POLS 341
Affirmative action and suspect classification doctrine
Affirmative action: a program under which women and/or persons of particular minority groups are granted special consideration i employment, government contracts, and/or admission to programs of higher education. Suspect classification doctrine: the doctrine that laws classifying people according to race, ethnicity, and religion are inherently suspect and should be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. In 1937 the focus of the Court moved away from the protection of economic individualism and focused on civil rights and liberties, especially the rights of traditionally disadvantage minorities. In Korematsu v. United States, it provided the first real indication that the Court was embarking on a new approach to the Equal Protection Clause. In Korematsu, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the "relocation" of Japanese Americans living on the West Coast during the Second World War. The Korematsu decision marked the inception of the suspect classification doctrine, which holds that certain kinds of discrimination are inherently suspect and therefore must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Included among those laws that are inherently suspect are those that classify persons based on race, religion, or ethnicity, as well as those that impinge on fundamental rights.
Chimel v. California
Although the Fourth Amendment clearly indicates a preference for search warrants, the supreme Court has held that, under exigent circumstances, a warrantless search may nevertheless be "reasonable." One example of a legitimate warrantless search is the search incidental to a lawful arrest. In Chimel v. California Justice Stewart said, "when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape ... In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. Exigent circumstances: Situations that demand unusual or immediate action. Warrantless search: A search made by police who do not possess a search warrant. Search incidental to a lawful arrest: Search of a person placed under arrest and the area within the arrestee's grasp and control.
Reasonable expectation of privacy and probable cause
An arrest must be based on probable case Arrests are often made pursuants to warrants based on preliminary investigations. In arrest warrant, like a search warrant, is issued by a judge or magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. As the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment implies, the legality of detention after arrest also depends on the existence of probable cause. It follows logically that a person arrested without a warrant must be brought promptly before a judicial officer for a probable cause hearing.
Brown v. Board of Education
By the early 1950s, the Supreme Court no longer tolerated the provision of demonstrably inferior educational services or facilities to African-Americans under the protection of the separate but equal doctrine. The Court unanimously struck down racial segregation in the public schools of Kansas, South Carolina, Delaware, and Virginia. Speaking for the Court in Brown, Chief Justice Warren declared that "in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently equal." The Court held that the operation of segregated schools by the District of Columbia violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court blunted the revolutionary potential of the original decision by adopting a formula calling for implementation of desegregation with "all deliberate speed." Brown v. Board of Education was the beginning of a process of desegregating public schools, a process that involved considerable resistance from supporters of segregation and numerous legal controversies over busing of students and federal judicial supervision of many public school systems. This case invalidated compulsory racial segregation in the public schools as a denial of equal protection of the laws.
Gregg v. Georgia
Georgia revamped its death penalty statue was before the Supreme Court in the Gregg case. The revised Georgia law required a bifurcated trial for capital crimes: In the first stage, guilt would be determined in the usual manner; the second stage would deal with the appropriate sentence. For the jury to impose the death penalty, it would have to find at least one of several statutorily prescribed aggravating factors. Automatic appeal to the state supreme court would also be provided. Appellate review would be required to consider not only the procedural regularity of the trial but also whether the evidence supports the finding of the aggravating factor and whether the death sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. Although Justice Stewart's opinion in Gregg makes much of the procedural safeguards required by the Georgia law, one suspects that the marked increase in public support for the death penalty that occurred during the four years after Furman had at least some influence on the Court's decision to uphold Georgia's revised law. In this, as in other areas, the Court seldom strays far from a clear national consensus. Fortunately for the Court, the restraint demonstrated by several of the justices in Furman facilitated the reinstatement of the death penalty in Gregg four years later without the necessity of overruling a precedent. Although the Burger Court effectively reinstated the death penalty, it refused to allow states to execute criminals convicted of lesser crimes than first-degree murder. Aggravating factors: Factors attending the commission of a crime that make the crime or its consequences worse. The Supreme Court effectively reinstates the death penalty by sustaining a revised Georgia death penalty law. The petitioner, Gregg, was convicted of armed robbery and murder and was sentenced to death. In accordance with Georgia's death penalty law revised after Furman v. Georgia, the trial was conducted in two stages: guilt and sentencing.
Habeas corpus, harmless error, exclusionary rule, and use of an affidavit
Habeas corpus: a judicial order issued to an official holding someone in custody, requiring the official to bring the prisoner to court for the purpose of allowing the court to determine whether that person is being held legally. Harmless error: A procedural or substantive error that does not affect the outcome of a judicial proceeding. In Arizona v. Fulminante, the Supreme Court disallowed the use of a confession that was obtained by a prisoner who was also a confidential FBI informant. The U.S. Supreme Court found that his confession had been coerced. However, the Court decided that its holding that a coerced confession is subject to harmless error analysis. Prior to this holding, a defendant was automatically entitled to reversal of his or her conviction if a coerced confession had been introduced into evidence at trial. Under the Fulminante decision, an appellate court is permitted to affirm a conviction if it determines that the defendant would have been convicted on other evidence even in the absence of the coerced confession. The Supreme Court found that the use of Fulminante's confession was not harmless error and therefore reversed his conviction. Exclusionary rule: Judicial doctrine forbidding the use of evidence in a criminal trial where the evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. The Court suggested that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment should be excluded from trial. In Weeks v. United States, the Court made this dictum a formal requirement of criminal procedure in federal courts. The exclusionary rule was implicit in the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The Court also argued that to allow illegally obtained evidence to be used in a criminal trial would be an affront to the integrity of the judiciary. Under Wolf v. Colorado, states were free to adopt or ignore the Weeks exclusionary rule. The discrepancy between the rules applicable to state and federal courts gave rise to the silver platter doctrine. Federal authorities could (and did) provide illegally obtained evidence to prosecutors in states that did not have the exclusionary rule. The Weeks decision applied only to illegal seizures by federal authorities, federal prosecutors could use evidence obtained illegally by state and local law enforcement agencies. In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court overturned Wolf v. Colorado and extended the exclusionary rule to state criminal prosecutions by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Clark made clear that the exclusionary rule was "an essential ingredient of the Fourth Amendment," which was "vouchsafed against the sates by the Due Process Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment. In dissent, Justice Harlan accused the Court of forgetting its sense of judicial restraint and failing to show due regard for stare decisis. Those who believe the exclusionary rule is merely a judicially created rule have criticized the Supreme Court for extending its supervisory power to the state courts. On the other hand, if the exclusionary rule is implicit in the Fourth Amendment and if the Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, then it follows that the exclusionary rule must be respected in state criminal prosecutions.The Supreme Court extended the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to state criminal prosecutions via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Burger court curtailed the application of the exclusionary rule. "The rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment Rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." The Court's current approach to cases involving the exclusionary rule is to weigh the perceived costs of its application against the potential benefits of deterring police misconduct. Using this approach, the Court has refused to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings. In some cases, the Court adopted a limited good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, allowing the use of evidence seized under a search warrant later held to be defective, if the officers were acting in good faith that the warrant was valid. Affidavit: a person's voluntary sworn declaration attesting to a set of facts.
Loving v. Virginia
Interracial marriages Mildred Jeter, a woman of African and Native American descent, and Richard Loving, a white man, lived in Virginia and were married in 1958 in Washington D.C. They could not wed in Virginia due to the Racial Integrity Act which was a state law banning marriages between any white person and any non-white person. When they returned to Virginia they were charged with a violation of the ban. The legal question was whether Virginia's Racial Integrity Act which prevents marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court unanimously declared Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute, the "Racial Integrity Act of 1924", unconstitutional, thereby ending all race--based legal restriction on marriage in the United States. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the court saying "there can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race." Justice Stewart Concurring stated that "we have consistently denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
Least restrictive means test
Least restrictive means test: a judicial inquiry as to whether a particular policy that is being challenged as an infringement of some fundamental right is the least burdensome means of achieving the government's objective. Based on a 1967 act of Congress, the FCC prohibited public radio and television stations from engaging in editorializing altogether. The Supreme Court declared this ban unconstitutional. Writing for a sharply divided Court, Justice Brennan's view concluded that the ban failed to meet a least restrictive means test. In Brennan's view, the ban "far exceeds what is necessary to protect against the risk of governmental interference or to prevent the public from assuming that editorials by public broadcasting stations represent the official view of government." The Court's general expansion of freedom of expression since the mid 20th century is reflected not only in areas of political, social, and cultural Legal inquiry if policy violates a basic right is the least burdensome means of achieving a governmental objective and the significance of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Baze v. Rees 08
Lethal injection case The Court reviewed Kentucky's practice of executing condemned prisoners by lethal injection. The specific question before the Court is whether the protocol adopted by the state carries an intolerable risk that persons to be executed will be subjected to unnecessary pain during the procedure.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
Many thought that Webster would overturn Roe v. Wade. This case challenged a missouri statue containing a number of restrictions on abortions. The law forbade state employees from performing, assisting in, or counseling women to have abortions. It also prohibited the use of any state facilities for these purposes. It also required all doctors who would perform abortions to conduct viability tests on fetuses at or beyond twenty weeks' gestation. The Supreme Court was split 5-4 on this issue as they could not agree on a majority opinion. A plurality expressed the view that the legislation could be sustained without overruling Roe v. Wade
Washington v. Glucksberg
Medical assisted suicide The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed the historical and cultural background of laws prohibiting assisted suicide. He pointed out that in almost every state it is a crime to assist in a suicide, and that the statues banning assisted suicide are longstanding expressions of the states' commitment to the protection and preservation of all human life. Rehnquist analyzed the interests that come into play in determining whether a statute banning assisted suicide passes constitutional muster. He rejected any parallel between a person's right to terminate medical treatment and the "right" to have assistance in committing suicide. The Court's decision recognized the right that a serious debate was taking place throughout the nation about the morality and legality of assisted suicide.
Three types of speech
Pure, impure, and symbolic Pure (conversation) Impure (libel and slander) Symbolic (flags, posters, characterization) Restrictions on freedom of speech Time, manner and place can be regulated as in a free speech area on a university campus Protected conduct includes posting signs, announcements of meetings, setting up facilities, and the like Examples of Government Exceeding Authority on Symbolic Speech Not valid government action to deny student from wearing black armbands - no regulatory interest and did not disrupt classroom (Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. 1969) Not valid to prosecute for displaying U.S. flag with peace symbol affixed and burning the U.S. flag assuming no incitement to riot resulted from either action. Incitement to riot and conspiracy not protected.
Lawrence v. Texas 03
Rev. Bowers case In Texas, two men were convicted of having anal sex with a member of the same sex in violation of a state law that made it an offense "to engage in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex." In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy opined that the Texas statute "furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." The Court expressly overruled its decision in Browers v. Hardwick on the ground that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from making private consensual sexual conduct of adults a crime. Justice O'Connor wrote separately that while she agreed that the Texas law was unconstitutional, she would have invalidated it on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was directly only against homosexual and not heterosexual conduct. The Court emphasized that its decision did not bear on the issue of whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The Court reconsidered its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick in the context of a Texas statute criminalizing private, consensual homosexual conduct.
McDonald v. Chicago
Second Amendment firearms The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of ordinances adopted by Chicago and Oak Park, Illinois effectively banning the possession of handguns at home.
Preliminary injunction and severability doctrine
Severability doctrine is the doctrine under which courts will declare invalid only the offending provision of a statute and allow the other provisions to remain in effect.
Tinker v. Des Moines School District
Symbolic speech is applied to a wide range of nonverbal communication that is subject to First Amendment protection. Opposition to the Vietnam War, wore black arm bands to protest American involvement in the Vietnam War. School officials suspended these students if they refused to remove these armbands. The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's view that the action of the school officials was "reasonable" because it was based on fear that a disturbance would result from the wearing of armbands. It was concluded that the wearing of armbands in this instance "was divorced from actual or potential disruptive conduct" and as such was "closely akin to 'pure speech' which...is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment." The school officials must be able to show that such action "was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."
Exceptions of incite to riot and conspiracy to prior restraint rule
Texas v. Johnson 1989: after publicly burning American flag outside 1984 Rep Convention, Johnson was convicted of flag burning. The Court (5-4) reversed saying conduct was protected by 1st Amendment because he did not threaten to disturb the peace nor does State's interest justify his conviction for engaging in political expression. Dissenting justices said this was to incite to riot and antagonize.
San Antonio v. Rodriquez
The Court considered a challenge to the Texas system of financing public schools primarily through local property taxes. The Court employed the traditional rational basis test, refusing to recognize wealth as a suspect classification. Using this approach, the Court found no constitutional violation. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Rodriguez in no way prevents state courts from adopting a contrary view of the relevant provisions of their state constitutions. When the litigation began, the public school system in San Antonio, TX, was financed by a combination of state funds and local property tax revenues. The state increased the amount of state aid to poorer school districts. Nevertheless, substantial disparities in spending still existed across districts, attributable to disparities in property tax revenues. This case raises the question of whether such spending disparities violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
The Court drunk down a federal statue that limited corporations and unions from making independent expenditures to engage in "electioneering communications" within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election for federal office.
Bush v. Gore 2000
The Court effectively decided the outcome of the 2000 presidential election. The case arose from a dispute over the procedures to be used and a timetable to be followed in a recount of the popular vote in Florida where the margin separating candidates Bush and Gore was thin. Due to the closeness of the election nationally, Florida's electoral votes would be decisive in determining the next president, but deciding who should receive Florida's electoral votes proved to be anything but simple. Although Bush ostensibly won the popular vote in Florida as recorded by the voting machines, Democrats claimed that a manual recount would prove Gore to be the winner. At the request of Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court became involved in the dispute. In Bush v. Gore, the Court ruled 7-2 that the selective manual recount was unconstitutional, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Under normal circumstances, the remedy for this constitutional violation would be to order a statewide manual recount under judicial supervision using standardized procedures. The Court decided to halt the recount and effectively declare Bush the winner. Exacerbating the controversy was the fact that the five justices who voted to halt the recount were the court's five conservatives. All five had been appointed by Republican presidents, making the decision to be a case of partisan loyalty trumping judicial self-restraint. This case shows the potential impact of judicial involvement in the electoral process. It remains to be seen what impact this decision will ultimately have on constitutional law in the equal protection and voting rights areas.
New York Times v. U.S.
The Court revisited the question of prior restraint on the press in the New York Times v. United States. The federal government attempted to prevent the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing excerpts from a classified study "History of U.S. Devision Making Process on Viet Nam Policy". The Supreme Court held that the government's effort to block publication of this material amounted to an unconstitutional prior restrain. The majority was simply not convinced the such publication (several years after the events and decisions discussed in this paper) constituted a significant threat to national security. A disaffected Pentagon employee, turned over to the NY Times a 7,000 page top secret study. Excepts from the study, popularly known as the Pentagon papers, appeared in the Times. After the Times refused a request to cease publishing excerpts from the study, the Justice Department filed a motion for an injunction in federal court. A Judge issued the first federal court injunction against a newspaper in this nation's history. Later a federal district court in D.C. refused to issue a similar injunction against the Post. The first judge lifted the injunction against the Times. On appeal to the circuit courts, the injuctions were quickly reinstated.
Near v. Minnesota
The Court struck down on a state law that permitted public officials to seek an injuction to stop publication of any "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical." The statute was invoked to suppress publication of a small Minneapolis newspaper, the Saturday Press, which had strong anti-Semitic overtones and maligned local political officials, particularly the chief of police. tHE state law provided that once a newspaper was enjoined, further publication was punishable as contempt of court. Chief Justice Hughes characterized this mode of suppression as "the essence of censorship" and declared it unconstitutional. With its decision in Near v. Minnesota, the Court specifically incorporated the First Amendment freedom of the press into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus making it fully applicable to the states. This restriction, however, is not absolute. The Court interpreted the First Amendment as imposing a broad prohibition against prior restraints on publication. The Court also made clear that freedom of the press is among the fundamental liberties that must be observed by state and local governments under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Van Orden v. Perry
The Court upheld a monument bearing the inscription of the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the Texas statehouse. Justice Breyer, wrote that "the Establishment Clause des not compel the government to purge from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious. Such absolutism is not only inconsistent with our national traditions, but would also tend to promote the kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid. The Court here addressed the question of whether a public display of the Ten Commandments violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The "display" in this case took the form of a monument, six-feet high and three-and-a-half wide located on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol.
Three conditions in which a search is valid and Miranda warnings
Three Conditions Must have a search warrant Miranda Warnings To safeguard the immunity against self-incrimination, the Court developed the Miranda warnings. Unless police inform suspects of their rights to remain silent and have an attorney present during questioning and unless police obtain voluntary wavers of these rights, suspects' confessions and other statements are inadmissible at trial. Most people in law enforcement support the Miranda decision as a means of professionalizing police conduct and, perhaps more importantly, protecting legitimate confessions from later challenges. Whereas, prior to Miranda, there was something of a presumption against the admissibility of a confession, today the presumption is clearly in favor of admitting confessions as evidence as long as the requirements of Miranda have been observed by the police. The Supreme Court created the public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given prior to any questioning of the subject. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is a doctrine that evidence derived from illegally obtained and thus inadmissible evidence is itself tainted and therefore likewise inadmissible. However the public safety exception is an exception to the Miranda requirement that police officers promptly inform suspects taken into custody of their rights to remain silent and have an attorney present during questioning. Under the public safety exception, police may ask suspects questions motivated by a desire to protect public safety without jeopardizing the admissibility of suspects' answers to those questions or subsequent statements. Another exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule is based on inevitable discovery of physical evidence that is challenged as the fruit of any poisonous tree. This exception to the Miranda requirements and the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine allows the admission of evidence that was derived from inadmissible evidence if it inevitably would have been discovered independently by lawful means. The Court imposes procedural safeguards on custodial police interrogations.
Miranda v. Arizona
To safeguard the immunity against self-incrimination, the Court developed the Miranda warnings. Unless police inform suspects of their rights to remain silent and have an attorney present during questioning and unless police obtain voluntary wavers of these rights, suspects' confessions and other statements are inadmissible at trial. Most people in law enforcement support the Miranda decision as a means of professionalizing police conduct and, perhaps more importantly, protecting legitimate confessions from later challenges. Whereas, prior to Miranda, there was something of a presumption against the admissibility of a confession, today the presumption is clearly in favor of admitting confessions as evidence as long as the requirements of Miranda have been observed by the police. The Supreme Court created the public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given prior to any questioning of the subject. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is a doctrine that evidence derived from illegally obtained and thus inadmissible evidence is itself tainted and therefore likewise inadmissible. However the public safety exception is an exception to the Miranda requirement that police officers promptly inform suspects taken into custody of their rights to remain silent and have an attorney present during questioning. Under the public safety exception, police may ask suspects questions motivated by a desire to protect public safety without jeopardizing the admissibility of suspects' answers to those questions or subsequent statements. Another exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule is based on inevitable discovery of physical evidence that is challenged as the fruit of any poisonous tree. This exception to the Miranda requirements and the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine allows the admission of evidence that was derived from inadmissible evidence if it inevitably would have been discovered independently by lawful means. The Court imposes procedural safeguards on custodial police interrogations.
Griswold v. Connecticut
The right of privacy was first invoked in the area of procreation and birth control. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court struck down a state statue prohibiting the use of birth control devices insofar as the statute applied to married couples. Later, the Court made clear that because the right of privacy is an individual right, laws forbidding the use of contraceptives by unmarried adults are likewise invalid. Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in Griswold attempted to justify the right of privacy in terms of emanations" from the bill of Rights. Dissenting justices criticized the majority for loosely interpreting the Constitution. Griswold set the stage for Roe v. Wade. The Court considered the constitutionality of a state statue criminalizing the use of birth control devices.
Compelling state (or government) interest, and the rational basis test
A government interest sufficiently strong that it overrides the fundamental rights of persons adversely affected by government action or policy. In Roe v. Wade a Texas law said that abortion as illegal. The Supreme Court ruled that the right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." All constitutional rights may be limited if there is a sufficiently strong justification to do so by the state. Specifically, because the Court identified privacy as a fundamental right, the State of Texas had to demonstrate a compelling interest to justify regulating or prohibiting abortion. The Court recognized a compelling interest in protecting maternal health that justifies "reasonable" state regulations of abortions performed after the first trimester of pregnancy. However, the State of Texas sought not only to regulate but also to proscribe abortion altogether and claimed a compelling state interest in protecting unborn human life. The Court recognized this interest as legitimate but held that ti did not become compelling until that point in pregnancy when the fetus became "viable" - that is, capable of "meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Beyond the point of viability, according to the Court, the state may prohibit abortion, except in cases where it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees
A unanimous Supreme Court found that Minnesota's interest in eradicating sex discrimination was sufficiently compelling to justify a decision of its human rights commission requiring local chapters of the Jaycees to admit women. Justice Brennan recognized a political dimension to the Jaycees' activities but nevertheless held that the organization's freedom of political association must give way to the superior state interest in abolishing sex discrimination.
Roe v. Wade
An unmarried Texas woman was faced with an unwanted pregnancy resulting from an alleged gang rape that she later admitted never occurred. The defense stated that Constitution allows a woman to control her own body, including the decision to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. The Court determined that the right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." The Court identified privacy as a fundamental right. The Court summarily rejected the argument that a fetus is a "person" as that term is used in the Constitution and thus possessed of a right to life, holding that the term"has application only postnatally." If a fetus is regarded as a person from the point of conception, then any abortion is certainly homicide. If that were the case, then states could not allow abortions even in cases of rape or where the pregnancy endangers the life of the mother. The Court relied on the right of privacy in striking down a Texas statute criminalizing more abortions. In Roe, the Court held that the state's interest in protecting the fetus becomes compelling only at the point of fetal viability outside the womb. States may thus prohibit only those abortions that are performed after the point of viability. After Roe, the Court reviewed a number of cases in which state and local governments imposed various restrictions on abortion. During the 1970s, most restrictions were declared unconstitutional. If the Court were to overturn Roe v. Wade, state courts would be free to determine whether their own states' restrictions on abortion violate relevant provisions of their state constitutions.
Alan Bakke v. UC Davis Medical School
Bakke a white male engineer brought suit to challenge the affirmative action policy of the medical school at UC Davis. Bakke had been denied admission to the medical school, although his objective indicators (test scores and GPA) were better than those of minority students admitted under a set-aside policy. The California Supreme Court found this to be a violation of equal protection and ordered Bakke to be admitted to the medical school. The University appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court voted 5-4 to invalidate the UC Davis quota system and admit Bakke to medical school. However also by a 5-4 margin, the Court endorsed affirmative action in the abstract, by recognizing race as a legitimate criterion of admission to medical school. The state has compelling interest in achieving diversity in its medical school, and this interest justified the use of race as one of several criteria of admission.
Walz v. Tax Commission
Church properties have been exempt from local property taxes and church incomes have been exempt from federal and state incomes. Tax exemptions for churches and religious schools raises the questions under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. On the one hand, it can be argued that a tax exemption is an indirect subsidy. Arguably, for government to exempt churches and church schools from paying taxes is to subsidize them in violation of the requirement of separation of church and state. On the other hand, one can argue that failure to exempt churches from taxation amounts to an infringement of the Free Exercise Clause, as Chief Justice Marshall stated that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of property tax exemptions for churches in the case of Walz v. Tax Commission. Walz brought suit against the New York City Tax Commission, arguing that the commission's grant of property tax exemptions and the Court's traditional deference to legislative bodies with regard to the taxing power, the Court found no constitutional violation. Chief Justice Burger noted that "...for the government to exercise...this kind of benevolent neutrality toward churches and religious exercise generally so long as none was favored over others and non suffered interference." The Court considered whether a property tax exemption for religious organizations constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause.
Preferred Position
Court right to decide on all legal matters In Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943), the Supreme Court, in striking down a law requiring a license fee for canvassers and solicitors, held that "freedom of press, freedom of speech, [and] freedom of religion are in a preferred position." Thus, when the courts are in a position of balancing multiple fundamental rights, they often hold First Amendment rights in a "preferred position." While this language has been dropped from modern opinions, its notion has not.
Boy Scouts v. Dale 2000
Dale was dismissed from his position as a scoutmaster when the organization learned that Dale was gay. The Boy Scouts had violated a state law prohibiting discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation by places of public accommodation. The Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that the Boy Scouts' freedom of association trumped the state's interest in advancing the cause of gay rights. Boy Scouts of America commented that the Dale decision "affirms our standing as a private association with the right to set its own standards for membership and leadership...and allows us to continue our mission providing character building experiences for young people, which has been our chartered purpose since our founding." Overall: Dale was dismissed from his position as an assistant scoutmaster of a New Jersey Boy Scout troop when the organization learned that Dale was openly gay. Dale sued the Boy Scouts in the New Jersey courts, asserting that the organization was in violation of a state statue barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by places of public accommodation.
New York Times v. Sullivan
Defamation of character consists of injuring someone's reputation by making false public statements about that person. Defamation is not a crime, but a tort. Verbal defamation is called slander, and written is known as libel. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, the primary defense in a libel action was proof that the published material was true. The Sullivan decision substituted a new rule that afforded far greater protection to published criticism of official conduct. This standard "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'- that is with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." As long as there is an "absence of malice" on the part of the press, public officials are barred from recovering damages for the publication of false statements about them. Sullivan emerged out of the civil rights struggle of the 1960s; he brought suit against the NYTimes for its publication of a paid advertisement in which civil rights leaders chastised Montgomery officials for police responses to civil rights demonstrations. The Sullivan decision, which broadened protection of the press against libel actions, thus reflected the Warren Court's commitment to protecting free expression by minority groups facing a politically hostile environment. This cases applied only to cases where pubic officials sued for libel. Under the rule adopted in New York Times Company v. Sullivan, a public official cannot recover damages for a "defamatory falsehood" relating to official conduct unless it is proved that the statement in question "was made with 'actual malice'- that is, with knowledge that was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
Everson v. Board of Education
Establishment Clause: Clause in the First Amendment prohibiting Congress from enacting laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The first case in which the Supreme Court applied the Establishment Clause to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, the issue was whether a local school board could reimburse parents for expenses they incurred in transporting their children to and from Catholic schools. The payments to parents of children in parochial schools were part of a general program under which all parents of children in public schools and nonprofit private schools, regardless of religious affiliation, were entitled to reimbursement for transportation costs. Justice Hugo Black justified the challenged payments on the theory that the school board were merely furthering the State's legitimate interest in getting children, "regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools." The child benefit theory articulated in Everson has for the most part been maintained. Thus, for example, in Board of Education v. Allen, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statue requiring local public school districts to lend textbooks on secular subjects to students in private and parochial schools. The Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the issue is whether the First Amendment prohibits a local school board from reimbursing parents for costs incurred as a result of transporting their children to and from parochial schools.
Mapp v. Ohio
Exclusionary rule: Judicial doctrine forbidding the use of evidence in a criminal trial where the evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, Under Wolf v. Colorado, states were free to adopt or ignore the Weeks exclusionary rule. Federal authorities could (and did) provide illegally obtained evidence to prosecutors in states that did not have the exclusionary rule. In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court overturned Wolf v. Colorado and extended the exclusionary rule to state criminal prosecutions by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Clark made clear that the exclusionary rule was "an essential ingredient of the Fourth Amendment," which was "vouchsafed against the sates by the Due Process Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment. In dissent, Justice Harlan accused the Court of forgetting its sense of judicial restraint and failing to show due regard for stare decisis. Those who believe the exclusionary rule is merely a judicially created rule have criticized the Supreme Court for extending its supervisory power to the state courts. On the other hand, if the exclusionary rule is implicit in the Fourth Amendment and if the Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, then it follows that the exclusionary rule must be respected in state criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court extended the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to state criminal prosecutions via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Time, place and manner doctrine
Freedom of speech in the United States is protected by the First Amendment, with the exception of obscenity, defamation, incitement to riot, and fighting words, as well as harassment, privileged communications, trade secrets, classified material, copyright, patents, military conduct, commercial speech such as advertising, and time, place and manner restrictions. Time, manner and place can be regulated as in a free speech area on a university campus
Heightened scrutiny and strict scrutiny
Heightened scrutiny: the requirement that government justify a challenged policy by showing that it is substantially necessary to the achievement of an important objective. The ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed the government carries the burned of proof that its challenged policy is constitutional. To carry that burden, government must show that its policy is necessary to the achievement of a compelling interest and that it is "narrowly tailored" to further that interest. The compelling interest test is generally understood to be far more stringent than the traditional rational basis test. Using the suspect classification doctrine, the Court has invalidated, explicity or implicitly, virtually all public policies that overtly discriminate among persons on the basis of their race. In the Court's view, it is virtually impossible for government to have a compelling interest that would require or justify racial or ethnic discrimination. Strict scrutiny: the most demanding level of judicial review in cases involving alleged infringements of civil rights or liberties. The Supreme Court has developed a level of equal protection review, falling between the rational basis test and the suspect classification doctrine. Heightened scruutiny, has been applied most prominently to gender discrimination claims. Under this approach, government must show that a challenged policy bears a "substantial" relationship to an "important" government interest. Because discriminatory policies are presumed invalid under heightened scrutiny, this level of review is closer to strict scrutiny than to the rational basis test.
Lemon Test on matters of religion
In Lemon v. Kurtzman a three-pronged test for determining the constitutionality of policies challenged under the Establishment Clause. It synthesized various elements of the Court's Establishment Clause. The Lemon test has been applied to a broad range of issues involving the separation of church and state. Under the Lemon test, a challenged policy must meet the following criteria in order to pass muster under the Establishment Clause: (1) it must have "secular legislative purpose"' (2) it must not have the principal or primary effect of "inhibiting or advancing religion"; and (3) it must avoid an "excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court has moved away from a strict application of the Lemon test but has stopped short of repudiating it altogether
The Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurtzman a three-pronged test for determining the constitutionality of policies challenged under the Establishment Clause. It synthesized various elements of the Court's Establishment Clause. The Lemon test has been applied to a broad range of issues involving the separation of church and state. Under the Lemon test, a challenged policy must meet the following criteria in order to pass muster under the Establishment Clause: (1) it must have "secular legislative purpose"' (2) it must not have the principal or primary effect of "inhibiting or advancing religion"; and (3) it must avoid an "excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court has moved away from a strict application of the Lemon test but has stopped short of repudiating it altogether
West Virginia v. Barnette
In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the Supreme Court requiring public school students and teachers to participate in a flag salute ceremony conducted as a regular part of the daily classroom schedule. In upholding the flag salute requirement, the Court rejected Gobitis' contention that it violated First Amendment principles of religious liberty as applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court overruled the Gobitis case by striking down a virtually identical flag salute requirement imposed by the West Virginia Board of Education. This law required all schools in the state to offer classes in civics, history, and the Federal and State constitutions "for the purpose of teaching, fostering, and perpetuating the ideals, principles, and spirit of Americanism, and increasing the knowledge of the organization and machinery of the Government." Barnette and other Jehovah's Witnesses, filed suit to enjoin the compulsory flag salute on grounds that it violated a constitutionally protected religious precept contained in the Old Testament forbidding the worship of "any graven image." Under their reading of the Scriptures, the flag salute constituted such forbidden worship.
Branzburg v. Hays
In the early 20th century, many states had adopted statues prohibiting criminal syndicalism, which was the crime of advocating political change through violent means. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court invalidated a criminal syndicalism statute and explicitly overruled Whitney v. California. In reversing the conviction of a local Ku Klux Klan leader who had conducted a televised rally near Cincinnati, Ohio, the Court held that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." The Brandenburg standard, with emphasis on imminent lawless action, reaffirmed and refined the clear and present danger test as articulated by Justice Holmes.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey
The Supreme Court announced that it would hear a case challenging a Pennsylvania law that contained a series of restrictions on abortion. The law required spousal notification, parental consent in cases of minors, and twenty-four hours waiting period before an abortion could be performed. The attorney general of Penn. defended the constitutionality of the statute, contending, that "Roe did not establish an absolute right to abortion on demand, but rather a limited right subject to reasonable state regulations." Attacking the statute, the counsel for the ACLU characterized Penn.'s regulations not only as unreasonable but as "cruel and oppressive." The Court reaffirmed a 5-4 vote the essential holding in Roe v. Wade that the constitutional right of privacy is broad enough to include a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. The Casey decision was greeted with dismay and derision from both pro-life and pro-choice groups. Pro-choice groups expressed alarm tat the Court was willing to overturn the recent precedent. By the late 1980s, it appeared that Roe v. Wade might be overturned. In this case, the Court reaffirmed its basic holding in Roe- but in so doing, gave states broader latitude in regulating access to abortion. This case was a suit against Pennsylvania Gov. Casey to challenge the constitutionality of a series of provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982. The act required a woman seeking an abortion to give hr informed consent prior to the abortion procedure, and specified that she be provided with certain information at least twenty-four hours before the abortion is performed. For a minor to obtain an abortion, the act required the informed consent of one of her parents, but provided for a "judicial bypass" option if the minor did not wish to or could not obtain a parent's consent. Another provision of the act required that, with some exceptions, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband of her intended abortion. The act exempted compliance with these three requirements in the event of a medical emergency. Finally, the act imposed certain reporting requirements on facilities that provide abortion services. A fragmented Supreme Court upheld all of the statutory provisions with the exception of the spousal notification requirement. The "joint opinion" abandoned the Roe trimester framework and declared a new "unduly burdensome" test for judging regulations of abortion. Applying this test, the joint opinion upheld the parental consent and informed consent provisions but invalidated the spousal notification requirements and 7-2 to uphold the other statutory provisions.
NAACP v. Alabama
The Supreme Court found that the State of Alabama had unconstitutionally infringed the NAACP's freedom of association by selectively enforcing a law requiring organizations based outside Alabama to register members' names and addresses with state authorities. In ruling in favor of the NAACP, the Supreme Court had to distinguish a precedent that cut the other way. In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court stressed the fact that the NAACP used lawful means in seeking its political objectives.
Katz v. U.S.
The Supreme Court in 1967 to overturn Olmstead in the landmark decision of Katz v. United States. Here, the Court reversed a conviction in which government agents, acting without a warrant, attached a "bug," or listening device, to the outside of a public telephone booth from which Katz, a suspected bookie, often placed calls. Justice Stewart stated that "the Fourth Amendment protects people- not places." The Supreme Court has since held that the Fourth Amendment extends to any place or thing in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Reasonable expectation of privacy: a person's reasonable expectation that his or her activities in a certain place are private; society's expectations with regard to whether activities in certain places are private. The Court overturn its earlier ruling in Olmstead v. U.S. and adopts a broad view of the scope of the Fourth Amendment protection.
Miller v. California
The Supreme Court set forth the constitutional standards for determining obscenity. The defendant, miller, was convicted in the O.C. Superior Court of "knowingly distributing obscene mater," a misdemeanor under California law. The appellate court affirmed his conviction without opinion. The definition of obscenity is (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,... (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic.
De jure and de facto
What exists by law and in reality De jure: "in law"; as a matter of law In Keyes v. Denver School District, the Court, with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting, found de jure discrimination where a series of administrative decisions in the 1960s had helped to maintain racially segregated public schools in Denver. Thus in Keyes, as in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (where the court approved court-ordered busing to achieve desegregation), the Supreme Court upheld a busing plan imposed by a federal district court. De facto: "in fact"; as a matter of fact The repudiation of the separate but equal doctrine in Brown and subsequent decisions led to the virtual disappearance of de jure racial segregation - that is, segregation required or created by law or public policy. Yet, de facto segregation in housing, employment, and education still exists to a great extent, as a function of both social norms and economic disparities. As the Supreme Court held as far back is 1883, segregation that is purely de facto is beyond the purview of the Equal Protection Clause per se. Many forms of de facto segregation, may be within the remedial power of both state and federal statutes. For example, under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Congress prohibited racial discrimination in the rental or sale of homes where the transaction is handled by a licensed agent. The questions surrounding such attempts at eradicating de fact discrimination are by no means closed.
Miller test on obscenity
Whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest... Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic. Court stated a 3 part definition of obscenity in cases are: (1) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests. (2) Whether it depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conducted and (3) whether work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic or scientific value.