torts gentry

NESS Test

- look at all conditions of a set, and determine whether each element is necessary to cause the injury or accident - i.e. if A+B+C lean on a car that can take 300 pounds and they're 175 each, A is sufficient to AB and AC but not BC (if they were being sued without A) - must break into sets to examine each one - say A and B were 175 pounds, but D is 120. Under NESS, when you look at A+D or B+D, neither sets were necessary to cause the injury... so D isn't liable under any test we've learned

Sindell v. Abbott Labs

Market Share Liability Landmark Case in Market Share remedy method. If a product is defective, and causes mass harm, and the liability cannot be traced due to multiple manufacturers, each manufacturer will be held liable for the proportion of product made (Market Share), for damages. (e.g. 10% of market = 10% of damages claimed)

4 tests for proximate cause

Natural and Ordinary was the plaintiff's injury a natural and ordinary consequence of the defendant's breach? Directness (replaced natural/ordinary) -was the plaintiff's injury DIRECTLY caused by the defendant's breach? -the damage might be an unforeseeable consequence of the breach, but if it follows directly (no intervening events), it fits this test Reasonable Foreseeability (RF + SOR = used today, overlap.) -Was the plaintiff's injury a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's breach? looks a lot like a duty question Scope of the Risk Test (probably most prevalent now) -the plaintiff's injury is caused by the defendant's breach if the injury is the realization of one of the risks that rendered the defendant's carelessness -"an actor's liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious" liable if the injury is a manifestation of one of the risks that made the negligence a breach in the first place -Ventricelli (trunk keeps popping open): is defendant liable if he's outside of the car dealing with it and hit? it's reasonably foreseeable the trunk will pop open, and you could see the possibility of getting out in traffic but it's NOT the thing that could be expected from the actual defect

Jolley v Sutton London Borough Council

RULE: a defendant can be held liable and proximate causation can be proved if the TYPE of injury obtained by plaintiff can be reasonably foreseen to be in the scope of risk associated with conduct (or reasonably foreseeable conduct). The manner and extent of the injury must not be reasonably foreseen or expected. Facts: 2 14 year old boys tried to repair a rotten boat left out by the defendant when it fell on and paralyzed Justin Jolley from the waist down. District court (using a broad level of generality) ruled in favor of the plaintiff and held the defendant liable based on reasonable foreseeability. The appellate court reversed and ruled in favor of defendant claiming that because the boat was so rotted, attempts of repair could not be reasonably foreseen. Highest court, tho, said: app ct level of generality was too strict, reasonable foreseeability DOES apply here because of the type of injury (not worried about manner or extent) level of generality

Campbell v. Kovich

Rule: Certain personal service agreements (hire of a freelance lawnmower) do not require the service provider to assume a duty to adhere to a heightened standard of care. Facts: the Kovich's hired a lawnmower to cut their grass. While being cut, an object flew from the lawnmower and hit their neighbor, Campbell, in the eye. Based on ordinary care requirements for lawn mowers, court found no breach in duty of care.

Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels

Rule: Compensatory damages should reflect the extent of injury (considering future, current, and emotional) to plaintiff regardless of degree of excessiveness perceived by the defendant. Facts: 2 skywalks fell onto a lot of people in the lobby of a Hyatt. Because Kenton's injuries were chronic and would stay with her throughout her life + her expected earnings were high (she was a 3rd year law student), she was awarded $4 million by the trial court jury, affirmed by the appellate and supreme courts of Missouri.

the TJ Hooper

Rule: Conforming to custom will not insulate from liability if the custom is unreasonable or there are better, more reasonable alternatives Facts: maritime law case involving the discrepancy over implementation of a requirement for working weather-radio communication devices

Rowland v. Christian

Rule: Court eliminated distinction between business invitee licensee and trespasser, found land owner occupier owes a duty to act as a reasonable man for purpose of rendering occupied property safely for others. Established 7 factor test to weigh the possibility of liability with foreseeability being key Facts: Rowland was at Christian's house as a social guest where he was badly injured by a crack in the sink that Christian was aware of but had not fixed. CA rejected the status classifications and moved to infer a broad duty to guests from land owners based on 7 factor test (premises liability)

Jones v. LA Fitness Int'l, LLC

Rule: Expert testimony that points towards a defendant's negligence (displaying blatant ignorance of an industry standard or regulation) counts as "a preponderance of evidence" that the negligence was the cause of the injury and it was obtained as a result from lack of meeting standards. Facts: Plaintiff was injured at a basketball court that he's played at over 40 times. He called an expert witness to testify to the lack of upkeep of regulatory padding on the walls of the court. The testimony in combination with the plaintiff's having hit the (padded part of) the wall many times and not being injured showed beyond reasonable doubt that but for the lack of padding, the injury would not occur.

Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd.

Rule: Express assumption of risk does not abrogate business owner's duty to business invitees to correct dangers that could have been foreseen and corrected; written waivers of liability can be void if they violate public policy (using Tunkl factors as guidelines). Facts: Contrarily to Jones, the defendant operated a ski resort that the court deemed to be a public interest, being that it was in Vermont and a significant portion of the economy. The court ruled that based on public policy considerations laid out by the Tunkl factors, the exculpatory contract was void. Helped to deter unsafe operations in public interests. assumption of risk / Tunkl

Paul v. Holbrook

Rule: If a defendant makes contact with a plaintiff that is deemed offensive or as a mental disturbance by a reasonable person, it constitutes battery and recovery is available. Facts: meredith + holbrook = coworkers, same level. sometimes they worked alone together, meredith says holbrook asked her to wear prevailing clothes/ suggested sex. on 2 occasions he grabbed and began massaging her shoulders, she complained and they never worked a shift together again + behavior stopped

Cecarelli v. Maher

Rule: If a defendant refuses to respond to a complaint or answer, a default judgment can be answered for recovery for an intentional, harmful, and wrongful physical attack. Facts: Plaintiff went to a dance and was popular with women but that offended 3 men who attacked him leaving permanent injury + requiring a lot of medical care and expenses

Martins v. Evans

Rule: If a jury's finding of fact regarding breach of duty is so unjust that it shocks higher courts, a remand and explanation of applicable law is warranted. Here, that review= standard of ordinary care. Facts: in a special verdict, the jury found Evans not guilty of negligence when he backed his truck into Martin at a rest stop. There was a lot of discrepancy in the facts, but the lower court believed Evans' side, and when given a list of questions to determine guilt, the jury answered "no" to the first question (was he negligent?). Higher courts said: there was obvious negligence in this case, whether contributory or gross, and jury needs to figure out these facts to decide which, then rule.

Hunt v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation

Rule: If a plaintiff is contributorily negligent in causing the injury, under modified rules of comparative fault (whether pure or not (if not, only when plaintiff is less than 50% negligent)), he or she is allowed to recover the percentage of damages proportionate to his or her negligence. Facts: After being somewhat inadequately trained on usage of a snow blower, plaintiff's fingers were partially severed. The plaintiff's carelessness resulted in 40% of the cause of injury, and the defendant's failure to adequately train/warn constituted 60% of the cause. damages were apportioned accordingly comparative fault

Pingaro v. Rossi

Rule: If a statute or other binding authority places strict liability on a party for a specific instance (dog owner for a dog bite), that party is liable regardless of any efforts, no matter how precautionary, to prevent the incident. Facts: After a gas tank worker received an alert to beware of dog and the company avoided that yard for 10 years when the owner wasn't home, the worker entered the yard of the dog and was bitten. NJ statute imposed strict liability to dog owners for any attack by their dog, no matter what precautions were carried out to prevent injury. strict liability

McDonald v. Robinson

Rule: If an accident is caused by reason of combined/ concurrent negligence, and but for either defendant 1 OR defendant 2 the injury would not have occurred, both actors are held liable. Facts: 2 drivers collided with each other then hit a pedestrian. Each defendant's fault was A cause, THE cause was indivisible, and the injury couldn't have happened without their concurrence, so they were both held liable. multiple necessary conditions (but for)

Jones v. Dressel

Rule: If an exculpatory agreement or waiver is signed by a party, not an adhesion contract, and not void by public policy, it is a valid agreement excusing a defendant from liability because of an assumption of risk held by the plaintiff. Facts: Plaintiff signed an exculpatory agreement before skydiving, then the plane crashed. Because of weight of the Tunkl factors in determining that the plaintiff knew of the assumed risk of sky diving, the ruling was for the plaintiff assumption of risk/ Tunkl

Bencivenga v. JJAMM

Rule: If an unidentified 3rd party was involved in causing the injury to a plaintiff but other defendants breached a duty or imposed liability on themselves for some reason, the other defendants are held entirely liable unless the 3rd party becomes identifiable Facts: plaintiff was at a club when a girl claimed he pinched her ass. she told a bouncer and then he was jumped by 4 men requiring surgery and a permanently crooked nose. The bouncers breached their duty to exercise reasonable care to discover and warn about intentionally harmful acts.

Kambat v. St. Francis Hospital

Rule: If the conditions for res ipsa loquitur (established by Byrne) are met and comprehensible by a lay jury without expert testimony, a jury must introduce the doctrine and infer negligence, shifting the burden of proving no negligence to the defendant. Facts: A patient had some lap pads left in her, but there was discrepancy on whether she swallowed them or not. the trial court said the plaintiff (without expert witnesses) didn't show to the lay jury that the elements were satisfied, so res ipsa couldn't be applied. higher court said that because the testimony made it highly unlikely that she had access to the pads, a lay jury COULD determine that it wouldn't have ordinarily occurred, was in exclusive control of defendant, and that the plaintiff was passive without relying on expert testimony. res ipsa loquitur

Port Authority of NY and NJ v. Arcadian Corp

Rule: If the plaintiff failed to show existence of a duty, proximate causation, or significance of a warning, the motion will be dismissed for failure to state a claim that warrants relief. Facts: A bomb exploded under the world trade center so the owners sued a manufacturer of a chemical used to create the bomb.

Smollett v. Skayting Dev. Corp.

Rule: If the plaintiff has an assumption of the risk that would result in the consequences that injured them, even when the **assumption was implied by awareness** and not expressed through waiver or contract, a plaintiff is barred from recovery for negligence. Facts: Smollett was injured at a skating rink. She verbally stated the risks associated with the lack of guardrails and raise between rink and carpet, so she was barred from recovery due to an implied assumption of the risk. implied aorta

Dalal v. City of New York

Rule: If there is a clear violation of a statutory requirement that results in the injury of another person (or a significant cost to society), that violation is enough to constitute negligence per se and satisfy a breach of duty without question. Facts: plaintiff was crossing the street (allegedly while possessing some type of negligence) when she was hit by the defendant's car. Defendant isn't wearing her eyeglasses required by her license. This was a clear violation of a NY statute for traffic safety, and the defense had no valid excuse for breach. Also (although not needed to establish negligence per se), the defendant's burden of wearing her glasses/contacts was much less than the cost of not.

Bayne v. Todd Shipyards Corp.

Rule: If there is a clear violation of an administrative regulation that results in an injury that the regulation a. intended to prevent and b. injured a person which that regulation intended to protect, that violation is enough to constitute negligence per se and satisfy a breach of duty without question. Facts: plaintiff sued for the defendant's violation of an administrative regulation that required certain safety precautions (guardrails) on unloading docks, where plaintiff was injured in the absence of them. The court found that the regulation was a. intended to protect the group of people the plaintiff fell under (workmen) and b. intended to prevent the type of harm the plaintiff suffered (falling off without rails). Also, the defense knew or should have known of the regulation in place.

Muckler v. Buhl

Rule: In a wrongful death suit based on premise liability, a plaintiff must show a preponderance of the evidence that the incident was more likely than not caused by the defendant's negligence. (over 50% probability) Facts: A 55 year old woman fell down the stairs due to the negligence of her landlord resulting from the lack of meeting a city ordinance requiring a certain amount of lighting to stairs for exit/entrance to plaintiff's apartment. Evidence showed no other impairing symptoms or possible causes of the injury, and the fact that the lighting was significantly below required standard was enough to prove that the defendant's negligence caused the injury beyond a reasonable doubt (with a preponderance of the evidence).

Butts v. Weisz

Rule: In a wrongful death suit based on premise liability, a plaintiff that does not show a preponderance of the evidence that the incident was more likely than not caused by the defendant's negligence will not survive a motion for summary judgement in the defendant's favor. Facts: 2 elderly couples were hanging out in the house of one couple that had a "hidden trap" type basement. Lights were off and the elderly man who didn't live there fell down the basement stairs and died. Plaintiff did not sufficiently prove causation because there was not a preponderance of the evidence showing that the defendants' failure to warn of danger/ keep light on was the actual cause of the plaintiff's death. (didn't pass but for test)

Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging

Rule: In order to deter fraud and profiting from obviously corrupt conduct, punitive damages may be awarded and assessed based on the extent of wanton and willful misconduct. Facts: The Mathais' were bitten by bed bugs at Motel 6. They sued Accor Economy Lodging because the personnel refused to act in response to their complaints and disregarded evidence of the infestation (moved to multiple rooms). Compensatory damages were awarded under "respondeat superior" and punitive to prevent profit from fraud.

wagner v state

Rule: Intent to make contact is all that is necessary to meet the intent element in a battery claim. the contact need not be deemed socially unacceptable facts: a mentally disabled patient attacked P. he was under a state agency's watch and they had immunity for battery claims, so they were trying to prove that this was battery not negligence. P said: it's not battery, that requires intent to harm. Wagner court said: no, that's dual intent, and even past that... we don't even care if the contact is deemed socially harmful/offensive, we just need intent to contact and that element is satisfied.

Condra v. Atlanta Orthopedic Group

Rule: Introduction of personal practices of defense expert witnesses, if applicable to subject matter, is lawful and important for a jury to determine ordinary conduct of care and establish a valid standard. Facts: DR prescribed a medication that resulted in serious worsening of patient's condition. At trial, the defense's expert witness practiced a certain protocol differently than the defendant, but testified that the defendant's use was not a breach of professional duty of care. However, the fact that even the expert wouldn't be that careless led the court to rule that looking into personal practice is in fact lawful.

Adams v. Bullock

Rule: Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary or reasonable care; there is no negligence when defendant fails to foresee extraordinarily remote or freak accidents. Facts: a little boy unknowingly swung a wire under a bridge causing it to electrocute him. It was found that no one standing or even reaching over could have touched the wire, and that this injury could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated by the trolley company. Therefore, higher courts said: no breach, too unlikely/ extreme.

National By-Products, Inc. v. Searcy House Moving Co.

Rule: Punitive damages against a defendant will only be awarded in the presence of intentional, wanton, or willful conduct that causes the injury or harm. Facts: Truck driver who didn't check the brakes in accordance with proper recommendations sped into a trailer w house on it that hit other cars and killed 2 girls. There was no evidence of intentional, willful, or wanton behavior causing the accident and because of the likelihood that the brakes didn't work the defendant was just deemed negligent, not intentional or willful

Leffler v. Sharp

Rule: There is no general duty to protect trespassers, only to "not invite it." (Unless it is a known trespasser, then there's a duty to exercise reasonable care not to further harm) Facts: Case played on importance of distinguishing between status of invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Leffler sued on basis that while he was drinking at a hotel and got onto the room which fell thru and injured him, he was owed a duty to prevent injury by that roof from the contractors/hotel owners. However, that roof wasn't on the lease and premise liability here did not hold them liable for him as a trespasser. (premises liability)

Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad

Rule: There must be a direct foreseeable link between the negligent act and the damage. Injury caused to a party of sufficient distance in an unforeseeable manner does not attract a duty of care. (Cardozo), dissent said it should be based on protection of reasonably foreseeable injury to society, not just those nearby. Facts: Man tried to board train with fireworks, RR attendants attempted to help him onto trail, but the package was dropped and the fireworks exploded, causing Palsgraf to be injured. Palsgraf sued RR for negligence

Taber v. Maine

Rule: Under respondeat superior, the United States or any large entity may be held vicariously liable where an employee's negligence in causing an injury results from something within the scope of the activities of their job. Facts: Maine injured Taber while driving intoxicated. Because he just finished a shift and his drunken return could have been foreseen as a characteristic of his naval enterprise, the US was also liable for Maine's negligence under respondeat superior. vicarious liability

United States v. Reliable Transfer Co

Rule: Under the rule of pure comparative fault, a plaintiff is allowed to recover damages proportional to the amount of fault the defendant's negligence had in causing the injury. Facts: tanker owned by RT co ended up on a sandbar, plaintiff sued US for not adequately maintaining a flashing light to help avoid the sandbar. Held that: when 2 or more parties have contributed to cause property damage in maritime collision or stranding, liability is allocated among parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault (allocated equally when fault is equal) pure comparative fault

Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd

Rule: Using the eggshell skull rule, a defendant is liable for the full extent of the damages to a plaintiff, exceeding foreseeability and requiring defendant's to take plaintiffs as they come. Facts: Claimant's husband lowered articles into tank of molten metal, smith was struck upon his lip and injured. He died of cancer. He already had pre cancerous cells and the burn triggered the development of these.

Victor v. Hedges

Rule: When a statutory violation is not the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff, it does not establish negligence per se and must be further investigated to determine liability. Facts: Hedges parked his car on the sidewalk, violating a statute. However, this statute was meant to protect against obstruction of pedestrians' walkways/ having to navigate around cars (risking injury). Therefore, the statute did not satisfy the 2 elements of negligence per say requiring that it be the right person + the right harm. After failing to establish negligence per say OR negligence from a breach of ordinary care, court ruled against plaintiff.

Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California

Rule: When a therapist knows or has reason to know that his or her patient presents serious danger of violence to another individual, he incurs and obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim, even if it takes a lot of effort. Facts: Tatiana Tarasoff was killed by the patient of a Dr. Moore (from U of Cal), and that patient explicitly stated his intent to kill her + when, then proceeded to do so. Case established a duty for therapists in future (affirmative duty to warn)

Ravo v. Rogatnick

Rule: Where multiple tortfeasors, not acting concurrently or in concert, substantially contribute to causing an indivisible injury and there is no evidence to identify the part of the injury caused by each tortfeasor, joint and several liability may be imposed. Facts: 2 doctors misdiagnosed and improperly treated a patient and her child, resulting in severe permanent damage. Because the injury was indivisible by fault or cause, both were held liable.

Jones v. Port Authority of Allegheny County

Rule: a common carrier (bus service) is required to exercise a heightened duty of care, in which carriers can be held liable more strictly (but not as strict as strict liability in Pingaro) Facts: Jones family sued because the husband was injured while getting onto the PAAC bus. Bus company claims it never happened, and trial court ruled in favor of them. Higher courts said that jury needs to retry + find more conclusive facts + consider the required heightened standard of duty that common carriers adhere to heightened standard of care

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.

Rule: abolished privity in duty by broadly saying that if there's probably expectation for use by other parties that can be considered dangerous (introduces some room for discussion by jury/judge), duty extends to those parties facts: buick failed to accurately inspect the wheel of a car which, down the line of selling from person to person, resulted in a wreck and injury to MacPherson + the vehicle (affirmative duty to inspect)

Vaughn v. Menlove (1837)

Rule: court rejects subjective duty of care and says that regardless of capability to exercise ordinary prudence, everyone is to be held objectively to a standard of duty of care in accordance to that of an ordinary man. Facts: Landlord sued his neighbor because his lack of care resulted in his hay-bell catching fire and subsequently burning the 2 places that the landlord (vaughn) rented out to tenants. Menlove tried to claim that he did everything he could but was too dumb to exercise ordinary care but that wasn't true, he was warned about it and said he'd chance it bc he had insurance. Threw out the subjective view of breach bc it gave too much leeway to claim things like this

Beach v. Hancock

Rule: even if a gun isn't loaded/ the D knows that he does not intend to actually harm P, D can still be liable for assault because of a reasonable apprehension of harm caused in P facts: D pointed a gun at P after going inside to get it during their heated argument. P was not aware of it, but the gun wasn't loaded. because P reasonably apprehended fear when D imminently threatened him, he met pfc for battery

Vosberg v. Putney

Rule: if a reasonable jury could find that there was intent to contact AND that contact was made in a way that could be seen as offensive based on societal standards, D can be liable for battery. here, the Ds conduct was unlawful, so since it made contact with P, his intent was also seen as unlawful Facts: D kicked P in a playful way (not intent to cause harmful contact, that would be dual standard), and the court found that since D intended to contact P, and society could deem the contact as harmful, D was liable for battery. Also speaks on eggshell skull rule bc P was severely injured due to a previous infection

Rylands v Fletcher

Rule: if someone maintains an abnormally dangerous thing (**reservoir**, wild animal, radioactive materials) on their property, they are liable for any resulting damages whether or not there was reasonable care, precautions, or the presence of negligence. facts: D hired someone to construct a reservoir on his land, and it ended up flooding his neighbor's (P) coal mine and preventing him from doing business at all.

Rhode Island Hosp. Trust National Bank v. Zapata Corp.

Rule: if the costs of the implementation of an additional method to an industry standard of ordinary care outweigh the societal benefits, the method should not me required to establish ordinary care. Facts: Zapata sued their bank for not catching one of their employees for embezzling money from them. They said they did not exercise ordinary care because they didn't examine the signature of every single check that they received, only large amount ones. (+ if they would have examined all, they could've caught zapata's snake earlier). Using Hand's algebraic formula + general social + policy considerations/costs, the court deemed the method of checking every signature as NOT a benefit to society and therefore not a breach of ordinary care. hand's method

Myers v. Heritage Enters., Inc.

Rule: if the question of duty is being applied to a set of facts that an ordinary person exercising personal care, regardless of profession or skills, could carry out accurately, then the duty should be considered based on relation to ordinary prudence, and breach should be decided by the jury. Facts: Mrs. Meyers injured both of her legs after an unsafe attempt to move her to her bed by 2 CNAs using a Hoyer life. Trial court initially found no breach of professional duty, but higher courts said that consideration under a professional standard called for an abuse of discretion by the lower court, and correct consideration had the power to overturn the ruling. Remanded to trial

Summers v. Tice

Rule: if there is clear evidence that two or more parties were negligent, but only one could have caused an injury, and if it cannot be shown which of the negligent parties caused the injury, then the burden of proof is on each defendant to show that he did not cause the injury. Absent such evidence, the negligent parties may be held jointly and severally liable for the damages as well as responsible for apportionment of damages. Facts: 3 hunters were supposed to stay in a line to avoid shooting each other. One went forward, and the other two fired a shot in his direction. Plaintiff was injured by one shot, but there was no way to know who fired the shot. Rejects condition that joint tortfeasors must have been acting in concert.

Cole v. Hibberd

Rule: if there's intent to contact and the resulting contact is deemed socially unacceptable, unlawful, or unreasonable, D is liable for battery Facts: D playfully kicked her friend and SOL was up for battery so P sued under negligence. D ultimately prevailed bc court said: no, this is a battery and time barred. Intent standard: intent to contact, contact resulting is harmful/ offensive as deemed by society. she didn't intend to harm her friend, but society would say: a reasonable person would know that kicking is unlawful

Brooker v Silverthorne

Rule: one cannot be held liable for assault if they did not cause in P a reasonable apprehension of IMMINENT harm. threat cannot be conditional or one for in the future Facts: D told P over the phone "if i was there i'd break your gd neck" since P could take reasonable steps to eliminate the chance of this happening, she did not allege imminent danger and therefore her apprehension of harm (although there) was unreasonable on an ordinary prudent person standard

Vetter v Morgan

Rule: regardless of what D thinks, if a jury determines that the Ps apprehension of imminent harm was reasonable in consideration of the facts, D can be held liable for assault facts: P was in her van in middle of the night when a group of boys pulled up beside her and started harassing her verbally and swerved in her lane. she veered off the road and hit a curb causing injuries that directly resulted from the harassment. altho doors were locked/ windows up, the men had much more power over her, were stronger, etc. it was reasonable for her to think they'd physically harm her

Falcon v. Memorial Hospital

Rule: specifically in medical malpractice cases resulting in wrongful death claims, a plaintiff can claim damages for the loss of chance of survival if the lost chance is a sufficient amount (even if less than 50%). Facts: After having a baby, plaintiff died from an unexpected embolism that had a 37.5% chance of being prevented with an IV. The injury of "loss of chance of survival" displays causation if it is a substantial amount of chance. Only applies to wrongful death in medical malpractice, and all courts don't adopt it. Helps with calculation of damages in wrongful death suits while also deterring negligence in omission of procedures by doctors.

Aikens v. Debow

Rule: there is no general duty to protect against purely economic loss as injury. But, if there is known foreseeability of economic harm that is identifiably established through special relationship or prior knowledge, liability can be established Facts: Debow crashed his truck into a bridge which resulted in the closing of the most efficient route to Aikens' hotel, so he claimed he lost 9k in wages. Policy says: observe the context but because of certain facts + the difficulty of proving liability on purely economic injury claims, Debow was not liable here

Klein v. Pyrodyne Corporation

Rule: under the 2nd restatement's 6 factors for abnormally dangerous activities, D was held liable for conducting a fireworks show that resulted in injury for meeting 3 of the 6 public policy consideration factors. facts: D did a public fireworks show when one misfired and injured D. Washington had a statute requiring insurance to be obtained by anyone operating a fireworks display as such. therefore, it implied strict liability for fireworks shows but court went further to assess liability based on public policy. concurrence differed from majority on reasoning of imposition, but overall the person in charge of the firework that misfired was liable under abnormally dangerous activity theory of liability

in re White

Rule: under the 3rd restatement, if one intentionally commits and battery (or assault) aimed at another person and, by mistake, strikes a third person, his intent transfers and holds him liable for battery (or assault) of the third person facts: D was aiming to shoot someone when he missed and hit P. doctrine of transferred intent was applied, D was liable because he intended to cause contact that a reasonable person would know with substantial certainty could result in injury to P

Appelhans v. McFall

Rule: without rejecting the tender years doctrine, the court ruled that children should have their duty of ordinary care related to children of like age, intelligence, and experience. Facts: 5 year old boy hit an elderly woman on his bike, she tried to sue on counts for both his negligence and his parents, but the court found that in accordance with the tender years doctrine, he was too young to be negligent + no evidence of vicarious liability. Important discussions on future considerations for tender years tho

Byrne v. Boadle

Rule:When an event occurs that (1) would not normally occur without negligence, (2) the defendant is in exclusive control of the instrumentality of harm, and (3) the plaintiff is a passive victim: there is a rebuttable presumption of negligence against the defendant Facts: Plaintiff was hit with a barrel of flour that fell from the defendant's flour dealing workplace. It's a case from England in 1863, but dissent disagreed with verdict (which ruled for defendant, it was just an accident) saying that the accident in itself established negligence on the part of the defendant, and the burden of proof (of no negligence) shifts to the defendant. origin of res ipsa loquitur

Multiple Sufficient Conditions

if it's impossible to prove which of two factors actually caused the injury, this imposes liability on both factors even tho they (alone) don't satisfy the but for test.

US v. Carroll Towing

maritime law claim that deals with negligence/ breach of standard of care Justice Hand ruled: Owner's duty to protect against potential injury is a function of probability of occurrence x magnitude of resulting injury compared to the burden of providing those precautions. if burden is less than function, liability in negligence is found because it shows that it would be less of a hassle to prevent injury in the first place than leave it up to chance. facts: barge is in question of being held negligent for sinking since the bargee assigned to monitor it was absent when it sank. if the bargee were there, they could have prevented the sinking.

Escola v. Coca Cola

rule: 4 requirements for original product liability. 1. D places product on market, 2. it contains a defect, 3. mfr knows it'll be used w/o inspection, 4. product causes physical harm facts: glass coke bottle exploded in someones hand

Chow v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc.

rule: 7 risk utility (wade) factors: 1. the product's utility to the public as a whole, 2. its utility to the individual user, 3. the likelihood that the product will cause injury, 4. the availability of a safer design, 5. the possibility of designing and manufacturing the product so that it is safer but remains functional and reasonably priced, 6. the degree of awareness of the product's potential danger that can reasonably be attributed to the injured user, and 7. the manufacturer's ability to spread the cost of any safety- related design changes facts: Chow sued lye manufacturer (+ distributor and package designer) for a design defect under the reasoning that it shouldn't be on the market + that dangerous to potential users. court used risk/utility test to hold that (in SJ) D failed to demonstrate that its product is reasonably safe for its intended use

nickerson v hodges

rule: Ds can be held liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress even when their conduct was part of a practical joke if (joint rule from nickerson and wilkinson) the D displays 1. outrageous conduct, 2. undertaken for the purpose of distressing P, that c. causes such severe emotional distress facts: P thought her ancestors buried a treasure chest on John Smith's land. her + friends spent months digging it up. smith's daughter/ friends tried to do an april fools joke where they buried a bucket of rocks and mud with a note to wait 3 days to open/ notify heirs. they found + took to store at bank. bank owner (D) checked it to see if it was rlly gold so he could protect it, found out it wasn't, kept his mouth shut. they opened it in front of ancestors, she immediately went into RAGE. 20 years before, P was in an insane asylum, and the deceptors knew this. she thought she had been robbed, lost her enthusiasm, and eventually died 2 years later ** also wasn't an assigned full case but was in an intro part of a reading **

Osterlind v. Hill (1928)

rule: In an instance of renter & rentee, when the rentee is not in a helpless position, the general rule of no duty to protect or rescue applies facts: defendant rented a canoe to plaintiff + a friend (both drunk), plaintiff drowned and estate claimed defendant ignored cries for help + sold a damaged canoe. Found no damage to canoe and no duty to rescue by renter (however..... imperilment duty ? misfeasance that creates harm ? law hadn't evolved to recognize it) (affirmative duty to rescue)

Baker v. Fenneman & Brown Properties, LLC (taco bell)

rule: a business or restaurant must offer reasonable care to guests to aid or protect invitees. statute 314a which defines special relationships giving rise to duty to aid/protect: intended to give a duty to protect to anyone in need no matter causation, not just those injured by business instrumentality facts: Baker fainted and convulsed twice at taco bell and was not offered help even after cracking a vertebrae and knocking out 4 teeth. defendant says no duty because it didn't happen DUE to taco bell, but court says you might not have necessarily breached it but businesses have a duty to protect customers (affirmative duty to protect)

Sturges v Bridgman

rule: based on nature and characteristics of the area affected by the interference, whether the interference is unreasonable or not (does it interfere with another's lawful use and enjoyment of land? look at frequency of intrusion and effect upon Ps use of property), and whether P owns the land/ has the right to possess it, a jury can impose liability for a nuisance based on Ds conduct facts: P and D are neighbors, but P wasn't using his back room initially (one that shares a wall w Ds candy kitchen where they pound sugar). Ds operations interfere with quiet that P needs in his new consulting room, so P is seeking injunctive relief. issue on appeal dealt with whether someone could raise a nuisance issue that they just began to see as a nuisance (due to change of Ps conduct) but had been occurring for a long period of time. answer was yes, even tho D didn't act unreasonable, his conduct created an unreasonable interference

Mussivand v. David

rule: cites MacPherson to emphasize that reasonable foreseeability of injury is enough to establish a duty, regardless of privity or relationship facts: david infected mussivand with genital warts by having sex w his wife, so it was reasonable to foresee her giving the warts to mussivand & david was found to be negligent in not warning (affirmative duty to warn)

Penland v. Redwood Sanitary Sewer Serv. Dist.

rule: if Ds conduct constitutes the elements of a nuisance, he can be held liable IF injunctive relief does not impose an undue hardship on D. facts: after changing their operations to dump sludge onsite, the neighbors of D sued for a permanent injunction to the sickening stench that interfered with their enjoyment of their residential neighborhood. at first, D said that this injunction was too harsh because of costs but court figured out a way to delegate costs to paying members in order to get D to shift its operations, giving the Ps injunctive relief, while D did not have to endure an undue hardship

wilkinson v. downton

rule: if a D willfully does an act calculated to cause severe emotional distress (especially when resulting in physical harm), he can be held liable under intentional infliction of emotional distress facts: D falsely informed P that her husband was "smashed up" in a car wreck and broke both legs. she had nausea and other physical side effects from resulting distress. ** we didn't read this but it was on slides **

Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.

rule: if an injunction for Ds conduct that constitutes a nuisance outweighs the benefit given to Ps by the imposition of the injunction, the court will not issue an injunction but award damages as relief + allow D to continue conduct facts: Ds cement plant was deemed a nuisance for causing air & ground pollution on Ps property. Ps were residents of a nearby neighborhood. since the cost of the interference was minor (185k lesser in value of home) but the cost of a permanent injunction to D (45 mil investment and to the 300+ employees) was large, the court ordered that instead of imposing a permanent injunction, the most efficient solution was to have D pay the difference in lost value to Ps + continue conduct

Fojtik v. Charter Med. Corp.

rule: if the P does not allege by a preponderance of the evidence that the tortfeasor acted with intent to confine (or knew with substantial certainty that their conduct would constitute confinement), D cannot be held liable for false imprisonment facts: P's family enrolled him in rehab for alcoholism. they used the words "either commit or we will take you in handcuffs", he tried to leave during his stay but was told he had to wait until later in stay for passes. later, he got passes. any time he left with them, he came back on time. claimed this was to speed up release by cooperating. court found that Ds means of inducing P to stay at the rehab center were NOT SUFFICIENT TO overcome Ps free will. a reasonable person would not have had a just fear of injury to his person, reputation, or property that disallowed him from leaving the rehab place

Burns Philip Food v. Cavalea

rule: if the tortfeasor intends to cause entry onto another's land, regardless of whether he knew that the entry was causing a trespass or not, they can be held liable for trespass. facts: burns put up a fence on what he thought was his land but it actually crossed onto cavalea's land. although burns did not intend to trespass, he had knowledge of a substantial certainty that he was placing the fence on the certain piece of land and that was enough to satisfy intent.

dickens v puryear

rule: iied is a gap filler tort that can hold Ds liable for extreme and outrageous conduct IF conduct is valid and in the absence of conduct that would create a separate tort (assault: reasonable apprehension, battery: unlawful contact, FI: unlawful confinement.... have to find conduct that DOES NOT fit the elements of these but DOES fit iied) facts: P sued D after they tied him up and beat him/ threatened to kill or castrate him amongst other things following Ps relationship with Ds underage daughter.. SOL for assault, battery, and FI were up, but IIED being a gapfiller was available as long as there was some conduct that resulted in it but not ass/bat/FI. recovery is for the emotional damages imposed by the physical injury and threats made by D, not physical damages like it would be if another intentional tort. threat he won iied under: to kill or harm P if he didn't flee town. no reasonable apprehension of IMMINENT harm (conditional/ future threat), but was extreme/ outrageous enough to cause severe emotional distress

littlefield v mcguffey

rule: physical manifestations of distress need not exist to adequately allege the prima facie case of iied. physical manifestations help to prove emotional distress and increase potential damages, but they are not a requirement of the tort facts: D harassed P when he (her landlord) found out that she was in an interracial relationship. he threw her stuff out, cancelled on her lease, and harassed her and her family with multiple threats causing P to suffer severe emotional distress. D tried to say physical manifestations of distress must be shown, but court said you can prove severe emotional distress without physical manifestations. the death threat alone would have been enough to give grounds for recovery.

Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.

rule: private necessity gives an incomplete privilege/right to a trespasser. it privileges their being there, but doesn't privilege them from liability for injury when it results. this applies to life and property. facts: P owned a dock that Ds ship was tied to when a storm came. During a storm, D kept the ship tied (damaging Ps dock) so that the boat would not be lost/ super damaged. D says conduct was necessary, so there should be no liability, but court awarded $500 in compensatory damages for the damage to the dock. court said: he's a trespasser, he's liable. but gentry says: he had private necessity there's also public necessity from 2nd restatement: one is privileged to enter land in the possession of another if it is, or if the actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of averting an imminent public disaster.

Wilson Sporting Goods v. Hickcox

rule: shows how the consumer expectation test would work instead of risk utility for products liability. chief concern: as a lay consumer, what would your expectations be about this product + are those expectations violated? facts: catchers mask actually ended up making the force when hit worse rather than better, as expected by consumers

hunt v. state

rule: under 2nd restatement, the chance of a Ds conduct being deemed ext/outr is strengthened by: it being done by an authoritative figure/ someone with power over victim, it causing issues of public humiliation or disgrace, the harassment being repeated, existence of a special relationship between parties, and if a special sensitivity/susceptibility is being taken advantage of (known by actor) facts: P, a young child, was interrogated by a police officer at school. the PO came to talk to bullies but used P as a pawn and knew he didn't do the bullying. his plan "worked" as bully owned up but P was traumatized/ didn't go back to school for 18 months. since the detainment was authorized, P had to prove that D intentionally or recklessly used ext/outr conduct. because he is an authority figure, the chance its seen as ext/outr is a lot higher. intent is hard here, but reckless? did D known/ should know that his conduct would have a high probability or substantial certainty of this injury resulting? up to a trier of fact. but claim survives a motion to dismiss.

Grant v. Stop n Go market of TX

rule: under shopkeeper's privilege, a store owner may detain a suspected shoplifter if 1. there is reasonable suspicion/ grounds to believe theft occurred and 2. the method of detention is reasonable detention based on time and manner. This is a question for the jury to decide in consideration of reasonability amongst the circumstances. facts: D thought P stole a pack of cigarettes when really it was a dollar bill he saw on the camera. he relied on shopkeepers privilege to say that his confining of P until the police arrived/ questioned him was warranted. district court granted SJ to stop n go, but app court remanded for a jury to decide based on reasonability. touches on 6th element of FI, is D legally authorized to confine P? (here, under this shopkeeper's privilege rule)

GENERAL UNQUAL DUTY

traditional standard says: exercise reasonable care. 3rd restatement= if your actions create a risk of hurting someone, you have a duty to exercise reasonable care not to hurt other people. Rowland v Christian = 7 factor test (there's a presumptive general duty, if you fail 7 factor test you have a duty, if it weighs in your favor you don't)