REI Final Exam

W4 - Joppke, Christian. "Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration." World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 266-293. https://doi.org/10.1017/S004388710000811X.

Liberal states increasingly adopt a highly restrictionist rhetoric, but one which doesn't translate much to actual inflows of migrants, which are still high This gap between restrictionist policies and expansionist outcomes is largely one of passivity, with states accepting migrants for humanitarian reasons and in recognition of their rights, or because of their inability to keep illegal immigrants out - So why are unwanted migrants accepted? This paradox seems to violate the idea of state sovereignty, even though state capacity for regulating and controlling migration hasn't decreased. But it does show how the state's sovereignty is incomplete in an international system that recognized humanitarian rights - But this is an insufficient explanation since many states still succeed at regulating immigration and if anything the condition favoring state regulation have only increased - globalization doesn't affect state controls at the border and the enforcement powers of the international regime are weak at best Instead, it is domestic causes which lead states to accept unwanted migrants - a self-limited sovereignty - which the author Freedman attributes to two factors: (1) immigration has concentrated benefits but defuse harms which creates a collective action problem in arguing against it (known as 'client politics'), (2) the anti-populist, anti-Eugenics norms in liberal states make it taboo to address the racial ethnic composition of incoming migrants This article adds two modification to this view: (1) legal processes prove a much greater shield of migrants than political ones, because while politics can succumb to xenophobic fervor, judges are more isolated from it and courts have proven bastions of humanitarian rights for migrants including family unification - the courts proving especially impactful in the case of European and German immigration protections, (2) differing contexts within Europe have led to different approaches to immigration, with guest-worker programs (as in Germany) making it harder to dispose of migrants then purely imperially motivated migration programs, as in Britain, who were also aided in increasing immigration restrictions by a lack of a written constitution, which made legal protection harder This article look at US and Europe to show the self-constrained sovereignty which makes liberal states accept unwanted migrants - arguing the US fails to control migration because of client politics (i.e. collective action failures) and the US's strong anti-populist norm rooted in the nation of immigrants and civil rights imperatives in politics, both of which are seen in the failure of US immigration reform in the 1990s -- meanwhile, Europe allowed migration because of both legal and moral constraints which limited deportation/zero-immigration strategies after the end of post-colonial and guest-worker migration programs, but with variation depending on the history of early migration policies as seen with Germany (who was limited by guest-worker programs which invited people to the state) and the UK (which never wanted migration but accepted it as an imperial necessity and thus had not issue restricting it) The idea that any of these countries have lost control over their migration policies is simply misleading Immigration in Europe has been much less of a constant than in the US - with migrants accepted in historically unique moments and by default and continued migration has largely been family migration completed via moral and legal rights/duties held sacrosanct by liberal states and not via client politics - Thus, where Europe once allowed primary immigration, it now allows secondary immigration, while shutting the door to all others This article thus argues that accepting unwanted immigrants is inherent within the liberalness of liberal states

W8 - Fortner, Michael Javen. "The 'Silent Majority' in Black and White: Invisibility and Imprecision in the Historiography of Mass Incarceration." Journal of Urban History 40, no. 2 (2014): 252-282. https://doi.org/10.1177/0096144213508615.

The overly top-down and functionalist explanations of mass incarceration have led to limits on the descriptive force and explanatory power of the narrative - Instead, they often create neat historical narratives that erase black politics and force white politics into a false binary - This essay returns to the genesis of mass incarceration in the 60s and 70s and places the concepts of law and order within local contexts so as to better understand its meaning The article argues that the individual components of law and order were united more by class consideration than race The simplistic narrative of mass incarceration minimizes the agency of Black Americans by painting them as helpless victims of a raical order - this is seen in the narrative of the New Jim Crow, with a functionalist narrative focused on white power and black powerlessness This narrative ignores both the multiplicity of Black experience including the unique place of middle-class Black families and the reality of black political activism and resistance Similarly, political narratives focused on conservative decision making overlook local and communal factors / dynamics - rendering black politics invisible and white politics monolithic This article focuses on the 60s and 70s to analyze three traditional narratives to mass incarceration - the New Jim Crow (i.e. functionalist) narrative, the neoliberal narrative, and the political strategy narrative - it then offers an alternative that renders black communities visible This article documents the existence of a 'black silent majority' which shaped black perception of and responses to crime problems Arguments that incarceration policies don't correspond with crime rates often focus too much on aggregate crime measures and too little on local contexts and different types of crime A more local analysis of New York crime levels makes their 1970 crime bill seem more responsive Law and order is often treated as a coherent category that evoked only racial symbols - ignoring the many overlapping and disparate symbols created by thinking of law and order and how those symbols vary in their salience and meaning in different communities Language about the silent white majority focuses more on all groups threatening the social/moral order - like hippies - than on racial threats - thus, the focus on race as the driver of law and orders support overlooks the importance of white student protests, corruption, and other threats which led to a diversity of local opinions to contribute to different policy reactions Looking at local conditions also shows the black/latinx communities were often just as worried about crime and drugs and favored punitive responses - this makes elite driven theories of mass incarceration seem far less plausible These has also been some literature on the existence of a middle class Black silent majority - much like the white one - which is not actively involved in protest or struggle but focused on the context of their daily life and success and thus equally likely to be opposed to movements threatening the social/moral order like hippies or student protestors Thus, the silent white and black majorities were united by a concern over class issues and social disruptors, leading to support for law and order rhetoric - this unity between the white and black silent majorities can be seen in their shared attitudes and support for the policy Various local surveys and measures affirm this interpretation of many black communities' response to crime and drug issues Current narratives of mass incarceration almost universally ignore this reality - overlooking black experience of oversimplifying it

W6 - Alba, Richard D., and Nancy Foner. Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North America and Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.

The scale of immigration into Europe and the US is massive, with immigrants making up almost ¼ of the US population and ⅕ of Europe This book argues that the integration of migrants is the key issue in how countries are handling increased migration - looking at a comparison of integration approaches for low-status migrants in the US, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands Integration = the process that increases opportunity to obtain the valued stuff of a society, including social acceptance and participation in major institutions Integration involves changes on the part of the individual and the receiving society and varies from generation to generation Integration implies access to the goods and privileges and rights of the state and its mainstream institutions, while assimilation assumes socio-cultural erasure There are two general mechanisms of integration - those that increase access to migrants and their children to social resources and equality and those that enlarge the circle of membership for the national community Existing literatures on the topics have frequently focused on national immigration regimes, American exceptionalism, convergence, differences in comparative political economy, and legacies of settler colonialism The west is undergoing a diversity transition wrought by increased demographic diversity and an aging native population - Thus, the continued vitality of these societies will hinge on their ability to successfully integrate newcomers and overcoming discrimination The concentration of migrants in certain neighborhoods can create disadvantages for them - Neighborhoods are also the primary venue of initial contact between natives and newcomers Race in the US both leads to limited options for migrants locked in a racial hierarchy - especially black migrants - and ironically also increases migrant protections and legitimacy because of the civil rights infrastructure and size of the non-white community in the US Meanwhile, religion is the more predominant divide in Europe, with Muslims socially and institutionally rejected The ability of migrants to win positions in local, regional, and national office is a key measure of their political integration All low skill migrants face similar insecurities and challenges when first integrating - Navigating language / culture gaps and lesser economic opportunities and segregated neighborhoods, decreased political representation, discrimination, and worse educational opportunities But there is strong evidence of increased integration in all of these states, as seen with increased election of migrants who are increasingly eligible voters and increased rates of inter-ethnic friendship and marriage, as ethnic/religious divides soften over time as new identities form - These trends are in conflict with growing inequality and a rising xenophobic right in both the US and Europe No country is successful across all domains on the issue of integration - This is seen in the US which has very high levels of economic inequality and racial divisions and little governmental support for migrants but is also much quicker to extend national identity to them and to elect them into office Thus, integration approaches and trajectories in different countries can't be understood without an examination of institutional histories and structures such as church-state relations, welfare regimes, education programs, and citizenship criteria Germany and the Netherlands will both rely very heavily on migrant demographics in the future but both have a mixed record of integration Britain and France have less demographic pressure and their migration regimes are more shaped by colonial histories, with higher levels of integration The US and Canada both accept a huge number of migrants and are more diverse demographically, with integration largely successful in Canada and bifurcated in the US The US immigration situation is worsened by the large number of illegal migrants and the high levels of economic inequality which traps migrants in the lower class and the unique history of both US racism and civil rights protections - good signs are high levels of patriotism, intermarriage and labor force integration in the US None of the grand narratives on immigration (national regimes, political economy, settler states, US exceptionalism, convergence) fully explains modern trends The national regime approach can be useful in explaining differences in citizenship policies and political inclusion, but overlooks institutional histories - The political economy approach has little explanatory power for the cases under consideration here - While an oversimplification (ignoring Canada's unique focus on skilled migration and the problem of illegal migration in the US and failures of integration in the US) the argument that settler states are more accepting has some credence in level of migration, levels of intermixing/marriages and the integration of migrants into national identities of American-ness or Canadian-ness - US Exceptionalism has support in the context of the unique history of US racism and slavery, but not in any other regard - and there is some truth to increased convergence in increasing citizenship and anti-discrimination laws in both Europe and America, although important differences remain in both institutions and ideologies There are intense concerns about migrant neighborhoods becoming parallel societies or ghettos - Although generally in all six examined countries migrants are much less segregated then the Black population in the US, but still segregated and in inferior neighborhoods - Still, there is a strong trend of migrant segregation which is especially damaging because of high levels of inequality in the US - Overall, most migrant neighborhoods seem to be way stations of integration and not permanent segregators, even if full parity with whites is elusive In general, living in more diverse communities with many members of the native majority too increases mainstream integration and connections

W1 - Vaughan, Alden T. The Roots of American Racism: Essays on the Colonial Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

The view that slavery's onset in 1619 was immediately imbued with racist underpinnings has been challenged by Fields' work, which argued that racism was developed late in the colonial project as an ideological necessity caused by changing social context and punctuated by the contrast between calls for liberty and the reality of slavery during the Revolutionary War But Fields is wrong in coming to this conclusion - both because she homogenizes the experiences of white and black laborers and thus fails to prove their rough synonimity in the early colonial era and because she misunderstands the language of colonial laws and thus reads into them a lack of racial distinctions without evidence For one, white servants had enough rights to never be too frequently mistreated or subject to too long of labor tenure, even if there are some examples of the groups mistreatment and unjust sentences. No Europeans (even the Irish) were assigned to true slavery as Africans were Thus, Fields exaggerates the early similarities between these groups and thus pushes the racialization of their differences back too far Fields also misreads early colonial law by not recognizing that Christian, white, and English were seen as synonymous Fields mistakes ambiguity in language being invented to express racial ideology as an ambiguity in that ideology itself, which leads her to see slavery as unallied with racism in its early years, incorrectly. Africans were almost always enslaved for life upon first arrival in the U.S., while no Englishmen or Europeans were enslaved. Further, it was only freed Blacks or Native Americans who were denied rights of citizenship despite their freedom What's more, all salves were identified as 'Negro' or 'black' and not by ethnicity or nationality and those labels were applied whether someone was free or not and regardless of how long they had been in the U.S.. This combined with the frequent limiting of Black people to first names only in records shows a notable sense that the English saw Africans as distinct and separate Although most literature defending slavery and deriding the black race wasn't published until the Revolutionary era, it would be a mistake to assume that an ideology can't exist just because a literature around it doesn't yet. Language simply hadn't caught up to society, but the idea of race was already distinctly present from the earliest signs of slavery in the U.S. The Fields interpretation of slavery causing racism is more optimistic about its ability to be deconstructed, while a more rooted racial ideology is harder to dispel

EXTRA - Relevant Readings Without Summaries

Siddiqi, Arjumand, Odmaa Sod-Erdene, Darrick Hamilton, Tressie McMillan Cottom, and William Darity. "Growing Sense of Social Status Threat and Concomitant Deaths of Despair Among Whites." SSM - Population Health 9 (2019): 100449. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2019.100449. Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. New York: New Press, 2011. Evicted - Matthew Desmond Acharya, Avidit, Maya Sen, and Matthew Blackwell. Deep Roots: How Slavery Still Shapes Southern Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. Tajfel, Henri. "Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination." Scientific American 223, No. 5 (November 1970): 96-103. Blumer, Herbert. "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position." The Pacific Sociological Review 1, no. 1 (Spring, 1958): 3-7. Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. Let Them Eat Tweets: How the Right Rules in an Age of Extreme Inequality. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2020. Norton, Michael I., and Samuel R. Sommers. "Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game That They Are Now Losing." Perspectives on Psychological Science 6, no. 3 (2011): 215-218. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691611406922. Du Bois, W. E. B. Black Reconstruction in America. New York: Atheneum, 1992. Hochschild, Arlie Russell. Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right. New York: The New Press, 2018. Jardina, Ashley. White Identity Politics. Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. London: Viking Press, 2018. Levy, Jonathan. Ages of American Capitalism: A History of the United States. New York: Random House, 2021. McGhee, Heather C. The Sum of Us: What Racism Costs Everyone and How We Can Prosper Together. London: Profile Books, 2021. Metzl, Jonathan. Dying of Whiteness: How the Politics of Racial Resentment Is Killing America's Heartland. New York: Basic Books, 2020. Baptist, Edward E. The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism. New York: Basic Books, 2014. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.32823. Mason, Lilliana. Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018. Mickey, Robert. Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America's Deep South, 1944-1972. Princeton Studies in American Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. Crenshaw, Kimberlé. "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics." University of Chicago Legal Forum 1 (January 1, 1989): 139. https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3007. Darity, William A., Darrick Hamilton, and James B. Stewart. "A Tour de Force in Understanding Intergroup Inequality: An Introduction to Stratification Economics." The Review of Black Political Economy 42, no. 1-2 (2015): 1-6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12114-014-9201-2. Kuziemko, Ilyana, Ryan W. Buell, Taly Reich, and Michael I. Norton. "Last-Place Aversion: Evidence and Redistributive Implications." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, no. 1 (2014): 105-150. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt035.

W4 - Koopmans, Ruud, Ines Michalowski, and Stine Waibel. "Citizenship Rights for Immigrants. National Political Processes and Cross-National Convergence in Western Europe, 1980-2008." The American Journal of Sociology 117, no. 4 (2012): 1202-2045. https://doi.org/10.1086/662707.

- Data from 10 European countries from 1980 to 2008 shows no evidence of cross-national convergence in European immigration rights and processes - Up until 2002 there was an increase in inclusiveness, which stagnated afterwards, a process fueled by electoral changes as the growth of immigrants in the electorate led to more liberal regimes, but with such processes eventually being counteracted by a backlash from right-wing parties - Long-standing policy traditions in different countries intimately shape these electoral mechanisms and lead to strong path dependencies in cross-national differences - Some theories have predicted there should be a cross-national convergence on policies as countries have liberalized - driven by international forms (the EU, post WWII global human rights norms, and globalization) or domestic ones (changes in cultures and modes of thinking about liberty) in different approaches - while other theories have focused on national political processes and the path dependency of different policy traditions - this article serves to unite both and critically analyze their relationship with each other - This study focuses on migrants who are from outside the EU and don't fall within a particular protected group (like asylum seekers or refugees) - Migrants have rights that stem both from their status as a migrant (with rights focused on access to nationality and protections against discrimination) and from their status as members of particular ethnic or religious groups (with rights focused on protecting cultural differences and facilitating separate institutional arrangements for minorities) - This data looks at four time periods - 1980, 1990, 2002, and 2008 in the UK, Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. - There is strong evidence for a growth in the inclusiveness of immigration policies (especially around anti discrimination protections) between 1980 and 2008, but this trend stagnates after 2002 and even somewhat reverses - There is evidence of convergence within some realms (anti discrimination, expulsion rights) there is a lack of evidence of convergence in most other realms, with policy-differences across countries maintaining themselves and sometimes increasing (as with marriage migration rights, public sector employment, cultural rights in education, and other cultural and religious rights) - Countries tend to show high levels of stability in fitting into different groups of policy - with some (like the UK and Sweden consistently being more liberal) and some (like Austria and Switzerland being more restrictive), even if there are some examples of change over time (with Germany and Holland both experiencing liberalization) - Mechanisms for convergence hypothesis: EU membership and strong judicial review have no effect on the levels of liberalization or convergence for states - EU membership and strong judicial review don't help protect migrant rights [COURT PART IS IMPORTANT FOR SUPPLY VS. DEMAND ARG.] - Mechanisms for electoral factors hypothesis: A strong left-wing incumbency within a country led to no major effect on immigrant rights (with the left versus right seeing no real distinction). But a weak populist right led to more liberal policies (with the inverse being true as well, as strong populist right-wing parties decreased immigrant rights and increased backlash against them) and a large share of immigrant voters increases the level of protection for immigrant rights. - The rise of right-wing populism and migration restrictions after 2002 was in part driven by the 9/11 attacks - Looking at the strength of the populist right and levels of immigrant voters, regimes can be classified into three groups: Liberal regimes (Sweden, UK, and Holland pre-2002) with limited populism and large migrant populations; restrictive regimes (Austria, Denmark, Norway) with high populism and few migrants; and mixed regimes with either high populism and high migration or low populism and low migration (France as an example of the former, Germany of the later) - Liberal policies leads to more migrants which leads to more liberal policies in a reinforcing cycles (a process that works the other way too) - Many countries don't fit neatly into one of these camps or the other however [it feels like the authors is stretching a little to create a classification at the end]

W4 - Czaika, Mathias. "High-Skilled Migration: Introduction and Synopsis." In High-Skilled Migration: Drivers and Policies, edited by Mathias Czaika, 1-19. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2196/view/10.1093/oso/9780198815273.001.0001/oso-9780198815273-chapter-1.

- More and more countries are trying to attract and retain skilled and high-skilled migration, even as low-skill migrants are increasingly seen as a problem in need of control - This can in part be attributed to the growing division of labor caused by globalization and the growth of the knowledge economy, with education and training levels booming since 1950 and with more people getting education making education more desirable in an autocatalytic process - Increased educational attainment also leads to increased need for migration and mobility because of skill clusters in urban environments - this is true not just of the OECD but also of non-OECD countries, which have also increasingly redesigned their immigration schemes after 2000 to try and attract more migrants - "In 2015, almost half of the 172 UN member states declared an explicit interest in increasing the level of high-skilled migration either by attracting foreign or retaining native talent. This share has doubled since 2005, when 22 per cent of all UN member states expressed this preference for additional high-skilled labour (Fig. 1.1). Industrialized, mostly Western countries in the transition to post-industrialized knowledge-based economies are at the vanguard of this global trend, with two-thirds of OECD nations having implemented or being in the process of implementing policies specifically targeting high-skilled migrants (Czaika and Parsons, 2017). Consequently the 'global competition for the highly skilled' (Boeri et al., 2012) has intensified and an increasing number of states and companies have become involved in a battle for the 'best and brightest'" - This process is also being propelled by increasingly aging populations in much of the world - "Tertiary-educated people have about a three times higher emigration propensity than less-educated people (Fig. 1.3). This mobility gap is partly a consequence of aspirations and opportunity differentials between highly educated and trained people and those who received less formal education and training. In particular, the mobility gap between tertiary- and secondary-trained people seems to be widening." - The growth in the highly educated is a SUPPLY side factor, with more educated people being more mobile, but it is one matched by growing DEMAND as countries increasingly search for high skilled workers needed for their economic growth and compete for access to them - Many highly educated people are very mobile if not seeking to permanently relocate - "the majority of migrants moving to highly developed OECD economies will soon be tertiary educated." (!!) - Most states have both short, medium, and long term strategies for recruiting highly skilled migrants - using labor demand policies in the short term to fill specific skill gaps, attracting companies, investors and entreprenuers in the medium term to increase intra-company flows of workers, and recruiting/retaining knowledge workers through permanent residency schemes, student recruitment policies, and access to citizenship rights to try to build up the national human capital stock in the long term - States increasingly compete to create the most attractive policy package for high-skill migrants. This goes beyond filling current skill shortages and into attracting high-skill migrants in general with an eye towards the positive externalities created via their effect on the economy (including a self-reinforcing cycle of such migration) - Cities are the essential core of global high skill migration and success in attracting such migrants largely depends on the dynamism of such cities - The 2008 recession did nothing to reduce demand for high skill migration in the OECD and in some places increased it - Skilled migrants are primarily attracted to good social and cultural environments with strong state supports, and less so by specific 'migration' packages - International students is the fastest growing group among all forms of international migration, increasing four-fold since 1970 - but this mobility is heavily concentrated on the UK, UK, Germany, France, and Australia - Student mobility is increasingly seen as one of the best ways of retaining a skilled work force however

W5 - Ford, Robert. "Acceptable and Unacceptable Immigrants: How Opposition to Immigration in Britain Is Affected by Migrants' Region of Origin." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37, no. 7 (2011): 1017-1037. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.572423.

- Most measures of immigration opposition don't look at the origin of the migrant groups. This paper looks at differences in opinion in the UK across seven different regions and shows that there is a hierarchy of opinion about them, with white and culturally proximate migrants preferred over non-white and more culturally distant ones. The gaps between these groups are quite large, showing the flaws in measures of migrant attitudes that aggregate across groups. - Opposition to immigrant has been decreasing recently in Britain, as a product of generational differences, with younger Britons more accepting of multiculturalism and less authoritarian in their views. - The lack of distinction between immigrant types wouldn't be a problem if all immigrant groups were viewed similarly, but there is strong evidence that they aren't and that ethnicity and similarity are used to rank immigrants - The difference in rates of anti-immigration mobilization between white groups and non-white groups calls into question arguments that say xenophobia is primarily driven by economic concerns and increased economic competition - Policy makers in Britain have often reflected the public's dislike for non-white migrants by mobilizing for more restrictions against them (as seen in efforts to undermine the post-colonial granting of citizenship to former subjects) - The initiation of much higher levels of European immigration was kick-started by the UK joining the EEC and EU, and yet neither brought major debates about growing immigration because that immigration was white - however, when Eastern European immigration significantly increased in the 2000s it brought much greater controversy - Muslim settlement has been a hot point of contention in large part because of the perceived differences in both ethnicity and cultural similarity - Education, diversity, and less authoritarianism/ethnocentrism all lead to greater support for a wide variety of migrants- all of these lead the young to be more tolerant than the old - The survey data provides clear evidence of a hierarchy of immigration preferences, with race the key determinant of attitudes - migrants from Australia and New Zealand are the least disliked, followed by Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Hong Kong, Africa, and then South Asia and the West Indies which are the most disliked. - This hierarchy remains remarkably consistent across generations, even if it varies by degree for different age cohorts - Economic controls have practically no effect on these views. Showing how little concerns about economic competition decoupled from race truly matter - The best predictors of increased opposition are authoritarianism and ethnocentrism

W6 - Hopkins, Daniel J. "Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition." American Journal of Political Science 104, no. 1 (2010): 40-60. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990360.

- Racial threat hypothesis often fails to capture local responses to growing immigration in the U.S. - This article serves to rectify this problem with a 'politicized places' hypothesis, which focuses on the overlap between local conditions (with sudden neighborhood influxes of immigrants) and national conditions (with national rhetoric that reinforces the threat of such immigrants). It is the confluence of these factors that provokes xenophobia. This hypothesis is supported by a wide range of survey and time-series data. - Racial threat hypothesis argues increased exposure to immigrants on a local level should increase hostility to them, as in-groups compete with out-groups for scarce resources. The politicized places hypothesis instead argues that "when communities are undergoing sudden demographic changes at the same time that salient national rhetoric politicized immigration, immigrants can quickly become the targets of local political hostility." It is the combination of uncertainty from demographic changes and narrative from national politics and media that foment a sense of politicized threat - A sudden increase in immigrants is the most powerful predictor of which localities consider anti-immigrant ordinances, while economic conditions had no effect on their own (and only small effects when interacting with immigration levels) - Americans are surprisingly ignorant of the demographics of their neighborhood, with perceptions of diversity and actual diversity having a 0.16 correlation. This makes assessing the impact of increased diversity difficult. - "The politicized places approach assumes that people are highly selective in incorporating environmental information and that information acquisition needs to be explained. The hypothesis couples two core assertions. First, it resolves the issue of local inattention to demographics by arguing that while levels of ethnic heterogeneity might escape notice, changes are less likely to do so... Still, changing demographics only catch local residents' attention. They do not necessarily connect those changes to politics. For that, people need salient frames that "define what the problem is and how to think about it" (Kinder 1998, 170). In other words, the demographic change might not be seen as having political ramifications unless frames are available that make those ramifications clear. One source of such frames is individuals' ideologies and long-standing beliefs... Another source of frames—-this one more obviously dynamic—-is the mass media... This work fits with the more general theory of symbolic politics, which explains attitudes by pointing to the presence or absence of symbols in political discourse" - "the central claim of the politicized places hypothesis is that at times when rhetoric related to immigrants is highly salient nationally, those witnessing influxes of immigrants locally will find it easier to draw political conclusions from their experiences". - The data for this article was combined across a wide number of data sets and measures the changes in coverage of immigrants in national news compared to the average to assess differences in national narratives - The model and data here provide strong support for the hypothesis, finding that "when immigration is a high-profile issue nationally, living in a changing local context is more strongly related to anti-immigration attitudes." - While just living in changing counties with little national news on immigration has no effect - Economic measures prove broadly unsuccessful at predicting xenophobia - September 11 provided a short-lived spike in threat thinking, showing the importance of national media narratives (with neither economic conditions or immigration rates explaining the spike well) - Zip-code level data is the best predictor of immigrant attitudes

EXTRA - Cheryl I. Harris, "Whiteness as Property," Harvard Law Review 106, no. 8 (June 1993): 1710-1791

From summary of the article - not written by Cheryl Harris - "Follwoing the period of slavery and conquest, whiteness became the basis of racialized pivilege - a type of status in which white racial identity provided the basis for allocating societal benefits both private and public in character. These arrangements were ratified and legitimated in law as a type of status property. Even as legal segregation was overturned, whiteness as property continued to serve as a barrier to effective change as the system of racial classification operated to protect entrenched power." (1709)

EXTRA - Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A World of Difference, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004

"Furthermore, while Swedes are remarkably homogeneous and can't be split along ethnic, racial, or religious lines, in the United States, the white majority was afraid that proportional systems would give more representation, and thus political power, to racial minorities (especially blacks). The U.S. polity is still shaped by the impact of slavery and immigration. Successive waves of immigration to the United States of ethnically diverse members of the working class created cleavages across racial and ethnic lines, which "confused" and diluted the classic class line of Marxism. An Irish worker in Boston, say, felt Irish first and then "worker" and often viewed, say, the new Italian immigrant workers with just as much animosity as he viewed capitalists. Marx and Engels were aware of this problem in the United States and considered it a critical obstacle for the formation of an American Communist Party" (9) "American political stability (which is itself the result of American isolation, military strength, and size) implies that the U.S. Constitution is of much older vintage than those of European countries. Many European countries have relatively recent constitutions, which are often the result of revolutionary periods in which the large mass of workers had a voice in the political arena. The American Constitution has obviously been amended, but it is still the same document approved by a minority of wealthy white men in 1776." (10) "we argue that one important reason for the differences between the United States and Europe that cannot be explained by institutions is racial and ethnic fractionalization. America's immigrants and the descendants of its slave population ensure that the United States is a much more racially fragmented society than anywhere in western Europe. Moreover, while European governments strove to eradicate ethnic and cultural differences over the past four centuries (with differing levels of success; compare homogeneous France and ethnically diverse Spain), American governments put much less effort into this task, which would have surely been impossible in such a diverse country. As a result, it is much easier to convince a white middle class person in the United States to think that the poor are "different" (read black) than to convince a white middle class person, say, in Sweden." (10) "Racial divisions and racial preferences appear to deter redistribution, especially when poverty is concentrated in minority groups. A vast body of experimental and survey evidence shows that individuals are more generous towards members of their own racial or ethnic group than to members of other groups. Of course, these attitudes are not innate, instead they reflect cultural and political conditioning. Race hatred is often used strategically by politicians whose main objective is to avoid redistributive policies; precisely by using the racial animosity of distrust, political entrepreneurs can gain support from even relatively poor whites against redistribution Places with natural ethnic, religious, or racial divisions facilitate this sort of divide and conquer strategy. It therefore follows that redistributive policies should be more limited in more fragmented societies where generosity across people is limited by racial cleavages. This effect is likely to be much more important when minority groups are overrepresented among the poor." (10-11) "Empirical evidence across countries and within the United States shows that racial heterogeneity tends to support the political importance of fractionalization. Research on American cities shows that participation in social activities, interpersonal trust, redistributive policies, and provision of public goods are lower in more racially fragmented communities. B(11) "Several authors (see Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby 2004 and the references cited therein) have argued that the desire to avoid white-black redistributions have led to "too many" local governments in the United States. The term "too many" has to be interpreted with reference to a hypothetical number that would maximize economies of scale and efficiency of government. One of the reasons why localities are "too many" is that in the choice of their number, Americans want to reduce the extent of redistribution that the system of government allows for." (90)

EXTRA - Olson, Joel. "Whiteness and the Polarization of American Politics." Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 4 (December 2008): 704-18.

"The polarization of American politics is a hotly debated topic in political science. Scholars tend to agree that the American political system has become increasingly divided along partisan and ideo- logical lines, as suggested by vitriolic presidential campaigns, the decline of bipartisanship in Congress, and the increasingly nasty tone of political discourse in the media and on the Internet. Scholars also agree that the parties have sorted themselves ideologically, with liberals now consistently voting for Democrats and conservatives consistently voting for Republicans. Yet there is little agreement regarding the causes of this polarization. This article explores the role that race plays in political polarization, or the tendency for politicians and voters to act along partisan and ideological lines. I argue that polarization has resulted, in part, from the changing nature of white identity, or whiteness, and the strategic response to this change by political elites. I further suggest that the transformation of whiteness and subsequent polarization lie at the roots of the "culture wars."" (Olson, 2008) (!!!) "During slavery and segregation, white identity functioned as a form of racialized standing that granted all whites a superior social status to all those who were not white, particularly African Americans. The loss of individualized standing due to the victo- ries of the civil rights movement, however, led to anger, anxiety, and resentment among many whites, and a desire to restore that standing. This white ressenti- ment, as I call it, presented a political opportunity for the minority party, if they could mobilize it. Yet given post-civil rights movement norms against overt racism, Republican strategists could not do so in a way that straightforwardly evoked white standing. They solved this problem by creating a narrative that portrayed the Democrats as the party of intellectual elites and undeserving rabble. The GOP, meanwhile, represented the "virtuous middle" squeezed in between. In constructing this conflict, Republican elites implicitly racialized both the virtuous middle and the "snobs" as white. By dividing the white elec- torate, they set the foundation for a polarized republic." (Olson, 2008) (!!!) "Prior to the 1960s, party identification among white voters tended to reflect regional, ethnic, and religious differences at least as much as ideological ones. But the aggressive effort to distinguish a virtu- ous middle from the snobs and the rabble contributed to splitting the white vote along ideological lines. In turn, increased ideological coherence created an incentive for each party to bundle positions on racial issues with hot-button "cultural issues" such as wel- fare, abortion, and gay marriage. This contributed to a partisan realignment that made the base of each party more ideologically consistent and more antago- nistic to the other party's ideology, paving the way for an increasingly polarized public susceptible to cultural wars." (Olson, 2008) (!!!) "To make this argument, I assemble the recent liter- ature on polarization, partisan realignment, and the rise of the Republican Party to review the four most common explanations for political polarization: val- ues, institutions, class, and race.1 I argue that none sufficiently considers how changes in white identity might have influenced polarization. I then explain how whiteness has been transformed from a form of social standing to a norm and how this created ressen- timent.2 From there, I explain how ressentiment enabled political polarization. Through an interpreta- tion of the speeches of Vice President Spiro Agnew, I show how President Nixon's team avoided overtly racist discourse yet still evoked the deep ressentiment felt by many whites at the loss of their racial standing by constructing a narrative of a "forgotten majority" squeezed between an elite of "impudent snobs" from above and a "constant carnival" of criminals and cam- pus radicals from below. The purpose of constructing this virtuous middle was to split the white vote into two camps, (racial) liberals and (racial) conservatives, and to mobilize ressentiment to bring a majority of whites into the latter camp. Finally, through a critique of Morris Fiorina's (2006) Culture War? I show how the transformation of whiteness is part of the geneal- ogy of the culture wars. Thus, the influence of white- ness on American politics continues to be felt even as the value of its "wages" declines." (Olson, 2008) (!!!!) {NOTE: Decline in the wages of whiteness has lead to a whole different politics of whiteness predicating on appealing to this sense of decreased predominance} "Second, I show that changes in the nature of white identity have been an important yet largely unacknowledged cause of polar- ization and culture war. Previous literature has shown that race was key to the recent rise of the Republican Party and that this realignment has led to polarization. I go further to suggest that changes in white identity cre- ated this opportunity for the GOP" (Olson, 2008) "I argue that the source of polarization was racial conflict at the grass roots between ordinary whites and African Americans. Republican elites then mobilized the white ressentiment that this struggle produced. Thus, as Lowndes (2008) argued, the rise of the GOP was not due to a "white backlash," which presumes an automatic, almost natural white reaction to civil rights pressures. Nor was it due entirely to elite manipula- tions. Rather, it was due to a successful political strat- egy by GOP elites, which turned the raw material of ressentiment into a Republican realignment." (Olson, 2008) "I do not wish to imply that the transformation of whiteness is the sole cause of polarization. Never- theless, it is an important factor that the polarization literature has failed to fully attend to. Finally, then, my argument supports King and Smith's (2005) claim that racial orders and struggles over them have been central to American political development, even in areas in which their influence might not be readily apparent. Thus, "the question of what role race may be playing should always be part of political science inquiries"" (Olson, 2008)

EXTRA - Einhorn, Robin. "Slavery and the Politics of Taxation in the Early United States." Studies in American Political Development 14 (Fall, 2000): 156-83.

"This article will examine a more direct impact of slavery on the political institutions of the early republic. By looking at taxation, and particularly at efforts to create a national tax policy, it will demonstrate slavery's role in shaping the most striking characteristic of the American state until the twentieth century: its relative weakness at the national level." (Einhorn, 157) "Nevertheless, James Sterling Young's account of political life in Washington, DC, in the early republic retains its power as an illustration of the weakness of the federal government. Lonely congressmen, who were huddled in crowded boardinghouses when they were not getting lost in the surrounding woods and swamps, felt their powerlessness acutely. London and Paris were nothing like this, and federal officials did not need appalled British and French diplomats to inform them of the difference. They could taunt the diplomats, as Thomas Jefferson did by greeting the British ambassador in slovenly "heelless slippers," but they could not pretend that they exerted great power over the nation they ostensibly governed." (Einhorn, 157) "While Britain and France both had slavery in their colonies (and thus could not claim moral superiority), it would seem significant that only the United States had a large population of slaveholders and slaves in the era that was, after all, the heyday of state building in Europe." (Einhorn, 158) "The ideological interpretation has dominated the historiography of the Revolution and early republic since the 1970s almost completely. It has neglected the concrete politics of institution building by filtering ever ything through the lens of countr y party republicanism. However strongly the Jensen and Bailyn "schools" differ from one another, they have collaborated in writing slaver y out of the histor y of the early American state.15 While the Jensen interpretation attributed the weakness of the federal government to the triumph of the agrarian democrats, especially in 1800, the Bailyn school attributes it to a consensual fear of the "power" that threatens "liberty" in the ideology of country party republicanism. Neither has had much to say about the impact of slaver y on American politics." (Einhorn, 158) "On July 30, 1776, Congress was discussing how to apportion tax burdens among the colonies, operating on the assumption that population offered the best proxy variable for the wealth of each colony. This immediately raised the question of whether to count slaves, the issue that ultimately would be "settled" by the Constitution's three-fifths clause. Thomas Lynch hit the ceiling on behalf of his South Carolina constituents: "If it is debated, whether their Slaves are their Prop- erty, there is an End of the Confederation."17 It was indeed the end of the Confederation for over a year. By the time discussion resumed in the fall of 1777, the tax issue had been recast, though it is not clear by whom. Under the Articles as they were adopted by Congress in 1777 and ratified by the states in 1781, taxes would be apportioned to the states according to real estate value. This was a wildly unworkable approach to taxation - imagine a national assessment of real estate during the war - but it had the important advantage of avoiding further debate about the composition of a taxable population. The tax clause of the Articles of Confederation was a more elegant strategy for preventing the production of discourse than the deliberate silence of the New York delegates on religion, but its result was the same. In the interest of unity, a divisive and troubling issue was "kept out of Sight."" (Einhorn, 159) "The argument of this article is that national tax debates always raised the issue of slavery. However much politicians wanted to avoid it, they could not have a serious discussion about the economy without addressing slavery. The tax clause of the Articles of Confederation was the most extreme example of a phenomenon that would be repeated many times over. The mere mention of slavery could cripple the American state at the national level, in this case by creating a tax apportionment rule that was impossible to implement - only a few states had the capacity to supply Congress with population totals, much less comprehensive data on real estate values.20 More- over, slavery's importance in the South and marginality in the North made it difficult to design a national tax system that could be accepted in both sections as an equitable reflection of "ability to pay," the dominant economic standard for gauging the fairness of tax systems since at least the eighteenth century. Adam Smith's analyses of the economic incidence and political effects of various forms of taxation were cited in U.S. debates, as were those of the French physiocrats; but European theory was misleading in the American context because it assumed a uniform political economy of free labor. Taxes had a different economic impact in a slave-labor economy than in a free-labor economy. Historians of the tax debates of the early republic always note that local economic variation posed a practical problem in the background of tax politics at the national level. If we move this problem from background to foreground, examining it on a suspicion that "local economic variation" was mainly a euphemism for slavery, a different solution emerges to the problem of the weakness of the early American state.23 It was almost impossible to design a tax structure for a nation that was, as Abraham Lincoln would put it, "half slave and half free." Even if it had been possible to have calm national discussions about how to tax an economy in which slavery was an alarmingly divisive institution (which it was not), the problem of designing the taxes remained. The result was an "exceptionally" weak national government, regardless of how this result fit into or was justified by abstract statements of ideology." (Einhorn, 159-60) (!!!) "Still, this institutional solution is not the whole story. Even though the practical problems of designing and debating about a national tax structure were immense - and insuperable during the Revolutionary War - they might have been solved after the adoption of the Constitution if the politicians of the early republic had wanted to solve them. Slavery's impact on American political institutions, in other words, was mediated through politics and, specifically, through the partisan politics of the conflicts between Federalists and Jeffersonians. These politicians were fully aware of the different ways that particular taxes would affect taxpayers in the North and the South. They were sophisticated about the economic incidence of taxation in their dual economy. They used this information to partisan advantage in national tax debates and, as everyone knows, the Jeffersonians won. This article concludes, therefore, with reflections on the meaning of that political victory." (Einhorn, 160) "Finally, these debates demonstrate the centrality of slavery to the design of a national tax system. From the 1776 attempt to draft Articles of Confederation to the end of the Federalist era, slavery intruded into every effort to create a tax system at the national level. This should not be surprising. Slavery was a major institution in the American political economy. However much politicians wanted to avoid discussing slavery in the interest of unity, serious thinking about the economy could not evade it. Whether they were analyzing the incidence of consumption taxes, applying a labor theory of value to the problem of tax apportionments, or sorting the implications of the three-fifths clause into partisan programs for direct taxes, politicians in the early republic had to figure slavery into their calculations. Neither Adam Smith nor the English country party ideologists could help here. There were no relevant European precedents for handling a crucial socioeconomic institution that made even its most ardent defenders uncomfortable. The political problems slavery raised were unique to the United States. Tax debates are often contentious, since they distribute concrete costs among groups who defend their direct economic interests. That is the stuff of politics. But when the interests included an institution as totally indefensible as slavery in a polity holding "truths to be self-evident," normal interest-group conflict could give way to paralysis. There is a paradox here for the history of early U.S. state-building. In the interest of political unification, it was absolutely essential to downplay slavery. Had Thomas Lynch bolted in 1776, the United States might have been dead within weeks of its creation. The three-fifths clause was a "great compromise" in part because its linguistic formula - "three fifths of all other persons" - accommodated slavery without naming it. But this state-building success was difficult to extend to the visible taxation of American wealth. European direct taxes were weakened by elite power and entrenched privilege. In the United States, the problem was not taxing elites, but naming their assets in the first place. Unless there is a powerful (thus, expensive) navy to protect commerce, a strong state requires an internal tax base. Whiskey and carriages could never become more than token revenue engines. Anything else elicited the dangerous politics of slavery." (!!!!) (Einhorn, 182-3)

EXTRA - Lipset, George. The Possessive Investment of Whiteness. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006.

"This book argues that public policy and private prejudice work together to create a 'possessive investment in whiteness' that is responsible for the racialized hierarchies in our society. I use the term possessive investment both literally and figuratively. Whiteness has a cash value: it accounts for advantages that come to individiuals through profits made from housing secured in discriminatory markets, through the unequal education opportunities available to children of different races, through insider networks that channel employment opportunities to the relatives and friends of those who have profited most from present and past racial discrimination, and especially through intergenerational transfers of inherited wealth that pass on the spoils of discrimination to succeeding generations. I argue that white Americans are encouraged to invest in whiteness, to remain true to an identity that provides them with resources, power, and opportunity. This whiteness is, of course, a delusion, a scientific and cultural fiction that like all racial identities has no valid foundation in biology or anthropology. Whiteness is, however, a social fact, an identity created and continued with all-too-real consequences for the distribution of wealth, prestige, and opportunity." (Lipset, 2006) "The term investment denotes time spent on a given end, and this book also attempts to explore how social and cultural forces encourage white people to expend time and energy on the creation and re-creation of whiteness. Despite the intense and frequent disavowal that whiteness means anything at all to those so designated, recent surveys have shown repeatedly that nearly every social choice that white people make about where they live, what schools their children attend, what careers they pursue, and what policies they endorse is shaped by considerations of race. I use the adjective possessive to stress the relationship between whiteness and asset accumulation in our society, to connect attitudes and interests, to demonstrate that white supremacy is usually less a matter of direct, referential, and snarling contempt and more a system of protecting the privileges of whites by denying communities of color opportunities for asset accumulation and upward mobility. Whiteness is invested in, like property, but it is also a means of accumulating property and keeping it from others. While one can possess one's investments, one can also be possessed by them. I contend that the artificial construction of whiteness almost always comes to possess white people themselves unless they develop antiracist identities, unless they disinvest and divest themselves of their investments in white supremacy." (Lipset, 2006) "White supremacy is an equal opportunity employer; nonwhite people can become active agents of white supremacy as well as passive participants in its hierarchies and rewards. One way of becoming an insider is by participating in the exclusion of other outsiders. An individual might even secure a seat on the Supreme Court on this basis. On the other hand, if not every white supremacist is white, it follows that not all white people have to become complicit with white supremacy - that there is an element of choice in all of this. White people always have the option of becoming antiracist, although not enough have done so." (Lipset, 2006) (!!!) "By generating an ever-repeating cycle of 'moral panics' about the family, crime, welfare, race, and terrorism, neoconservatives produce a perpetual state of anxiety that obscures the actual failures of conservatism as economic and social policy, while promoting demands for even more draconian measures of a similar nature for the future. The racism of contemporary conservatism plays a vital role in building a counter subversive consensus because it disguises the social disintegration brought about by neoconservatism itself as the fault of 'inferior' social groups, and because it builds a sense of righteous indignation among its constituents that enables them to believe that the selfish and self-interested politics they pursue are actually part of a moral crusade." (Lipset, 2006) "Because they are ignorant of even the recent history of hte possessive investment in whiteness - generated initially by slavery and segregation, immigrant exclusion and Native American policy, consquest and colonialism, but augmented more recently by liveral and conservative social policies as well - white americans produce largley cultural explanations for structural social problems. The increased possessive investment in whiteness generated by disinvestment in U.S. cities, factories, and schools since the 1970s disguises as racial problems the general social problems posed by deindustrialization, economic restructuring and neoconservative attacks on the welfare state and the social wage. It fuels a discourse that demonizes people of color for being victimized by these changes, while hiding the privileges of whiteness. It often attributes the economic advantages enjoyed by whites to their family values, faith, and foresight - rather than to the favoritism they enjoy through the possessive investment in whiteness." (Lipset, 2006) "It is my contention that the stark contrast between nonwhite experiences and white opinions during the past two decades cannot be attributed solely to individual ignorance or intolerance, but stems instead from liberal individualism's inability to describe adequately the collective dimensions of our experience. As long as we define social life as the sum total of conscious and deliberative individual activities, we will be able to discern as racist only individual manifestations of personal prejudice and hostility. Systemic, collective, and coordinated group behavior consequently drops out of sight. Collective exercises of power that relentlessly channel rewards, resources, and opportunities from one group to another will not appear 'racist' from this perspective, because they rarely announce their intention to discriminate against individuals. Yet they nonetheless give racial identities their sinister social meaning by giving people from different races vastly different life chances." (Lipset, 2006) "Group interests are not monolithic, and aggregate figures can obscure serious differences within racial groups. All whites do not benefit from the possessive investment in whiteness in precisely the same ways; the experiences of members of minority groups are not interchangeable. But the possessive investment in whiteness always affects individual and collective life chances and opportunities. Even in cases where minority groups secure political and economic power through collective mobilization, the terms and conditions of their collectivity and the logic of group solidarity are always influenced and intensified by the absolute value of whiteness in U.S. politics, economics, and culture." (Lipset, 2006)

W4 - Koslowski, Rey. "Selective Migration Policy Models and Changing Realities of Implementation." International Migration 52, no. 3 (2014): 26-39. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12136.

- Selective migration models have spread as states increasingly try to attract high-skill migrants. They can be divided into three ideal types: (1) the Canadian 'human capital' model with the government selecting permanent migrants with a point system that focuses on human capital, (2) the Australian 'no-corporatist' model based on government selection using point system with extensive business and labor participation in outlining needed skill sets, and (3) the market-oriented and demand-driven model based primarily on employer selection of migrants seen in the U.S. - More and more so, each of these governments have been borrowing aspects of migration policy from each other, leading to a blending of these policy models. - "In a UN survey of member states to which 158 governments replied, 27 per cent indicated that they have policies to increase high-skilled immigration; and among more developed countries, the percentage was much higher at 47 per cent (UN, 2010). This trend toward selective migration policies is increasingly being framed in terms of national economic competitiveness and described as a "battle for the brains"" - Selective migration can either be explicit - with the government setting annual targets as in Canada and Australia - or implicit - with the government allowing for a certain number of employer-sponsored visas, as in the US - Australia's export heavy market and constrained position in global markets makes labor input on migration more important - US migration policy evolved much more slowly and piecemeal than Canadian policy - In the US, corporations and labor aren't 'brought to the table' as in Australia, but instead compete in the political arena to shape government policy in favor of their agendas - These groups have long been separated into 'supply' and 'demand' categories - with the supply systems in Australia and Canada having immigrants initiate the process and the 'demand' system in the US having businesses initiate it - but this papers over the differences between Australia and Canada and overlap between all three approaches - No one system is clearly better at attracting high-skilled migrants, since all three succeeded in different ways and data is limited - These are ideal type models and each country frequently diverges from them in implementation - Canada has moved more towards a US/Australia model with a focus on employment and occupation matching over recent years, while Australia has moved more towards the US model, meanwhile the US has changed relatively little because of gridlock over immigration policy - "In terms of permanent immigration over the past few years, Canadian and Australian immigration authorities have effectively shaped flows in order that the majority (usually above 60 per cent) entered on the basis of their education, employment and skills instead of family reunification, whereas 12 to 15 per cent of US immigrants acquire permanent residence with employer sponsor- ship. Nevertheless, in absolute numbers, the US still admits over twice as many permanent immi- grants as Canada and Australia combined and even admitted more employment-based permanent immigrants than either Canada or Australia until 2009." - In the OECD, foreign born migrants with tertiary education make up 29% of all migrants. Many skilled migrants struggle to find jobs that utilize their skills

W1 - Bail, Christopher A. "The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries Against Immigrants in Europe." American Sociological Review 73, no. 1 (2008): 37-59. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240807300103.

- The conceptual distinctions (or 'symbolic boundaries') used by majority groups to construct notions of us and them vary significantly between nations - this article analyses how different countries contract these boundaries using data from 21 European countries in 2003, showing that publicly created symbolic boundaries don't correspond with official integration policies (France, Germany, and the UK have different policies but very similar boundaries) - The rise of immigration in Europe has increased the salience of symbolic boundaries and the impact of their variation across different countries, which can be quite distinct, as the UK's multiculturalism and Germany's focus on heritage emphasize - Too much research has focused on Western Europe while ignoring the formation of immigration boundaries in Eastern Europe - Symbolic boundaries can be defined as 'conceptual distinctions made by social actors that separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and groups membership' - in comparison, social boundaries are 'objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources and social opportunities' - This article focuses on symbolic boundaries, which form the basis for social ones - Symbolic boundaries exist across a variety of axes of identity, and thus when one form of boundary fades, another can rise to compensate (like religion replacing race with the race of anti-racist sentiments) - Thus, the evolution and policing of symbolic boundaries helps to protect majority groups in flexible ways - There are four major axes of differentiation between different country's interactions between migrants and citizens: (1) the sources and timing of migration [with migration booming most after WWII, then slowing in the 1970s as it shifted to family reunification, and increasing within Europe with the fall of the Soviet Union and rise of the EU], (2) the size and origin of the immigrant group and their position in the labor market [with some states having massive migrant populations, like Luxembord, and others having tiny ones, like Poland], (3) citizenship and civic inclusion policies [with differences between jus soli countries like France and jus sanguinis (blood based) countries like Germany] , and (4) philosophies of integration [with different countries taking very different approaches, as seen in France's republicanism model focused on assimilation and Britain's multicultural model focused on pluralism] - In Western and Northern Europe - "Given the widespread stigmatization of racism in Western Europe, religion has become a primary focus of the boundary-work literature in this region (Zolberg and Long 1999). For example, Goldberg (2006:349) argues that World War II created a "shift in Europe's dom- inant fixation of concern and resentment from the figure of 'the black' ... to that of 'the Muslim.'" - with this being especially pronounced in secular nations like France or with politicized Muslin enclaves like Britain - Assimilation is a growing (if variant) demand of Western and Northern Europe, in line with a growing 'civic' focus of immigration criteria on an international level - Southern Europe has abruptly transitioned from emigration to immigration recently, making symbolic boundaries more unstable (and broadly more tolerant, on racial issues at least, if not religious ones) - Meanwhile, increased unemployment increases the stress created by increased migration - Racism and xenophobia is highest in Eastern Europe, although immigration is low - The sample for this study are 'native' and non-minority residents of 21 European countries and are asked to assess how important different factors are for someone being eligible to come and live in the country - Language and culture are consistently ranked highest, race lowest (perhaps because norms on anti-racism are so strong) - The fuzzy analysis in this article identifies three sets of symbolic boundaries: Set A, with stronger racial and religious boundaries, slightly stronger occupational boundaries, weaker cultural and linguistic ones, and slightly weaker educational boundaries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Finland, Poland, Ireland, Czech Republic); Set B, with stronger linguistic and cultural boundaries, slightly stronger educational ones, weaker religious and racial boundaries, and slightly weaker occupational ones (Britain, France, Austria, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg); and Set C, with weaker boundaries across the board (Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden). - Thus, Set A (strong race and religion focus) are Southern and Eastern Countries primarily, one the periphery of Europe, Set B are the Central Western European Countries, and Set C is Scandinavian - Set A seems to have consistently lower levels of immigration than Set B or C, but Set A has much higher increases in immigration after 1998. Meanwhile, Set B countries had very high migration in the past and it has become more normalized, with exlusions based on 'merit' and individual level considerations but shying away from racial or religious ones (with the latter a guise for the former)

W1 - Wimmer, Andreas. "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory." American Journal of Sociology 113, no. 4 (January 2008): 970-1022. https://doi.org/10.1086/522803.

Constructivism views ethnicity as a social process that is made and remade depending on circumstance as opposed to something fixed and clearly defined But little has been done to explain why ethnicity presents itself in both of these forms, and many others. This article first makes a systematic description of the wide variety of ethnic constellation along four dimensions of variations: the political salience of the ethnic boundaries, the exclusivity of ethnic lines, the cultural differentiation between groups, and the stability of ethnic identity over time. Second, this article offers a new theory to explain ethnic group formation that explains these variant outcomes via a model focused on negotiations between actors shaped by their social field There are four steps to this new model of ethnic formation. First, the author inventories the possible strategies of ethnic boundary making. Second, they discuss the three characteristics of social fields that determine these choices: (1) the institutional framework (especially the nation-state) determines which types of boundaries (ethnic, social, class, gender, etc.) can be meaningfully drawn; (2) the position in the hierarchy of power define the interests that lead to the choice of different strategies; (3) the structure of an actor's political alliances determines who will be included in their ethnic category. The third step explores how the ensuing classificatory and political struggles over different categories eventually leads to consensus. The fourth step shows how the nature of this consensus explains ethnic salience, social closure, cultural differentiation, and historical stability. Weber defined ethnicity as the subjective sense of belonging based on a belief in shared culture and common ancestry. The U.S. often defines race as a distinct and grander character than ethnicity, in spite of the definition not applying well elsewhere The four dimensions of ethnic variation: political salience (how much political alliances fall along ethnic lines and how prominently one's ethnic identity influences one's political context); social closure (how closed offa group is to outsiders vs. fluid and accepting); the level of cultural variation (which can reinforce ethnicity when the boundaries are more secure and decrease it when more similar); and stability (the degree of longevity for certain ethnic markers, which will vary depending on how membership is transmitted [via inheritance or via association or via activities]) There are five strategies used for ethnic boundary making: Expansion (making new boundaries by expanding those included); contraction (making boundaries by restricting those included); inversion (challenging existing boundaries by challenging existing hierarchies); boundary blurring (undermining and/or overcoming ethnic division by emphasizing cross-cutting social cleavages); repositioning (crossing boundaries by changing their membership) The modern political form of the nation state uniquely encourages promoting ethnic unity compared to empires, and it incentivizes minorities to emphasize ethnicity in the name of self-determination or, at a minimum, increased recognition The degree of ethnic political salience, social closure, cultural distinction, and historical stability will depend on the amount of power inequality and the degree of consensus between groups. More complete consensus leads to less politically salient boundaries, higher power inequalities lead to higher levels of social closure, and higher levels of political salience and social closure will in turn lead to more cultural differentiation (and vice versa for all of these factors - less inequality = more blurring, cultural overlap, and social mixing, all of which lead to less historical stability) There are three ways change can be introduced into these dynamics: (1) institutions, power balances, or allegiances could change (exogenous shifts); (2) these characteristics could shift because of the strategies of the actors (endogenous shifts); (3) new strategies diffuse into a social field and are adopted by certain actors (exogenous drift)

W4 - Peters, Margaret E. "Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration in the Era of Globalization." World Politics 67, no. 1 (January 2015): 114-54. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887114000331.

Explanations of immigration restrictions that focus on prejudice have a hard time explaining changes in policy over time while those focused on fiscal costs fail to explain restrictions prior to the rise of the welfare state - Any number of explanations including those focused on unions and on immigrants lobbying fall short because they fail to account for the essential role of trade and trade's impact on the political behavior of firms - over time, most states with open trade have had closed migration policies and vice versa This is because trade policy effects the political choices of firms in labor-scarce states - when trade is limited for these states, wages will rise without immigration, leading firms to advocate for low-skill immigration. But when trade is open these businesses see depressed prices and often close, leading to decreased advocacy for immigration and increased access to labor because of those laid off in closures, leading firms to advocate for policy change less and for politicians to restrict immigration to appeal to immigration averse or resistant constituents This theory is tested using data from 19 countries with varying trade policies between 1983 and 2010, which shows a strong link between trade and immigration policy with the 19th century a period of open immigration and closed trade and the 20th century (especially post-WWII) being one of open trade and limited immigration This paper focuses on low-skill migration and labor-scarce states because this makes up the majority of migration to the most desirable locations and because low=skill migration is more affected by trade policy and is more politically polarizing Opposition to immigration should increase overall over time as increased technological gains and productivity gains obviate the need for low-skill labor in closed-trade societies and decrease the odds of closure in open-trade societies Further, high levels of trade openness lead to higher costs in subsidies and more extreme immigration openness to keep firms open because of increased competitiveness, which makes the cost to politicians of trying to keep firms afloat higher and decreases their willingness to do so, especially facing high public backlash There is a long history - going back to at least Alexander Hamilton - of politicians recognizing the tradeoff between tariffs and immigration - the decision politicians make in these contexts depends on the political capital of export-oriented vs import-competing firms The data set for this article includes settler states (US/UK/Canada), European liberal dems (France/Germany), export-oriented industrializers (Japan/South Korea) and rentier states (Kuwait) States have many different ways of limiting and attracting migrants, a fact that makes coding for these different policies difficult Historical trends show an overall movement towards increased trade and increased immigration regulation over the past two centuries across the board The data shows little support for the idea that the ethnic homogeneity of the liberal democratic states of Europe made them more restrictionist than settler states In the 1800s, trade restrictions were one of the few ways government could consistently generate revenue and immigration policy was comparatively open The interwar period was an exception of little trade and little immigration because of the lack of growth and high unemployment caused by depression Since 1950, however, the economy has grown increasingly open while immigration has gotten increasingly regulated - in the data, trade is statistically significantly related to immigration for all years, a fact that decreases the odds of other factors causing the relationship because of the political, cultural, and governmental variation over that time There is no relationship between level of restriction and regime type - a surprise since democratic theory says increased democracy should increase immigration restrictions The trends hold when controlling for other interest groups' efforts like native labor, taxpayers, nativists, and immigrants Right wing parties have historically been more pro-immigration than left wing one - in part because of the anti-immigration views of unions Increased immigration tends to lead to a political backlash and increased restrictions in the post-Bretton Woods era

W8 - Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta. Race for Profit: How Banks and the Real Estate Industry Undermined Black Homeownership. Justice, Power, and Politics. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2019. (Chapter 4)

HUD relied on public providers and real estate agents to provide low income housing to tens of thousands, in spite of the fact that their discriminatory practices had been the basis for much early segregation and that their laws were still based on the discrimination against and exploitation of Black homeowners The FHA had long discriminated in its support for affordable housing, not just via redlining, but also through sales to primarily white owners - but when the FHA was subsumed under HUD under Romney, efforts at increasing black homeownership were seen as an attractive alternative to building new public housing, which proved increasingly difficult - Thus, new impetus was put on enabling black homeownership and making black home buyers attractive customers in national real estate markets HUD was driven to a strategy of holding finance the purchase of old homes, instead of building new ones by high land and construction prices, the urgent demand for increased housing in cities, the resistance to low-income housing in suburbs, and by increased lobbying in the housing industry The result was the government increasing investment in financing poor housing which did much to increase profits for the industry and did little to aid black homeowners as very poor quality houses were now being subsidized for sale by the government - Even when congress began to investigate this problem, Romney blamed buyers for the issues and defended HUD Poverty made many of these new hombuyers especially vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation - They were frequently only shown poor quality housing at marked up prices because of the deep ties between the housing industry and discrimination against black communitites Real estate speculators capitalized on the program to sell unlivable houses at market prices to first time buyers, with FHA appraisers doing little to hold real-estate agents to account for using housing as a means of extracting profit from poor communities This represented a form of 'predatory inclusion' with black families welcomed into real estate markets on highly unfavorable terms What's more, the process of appraisement carried out for the program relied directly on subjective measures of buyer and neighborhood quality that were highly racialized and were done with an assumption of urban decline which meant defaults in housing were often overlooked and where appraisers often befriended real-estate agents Appraisals were also based on 'comparables' which were the very high prices set by speculative sales in the same neighborhood The program relied on 'fee appraisers' who had set quotas for appraisals making them prone to rushed and poor work - meanwhile many of the hired fee appraisers were also employed by real estate firms, creating a strong incentive for increased prices The low quality of FHA loans meant they were managed by mortgage banks, which had an incentive to foreclose on new sales as quickly as possible HUD-FHA was also infused with racist attitudes and outlooks within its bureacracy from the start - leading to huge short comings in its operation and implementation and a general acceptance of discriminatory practices and private sector exploitation

EXTRA - Shayo, Moses. "A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution." The American Political Science Review 103, no. 2 (2009): 147-174. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409090194.

Higher levels of national pride correspond to lower levels of redistribution in most advanced democracies People have many identities and chose which to focus on, which determines their social actions in a way that affects the social environment and what identities they chose - A social identity equilibrium is steady where (1) individual behavior is consistent with an individuals' identity, (2) social identities are consistent with the social environment, (3) the social environment is determined by the behavior of individuals Social identity is determined by preferences, which are determined by (1) relative group status (the affective factor), and (2) relative similarity with group members (the cognitive factor) Group identity leads members to follow the prescribed behavior of their group and sacrifice material payoffs for increased relative status (in-group altruism) This model looks at class and national identity to assess redistributive preference - If income redistribution increases the status of the poor more than national status, class will be the key identity and redistribution will be promoted which will further increase class identity - in contrast, when low-income people identify more with the nation than their class, redistribution will matter less to them, which is again self-reinforcing The nation will be prioritized over class when commonality with fellow nationals is high and there is a decreased sense commonality with other lower-class members Exogenous factors also matter since increased international stature can increase levels of national pride, and since increased inequality can decrease the status of the lower classes This model helps explain why the poor are almost universally more nationalistic, why increased nationalism decreases support for redistribution, and why redistiributive support is low in the US The social groups in this model are classed as the poor (P), the rich (R), and the nation (N), all affected by perceived distance and group status - belonging to a group means caring about the relative status of that group and carrying a cognitive cost which increases with distance from them When group behavior promotes a rejection of redistribution, the imperatives of group compliance can compel deviations from self-interest This model assumes the level of redistribution is determined by the poor because they represent the voting majority Theis models assumes status is measured by material payoffs, which will decrease nationally with more redistribution (this seems questionable) The factors that determine whether a high-redistribution or low-redistribution equilibrium exists are: (1) the salience of national attributes compared to class ones, (2) the level of exogenous sources of national status, (3) the levels of exogenous sources of poor-class status - This model predicts that as similarity in the working class decreases, so does redistribution Between countries, levels of redistribution vary with remarkable consistency with the levels of national pride (this holds with controls for ethnic divisions).

W8 - Tilly, Charles. Durable Inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. (CHAPTER 2)

Many forms of individual relations that seem like one-offs actually have deeply relational elements to them - as seen with the subtle social distinctions which separate a tip from a bribe Society is constantly structured by different forms of social relation, which then multiply upon themselves to create long chains and networks of interaction/connectivity which also compound with each other Social structures are important and thus are only kept together by 'social shims' like self-corrections, clarifications, and mutual aid Social transactions will be easier or harder depending on (1) the degree of localized common knowledge that the participants share, (2) the extent of scripting for such translations that is already available - all four of the mechanisms that help preserve durable inequality (exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation, and adaption) operate through combination of scripting and local knowledge When scripting and local knowledge are low, shallow improvisation or avoidance occurs, when both are high it leads to intense ritual, when scripting is high but knowledge is low it leads to thin ritual, and when knowledge is high but scripting low it leads to deep improvisation Scripts promote uniformity and knowledge promotes flexibility and combined they allow for strategic/limited flexibility via routine interaction which is in the middle of both axes Categorical inequality routinely call on routines, understandings, and justifications acquired from other settings for organizational work Together, scripts and knowledge lower the transaction costs of activities, meaning shifting them is highly costly - This makes for social relational path dependencies in certain contexts - Hierarchies and norms of interaction become woven into numerous social contexts and then become self-reinforcing by generating beliefs about the legitimacy of the boundaries and differences between actors Organizations form around the monopolization of resources and people join to gain access to those monopolies Organizations are only successful when they can accomplish three things: (1) capturing valuable resources, (2) lowering transaction costs via bounded networks, (3) forming cross-boundary ties to sites which can provide opportunities / assets to realize gains from those resources In this context, having a clear boundary of membership has significant advantages for resource-holders - organizations thus create extreme forms of categorical inequality with clear boundaries between ins and outs and limits to resource access Categories are used to help establish boundaries between different groups and are created via invention, borrowing or network encounters These boundaries are then reinforced through stories that explain their existence and build solidarity, as well as competitive interactions with others Such boundaries are the basis of understanding durable inequality as the product of exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation and adaptation Although some categories have very strong boundaries maintained by stigma, most allow some flexibility and variation to decrease the costs of maintenance These categories are rarely explicitly thought out and manufactured and instead form via social interactions and borrowing - but once formed they rely on the growth of common knowledge and behavioral regularities to generate relational scripts that cement boundaries and allow for the creation of social myths which attribute hard, durable, and even genetic reality to the categories - leading to real social consequences Boundaries related to categories thus help create sense of internal solidarity and connectedness which when combined with hierarchies can create durable inequality, since resources are unevenly distributed and the relatively impermeable barrier decreases the likelihood of equalizing relations and such asymmetric interactions justify the boundary and render it more visible - This inequality seems natural so long as inconsistencies (like having privileged members of the inferior group) do not arise - such inconsistencies make violent mobilizations more likely The boundary between groups in and of itself contains knowledge, limits mobility and affords leverage to group members - this allows what seems to be individual-to-individual inequality to result from categorically organized differences

W4 - Boucher, Anna, and Justin Gest. Crossroads: Comparative Immigration Regimes in a World of Demographic Change. Cambridge Core. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316416631.

Migration was largely unregulated for much of history - but as nation state have arisen and diverged, developed ones have increasingly had to manage migration - a need complicated by the post-WWII human rights framework - How countries address the rights, needs, and expectations of migrants helps distinguish different immigration regimes There have been 2 dominant models of migration schemes: (1) a liberal model supported by authors like Joppke, which arose after the end of the Cold War and fueled optimism about immigration and naturalization based on ideas of globalization, the rise of the internet, and a sense of convergence in global governance on an open and liberal model whereby migrants gain equal and permanent incorporation into nations; (2) a market model, which saw migration as both a market opportunity capable of exploitation and a potential threat to national identity and sovereignty - this view stems in part from gulf states exploiting migrants as guest workers with few residency rights or protections (the Kafala system) and views of migrants as economic resources to be managed An immigration regime is defined as the migration policies and outcomes with collectively reflect the admission and settlement of foreign born people - including both state policies and the outcome of those policies and generated by regulatory processes and powerful interests This book creates a taxonomy of these regimes based on 2011 data for the OECD and beyond - it identifies seven regime types: (1) neoliberal regimes (UK, Canada, and many other former settler states), which have high levels of temporary migration, strong labor admissions, and high naturalization rates, (2) humanitarian regimes (US, Finland) which have sustained and significant migration flows under diverse visa types and high rates of naturalization, (3) Extra-union regimes (France/Italy) which have moderate levels of EU migration, diverse admissions, and low naturalization; (4) intra-union (Germany/Holland) which have high EU migration but limits to other migrant flows or citizenship, (5) Kafala regimes (Kuwait/Oman) which have high temporary labor flows but limited citizenship, (6) Quasi-Kafala Regimes (China/Russia_ which are economically focused like Kafala Regimes but with much lower migration flows, (7) constrained regimes (Brazil/Japan) which feature low migration flows, little economic focus, and little naturalization Overall, settler migration schemes have decrease and levels of temporary, labor based migration have increased across the board - a trend which reflects continued need for labor but also domestic and xenophobic backlashes - Countries increasingly want the economic benefits of migrations without the risks of democratic or societal transformation, leading to decreased naturalization and more transitional migration There is no one narrative that explains this shift to a market model, but three key factors are: (1) the greater adoption of neoliberal economic models which increasingly permeate systems of governance, economics, and migration, (2) increased xenophobia and protectionism in politics, (3) rhetorical links between immigration and terrorism by politicians Previous classifications of migration schemes have been limited by a focus just on the West, unclear classificatory factors, and an inability to account for the relationship between admissions and citizenship policies as opposed to just one or the other - shortcomings this study makes up for This book focuses on three primary categories of immigration policy outcome: (1) visa-mix, which has long been a tool of regulating the quality and origin of migrants, (2) temporary ratio, (3) naturalization ratio The total share of foreign born people in the world has remained roughly constant over the past 100 years in a stalemate between easier migration and more regulation For most of history there were no clear regulations on migration, especially in settler states - this changed in the late 19th and early 20th century when many countries (beginning with the US) began to regulate incomes based on Eugenics and race - a trend which lasted until the 1960s and 1970s when Civil Rights and human rights movements made them unviable Stronger economies tend to attract more migrants from a range of local countries, while worker ones attract less and more dispersed migrants The 1990s saw the rise of liberal migration in the west, while decolonization and pan-urbanism brought about market migration in the gulf There are a number of factors which feasibly could help explain variations in migration regimes: colonial legacies, population aging, natural resource wealth, economic freedom, welfare state generosity, and the political ideology of the ruling government Colonial history (and shared cultural origins), levels of economic freedom (to a degree), generosity of welfare (for neoliberal and intra-union states) all have some explanatory power But no one of these theories has strong explanatory power - instead, an integrated and segmented theory is needed to explain variations in regimes A crucial factor is the relationship between admissions and naturalization, with four trends: (1) increased flows lead to decreased naturalization because of resource strains, (2) high levels of free movement = moderate naturalization because of ease of exit and entry, (3) increased humanitarian and family flows increases naturalization because the interest in staying is high, (4) high economic migration and high naturalization happens in states focused on skilled migrants There are three key logics states balance in building migration regimes: (1) economic needs, (2) humanitarian obligations, (3) perceived public aversion - this helps explain the rise of the market model with increased neoliberalism, increased xenophobia and backlash to globaliziation, and increased fear of terrorism The market model will also likely be self-reinforcing as decreases in permanent migration decrease the political influence of migrants Visa controls, naturalization rates, and temporary ratios serve as ways of regulating the gender and ethnicity of migrants in non-explicit terms

W4 - Goodman, Sara Wallace. "Integration Requirements for Integration's Sake? Identifying, Categorising and Comparing Civic Integration Policies." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, no. 5 (May 2010): 753-72. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691831003764300.

More and more countries are implementing civic integration requirements for migrants - this paper asks why and examines variation between cases What distinguishes civic integration from other migration models like assimilation or exclusion is the focus on economic and political integration combined with a commitment to the characteristics typifying national citizenship like country knowledge, language, proficiency and liberal values Countries are not just increasingly embracing civic integration for naturalizing migrants, but for all types of residency as well The issue of civic integration extends to both immigrant integration (performance and equality) and to citizenship (membership and status) contexts, an important distinction Civic integration provides another venue through which states can shape their citizenship policy, since it adds teh question of what conditions are needed to gain citizenship to the more simple analytical question of who can apply to begin with - Thus, analyzing a state's citizenship strategy requires accounting for both barriers to naturalization (which can be thick or thin) and barriers to access (liberal or restrictive) This paper provides analysis on state strategies to integration though a new dataset (CIVIX) Overall, with variation between country, there has been an overwhelming movement towards more civic integration policies Looking at both citizenship access (liberalness) and membership content (civic integration), the different settlement regimes in Europe can be split into four parts: (1) prohibitive regimes, with little citizenship access and high expectations on membership content (Germany, Austria, Denmark), (2) Insular regimes, with little citizenship access but low expectations on membership content (Greece, Spain, Italy), (3) Enabling regimes, with high citizenship access and low expectation on membership content (Portugal, Ireland, Sweden), and (4) conditional regimes with high citizenship access and high expectations on membership content (UK, France, Holland) A key lesson learned from these cases is that civic integration is mainly a strategic and symbolic tool for limiting access to citizenship in countries with open borders or preserving a sense of insularity in those with closed ones - it plays little corrective-functional role in either case - It still plays a role in closing the symbolic gap between settlers and citizens which arose in Europe after WWII though by making clear definitions of citizenship residents can aspire to But civic integration also helps to limit new immigration without seeming like the country is harsh to migrants and without making it clear they are targeting migrants based on ethnicity for higher citizenship and civic integration requirements - Thus, civic integration allows the facade of liberalism with the reality of anti-racism The rise of civic integration thus represents a continued resistance to migration and diversity throughout Europe

W7 - Joppke, Christian. Neoliberal Nationalism: Immigration and the Rise of the Populist Right. Cambridge Core. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108696968. (CHAPTER 1)

Nationalism has frequently been depicted as a thin-centered ideology often divided between a more accepting civic version and a more elastic ethnic one - Under this view, more positive forms of nationalism try to shape the nation while more dangerous ones try to protect a shaped nation -0 This conflict between boundary maintenance and nation building has only increased with the rise of globalization and neoliberalism leading to a nationalism-neoliberalism nexus Neoliberal nationalism is aimed at attacking cosmopolitan elites and migrants seen as profiting from globalization - but it is also often dressed in the prestige of the state which seems to act out sovereignty and national protections in the wake of decreased control due to globalization Defining the membership of the state has always been an inherently political task at the heart of the modern nation After WWII, however, this right of limitation for states was severely curtailed and a new more liberal regime of migration put in place The new neoliberal nationalism is an attempt to reclaim the right of limitation from these liberal norms - it is a product of the neoliberal restructuring of the western state since the 1980s, and is both reactive and oppositional to neoliberalism in that it tries to reinstate limits on free movement and national control and complementary to neoliberalism as it adopts the language of personal responsibility and rejection of welfare Thus, the neoliberal-nationalism nexus is a dialectic, which both impacting the other while simultaneously evolving Whereas liberalism and neoliberalism both focus on protecting and promoting individual freedoms, liberalism relies on separation and walls to do so, while neoliberalism focuses on the market and its ensuant freedom to do so, denouncing the capacity of rule governed societies Neoliberalism sees inequality as an unintended market outcome which can therefore not be seen as unjust and in need of rectification - indeed pursuing material equality is seen a undermining equality before the law, since both can't coexist - Meaning government intervention to help people is an evil Neoliberalism is in constant conflict with the state because it both refutes the utility and purpose of the state while requiring its existence as all markets do - The neoliberal critique of the state as elitist, bloated, corrupt, and self-aggrandizing closely mirrors the language of populism but with a focus on the markets not the people Indeed, modern neoliberalism is increasingly not just an economic but a political ideology, which seeks to import market standard onto citizens through a punitive paternalism aimed at the bottom and focused on self-responsibility (especially in the racialized context of the US) Neoliberalism has consistently been opposed to democracy, which is seen as a Trojan Horse of mass politics threatening free markets - neoliberalism instead promotes a competition oriented state focused on the mere provision of laws and procedures for market actors to follow with open trade and non-discrimination This combination of openness and non-discrimination makes neoliberalism anti-national But neoliberalism is also a cultural rationality that is deeply transformative, creating an all-dominating culture of individualism and economically framed thinking - this thinking has permeated the government and rule of law too by making both see their job as increasing growth and efficiency and decreasing barriers to both and has permeated culture with a focus on competition and production as the main avenues of human interaction, putting a focus on personal responsibility Neoliberalism's rise and globalization put an end to the growth of the social welfare state which had propelled equalizing growth after the end of WWII - this shift from social democracy to neoliberalism was kick-started by the 1973 oil crisis, with states becoming more and more subservient to markets instead of vice versa This led to a decrease in democracy as the fiscal basis for the modern state was lost to the demands of the globalized market, with taxes replaced by debt and with states at the whim of private credit ratings and mobile capital as their tax rates plummet, while austerity also limits social programs This has partially resulted in a cartelization of political parties, which increasingly represent the state and lack fixed constituencies in the individualized world, all of which can lead to a combination of a technocratic state and populist politics on the right and elitist/meritocratic parties which economize everything on the left, which increase attacks on welfare provisions and makes them reliant on the logic of deservedness, not neediness Globalization has massively increased the wealth gap in the west while decreasing the global wealth gap because of the mobility of capital Since neoliberalism has focused on the opening of borders and trade, nationalism is a natural response to it, one increasingly expressed via populism, meaning populists increasingly see themselves as opposed to neoliberalism and multiculturalism (and vice versa) This work defines populism, not as a thin-centered ideology, but as a political style, which makes it a matter of degree and not kind and something that any politician can use or slip in and out of Populism and technocracy are closely allied and equally illiberal in that both try to undermine governance by parties as mediators, populism via the people and general will and technocracy via reason and expertise Populism is not just a vertical axis of the people vs elites but a horizontal one of people vs others, which is what makes it a frequent bedfellow of nationalism - the thing that differentiates right and left wing populism is the strength of this horizontal axis, something which helps explain the cultural instead of economic predominance of the modern right. Most evidence points to the right being fueled by a sense of cultural and social decline The radical right today is opposed to neoliberalism (instead embracing welfare chauvinism) and embraces a niche electoral strategy focused on nativism and protecting past privileges and ethnopluralism which embraces more diversity than racism but is still highly exclusionary and focused on group / national membership and the protection of the majority group and its culture (which is increasingly associated with civilization / culture in opposition to immigration) This civilizational self-protection narrative sometimes leads the far-right to embrace the guise of liberal ideas in order to discriminate against Muslims, who purportedly reject those ideals The Republican Party in the US has been pushed far right by the Tea Party and Trumpism and a growing levels of polarization, which is being promoted by the sense of cultural and political abandonment captured by Hochschild The radical right's main effect has been in moving its issues and narratives fueled by the rhetoric of populism into the mainstream, moving both the right and left further to the right Beyond populism, there are also statist manifestations of the new nationalism which exist under a compensating and constitutive logic, with a compensatory logic using nationalism to compensate for the decrease in sovereignty caused by neoliberalism while with a constitutive logic nationalism is an element of the neoliberal order itself and borrows elements from it Compensatory nationalism is performance oriented and often intertangled with populism - it is the theatrical performance of sovereignty Constitutive nationalism sees the nation and state as essential for preserving the order needed for the free market, in the name of a protection of family and nation - free market logics are used to help preserve old hierarchies and avoid change as disruptive, while some diversity is allowed, but mostly at the top through a cosmopolitan multiculturalism and where personal responsibility ethics both help protect the markets and hierarchies from intervention via protective paternalism which preserves an us vs. them of the 'lazy-bums' vs. the hard working nation The radical right is now the new form of working class party throughout much of Europe There is a paradox in that the growing interconnectedness of the developed world in good and capital corresponds to increased restrictions on immigration The primary field of modern nationalism - which is increasingly performative in light of globalization - is membership policy

EXTRA - Cas Mudde and Critobal Rovira Kaltwasser, "Populism," in The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, ed. Michael Freeden and Marc Sears, 493-512 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Populism can be defined as a 'thin-centered ideology' which focuses on a distinction between 'the pure people' and a 'corrupt elite,' and advocates for the protection of popular sovereignty at all costs. Historically, the literature has identified three types of populism: (1) agrarian populism, seen in Russian and the U.S. at the turn of the nineteenth century, (2) socio-economic populism, which is seen in Latin America in the mid-twentieth century, (3) xenophobic populism, which is seen in Europe in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. Populism is best defined as an 'ideational approach to politics.' - Populism is a 'thin-centered' ideology pitting the people versus elites and promoting the expression of the general will. It is thin-centered because it severs itself from wide ideational contexts and "offers neither complex nor comprehensive answers to the political questions that societies generate" - thus, populism attaches itself to, and is assimilated into, other 'ideological families.' "This means that populism can take very different shapes, which are contingent on the ways in which the core concepts of populism—the people, the elite, and the general will—appear to be related to other concepts, forming interpretative paths that might be more or less appealing for different societies." (498) This means that populism rarely exists in a 'pure' form, but instead is always manifesting itself in combinations with other concepts that allow it to better survive. The negative pole of populism can be either elitism (which sees society and divided between elites and the masses and believes the elites and inherently more fit to rule) or pluralism (which views society as highly diverse and with overlapping views and belief systems, and believes good politics works to compromise and find consensus from these myriad views). All ideologies have core and peripheral concepts to them. Populism has three core concepts (1) the people - a very vague term that can refer to the people as sovereign (a base for political power), the common people (a unified and noble mass with coherent values and traditions), and the people as a nation (which captures the unique founding myths and cultures of whole political communities that set them apart from others, usually with a distinction between those who belong to this community, and those who do not). (2) the elites - elites are morally distinguished from the people in populism, since they are corrupt and the people are pure. The elites are usually defined on the basis of power, they are usually defined as an economic class with 'special interests,' and they are often defined in a national sense that distinguishes them from the people not just morally but ethnically. (3) the general will - this is where populists gain their legitimacy: from the pure, ultimate, and incontestable authority of the people within a democracy, which gives such leaders an unimpeachable sense of legitimacy and places any threat to populism as a threat to democracy itself. This lends itself to the promotion of measures of direct democracy like plebiscite and referendums. This idea of the general will also creates an image of a cohesive mass of people, which stigmatizes any views or groups that fits outside of this 'general will.' Populism can be combined in various ways with democracy, nationalism, and gender. (1) Democracy - populism relies on democratic legitimacy to support itself, by promoting a supposedly suppressed general will. Thus, populism is usually essentially democratic but opposed to liberal nationalism since it opposes any limits on the will of the people, whether these limits come from existing laws or in the name of protecting minorities. (2) Nationalism - populism can be but need not be linked with nationalism, although the recently nativist populism of Europe is especially nationalist in nature. (3) Gender - populism is often machismo in nature and is often supported primarily by men.

W1 - Fields, Barabara Jeanne. "Slavery, Race, and Ideology in the United States of America." New Left Review 181, (1990): 95-118.

Race is an ideology in the United States that still structures much of society - it provides the map through which the terrain of daily social life is navigated. This ideology was largely a result of the efforts by America's founders and settlers to reconcile the idea of political equality with the system of slavery, a reality itself stemming from the different treatment of European immigrants (who came voluntarily and brought with them established concepts of rights, which gave them a 'residuum of power,' and who had fixed terms of labor) and African immigrants (who came involuntarily and lacked the historical protections of Europeans, and had indefinite terms of labor). This ideology took a while to develop however, and was only enshrined once it was clearly incentivised by the economics of labor, the resistance of subjugation by European servants, their ability to resettle and establish independent economic lives in the lands of the west, and consequently established systems of law and custom that helped protect white rights in opposition to black rights (a legal edifice in part erected in response to Bacon's rebellion). All of this led to the construction of race as a result of economic incentives, creating an ideological road map for the navigation of daily life and privileges, which then became assumed as a natural part of the social world This ideology became the necessary supplement to the exercise of force over Black Americans in the United States because it forces racial subjugation into a subject of routine, constantly enforced and reinforced through daily actions that reenact the hierarchies it purports are natural and just. "Race explained why some people could rightly be denied what others took for granted: namely, liberty, supposedly a self-evident gift of nature's God. But there was nothing to explain until most people could, in fact, take liberty for granted—as the indentured servants and disfranchised freedmen of colonial America could not." (114) - Thus the creation of strong established political rights and the growth of the political community in the U.S. was the root cause of the creation of racial identity there "And ideology is impossible for anyone to analyze rationally who remains trapped on its terrain. That is why race still proves so hard for historians to deal with historically, rather than in terms of metaphysics, religion or socio- (that is, pseudo-) biology." (100) "People are more readily perceived as inferior by nature when they are already seen as oppressed. Africans and their descendants might be, to the eye of the English, heathen in religion, outlandish in nationality, and weird in appearance. But that did not add up to an ideology of racial inferiority until a further historical ingredient got stirred into the mixture: the incorporation of Africans and their descendants into a polity and society in which they lacked rights that others not only took for granted, but claimed as a matter of self-evident natural law." (106) Ideologies reflect lived realities and protected by power and routine "If race lives on today, it can do so only because we continue to create and re-create it in our social life, continue to verify it, and thus continue to need a social vocabulary that will allow us to make sense, not of what our ancestors did then, but of what we ourselves choose to do now." (118)

W3 - Mongia, Radhika Viyas. Indian Migration and Empire: A Colonial Genealogy of the Modern State. Durham: Duke University Press, 2018.

The current system of states controlling the international movement of people seems unremarkable today - This books explores the historical processes that led to the creation of that norm, with a special focus on the colonial genealogy of the modern state By looking at Indian migration from the British empire, this work traces the global shift from empire-states to nation-states - with the use of migrant labor to compensate for the abolition of British slavery inspiring the creation of new mechanisms of state control for the movement of free people - leading to a large bureaucratic logic of facilitation But this initial control of indentured labor then extended to migrants writ large when Indians began to move to white settler colonies at the beginning of the 20th century, part of these efforts was the rise of the passport as a means of controlling migration via racialized nationality The formation of colonial migration regulations was dependent upon, accompanied by, and generative of profound changes in the understanding of the modern state through the creation of technologies of control which endured and came to embody and express the transformation of the state - a view which challenges traditional interpretations of the modern nation state stemming more simply from Euro-America Methodologies which focus on the nation inherently underplay how the national arose from a non-national, cross-state, and trans-colonial process The process whereby migration was nationalized, in part through its effect on forming the identities of receiving nations, was highly heterogeneous and inconsistent - Under this view, the state is an unstable and historically changing entity. It's a view which undermines the idea of migratory control as a constant of the role and powers of the state - a reality captured by the struggles of the British state to legitimize control of Indian indentured migration Indeed, much of the modern apparatus of migration controls arose from historically contingent ad-hoc policies that became normalized over time The distinction between free and coerced migration leads to an implicit endorsement of statism by accepting the state's terms on who is free There has been a historical distinction between the modern state (constituted with equal and equivalent citizens) and the colonial state (predicated on stratification and differentiation) - But this view ignores the overlap and fuzzy boundaries that divide the metropolitan state from its colonial counterpart, with policies and approaches from both bleeding into the other through a relational process with colonial states often being crucial to defining metropolitan ones This focus on the importance of colonial migrations in shaping normative understandings of the state is captured in the term: the colonial genealogy of the state, with the state being formed around many haphazard and historically contingent responses to crisis that then congeal into stolid institutions and ideologies When looking at the rise of regulations on indentured labor, this books advances two key arguments - first, because this labor was meant to replace slave labor, early regulations of it focused on creating contract law which distinguished it as free and non-enslaved, a moment which was key in establishing the idea of consent as an essential element of freedom. Second, this process led to a major expansion in the scope of the legitimate state in regulating free migration which was predicated on a view of the 'necessary ignorance' of the colonial subject These changes proved essential in redefining the scope of state authority and sovereignty as it related to migration and free labor Building on these initial relations, a massive disciplinary bureaucracy arose as a way of regulating trans-continental improvements in a form that goes beyond the sovereign power expressed by the contracting process While the demand for labor lead to a logic of facilitation, whereby the state aided in transporting migrants to plantations through contracts, the 20th century brought with it increased racial anxieties and facilitated a logic of constraint, whereby migration streams were divided and segregated by race, leading to whole new modes of regulation based on racialized nationalities and religion, with the use of marriage and passports as tools in these regulatory battles These processes allowed migration to become central to the production of nationality and affirmed the state's monopoly over migration controls This account puts the abolition of slavery and its effect on migration at the forefront of modern understandings of contracts and freedom - making concepts of the modern state which ignore the formation of migration and slavery woefully incomplete

EXTRA - Beckert, Sven. Empire of Cotton: A Global History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014.

The expansion into Native lands also allowed cotton production to boom, helping the early US economy immensely - "In the late eighteenth century, Native Americans still controlled substantial territories only a few hundred miles inland from the coastal provinces, yet they were unable to stop the white settler's steady encroachment. The settlers eventually won a bloody and centuries-long war, succeeding in turning the land of Native Americans into land that was legally 'empty.' This was a land whose social structures had been catastrophically weakened or eliminated, a land without most of its people and thus without the entanglements of history. In terms of unencumbered land, the South had no rival in the cotton-growing world. With the support of southern politicians, the federal government aggressively secured new territories by acquiring land from foreign powers and from forced cessions by Native Americans... All of these acquisitions contained lands superbly suited for cotton agriculture. Indeed, by 1850, 67 percent of U.S. cotton grew on land that had not been part of the United States half a century earlier... That territorial expansion, the 'great land rush' as geographer John C. Weaver has called this moment more broadly was tightly linked to the territorial ambitions of planting, manufacturing, and finance capitalists. Cotton planters constantly pushed the boundaries, seeking fresh lands to grow cotton, often moving ahead of the federal government... To make the land useful to planters, the newly consolidated territory needed to be removed from the control of its native inhabitants." (Pg. 105-107) The need to control slaves led to huge political power in the south "The insatiable demand of cotton planters dominated the politics of the new nation, not just because of their reliance on the state to secure and empty new land, but also because of their need for coerced labor... While brutal coercion weighed like a nightmare upon millions of American slaves, the potential end of such violence was a nightmare to those who gathered the fabulous profits of the empire of cotton. To make such a nightmare less likely, planters in the United States also drew on the third advantage that turned them into the world's leading cotton growers: political power. Southern slaveholders had enshrined the basis of their power into the Constitution with its three-fifths clause. A whole series of slaveholding presidents, Supreme Court judges, and strong representation in both houses of Congress guaranteed seemingly never-ending political support for the institution of slavery. Such power on the national level was enabled and also supplemented by the absence of competing elites in the slaveholding states themselves, and the enormous power slaveholders enjoyed over state governments. These state governments, in the end, also allowed North American cotton planters to amplify their good fortune of navigable rivers near their plantations by building railroads deeper and deeper into the hinterland." (pg. 108-11) The US economy was built off of slavery - "Cotton so dominated the US economy that cotton production statistics 'became an increasingly vital unit in assessing the American economy.' It was on the back of cotton and thus on the backs of slaves, that the US economy ascended in the world." (119) The link between manufacturing in the US and slavery - "This move of American merchant capital into manufacturing marked another tight connection between slavery and industry. Early cotton industrialists such as Cabot, Brown, and Lowell families all had ties to the slave trade, the West Indian provision trade, and the trade in agricultural commodities grown by slaves. The 'lords of the lash' and the 'lords of the loom' were, yet again, tightly linked." (147) The link between the US economy's success and cotton - "The industry that brought great wealth to European manufacturers and merchants and bleak employment to hundreds of thousands of mill workers, had also catapulted the United States onto center stage of the world economy, building 'the most successful agricultural industry in the States of America which has ever been contemplated or realized.' Cotton exports alone put the United States on the world economic map. On the eve of the Civil War, raw cotton constituted 61 percent of the value of all U.S. products shipped abroad... The reason for America's quick ascent to market dominance was simple. The United States more than any other country had elastic supplies of the three crucial ingredients that went into the production of raw cotton: labor, land, and credit... Slavery enabled the stunning advances of industry, and the accompanying profit" (243)

W5 - Joppke, Christian. "Transformation of Immigrant Integration: Civic Integration and Antidiscrimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany." World Politics 59, no. 2 (2007): 243-273. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2007.0022.

The typical classification of European immigration systems as multicultural (The Netherlands), Assimilationist (France), or segregationist (Germany) is a flawed one. Instead, immigration policy throughout Europe has been evolving in response to a new elite-support for immigration and Europeanization. There has been a convergence on immigration policies across Holland, France, and Germany across issues of civic integration and antidiscrimination policies. Since the 1990s, there has been an ideational embrace of new immigrants in Europe, combined with an institutional shift to immigration being managed by Europe instead of the nation-state. This means there is a European level embrace of migration contrasting with a state-level distaste over it This embrace of immigration is in part driven by the demographic decline facing Europe Europeanization is aiding this embrace of immigration both through new legal framework for the settlement of immigrants and through a process of cultural standardization' across the continent This new dynamic on immigration is captured via two policies - civic integration and antidiscrimination, which, while complementary in some regards, also function under contesting logics. Civic integration treats migrants as individuals responsible for their own assimilation, whereas anti-discrimination depicts them as members of socially victimized groups. Civic integration kicks off the immigration process and discards group identity and anti-discrimination closes off the immigration process and embraces group identity This reflects a two-way logic of integration whereby migrants must first change and then their receiving societies must change in turn. This fits within a view of liberalism with a heavy focus on duties instead of rights The Netherlands has focused heavily on civic integration with the use of 'integration tests' - this focus on integration has then been used as a guise to limiting immigration all together France has followed Holland's lead in increasingly promoting integration efforts for migrants and the requirement of proof of such integration for immigrants to get visas, much like in Holland. Germany similarly adopted a slightly less stringent version of the dutch focus on forced integration Anti-discrimination policy, in turn, aims at those who are 'no longer immigrants' but who are still held back by discrimination Anti-discrimination policy was spearheaded by the European Race Directive, which is based on U.S. civil rights law The Dutch embraced these policies fairly easily, but saw strong resistance to affirmative action efforts France embraced anti-discrimination laws while integrating them into a state that explicitly refuses to recognize race Germany lacks any cultural drive or demand for anti-discimrination and there was widespread and successful resistance to anti-discrimination laws Efforts at integrating and repressing migrants aren't racist or nationalist, but fit within the logic of liberalism, with illiberal means being used to assure the liberal goals of social integration, progress, and decreasing the costs of welfare This is realized in the European policy of 'social-inclusion,' which forces migrants to integrate into society, with no focus on equality between groups but only on decreasing the harms to the states - Anti-discrimination laws only coexist with forced integration There is thus a paradox between the oppressive 'negative liberty' of forced integration and equality of the 'positive liberty' of anti-discrimination laws

EXTRA - Darity, William A., Darrick Hamilton, and James B. Stewart. "A Tour de Force in Understanding Intergroup Inequality: An Introduction to Stratification Economics." The Review of Black Political Economy 42, no. 1-2 (2015): 1-6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12114-014-9201-2.

This article details a special edition of the Review of Black Political Economy focused on stratification economics, which examines the competitive and sometimes collaborative interplay between members of social groups animated by their collective self-interest to attain/maintain their relative group position within social hierarchies. It thus expands the boundaries of economic analyses on intergroup differences Economic measures of inequality and social welfare all too often exclude considerations of group disparities Stratification economics sees discrimination as reational as opposed to much of economics, which sees it as a market failure - it is instead viewed as a function of promoting relative group position. Stratification economics also helps correct for the over emphasis on individual optimization and under-emphasis on group optimization in traditional economics

W7 - Mutz, Diana C. "Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, PNAS Plus, 115, no. 19 (2018): E4330-E4339. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1718155115.

This article uses a representative longitudinal sample of US voters (panel data) from 2012 to 2016 to test a number of hypotheses about the Trump vote - the First hypothesis is the 'left-behind' one, which focuses on decreased economic opportunity and stagnation for the working class. The second hypothesis is that of status threat caused by a decrease in the power of whites, Christians, and men, and a sense of global decline for the United States which made the appeal of a candidate promising a protection of past hierarchies much strong The evidence shows little support for a pocketbook explanation for voting and instead shows a strong link between Trump support and a sense of anxiety among high status groups (as opposed to complains about past treatment by low status groups) These trends are most convincingly explained by increased racial diversity and decreased demographic dominance and globalizations, which has led whites to feel under siege This evidence provides support for people's preferences changing between 2012 and 2016, not just issue salience within the parties There is generally little evidence of voters using personal economic status (and not sociotropic measures) as the basis for voting decisions The state of the economic - which was trending upwards and in recovery in 2016 - also adds doubt to the hardship thesis Dominant group status threat makes the status quo and existing hierarchies more appealing and the defense of in-group norms more important This sense of threat can be explained by Zero-Sum narratives both in relation to US diversity and an increasingly globalized US economy - the two views are deeply tied to each other because of the implicit ties between America and whiteness While increased diversity and globalization have been convincingly tied to status threats, immigration itself so far hasn't been Racial threat is likely triggered by Obama and a sense of increasing power by minorities (as opposed to prejudice against them) Party loyalty was still very high in the 2016 election in spite of the election's supposedly non-traditional nature Concerns about open trade and preservation of the status quo made Republicans closer to the mean voter than Democrats There is almost no evidence of economic considerations driving 2016 based on the data, while change in status indicators were highly predictive - importantly, it was only those whose sense of status threat increased, not those with already high status threat, who voted for trump more This led republican candidates to be much closer to mean voters - meaning party realignment also played some role The single most important variable for vote change was the issue of trade, followed by China's threat Trump support is also significantly impacted by a sense that the American way of life is threatened and that high status groups - like men, Christians, and whites are discriminated against - These effects cancel out any effect from immigration There is no sign of the causes of increased status threat abating in the US any time soon, meaning populism will only continue to increase

W7 - Gillion, Daniel Q. Governing with Words: The Political Dialogue on Race, Public Policy, and Inequality in America. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

This book looks at the role politicians' remarks can play in shaping public policies and societal attitudes and what the social and political implications are of the government moving towards a more race-blind rhetoric - The book argues that race-conscious dialogues in government are more than just symbolic or inconsequential and can actually influence institutional and societal norms Race-conscious speech has consistently changed policy agendas in the US by initiating political dialogue and both race and class conscious policy solutions Thus, not only do federal politicians making racially aware statements lead to an increase in public policies that address race, but they also lead to a sense of increased representation for non-white communities and can change individual life-style behaviors The conflict on this topics is created by the fact that the majority of the American public disapproves of politicians highlighting race and that the dominant political ideology in the US has been one focused on colorblind language lately in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement which has lead politicians to see a de-emphasis on race as essential to building coalitions or as a tool of maintaining the status quo The result is a political rhetoric which largely ignores the continuing reality of racism and inequality and policy solutions to it This book thus focuses on discursive governance, arguing rhetoric acts as an impetus for political and cultural change on inequality in the US This happens through a deliberative form of democracy where the dialogue of politics helps set the political agenda and is received and acted upon by the public and thus which can be mirrored in the public sphere through a shift in norms and understandings Race conscious rhetoric works on two levels - (1) it changes the policy agenda by initiating dialogue and producing inequality addressing policies, and (2) it increases the salience of governing messages addressing minority communities Distaste for rhetoric on race limits public engagement on it since it is politically costly for presidents to address the issue Evidence shows congresspeople are more successful in passing racially progressive regulations when they use race-conscious language Republicans often use the rhetoric of race-consciousness while voting against it - an example of representation incongruence Rhetoric on race not only reshapes political agendas and policy debates but impacts the politics and non-political aspects of racial and ethnic communities who are attuned to this federal dialogue Race has been black-boxed today in that the success of the Civil Rights Movement makes any modern focus on race seem like a digression to old ways The discursive governance model argues rhetoric on race influences institutions (through policy coalitions / networks and agenda setting) and society (through citizen perceptions of politicians and by informing cultural attitudes and behavior) - Thus, race-conscious rhetoric can be influential just via increased awareness of US inequality Social acknowledgment of race is key because dialogues of color-blindness can disguise and normalize relationships of privilege and subordination

EXTRA - Bobo, Lawrence D. "Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations." Journal of Social Issues 55, no. 3 (1999): 445-472. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00127.

This article works to elaborate on and build upon Blumer's group position theory of prejudice, adding empirical support Blumer's theory of group position is particularly useful in that it combined the sociological with the psychological - it defines prejudice as more than just negative stereotypes/feelings but a commitment to the relative status positions of groups - this model worked to move explanations for prejudice away from mechanisms that work within the individual Blumer argued racial prejudice stemmed from dominant groups working to maintain their standing vis-a-vis an out-group, which was expressed via four features in the dominant group outlook: (a) a feeling of group superiority, (b) a sense of outgroup differentiation and alien-ness, (c) a sense of proprietary claim over certain rights, statuses, and resources, and (d) a sense of threat from members of the subordinate group who want an increased share of the dominant group prerogatives Parts (c) and (d) are especially key to creating prejudice and recreating it through resource hoarding and a fear of threats to these resources and privileges and the status position they convey Three points of Blumer's model have been particularly overlooked in trying to support it: (1) that racial cleavages are fundamental to shaping human social organizations and are quasi-autonomous social forces which fundamentally affect and exist independent of other forces and cleavages, like the economic order - These orders are socially constructed, however, and can be challenged politically when the power of low-status groups increases without an immediate response by high-status groups (whether it is because the change in power is slow and opaque or a sudden change in the interests or needs of outside parties in relation to the status order) (2) Blumer argued that racial attachments based on group position have key non-rational and socio-emotional elements - racial divisions are not inherently natural or rational - Thus, purely objective.instrumental readings of blumer are misplaced and overlook both how much a sense of group position is normative, a sense of what 'ought to be' instead of 'what is', and the way racial prejudice functioned both along the axis of domination/oppression and exclusion/inclusion, with the former being material and the latter more emotional. All of this shows that considerations of group status should not be reduced to simple measures of risk or position, but emotion too, which means policy and economic changes to racial orders will only go part way to effectively changing the factors motivating prejudice (3) Blumer thought that once a set of racial inequalities had been institutionalized there was a meaningful interest that attached to such group positions in a racially stratified social order - Collective group interests are thus essential to maintaining prejudice, as they become attached to proprietary claims to goods and services and opportunity structures and represented by interest groups - This closely corresponds with a mixing of prejudice with realistic group conflict theory and its focus on groups in an unequal social order with interests in the order, a sense of threat to it and thus struggle over it The baseline model of group competition from Blumer has been affirmed by increasing evidence of zero-sum thinking and fear of others 'getting ahead' by disadvantaged whites Feelings of group threat have been found to have a clear effect on policy preferences too, including leading to an increase in anti-immigration views The decrease in overt white racial prejudice between 1940 and 1980 can be interpreted within the Blumer framework as a shift from overt racism to laissez-faire racism, with over prejudice decreasing but racial inequities and status differences/beliefs remaining, while racial inequities are increasingly placed on personal.communal failings of Black communities instead of overt references to their race and still include strong resistance to policy change This shift represents the repositioning of group based prejudice due to a change in economic and political power dynamics, with whites responding to the threat of an emergent black middle class and political class with an adaptation of racial hierarchies and thinking

EXTRA - Tajfel, Henri, and John Turner. "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." In The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, 33-47. Monterey: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1979.

This chapter aims to present a theory of - and support for - intergroup conflict, which builds on the work on individual-level prejudice This theory has close parallels to Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RCT), which stems from Sharif's boys camp experiments and which focuses on objective rewards as a driver of intergroup conflict and group identity - But this theory places more emphasis on the formation of group identity beyond incentives for rewards This model is built on the theoretical distinction between interpersonal (interactions between two people unaffected by group standing) and intergroup (interactions fully determined by one's group standing) behavior - These are extreme ideal points and not real forms of behavior but proximate real interactions (interpersonal being an interaction between husband and wife, intergroup between two opposing soldiers) - The key questions is what drives behavior in accord with one set of identities (groups) over another (personal) with the key answer being that increased levels of intergroup conflict lead to an increased focus on intergroup relations (prioritizing the South or North over friendship in the Civil War, for example). But this is only part of the explanation, since ingroup affiliation and group identity emerges even in contexts of little shared history, minimal affiliation, high levels of anonymity, and low rewards (Tajfel, 1970) Another key factors is a person's place on the continuum between 'social mobility,' with a focus on personal flexibility and permeable group membership (often through upward mobility) and on the other end of the spectrum, 'social change,' which a focus on social stratification and immobility, as seen with caste systems and fixed inequities). When situations are perceived as stratified, it will increase intergroup behavior both for the winners and losers of that stratification - This is because these contexts help from the belief that groups are fixed and group members will interact with others as a member of that group, not as individuals Belief in the level of stratification in a social system need not directly correlate with actual stratification, although they are often related The less an individual feels they can more between groups, the more they will think as a group and in zero-sum terms In terms of behavior, therefore, the more the members of a group are towards the 'social change' end of the continuum, the more unified they will be in their response to outgroups and the more unified they are, the more homogenizing they will be of outgroups, ignoring their interpersonal variation The same holds true in reverse with groups that are high on social mobility being less unified and thus less homogenizing of outgroups This model thus explains intergroup relations via a focus on socially shared systems of beliefs Thus, "wherever social stratification is based upon an unequal division of scarce resources - such as power, prestige, or wealth - between social groups, the social situation should be characterized by pervasive ethno-centrism and outgroup antagonism between over- and under-privileged groups." But this process is complicated by greater understandings of social status which lead low status groups to internalize their inferiority and self-associate less and increase positive assessments of outgroups which contradicts RCT This phenomenon is not by any means permanent however, and the period between 1950 and 1970 saw low status groups in the US increasingly embrace group identity, which shows that changes in intergroup relations can happen without an increase in deprivation, again a rebuke of RCT - This theory would argue that social-structural differences that are well institutionalized and legitimized will decrease outgroup antagonism by low status groups, while questioned divisions will increase outgroup divisions When existing stratifications are questioned by outgroups, "the dominant group may react... either by doing everything possible to maintain and justify the status quo or by attempting to find and create new differentiations in its favor, or both." There is strong experimental evidence that ingroup bias is remarkably omnipresent in intergroup relations, even with los stakes and that group members will act with an eye towards maximizing differences between groups over maximizing group gains - This happens even with very minimal levels of group alignment Social groups can be defined as collections of individuals who perceive themselves as members of a category, are emotionally invested in that category, and have some consensus about the evaluation of the group and its members Social categories based on these groups help to systematize the world and place oneself within society - they give individuals social identities Since people care about self esteem and that is tied to their group identity, if people belong to low-status groups they will either try to leave or to advance their group. Thus, desire for positive self-evaluations via group membership drive ingroup / outgroup competition and differentiation This relies on ingroup internalization, a social situation facilitating comparison, and a relevant outgroup - With these conditions, groups will strive for superiority over outgroups and will inevitably compete with one another and seek comparative group gains (often at the cost of the self as affirmed experimentally) Thus, this model doesn't see status as a scarce commodity like power or wealth but the outcome of intergroup comparisons and competition - For low-status groups in a high social mobility context, this will often result in flight from the group to increase personal status even if your original group status doesn't increase Low-status members may also seek increased status through direct competition with outgroups with the aim of reversing the relative positions of the in and out groups (this requires group cohesion and limited capacity for mobility, along with a limited capacity for social creativity to decrease pressures for change by decreasing resentment over a low-status position) Thus, competition with the outgroup will be fostered when the subordinate group identity is strong and the dominant group is maintained as the point of comparison Status positions are secure when stratification is accepted and fixed and insecure when it is questioned - increase insecurity will increase group identity and competition - low-mobility and low-legitimacy of hierarchies leads to high odds of resistance by low-status groups and increased discrimination by high-status ones

W1 - Brattain, Michelle. "Race, Racism, and Antiracism: UNESCO and the Politics of Presenting Science to the Postwar Public." The American Historical Review 112, no. 5 (December 1, 2007): 1386-1413. https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.112.5.1386.

After WWII, UNESCO was created with the idea that presenting science to the public could undo racist ideologies, but the project was quickly mired by a lack of agreement amongst scientists and a continued belief in the scientific validity of racial distinctions. Indeed, the revised UNESCO Report reputed scientific racism but affirmed race as a natural distinction and highlighted the differences in intelligence scores between 'civilized' and 'non-literate' societies UNESCO shows the politically fraught nature of not just understandings of racism, but of anti-racism too, which is just as defined by contingent social and political concerns and opportunities An often overlooked topic in the study of race is the evolution of race concepts and how that interacts with the expression of racism. The UNESCO project is a good example of the errors with just criticizing past conceptions of race. The project, while rejecting the Nazi conception of race, still presumed race as a natural category and requested evidence to disprove its existence, which made it very difficult to reasses the concept as a construct and legitimized category of human variation. This had the unintended consequence of legitimizing the concept of racism under the guise of antiracism and thus creating an even more resistant form of popular racism. Racism was rampant during and in the lead up to WWII and scientists were reluctant to publicly denounce it, often being complacent in the misappropriation of science to justify racism, which led to the belief after WWII that education was an effective alve to the issue of racism if not a questioning of race as a category WWII led more and more scientists to publicly question race as a scientifically meaningful category, which helped inspire UNESCO Report #1, but a significant scientific cohort favored race as a salient category, not just because of its social impact but because of a faith in its natural validity too, which helped inspire UNESCO Report #2, with 'agnostics' unsure of racial distinctions, 'pessimists' seeing the term as still useful, and 'enablers' arguing it embodied racial genetic differences. The Post-WWII era saw the rise of antiracism movements with a new sense of unity based on shared oppression via states fixated on race - a movement which occurred both within the U.S. and the U.N. more broadly. The Cold War stymied the more international side of the movement by embroiling it in the Soviet-U.S. conflict which saw international racial cooperation as a threat The hesitancy to abandon the category of race, even in the name of antiracism, can be seen in the backlash to UNESCO #1 The effort to use genetics as a salve for racism proved elusive as many geneticists continued to adhere to beliefs in group heritable traits and thus consensus on the issue was elusive. This is in part because the null hypothesis here was the existence of differences. These issues of muddled messages were accentuated by geopolitical squabbling over the report and challenges in interpreting its message by the public, with some confused by it and some appropriating it for their own cause. Unsurprisingly, racism remained deeply rooted in the U.S. popular ethos. The report enabled new terms of racism in that it treated the question of genetic equality as distinct from that of equal treatment and thus seemed caught in contradiction via an attempt at antiracism framed in the paradigm of presumed racial difference When historians don't acknowledge the evolution of the idea of race they risk portraying it as an immutable category throughout history - saying race is what it was.

W4 - Joppke, Christian. Neoliberal Nationalism: Immigration and the Rise of the Populist Right. Cambridge Core. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108696968. (PART 1)

Citizenship is not a naturally liberal institution but instead one aimed at exclusion and social closure, which helps create and sustain the nation state Many have argued recently, however, that the new regime of international human rights has significantly decreased the gap in rights between citizens and non-citizens/permanent residents as the nation state has become more liberal and universalistic But this interpretation underplays the role of neoliberalism in reshaping citizenship and citizenship's nationalist dimension Instead, citizenship should be seen as moving towards a model of 'earned citizenship' whereby citizenship needs to be earned through integration - this earned citizenship still has liberal undertones and avoids overt sexism or racism, but also fits better with nationalism and neoliberalism since it becomes the immigrant's duty to convert to a sacred and bounded national ethos, with a neoliberal focus on personal responsibility and capacity that goes above and beyond what is expected of regular citizens - it thus makes citizenship a price to be won and a privilege to be earned instead of a right, a change in thinking which affirms the importance and quality of the national community This goes against the liberal conception of citizenship as a right and not an earned privilege or contract, or as Arendt put it, the right to have rights But this conception of citizenship as a right was diminished by the rise of social welfare, which made earning access to the state seem more important and by the increase in diversity of national membership which threatened to weaken the bonds of mutual membership which made the liberal model sustainable This combined into a fear of migrants taking welfare without earning it to encourage a more neoliberal conception of citizenship - one only reinforced by the rise of meritocratic thinking in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement and the creation of integration schemes for migrants as a tool of nationalism The charge that integration efforts are just racism in disguise ignores the importance of integration in 'bringing people to the level of post-industrialism' Using performance related imperatives to frame immigration is nothing new and dates back to the earliest American immigration regulations along with conditions for non-birthright citizenship, which has always been contractual to some degree - so what is new about earned citizenship? What has changed is the increased foregrounding and reinforcement of conditionality - with citizenship becoming more difficult to get, easier to lose, and less in value, with the first two arising from neoliberalism making citizenship more exclusive and the third from the rise of the global denizen The more difficult to get factor can be seen with the rise of civic integration in both Europe and the US at all stages of the immigration process - the key trends across all of these programs is an increased focus on duties and the idea that the migrant has to earn citizenship Europe is restrictive with its integration policies because most of its migration is unwanted - only states with wanted migration can be generous with the rest - this increased integrationism is also reinforced by the ideology of the neoliberal welfare state where benefits need to be earned via work (workfare)

Extra - Thomas Piketty, Capital and Ideology (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2020).

The racial divide that defined U.S. parties is increasingly seen in Europe as well with Muslim voters overwhelmingly voting for the left - "It is particularly striking to see that electoral cleavages due to identity con- flicts are today comparable in magnitude on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, the gap between the black and Latino vote for the Democratic Party and the vote of the white majority has been about 40 percentage points for the past half century; controlling for variables other than race barely changes this finding (Figs. 15.7-15.8). In France, we found that the gap between the Muslim vote and the vote of the rest of the population for parties of the left (themselves undergoing redefinition) has also been about 40 percentage points for several decades now, and controlling for other variables again has little effect.27 In both cases the cleavage defined by racial or religious identity is immense—much greater, for instance, than the gap between the vote of the top income decile and that of the bottom 90 percent, which in both France and the United States is generally on the order of ten to twenty points. In the United States we find that since the 1960s, in election after election, 90 percent or more of African American voters have voted for the Democratic Party (and barely 10 percent for the Republicans). In France, 90 percent of Muslims vote in elec- tion after election for the parties of the left (and barely 10 percent for the par- ties of the right and extreme right)." (826) The left is increasingly the party fo the highly educated in Both the U.S. and Europe, which is making the parties on the left and right just competing coalitions of elites - an educated elite (on the left) and a wealthy elite (on the right), leaving the working class behind U.S. opposition to welfare is directly tied to racial resentment. Ethnic and racial identities are far more flexible in Europe than the U.S., where the history of slavery and Jim Crow has created much more stratified ethnic identities (829)

Extra - Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth. Who Counts as an American?: The Boundaries of National Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511750717.

Quote from Jardina - "According to Theiss-Morse (2009), strong national identifiers, who are more likely to view themselves as prototypical group members, also have an incentive to establish distinct boundaries around their national group. These boundaries are more likely to be exclusive, meaning that some Americans might maintain a particular normative idea of who represents a 'true' American (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Schildkraut 2007; Wright, Citrin, and Wand 2012). Theiss-Morse differentiates between 'hard' and 'soft' boundaries when it comes to American identity. Hard boundaries, she argues, are those characteristics that people are born into or are difficult to change, like being Christian, being born in the United States, living in the United States for a long period of time, speaking English, and being white. In contrast, soft boundaries exist around qualities that are easier to adopt, like obtaining American citizenship, feeling American, and respecting the nation's laws and institutions... [Based on the research in White Identity Politics, it is shown that whites with higher levels of racial identity create harder lines around national identity] It is immediately obvious... that there is a divide in opinion between whites with low levels of racial identity and those with higher levels. For instance, a greater number of people who say that having American citizenship is extremely important to being truly American are high identifiers. The vast majority of those who say American citizenship is not at all important score low on racial identity. We can also see that white identifiers are disproportionately represented among those who think that being Christian is important to being American, and they are slightly more inclined to be among those who think that speaking English in important.... White identifiers are over-represented among those who think having American ancestry, having been born in America, and living in America for most of one's life are important for being truly American. Perhaps not surprisingly, while 'being white' is not an especially popular criterion for being American, those who think it is are more likely to identify as white." (123-5)

EXTRA - Engler, Sarah, and David Weisstanner. "The Threat of Social Decline: Income Inequality and Radical Right Support." Journal of European Public Policy 28, no. 2 (2021): 153-173. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1733636.

Rising inequality intensifies feelings of relative deprivation and signals a potential threat of social decline as the social hierarchy widens - this leads those higher in the social hierarchy to pursue populism as a means of defending social boundaries. This article uses data from 14 OECD countries over three decades to show increases in income inequality increase the likelihood of far-right support especially among those with high subjective social status and lower-middle incomes This article thus argues it's the threat of decline, not actual deprivation, that drives populism This adds to theories which focus on a sense of being left-behind as central to populism in Europe Income inequality is key for signaling not just real decline but potential decline too (relative deprivation vs. risk) - thus it is the threat of decline and decreased prestige that motivates radicalization, with the far-right providing a protection of existing social orders For those with low subjective status, increased income inequality increases racial left support and the promotion of redistribution Increased income inequality shifts the social status hierarchy in society and thus increases the gap between groups and fears of decline While income is inversely related to radical-right populist (RRP) support, there is a strong cultural focus in their platforms better understood via subjective social status, which is a conceptually distinct form of social stratification which should also negatively correlate with RRP support - Thus, subjective measures of decline are compared to objective ones here The higher one's income the greater the threat of decline but also the lower the risk - Thus, middle income groups are unique in both having a very high fear of decline and a fairly high risk of it, priming them for RRP support under the threat of social decline hypothesis (!!) Wage polarization in the West spurned by deindustrialization and automation makes fears of decline for the middle class especially acute Class and education are far better predictors of RRP support, along with subjective social status, compared to income - Meanwhile, increases in income inequality increase RRP support in the medium and long term for all income groups. This affect is more pronounced amongst those with high subjective social status and with low-middle and middle income levels There is preliminary support for radical left voting increasing with increased inequality most for low-income and low-status groups In this context, the anti-globalization, anti-immigrant rhetoric of RRPs is very appealing to the status anxious voter

EXTRA - Rehm, Philipp Benjamin. Risk Inequality and Welfare States: Social Policy Preferences, Development, and Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316257777.

The 20th century saw an unprecedented expansion of social security insurance states across all rich democracies and for almost all risks people faced: age, sickness, addicent, and unemployment - The programs have since expanded in range, reach, and resources This process is revolutionary and worth study in its trend (the emergence of almost universal insurance states), the difference (why some states have more robust protections than others) and the dynamics of the process There are three current approaches to explaining the rise and diversity of insurance states: functionalist, antagonistic, and cross-class approaches - Functionalist approaches explain social policy development as a response to changing societal conditions (like the increased risk with industrialization) and is successful at explaining general trends but struggles to explain variation - Antagonistic approaches focus on redistribution as a response to conflict between competing social groups like the rich and poor (this includes the Power Resource Theory (PRT) which focuses on class struggle and the Meltzer-Richards model which focuses on the poor's power in democracy) and while these explanations excel at explaining the dynamics of social policy change, they struggle to explain the trend of its expansion as well as some variation - Cross-class approaches analyze welfare states from an insurance perspective, with social insurance less zero-sum and capable of gaining cross-class support from various risk groups in society under the assumption that groups at risk turn to the state for security and that certain industries benefit from social investments, with these explanations succeeding at explaining cross-national variations but with little success in explaining the dynamics of emerging insurance states Existing explanations for welfare states struggle to explain: (1) why they are so widely popular across countries and classes, (2) how this popular support impacts policy packages, (3) the role of economic and societal crises in the development of the welfare state This book offers a new theoretical model for these questions based on the argument that a person's relative position in the risk distribution is a powerful predictor of their social policy preferences - because most people are risk averse, social insurance is broadly popular, meanwhile, the distribution of risk (risk inequality) is key to understanding macro outcomes There are three aspects of risk inequality key to this model: (1) the average level of risk, or how common a problem is, which can change over time (with the rise of industry and industrial accidents, for example) - This fueled the expansion of social policy as risk-averse citizens turned to the state for protection from new risks; (2) the shape of the risk distribution, which indicates if a majority and the median has above or below average risk - if the distribution is top-heavy the majority will benefit from socializing risk leading to increased social security programs, if it is bottom-heavy expansion will be more mitigated and rely more on 'milestone' moments; (3) the spread of (bottom-heavy) risk distributions determined how commonly shared risks are which impacts levels of aggregate support - More homogenous risk distributions decreased contestation on social insurance and increase its generosity (a situation of lower risk inequality) All three of these factors - the mean, standard deviation, and skew of risk distributions - can change, with social policy responses changing too - Such changes can happen slowly (with gradual social change) or rapidly (with crises that reshape risk inequalities) There are three types of crisis with different effects: (1) crises which affect the weakest most and increase the average risk level without affecting the majority much (like recessions), which leads to decreased social policy support and retrenchment, (2) crises which affect a majority of citizens and thus decrease risk-inequality and threaten a 'risk-flip' where a bottom-heavy distribution becomes top heavy (like a depression), which should lead to an expansion of social policy, (3) crises that are so pervasive or systematic that risk is replaced by insecurity (like wars), which leads to a veil of ignorance that eases setting up social welfare states This framework has strong empirical support and shows that micro-level assessments of one's relative (not absolute) risk distribution - affected by the average level of risk (how common it is), the standard distribution of risk (how broad the coalition supporting security is), and how it is skewed (with top-heavy vs. bottom-heavy risk distributions determining if the majority benefit from protections for it) - then aggregate to determine the macro-level social security environment Citizens are well informed about their risk exposure and their social views closely match this positional information - increased risk inequality means less evenly distributed and homogenous risks which means less welfare support - This also helps explain the link between population heterogeneity and social security, since increased heterogeneity almost always increases risk inequality A number of developments bode poorly for welfare support going forward based on this model, as seen with increasingly polarized labor markets and increased inequality, both of which make supporting the poor less attractive and more permanent Privatized pensions increase risk inequality by tying social security to income levels and making societal-level pensions more expensive

EXTRA - Craig, Maureen A., Julian M. Rucker, and Jennifer A. Richeson. "The Pitfalls and Promise of Increasing Racial Diversity: Threat, Contact, and Race Relations in the 21st Century." Current Directions in Psychological Science 27, no. 3 (2018): 188-193. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417727860.

This article examines the impacts of growing racial diversity on white voters in the US There is a long history of work arguing that an increasing population share for non-white groups could increase feelings of threat anxiety for whites Yet, despite this literature, there is also a strong literature arguing intergroup contact should decrease bias and prejudice There is also evidence that anticipated increases in racial diversity will lead to anxiety and threat responses by whites and more conservative voting This article argues that anticipated increases in diversity should increases a sense of threat but that as actual diversity increases it should lead to positive exposure which will decrease prejudice over time - whereas increased diversity will elicit increased threat responses, positive intergroup interactions can buffer this effect This effect may be impacted by personal and contextual mediators such as bad economic conditions or strong group identity which will increase threat responses Significant changes in diversity status (like the majority-minority shift) and changes in the rate of diversification can also increase a sense of threat Minority groups can also have a threat response to increased diversity from other groups Overall, increased diversity seems to promise increased threat responses by whites, if direct contact can sometimes mediate that

EXTRA - Rehm, Philipp, Jacob S. Hacker, and Mark Schlesinger. "Insecure Alliances: Risk, Inequality, and Support for the Welfare State." American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (May 2012): 386-406. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000147.

This paper argues that support for the welfare stats varies based on the degree to which economic disadvantage (low-income) and economic insecurity (high-risk) are correlated - When the disadvantaged and insecure are the same, the base of support for the welfare state is narrow while when they are different it is broader and less polarized Correlated risk and disadvantage in income lead to: (1) increased opposition to welfare, (2) increased opinion polarization, (3) decreased average support. There is a close tie between public support for welfare programs and their generosity - strong programs don't survive hostile societies The existing literature on welfare status support has focused either on class (power resources school or thought) or risk (revisionist school) but not on both together But risk and class are not mutually exclusive and provide a stronger basis for explaining variation when combine - if low-income citizens want social welfare for its redistributive features while high income citizens want it for its risk-mitigation, then the coalition of support will be broad and welfare will be generous - but if low-income people are also the most high risk that will limit the coalitional support for welfare systems since only one class stands to benefit - Thus, the overlap between risk and income is key This relies on the assumption (well-supported) that decreased income increases welfare support and increased risk increases welfare support Wealthy but insecure groups will support welfare because they are less risk averse and many welfare risks like unemployment or disability are poorly covered by private markets, while the poor but low-risk will support welfare because they usually pay little into the programs but stand to gain much - Naturally, therefore, the poor and at risk will have double the motivation to support welfare and the rich and secure very little motivation While the rich are universally more secure than the poor, the degree of that relative security varies and provides the explanatory power in this model Increased overlap between risk and advantage should increase support for welfare (#1), decreased polarization of opinion (#2), and decreases in the share of citizen's opposing welfare (#3), with all three hypotheses supported by the data The focus here is on relative disadvantage and risk and not absolute disadvantage and risk Both cross-national and within nation (for the US) results strongly support the theory presented in this paper - more correlation between advantage and risk = less welfare support Economic shocks should increase support for the welfare state so long as their effects aren't only felt by the disadvantaged

EXTRA - Hopkins, Ed, and Tatiana Kornienko. "Status, Affluence, and Inequality: Rank-Based Comparisons in Games of Status." Games and Economic Behavior, Games and Economic Behavior, 67, no. 2 (2009): 552-568. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.004.

This paper examines the effects of changes in income distribution in an economy where agent utility depends on consumption and rank in the distribution of consumption - Increases in income for those at the bottom increase social competition for those in the middle and thus makes them worse off, even if their income increases too This contributes to a growing literature in economics that shows people care strongly about their relative position and that their measure of happiness has much more to do with relative position than absolute position Equality increases can threaten the middle class as it becomes easier for the poor to overtake them - consequently, income increases only bring maximal utility when they are universal and correspond to no equalization of incomes This paper thus argues that increases in equality are bad for the middle classes because they increase the threat of being overtaken and thus increase the amount of money everyone wastes on 'positional' goods which display their status. Thus, equality creates an inefficient form of standoffishness which actually decreases pos-redistribution incomes - This may help explain why increased inequality isn't well linked with increased unhappiness Thus, under this model, increased equality (and thus increased status competition) can lead to decreased satisfaction even when one's income and rank both increase NOTE: An important flaw in this model would be that it focuses on status as an individual consideration compared to a society and not a group consideration - this is especially key for people who face status decline but belong to high status groups (i.e. low income whites, see Engler and Weistanner) -- It also only focuses on consumption as a display of social rank which excludes other forms of economic inequality and non-economic inequality

EXTRA - Klor, Esteban F., and Moses Shayo. "Social Identity and Preferences Over Redistribution." Journal of Public Economics 94, no. 3 (2010): 269-278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.12.003.

This paper uses an experiment to show the effects of social identity on redistribution preferences where subjects are assigned to two distinct natural groups and are randomly assigned gross income and then have to vote over redistributive tax regimes - The experiment shows that many participants forgo monetary pay-off maximization and instead select tax rates that benefit their group when the cost isn't too high - This behavior isn't explained by efficiency concerns, inequality aversion, reciprocity, social learning, or conformity, but instead shows the ability of group identities and interests to over power personal interests These results help explain why economic self-interest tends to be a rather weak predictor of voting behavior, with social identity being key This fits well with the focus on group status outlined in Social Identity Theory a la Tajfel and Turner Over a third of participants show a strong in-group bias - voting to redistribute to their group when they are wealthy and lose as a result and also voting to minimize redistribution when their group is rich, even if they are poor, even when they can't see how other group members behave This tendency is capped by self-interest, however, and when the costs of ingroup support gets too high for an individual it decreases The odds of supporting your ingroup at your own cost are higher for high-income participants than low-income ones The subjects in the experiment were 180 students at Hebrew University and there were real payoffs based on the game results - in the treatment the participants are assigned to groups before the repeated votes on tax rates while the control had no group assignment There is no feedback until the end so individual's can't be responding to group pressures or ideas of reciprocity / fairness The treatment had 33% behaving with a strong focus on their group, with those focused on monetary maximization decreasing Socially identifying participants voted for high-taxes when their group was rich less than 30% of the time, compared to 90% when their group was poor.

EXTRA - Gidron, Noam, and Peter A. Hall. "The Politics of Social Status: Economic and Cultural Roots of the Populist Right." The British Journal of Sociology 68, no. S1 (2017): 57-84. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12319.

Understanding the rise of right-wing populism, especially for working-class men, requires an understanding of the interaction between the economic and the cultural and how they interact to create status anxiety - This paper details this status based explanation of populism by showing lower levels of subjective social status correspond with support for populism and that the status of working-class men has decreased since 1987 across 20 developed democracies and that these workers disproportionately support populism Surveys show that economic and cultural anxiety have been key in driving support for populism throughout Europe - Indeed, a sense of economic decline seems to perpetuate a sense of cultural decline and vice versa Populism may be driven by a decrease in the economic appeal of the left, but populist parties seem to mostly be winning on identity appeals The focus in this paper is on subjective social status - or a person's sense of where they stand relatively on social hierarchies Voting based on status may be both a retrospective attempt to reassert your social standing and.or an emotional response to your status decreasing Status decline thus may be driving populism through the interaction between material decreases and changes in salient cultural frameworks, both of which have been driven by economics (like decreased manufacturing and wage growth), demographics (both ethnic change and urbanization), and cultural shifts over the past decades Decreases in male dominance and increases in gender parity also contribute to a sense of cultural decline in much of the west Status decline is likely to increase populist voting for those a few rungs above the bottom of the hierarchy who feel they have something to defend Surveys asking respondents for subjective social status indicators strongly predict support for populism and have shown a decrease in social status over time The relationship between cultural and economic status anxiety may be either additive or interactive

EXTRA - Ridgeway, Cecilia L. "Why Status Matters for Inequality." American Sociological Review 79, no. 1 (2014): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122413515997.

Understandings of social inequality need to incorporate status just as much as gaps in resources and power - status both manifests in micro-motivations for behavior and serves to stabilize resource and power inequities through status-protection efforts, entrenching inequality Material inequality is unstable, while status inequality is more consolidated because it attributes that inequality to immutable traits Status also serves to entrench and stratify pre-existing categories of differentiation within society - Status also helps to sustain and perpetuate these inequalities by providing power and resources on the basis of status, which was originally derives from access to power and resources Status determines the cultural context by which almost all social groups in the US are evaluated and understood Status impacts material inequalities through status biases in behavior and judgements (biases in who we trust and promote), associational preference biases (preferences in who we associate with(, and reactions to status challenges Status qualifies who works in high-power institutions, which also allows it to act as a gatekeeper over those institutions by defining how others interact with them

EXTRA - Walasek, Lukasz, and Gordon D. A. Brown. "Income Inequality and Social Status: The Social Rank and Material Rank Hypotheses." In The Social Psychology of Inequality, edited by Jolanda Jetten and Kim Peters, 235-48. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28856-3_15.

While the negative social consequences of growing inequality are increasingly well-documented, the individual level psychological mechanism behind this - maintly, the status anxiety hypothesis - is still underspecified. In particular, the status anxiety hypothesis (1) fails to distinguish generalized concerns with status from concerns with materialistic status, (2) fails to explain the weak link between inequality levels and self-reported subjective well being, and (3) fails to explain why inequality influences concerns with status and not vice versa (a la Hopkins and Kornienko) The status anxiety hypothesis is predicated on the idea that increases in inequality lead to increases in concern about social hierarchies and relative position - a view supported by the growing literature that shows inequality increases the willingness of people to take risks to increase their social rank The ranked based cognitive model supported by this article argues that judgements of personal and other's social status are subjective and contextual and based on their rank within a social comparison group (thus, status is only about rank, not other factors like respect) This model of subjective relative ranked position predicts personal subjective well-being much better This model also argues that increased inequality should not lead to social rank concerns (with generalized anxieties over risk) instead of just material risk concerns (with anxieties over rank limited to and focused on economic dimensions alone) - Support for this is seen in evidence of the import people place on conspicuous consumption and material signaling as a display of status, which only increases with inequality People search about luxury goods much more in more unequal regions when controlling for income There is also strong evidence that increased equality makes income more determinative of life satisfaction since increased income significantly increases social rank in an equal society The increased focus on status in unequal society can be explained by signaling errors - when a country is more equal, it is easier to mistake a person's status level because of signaling uncertainty, but more dispersed incomes makes this harder which makes focusing on status more important - Thus, status is a more reliable signal in unequal societies which means it will be a greater focus of individuals

W8 - De la Roca, Jorge, Ingrid Gould Ellen, and Katherine M. O'Regan. "Race and Neighborhoods in the 21st Century: What Does Segregation Mean Today?" Regional Science and Urban Economics 47 (2014): 138-151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.09.006.

While levels of segregation between blacks and whites have declined, they remain quite high and hispanic/Asian segregation has remained unchanged Neighborhoods for non-whites continue to be highly unequal compared to those of whites - Black communities are consistently more deprived and disadvantaged, with under-performing schools and more violent crime - an issue only increasing in more segregated cities Segregation by choice is not troubling, segregation by discrimination is deeply so, and it is mostly the latter at work in the US and even as explicit discrimination has decreased, high levels of inequality and white flight have preserved segregation in many places Segregation in Hispanic and Asian communities seems to be driven less by white avoidance and more by language and culture clustering This segregation translates to real and lasting differences in quality of neighborhoods however, and difficulties for non-whites trying to escape them Overall, white-black segregation has decreased (with dissimilarity scores US cities dropping from 0.731 to 0.594 between 1980 and 2010) for Black-white divides, but is still quite high, while white-hispanic and white-asian segregation is unchanged Focusing only on white-black segregation mischaracterizes trends in segregation in the United States, since most non-white people are becoming more segregated Gaps between neighborhoods in poverty levels have also decreased, but are still quite high - while the gap is almost non-existent for Asians, at least in part because they are much less segregated than Blacks Black schools are 22 percentile points lower (hispanic ones 16 percentile points) than white ones on proficiency ratings and poverty does nothing to explain this - the average poor white person lives near a better school than the average non-poor black person Crime rates are also significantly higher in black and hispanic parts of the city, than in white parts All of these gaps worsen significantly in more segregated cities, even when including controls - there is some evidence that the relationship between segregation and poverty / disadvantage has decreased since 1980, although it has increased in some ways for Hispanics and is staying constant in many contexts, proving the folly of narratives that say we are post-segregation

W3 - Lucassen, Leo. "The Rise of the European Migration Regime and Its Paradoxes (1945-2020)." International Review of Social History 64, no. 3 (2019): 515-531. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859019000415.

After WWII there has been a decline of an anti-racist, equality based approach to migration and a rise of a more integrationist and pessimistic approach which sees multiculturalism as a failure - and yet this change in tune has occurred simultaneously with a rise in the highly free European migration scheme for EU residents For centuries, migration into western Europe was relatively free and market governed with intervention mainly aimed at stopping workers from leaving and regulating religious groups The freedom of migration remained for Europeans with the rise of the nation state, but became increasingly restricted for other ethnic groups seen as diluting the nation - there were also many Europeans sent abroad, both willingly and unwillingly in the 19th century WWI marked the end of this free migration scheme amongst western European nations, as distinguishing between local and foreign workers and prioritizing the former became a growing imperative as the size of the state and the level of suffrage and its welfare provisions all increased Increased suffrage both increased the salience of working class demands to limit suffrage and the state's financial interest in only providing benefits to citizens These changes became more permanent and entrenched after the Great Depression and with the rise of eugenics ideology and the prevalence of racism towards colonial possessions and Jews (especially in eastern Europe) This shifted again after WWII, when decolonization, the 1951 refugee convention, and a new ideology of equality all shifted the playing field - all three of these developments helped decouple migration from the labor market To begin with, decolonization led to a huge wave of politically motivated migrants as newly national former colonies tried to shape their populations and as people relocated to Europe in the wake of political upheaval Second, the expansion of a global recognition of refugees stemming from the Geneva Convention led to huge inflows of migrants during periods of humanitarian crisis, especially in Eastern Europe and the Middle East Third, the rise of the welfare state and a new normative framework around equality had unintended effects on migration as leaving carried growing consequences of also losing access to the welfare state's benefits and as equality norms increased advocacy for migrants integration into the welfare state There was a growing humanitarian turn at this time, with bodies like the UN - initially created to covertly defend imperial practices - became commandeered as a means of defending the rights of marginalized groups and enhancing the power of the newly decolonized Rising immigration in Western Europe was largely embraced up until the 1980s, because of demand for labor and backlash to Nazi ideals which lead to an excitement around multiculturalism, even if it was a light multiculturalism focused on integration This shifted in the 1980s and 1990s, as government discourse moved to the right and the Islamic identity of many migrants became a greater focus point, with Muslin culture being contrasted with Western values - a trend that has sense converged in the rise of the highly xenophobic alt-right in Europe and the US today Germany was key in innovating open migration in Europe after WWII, both because it needed labor and because it needed to prove its capacity for integrating Eastern Europeans - Thus, the EU's open migration system has its origins in post-war geopolitical needs - it was also deeply tied to efforts to wholly exclude non-European migrants from Europe to 'protect' the cultural makeup of the west Thus, internal migration in Europe is praised as key to an open market while outside migration is heavily restricted, and while Europe embraces the language of equality is also turns to xenophobia and racist policies to keep migrants out. These values have fluctuated greatly over time

W2 - King, Desmond S., and Rogers M. Smith. "Racial Orders in American Political Development." American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005): 75-92. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051506.

American politics should be seen through the lens of two competing racial institutional orders - a white supremacist order and an egalitarian transformative order. This shows racial injustices not as an aberration in the U.S. but instead a central aspect of its hierarchy from the start Political institutional orders are here defined as coalitions of state institutions and other political actors or organizations that seek to serve and exercise governing power in contexts that define the range of opportunities open to political actors - this makes them more loosely bound than state agencies but more empowered and enduring than political movements Racial institutional orders are ones in which political actors have adopted (and adapted) racial concepts, commitments, and aims in order to help bind together their coalitions and structure governing institutions that express and serve the interests of their architects Thus, the U.S. isn't simply an overbearing racial state but instead one of competing (if often unequal) racial orders, with shifting coalitions and interests Because these orders so structure US politics, actors have typically been compelled to join one or the other (even if they have tenable ideological ties to it) These tentative members of each coalition have opened up opportunities for coalitional change during crisis points in the U.S. - this also led to shifts in coalitional strategies (like definitions of whiteness) at key moments These orders have their roots in the very earliest political institutions in the U.S., which served to enshrine white supremacy Meanwhile, the anti-racial coalition has its roots in the declaration of independence and the success of the coalition in the civil war But today, the egalitarian coalition struggles with future directions while the white supremacist one has clarity These orders help explain the radicalized aspect of many parts of U.S. government that may seem unrelated Looking at racial orders both helps in examining their overlap with other political allegiances and doing comparative work with other countries Racial institutional orders seek and exercise growing power in ways that predictably couple status, resources, and opportunities by placing them in racial categories, even if the boundaries of these categories are constantly shifting. Thus, the orders change when these conceptions of divides change The white supremacist order was aimed at defending both slavery and the displacement of tribes and then developed into wider support of white status, which helped embed whiteness in the ethos of much of the country (a la Du Bois' wages of whiteness) These orders are traced through the history of US politics for much of the remainder of the article In the post Civil Rights era, the white supremacist order became more veiled but still has a clear racial agenda aimed at empowering whites The remaining power of whites led to muddled efforts at egalitarian policies on the left for much of the era after the CRM Many issues in U.S. politics are linked, both directly and indirectly, with these racial orders - an issue often overlooked in political science. This is seen in the deep effect of racial orders on the shape of US bureaucracy, the US congress, and immigration policy to name a few

W8 - Tilly, Charles. Durable Inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. (CHAPTER 7)

Effective governments usually involve both exploitation and resource hoarding - Ruling classes use government resources to extract surplus value from categorically defined and excluded subject populations, as seen with things like taxes and conscription This exploitation is universal and the key question is how the surplus is disposed of - in private enterprise, creature comforts, war or public goods Democracies still enforce distinctions between exclusion and inclusion but simply include much more of the citizenry in the ruling class which increases investment in public goods and democracies allow for more regulate channels of movement from exclusion to inclusion Categorically organized opportunity hoarding also happens in politics (via, say, different property rights for the rich and poor or licensing for certain professions) but is often more hidden. Categorical inequality within the state can lead to its self-perpetuation via emulation and adaption The politics of inequality concerns the involvement of governments in inequality creating social processes and the impact of inequality on government processes Inequality generating processes aren't substantially different in their operation when one of the parties is in government except that governments have organizational priority and coercive means, which makes their involvement in such processes harder to avoid / resist States have always intervened in patterns of inequality - usually to help maintain inequalities that protect the ruling class and preserve state resources Laws frequently rely on existing paired categories or the creation of new ones to delimit rights - as in between married and unmarried States thus significantly effect durable inequality, mostly by reinforcing its existing forms, but sometimes by disrupting them in a mass democracy States are also sites and instruments of exploitation and resource hoarding via access to the polity (usually with citizenship) and the unsuant rights Where certain polity members succeed in directing state resources to themselves via state power (for example with veteran pensions), state backed exploitation and hoarding occur In the US, such exclusion has frequently functioned along racial lines via limits to citizenship and thus entitlement to resources and power, although the boundaries and extent of this exclusion have been in constant flux - similar processes are in place in delineating the nation from non-members All acts of certifying and recognizing categories by the state necessarily exclude others from that recognition State action often serves to certify inequalities through legal categories built into the state structure (as in Jim Crow) The fact that members of dominant categories can usually mobilize more effectively and enjoy more direct access to state power means status often reinforces categorical inequalities - Meanwhile, adaption and resource/opportunity hoarding can lead even exploited groups to defend existing categorical distinctions Democracies often balance competing demands via the balance between greater numbers of oppressed and greater resources of elites, with only momberts of crisis leading to large scale efforts to attack unequal categories by the state All governments produce exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation, and adaption - they differ mainly in who benefits from them The way changing incentives (i.e. desire for inscription and increased democratization) can lead governments to reshape logics of inequality is seen in the process of catholic emancipation in the UK This example also shows how categories once used to implement unequal treatment eventually became key for political mobilization against discrimination State based systems of inequality often generate contempt and mistrust, but people need not hate other categories to collaborate in the reproduction of them Social movements challenge disparate treatment across category lines and threaten drastic collective action if not remedied - these rely on such categories and the existence of outsiders (elites) to mobilize supporters and allies and establish regimes of redistributing hoarded benefits Social movements gain their power through the implicit associated threat to act in adjacent arenas - they rely on their status as a coherent category and as WUNC (worthy, unified, numerous, and committed) - these imperatives are often competing and exaggerated by the movement Political identities can be understood as personal traits, as malleable features of consciousness, or as discursive constructions Sometimes social organization and relations are governed by embedded identities (race, gender, etc.), sometimes by disjoined ones (associations or legal categories) - but which one political ties are based on can make a big difference The character and extent of categorical inequality massively effect political processes since inequality is one of the major grounds and constraints of political life Democracy mitigates many of these inequalities by creating broad and equal forms of citizenship - but inequality itself also fundamentally threatens democracy since those with extensive access to resources will try to buy their way out of democratic processes and to subvert interventions in the exploitation and opportunity hoarding Exploitation and resource hoarding provide means of control, emulation makes structure of inequality ubiquitous, and adaption ties exploited groups to unequal structures - all of which makes inequality fairly easy to maintain - only when the balance of power in these categories shift do opportunities open for challenging inequality - top-down inequality becomes contested when elites infringe on otherwise established rights - bottom-up resistance occurs when the suppressed get new power

W3 - Appiah, Kwame Anthony. "Language, Race, and the Legacies of the British Empire." In Black Experience and the Empire, edited by Philip Morgan and Sean Hawkins. Oxford: University Press, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290673.003.0014.

English serves as both a marker of colonial imposition inherited by many African people and an area where people of African descent have made an abiding contribution to cultural developments English competes with a variety of local vernaculars in Africa and is inflected with elements of these other languages through its role as a lingua franca, with many African communities appropriating and reworking English as an expression of their African identity English is the official language of over half the population of Black Africa - although its often limited to use in governance and by elites - but because local African languages are more limited to specific communities or groups, those looking to create a unifying national tradition have often had to rely on English so as to not seem particularistic English also persevered because so many government and educational documents were already written in it that transitioning away proved a huge difficulty and because for some it remained a valuable marker of status and privilege - al of this combines to mean the most important body of writing in sub-saharan Africa continues to be in colonial languages Authors like Cruemwell have argued for the right to speak for the continent of Africa on the basis of the unifying category of race - a view which helped inaugurate the ideology on pan-Africanism - This view was in some ways a national one since it built on the commonality of the African colonial experience, the racial categorization of the colonizers, and the language of freedom used by Black citizens in the US But the African sense of race wasn't as defined by clear boundaries of separation and resentment as the American conception was - a difference arising, in part, from the fact that colonial powers were never as successful at deeply penetrating the culture of their subjects, meaning colonization led led to a sense of resentment towards white culture than a sense of togetherness in African experience Africans thus embraced a view of race a morally significant and unifying - but did so without relying on the commonality of local language as a key aspect of national unity While English and other colonial languages were initially tools of cultural subjugation and conversion, they have since been repurposed by African writers to give meaning and significance to their African identity - a requisitioning of the tool of language to affirm the ties between race, nation, and literature But this leads to a constant conflict between views of English as a suppressor of African culture, the nativist view, or as a tool that can be separated from its racist and imperialist past - nativist critiques often overvalue the outer vestiges of culture, however, while undervaluing the power that English can have when repurposed. Indeed, much of modern pan-African culture stems from the appropriation of European imposition - including the very idea of Africa as a distinct and unified entity With books that use languages to write about and for African cultures - like Achebe - language can be a tool of incorporation But buying into pan-Africanism also buys into a category of differentiation derived from European racism

W6 - Roediger, David R. "Whiteness and Race." In The Oxford Handbook of American Immigration and Ethnicity, edited by Ronald H. Bayor, 197-212. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Immigration has often been used to reinforce and not undermine the black-white color line in the US, with immigrants identifying with whiteness as a means of protecting their status built from buy-in to the degradation of Blacks This is a fact that has often been captured by cultural works on race in the US, if less so by academic ones, since reflections on US race have often been best elucidated by focusing on the disparities in treatments between migrants and black citizens Authors like Baldwin have seen tragedy in the tendency of migrants to buy into a lie of whiteness for a sense of security But Academia has not ignored this topic, with critical whiteness studies increasingly emerging over the past decades as many scholars have taken cues from Du Bois and Baldwin to see whiteness as a tragically learned behavior This field of academia is only just emerging and thus much still remains to be developed within it - Some have critiqued the literature for its interdisciplinary and non-traditional sources of evidence, a problem in part caused by the fact that expressions of whiteness by migrants were often micro-scale and episodic There has also been the challenge of balancing an acknowledgement of the sufferings of immigrants balances with observing their adopted whiteness - indeed, many works on whiteness are weighed down by the political views of the writers The contestation on these works is seen over debates on if immigrants became fully white or conditionally white and the complexities of their identities Indeed, the impact of European racial orders on racial thinking for migrants once in the US is a much overlooked topic

EXTRA - King, Desmond, Patrick Le Gales, and Tomasso Vitale. "Assimilation, Security, and Borders in the Member States." In Reconfiguring European States in Crisis, edited by Desmond King and Patrick Le Gales, 428-46. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Incoming immigrants in Europe are confined to specific neighborhoods and pockets of housing - they are thus increasingly disaffected, alienated, and willing to embrace extremism (especially 18-30 year old males). In contrast, the U.S. and Canada have been much more successful at integrating and assimilating immigrants. Immigration was not a prominent part of Europe managing its borders and nation states until the early 20th century, an issue growing more and more salient to conceptions of the state in modern Europe. Here, the U.S. and Canada are models of immigrant integration, which contrast starkly with Europe's. Many European countries, like Germany, make citizenship and employment difficult for migrants. France and the UK see similar levels of discrimination and segregation amongst immigrant communitites. This leads many in these populations feeling alienated from the European nation state and more willing to resort to political radicalism. This is, at root, a failure of European assimilation. Indeed, many European nations have settlement processes that support the formation of enclaves and the ghettoization of neighborhoods which limits cross-cultural contact. This leaves these populations especially vulnerable to radicalization There is a conflict between European views of the secular state and the need to accommodate the Islamic culture of incoming migrants. Still, the constitutional challenges presented by their communities have, in many ways, been overblown. Hostility between Muslim and Non-Muslim communitites has still been high and racil/religious opposition to the diversification of traditionally white christian states has been abudnant. Overall, Europe lacks the cultural image of being 'nations of immigrants' and thus is unprepared for growing immigration. The EU has become a means of collective immigration control and enforcement in Europe. This system functions under the Dublin Regime, which controls border activities and asylum for member states. States increasingly look to limit benefits and rights to migrants as a way of re-asserting autonomy over migration policy Huge inflows of migrants have also put stress on the open border concept in the EU - migrants are only coming in more and more numbers and this is increasingly stressing both European cooperation and their respect of migrant rights, which are violated by mass detention and surveillance These factors compound into growing pressure for nationalist governance and xenophobia throughout Europe All of this has increased the militarization of European border and challenges to European unity

W2 - Carter, Niambi Michele. American While Black: African Americans, Immigration, and the Limits of Citizenship. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.

The key argument of this book is that Black people respond to the threat of immigration by critiquing the system of white supremacy that excludes blacks through the exploitation of other groups - They critique the imperatives for cheap labor and not the laborers Thus, Black interpretations of immigration are themselves shaped by their sense of racial position and political exclusion and black opinions on immigration reflect, in part, their greater feelings about how they fit within the American political landscape This book focuses specifically on Black beliefs and does not consider whites as a comparison group - Black people often respond to immigration via critiques of the system that valorizes immigrants over Blacks if not critiquing the immigrants themselves Thus, Black perceptions of political issues like immigration are intimately shaped by their situation within a system of white supremacy Thus, Black immigration attitudes are often marked by a 'conflicted nativism' that both recognizes immigration restrictions as a form of white supremacy and resent the use of immigration to undermine Black labor and demonize Black values - Thus, they have anti-immigration views rooted in opposition to white racism Zero-sum racial competition has led to frequent clashes between blacks and more recent immigrants - with Black resentment towards these groups in part rooted in the ways the racial hierarchy allows immigrants to be wielded against Blacks and yet depictions of these conflicts overwhelmingly focus on the trope of angry and intolerant Blacks, leaving white supremacy unquestioned White supremacy escapes scrutiny by placing the blame for system level discrimination on particular prejudicial actors or 'bad apples' and by placing all racialized outcomes which aren't explicitly the product of white actions into the realm of happenstance or the responsibility of communities of color - this narrative removes white responsibility for system level factors and denies racism can survive beyond its legal codification This allows the workings of whiteness on many things - including black responses to immigration - to go wholly overlooked Black history in the U.S. shows a remarkable consistency in the levels of ambivalence regarding immigrants caused by the conflict between their support for self-determination and their fear another group's self-determination will come at their cost both because of the co-optation of immigrant groups into whiteness and the exploitation of their cheap labor and the traditional ties between whiteness and the privileges of citizenship. All of this increases black desire for increased inclusion and racial insecurity combined with a sense of only limited citizenship, which makes the integration of other groups into citizenship feel more dangerous One of the key qualifiers for migrants integrating into US citizenship has been their buy-in to a racial hierarchy with Blacks at the bottom National identity was subsumed by race as the operational identity for Blacks because their race was so essential in defining their status Thus, immigration becomes a way for Blacks to articulate their feelings about the failure of the US nation-state and its need to integrate them - the Black ethos of conflicted nativism thus stems from a resentment of immigration as a potential obstacle to increased inclusion This tension has only increased as immigration has increased and thus the prominence of Latino/a and Asian issues has increased too - Blacks still see much of the world and their political stance through a black/white dyad however - Whiteness defines inter-racial conflict of non-white groups This leads to a rebuke of the theory of natural coalitions by non-white groups in the US since it doesn't account for how the hierarchy of race in the US shaped by whiteness distorts these relationships and lead to corruption/animus and how colorblind rhetoric suppresses this conflict

W4 - Hollifield, James F. "The Emerging Migration State." The International Migration Review 38, no. 3 (2004): 885-912. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00223.x.

There are necessary conditions for migration to occur (supply and demand side factors and kinship networks) and there are sufficient conditions (which are the legal and political - the willingness to accept migrants and grant rights) States are trapped in a 'liberal' paradox - on the one hand they require open trade, investment, and migration to maintain a competitive advantage, but on the other hand the movement of people involves greater political risks and backlash In both Europe and North America, rights are the key to regulating migration as states strive to fulfill three functions: maintaining security, building trade and investment regimes, and regulating migration - with each as important as the last in the modern state Since the rise of the nation state, migration has represented a threat to sovereignty by infringing on the borders of the state and potentially changing the makeup of its people (in a way traded goods or capital can't) - this could change the citizenry in such a way as to violate the social contract and decrease the legitimacy of the government or state This is what creates the liberal paradox - that the economic logic of liberalism is one of openness, but the political and legal logic is one of closure This article argues that trade and migration are inexorably intertwined in modern international affairs, since the openness needed for the trading state also requires the openness of migration, and that the balance of a nation's power and interests relies as much on migration as on commerce and finance The rise of international markets and labor make migration harder to regulate while kinship networks make it easier for migrants The rise of nationalism and state benefits made monitoring state membership more important and helped give rise to the passport Until 1914, states largely lacked clear regulatory schemes for migration and it was almost all caused by push and pull factors and colonization But after the increased displacement and nationalism of WWI, a market driven system of migration became increasingly replaced by regulations and closure - this trend was reinforced by decolonization, which made the markers of citizenship and sovereignty much stricter The interwar period was an era of intense immigration restrictions, while WWII sparked a much more liberal and rights based conception of migration based on the UN and the Geneva Convention, which recognized the rights of people across borders Thus, the new regulatory scheme of migrants is based on the provision of civil and human rights - thus the paradox of the liberal state could in part be involved through an international regime of migration that regulated their legality and rights - but this has been challenged by the rise of globalization which makes travel, communication, and information all easier for migrants In much of the developing world, migration regimes are less clearly established which makes the mistreatment and deportation of migrants more viable and purely market based migration more common In contrast, Europe has much more strictly defined norms of migration - here, guest workers were a major part of the economy until the 1970s, when the oil shock and recession led to a suppression of guest worker programs and encouraging of foreigners to return home, but efforts to limit migration like a trade good were undermined by family reunification enforced by Courts recognizing the rights of migrant workers Thus, the issue was that, unlike capital, migrants acquired rights in the post-WWII migration framework, which made deportation hard This lead to new political discontent and resistance to migration, with fears of assimilation failures and culture shifts - but the rights protections and post-war norms around migration proved resilient in spite of this, even if states became far more restrictionist on immigration Creating a free trade and movement EU required creating very strong protections against outsiders gaining entry to the EU - but, this process was complicated by the end of the Cold War and huge increases in global migration after the 1990s - the result was massive increases in illegal immigration and countervailing right wing reactions which limit the government's willingness to increase quotas or legal immigration Nonetheless, migration is only likely to continue to increase as the push and pull factors motivating it only get stronger - still this increased in migration is occurring in a context of legal regulation and rights contestation between the individual and the state The state is increasingly tied to its efforts to regulate trade and migration - a more multilateral regime, like the EU, will be needed to manage this migration

W1 - Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta. From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016.

The rise of the BLM movement in many ways mirrors the Civil Rights Movement and the exhalations of MLK Colorblind lawmaking has served to undercut efforts by the government to intervene in instances of inequality and discrimination while allowing it to justify an image of continuing equity - Exemplified in the Shelley ruling Colorblind lawmaking haunts all low income people by justifying cuts to the welfare state and decreasing upward mobility BLM is being used to challenge the orthodoxy of the US as a colorblind society How do we explain the ascendance of a black elite along with the continued subjugation of the black masses? It is a trend tied to the great issue of economic inequality pervading much of US society which is especially pronounced for black communities This inequality within black communities has decreased the ties created by a sense of shared subjugation - it also leads to a fundamentally different interpretation of inequality by elite and working-class black communities There is a constant fight between acknowledging institutional racism and battling the 'personal responsibility' narrative of black failure - a narrative bolstered by the successes of the Black elite (and especially Obama) - the BLM movement has arisen partly as a counter to this narrative of Black responsibility during the Obama administration, instead drawing attention to the fundamental inequities and growing wealth disparities at the heart of Black life in America Obama has done little to help poor Black communities and has actually legitimized the culture of poverty narrative BLM has forced a crisis in this narrative and drawn Black elites and political elites more broadly into admitting the extent of racial inequality (at least more so) Black elites have been key in promoting a decrease in social and governmental support for poor black communities and increased privatization The role of inequality in Black oppression is raising critiques of capitalism as a crucial element of Black liberation Tying structural inequities and oppression to cultural, biological, and personal failings has been a tool of justified racism since slavery and has been of special import as a way of reconciling Black oppression with America's image of democracy, mobility, and opportunity The ideology of the American dream erases the 'glue' of racism, genocide, and exploitation which have built America and sustained its growth and was built on the massive (and racialized) investments of the U.S. government after the Great Depression and WWII The Cold War put pressure on the government for racial equalization at a time of growing civil rights mobilizations - this was tied not just to efforts to promote American systems of government globally, but the free market too Communism and socialism were used as boogeymen to help suppress efforts to expand the social welfare state and aid to the poor The Civil Rights movement dramatized efforts to reveal institutional racism compared with the pinning of inequality on black cultural failures a la Moinihan The critiques of the Civil Rights Movement spilled over into critiques of capitalism writ large - from MLK to Black Panthers The Civil Rights Movement succeeded at shifting the discourse on inequality and motivating a change in public opinion - as reflected in the Kerner Report But fully acknowledging systemic racism is anathema to most both because it (a) would undermine U.S. global stature, and (b) would require a massive redistribution of resources and wealth -- one product of the culture of poverty narrative is its capacity to separate the causes of black inequality from the causes of greater inequality throughout the U.S.

W7 - Mudde, Cas. "The Populist Zeitgeist." Government and Opposition 39, no. 4 (2004): 541-563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x.

This article makes three key contributions: (1) it provides a new definition of populism, (2) it argues that the idea of populism as a corrupted form of liberal ideas is flawed and that populist discourse is now mainstream in Western democratic politics, leading to a populist zeitgeist, and (3) that reactions to and explanations of the current populist zeitgeist are seriously flawed and may actually strengthen populism instead of weakening it Some definitions of populism look at it as 'pub' politics which provide simple solutions to complex problems or as opportunistic politics which aims to quickly please voters and buy support - But both of these definitions are hard to operationalize Here, populism is defined as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups - the pure people and the corrupt elite, and which argues politics should be an expression of the general will of the people - this form of populism has two opposites: elitism (which accepts populism's binary but endorses the other side of it) and pluralism (which rejects the homogeneity of populism and sees society as heterogeneous with often competing views and wishes) Under this view, populism is a thin-centered ideology which can be combined with many other ideologies like nationalism - populism is also moralistic and normative rather than programmatic under this definition and populism is, as such, inimical to compromise since any compromise feels like a sacrifice of principles and morals The 'people' in populism are neither real nor all-inclusive, but are an imagined and pure heartland of people with clear boundaries Populists are reformists, not revolutionaries - they see the system of politics as corrupted but not fundamentally flawed - Mainly, they want to increase the status and role of the 'people' within politics and decreased elitists interests and mediators The 'heartland' only becomes politically active when there is a high level of political resentment, a perceived challenge to 'one way of life' and the presence of an attractive populist leader - Usually populist voters have to be mobilized by a leader Despite a focus on the right, populist parties have been found on both left and right since the end of WWII - Indeed, the language of populism has become a regular feature of Western politics since the 1990s on both sides of the political spectrum What accounts for this growing populist zeitgeist? At least part of it is that populist claims are more true now - elites have gotten more distinct from the people, governance more bureaucratized, and party leaders more homogenized But this is only a small part of the rise of populous, which relies more on changes in perceptions, which has partially been driven by the independence and commercialization of the media after WWII, which makes politics look both corrupt and elitist, and partially by people becoming more educated and thus less willing to accept elites thinking for them - This has also 'demystified' political office, meaning the relationship between elites and the people has changed - Traditional authority has eroded and legal authority based on merit is now being questioned which means charismatic authority is more and more important There is a misperception that responding to populism requires increasing democracy and listening to the people more, but the modern right in populism feels their government is perverted and wants leadership and less participation to fix it - They care more about the output of democracy than the input - they thus care more about politicians knowing the people than about increasing their ability to actually partake in politics Populists also want extraordinary leaders who are often elites, but ones who are aligned with the views of ordinary people (often in the form of outsider elites) Populism embraces representative democracy but abhors the limits of constitutional or liberal democracy

W6 - Hajnal, Zoltan L., and Jeremy D. Horowitz. "Racial Winners and Losers in American Party Politics." Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 1 (2014): 100-118. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592713003733.

A key question is if the strong racial divide in U.S. politics translates to different outcomes for Republican and Democratic presidential administrations. Overall, Democratic presidencies are associated with significantly higher levels of well being for racial minorities in the U.S. (with Black Americans, in particular, benefiting from Democratic administrations under measures of income levels, poverty levels, the unemployment rate, and criminal justice issues). Crucially, these periods of well-being don't seem to come at the cost of white Americans, who also fare well under Democratic administrations (although less so than Republican ones). These results also show the unique influence of the presidency (and its partisan orientation) on the prevalence of racial inequality in the U.S. "If Democrats had been in power over the entire period we examine, much of America's racial inequality may well have been erased." (102) These results hold even with a wide variety of robustness checks, including differences in economic growth between the regimes.

W1 - Mamdani, Mahmood. "Settler Colonialism: Then and Now." Critical Inquiry 41, no. 3 (March 2015): 596-614. https://doi.org/10.1086/680088.

A language of exceptionalism has been at the heart of American culture since Tocqueville and this narrative has been predominated by a Euro-centric perspective on American development whereby the U.S. succeeded at democratizing via its lack of feudalism which made social equalization and revolution and individualism all low effort events without much destructive effect. This focuses on a narrative of inherited equality, a narrative sharply in contrast with the history of slavery and native land grabs. The narrative of the U.S. as free from social and political inhibitions because of its immigrant inhabitants ignores the conquest of the land and unwilling and limited participation of much of its population - It is thus an overwhelmingly white narrative Similarly, claims about the lack of socialism or a strong left are often explained via the lack of a feudal labor relationship with a strong working and landed class. These explanations focus on a lack of American social hierarchy that clearly ignores race Even accounts of U.S. history which include discussions of race do so without discussions of the Native question and its implications on the legitimacy of the US project writ large. This is seen in differing interpretations of the frontier, with some seeing it as open land (a view supporting the populist notions of the common man creating American democracy) and others seeing it as Indian territory (a view supporting progressive notions of the conquering, taming, and civilizing of one race by another). If the Revolutionary War fought against centralized power, the Civil War fought for it in opposition to localized tyranny But while federal power was increasing in the name of African American equality, that same power was used to make Native exclusion more complete, via the exclusion from birth-right citizenship and growing regulation of reservations This highlights a key issue in the U.S., which is its focus on the race question and racial equality while ignoring the colonial question. Thus, even as the U.S. has become less racially stratified, it has only ever become more and more of a settler state The U.S. is thus not just the first New Nation of the world, but the first modern settler state - Constantly forcing natives to the margin and excluding them in the name of expropriating their land. And what is remarkable is that this status as a settler state is so complete that the question of decolonization has never been publicly prominent. The U.S. pioneered the approaches to settler colonialism later adopted throughout the world, as seen with South African reservations. This approach included the use of reservations and camps to contain and concentrate natives, the limited status of local sovereignty combined with a lack of citizenship rights, and the regulation of native movements through the 'pass' system The U.S.' constant suppression of its settler state status is evidence of its continued importance Settler histories in the United States are a compelling way of thinking about the Israel-Palestine conflict. The U.S. is in deep need of a cultural and political decolonization process that recognizes their history as settlers.

W2 - Anderson, Carol. White Rage: The Unspoken Truth of Our Racial Divide. London: Bloomsbury, 2020. https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=OxfordUni&isbn=9781526631633.

Behind the response to high profile police killings of Black men is white rage - the perpetually overlooked and subtle expression of white racial resentment which expresses itself through physical violence then through courts, legislatures and bureaucracies with aim to counteract and suppress black advancement and resolve, and which blames black communities for their own suppression - this is a phenomenon of white America writ large, not just the South or the North, with all whites seeing black advancement as a threat This white rage has only been amplified since Obama's election and has been a consistently anti-democratic and anti-growth force in the U.S., restraining our institutions and wasting billions of dollars The reconstruction era represented an unprecedented opportunity to reconstruct U.S. racial orders as seen in the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments, but the moment was stymied from the get-go by Lincoln's racist resettlement plan, his death, and the clearly white supremacist goals of the confederacy Efforts to reunite the union led many, including Lincoln, to underplay the import of racism in motivating the war. Yet, racism and white supremacy were still rampant in the U.S., with many whites terrified by a mass of newly freed black men Johnson held deep prejudice against Black Americans and did all he could to limit their advancement and re-empower the South, including undermining the Freedman Bureau and black land grants to return land to plantation owners instead - also pardoning the confederacy's leaders This undermining of Reconstruction laid the groundwork for mass violence against newly emancipated Blacks - Meanwhile, white supremacist governance quickly re-emerged in the South, where Black Laws and Jim Crow followed short after, serving to quickly re-entrench the divisions of slavery if in a new form. Black resistance was then seen as proof of their lawlessness and unruliness and the need for more control over them Johnson vetoed early congressional efforts at remaking the South and preserving the Freedman's Bureau - he showed a priority in suppressing Black advancement that came even at the cost of his usual constituency, the white working man By restoring land to slave owners, suppressing black education, protecting racialized state institutions from interventions, prioritizing the economic needs of whites at the cost of blacks, and constantly deriding blacks as lazy and unequal, Johnson smothered any hope of Reconstruction Johnson's critiques of Civil Rights legislation prioritizing Blacks over Whites has echoes of white protectionism today The sabotage of Reconstruction enabled massive levels of violence by whites against blacks with any preference of equality Where congress tried to intervene via the 14th and 15th Amendment, Johnson and the Supreme Court did all in their power to sabotage the amendments in their implementation through the empowerment of states rights and corporate rights. The court succeeded at systematically rolling back the rights gains put in place by congress, culminating in Plessy and the defense of poll taxes

EXTRA - Kenneth T. Andrews, Kraig Beyerlein, Tuneka Tucker Farnum, "The Legitimacy of Protest, Explaining White Southerners' Attitudes Toward the Civil Rights Movements," Social Forces 94, no. 3 (March, 2016): 1021-1044.

Abstract: "Activists seek attention for their causes and want to win sympathy from the broader public. Why do some citizens but not others approve when activists use protest tactics? This is a crucial but poorly understood aspect of social movements. While most prior research has focused on the personal determinants of attitudes toward movements, we argue that proximity to protest may cultivate positive views about a movement. Individuals living near centers of movement activity may become more favorable to protest because they become more sympathetic to the demands of activists. We investigate public support about protest tactics among white Southerners during the early stages of the civil rights movement. To do so, we employ a representative survey conducted in 1961 with nearly 700 white adults living in the South. These survey data are combined with contextual data measuring local protest, political behavior, and civic organizations. Most scholars have focused on the ways that civil rights activity propelled white counter-mobilization, but protest also won sympathy from a small subset of white Southerners, thereby fracturing the dominant consensus in support of Jim Crow segregation. We also find that local racial political context matters: individuals living in counties with weaker support for segregationist politics, where white moderates were active, and outside the Deep South were generally more favorable. At the individual level, our strongest findings indicate that sit-in support was more likely from those with greater educational attainment, less frequent church attendance, and exposure to discussions about race relations from the pulpit."

EXTRA - Thomas A. DiPrete and Gregory M. Eirich, "Cumulative Advantage as a Mechanism For Inequality: A Review of Theoretical and Empirical Developments," Annual Review of Sociology 32 (2006): 271-97.

Abstract: "Although originally developed by R.K. Merton to explain advancement in scientific careers, cumulative advantage is a general mechanism for inequality across any temporal process (e.g., life course, family generations) in which a favorable relative position becomes a resource that produces further relative gains. This review shows that the term cumulative advantage has developed multiple meanings in the sociological lit- erature. We distinguish between these alternative forms, discuss mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature that may produce cumulative advantage, and review the empirical literature in the areas of education, careers, and related life course processes." (271)

EXTRA - Michael Biggs and Kenneth T. Andrews, "Protest Campaigns and Movement Success: Desegregating the U.S. South in the Early 1960s," American Sociological Review 80, no. 2 (April, 2015): 416-43.

Abstract: "Can protest bring about social change? Although scholarship on the consequences of social movements has grown dramatically, our understanding of protest influence is limited; several recent studies have failed to detect any positive effect. We investigate sit-in protest by black college students in the U.S. South in 1960, which targeted segregated lunch counters. An original dataset of 334 cities enables us to assess the effect of protest while considering the factors that generate protest itself—including local movement infrastructure, supportive political environments, and favorable economic conditions. We find that sit-in protest greatly increased the probability of desegregation, as did protest in nearby cities. Over time, desegregation in one city raised the probability of desegregation nearby. In addition, desegregation tended to occur where opposition was weak, political conditions were favorable, and the movement's constituency had economic leverage." (416)

EXTRA - Richard Johnson and Desmond King, "'Race Was a Motivating Factor': Re-Segregated Schools in the American States," Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy (September 2018): 1-21.

Abstract: "During the Obama presidency, Republicans made major gains in state legislative elections, especially in the South and the Midwest. Republicans' control grew from 13 legislatures in 2009 to 32 in 2017. A major but largely unexamined consequence of this profound shift in state-level partisan control was the resurgence of efforts to re-segregate public education. We examine new re-segregation policies, especially school district secession and anti- busing laws, which have passed in these states. We argue that the marked reversal in desegregation patterns and upturn in re-segregated school education is part of the Republican Party's anti-civil rights and anti-federal strategies, dressed up in the ideological language of colour-blindness."

EXTRA - Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith, "The Last Stand: Shelby County v. Holder, White Political Power, and America's Racial Policy Alliances," Du Bois Review 13, no. 1 (2016): 25-44.

Abstract: "In 2013, the United States Supreme Court decided Shelby County v. Holder, which invalidated Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The ruling is part of longstanding efforts to maintain American institutions that have provided wide-ranging benefits to White citizens, including disproportionate political power. Over time, such efforts are likely to fail to prevent significant increases in political gains for African Americans, Latinos, and other minority citizens. But they threaten to foster severe conflicts in American politics for years to come."

EXTRA - Avidit Acharya, Matthew Blackwell, and Maya Sen, "The Political Legacy of American Slavery," Journal of Politics (February, 2016): 1-61

Abstract: "We show that contemporary differences in political attitudes across counties in the American South in part trace their origins to slavery's prevalence more than 150 years ago. Whites who currently live in Southern counties that had high shares of slaves in 1860 are more likely to identify as a Republican, oppose affirmative action, and express racial resentment and colder feelings toward blacks. These results cannot be explained by existing theories, including the theory of contemporary racial threat. To explain these results, we offer evidence for a new theory involving the historical persistence of political and racial attitudes. Following the Civil War, Southern whites faced political and economic incentives to reinforce existing racist norms and institutions to maintain control over the newly free African-American population. This amplified local differences in racially conservative political attitudes, which in turn have been passed down locally across generations. Our results challenge the interpretation of a vast literature on racial attitudes in the American South." (1)

W3 - Bleich, Erik. "The Legacies of History? Colonization and Immigrant Integration in Britain and France." Theory and Society 34, no. 2 (2005): 171-195. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-005-7016-7.

Although Britain's colonial and integration policies have often been portrayed as relying on indirect rule and differentiation based on race, while French ones have been portrayed as focusing on direct rule and assimilation, this is in many ways a false dichotomy. Moreover, the argument that these differences then translated into differences in modern integrationist strategies has been overstated French and British colonial and integration policies are neither as internally consistent nor diametrically opposed as often assumed - What's more, while there is some influence, the ties between the colonial past and modern integration aren't as direct as argued Indirect rule was pursued by Britain at times, with a focus on racial stratification and hierarchy and empowering some native groups over others - but both Britain and France's empires were so vast and diverse that no one coherent colonial policy was in place in either, in spite of narratives of French central and assimilationist rule contrasting British rule - Both states used direct and indirect rule, hierarchies and assimilation, and civilizing missions predicated on racial hierarchies Similar conclusions emerge with regards to modern migration policies, with these being evidence of British multiculturalism and of French assimilation sim without either being a universal or demeaning framework in the other's context Many immigration policies in both the UK and France have sought to handle the issue without reference to migrants, but instead through investment in particular areas While colonial policies in citizenship and immigration were inspired by colonial rule in both France and the UK and there is some truth to the multiculturalist vs. assimilationist divide, the broader links between these processes and integration policies is tenuous and the organizational overlap between the two is limited and even where colonial policies of open citizenship and migration carried over, they were quickly reversed or revised during periods of conservative political backlash or economic decline

W5 - Ford, Robert, and Matthew J. Goodwin. Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain. Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy. New York: Routledge, 2014.

British politics is typically dominated by the Conservatives, Labour, and Liberal-Democrats, but the UK Independence Party (UKIP) has proven uniquely capable of challenging this status quo. UKIP started as an extreme fringe party with very little support, but by 2013 they were winning consistent popular support under the leadership of Forage. UKIP originally prospered in the more experimental European elections and took longer to succeed in parliamentary ones. By 2009, UKIP and the BNP (British National Party - a far more right wing, nationalist, authoritarian, and white supremacist alternative to UKIP) were winning ¼ of voters in spite of Britain traditionally being seen as resilient ot the radical right, although both declined again after that until UKIP surged after 2013 UKIP gains power by giving a voice to groups who feel written out of British Politics - Particularly older, less-skilled, less-education, working class citizens hit especially hard by recent cultural and economic changes. They are the 'left-behind', who used to be central to British politics but now are increasingly marginalized by a growing middle class. Before UKIP they responded with an abandonment of politics, but now their energy is channeled into the far right in UKIP UKIP also reflects a new set of concerns for voters which were before left out of politics - importantly, UKIP is uniquely opposed to multiculturalism and immigration creating a 'new' threatening and alien society, as led by the focus of older, less-educated, less skilled and more economically insecure voters Thus, UKIPs rise is a result of Britain's typical parties failing to address deep-rooted and long-burning social and political conflicts in their society, with labour and conservatives both focusing on winning over a cosmopolitan middle class UKIP has managed to build a successful party, against all odds, by uniting this cross-partisan coalition of left-behind working class voters.

EXTRA - Peter Mair, "Populist Democracy vs. Party Democracy," in Democracies and the Populist Challenge, ed Yves Meny, et. al, 81-97 (Blackingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).

Democracy requires a balance between the people and the constitution - but there is a growing fear that the constitution and the formal structures of government are overpowering the people within modern democracies. This is reflected in growing discontent and declining participation in politics throughout Europe, and government's increasing bureaucratization and depoliticization. Normally, the political party plays the essential role of binding the constitutional side of democratic governance with the popular side. Parties were mediators between the voters nad government, and served to aggregate interests and distribute resources. But political parties are in decline in much of the west. This is caused by (a) a change in party identity, with the previous dividing lines of parties (especially around class) fading in the modern era, (b) a change in the function of parties, with the mass institutionalization of democracy in europe meaning parties are no longer needed for voter mobilization or interest articulation (which can be handled by the media), but instead primarily needed to act as procedural filters on the political process, helping with recruitment, filtering of candidates, and organizing of legislature. Thus, populism arises as an alternative to parties used to link an undifferentiated and depoliticized electorate with a neutral and non-partisan government. Populism can take two forms - it can be a form of protest (a resistance to a political elite that seems increasingly out of touch with the people they are supposed to represent), or a form of linkage (a tool for democracy in a system where parties are no longer prominent and thus representation is lacking. Populism as a form of linkage involves (1) partyless democracy where partyness no longer serve representative needs and competition between them no longer represents political interests, (2) appeals that are directed to the people writ large and not particular groups of voters, (3) and a government that serves the national popular interest rather than sectional interests. Populism as a form of linkage will arise out of indifference to democracy, populism as a form of protest out of distrust of democracy. Thus, populist democracy can most simply defined in its current form as 'popular democracy without parties' This process is seen in New Labour in Britain, where the appeal of the party was to the people writ large, with increased reliance on plebiscitarian techniques, and the party acted as the government write large. The 'new way' was meant to overcome traditional party divisions

W2 - Appiah, Anthony. In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. London: Methuen, 1992.

Du Bois acknowledged the continuing prevalence of race as a category of differentiation, if not a hierarchy of it, and argued these races are united more via a 'spiritual' cohesiveness than physical differentiation - with the groups needing to work together to realize that spiritual mission via a pan-Negroism and collaboration within the Black community which maintains racial identity until Black people have made their unique contribution to civilization and humanity Thus, Du Bois embraced the idea of race as a socio-historical distinction which can achieve, via common action, a worthwhile end which wouldn't otherwise be achieved - This is an embrace of racial difference with an air towards each group's contributions to the world - He thus isn't aimed at overcoming race, but instead the ideology of inferiority linked to it and tied to a connection of race with biology But Du Bois' conception of race is flawed in its own right in the sense that it relies on a dictum of common descent, not sociocultural tractors There is growing evidence and consensus around the meaninglessness of race as a basis of genetic and characteristic differentiation The author here argues that a biological sense of race is always under the surface of Du Bois' writings on sociocultural race This leads Du Bois to continue to reify the difference between Blacks and other races and thus to unintentionally affirm racism In this way, Du Bois' pan-Africanism is a form of anti-racist racism - it affirms an identity based on race which assumes a unity of races that can only be drawn back to biological distinctions and morally relevant differences

W1 - Manjapra, Kris. "How the Long Fight for Slavery Reparations Is Slowly Being Won." The Guardian, October 6, 2020, sec. News. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/oct/06/long-fight-for-slavery-reparations-evanston-chicago.

Evanston Ill. is implementing what is widely considered to be the world's first government funded reparations program - with a grant being offered to Black city residents which can be used for housing improvements to compensate for segregation and housing discrimination. It is funded via new taxes from Marijuana sales However, the limited scope, scale, autonomy, and clarity within the program all lead many to question if it qualifies as reparations - Residents don't get direct payments, can only use grants of only about $25,000 for the pre-approved housing projects, are limited by a small budget only extending benefits to dozens of families, are contained by the city limits and specific eligibility standards, and the program does nothing to contribute to the broader national reparations policy (critiques noted by prominent reparations advocates) The program was partly inspired by the BLM movement in 2020 and evidence of historic and contemporary housing discrimination and inequality in Evanston, along with the long established movement for reparations in the U.S. Those who support the program hope it will inspire long term investments in Reparations in other communities while detractors fear it will misrepresent and distract from the proper scope, scale, and source of reparations Reparations have long been paid to slave owners in compensation for their loses, as in Haiti and Great Britain Reparations have also long been a demand of the enslaved, dating back to the 1700s and evidenced in Civil War claims to 40 acres and a mule and reconstruction mutual aid funds -- There have subsequently been consistent and grass roots calls for reparations throughout the 20th century and revitalized in the 21st by the Coates essay Efforts for reparations have occurred all over the world, especially after decolonization Increased momentum for reparations in the US is rampant, with support for HR 40 especially strong in 2020

W3 - Marfleet, Philip. "Refugees and History: Why We Must Address the Past." Refugee Survey Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2007): 136-148. https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdi0248.

Forced migration is a topic of study consistently excluded from analysis in history and migration studies, in part because of the lack of overlap between the two fields of study The mass suppression of refugee studies overlooks their import as a fundamental part of global politics today and an aspect of global politics deeply linked to the past and its stories of colonialism, interventions by outside actors, and local divisions/conflict Addressing the importance of these histories and their modern implications requires reinstating migrants into the historical record and increasing the study of them There are two competing narratives about refugees - one that they are as old as history and one that they are a contemporary legal category The ideas of displaced peoples and protected places of sanctuary have deep historical roots, often tied to religiosity Limits on studies of refugees are in part a product of the modern nation state which has circumscribed what is seen as relevant to study, leaving migrants as unimportant topics and promoting the belief that they represent a mid-20th century category and didn't exist before since the Geneva convention was the first to explicitly define the term refugee (while also vastly restricting protections for such displaced people) The idea of a refugee came from early European efforts to create clearly demarcated nations within which there needed to be well-defined outsiders who were rejected - this led to a huge expulsion of groups like the movement of Jews and Muslims out of Spain and Calvinists from France Thus refugees have been present since the birth of the modern state and nation and were key to defining them early on and yet the prioritization of the nation and state means they have been consistently and systematically forgotten - refugees are the subject of a mass amnesia in part because they are marginal figures at a constant power imbalance within their adoptive state with their constant lack of resources and communication rendering them unable to resist their public portrayal - often the first target of the state when fortunes decline The role of refugees increased massively during decolonization when efforts at national differentiation and partition led to mass expulsions but this history has also been lost behind narratives of nation building and independence - one of the reasons refugees seem dangerous is their narrative challenges national narratives along with the sociocultural and political arrangements that endorse them Histories have excluded refugees because they don't fit within the dramas of the state and its boundaries - we are in need of new histories which acknowledge these lived experiences and validate the importance of refugees

W5 - Dancygier, Rafaela M., and David D. Laitin. "Immigration into Europe: Economic Discrimination, Violence, and Public Policy." Annual Review of Political Science 17, no. 1 (2014): 43-64. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-082012-115925.

Immigrants can be excluded from the labor market and subject to more animus if the initial reactions to them are more severe (and violent) and thus they are more likely to form into enclaves. Thus, initial reactions to immigrants shape their integration into the community and economy, which shape native responses to them. Citizenship status and demographic makeup may be key to the response of nations to immigration influxes. Native prejudice and other factors lead to the exclusion of immigrants from labor markets to create forced suboptimal returns and net costs to the economy - a trend that is especially concerning with immigration levels still rising. There may be a strong overlap between economic and political explanations for opposition to immigrants. For one, rising levels of immigration may lead to increased concerns about immigration by locals, which can lead to cultural 'statistical' stereotypes when immigrants invest less in human capital accumulation during economic downturns. Immigrants gaining economic advantages and being economically rooted can also be prevented by immigrant-native violence and immigrant-state (i.e. police) violence. This violence will encourage immigrants to self-segregate and stick within their ethnic enclaves, which will exclude them from the labor market more, and only reinforce fears and stereotypes. It is thus hard to tell whether the economically excluded donkey proceeds the culturally biased cart, or vice versa. Still, it would seem that discrimination leads immigrants to take a different approach to market integration and to self-isolate in ethnic enclaves, which subsequently shapes native reactions against them. Granting citizenship status to immigrants helps them with economic and cultural assimilation by increasing the ease of integration into the workforce. The more diverse an immigrant population is within a country, the less likely it is to form enclaves and thus the less threatening it is likely to seem to the public.

W4 - Hainmueller, Jens, and Dominik Hangartner. "Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination." American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (February 2013): 159-87. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000494.

In Switzerland, some municipalities used referendums to decide on the citizenship status of foreign residents - These decisions show country of origins was the single greatest predictor of naturalization success, with 'no' votes being 40% higher for immigrants from Yugoslavia or Turkey compared to richer, northern/western European states - Effects which vary with the xenophobia of the region and the size of ethnic groups Referendums allow a better measure of immigration views because they are closed ballot, have real life consequences, and are repeated over and over again Variation in origins accounts for 40% of the difference in naturalization requests all on its own - although the effect varies from region to region, in contrast, skill, education, and language skills all matter far less (or not at all) Having the vote in a more xenophobic municipality increased origin based discrimination by almost 300% - about 60% of the origin-based discrimination in the Swiss sample is thus attributed to taste-based factors (i.e. xenophobia and prejudice) and the other 40% being attributed to statistical discrimination with its assumptions about average integration levels of by different places of origin There is also strong evidence for a group threat view of this prejudice since origin-based discrimination is well correlated with increases in the relative size of certain migrant groups at different times/periods, with a larger group = more discrimination because of an increased threat Switzerland's migration scheme fits into the more restrictive as opposed to the more liberal category The data shows that preferences on migration vary not just between municipalities but within them too Gender, age, martial status, and language skills all have little effect on outcomes while being born in Switzerland or residing there for over 10 years has only a marginal effect, while increased economic or educational status has small benefits

W2 - Francis, Megan Ming. Civil Rights and the Making of the Modern American State. Cambridge Core. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139583749.

In response to the show trials in the Jim Crow south used to justify lynchings, the NAACP launched its first legal effort and had the presence of mobs in Court rooms ruled unconstitutional in Moore v. Dempsey (1933) The NAACP was formed in reaction to the rising violence and racial horror of the post-Reconstruction United States in 1909 Its first and successful task was a massive PR and education campaign to change the public narrative on lynching and to promote anti-lynching bills - It then turned increasingly to legal advocacy This book places the NAACP at the center of efforts to reshape and build the American state in the 20th century The NAACP helped the Supreme Court see that states were too weak for Civil Rights protections and this laid the foundation for their massive intervention in the 1950s - Thus, the NAACP helped set off a path dependency of a civil rights interventionist Supreme Court, caused by anti-lynching efforts In this way, the NAACP anti-lynching campaign and the Moore v. Dempsey victory were critical junctures in U.S. politics Further, the NAACP's focus on the Supreme Court and litigation as the key part of its advocacy was a strategic decision arrived at after many wins and losses - a choice which serves as a valuable case study on how organizations settle on their advocacy approaches - With the court offering the greatest opportunity for radical change in the face of a reticent executive and legislative branch This book thus argues both that civil rights organizations (and the NAACP in particular) have been undervalued in studies of American political development, since they have been crucial in reshaping the boundaries of the US states and overcoming institutional stasis, and also that the crucial point of departure for the U.S. Civil Rights Movement was in the early and not mid 1900s Top-down accounts of the U.S. Civil Rights movement understate the role of civil society and civic activity, with Black Civil Rights organizations playing a crucial role in mediating between black society and the state Narratives of race in the US that focus on big events also necessarily play down the New Deal era, where the rise of social security is prioritized - this underplays the massive import of the rise of civil rights organizations at this time, a narrative that goes counter to the typical focus in American Development Studies on elite actors and institutions influencing the people and not vice versa The period between 1910 and 1930 is thus often unjustly ignored as a lull in civil rights history with Blacks removed from national politics instead of recognizing it as a key period when the NAACP helped enlarge the capacity of the US state in the lead up to the 1960s, especially through its effects to expand the interventionist nature of the Supreme Court on issues of race - The historiography around Civil Rights needs to be adjusted to better account for this period and the work of the NAACP

W6 - Putnam, Robert D. "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century, The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture." Scandinavian Political Studies 30, no. 2 (2007): 137-174. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2007.00176.x.

Increased immigration leads to important cultural, economic, and developmental benefits in the long run, but can decrease social solidarity and capital in the short run Diverse neighborhoods in the US see ethnic groups 'hunkering down' which decreases trust, altruism, and cooperation - but in the long term such divisions can be overcome with more cross-cutting forms of social solidarity and more encompassing identities as seen in the US military and religious institutions Almost all advanced democracies can guarantee they will be more diverse a generation from now than they are today The three key claims of this article are (1) diversity is inevitable and good, (2) in the short run, such diversity decreases social solidarity and social capital, (3) in the medium / long term, it proves beneficial as social solidarity is recreated with new encompassing identities - making a key challenge for modern societies the construction of those identities Immigration has been found to increase productivity and creativity, economic growth, the sustainability of welfare systems, and development in the global south Most evidence shows however that, in contrast to contact theory, exposure to more diversity leads to conflict and more in/out group thinking But the assumption that ingroup trust and out-group trust are negatively correlated may be mistaken since social capital can be both bonding (ties to people like you) and bridging (ties to people unlike you) and these two are not zero sum with each other - Thus, while many theories assume that decreased bridging = increased bonding because of ethnocentrism, 'constrict' theory (as argued here) argues that both can decrease simultaneously in more diverse neighborhoods The survey used here finds more diverse neighborhoods trust their neighbors less and trust their co-ethnics less - strong support that increased diversity leads to a universalizing instinct to 'hunker down' socially - An effect that holds with controls for affluence, mobility, population density, gini, gender, age, ethnicity, immigration, mobility, citizenship, and home ownership These results are extremely robust to controls and checks The same effects apply to economic inequality as to ethnic diversity These effects can be overcome by drawing lines around new identities which are more cross-cutting, decreasing the salience of ethnicity as a cultural divide as was successfully implemented in the US military and in US churches and the integration of former migrants into the American community - all show the benefits of turning 'us' and 'them' into 'we'

W1 - Hanchard, Michael George. The Spectre of Race: How Discrimination Haunts Western Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.

Issues involving membership and migration in democracies date back to autochthony, which limited Athenian citizenship to local-born men via a myth of social origins from the soil. This shows the constant coexistence between democratic institutions and anti-democratic ones which limit access to the polity for 'others' - there is a deep and historical/contemporary tie between democratic governance and political inequality, which was rendered politically salient via the concept of race Social inequalities cannot be explained without an examination of the political inequalities from which they often stem and this political inequality in turn stems from deliberate decisions to exclude specific groups from political participation and social/economic opportunity - This exclusion is justified by imposed categories of difference like race, which project a need for homogeneity and which manifest in the mix of democracy, difference, and inequality throughout the West An advantage of race as a marker of difference, compared to autochthony, is its portability - Blackness and whiteness are constants in all locales A constant feature of modern Western political life, not just in fascism, but in democracy too, is the fusion of state power with race for exclusion. This link between race and political development is now often overlooked but goes back to the very roots of contemporary politics and was at the heart of the ideas of political viability, stability, and development from early on Comparative government has gone through three stages of examination with race - One, at its genesis in the late 19th century and early 20th century, when racial ideologies and racism imbued studies of political development; another in the mid 20th century when comparative politics grew as a field and racial analysis was replaced with cultural analysis, egged on by the transformations (both ideological and political) of WWII and colonialism; and a third after the fall of the USSR when political science became more empirical and more willing to acknowledge the importance of difference The essential role of slavery and racism in the development of both ancient and modern democracy is shockingly overlooked - the central role of ethno-national racial regimes in the development of the U.S., U.K. and France is thus a key focus of this book - fears about minority and racialized populations with access to polity and society led to early discrimination which manifested in immigration policy and racial politics for all three countries over time All three devised racial and ethnonational regimes to delimit political membership in their polities and maintain political inequality - including the use of ethno-national criteria for political membership and leadership linked to race. These norms were not initially in place but arose via the need to regulate the interactions between citizens and non-citizens The existence of ethno-racial democracies isn't limited to one regime type and isn't limited to only one side of the political spectrum (left or right) Populations began to be policed when there was some sense they were growing or becoming a problem - with the internal regulation of differences often mirroring the approaches used to police colonial societies. Thus, colonialism as a system of control was imported into the developed world Racial regimes = formal and informal institutions that structure preferences and outcomes in the interactions between dominant and subordinate groups, with effects on economies, norms, customs, political power, rule of law, and the distribution of resources. Bias is mobilized to justify unequal treatment. There is a common pattern in all three countries of minorities mobilizing for increased inclusion and participation and the state using its power to suppress such efforts, while growing in power via the demands for maintenance of the socio-political status quo by the majority Even where the law is no longer openly discriminatory, when racial and ethnonational regimes are deeply intertwined with governance they can continue to perpetuate via informal institutions which reinforce inequality The UK, France, and US have all made great efforts to highlight the highly democratic nature of their governance while simultaneously protecting racial exclusion In France, incoming migrants were deemed non-national and unassimilable and Republican ideology was used both to mobilize national support and to discourage the create of state institutions intended to combat discrimination. In both France and the UK, post-colonial migration led to policy shifts in immigration, naturalization, and citizenship aimed at limiting their social and political integration. The US, in contrast, had much more explicit forms of segregation contrasted with more significant movements for equalization and discussions of race The UK and France both scrambled to implant immigration and naturalization laws that protected their racial identity and power structures All of this is proof of polyarchy - the coexistence of democracy with ethno-national inequality upheld by exclusionary regimes enforced by both informal and formal institutions Key Quotes: (!!!){Evidence of view that inequality is rooted in the issue of prejudice} - "Racial regimes are a combination of formal and informal institutions that serve to structure preferences and outcomes in the dynamic interactions between dominant and subordinate groups, based upon presumed racial and ethno-national distinction. Such regimes are not limited to the sphere of economics, specifically mass labor and production, but inform juridical-legal spheres of polity and society. Underpinned by norms, customs, and rule of law, racial regimes perpetuate inequalities in the allocation and distribution of public goods and resources such as education, employment, housing and social welfare. The bureaucratic and administrative dimensions of racial regimes maintain and reinforce distinctions between groups, which in turn affect opportunities for education, housing, health care, employment, and quality of life overall. With their emphasis on immigration (voluntary and coerced), racial regimes impact domestic and foreign policy. Institutional racism operates within these regimes when institutional actors mobilize biases to justice etra-procedural and ultimately unequal treatment of marginalized and minority populations." (Hanchard, 120) {IMPORTANT IDEA ABOUT HOW INEQUALITY CAN BE SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEGAL SUPPORT VIA INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS - CAN BE APPLIED TO SOCIALLY DOMINANT EQUILIBRIUM BECAUSE, AS SHOWN ABOVE, IT STILL ASSUMES A LEVEL OF PREJUDICE BY THE ACTORS} - "As in the case of the United States, Jim Crow and other modalities of formal segregation were often supplemented with arbitrary extralegal violence to punctuate the racial order. Under these conditions, the informal institutions created to coordinate acts of extralegal violence were consistent with the aims and objectives of the formal state institutions. In many instances the actors were the same, even if the venues and circumstances in which extralegal orders were meted out were distinct... The temporal dimensions of racial and ethno-national regimes are identified in the changes in institutional laws and norms over time. Social movements that have effected institutional and societal change (feminist or womanist, civil rights and antidiscrimination movements) helped bring about changes in law, norms, and procedures of governmental authorities at various levels, including but not limited to police departments. In many instances, however, changes in federal law were often not accompanied by shifts in local institutional cultures, which often resisted the assimilation of newcomers; the Great Migration in the US, the Maghrebi and Sub-Saharan Africans in France, and South Asia, Caribbean, and African immigrants and residents in Britain. Here is where the formal and informal institutions have often diverged, when changes in national law were not unilaterally applied across the country; they were rejected or ignored in parts of the territory where racial and ethno-national regimes are too deeply intertwined with fundamental governmental institutions to dislodge. Institutional racism can thus coexist alongside formal changes in law designed to reflect changes in norms that publicly prohibit discrimination." (Hanchard, 124) (!!!!!)

W8 - Rugh, Jacob S., and Douglas S. Massey. "Segregation in Post-Civil Rights America." Du Bois Review 11, no. 2 (2014): 205-232. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X13000180.

Looking at levels of residential dissimilarity and spatial isolation for non-white groups in 287 metropolitan areas, between 1970 and 2010, this article finds that black segregation and isolation have fallen steadily but still remains high, especially in places with historical hyper-segregation - Meanwhile, hispanic segregation has incresaed slightly and hispanic isolation has increased massively becasue of rapid population growth, and asian segregation has changed little while Asian isolation has increased (but is relatively low) Whites remain quite isolated from all three non-white groups, despite increased diversity and shifts toward integration Multivariate analysis shows this minority segregation is the product of restrictive density zoning regimes , large/rising non-white populations, lagging non-white socio-economic status, and active expressions of anti-black/anti-latino sentiment in large metropolitan areas - Places with these attributes are integrating slowly (with Black populations) or beocming more segregated (with hispanic populations) while those without these features are rapidly integrating It is unclear how discrimination and segregation have changed since the 1960s, since its legal and attitudnal supports have disappeared in some regards but still remain or have evolved in many others - thus a new account of changes in segregation is deeply needed Dissimilarity is measures here by how much a residential distribution departs from the ideal level of evenness Isolation is measured using the minority percentage within the neighborhood of the average minority member The level of racism within a metropolitan area was measured using Google Trends search results for the 'N' word The size of a racial group massively impacts the odds of segregation and isolation, which helps explain the increase of both for Hispanics The fact that big increase in hispanic and asian populations didn't lead to major increases in segregation shows the difference in local reactions to such groups compared to Blacks, who saw huge increases in segregation when their population share increased in the past Whites still inhabit overwhelmingly white neighborhoods - in spite of a steady decline, most whites still live in neighborhoods that are three-fourths white Black racism has a powerful and significant effect on predicting levels of black-white segregation - it is the strongest of the predictors Larger metro areas = increased segregation, and larger military presence = decreased segregation, and increased immigration = increased segregation Metro areas with high segregation and little progress towards integration house a disproportionate number of non-whites, showing the continued effect of hyper-segregation

W1 - Greer, Allan. "Commons and Enclosure in the Colonization of North America." The American Historical Review 117, no. 2 (2012): 365-386. https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.117.2.365.

Many historians have assumed that the dispossession of land in the U.S. resembled and mirrored the enclosure movement in the UK But while there were some elements of the enclosure and privatization as an aspect of settlement and theft in the US< settlers also created commons, and the disposition of land was in fact largely a product of the clash between native and settler commons The focus on enclosure and privatization stems in part from Locke's 'On Property' which linked labor to ownership Locke acknowledges the legitimacy of public commons by shared consent in the UK and argues such commons need no such universal consent in the US because the land is universal in scope and thus enclosure requires no consent either But there is no support for Locke's notion that a public commons relies on governance and laws which establish it - this distinction relies on a differentiation between 'civil' societies and 'natural' ones that ignores the role of common property in native societies and their prominence both within and beyond localities in European societies - There were many locations in North America drawn upon by tribes for local resources but not open to other tribes which acted as 'outer' commons - meaning Locke's idea of a universal commons was misguided Settlement and disposition involved creating agricultural lots, but also creating settler-colonial commons, which were a much greater threat to natives because they laid more extensive claims to land and reshaped it with their livestock But while Locke's notion of immediate enclosure and privatization is misleading, the exclusion of Natives from colonial commons was real and contentious - for while local commons and agriculture weren't always incursions on native lands, the growth of a colonial outer commons was a large source of disposition. In this sense, the frontier took the shape of a zone of conflict between native and colonial common space (as seen with Spanish customs of communal grazing) This incursion was not just one of occupying space but also of degrading land through grazing and over usage which conflicted with native commons practices And what started as informal commons increasingly became more formal, legalized, and exclusionary as settler communities became established with native communities almost always the losers in these arrangements and subject to a slow encroachment of rights In this sense, domination via common property proceeded acts of settlement, enclosure, and privatization in dispossessing natives

W6 - Beaman, Jean. Citizen Outsider: Children of North African Immigrants in France. Oakland: University of California Press, 2017.

Many racial and ethnic minority children of migrants in France feel a deep disconnect between where they are born and how they are perceived, with non-white people receiving disparate treatment based on their race because they don't fit in the imagined community of France This book specifically focuses on second generation North Africans who achieve upward mobility and fit within the middle class - Since it is this group which has most successfully assimilated, acculturated, and integrated, and yet which still feels left out because of French cultural conceptions of who a French person is, which are based on race and ethnicity and not law or citizenship status This group is thus one of 'citizen-outsiders' - people who are both members of a society yet relegated to its margins because of their race - Thus, legal citizenship is often unconnected from cultural citizenship, showing the limits of legal definitions of belonging These issues endure in spite of France's purported color-blindness and civic sense of nationalism - Through both institutions and micro-level interactions and a fundamentally white-supremacist/colonial definition of France Muslim identity is used as a means of racial and ethnic exclusion when such exclusion is culturally and socially unacceptable While 70% of second generation north Africans feel French, almost 50% feel their French-ness is denied by others - They are also significantly more likely to face discrimination and diminished life chances compared to their white counterparts The continued use of race for social exclusion is seen in the marginalization of well-educated middle-class second generation North Africans France's republican color-blind ideology merely obfuscated racial differences, instead of minimizing or eliminating them - making ignoring race easier This book is primarily based on semi-structured interviews with second generation middle class North African migrants in France The difference in status for these groups is often first established early on in their education through disparate treatment These experiences lead to difficult mediations and cognitive dissonance on an individual level between people's ethnic and civic identity with some embracing a hyphenated/combined identity and others embracing only their ethnic identity - Identifying as just French is true for less than 20% of them Meanwhile, some feel stuck between both identities and thus feel they fit within neither All of this shows the growing importance of cultural citizenship as a marker of difference in multicultural societies Second generation middle class north Africans are both racial and economic brokers between their French and African identities/communities They are marked as different through many different avenues of interaction - at work, through both hiring and post-hiring treatment, at home, through religion, and in the public sphere, as people's names, neighborhoods, worship status and more all help to mark them as different and non-French and set a glass ceiling on their cultural mobility Place of residence serves as a proxy for ethnic identity throughout much of France There is a jarring disconnect between the Republican ideology adopted by second generation North Africans and the discrimination they face daily which is a marker of the cultural, racial, and post-colonial markers of French conceptions of citizenship

W5 - Goldstein, Judith L., and Margaret E. Peters. "Nativism or Economic Threat: Attitudes Toward Immigrants During the Great Recession." International Interactions 40, no. 3 (2014): 376-401. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.899219.

Many scholars have sought to explain the gap between open economic policy and closed immigration policy in the United States This article uses a survey experiment from the Great Recession to show how changes in one's economic circumstance interact with views on immigration Here, a sense of threat from the recession by high skill workers increases resistance to high-skill immigration, while there was a more nationalist response to low-skill ones even with controls for economic context, although those who felt more threatened by the recession were more likely to be be against low-skill immigration This paper finds many have internalized the view that open trade is good but not so with open immigration During the recession, cultural bias interacted with a person's economic position to predict views on immigration while the recession increased the salience of economics Low-skilled immigration has been opposed much more than high skill immigration and immigration from Mexico much more than from Europe While opposition to both low-skill and high-skill immigration increased a lot burning the recession, approval for trade increased There is little evidence of skill level or fiscal effects as determinants of immigration attitudes - but prejudice/nativism and non-economic views fail as longitudinal measures of immigration attitudes - When longitudinal attitudes during the great recession are considered, economic effects emerge as immigration attitudes change and high-income people become more immigration averse Thus, while nativism effects immigration attitudes, it does worse at explaining changes in immigration attitudes over short time periods - the same is true for demographic indicators, which do poorly at predicting changes in immigration views Instead, feelings of economic threat are the best predictor of changes in views on immigration - This is both a socio-tropic and egotistic sense of threat which presents across three regards: (1) threats to one's family, (2) threats to one's community, (3) threats to the nation Overall, views on immigration are highly stable, but what change does occur is well predicted by economic perspective and education measures - a sense of personal and communal prosperity increases support for immigration while high education decreases support for high-skill immigration during the recession because of a sense of threat There is very little support for the view that changes in social spending predict immigration views / opposition Thus, the U.S. has high popular support for open trade, nativist views on immigration and a shifting perception on immigration depending on a person's sense of threat

W8 - Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta. Race for Profit: How Banks and the Real Estate Industry Undermined Black Homeownership. Justice, Power, and Politics. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2019. (CHAPTER 3)

Nixon oversaw a major transition at HUD following the Johnson years, which increased the focus put on local control - Nixon also shifted the narrative on housing towards a more color-blind one which ignored the importance of race and undermined efforts at increasing affordable housing in the suburbs, locking Black homeowners in the cities as the federal government refused to intervene to enforce anti-discrimination mandates George Romney as HUD secretary was a contrarian voice in Nixon's regime - working towards recognizing the need for investment in Black communities and the importance of giving them access to housing outside of the city - Romney say including Black communities in US economic opportunities as essential to avoiding more extreme politics The focus for the early Nixon administration, much like Johnson's, was using the free market to resolve the issue of US urban communities Efforts within HUD and focused on urban renewal in general were harmed by US economic decline that began in the 1970s and which led to growing costs for both housing and land and labor - This economic crunch increased efforts by the housing lobby to influence housing policy in the name of more new construction instead of refurbishing old structures, an effort that meant housing policy became intimately tied with the interests of market forces Romney focused efforts on building quick, cheap, and minimally regulated new housing units to try to boost production Efforts at affordable housing were stimied by NIMBYism in suburbs and Nixon's 'Silent Majority' political strategy focused on the discontent of white suburbs - a trend accentuated by the white flight and black urban migration which defined the 1960s and 1970s - This led to a political dilemma whereby open land for new projects was most available in suburbs, which were also overwhelmingly white and the most politically resistant to such projects Meanwhile, urban renewal and refurbishment programs which focused on increased funding for black communities, proved far too limited Exhaustion within black communities over barriers to equal housing opportunities led to a focus on urban investment over seemingly doomed integration - a focus accentuated by the fact that increased black concentration in cities gave them more political power there which made it feel more like an empowered community But a lack of sufficient funding or resources rendered much urban renewal dead from the start, which meant decreased investment and increased deterioration could continue to justify a lack of intervention/engagement and a continued isolation by white law-makers, since such neighborhoods seemed to affirm racist tropes Suburban communities also succeeded at erecting a formidable legal edifice to prevent integration, with zoning laws front and center - These concerns about suburban integration toften combined concerns about class and race and were enabled by the divestment of federal enforcement through 'new federalism' These concerns in suburbs were exacerbated by the profit incentives of builders, who created new units far too quickly for towns and cities to accommodate all the newcomers, especially since it was overwhelmingly poor / working class suburbs and not rich ones selected for projects, which could flood unprepared public resources like schools and increase resentment - Thus, HUD encouragement of new housing with no simultaneous investment in community services left many suburbs very resistant to public housing HUD efforts to use public policy to force integration were undermined by Republican political strategies which jarred with such forced integration - Indeed, such efforts led to Romney's marginalization in the administration and a much more reticent approach by HUD aimed at avoiding progress or court intervention Nixon's administration increasingly rejected public housing in suburbs as 'forcing economic integration' that would decrease property values, downplaying the race issue - he emphasized the idea of choice as driving segregation and changed questions of segregation to economic issues to justify not enforcing housing law and leaving racial divisions intact in the name of a colorblind approach which ingored how choice was prevented by past discrimination

EXTRA - Tesler, Micahel. "The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race." American Journal of Political Science 56, no. 3 (July 2012): 690-704

Obama's strong association with health care has led to racial spillover on the issue, where it has become polarized along racial lines. Racial opinions on health care were much more polarized in 2004 then decades before and much more polarized when the policies were associated with Obama then with Clinton. Racial divides on Health Care are 20% higher under Obama than Clinton. The racialization of political issues is rather straight forwards on race-targeted policies like Affirmative action - but less explicitly racial issues polarize along race when communication increasingly associates race with those policies (as seen with thinking on Welfare in the 1980s). Racial cues and the identity of thought leaders are key in shaping mass opinion about issues (as seen with Evangelical support for Bush during the Iraq War). This means Obama's race always being at the forefront of his public figure (in spite of his efforts to downplay it) lead more and more issues to be associated with race and thus polarized along those lines. This leads to the spillover of racialization. This is seen in the change in racialized support for health care under Obama.

EXTRA - Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. "Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse." American Political Science Association 15, no. 2 (June 2017): 443-454.

People support populist-authoritarian movements because of a cultural backlash against the post-materialism of the late 20th century, but support for these groups have been growing so much recently because of the growing insecurity among white workers caused by stagnating wages, the decline of manufacturing, and the rise of economic inequality. This was sparked, in part, by the post-materialist diversion of politics away from economic issues. The post-materialist change was caused by the growing levels of security amongst the post-WWII generation, which lead to a shift in values and priorities (in a largely liberal direction) compared to those raised in insecurity prior to WWII who are more prone to authoritarianism. There are two key questions for the rise of populism - 1) what motivates people to support populist far-right movements? 2) why is populist far-right support so much higher today than it was several decades ago in high-income countries? This paper argues that the answer to the first question is largely driven by the cultural backlash fueled by the rise of post-materialism after WWII, while the second question is answered by the growing levels of income inequality and economic insecurity (coupled with rising immigration) that faces working class whites in Europe and the U.S., which has reversed feelings of security and thus paused the decline in materialist and authoritarian sentiments throughout the West. Thus, growing economic insecurity and demographic change is fueling cultural insecurity, which is at the root of populism. Postmaterialism was 'its own gravedigger' in the sense that the rise of post-materialism lead the left to shift its voting base to the middle class and highly educated, and largely abandon the sentiments of the working class of issues of economics and immigration. This lead to a xenophobic and authoritarian backlash by those who worried their 'values' were being left behind, with cultural issues increasingly defining politics instead of economic ones. Consequently, less and less focus was placed on issues of redistribution and less being done to address inequality on both the right and left, which made economic inequality and the deprivation it causes only more salient for the far-right and more likely to be funnelled into nativism. Grading populist support along economic variable reveals little, but grading it along 'five cultural factors' "such as anti-immigrant attitudes and authoritarian values", such values were highly predictive of support (446)

Mudde, Cas. "Fighting the System? Populist Radical Right Parties and Party System Change." Party Politics 20, no. 2 (March 2014): 217-26.

Populist radical right parties have not fundamentally changed the party system in Europe even though they are the only new successful party family to emerge in europe since WWII and their keystone issues of immigration is becoming more important This article assesses the nature of party systems, especially their mechanical dimensions (the directionality of the interactions between the relevant parties) - it doesn't look at ideology because that fits into party competition The populist radical right rose after the 1980s and shares a core ideology of (at least) a combination of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism While these parties still have limited success, the trend points upward in that they were in no national government in the 1980s and by the 2000s were in 7 majority and 3 minority governments. Still, these gains are limited and the individual parties themselves tend to rise and fall quickly Party systems are defined by the interactions of parties, not party characteristics There is little evidence of populist-radical-right parties (PRRPs) changing the number of relevant parties in the system Parties have become more ideologically polarized - with PRRPs opposed to liberal democracy - in at least 5 nations (Austria, Denmark, Italy, Holland, and Switzerland) Austria and Switzerland are the only two clear examples of PRRPs radicalizing the mainstream right and polarizing the political system as a result - however, the overall effect of PRRPs in Europe is small PRRPs have caused little change in the 'pillarization' of politics, which has been devolving since the 1980s When PRRPs do rarely succeed they often lose issue ownership as mainstreet parties converge on parts of their platform and their rhetoric, forcing PRRPs to adjust strategy PRRPs have lead to bipolarized party systems with opposing left-right blocks in ten countries, with only France, Denmark, and Italy (3 out of 16) having obht a bipolar system and strong PRRPs Thus, PRRPs may have changed the ideology and identity of some parties, but have done little to change the systemic interaction between relevant parties within countries. This article has focused only on PRRPs though and not right-wing populism in general, which could bias the results One important way PRRPs could impact party interactions overlooked in this article is by forcing issues onto the political agenda that would otherwise be ignored (like immigration) and thus changing the terms of the political debate

W5 - Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. "What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?: Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases." Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 1 (2008): 3-23. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414006294168.

Public grievances are crucial for the rise of new political movements, but the mechanisms for such grievances leading to the rise of right-wing populists are disputed. While some right-wing populist parties utilize economic grievances (a feeling of growing insecurity and anger of globalization), or grievances over political disillusionment (a feeling of lost sovereignty and bloated/corrupt governments), the single uniting focus of all successful right-wing populist parties are grievances over immigration. These findings are done looking at data from the European Social Survey and party platforms from 2002-3 across all right-wing parties in Europe. Grievances are essential for mobilizing new support for parties within a political system, and thus identifying which grievances are isolated by parties as important provides clear perspective on what unites the far right in Europe. This study looks at far rights parties in Austria, Flanders, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Norway. Overall, economic grievances gave no mobilization advantages to the populist right, along with issues over distrust of the EU or opposition to environmental regulation. All of these issues were more successfully mobilized by major right wing parties on the left and right. Meanwhile, "no populist right party was successful without mobilizing grievances over the immigration crisis better than all major parties of the left and right" (14) Indeed, overall, immigration policy preferences are a "close to perfect predictor of not voting for the populist right" - this is because those with liberal immigration policy preferences have "close to a zero probability of voting for the populist right" (15-7) - "For voters with very restrictive immigration policy preferences, the probability of voting for the populist right is somewhere between 15% and 20%." (17)

W5 - Dancygier, Rafaela M. Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.

REI Version Europeans fear that Muslim religiosity, communalism, social conservatism, and illiberalism make them unable to integrate into European society - this lead to competing imperatives between anti-Mulsim prejudice and the growing voter block of Muslims incentivizing party courting - This book addresses how parties respond to the growing and increasingly stable Muslim electorate and anti-Muslim sentiment Many parties represent muslims at rates far below the population average while many muslim parties have patriarchical voting networks that strike some as illiberal (while candidates who downplay their religion are often ostracized too) This book looks at party responses to changing electorates, looking at both how and when parties include new groups who are disliked by existing voters and by explaining how short-term inclusion strategies decrease ideological coherence and electoral performance Inclusion dilemmas involve contexts where integrating a new group into a party will please some and upset others - more ethnocentric voters decrease the odds of including new members, but more cosmopolitan voters (as on the left) may have more conflict with traditional Muslim beliefs This book argues that only when the net vote gain from inclusion outweighs losses will Muslims be incorporated on left or right When net vote gains are positive but when a group isn't electorally critical, parties will engage in symbolic inclusion with some minority candidates with uncontroversial / cosmopolitan views - When the group is large enough that it becomes pivotal, parties will pursue vote-based inclusion whereby minority candidates are more representative and more popular with their base But the conflict is constantly between the left's cosmopolitanism and the right's ehtnocentrism, which leaves Muslim candidates uncomfortable to both sides This is particularly true on the left, where Muslim conservatism and patriarchalism conflict with the left's cultural views while ethnic networks can come to replace / overshadow class based ones, leading some voters to shift rightward The ambiguous political position of Muslims makes their integration a challenge to traditional accounts of coalition building The conflicts of integration are increased by the gap between what is strategic on a national level vs on a local level Minorities that are less monolithic and less association with one party have more influence because the threat of losing their votes is more real Different inclusion types lead to different candidate types - more serious inclusion = more ethnically popular and ideological candidates This work challenges the view of Muslims as politically isolated and excluded More permissive electoral regimes and more exclusive immigration institutions should decrease Muslim influence as in Germany and Austria, while the opposite should be true as well, as in Belgium and Britain, in spite of all four of these countries having similarly sized migrant populations Muslim communities are often sorted into urban spaces shared by the left when polarization occurs and left-ward views on gender increase with exposure to more Muslims, leading those areas most likely to incorporate Muslims politically to be also those most likely to have preference gaps between Muslims and non-Muslims - Electoral incentives Trump ideological considerations for parties Increased inclusion = an increased focus on male candidates who are more likely to win Muslim voters - this increases ethno-religious parity and decreases gender parity which decreases the ideological coherence of leftward parties The more likely parties are to win seats, the more likely they will pursue inclusion - But this leads the left to prioritize ethnic over class kinship links which end up decreasing their party coherence and success CPE Version Levels of Muslim political inclusion (measured via political candidates) and its form vary widely across Europe - short run inclusion strategies often undercut the ideological coherence of a party, an issue made acute for both sides of the political spectrum by Muslim's cultural conservatism but ethnic diversity Party inclusion strategies are driven by votes (net vote gain), not ideology - Vote gains have to be sufficiently large to motivate inclusion Symbolic inclusion - when vote gains are positive but not critical, candidates will be fielded that minimize contradictions with party policy - this will lead to more female candidates with less kinship ties Vote-based inclusion - when vote gains are pivotal and minority candidates have increased autonomy and thus there are increased risks to ideological coherence - this will lead to more male candidates with kinship ties Vote-based inclusion can crowd out class considerations on the left, which can benefit a ethnically exclusive right which increasingly appeals to the working class Thus, short inclusion strategies on a local level can damage a party naturally by alienating both cosmopolitans and ethnocentrists Minority groups that are not captured by either party wield more influence because they can't be taken for granted Different representation strategies and inclusion types lead to differences in who gets represented and its consequences for the party Austria and Germany have restrictive citizenship and electoral laws, Belgium and the UK the opposite The greater the inclusion of Muslim candidates, the lower the parity in gender between the candidates Inclusion dilemmas arise from the votes gained via incorporating minorities vs the voter alienated and policy platforms contradicted Symbolic inclusion is aimed at appealing to cosmopolitan voters just as much as ethnic minorities - it is virtue signaling via candidates - Symbolic inclusion will result in ideologically aligned candidates that placate party majorities, but ones that appeal to minority communities less. Meanwhile, vote-based inclusion will result in more 'authentic' candidates with a greater capacity for mobilization and vote delivery Urban settlement patterns mean minority actors will often share districts with working class voters that are more ethno-centric District boundaries, citizenship inclusion, and electoral rules all effect approaches to minority voters Minorities who cluster together tend to have stronger minority identities and thus are likely to be both more concerning to ethnocentrists and more conservative than liberal tastes - but these groups also tend to have higher mobilization potential for parties (although that mobilization will be ethno-religious, not class based) This model relies on minorities being able to mobilize co-ethnics, not being captured by one party, and parties being vote maximizers The geographical concentration of Muslims heightens the inclusion tradeoff that parties face with them since Muslim enclaves are more likely to be conservative and in urban city centers - this means inclusion pressures and value conflicts are both highest in cities, especially since proximity to Muslim communities leads to preference polarization with non-Muslim ones Left parties in the UK, Belgium, Austria, and Germany all emphasize integration and equality for migrant communities while rightward parties almost never do so Left parties are more likely to pursue inclusion but this is not well correlated with ideological processions of inclusion - instead, electoral incentives matter much more for which country party pursues which integration policy - Here the different levels of inclusion in citizenship and election laws are key Note: endogeneity issues with relationship between inclusion policies and party inclusion strategies? Looking at non-center parties important in coalitional systems? When the Muslim vote is more crucial, parties are more keen to rely on the kinship networks of Muslim candidates - This has increased electoral volatility and decreased the salience of class as a mobilizing factor, which harms the party brand as a whole and increases odds of personalistic kinship networks failing to deliver for the party since they are inherently more volatile - Thus, pursuing ethnoreligious votes actually decreases party success In Muslim heavy neighborhoods, decreases in income should lead to decreases in Muslim inclusion because of increased ethnocentrism by low-income voters, until their population share becomes large enough for them to be decisive The same relationship doesn't hold for Hindu candidates who are seen as less of a threat and less foreign Because men have stronger kinship ties, vote-based inclusion is likely to prioritize male candidates at the cost of gender parity - because of this tradeoff, some parties who see Muslim mobilization as less important will opt for symbolic inclusion and more palatable and gender-equal candidates There is thus a trade-off between religious and gender parity based on the level of inclusion pursued by a party The tendency to select male candidates is in part a product of parties lacking sufficient information on candidates and using demographic markers to compensate Because urban concentration is linked to economic deprivation, economic development and incorporation for minorities may ironically decrease their political influence Labor based inclusion strategies allow for incorporation of new groups while race/religious based mobilization doesn't - This makes the decrease in working class coherence via deindustrialization an decreased unions and increased immigration especially damaging to modern left wing parties Dilemmas of inclusion can make it very hard for socially liberal cosmopolitans to embrace more racially diverse parties since this often conflicts with some of their own progressive values

W6 - Fitzgerald, David Scott. "The History of Racialized Citizenship." In The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship, edited by Ayelet Shachar, Irene Bloemraad, Maarten Vink, and Rainer Bauböck. Oxford Handbooks in Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198805854.013.6.

Racial categories have been the basis for assigning/taking away citizenship since antiquity - looking at this historic record, which includes cycles of racialization and deracialization, shows that jus sanguinis (citizenship based on parental ethnicity) is not inherently racist and jus soli (citizenship based on place of birth) can be fully compatible with racialized citizenship - This paper argues that the formation of nation-states out of empires lent itself to racialization while the consolidation of nation-states decreased racialization, with the modern era, marked by the mid-twentieth century, being a period of deracilalization even as political entrepreneurs test these anti-racist institutions Racialization can occur within citizenship at four distinct points - three through the process of nationality (birthright acquisition, naturalization, and denationalization) and one via the internal dimensions of citizenship (status, rights, and obligations) - in all of these contexts, racialization can consist of either negative discrimination or positive preference for a group Birthright acquisition is the question of jus solis or jus sanguinis, naturalization can be either explicitly or implicitly racialized, denationalization can occur through expulsion / ethnic cleansing (although denationalization is increasingly seen as illegitimate) and internal dimensions of citizenship can be separated into legal status and substantive practice (with practice more racialized than status) In spite of the traditional view of racism as a more modern phenomenon, there is strong evidence for proto-racialization in antiquity with Athenian citizenship based on jus sanguinis placed in contrast to racialized barbarians - the period of roman rule and Eurasian empire, however, witnessed a de-racialization in part because of the diversity of the empire It wasn't until the expulsion of Jews Iberia and the rise of European colonization that racialization emerged again This process of racialization was enhanced by the need to codify nationality in newly forming nation states There is much evidence of nations adopting jus sanguinis as a way of incorporating more groups not less and in replication of other states Jus Sanguinis has also been used to justify citizenship unique from colonizers in decolonizing states The way jus solis can be commandeered to affirm an ethno-nationalist view of nationality is displayed in the US - the US has had racially defined citizenship from the very state, with natives excluded in 1789 and Black slaves not getting protections until the 14th Amendment's codification of jus soli - but rules on naturalization were based on whiteness, as seen with Ozawa and Baghat Singh Thind - Most of these restrictions were gone by the 1950s however Immigration controls were the key mechanism of racializing US citizenship for much of its history, along with limits to the rights of citizenship for non-blacks Thus, both just solis and jus sanguinis can be racialized or non-racialized depending on context The creation of nation states often required defined nationalities which inspired mass violence / exclusion of those who didn't fit in But backlash to Nazism and the growth of consolidated nation states has led to a trend of denationalization recently with some prominent exceptions like South Africa or the Dominican Republic Some positive racial preferences around citizenship remain, but are couched in the terms of family and cultural protection - Indeed, the number of countries with positive cultural preference in their immigration laws actually increased in the 20th century International norms and regulations increasingly prohibit race-based distinctions for naturalization and citizenship The association of ethnicities with states makes the political consequences of race-based discrimination more serious

W3 - Marfleet, Philip. "Explorations in a Foreign Land: States, Refugees, and the Problem of History." Refugee Survey Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2013): 14-34. https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdt006.

Studies of refugees frequently overlook the long lasting effects of major displacements and how such events are experienced over time The foundation of nation states is deeply tied to the movement of people within an across territorial boundaries, with mass migration and displacement being part of the process though which nations are made, since the modern nation-state relies on asserting authority over set geographic spaces and populations within them and since displacement has been key to setting these socio-cultural borders - yet, in spite of this, the role of refugees in modern statemaking has been all but ignored This amnesia of forced migration is a corollary of the national character of modern history writing, which ignores those who don't fit into the nation state framework, with this lens only just being appreciate in the more transnational world of today Under this view, migrants of all forms, including internal ones, are seen as dysfunctional in relation to the state, since the state's authority rests on its ability to map and exert authority over its population - something that is undermined by mobile people This was reinforced by the fact that nation-states made sedentary and rooted peoples the norm, making non-rooted people a threat both to the state (as untethered entities) and to the people (as unidentified 'others') - this had a self-reciprocating effect, as persecuted groups also became increasing displaced from their states, as seen with European Jews People who don't fit a national norm are often displaced by newly formed states or aspiring nations, making them even more vulnerable as they no longer fit in anywhere within the nation-state model - this form of state hostility to mobile people can be seen with special clarity during colonialism, when mobile groups evaded colonial control, were characterized as highly primitive, and were subjects of genocide, confinement, and historical erasure, all in the name of land acquisition and sovereign control North America's historical narrative of colonization shows how states have written over their history of expropriating and dispossessing Indian land an d peoples, in large part because their lack of fixed land of property made them seem unproductive and backwards With growing European military dominance, extermination increasingly became a viable means of controlling and erasing unfixed and mobile groups The lack of formal tools of recording history within these mobile societies left them largely erased from the history books once exterminated Religious discrimination and exportation were key tools of national identity formation in the early European state - when groups weren't wanted they were often wholesale exported to foreign territories as in Australia Forgetting has long been recognized as a crucial factor in the formation of states and nations - as seen with the U.S. forgetting its settler colonial and racialized past in forming a national ethos of equality - Migrants, both forced and voluntary, provided the crucial energy for constructing the US state and yet have been erased from its history and forced to amalgamate while being exploited Instead, America's history of diverse and repressed migrants is replaced with one that focuses on the prototypical pilgrim forefather - here, as in other states like Israel, some stories of migration are lauded and celebrated as key events in national history while others are ignored and repressed, a trend seen all over the world, from Turkey to Greece to Burma and India, with refugees and migrants being suppressed from histories Thus, the loss of migrant histories isn't just an accident of circumstance but also an active choice of nation-states built on their suppression

W5 - Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel J. Hopkins. "Public Attitudes Toward Immigration." Annual Review of Political Science 17, no. 1 (2014): 225-249. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-102512-194818.

Self-interest/economic explanations for rising xenophobia fare far more poorly than explanations that focus on overarching and symbolic concerns about shifts in a nation's culture and society, often propelled by ethnocentrism and perceptions around assimilation. Where economics does have an effect on voters, it is through national anxiety about the state of the economy and not individual self-interest. Opposition to immigration on the far right is not well correlated with economic circumstances, and instead seems to be motivated by sociotropic concerns about the cultural impacts of immigration writ large, with a specific concern about threats to national identity. This thesis gains much more support than ones that focus on pocket-book concerns and the idea that immigrants will shift resource distribution away from people and thus cause animus out of self-interest. Peoples level of support for immigration don't seem to vary based on how much the immigrants skill levels overlap with their own - further proof of culture and values being the driving force behind these trends. Meanwhile, sociotropic assessments of the economy and cultural concerns like those surrounding language acquisition and ethnic homogeneity are very strong predictors of immigration views. Opposition to immigration can also be triggered by particularly salient events. There is mixed evidence on if personal exposure to immigrants, or changing sizes of immigrant groups within one's own community, is related to opposition to them

W1 - Kelley, Robin D. G. "'We Are Not What We Seem': Rethinking Black Working-Class Opposition in the Jim Crow South." The Journal of American History 80, no. 1 (1993): 75-112. https://doi.org/10.2307/2079698.

Small, daily acts of resistance by the working class to discrimination were common throughout the Jim Crow South, although often ignored and denied in History in favor of narratives focus on elites and grand acts of resistance instead of daily acts of political struggle - these 'hidden transcripts' of resistance by seemingly compliant groups have a huge effect on the social landscape - they are 'infrapolitics' which, like infrared light, exist beyond the visible spectrum A focus on infrapolitics not only highlights the complicated power structures and multifaceted reality of resistance in the oppressive South, but also shifts the focus of politics from a 'how' focused on traditional institutions of political expression to a 'why' that includes non-mainstream participation by the oppressed. In a system of oppression, resistance was built into the fabric of daily life, as small acts of rebellion became a key expression of independence This resistance took place throughout the South in communal settings (like Church) in household settings, in workplace settings, and in public spaces, with segregation enabling both covert resistance to the white world and unmonitored resistance within the black one (like church and social clubs) The markers of black community organizations were key to black social and cultural survival and material support The household and domestic life is an oft overlooked aspect of political development and unspoken resistance separate from workplace and labor resistance Clothing like the zoot suit was an expression of resistance to subservient work conditions and demeaning language towards black men Acts of subtle protest, sabotage, strike, and resistance are often overlooked in the story of working-class opposition at work Mobility was also central to infrapolitics since it allowed protest and resistance to oppression via the threat or actual act of leaving Doing home work became a means of gaining autonomy and avoiding exploitative work environments for Black women White workers emphasized racial divides as a way of protecting the wages of their whiteness and accruing privilege and avoiding social ostracization Public and small scale resistance to acts of humiliation were also a constant expression of political opposition to public segregation and degradation Resistance to segregation and humiliation on public transport was spearheaded by Black women - and such acts proved effective disruptors By prompting responses by whites, acts of resistance, both subtle and overt, reshaped the power dynamics of oppression Infrapolitical resistance and more organized protest are two sides of the same coin, with subtle resistance often enabling overt objections

W4 - Peters, Margaret E. "Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Immigration Policy Making in the United States." International Organization 68, no. 4 (2014): 811-44. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000150.

This article argues US immigration policy after 1950 can only be explained with reference to the increased integration of global markets - increased trade openness increased the exposure of firms that relied heavily on immigrant labor to foreign competition, leading them to close more, while increased foreign direct investment (FDI) allowed more of the same firms to move overseas - as a result, the number of employers spending their capital to advocate on immigration issues decreased significantly, which gave policymakers more room to restrict immigration - a finding supported by an examination of voting behavior in the US Senate as it corresponds to globalization. Meanwhile, theories which focus on domestic factors like nativism, immigration lobbies, and organized labor all fail to account for the trends in migration policy Instead, the focus needs to be on the economies need for low-skill labor, a factor affected by a country's trade policy and the capacity of firms to move overseas (firm mobility) - this view argues firms should advocate for more low skill migration when barriers to trade and mobility are high, while the inverse is true as well, a trend which has a significant affect on policy outcomes because of the influence of the business lobby on Washington Indeed, Senate voting behavior is well predicted by trade openness and firm mobility, while a Senator's party or ideology and national levels of welfare spending, unemployment, GDP, and foreign-born population has little to no explanatory effect Opening trade and capital, by changing how firms function, changes the political landscape in ways that reverberate in migration policy Because of various policy decisions and global trends after WWII, trade openness and firm mobility were largely out of the control of senators in their era too ,which increased the validity of findings focusing on their voting patterns This article also views low-skill migration (the focus of it) as distinct from high-skill migration, since high-skill workers interact with the state differently and interact with the market differently and are more palatable politically - it also focuses on less productive and low-skill intensive firms The arguments in this article should apply broadly to any low-skill labor scarce state, even if the focus is the US High-skill intensive firms prefer to lobby on issues besides migration, so when their share of the business market increases because of open trade, voices opposed to immigration come to dominate and business advocacy for increased low-skill migration drops off Senate votes show both levels of firm mobility and trade openness are statistically significant in impacting votes on immigration and these effects hold even when controlling for other factors typically attributed to immigration support like the size of unions, size of the immigration population, size of the welfare system, and GDP levels Data on firm lobbying also confirms that more mobile and less trade protected firms lobby systematically less on low-skill migration

W1 - Bailey, Zinzi D., Justin M. Feldman, and Mary T. Bassett. "How Structural Racism Works — Racist Policies as a Root Cause of U.S. Racial Health Inequities." The New England Journal of Medicine 384, no. 8 (2021): 768-773. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMms2025396.

Structural racism affects both population and individual health through at least three interrelated domains: redlining and residential segregation, mass incarceration and police violence, and unequal medical care Redlining, limits to home loans, and predatory lending have all increased segregation and contributed to massive wealth disparities - this has contributed to long term health problems not only via increased exposure to pollution and toxins but also higher stress and decreased nutrients in these communities U.S. policing has long been highly racially disparate, overtly violent, and used as a tool of maintaining racial hierarchies - these disparate impacts have only been accentuated by the rise of mass incarceration since the start of the War on Drugs. All of this has harmed health outcomes, not just through deaths via the police but also the poor conditions in prisons, both broadly and during the pandemic, not to mention the psychological and communal stressors caused by prison terms American medicine has some of its origins in scientific racism and the Eugenics movement, with medicine used to legitimize the dehumanization and exploitation of black bodies - disparities in treatment, access to care, and assumption in care are all shaped by race, stereotypes, and prejudice (including the consistent devaluation of Black pain) - this is compounded by a systemic under-investment in health resources in Black communities, with decreased care and increased costs These gaps in health are so abundant and routine they have become normalized and are viewed as inevitable - these issues require more study, documentation, training, and acknowledgment and adjustment in response to shifting social norms

EXTRA - Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig, "Global Competition and Brexit," American Political Science Review 112, no. 2 (2018): 201-218.

Support for Brexit was higher in regions of Britain hit harder by economic globalization. This paper traces this phenomenon to surging imports from China over the past three decades causing a divergence in economic performance between different regions of the country. Those exposed to this shock have seen a decline in industry and employment. Thus, the 'losers' of globalization are left feeling displaced by this import shock and respond with support for more populist measures. The impact of such import shocks, more importantly, is sociotropic, not purely personal and economic (pocket-book), with people in affected regions responding similarly. Further, individual attitudes towards immigration are systematically worsened by the import shock, while not being systematically related to the actual levels of immigraiton within a region - pointing to sociotropic feelings of economic distress as a driving cause animus towards immigrants. There are three mechanisms through which the import shock may have increased support for Brexit - (1) the vote for Brexit could have been an anti-incumbent vote, with the 'losers' of globalization sending a message to the incumbent government and expressing their discontent with the government's approach through a generalized opposition to them; (2) a vote for Brexit can be seen as protectionist backlash by voters aware of globalization's role in their economic decline and thus seeking to 'take back control' of their economy; (3) a vote for Brexit could be tied ot immigration, with areas more concerned about immigration (perhaps because of economic decline) being more likely to support it. This findings of this paper support import shocks as decisive in the referendum, showing that if they hadn't happened the results would have been likely reversed. The results are further both highly statistically and substantively significant. Meanwhile, the inflow of immigrants within a region is a poor predictor of support for Brexit. Thus, 'globalization without compensation' should be key to understanding populism in the West right now - "The inability of governments to set up effective compensation policies for the "left behind" of globalization might have led to a crisis of embedded liberalism, breeding isolationism and neo nationalism." (217)

EXTRA - Stepan, Alfred, and Juan Linz. "Comparative Perspectives on Inequality and the Quality of Democracy in the United States." Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 4 (December 2011): 841-855.

The U.S. is (and has consistently been) uniquely unequal for a developed democracy. This is because of a mixture of five factors that make the U.S. political system majority constraining and thus equalizing reform especially hard to pass: 1) the unique number of veto players in the U.S. (four), which limits the capacity for status-quo shifting policies. Very few other countries have more than two veto players. 2) the structure of the Senate, which is deeply malapportioned 3) the disproportionate power of the Senate (aided by the filibuster, its appointment powers, and veto power over House bills), 4) the 10th Amendment's reservation of rights to the states, 5) the difficulty of the U.S. system of constitutional amendments. The process of racial disenfranchisement in the south was sanctioned by law (state constitutions) and uniquely enforced through the consistent and systematic inaction of the federal government. Even today, the U.S. remains unique is how unequal it is in almost all regards. The massive impediments to effective policy change in the U.S. is reflected in its deficiency welfare programs. This is in spite of the massive demand for inequality reducing measures in the U.S. public. U.S. federalism increases this problem by decreasing the federal government's prerogative on key social programs and fuelling a race to the bottom on corporate tax rates (and thus state revenues).

W2 - Marx, Anthony W. "Race-Making and the Nation-State." World Politics 48, no. 2 (January 1996): 180-208.

The U.S., South Africa, and Brazil all started with similar racial divisions and histories of slavery. In both the U.S. and South Africa, attempts to build the nation state after the civil war and Boer War led to efforts by the government to appease a divided (and armed) white population - forcing a strategy of white unification via black degradation. In contrast, Brazil lacked such a strong division and a dominant threat of force from one of its racial groups, and had no civil war to end slavery, so was able to avoid the racial construction of their nation and instead embrace and ethos of racial diversity (with remaining inequality). Ironically, however, it was the institutional aspect of discrimination that allowed for the racial solidarity needed to resist it in the U.S. and South Africa. Referring to the post conflict equilibriums - "Agreement on a racially defined "other" as a common enemy defined and encouraged white unity. Thus, the same issue of race that had exacerbated prior conflict was used to heal it, as racial domination gradually transformed a potential triadic conflict among white factions and blacks into a more manageable dyadic form of "white over black"" (182) - Thus, the reinforcement of norms of 'racial domination' and of unified racial identity were a means of "reinforcing and consolidating the nation state" for both the U.S. and South Africa The unintended effect of the racial domination in both the U.S. and South Africa was a promotion of black protest which eventually destabilized the state and forced reform, meanwhile, Brazil faced no such threat from strongly segregationist policies and racial conflict was avoided (even if other forms of inequality were rampant). Economic propositions for the end of discrimination fall short because they fail to explain how South Africa maintained aparthied for decades after it became a significant source of pressure on their international trade relationships and businesses after 1948, the state pursued apartheid despite the tremendous cost of regulation and the manifold inefficiencies. Throughout, white workers' demands for privilege were met" (189-90) Similarly, labor movements in the U.S. were willing to sacrifice the benefits of stronger advocacy for maintained racial segregation, showing that cultural and political distinctions, not economic benefits, were at the heart of discrimination. The origins of the different racial responses in these three states came from the bargains of the states in trying to keep the nation together after emancipation / faced with a free black population. Once coalitions were formed around white-alliances at the cost of black subjugation, it created path dependencies of racial domination difficult to break with without concerted social opposition

W3 - Rana, Aziz. "Colonialism and Constitutional Memory." UC Irvine Law Review 5, no. 2 (June 1, 2015): 263. https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol5/iss2/4.

The US shares a number of traits with other settler societies - including their division of legal, political, and economic rights between insiders and subordinate outsiders - in spite of the U.S.'s reluctance to see itself as an imperial or settler state, a reluctance stemming in large part from the symbolic significance of the US constitution as a symbol of freedom and equality This civil narrative makes it more difficult for Americans to appreciate the country's colonial underpinnings or to address the resulting grievances This was a narrative that first emerged in the US with their entry onto the global stage following the Spanish-American war Throughout much of the late 19th and early 20th century however, the US both implicitly and explicitly aligned itself with other settler states like Australia and South Africa This view of the US bolstered a real belief in the importance of the government in both providing racially defined insiders with the emancipatory conditions of self-government and economic independence while also extracting the land and labor for this from non-settler groups This view of the US as a white man's country rightfully reaping the fruits of native land and black labor is abundant in early US politics and the Declaration of Independence This alignment of the vision of America with the definitions/frameworks of settler colonialism seems foreign today when the US embraces an identity focused on a civic exceptionalism defined by adherence to democracy and equality, which is placed in direct contrast to imperial powers - although many acknowledge the history of oppression in the US, they see it fitting into a long story of progress towards the American creed This more civic view of the US is grounded in the symbolic value of the US constitution - a view which almost entirely erases the colonial view of the US past and paints the US as a counterpoint to the settler-imperialism of Europe (and especially the UK) - thus the US has been redefined in civic instead of setter terms This civic interpretation of the US stems from teh early 20th century when the US saw both the closing of its frontier and its emergence as a global power at a time when all vulnerable colonial possessions had already been claimed and when white Americans rallied around an enlightenment interpretation of the US constitution which embraced US exceptionalism and portrayed the US as a benign power aligned with the interests of the world and in contrast to Europe - this view was based on a deification of the US constitution which reimagined the U.S. in more inclusive terms and allowed the country to consolidate its position as both a largely completed settler project and global power whose main connection was via trade, not colonization Thus, the civic ideology of the US arose from its settler ambitions and need to justify its rule abroad in an era when colonialism was a hard sell While this shift in ideology allowed the US to become more civic minded and egalitarian, it was also highly successful in suppressing the US's colonial infrastructure, the legacies of its settler project, and the importance of its continued economic and political subordination of marginalized communities This means the US civic and settler identity are deeply and closely interlinked - not separate and distinct During the CRM many Black political leaders noted the way the US focus on its anti-imperial revolutionary war underplayed the country's continuation of the imperial project Black leaders emphasized this narrative because it highlighted the damage of the US civic creed and the deep rooted nature of US inequality Their critique called for another constitutional convention since US ideology had embraced decolonization without its institutions actually decolonizing and redistributing resources This view drew largely from Black identification with decolonization efforts and their ability to use Cold War pressures to their advantage This view also painted the suppression of rights for Blacks as integrated into this framework of colonial governance that prioritized some's freedom and autonomy at the cost of other's oppression - limiting different groups to different tiers of governance and rights and locking inequality into the roots of US politics These calls by the Black Panthers and other Black groups have largely been delegitimize today as alienating and radical departures from America's civic creed

W8 - Michener, Jamila. "Race, Poverty, and the Redistribution of Voting Rights." Poverty & Public Policy 8, no. 2 (2016): 106-128. https://doi.org/10.1002/pop4.137.

The US tried to increase low income voter turnout and registration through the 1993 National Voter Registration Act (NVRA - Section 7) which required all public assistance agencies (PAAs) to serve as voter registration sites. But implementation of the act has been highly varied - This article shows that variation is based on race, which is a critical determinant of state efforts at low-income incorporation. Indeed, state compliance decreased significantly when (1) non-whites are less active in electoral politics relative to their white counterparts, (2) Black people are a greater share of the state population, (3) welfare bureaucracies employ more Latinos - This shows how the entanglement of race and poverty in a federalist system can frustrate efforts at advancing participatory equality There are two sets of actors who use race to limits measures for participatory equality: elites and bureaucrats Non-compliance with Section 7 is aimed at repressing poor black political turnout Federalism has long been a tool used to aid efforts at supressing non-white voters Political elites have an incentive to undermine Section 7 since it can undermine political balances and empower the impoverished Meanwhile, bureaucrats hold a great deal of power as the implementors of the policy Thus, the less active non-whtie are, the larger a population they are, and the more they differ from bureaucrats (i.e. the less black the bureaucracy), the greater the incentive to keep them from accessing these new voting rights - Conversely, more active non-whites, smaller non-threatening population sizes, and similar bureaucracies all aid in increasing compliance Compliance is also higher in Democratically ruled states and with a Democratic president and lower in Republican ruled states The high correlation between Latino bureaucrats and decreased compliance shows both the flexibility of Latino identity and the fluidity of their party identity These effects hold even when controlling for partisanship, even though partisanship is strongly linked to decreased compliance This shows the key influence black political empowerment can have on the outcome of potentially equalizing policies Meanwhile, local politics and prejudice can significantly aid in the preservation of racial inequalities in the US

W2 - King, Desmond, and Rogers Smith. "'Without Regard to Race:' Critical Ideational Development in Modern American Politics." The Journal of Politics 76, no. 4 (October 2014): 958-971.

The conservative coalition in the U.S. has succeeded over the past decades, where the progressive coalition has faltered, because of the successful 'critical ideational development' (a special kind of critical juncture) by the G.O.P. of repurposing 'color-blind' rhetoric for the maintenance of racial inequality. This outlook has allowed for a strong and cohesive coalition for Republicans (combining libertarianism with racial conservatism) that has spilled over into other policy areas, whereas Democrats have lacked a similar unifying ideology, and have been divided over the question of race-conscious policies and material equality. "Color-blind advocates proved far more effective than race-conscious ones in associating their policies with imagery that gave their positions broad appeal" (960) Ideational innovation occurs only insofar as (1) political ideas succeed in resonating with ingrained identities and interests, (2) these ideas frequently repurpose old ideas for new ends, (3) ideational reforms occurs via the the forming of advocacy coalitions via 'coordinative discourse among political leaders' and through the creation of mass support via 'communicative discourses', (4) the reformulation of ideas is aided by common cultural images associated with established identities. - all of this allows ideational innovation to slowly reshape coalitions and political landscapes. Color Blindness in the 1960s was only one of many strategies pursued by the left in the goal of creating racial equality - it was a brick in the wall of progress But republicans seized on colorblindness as a way of making racial conservatism seem aligned with the civil rights movement and a 'post-racial' world - and allowed issues like states rights to be disassociated with segregation - This focus on excluding racial quotas snowballed into a focus on excluding all racially conscious policies all together, under the guise of 'true' equality - All of this empowered a conservative movement with a deep opposition of any recognition of racial inequality or difference, supported through the language of colorblindness Meanwhile, a liberal coalition based around race consciousness and material equality between the races was harder to coalesce, as many saw attempts at explicitly equalization as only temporary solutions and not compatible with long term American ideals. Republicans were advantaged by the great simplicity of color-blind rhetoric compared to the complicated nature of race conscious solutions and their nuances. Further, color-blindness fits within a broader philosophical outlook among republicans embracing the ethos of personal responsibility. This has helped push race out of the mainstream of American political contestation

W1 - Hansen, Peo, and Stefan Jonsson. "Imperial Origins of European Integration and the Case of Eurafrica: A Reply to Gary Marks' 'Europe and Its Empires.'" Journal of Common Market Studies 50, no. 6 (2012): 1028-1041. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02282.x.

The creation of the EEC was a landmark geopolitical event which aimed not only to create a pan-European community with a shared common market but to extend that community in European overseas territories, incorporating Africa into a Euro-Africa Colonialism was central to the development of the EEC - It was not only a central aspect of the creation and reality of Europe's internal and external politics during that era, but was also key to motivating the collaboration of the EEC and essential in encouraging the scope of the new arrangement via the assumption its benefits and conditions would extend beyond Europe and into Africa A historical view of the political empires within Europe being contained by its geographical landmass as opposed to far more diverse and overlapping with Asia and Africa is fundamentally mistaken and overlooks Europe's constant interaction with the rest of the world Thus, the view of the rise of the nation state in Europe as the end of the European empire is mis-based - this also means understandings of the EU independent of its international relationship, exploitation of colonies, and resources related to imperialism Even the modern EU maintains dynamics of empire in its handling of migration, integration of border status, and integration The EU was founded as a means of incorporating diverse colonial holdings into a new imperial amalgam that would fuel Europe's revival Indeed, the European project was only seen as viable because it was connected to a vast territory and resources via Euro-Africa The project was also seen as a way of protecting European influence and colonial status in Africa after the losses of WWI and WWII

W8 - Goffman, Alice. "On the Run: Wanted Men in a Philadelphia Ghetto." American Sociological Review 74, no. 3 (2009): 339-357. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240907400301.

The effect of mass incarceration on Black communities and neighborhoods has too often been overlooked, especially as it relates to the daily lives and experiences of affected Black communities - This work draws on six years of field work in philadelphia to study the increased incarceration and surveillance of Black lives, with people growing up as 'wanted' and avoiding jail a constant precaution for those haunted by warrants for minor infractions The constant threat of imprisonment transforms social relations by making family, work, and community all more tenuous - meanwhile, the fear of imprisonment is sometimes used as a catchall excuse for other failings or as a tool of social control by others within the community Incarceration has significant and long lasting effects on the life chances of Black men and their partners and children The over policing of poor neighborhoods has many obvious and hidden effects on the structure of daily life for their members The result is many of these men feel illegal or semi-legal and have an overriding sense of suspicious which leads to avoiding institutions, places, and many relations of support -Criminal justice logics thus come to pervade daily interactions for many within black communities Whereas police used to ignore high crime neighborhoods, the war on drugs and crime has completely reversed that Now the neighborhoods are under near constant supervision leading to a climate of fear and suspicion- Police brutality attached to the surveillance was a regular part of life for the philadelphia group observed for this paper Close to half the men in the community had warrants out for their arrest, almost all for minor infractions and even those who didn't could be brought in on any number of trumped up charges, small infractions, or connections to others All community relations exist around the assumption that young men may be taken in if they encounter authorities - this makes relationships dangerous and networks of connections like trends and family also networks of liability - Even going to the hospital becomes a liability Proper employment is also risky for people with a warrant out, as can calling the policy when a crime happens, making them more likely to be the subject of crimes and more likely to use violence in retribution People frequently used the threat of calling a parole officer to exert control over others, even their partners who see threats tied to criminal justice as a way of forcing good behavior from their partners or to punish them for bad behavior Relationships can also be used by the police to force people to talk or risk getting taken in themselves or their kids taken away This all leads men to focus on unaccountability and unpredictability to avoid the liability of being turned in, which means regular living and work is too dangerous But people also use being wanted to save face ands explain inadequacies sometimes All of this shows the effects of mass incarceration beyond simply the number of people locked up - it puts stable community life, employment, and housing all at contrast with efforts to avoid run-ins with authorities - life is thus lived under the umbrella of constant fear, if not constant surveillance of all acts, giving the constant sense of being on the run

W3 - Hooijer, Gerda, and Desmond King. "The Racialized Pandemic: Wave One of COVID-19 and the Reproduction of Global North Inequalities." Perspectives on Politics, 2021, 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759272100195X.

The long history of racial discrimination and economic deprivation for non-white communities in the Global North lead to a consistently larger burden on these communities during the first wave of the Covid pandemic, as documented with evidence from the US, UK, Netherlands, and Sweden - pre-existing gaps in health and economic conditions were only exacerbated by the pandemic This is not an outcome limited to the US but one that applies to much of the global north where institutional racism and discrimination reproduced health inequities and where initial government responses failed to address these inequities by not acknowledging the particular challenges these groups faced These trends hold actress these different countries in spite of their variant histories, government structures, and social states These disparities are impossible to understand without an eye towards the deeply institutionalized forms of inequality in health, employment, and housing throughout the north, all of which remain as vestiges of the North's colonial and racially hierarchical past, which are self-reproducing, interlocking, and reciprocating in these societies today The lingering inequality in these states can be split into two factors - systemic discrimination and health system inequities - systemic discrimination captures institutional racism in the global north which is often reproduced through constant small scale acts - health system inequities captures how the social determination and distribution of health care is more clearly and explicitly racialized in there countries as a product of discrimination and persistent socio-economic inequality linked to these country's national ethnic hierarchies The consequences of both of these are significant inequities in the impact of covid-19 on communities of color in the north These disparate health outcomes, the increased impact of the pandemic on service and front-line jobs which non-white communities hold disproportionately, and the exclusion of migrants from state support programs all mean the pandemic has helped to entrench inequality in the US The inequalities in access to health care, occupations, neighborhood support and wealth all combine to compound the inequality of the pandemic in an interlocking relationship as reflected in the higher rates of unemployment and slower recovery from that unemployment in these communities during the pandemic and their increased representation in vulnerable occupations

W2 - Reskin, Barbara. "The Race Discrimination System." Annual Review of Sociology 38, no. 1 (2012): 17-35. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-071811-145508.

The persistence of racial disparities is in part due to the fact that they are reciprocally related and integrated in a coherent system - This system manifests in uber discrimination, a meta-level phenomenon which shapes our culture, cognitions, and institutions Not acknowledging this system of reciprocal feedback leads to model mis-specification which limits effective remedies This article views race through a system theory which views racial disparities as greater than the sum of racial disparities across subsystems and analyses the relationship between these subsystems over their individual functioning These systems have positive feedback loops without intervention - A discriminatory system is one in which (a) disparities systematically favor certain groups, (b) disparities across subsystems are reinforcing, and (c) one source of these disparities is discrimination - this is seen in the real world where residential, educational, employment, health care, credit, and criminal justice discrimination combine into uber discrimination, which infuses the world we occupy and is thus reflected in our beliefs and values on race. Thus, discrimination creates systems which ideologically justify discrimination Research within political science has suffered through its focus on explaining individual causes of racial disparities and this has often been joined by a reticence at attributing disparities to discrimination - instead, this article argues a society-wide system of discrimination exists where (a) race linked disparities exist in every subsystem, (b) at least some of these disparities result directly from discrimination, and (c) disparities in each subsystem are reciprocally linked to each other Evidence of this is seen in residential and school segregation, education disparities, labor market outcomes, housing access, access to credit, health services, and criminal justice - with each linking to the other in a reciprocal relationship (housing discrimination leads to decreased education and health outcomes and labor opportunities) so that discrimination collectively effects all American institutions and infects our minds, culture, and institutions with uber discrimination This makes intervening against US discrimination especially hard because one subsystem counteracts interventions in another, no one mechanism contributes to the disparate outcomes, and because those who benefit from the system have a stake in its maintenance This makes intervening at strategic leverage points all the more important, or introducing exogenous forces which act simultaneously on all the subsystems (which has almost happened two with race - during Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Movement), but even these massive interventions have fallen short as delays and opportunism and vested interests preserved the racial order if in a new form - This is seen in Nixon's Southern Strategy This shows the uselessness of interventions that aren't systematic and strategic since racial harms are cumulative disadvantages - these interventions exist within a systematic context requiring systematic interventions and a recognition of the system-wide nature of discrimination which is often lost when limiting analysis to specific individual factors The three interventions that succeed against a systemic process of discrimination are (a) overarching exogenous forces (like mass federal intervention), (b) interventions at leverage points, like housing, (c) moving subsystems out of the system, and altering common practices in subsystems which decrease discrimination

W7 - Price, Melanye T. The Race Whisperer: Barack Obama and the Political Uses of Race. New York: New York University Press, 2016.

The role that race plays in politics has gotten more complicated as explicit expression of it have decreased - this book examines the complicated ways Obama interacted with the topic of race within this context - because Obama is the first non-white member of the White House, understanding his use of race for voters, opponents and political goals is a new challenge Because of Obama's race, all politics around him is unavoidably racialized - Thus, this book looks at Obama's explicit and implicit uses of race, the effects of these invocations on politics, and how they affected other social groups Obama has used multiple and complex narratives about his own racial heritage to mobilize support, garner acceptance, and decrease the contentiousness of his race - his approach sees race as more fluid, malleable, and susceptible to context - Obama thus combines appeals to concrete racial identities with a more all embracing rhetoric aimed at building a larger coalition Obama thus is much more skilled at both understanding and using the malleable nature of the racial landscape than past presidents Obama was able to position himself as both a racial insider and someone who transcended those boundaries - a fact helped by Obama's biographies and his consistent effort to paint himself as an embodiment of the American Dream Obama's campaign uniquely succeeded at tone shifting for different audiences and that helped build him a celebrity status, especially among young voters Part of the issue with past works on Obama's election has been their focus on race as a static social entity Obama succeeded because of his ability to present a form of blackness that would secure cross-sectional support - this was aided by an implicit acceptance of Obama's avoidance of Race by black voters who saw it as a political necessity America's political parties have become racially polarized while their language has become re-racialized, with implicit tropes relied on instead Republicans increasingly rely on implicit invocations of racial resentment as seen with Willie Horton and Sistah Solja - all of this fits into a modern conservatism increasingly built on white racial hostility and a sense that the government coddles minorities - but Democrats have similarly consistently prioritized white electoral concerns and distanced themselves from being a 'minority' party, as seen with Clinton's campaigning Many of Obama's rhetorical techniques were used to help convince voters he belonged and had the skill and character to be president

EXTRA - Gest, Justin. The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2016.

The white working class in both the U.S. and U.K. are suffering from a sense of marginalization and deprivation, caused by the gap between their expectations of social and political status, and the reality of that status during an era of globalization, demographic shifts, and political realignment. This is reflected in the rise of post-traumatic cities throughout the U.S. and the U.K., where the sense of deprivation and status loss for the working class white population is especially severe. There are dominant narratives of white working class resentment that focus on economics (the decline of manufacturing and effects of globalization) on morality (whites clinging to the unfair advantages of their race, especially the white working class), or on demographics (the decline in racial homogeneity in both Europe and the U.S. since WWII). The establishment of white privilege throughout history has made such privileges 'the natural order of things' and makes disturbances to it feel like an unfair denial. This feeling of being demoted from the center of a country's economy, society, and politics, leads to resentment expressed as populism. "white working class people are consumed by their loss of social and political status in social hierarchies, particularly in relation to immigrant and minority reference groups. Their politics are motivated and pervaded by a nostalgia that reveres, and seeks to reinstate, a bygone era." (16)

W7 - Joppke, Christian. Neoliberal Nationalism: Immigration and the Rise of the Populist Right. Cambridge Core. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108696968. (CHAPTER 2)

There is a constant conflict within the west created by the gap between supply and demand in migration, whereby accepting many migrants leads to increased migrant inflows, more political pressure, and a decrease in migrant rights but accepting no migrants leads to a stress on asylum and family unification channels of migration which become overloaded with applicants - meanwhile, high-skill migrants are sought after and recruited The West has very restrictive migration regimes overall and the far right has been getting more and more restrictionist - states are unwilling to compromise on the unfettered control of their borders, even while acknowledging human rights and the right to leave Selections by origin within states have been replaced by selection by merit, with many of the same outcomes Thus, the modern structure of immigration policy, in line with the neoliberal age, is to court the top and fend off the bottom, with the two policies acting in fundamentally different and disaggregated ways, with new nationalism only having a surface level impact on both For high-skill immigration the logic is one of 'lociting' flows where no previous flow existed and which has no limit because of competition between states For low-skill immigration the logic is one of 'stemming' flows which exceed demand, thus rendering it susceptible to politicization by the far-right These two trends make low-skill immigration very susceptible to politicization and nationalist mobilization while high-skill immigration is a political non-starter - this bifurcation of policy and its political response is ubiquitous today, and western states are increasingly embracing temporary and limited migration in an echo of kafala regimes, instead of the kind of settlement migration they used to - this approach satisfies both neoliberal and nationlist demands European high skill immigration programs were largely inspired by Canada and innovated in Germany Student immigration is an especially appealing route that is increasingly being embraced across the OECD High-skill immigration policies have received very little backlash from populist-nationalist movements on the far-right For low-skill migration there are two forms of distinct flow - labor migration, and factual migration aimed at family unification / asylum or due to illegal/irregular migration, with the first being economically motivated and the second unwanted but in recognition of the rights of migrants or due to a failure of state controls This migration is increasingly managed via temporary-ness, which allows economic advantages without political or integration costs - meanwhile, the avenues for migration open via family reunification and asylum have been subject to continually increasing restrictions Focus on the growth of parallel societies here also increases the demand for integration efforts throughout Europe and further restrictions The impetus to limit low-skill migration in Europe predates the rise of right-wing populist parties There is evidence of nationalism as reactive to neoliberalism, as seen in Brexit, which was a backlash to open British migration Trump arose in a similar context and largely eviscerated the anti-dicsrimination and anti-populist norms around migration with his Muslim ban Germany also sees populism and nationalism in response to neoliberalism with the rise of the AfD following syrian migration Trump only truly matched policy to his populist rhetoric on the issue of immigration, which has become increasingly restrictionist in the US and increasingly tied to the extreme polarization of the republican and democratic party - policy has focused increasingly on enforcement in line with a rightward shift in the US electorate and the logic of penal populism - the Republican party has moved far to the right in part driven by the increased diversity of the US and the refuge taken by whites in the Republican party, with polarization especially extreme on immigration Trump seized on both of these trends and made them more explicit, embracing a blatant nationalism and trying to use immigraiton politically instead of solving it The German decision to accept Syrian migrants spurred populism, not just in Germany, but in many European countries, where christian nationalist parties responded to the betrayal of increased immigration - Without increased enforcement/restriction on asylum seekers, populism is only likely to increase There is a huge amount of transatlantic convergence on the issue of immigration today, with restrictions, responsibility, and temporary residency the dominant trends

W5 - Leiken, Robert S. "Europe's Angry Muslims." Foreign Affairs, January 28, 2009. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2005-07-01/europes-angry-muslims.

There is a growing issue of homegrown Islamic radicalism throughout Europe - Muslim immigration has been increasing in Europe since the end of World War II and such migrants now make up between 15% and 20% of the population. What's more, this population is expected to double by 2025 in Europe - These migrants have been largely alienated and isolated in a Europe unaccustomed to immigration and largely hostile to ethnic change - the result is ethnic enclaves with strong cultural identities, limited economic prospects and growing resentment. Thus, much of Europe's migrant community embraces a radical rejection of the West as they face citizenship in name only, coupled with social, economic, and political isolation. These enclaves are isolated and angry and out of the reach of European states and populations. Similarly, this discrimination against migrants is self-reinforcing since it leads to growing resentment against immigration by white Europeans and increased nationalist and xenophobic backlash. This is happening even in countries which pride themselves on acceptance, like the Netherlands Many Islamist militant in Europe have thus been born and raised in these states There are two types of jihadists in Western Europe, outsiders (incoming migrants with existing radicalism) and insiders (alienated citizens born and raised in Europe but rejected by their states) These jihadists have found increased motivation for attacks following the U.S. invasion of Iraq - Europe has responded with an increased focus on policing as opposed to the creation of a war on terrorism like in the U.S., although support for increased surveillance is growing Increased Islamic extremism is testing post-WWII cross border cooperation and religious/ethnic toleration throughout Europe, with a declining support for multiculturalism Immigration is thus stressing the values of the liberal state and cultural norms throughout Europe and new programs of assimilation are needed to address this.

W1 - Vaughan, Alden T. "The Origins Debate: Slavery and Racism in Seventeenth-Century Virginia." The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 97, no. 3 (July 1989): 311-54. https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2116/stable/4249092.

There is a huge amount of scholarly debate over the origins of colonial slavery and its relationship to racism - with some arguing slavery preceded and necessitated racism (Handlin) and others arguing they grew and coexisted with each other. Many documents from the early 1600s show a deference to Blacks (they often lack names) and a separating of them from servants, showing that the system of racial slavery was deeply interwoven with racism from the start Those who see slavery as predating race point to free blacks in early Virginia as evidence for their potential for social equality early on, but this may also just be evidence that while racism and slavery were both present at the time they hadn't reached their apogee yet. Indeed, far before Bacon's Rebellion, Black slaves were always referred to as black and never as 'Ashanti' or 'African.' Black born children inherited their mother's status ,and only blacks were held in permanent servitude Others argue the key advantage of black slavery as labor demands grew was that it lacked rights protections and couldn't be armed or rebel as easily - a need made clear after Bacon's Rebellion. Thus, racial hierarchies and the growth of slavery were aimed at decreasing insurrection. Others still argue that slavery only rose in response to decreases in white indentured servitude which made it a necessity to meet increased labor demands. There is still sharp historical disagreement over the status of blacks pre-1600s, the depth of discrimination against them, the reason for their enslavement, and the point at which antipathy towards them became tied to biological assumptions The author here argues that all evidence points to significant racial prejudice being apparent from the very start Their is strong evidence of considerable prejudice against Africans and Blacks by the early English, pre-1619. This stemmed from both religious beliefs (The Curse of Ham) and inherited beliefs from the Caribbean "The explanation for Virginia's slavery that comports best with the evidence is that white Virginians made permanent bondsmen of imported Africans and their descendants because it was economically advantageous... because Africans were usually powerless to prevent enslavement or to discourage additional importations, and because planters and probably most of their white neighbors believed that Africans were an inherently inferior branch of mankind."

W5 - Rovny, Jan. "Where Do Radical Right Parties Stand? Position Blurring in Multidimensional Competition." European Political Science Review 5, no. 1 (March 2013): 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773911000282.

There is much debate over the economic orientation of radical right parties and this paper questions the utility of investigating that - It argues politics is a larger struggle over the issue content of political competition since different parties are invested in different issues and prefer competing on some over others - This leads parties to emphasize their stance on some issues while strategically avoiding positioning on others to mask their distance from voters In this context, many radical right parties engage with position blurring on economic issues, making studying their stances a lost cause This shows the limits of a spatial theory of party competition since such a theory focuses on position taking and ignores position blurring/avoiding - Thus, ambiguity in far-right economic platforms is a strategic choice This article looks at electoral manifestos, expert placement of political parties, and voter preferences for 17 radical right parties in Europe It is widely agreed the radical right embraces ethno-nationalism and populist anti-establishment views, but their economic stances are still vague - a fact enhanced by their cross-class group of voters with many conflicting economic views and a lack of clear trends on economic agendas The problem in all of these works of analysis assume far right parties hold discernible positions mappable onto spatial dimensions Under this view, voters select parties based on their relative position with respect to party positions on all issues This view ignores the fact that parties will want to focus on some issues more than others and will avoid taking clear stances on some Thus, politics should be seen, not as a fixed style but rather as a contest over the presence of various issues and parties should be seen as not just responding to vote preferences but also shaping them through emphasizing some issues and not others Under this view, there are two key party strategies - issues introduction and position blurring on certain topics The utility of issue blurring on some topics and not others is something wholly overlooked by the literature in political science which says ambiguity is politically costly Buth issue introduction and position blurring are likely to be more complicated for large and well established parties, but easier for new ones - this is especially true for the radical right which is so culturally based and has such a disparate voting network that ambiguity on the economy while clarity on cultural issues is key - a discrepancy in platform clarity that should translate to the data on platform position, expert assessments, and voter choice ( with far-right voters focusing almost exclusively on non-economic issues) Position blurring is an effective strategy for opposition governments but a problematic one for governing ones, as seen in Austria The data supports all of the hypotheses presented here, with huge ambiguity in far-right economic policy and a voting base much more centered around and focused on the cultural and social agenda of the party (its national, ethnocentrism, and populism) Populist parties place almost 2 times more emphasis on non-economic issues in their manifestos than economic ones, and blur on economic issues The radical left has far less uncertainty and blurring on economic issues than the radical right, whose positions frequently shift Far right voters are very well predicted by non-economic considerations/views and not economic ones

W3 - Laster Pirtle, Whitney N. "Racial Capitalism: A Fundamental Cause of Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic Inequities in the United States." Health Education & Behavior 47, no. 4 (2020): 504-508. https://doi.org/10.1177/1090198120922942.

This article isolates racial capitalism as the fundamental cause of the racial and socioeconomic inequalities caused by Covid-19 Racism and capitalism mutually construct these harmful social outcomes by (a) shaping multiple diseases which act in tandem with Covid to increase inequities and poor health outcomes, like diabetes and asthma, (b) increasing negative disease outcomes by increasing risk factors for the poor and people of color such as segregation, homelessness, and medical bias, (c) shape access to flexible resources such as medical knowledge and freedom which can be used to decrease risk and consequences of the disease, and (d) replicate historical patterns of inequities within the pandemic despite supposedly equalizing interventions, showing the need for more effective policy responses This view sees racial capitalism as the source of the modern world system which constructed much of the modern state and society through slavery, colonialism, and genocide and which continues to effect modern health outcomes for non-white people as displayed with special clarity in the case of Covid-19

W2 - Hochschild, Jennifer L., Vesla M. Weaver, and Traci Burch. "Destabilizing the American Racial Order." Daedalus 140, no. 2 (2011): 151-165. https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00084.

This article looks at changes and continuities in the American racial order amongst young adults since Obama's election Growing U.S. immigration and diversity is challenging traditional conceptions of race in the U.S. - Meanwhile, decreased discrimination, increased progressive attitudes, and more intermixing are decreasing associations between race and success which could transform U.S. racial orders A racial order is defined as: societies widely understood and accepted system of beliefs, laws, and practices that organizes relationships among groups understood to be races/ethnicities - a racial order can be analyzed through (1) definitions of race or ethnicity, (2) classification of individuals into races/ethnicities, (3) groups' positions relative to other groups, (4) acts that are forbidden, permitted, or required, and (5) social relations amongst groups All of these factors are changing amongst young adults today and those changes may be multiplicative - But this social liberalization on race may be counteracted by cultural, political, and economic obstacles like mass incarceration and backlash by white groups This paper works to disaggregate these changes and predicts that our racial order is likely moving more towards progress than regress Overall, the definitions of race seem to be destabilizing and rapidly evolving with young people seeing the categories as more permeable in the U.S. , which may mean the U.S. racial order is open to change This is coupled with the classification of individuals into races becoming more complicated, with more and more people identifying as mixed race, a trend which will likely only increase because rates of intermarriage are increasing too. Thus, reluctance to self-locate within more than one race in decreasing Similarly, many incoming immigrants are reluctant to locate themselves within US racial categories The power balance and relative positioning of groups has shifted too, with increased status for both Asian and Latino/a Americans - meanwhile, non-white political power seems to be increasing, as seen in the 2008 election and U.S. politics more broadly Meanwhile, there has been a decrease in legally endorsed discrimination since the Civil Rights Movement (even if other forms of state sanctioned discrimination still prevail) A sense of shared values across races is also increasing while overt endorsement of prejudice and stereotypes is decreasing All of these changes in society are likely to translate to changes in U.S. racial orders to reflect a more diverse and accepting world

EXTRA - Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig, "The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe," American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 4 (October, 2018): 936-53.

This article looks at the impact of globalization on electoral outcomes in 15 western countries between 1988-2007, specifically looking at exposure to Chinese imports within regions. It finds that at the district level, strong import shocks lead to (1) more support for nationalist and isolationist parties, (2) an increased support for radical-right parties, (3) a general shift rightward of the electorate. These effects are sociotropic in these communities. Thus, it would seem that globalization is a key source of nationalism and far-right populist throughout democracies in Europe and the U.S., with economic nationalism being an alternative to trade liberalism and redistribution that instead focuses on the exclusion of 'outsiders' and ousting of corrupt elites. Globalization also limits the appeal of lef-twing parties because higher capital mobility, declining tax revenues, and more liberalized state economies are all antithetical to left-wing populist solutions, which primarily depend on redistribution and the extension of social welfarism. This leaves economic nationalism, coupled with protectionism and lower taxes, as a more appealing model for those left behind by globalism. Further, the insecurity caused by the losses of globalism lend themselves more to ethnocentrism and anti-minority sentiments, which make the multiculturalism of the left less appealing. "Electorates tilt in a more protectionist and isolationist direction when exposed to stronger shocks... [further] in response to the import shock, the electorate tends to abandon mainstream social-democratic parties and favor parties that propose economic nationalism... Overall, this body of empirical evidence points to a general shift towards nationlist, isolationist, and conservative policy platforms in response to the import shock." (C&S2 - 945)

W1 - Chandra, Kanchan. "What Is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?" Annual Review of Political Science 9, no. 1 (2006): 397-424. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.062404.170715.

This article presents a definition that captures the classification of ethnic identities within political science, whereby ethnic identities are a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by attributes associated with or believed to be associated with descent This definition shows ethnicity does not matter for many topics typically linked to it, including violence, democratic stability, and patronage Most work in political science on ethnicity invokes Horowitz's definition which sees it as an umbrella concept which allows for differentiation by color, language, religion, etc. But many definitions of ethnicity are hopelessly vague or inconsistent which makes evaluating the effects of ethnicity difficult The descent based definition used here is distinct in two ways: (1) it introduces a distinction between categories of membership and attributes which quality individuals for membership in that category; (2) it empties the definition of characteristics like common culture, history, territory, or language which are only sometimes associates with ethnicity and thus cannot be defining attributes Using this more consistent definition allows us to better assess where ethnicity really matters and where it doesn't Two other factors that are intrinsic to ethnic identities are constrained change, where by a person's ethnic identity is somewhat fixed by a set of underlying attributes, and visibility, whereby information about a person's ethnic category can be obtained through superficial observation Because so much work that studies the effects of ethnic identity relies on properties of measurement which are not intrinsic to ethnic identity, concepts like ethnic diversity, ethnic riots, ethnic parties, ethnic violence, and ethnic conflict have not been shown to matter and the outcomes observed must be due to omitted variables interacting with ethnic identity. The view of ethnicity as descent based limits relevant attributes to those which are impersonal - they represent a part of a country's population instead of a whole, they apply equally to all members of a direct family, and the qualifying attributes for membership are also descent based A need for common ancestry, a myth of common ancestry, a common region of origin (or the myth of one) are all flawed measures of ethnicity as are expectations of a common culture or a shared history because of the inherent ambiguity of those measures Further, all of these factors cannot be combined into a functional definition of ethnicity since the red line of inclusion is unclear and many of the categories overlap or contradict one another All of our research needs to be updated to match these new definitional standards since current findings on ethnicity rest on shaky definitional grounds

W6 - Heath, Anthony F., and Valentina Di Stasio. "Racial Discrimination in Britain, 1969-2017: A Meta-Analysis of Field Experiments on Racial Discrimination in the British Labour Market." The British Journal of Sociology 70, no. 5 (December 2019): 1774-98. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12676.

This article reviews the literature on field experiments on discrimination in Britain, along with a new experiment on the topic and finds several enduring contours of discrimination: (1) there is an enduring pattern of modest discrimination against white minorities of European heritage compared to much greater risk of discriminatino for non-white groups, showing such discrimination is racialized; (2) different black and pakistani groups face very similar risks of discrimination, (3) there is no major decrease in risk of discrimination over time regardless of the ethnic group - All of this fits within the ethnic penalties literature which points to discrimination as a major factor in high unemployment rates Evidence from discirmination field experiments on hiring helped motivate anti-discrimination legislation early on in the UK This Article thus aggregates findings across 11 experiments to explore the effects of discrimination on hiring specifically The findings are very consistent in showing white groups face only moderate discrimination compared to non-white groups with both Black/Carribean and Indian/Pakistani/South Asian groups facing comparable levels of discrimination Measures of discrimination over time show no significant decrease and perhaps a slight increase in discrimination levels The continuation of such discourse in spite of survey evidence of declining racial prejudice is an interesting and important finding which points to the rise of more subtle and masked forms of racism and negative stereotypes around aptitude and skill

W7 - Hooijer, Gerda. "'They Take Our Houses': Benefit Competition and the Erosion of Support for Immigrants' Social Rights." British Journal of Political Science 51, no. 4 (2021): 1381-1401. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000150.

This article shows that low-middle-income voters become less supportive of immigrant social rights when social housing in their municipality is allocated to refugees, showing that benefit competition can erode support for immigrant rights - This work thus adds an important new analysis on debates over inclusiveness with the rise of immigration and populism The focus is on the Netherlands, which has the largest social housing market and thus which has strong interests in access to that housing The results show that only those vulnerable to competition decrease their support for immigration, while high income people or very low income ones with little threat of losing benefits show no decreased support when more migrants arrived Those in the lower-middle income class not only decreased support for immigration but also increased support for the populist far-right Benefit competition can only occur when supply elasticity for benefit provisions is low, as it is in Holland - the more benefits depend on income and the more the economic risk of benefit competition is concentrated among the poor, the greater the demand for immigration restrictions The four conditions for benefit competition are: (1) immigrants and natives wanting access to the same services, (2) immigrants having access to welfare provisions (true in Europe but not in the US), (3) Immigrants being net beneficiaries and not net contributors to welfare, and (4) the supply of welfare provisions cannot be expanded in the short-term The Netherlands social housing context meets all of these qualifications, leading to high levels of benefit competition Increased benefit competition makes the appeal of right-wing populist parties promising to protect from such competition much stronger This thus focuses more on a personal self-interest explanation for increased populism and decreased support for welfare policies

W1 - Hollinger, David A. "Amalgamation and Hypodescent: The Question of Ethnoracial Mixture in the History of the United States." The American Historical Review 108, no. 5 (2003): 1363-1390. https://doi.org/10.1086/529971.

This essay looks at the efforts to maintain dividing lines between the intermixing and marriage of racial groups and their motivation The issue of miscegenation was a uniquely American one - only borrowed from the US in other racial regimes like South Africa and Nazi Germany In contrast, intermarriage and mixing was seen as crucial to cultural integration in the 'melting pot' of European immigrants - these two different vocabularies of mixing aided the ideological distinguishing of 'white' Europeans who could integrate from Black Americans who couldn't. This explains and is explained by the strange reality of the U.S. both being a nation based on slavery and one highly identifying with immigrants The unique social stigma of Black-white mixing is captured both by white's willingness to acknowledge Indian heritage and Latino/a heritage and the association of even small portions of black ancestry with complete black identity (the principle of hypodescent). This norm not only denies many black people agency in choosing how to reckon with their white identity but also denies the long history of both voluntary and involuntary inter-mixture in the U.S. - All of this exposes both the socially defined aspects of blackness and the stigma attached to its associated status Increased immigration and growing Latin American and Asian populations in the US (who dealt with different but overall more accepting norms of mixing) since the 1970s have only highlighted more the unique mindset around Black-white mixing in the U.S. Hispanics have long been treated as both white and non-white non-black in the U.S., leading to the strange mix of race and ethnicity on the modern census Both Latinos and Asians demonstrate that class position has a huge effect on the relative stability of ethnoracial boundaries - it is the lower class status of Black Americans which makes permeating the racial divide with them so non-negotiable as a stigma - Thus, miscegenation laws not only recognize, but serve to socially cement, the status of Blacks as lower class and lesser Limiting intermarriage also limited black access to white wealth and property via inheritance - Miscegenation was thus a tool of economic domination Ironically, Black groups have embraced a quasi one-drop mentality so as to not deny recompense to those subject to discrimination by whites. This means much of the anti-discrimination law in the U.S. is predicated on the idea of clearly bounded and durable racial groups This has led to a garbled web of entitlements for some groups and not others to anti-discriminatory redress in the U.S., often just lumping all minorities under the 'akin to black' category - categorization made messy by increased intermarriage between those groups and whites But to readdress these ethnoracial distinctions now is taken as a disregard for non-white discrimination, making an acknowledgement of messy ethno-racial boundaries impossible and the recognition of the uniquely cloistered image of Black Americans impossible Levels of historical amalgamation in the US are remarkably high beyond the black-white divide Only now are levels of Black-white intermixing increasing and joining instances of American amalgamation more broadly, which has been stuttering and often tension filled but still a unique and enduring aspect of U.S. history

W5 - Alesina, Alberto, Armando Miano, and Stefanie Stantcheva. "Immigration and Redistribution." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24733 (June 2018): 1-44.

This paper designed and conducted large scale surveys and experiments across six countries (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the UK, and the US) on native perceptions of immigration and how such perceptions influence support for redistribution - in all countries there are significant misperceptions about immigrants, with people overestimating their share of the population and seeing them as more culturally and religiously different than they are Immigrants are also assumed to be economically weaker (less educated, more unemployed, and more reliant on welfare) than they really are The less support for redistribution a respondent has the more immigrants are seen as economically weak and welfare reliant Simply making respondents think about immigration before answering questions about redistribution decreased their support for redistribution and decreased their actual donations to charities and support for progressive taxes - this is true even when providing information on the true shares and origins of migrants Anecdotes about hardworking migrants help mitigate the negative effects of thinking about immigration on redistributive views All of these results suggest that salience and narratives shape views on immigration more than facts and information Those with greater misperceptions about immigration are more unwilling to pay to find out the correct information on it The biggest predictor of decreased support for redistribution is an increased sense that immigrants are free-riders who take advantage of the welfare state This study focuses only on legal migration and not illegal migration More conservative people and less educated are more likely to associate immigration with low levels of economic worth and high levels of cultural / religious difference Out of the country's sampled, the US is the most supportive of immigration and most likely to see them as American compared to their European counterparts - Especially France, Italy, and Germany Increased exposure to migrants and increased exposure to culturally distinct / economically weak migrants lead to increased estimates on all three factors on the national level

W2 - Harris, Fredrick C. "It Takes a Tragedy to Arouse Them: Collective Memory and Collective Action during the Civil Rights Movement." Social Movement Studies 5, no. 1 (May 2006): 19-43. https://doi.org/10.1080/14742830600621159.

This paper looks at how events evolve into collective memories and how those memories are then utilized for collective action, as it relates to the Civil Rights Movement, with special emphasis on the impact of the Emmit Till lynching on the greater Civil Rights Movement Collective memories reflect group sentiments through a shared sense of the part and thus help to mobilize collective action by strengthening bonds of group identity and increasing an articulated sense of grievance While some collective memory may be mobilizing, other may bring a sense of shame or grief that actually limits collective action Collective memories for marginal groups may exist below the radar of elites and dominant institutions until structural opportunities expand the capacity for collective action, when collective memories can become key to articulating grievance Collective memories associated with racial oppression are common in the US and can signify the cost of Blackness - a fact that can both increase protest and suppress it through a reminder of the potential repercussions This theory focuses on the idea of collective memory as a tool of micro-mobilization, whereby collective identities and grievances are formed and transformed via small-scale face-to-face interactions. Thus, social interaction forms collective memories that then clarify group loyalties, goals, and the need for cooperation The theory argues that key events are appropriated by social entrepreneurs when they seem ripe for collective action and are then used to construct frames of reference that help mobilize that actions. These frames reduce the abstract to the familiar and allow a clear elaboration of goals - They also allow symbols of threat to be transformed into symbols of opportunity with people acting as agents of history This process relies on the sustenance of a collective memory through memory processes which mark the event and sustain its significance The CRM represents a key example of crucial events that could have suppressed political action being remobilized in favor of it Four notable instances of this were the Scottsboro Trials, the Brown decision, the Emitt Till lynching, the Montgomery bus boycott, all of which showed high levels of collective memory, with even those not involved during the vents saying they recalled them All of these events (with the exception of the Scottsboro Trials) helped trigger collective action and proved more salient than modern political events in doing so - although the effects of all of them (with the exception of the Till lynching) were more diminished in the South where suppression and rural conditions limited mobilization The view of Till's murder as a catalyst of the CRM via collective memory is supported not just by the data, but via observational data too

W8 - Cascio, Elizabeth, Nora Gordon, Ethan Lewis, and Sarah Reber. "Paying for Progress: Conditional Grants and the Desegregation of Southern Schools." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125, no. 1 (2010): 445-482. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.1.445.

This paper looks at how large conditional grant programs influenced school design in the South, showing that at risk districts would desegregate just enough to receive their funds - those districts with larger grants were less likely to be subject to court order later because of the large funds at risk, showing funds decreased the burden of desegregation This lends further evidence to the well established benefits of conditional grants as policy tools by the government There was a huge boost in southern desegregation in the middle of the 1960s and this article ties that decrease to the federal 'carrot' of funding incentives for voluntary desegregation - Showing that those districts with far more at risk in funding from the CRA were also the ones most likely to avoid future court orders The probability of only token desegregation decreased by over 8% for every additional $100 in per-pupil funding, with spending of about $1200 per pupil needed for a school to move beyond token desegregation - These effects lasted into the 1970s Thus, funding was an effective tool for desegregation that combined with Court enforcement and executive action to push desegregation Note - this work's model depends on the assumption that spending per pupil didn't vary by race within districts - seems unlikely Funds did have a meaningful impact of the odds of district desegregation more - but only in poor districts The cost of desegregation at $1200 a pupil shows how much districts were willing to pay to stay segregated - a similar price, $1500, was paid to avoid teacher desegregation Each extra $100 in per-pupil funding decreased the odds of being under a court order by 6.6% - decreasing the burden on Courts - without such an intervention, levels of court supervision would have had to increase three times to achieve the same effect However, districts with high levels of funding, although less likely to require a court order, were no less segregated through 1976

EXTRA - Tesler, Michael. Post-Racial or Most-Racial? Race and Politics in the Obama Era. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2016.

Throughout most of his presidency, Barack obama explicitly refused to discuss issues of race This book claims mass politics has become more polarized around race since Obama was elected - he thus helped share in a 'most-racial' period of extreme racial polarization between liberals and conservatives, in spite of widespread hope that his presidency marked the beginning of a post-racial period. The key mechanism here is that the Obama era made racial evaluations more prominent for political assessments in the United States - A process of 'racialization' that happened in spite of Obama's best efforts to avoid it. Racial attitudes were already important political predictors in 2008, but Obama's election led racial consideration to spill over into the broader political environment, with all political factors being increasingly viewed through the prism of race because Democratic politics were inseparable from Obama's race. Indeed, racial attitudes towards black Americans and Muslims were very strong predictors of support for Obama through 2012 and beyond, and these views spilled over into a wide number of policy opinions, especially health care What's more, racial opinions are more emotionally charged than other ones, leading to an increased virulence of debate around policy issues that became increasingly racialized in the U.S. This racial polarization spread into races beyond the presidency, impacting congressional voting as well - this increased the emotional stakes of congressional outcomes and decreased the chance for bipartisan cooperation for Obama Party identity, especially for poorly-educated whites, was strongly linked with racial identity after 2008 Views of 'whites' also increasingly predicted non-white voting patterns in 2012 and beyond as Republicanism became increasingly associated with white identity Obama's presidency made it hard to disassociate political issues from him and him from Race - this lead to the spillover of racialization - Here, media coverage of politics proves essential to linking policy associations to race. This is in large part because group identity is a key predictor of political support across a variety of contexts. While past presidents lead to partisan polarization on a number of issues, Obama led to uniquely racial polarization. Democrats and Republicans have increasingly separate realities on issues of race after the Obama presidency.

W1 - Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta. "The Case for Ending the Supreme Court as We Know It." The New Yorker, September 25, 2020. https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-case-for-ending-the-supreme-court-as-we-know-it.

Trump's Barrett appointment shows the flaws of the appointment process and how blatantly political and compromised the Court has become - only building on Trump's overhaul of the judiciary which is now much younger and much more conservative The Supreme Court has historically tended towards conservatism - it ruled to reinforce slavery, to render moot reconstruction and its amendments, to legitimize Jim Crow. Even the progressive Warren era was mostly undoing past damage done by the Court and often with decisions that were vague enough to forestall real change and only motivated by moments of local or global upheaval The Court continues to have excessive fiat power over civil rights, as evidence by Shelley The pandemic has increased support for BLM, public health care, and socialized governance - it has also increased calls for dramatic Court reforms, especially with many findings the Ginsburg replacement opportunistic and illegitimate But establishment democrats have been unwilling to embrace the movement for reform, which makes protest all the more essential The Court is and has long been linked to the suppression of democracy in the U.S. and thus needs to be reformed

W4 - Goodman, Sara Wallace. "Fortifying Citizenship: Policy Strategies for Civic Integration in Western Europe." World Politics 64, no. 4 (2012): 659-698. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887112000184.

Western Europe has increasingly addressed mass immigration through language and social knowledge requirements which are prerequisites for citizenship or settlement Although such tests have long existed in the US, they are increasingly being used in Europe where the state has changed from a passive recipient of labor imports to a state which actively sues immigration and restrictions around it as a tool of defining national membership and belonging Civic integration policy has shifted understandings of citizenship from vague notions of integration to formal institutions and defined norms But policy differentiations and differences on issues of civic integration have been strongly overlooked in the literature so far Civic integration schemes vary between states in scope, sequencing, and density (the difficulty fo the requirements) - differences which are produced by a combination of existing citizenship requirements and political pressures for change In states with restrictive citizenship and where political actors face no pressure to break from those policies, they retrench citizenship distinctions by disincentivizing integration and expanding permanent residence as a category. In restrictive state with pressure to liberalize, civic integration serves to offset or counterbalance inclusion reforms and increase the focus on permanent settlement. In liberal states, with open immigration systems and little political pressure for exclusion, civic integration serves to promote an enriched citizenship and encourages naturalization - thus, in this context civic integration strives to incorporate and define the identity of migrants without excluding them. Finally, liberal states with pressure for exclusion use civic integration as a means for that increased exclusion within a moderate liberal framework European states all share in a need to define membership and nationality with increasing diversity, but how they do so varies based on domestic contexts and pressures - thus, the same tools of integration can be used for different ends in different contexts Civic integration's significance is tied to its relationship to legal states and rights which has arisen as a means of regaining control over nationality for quickly diversifying states Mandatory integration frameworks serve to reinforce, not replace the contours of citizenship policy Denmark exemplifies the retrenchment trend, with citizenship being restricted and permanent residence floated as a replacement - Germany is a case of moderate restriction with integration requirements coming from bargained political compromises - and the UK is the liberal case where integration is used to promote liberal citizenship while mediating opposition to immigration

EXTRA - Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash," HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series (September, 2016).

While the dominant thesis on the rise of populism has focused on economic insecurity, cultural insecurity and backlash provides a more convincing framework for explaining the phenomenon. Populism is expanding massively through Europe right now - "Across Europe, as we will demonstrate, their average share of the vote in national and European parliamentary elections has more than doubled since the 1960s, from around 5.1% to 13.2%, at the expense of center parties.3 During the same era, their share of seats has tripled, from 3.8% to 12.8%." (2) Most explanations of populism can be grouped into demand side arguments - focused on public opinion - supply side arguments - focused on party strategies - and institutionalist arguments - focused on the electoral and constitutional rules of the game. This article focuses on the demand side, and argues that populism is the result of a broader backlash to progressive cultural change that rebukes the post-materialist revolution from the 1970s, as seen in the concentration of populist sentiments among older, white, undereducated, and religious men whose 'traditional' values are the most likely to feel displaced and whose traditional privilege and status is most likely to feel threatened. Immigration is likely to play into this by making societies feel increasingly multicultural and with fluctuating values. When measuring the cultural values associated with this backlash (anti-immigrant attitudes, mistrust of global and national governance, support for authoritarian values, and left-right ideological self placement), all of them were strongly and consistently related to populist support. In contrast, measures of economic inequality and deprivation - which focuses on the impact of globalization, and would predict high levels of populist support amongst unskilled workers, the unemployed, those without college degrees, and those most exposed to immigration - prove inconsistent in predicting populist support levels This cultural backlash thesis is supported by the increased focus on cultural issues within party politics int he US and Europe, and declining prominence of class as a predictor of partisanship.

W5 - Gest, Justin, Tyler Reny, and Jeremy Mayer. "Roots of the Radical Right: Nostalgic Deprivation in the United States and Britain." Comparative Political Studies 51, no. 13 (2018): 1694-1719. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017720705.

White conservatives in the U.S. and U.K. are more prone to support the 'Radical Right' because of their sense of nostalgic deprivation: the gap in their perceptions between their current status and their historical status. This aligns with the view of whiteness as a valuable set of privileges, assumptions, and assets in its own right (Cheryl Harris). This paper uses surveys to measure people's levels of support for sentiments of nostalgic deprivation, and then the predictive power of those sentiments for support for the Radical Right. Nostalgic deprivation can be understood in economic terms (inequality), political terms (disempowerment) or social terms (stigmatization or value change) - all of which tie into the expectations of whiteness (and the privileges it entails) for those living in the U.S. and Europe. "Nearly six in 10 White adults in both the United States and Britain feel that they have lost political power." (1703) Meanwhile, every measure of senses of social, political, and economic deprivation made conservative voters more likely to support the radical right.

W6 - McDermott, Monica, and Frank L. Samson. "White Racial and Ethnic Identity in the United States." Annual Review of Sociology 31, no. 1 (2005): 245-261. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.31.041304.122322.

White racial identity is often just assumed as the default, privileged identity and this article argues for a more nuanced approach to race Growing diversity has highlighted whiteness as a racial identity more and increased acknowledgements of its frequent exclusion from studies of racial identity, with studies of white racial identity increasingly shifting to a focus on white racial identity in the US The diversity of whiteness and its frequently changing status are important topics of study often overlooked, including the shifting boundaries of whiteness, which are only growing more unclear in a multiracial United States There has been an ironic resurgence of the term Caucasian as a substitute for white in spite of its racial science origins Whiteness is often invisible and taken for granted, it is rooted in social and economic privilege and its meaning / impact are highly situational Whiteness is in many ways unmarked and assumed for those who are white - It is seen as an unexamined default But changes in the US population is making whiteness more visible and identifiable as a racial category in the US Whiteness is strongly tied to privilege and this privilege is often invisible to white people - Privilege is frequently denied by whites as can be seen in the rise of color-blind racism - Some try to address this by advocating an abolitionist anti-racist approach which downplays whiteness, while others seek to focus on whiteness as a situational concept affected by context Whiteness may be more and more explicit as an identity for those with cross racial contact and those whose experiences have a disconnect with the assumed privileges connected to whiteness Social psychology has long focused on whiteness as a dominant group identity that fits with ingroup outgroup dynamics Whites still retain some sense of European ethnic identity, but it is more amorphous and selective - the complexity of this relationship is seen in the way many different ethnic groups have been subsumed into whiteness and its benefits Whiteness has helped spur collective action to help protect white racial resources, often manifesting in white supremacy and misogyny White supremacy helps reify white identity by giving it clear contrasts to others and highlighting the accomplishments and cultures that make it up Whiteness is not static, unchangeable, or easily defined but instead a complicated and dynamic identity