage Conflict between labor and capital Demands of social rights and welfare provisions ⇒Social democratic parties. This family is later divided by the Bolshevik revolution.

cleavages stemming from industrial revolution

Center periphery cleavage because of: Administrative centralization (fiscal integration) Cultural standardization (compulsory schooling, national language) ⇒ Regionalist parties State-Church cleavage: National revolution based on liberal ideology: secular institutions State-Church conflict: abolition of Church privileges ⇒Conservative and religious parties

cleavages stemming from national revolution

Beyond the rise in ideological consistency, another major element in polarization has been the growing contempt that many Republicans and Democrats have for the opposing party. To be sure, disliking the other party is nothing new in politics. But today, these sentiments are broader and deeper than in the recent past.

contempt of other party

Unrealistic sociological assumptions Concept of rationality may be "western-centered": what is rational may be different from one place to another. It's a cultural model - those people aren't rational because they don't behave the way we do (globalization has diffused this kind of norm) - rationality is dependent on culture, but different cultures think different things are rational Culture as an underpinning may provide patterns not only for preferences, but also for the way people reason. e.g. in some cultures, financial distress is shameful so you rationally keep this information to yourself - in other cultures, it's rational to ask for help. Preferences are not exogenous, they change with context and over time e.g. with age you get more conservative People are never alone: their preferences and perceptions are (co-)shaped by reference groups e.g. we're shaped by family and friends' opinions

critiques of rational choice

Majoritarian Systems Single-member plurality (first past the post): choice of a candidate seat awarded to candidate who receives most votes - UK, US, Canada, India etc. Two round-system or runoff: choice of a candidate; if no candidate wins absolute majority of votes in first round, a second round takes place with a certain number of candidates; the rule for the second round is plurality e.g. France Alternative vote (AV) and Single transferable vote (STV): ranking candidates; least supported candidates are eliminated (and vote is transferred to other candidates) so that a candidate wins a quota or a majority e.g. Australia, Ireland Only 33.7% people voted for the majority but they are the ones whose interests will be represented - it's a plurality vote "elective dictatorship" (Lord Hailsham) Exclusion of smaller candidates - very difficult for small parties to win a constituency e.g. Lib Dems in the 1980s (had a negative premium of -21.9% in 1983 - Thatcher) Proportional systems Proportional or list systems vary a lot; all achieve to a certain extent proportionality between votes and seats. Dimensions: Size and number of constituencies: magnitude. Upper tiers Allocation method Preferential vote or intra-party choice: open or preferential lists (Chile, Poland) and panachage (Swiss, Luxembourg) Thresholds Mixed systems Mixed or mixed-member electoral systems are looking for the best of both worlds! Usually, voter casts two votes (local constituency + regional or national party list). Germany: seats allocated by half with each system, with compensation mechanisms between both. Existence of compensatory mixed systems (to correct for over- or under-representation in districts): New Zealand, Venezuela; parallel systems make not direct link between both systems: Japan, Pakistan, Russia.

different types of electoral systems

Skepticism about competence of voters linked to the emergence of representative democracy. Early observation of the stability of electoral behavior and of the diverging electoral orientations of territories. Siegfried (1913): geological nature of territories determines housing type, which determines capital ownership, which determines social structure, which determines political orientation. Rural areas vote right wing and cities vote left-wing - farmers are independent, people in cities much more aware of problems of social differences Families who were once farming family (up until third generation) will still vote conservative Bois (1960) built on the example of Sarthe to show that this was more complex: historical trauma can explain unexpected orientations. The study of electoral outcomes led to important results to understand voting behavior. Diffusion of behavior across territories (contagion effect) Contextual determination of behaviors Endogenous dynamics of behavior within territories (conformation effect) Yet, ecological approaches cannot draw inferences about individual behaviors (ecological fallacy). Typical and very common ecological fallacy: Front National has risen a lot in areas that were formerly dominated by the Communist Party. Hence, Communist voters switched to Front national? While such switches do exist they do - probably - not account for the whole rise of the Front national. The Front national is the main "workers"' party, but this may also result from the fact the whole electorate has moved to the right and that workers that used to vote for the Gaullist right have abandoned that party and moved further right.

ecological approach to voting

Economic approach: Downs; voters are rational, meaning that they make voting decisions in a calculating manner by choosing the party that will provide more benefits than any other - according to Downs, voters do not make decisions on the basis of long-term social or psychological dispositions but make their judgment about parties by evaluating current politiy positions of parties and candidates

economic approach to party choice

Adoption of the same currency The Maastricht Treaty, which was signed in February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993, outlined the 5 convergence criteria EU member states are required to comply with to adopt the new currency the euro. The purpose of setting the criteria was to achieve price stability within the eurozone and ensure it wasn't negatively impacted when new member states accede. To join the currency, member states had to qualify by meeting the terms of the treaty in terms of budget deficits, inflation, interest rates and other monetary requirements. Problems: eurozone crisis (Greece): In April, the EU orders France, Spain, the Irish Republic and Greece to reduce their budget deficits - the difference between their spending and tax receipts. In October, amid much anger towards the previous government over corruption and spending, George Papandreou's Socialists win an emphatic snap general election victory in Greece. In December, Greece admits that its debts have reached 300bn euros. Greece is burdened with debt amounting to 113% of GDP - nearly double the eurozone limit of 60%. Ratings agencies start to downgrade Greek bank and government debt. In February, Greece unveils a series of austerity measures aimed at curbing the deficit. The euro continues to fall and other EU member state debt starts to come under scrutiny, starting with the Republic of Ireland. In April, Portugal admits it cannot deal with its finances itself and asks the EU for help. A lot of EU bailouts.

economic convergence of the EU

A direct effect of electoral systems on structures of electoral competition (party system) Effective number of parties Centrifugal and centripetal competition Duverger's laws (1951): Plurality leads to two-party systems Proportional formulas lead to multiparty systems Rae (1971): magnitude (M) says it all! (Number of seats per constituency) Why do electoral systems matter? Mechanical effects Psychological effects on voters (strategic voting) Strategic behavior of parties (electoral coordination) Embedded institutions: electoral systems interact with social structure and other institutions

effects of electoral systems

sets of rules which define how voters are cast and seats are allocated.

electoral systems

National governments are the key actors (Hoffmann 1966): (geostrategic or classic) intergovernmentalism They have preferences over policies to delegate to the regional level (national interest, ideology, national politics) European integration as the result of intense bargaining among sovereign states. National economic actors determine governments' preferences (Moravcsik 1991, 1998): liberal intergovernmentalism International decision-making is a two-level game, with a domestic and an international game - the national interest is a result of a negotiation between stake-holders Domestic game is usually determined by the main economic actors and interest groups. International agreements are seen as trade agreements and their chances of success depend on the relative strength of free-trade coalitions as opposed to protectionist coalitions.

explaining European integration: intergovernmental approach

The family is responsible for, among other things, determining one's attitudes toward religion and establishing career goals. Families exert the first and most important influence on the formation of individual values. The values which are transmitted in the early years of learning are generally kept throughout life. Family is also one of the central influences in preparing individuals for their role in society. The process of socialization by the family begins in infancy. Children begin to develop attitudes towards authority based on how the parents treat them from birth. Studies have shown that families have a homogeneous political outlook. Parents generally share similar political beliefs. According to one study in the U.S. in the 1970s, 83% of husbands and wives shared the same political party affiliation, but this has strongly declined since. In families with homogeneous political outlook, children receive consistent political messages. When both parents share a party affiliation, children will most likely hold that same party affiliation. When both parents are independents, their children overwhelmingly identify themselves as independents

family as an agent of political socialization

This will have an enduring effect on party competition, leading parties to compete for the median voter - this means that in terms of policy goals, parties will converge around the policy position of the median voter, leading to greater policy stability Parties will mold their strategy on the centrist voter - they will devote their resources to know exactly what C's preferences are - political competition will involve around the center (central pedal) - ultimately, political actors have little convictions of their own (cynical view of political actors) - political actors will do whatever it takes to win power Essentially, the idea is this: Any politician who strays too far from voters at the philosophical center will soon be out of office. In fact, there is a dynamic that pushes politicians to embrace the preferences of the typical or "median" voter, who sits squarely in the middle of public opinion. A significant move to either the left or the right would open the door for a rival to take a more moderate stance, win the next election and change the agenda.

implications of median voter theory

Sometimes, as Krehbiel writes, the policies being voted on are too complex to be placed within a one-dimensional continuum. Buchanan and Tollison also note that this is a problem for the median voter theorem, which assumes that decisions can be made on a one-dimensional field. If voters are considering more than one issue simultaneously, the median voter theorem is inapplicable. This may happen if, for example, voters may vote on a referendum regarding education spending and police spending simultaneously. Sometimes voters don't vote sincerely e.g. a German that loves Merkel but thinks she's overdoing it with migration policy so they vote for the far right party to send a message

inapplicability of MVT

1 Salaries are linked to productivity and people vary in how productive they are. Because productivity has a constant effect on your wage, those who cannot earn a higher wage than welfare would provide (e.g. left of X0), will choose not to work. Very productive individuals will prefer very low or no taxation. 2 The important ones, those belonging to neither of those two categories, will usually prefer medium level taxes. 3 Income is not distributed evenly. Since it is skewed right, the mean income will exceed the median income. The relevant variables are the mean population income and the decisive person's (e.g. median voter's, or dictator's) income. Problem: in democracies, the poor vote less than the rich and could thus be less represented. And dictatorships often prove dangerous fro property rights. Moreover, liberal democracies feature capitalist economies. And those ensure returns relative to investment. Yet, "profit takers" invest more and get more returns than "wage-earners" (Przeworski 1991).

meltzer-richards model

Groups are natural Bentley: belonging to groups is sown into the nature of men e.g. America naturally divides itself into groups based on ethnicity/religion; to understand society have to understand groups Truman: groups are part of our first socialization; we don't choose our groups - we were told that we were part of Irish/Italian culture and that distinguishes us from other groups and we are good at this (stereotypes); not just part of one group - part of people living in particular part of town (allegiance/identity) - learn a particular profession and that's a group you're part of; we're all made up of many different identities - many of these are active though Groups are part of every differentiated society Some are active: living in Reims and becoming very attached and passionate about Reims - for majority of Sciences Po students, Reims is just a passing identity, but for others it's an active identity/group Some are latent: they're under the surface; not overly important to the group member The "group basis of politics" (Latham) Government is all about competition between groups; elections are an appendix to this process; government has to regulate this competition so that's it's not detrimental to greater number - if everyone is equally selfish this should work - our collective selfishnesses will keep us in check Bentley: "when groups are adequately stated, everything is stated" (1908) Criticism of this: the logic of collective action Paradox of collective action (Olson): Everyone will act in groups; having a group behind you when facing a big organization is how politics works Group interest and individual interest are not identical; even though we benefit from groups, it might be interesting to do something different As there is a cost to mobilization, each individual must weigh costs and benefits The rational strategy is that of the free rider. As we have seen before, individual rationality and the rationality of collective strategies are in opposition; let others do the work and just tack on once all the hard work is completed so you benefit from the results but don't have to get your hands dirty Therefore, groups should not exist Rationality tells us not to mobilize for collective action, but we do - why is that? This is the paradox

modern perspective on collective action

An important aspect of social and political change over the past two decades has been the Europeanization of identities. This can be seen in at least two ways. First, there is the increasing importance of European identities in the sense of identities that involve some degree of reference or orientation to Europe. There is considerable empirical research demonstrating the existence of European identification at least as a secondary identity that complements national and regional identities. European identity especially among young and educated people is much stronger than what is often thought. As with many identities, a European identity may co-exist alongside other identities, since individuals generally have more than one identity. Indeed, such European identities may not always recognise themselves as such, since the European dimension is only one level and interacts with other levels. The emergence of the notion of Europeans as bearers of European identity is a relatively recent phenomenon and has been much influenced by European policy making around cultural issues, such as the European Capitals of Culture programme, Erasmus exchange programmes, European research, and a communication policy, the idea of a European citizenship. There can be no doubt that Europe has become the phenomenological basis of a shift in identities away from the nation as the exclusive reference point. Mobility is a key aspect of European identities. The more Europeans travel the more likely they are to have a degree of European identification. This suggests that the clash of values is more likely to be generational than territorial. It is not then the case that one part of Europe is more European than another. These cleavages are not primarily national. Secondly, European identity can be seen, not as an identity that is outside or anti-national, but as an internal transformation of national identities. In these terms, it is not a case of European versus national identities, but of the Europeanization of national identities that is significant. Thus it is the case that many national identities have found within the project of European integration the means of advancing their interests, but too of re-orienting their self-understanding. Germany is a very good example of this process of the Europeanization of national identity in the context of a more critical approach to history. As Habermas has argued, the movement of European integration had unavoidable normative lessons to offer Germany, and Europe. Other examples are Portugal and Spain. In these cases European integration offered a means of re-positioning national identity in the aftermath of the end of the dictatorships when democracy was slowly introduced. In the case of Ireland, European integration was a means of re-orienting national identity in a more positive direction than one that was predominantly shaped by negative relations with the UK Fear: The further unification of Europe is regarded by many Europeans as a threat to the survival of national cultures and identities. They fear that the disappearance of the internal borders between the European Union states may ultimately result in a loss of variety in national cultures and of distinct national identities.

national convergence

Experience of several (northern) European states Some interest groups are stronger than others, some cleavages more significant than others There are few groups, which are very strong and hierarchically organized, potentially only group in sector Interest groups participate in policymaking, often through institutionalized procedures Corporatism: organization of society into interest groups/corporations subordinate to the state Size Corporatism is a small-country phenomenon Trade openness Trade openness encourages all kinds of internal coordination (and corporatism) And small countries are more trade open on average Number of parties Bipartism "favors" corporatism

neo-corporatism

Post WWII: There's an establishment of successful capitalist economies that used Keynesian economics to create three decades of prosperity. These capitalist states focused on the welfare of the citizens, inculcating a new idea that emphasized the role of the state should be to care for the individuals that make up its' community. This prosperity, however, was rooted in oil, so when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries restricted its output of oil in 1973, oil prices soared and inflation increased, bringing high unemployment and recession with it. The crisis led to political experimentation, and adversarial states embraced neoliberal policies. Neoliberal policies changed the role of the state from welfare-oriented to a role of reduced state intervention in the lives of the market and the citizens, which can be defined as a rollback of the state.

overview of the welfare state

PART A. The paradox of collective action Paradox of collective action (Olson): Everyone will act in groups; having a group behind you when facing a big organization is how politics works Group interest and individual interest are not identical; even though we benefit from groups, it might be interesting to do something different As there is a cost to mobilization, each individual must weigh costs and benefits The rational strategy is that of the free rider. As we have seen before, individual rationality and the rationality of collective strategies are in opposition; let others do the work and just tack on once all the hard work is completed so you benefit from the results but don't have to get your hands dirty Therefore, groups should not exist Rationality tells us not to mobilize for collective action, but we do - why is that? This is the paradox PART B. Overcoming the paradox: the paradox doesn't have to limit the power of social movements as a force of collective action Size matters: easier to organize in smaller groups if the entire group is very large Selective incentives: all abut restoring excludability and rivalry of public goods - you create a trade union (deal with working conditions for specific trades) - people who are not part of the trade union will also benefit from the successes of the trade union - why do people then pay the fee to a member of the trade union? There are benefits specific to this group - organizer of the trade union has to show that it's worth being part of the trade union - creation of selective incentives e.g. some trade unions provide advantages with holiday tariffs/subscription tariffs to things like gyms; also a means of socialization Political entrepreneurs Salisbury: a larger view of incentives/benefits; the problem with Olson is that he only looks at material benefits - people aren't just interested in material benefits but also moral benefits: the feel-good factor: the feeling that you're helping those in your profession on the whole against the system The entrepreneur will organize mobilization and create an equilibrium between material and expressive benefits Expressive groups are cheap and short-lived e.g. joining a protest for the sake of protesting; they want to be heard even if they don't know what they want to be heard on - by mobilizing they will learn about it - people do it for the feeling they get from mobilizing with others Material groups are more stable; you feel yourself existing - you want to express your existence; your will to exist - very popular with young people But the same groups may look for different things at different stages of their development It is in the entrepreneur's interest to develop a stable mix of benefits He benefits from exchange with group members Lobbying may thus further the entrepreneurs' capacity to exchange rather than the group's interests Repeated interaction (Axelrod): people will not behave in the same way if it's a repeated action; the repetition of interaction creates constraints on the present; the shadow of the future: your behavior will not be the same - you need a deadline extension, you're an exchange student so you're leaving next semester so you beg for a deadline extension - however, if you're a first year, and you know that teacher will be your teacher next year and you don't want to create a negative impression, you do your best to have the essay completed on time; this is a good explanation for negotiation in international organizations

paradox of collective action and overcoming the paradox

Low awareness, expectations, and participation. Example: Mexico (in the late 1950s). In this model citizens have no cognitive orientation toward the political system Societies characterized by this type of political culture do not expect anything positive of government, nor do they expect to participate in politics because it is seen as an elite domain. Furthermore, the government is seen as the enforcer of its own rules and consequently, the realm of politics is seen as one to be avoided whenever possible. In today's language, this is (or was) a society with low levels of trust (only trust your family)

parochial culture

Participant culture: high levels of all three (awareness, expectation, participation). Examples: USA, UK In this model citizens have cognitive orientations toward both the input and output aspects of the system. Societies which possess this type of political culture tend to have citizens with high expectations and a high level of participation in politics - and not only at elections. This type of culture is central to the principles of any democratic society

participant culture

One of the founding paradigms of US political science A great number of interest groups cutting across multiple cleavages; people are part of many different groups; they may mobilize for different reasons at different times Competition between interest groups, no interest group dominates because there are checks and balances Public good is attained through invisible hand - if everyone acts selfishly then everything will work out

pluralism

I. Parochial cultures Low awareness, expectations, and participation. Example: Mexico (in the late 1950s). In this model citizens have no cognitive orientation toward the political system (i.e. no "culture"?). Societies characterized by this type of political culture do not expect anything positive of government, nor do they expect to participate in politics because it is seen as an elite domain. Furthermore, the government is seen as the enforcer of its own rules and consequently, the realm of politics is seen as one to be avoided whenever possible. In today's language, this is (or was) a society with low levels of trust II. Subject cultures Subject cultures: higher levels of awareness and expectation but low participation. Examples: Italy, Germany (in the postwar period) people vote but they won't be vocal about their political views/join parties In this model citizens have cognitive orientations only towards the output aspects of the system. This tends to crystallize in a citizenry that expects positive action from government, but that does not tend to be politically active itself. They, too, see politics as an elite domain only to be engaged in by those with power and influence. III. Participant cultures Participant culture: high levels of all three (awareness, expectation, participation). Examples: USA, UK In this model citizens have cognitive orientations toward both the input and output aspects of the system. Societies which possess this type of political culture tend to have citizens with high expectations and a high level of participation in politics - and not only at elections. This type of culture is central to the principles of any democratic society

political beliefs are place-specific

Following WWII, remarkable economic growth that brought new conditions into advanced industrial societies - the post-war birth cohorts spent their formative years under levels of prosperity that were unprecedented in human history, and the welfare state reinforced the feeling that survival was secure, producing major differences in the priorities of older and younger generations Scarcity hypothesis: Virtually everyone aspires to freedom and autonomy, but people tend to place the highest value on the most pressing needs. Material sustenance and physical security are immediately linked with survival, and when they are scarce people give top priority to these 'materialistic' goals; but under conditions of prosperity, people become more likely to emphasize 'post-materialist' goals such as belonging, esteem, and aesthetic and intellectual satisfaction Intergenerational value change will occur if younger generations grow up under different conditions from those that shaped earlier generations - so that the values of the entire society will gradually change through intergenerational replacement. As the four oldest birth cohorts die off during the four decades following 1970, we should observe a major shift in the motivations of these societies, with post-materialists becoming as numerous as materialists, bringing a corresponding shift away from economic issues toward increasing emphasis on quality of life and expressive issues.

political beliefs are time-specific

Political socialization: The values and assumptions people hold about politics are acquired in a process called political socialization, i.e. the learning of political values and factual assumptions about politics.Through (and thanks to) political socialization people understand, accept, and usually approve and support the existing political system. The persons by which and the setting in which the process of political socialization is accomplished are called the agents of political socialization

political socialization and agents of political socialization

Globalization has led to supranational organizations sometimes having too much power over members states/nations - re-articulation of the state-society relationship in the sense that the citizen now is entitled to less rights (less welfare) State has even less of a say in the lives of the citizen, which they initially lost because of a rollback of the state The state is now subordinate to greater organization e.g. European Commission on Human Rights - the citizen now has much more protection However, some nations feel that supranational organization wield too much power...

power of globalizing forces

When gang members meet radicals in prison, they are able to supplant one gang identity or cause with that of another: violent Islamism. In this context, Islam the religion is used as a cover for gang-like behavior. For example, Amedy Coulibaly, the gunman at the Jewish supermarket in Paris, had served a prison sentence for armed robbery. He was radicalized in prison by an al Qaeda recruiter. In the US, Islamic leaders are forbidden from entering prisons - converted inmates only come into contact with Islam in its radicalized format Strong emphasis on communal prayer (jamaat) that, in the words of the study, helps "sustain strong internal attachments." one researcher explains how this communal-based worship operates in an incarcerated environment: Historically, christian prison reformers envisioned conversion as cloistered reflection or silent prayer. islamic teaching, however, changes self-image and social relationships primarily through communal prayer

prisoners - radicalization

Psychological approach: party choice and party identification are linked: voters are inclined to support their preferred party - here it is not the group, but the individual who is guided by long-term psychological dispositions - they key term in the psychological group is 'partisanship' or party attachment: the psychological identification with a party There has been an erosion of the long-term partisan loyalties, which is called partisan dealignment The role of parties within the democratic process is diminishing - clear increase in non-institutionalized forms of participation which are characterized by the bypassing of elections and parties; second change: decline in attachment to political parties Democraticness of Western societies has not been in decline since the 1960s, but rather appears to be stronger, albeit in a different way

psychological approach to party choice

Ted Gurr: "a process in which the group has been mobilized in pursuit of a social or political objective but has failed to make enough progress toward the objective to satisfy all activists. Some become discouraged, while others intensify their efforts, lose patience with conventional means of political action, and look for tactics that will have greater impact. This is the kind of situation in which modeling or 'imitative' behavior occurs. Impatience and frustration provide an expressive motivation (anger) and rationalistic grounds (dramatic episodes of violence elsewhere) that make it likely that some activists will decide to experiment with terror tactics. The choice is made, and justified, as a means to the original ends of radical reform, group autonomy, or whatever. And the dynamics of the process are such that the terrorists believe that they enjoy the support of some larger community in revolt." The idea that terrorists have a community supporting them is important: Radicalization can be the result of socialization, but it is appears to be more the result of social environment, rather than individual characteristics. Unlike the idea of the lone psychopath, terrorists radicalize within social groups. It is the proximity to like-minded individuals that facilitates radicalization. Focus of attention has to be shifted from individual irrationality to collective goals: from terrorists' characteristics to recruiters' strategies Usually, radicalized citizens do it with other peer groups Azeem Ibrahim: "What [former CIA case officer Marc Sageman] discovers is that terrorists are most likely to be motivated not by disadvantage but by a sense of moral disgust. . . . It is sparked when the individual reacts to stories of Muslim suffering around the world with moral outrage. Some of those who feel outraged will progress to the second stage, in which they interpret that suffering in the context of a wider Manichaean war between Islam and the West. Of those who take that view, a minority will progress to the third stage, in which their smoldering resentment will be fueled by bad personal experiences in western countries. . . . Of those who undergo these three stages, fewer undergo the fourth, in which the individual joins a circle of friends which becomes like a family closed to the outside world. . . . They read, listen to and watch only material which stokes their view of the world and prepares them for action and, in some cases, the murder of innocents."

radicalization usually happens within social groups

Rational choice depends on preferences and beliefs of individuals - we care about things that are important to us/close to us e.g. don't have strong opinions on the Turkish attacks, but strong opinions on the Paris attacks because live close to Paris The origins of these preferences and beliefs are often considered to be exogenous (i.e. they're part of us before we arrive; not studied). Culture is one answer to the origins of these preferences and beliefs. That is why rationality and culture may be considered as complementary rather than competitive views on political behavior.

rational choice as a function of culture

Main results of RC: intentional and rational actors generate collective outcomes and aggregate behavior that are often socially suboptimal - individuals will pursue their own interests limited by what others want - if everyone is doing this, then the aggregate outcome can be negative: e.g. in a fire, collective rationality tells us to all be calm while individual rationality tells us to engage our survival of the fittest tactics and get out of the building as fast as possible - stamping over people if necessary - which could result in none of us actually escaping Behavioral rational choice includes the use of heuristics (i.e. rules of thumb, techniques based on experience for problem-solving that are readily accessible) - uses social psychology to see how people behave in situations of uncertainty - they result to cognitive shortcuts most of the time e.g. rules of thumb - there is no sense so we try to make sense of it - e.g. every time I go to the toilet, economic market prices goes up so I treat this as a superstition that will always be true Assumption: individual actors make reasoned choices given the likely choices of others and the contextual and institutional constraints in a situation of imperfect information.

rational choice theory definition

Relative deprivation: the sense of deprivation is such as to involve a comparison with the imagined situation of some other person or group. This other person or group is the "reference group", or more accurately the "comparative reference group" - need to compare yourself to someone else to feel deprived If people feel deprived, they will mobilize to correct injustice If over time, the conditions for a specific group are increasing and then suddenly decrease - they will mobilize to correct this injustice Ted Gurr (1970): "The primary causal sequence in political violence' is 'first the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors" The US Civil Rights Movement crystallizes all of this; Rosa Parks and Little Rock Rhoda Luis Blumberg (1984): Events that made the transition to protest possible: Mass migration of black peasantry out of the South, transformation into an urban group; the reference group for blacks changes - creation of new social groups; new awarenesses; new debates White violence/discrimination against black urban newcomers who they see as competitors in labor markets; immigration doesn't generate violence, but the fear of the consequences of immigration creates violence World Wars and Great Depression; the Depression had traumatized the US economy and led to reorganization; have to rethink things - rigid orders that dominated the South were preventing development; need more active/competitive labor markets - World Wars: people had been fighting on the front irrespective of race, so blacks now have to go back after fighting for the country into the same demeaning social order? An effective equality is created at the front because they're all dying and going through the same struggles irrespective of skin color Years of litigation and first legal victories: Brown v. Board of Education (1954) - huge pro-civil rights achievements in the mid-1950s Development of community institutions and organizations in the Cities with the advent of new social groups; networks are good for mobilization - people will mobilize more easily - and there were great leaders e.g. MLK Rise of leaders/political entrepreneurs, able to exploit mobilization potential. Changed international climate: following WWII most European colonies were decolonizing; recognizing wrongdoings; the US was going to keep segregating at home even though they had been fighting segregation in Europe?

relative deprivation theory

Olson applied to Social Movements: The spatial distribution of the mobilization is more strongly correlated with the availability of resources than just with the spatial distribution of injustice or grievance Different type of supporters will provide different types of resources Material resources (finance) Moral resources (symbolical support, approval): Hollywood stars would speak up for civil rights because they'd go abroad and be asked what was wrong with their country Expert resources (specific skills and knowledge, access to the media etc.) Human resources (time) Organizational resources (pre-existing networks organizations, e.g.: NAACP, Church) Doug McAdams 's study on Freedom Summer shows that supporters may seek only moral retribution. This will, in turn, considerably lower the cost of mobilization - engaging in the protests can shape the rest of people's lives Newer approaches have kept much of the Olsonian heritage, but have also re-emphasized the importance of ecological approaches. Structure of political opportunity (SPO): mobilization and protest may depend on context (Kriesi et al 1995) Territorial structure of state: is it centralized/federal Institutional architecture: how easy is it to access senators/administration Bureaucratic autonomy: can access local bureaucratic leaders and influence decisions? The prevailing strategy towards civil society: hostile towards public mobilization or focus on negotiation with mobilizers Others have emphasized the importance of cognitive frames and frame alignment. Much recent research has insisted on the importance of social networks and social capital (Putnam); coordination of social movement action

resource mobilization theory

A decade ago, the public was less ideologically consistent than it is today. In 2004, only about one-in-ten Americans were uniformly liberal or conservative across most values. Today, the share who are ideologically consistent has doubled: 21% express either consistently liberal or conservative opinions across a range of issues - the size and scope of government, the environment, foreign policy and many others. The new survey finds that as ideological consistency has become more common, it has become increasingly aligned with partisanship. Ideologically consistent people have more influence on the political process: They are more likely than those with mixed views to vote regularly and far more likely to donate to political campaigns and contact elected officials.

rise in ideological consistency

This rollback was marked by changes in the nature of citizenship (changes in state-society relationship) The citizen: cuts to the welfare state Welfare cuts made the citizen more autonomous; Thatcher's disbelief in 'Society' Case study: Reagan's Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 which tightened program eligibility of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, cut AFDC expenditures by 14%. Cuts were being made when need for spending had increased during the Reagan years because of the increase of poverty in the 1980s: skill mismatch. Instead of introducing antipoverty policies, the Reagan administration actually increased poverty: the average disposable income of families on AFDC fell from 101% of the poverty line to 81% of the poverty line - The citizen now has less of a right to the welfare state because of changing role of the state

rollback of the state

Social progress has been a European objective since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The founding fathers of the EU believed that economic integration would promote progress in social protection across participating countries, such that convergence of social protection systems would follow more or less spontaneously. However, the welfare state literature indicates that economic integration may also be harmful to social protection systems. Fears for a social race to the bottom have been expressed. In the 1990s both the European Council and the European Commission adopted a more active convergence strategy: they proclaimed the objective of a convergence of social policies of Member States and the development of common objectives of social policies. In 2000 the European Council adopted the goal that besides economic growth, social cohesion should also be strengthened in the EU (the Lisbon Agenda). Even within Europe, the burden of comparative analysis of welfare over the past twenty years emphasizes the diversity of capitalist democracies. Famously, Esping‐Andersen has suggested that there are three ideal types of (capitalist) 'welfare state regime' (1990). The states that approximate most closely to two of these types ('socialist' Sweden and 'conservative' Germany) are members of the European Union.

social convergence EU

Atran says ISIS, working through existing social networks, is adept at leveraging idealism: A recent survey of ISIS social media found their foreign followers are often adolescents or young adults. Atran says recruiters often spend hundreds of hours showing young people how the problems they see in the world and in their own lives are connected to larger problems that ISIS is fighting online - they're halfway across the world, but use online networks to get in touch with potential jihadists Gets in contact with Westerners: From its start, social media has been integral to ISIS's rise. It enables ISIS militants to raise its prestige among terror groups, and overtake older jihadist competitors like al-Qaeda. It serves to coordinate troops and win battles. And it allows the group to administer the territory under its control. Now ISIS is using social media to expand its war far beyond its borders. What started with the choreographed execution video of James Foley, blasted across the Web through an army of dummy Twitter accounts, has now morphed into something more devious and distributed. Rather than calling followers to the front lines, ISIS's social-media strategy cultivates them at home in the U.S., Europe, Africa, and Asia. Enlistment: ISIS militants cultivate vulnerable recruits with sympathetic messages, and engage them via secure messaging services. Recruiters will occasionally ship gifts to the targets—and sometimes, even an airline ticket. If the recruit cannot travel, they are encouraged to launch terror attacks at home.

social media as one big social group

The sociological approach: focuses on class and religion as main determinants of voting behavior - social group-based voting means that voters feel attached to parties that historically have supported the social group to which a voter belongs- two main examples of social cleavage voting are class voting (the working class supports the Left) and religious voting (religious groups vote for parties that adhere to their religion) One of best-known sociological theories on voting behavior is social cleavage theory: can have one cleavage or multiple cleavages - unidimensional systems in which class cleavage is the most salient is found in UK and Scandinavia. Multidimensional systems combine two varieties of cleavages (class and religion) e.g. Germany, Italy and France When one cleavage internally divides the group of another cleavage (cross-cutting cleavages) The basic assumption underlying the sociological approach is that party choice results from group membership Universal suffrage froze the cleavage structures into place Old social cleavages have weakened; they dissolved because of major shifts in the social structure e.g. growth of welfare state; increasing education; urbanization etc. - the bond between parties and voters has also weakened as a result Class and religion are still important in Western Europe, but their impact is less obvious than before 1970 - but has been replaced with other issues e.g. environmental issues Weakening of cleavages has far-reaching consequences: parties transform from representative bodies to office seekers - they compete for power for themselves and seek electoral support in more or less homogenous societies; new cleavages and new parties emerge as a response to new lines of division in society (however, these new parties e.g. Green parties are not able to take over from established parties) Some parties are involved in cleavage politics: the exploitation of cleavages by means of redefining cleavages as a reaction to changes in the social structure e.g. immigration - Right extremist parties use this issue to gain electoral support by sharpening the division lines between natives and immigrants

sociological approach to party choice

Not a model as such, but the result of crowding out generated by state interventionism Weak interest groups in great numbers State dominates relations with interest groups Access to state is limited to few and private channels, others are constrained to outside lobbying

statism

Downs specifies the conditions under which stability can be achieved: a single issue dimension: a political system where people vary along one dimension (left - right dimension; has to do with redistribution/taxes - conservatives favor lower taxes for example - this depends on the country though, conservative party in Sweden would be considered liberal in a Latin American country, for example) an odd-number of voters - shouldn't be equal sections of society voting for each political party with single-peaked preferences and who vote sincerely there are only two parties

structure of median voter theorem

Subject cultures: higher levels of awareness and expectation but low participation. Examples: Italy, Germany (in the postwar period) people vote but they won't be vocal about their political views/join parties In this model citizens have cognitive orientations only towards the output aspects of the system. This tends to crystallize in a citizenry that expects positive action from government, but that does not tend to be politically active itself. They, too, see politics as an elite domain only to be engaged in by those with power and influence.

subject cultures

The notion of Social capital (Coleman 1990) provides a new understanding of civic culture. Aims to explain institutional and democratic performance. Social capital is different from economic capital and cultural capital (Bourdieu). It adds two main elements to it: trust and social networks (covers associations of civil society, communities,...). Putnam (1993) about Italy: the performance of a regional government is very closely related to the civic character of social capital in this region. Putnam 1995 Social capital has declined Trust in government has decreased. Hence a feeling of a "democratic deficit" (disparities between the perceived performance of institutions and public aspirations). Linked to increasing demands (participation, efficiency,...) resulting from growing cognitive skills and self-expression values, coverage of government by the media, and policy building limitations.

trust/social capital

Thesis: Social movements emerge when people feel relatively deprived. However, in reality, the spatial distribution of the mobilization is more strongly correlated with the availability of resources than just with the spatial distribution of injustice or grievance. However it is also important to note that there is a paradox associated with the emergence of social movements that has to do with the logic of collective action. But, the paradox doesn't have to limit the power of social movements as a force of collective action.

when do social movements emerge?

For many younger people an identity crisis isn't uncommon, regardless of their religion. Some teenagers react by rebelling. Others, more extreme, will turn to crime and gangs. Many second- and third-generation Muslim children may be raised believing that their heritage is of one or both of their parents. Sometimes when these children visit the villages of their parents, they find they are teased because they don't fit in. That yearning for a clear identity can leave them facing a personal crisis, vulnerable to radical exploitation in person or online. In the simplest sense, Islam teaches us that our lives are a struggle, or jihad, to live a good life and refrain from bad deeds. At the end of our lives, we will be judged on whether the good deeds outweigh the bad. Those who seek to radicalize scare these young people by saying they can't win that struggle while living in "decadent" modern Western culture. The radicalizers anger the young by showing them propaganda and images of Muslims being killed by Western forces in Middle Eastern conflicts. Then they convince them that there is a shortcut to paradise by taking revenge in the name of God. We know this is nonsense. But a scared and angry young person with an identity crisis may not be so sure. (NPR) Atran says these young people "self-radicalized." They were searching for meaning in their lives and found it through friends who shared their idealism. ISIS recruiters promised them glory, adventure, and purpose - things that appeal to many young people.

young people - radicalization