Case Law full articulation

US v. Mendenhall

Airport drug courier, walk and talk not a seizure when consensual conversation.

Florida v. Royer and US v.Mendenhall:

-At airport, no consensual once bag is taken to a closed room away from owner. - No probable cause. -U.S Supreme Court determined that the detention was a seizure tantamount to an arrest, and since the officer did not have not probable cause, it was an illegal seizure. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), was a U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with issues involving the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the case establishes a firm line in cases where police conduct search and seizure without a warrant. The court ruled that, while it is legal for authorities to target and approach a person based on their behavior, absent more, they cannot detain or search such individual without a warrant. After purchasing a one-way airline ticket to New York City at Miami International Airport under an assumed name and checking his two suitcases bearing identification tags with the same assumed name, respondent went to the concourse leading to the airline boarding area, where he was approached by two detectives, who previously had observed him and believed that his characteristics fit the so-called "drug courier profile." Upon request, but without oral consent, respondent produced his airline ticket and driver's license, which carried his correct name. When the detectives asked about the discrepancy in names, respondent explained that a friend had made the ticket reservation in the assumed name. The detectives then informed respondent that they were narcotics investigators and that they had reason to suspect him of transporting narcotics, and, without returning his airline ticket or driver's license, asked him to accompany them to a small room adjacent to the concourse. Without respondent's consent, one of the detectives retrieved respondent's luggage from the airline and brought it to the room. While he did not respond to the detectives' request that he consent to a search of the luggage, respondent produced a key and unlocked one of the suitcases in which marihuana was found. When respondent said he did not know the combination to the lock on the second suitcase but did not object to its being opened, the officers pried it open and found more marihuana. Respondent was then told he was under arrest. Following the Florida trial court's denial of his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of the suitcases, respondent was convicted of felony possession of marihuana. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that respondent had been involuntarily confined within the small room without probable cause, that at the time his consent to search was obtained, the involuntary detention had exceeded the limited restraint permitted by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , and that such consent was therefore invalid because tainted by the unlawful confinement. Held: The judgment is affirmed. 389 So.2d 1007, affirmed. JUSTICE WHITE, joined by JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE STEVENS, concluded that respondent was being illegally detained when he consented to the search of his luggage and that such[460 U.S. 491, 492] consent was tainted by the illegality and hence was ineffective to justify the search. Pp. 497-508. (a) When the detectives identified themselves as narcotics agents, told respondent he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to the police room, while retaining his airline ticket and driver's license and without indicating in any way that he was free to depart, respondent was effectively seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. At the time respondent produced the key to his suitcase, the detention to which he was then subjected was a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty than is allowable on mere suspicion of criminal activity. What had begun as a consensual inquiry in a public place escalated into an investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room, and respondent, as a practical matter, was under arrest at that time. Moreover, the detectives' conduct was more intrusive than necessary to effectuate an investigative detention otherwise authorized by the Terry line of cases. Pp. 501-507. (b) Probable cause to arrest respondent did not exist at the time he consented to the search of his luggage. P. 507. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the result, agreed that at some point after the initial stop the officers' seizure of the respondent matured into an arrest unsupported by probable cause. The respondent's consent to the search of his suitcases, therefore, was tainted by the illegal arrest. P. 509. WHITE, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which MARSHALL, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 508. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 509. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 513. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and O'CONNOR, J., joined, post p. 519. Calvin L. Fox, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Jim Smith, Attorney General. Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, Joshua I. Schwartz, and Deborah Watson. Theodore Klein argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Irwin J. Block. * [ Footnote * ] Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, and Steven J. Twist, Chief Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al., as amici curiae urging reversal. [460 U.S. 491, 493] JUSTICE WHITE announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE STEVENS joined. We are required in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, properly applied the precepts of the Fourth Amendment in holding that respondent Royer was being illegally detained at the time of his purported consent to a search of his luggage. I On January 3, 1978, Royer was observed at Miami International Airport by two plainclothes detectives of the Dade County, Fla., Public Safety Department assigned to the county's Organized Crime Bureau, Narcotics Investigation Section. 1 Detectives Johnson and Magdalena believed that Royer's appearance, mannerisms, luggage, and actions fit the so-called "drug courier profile." 2 Royer, apparently unaware of the attention he had attracted, purchased a one-way ticket to New York City and checked his two suitcases, placing on each suitcase an identification tag bearing the name "Holt" and the destination "La Guardia." As Royer made [460 U.S. 491, 494] his way to the concourse which led to the airline boarding area, the two detectives approached him, identified themselves as policemen working out of the sheriff's office, and asked if Royer had a "moment" to speak with them; Royer said "Yes." Upon request, but without oral consent, Royer produced for the detectives his airline ticket and his driver's license. The airline ticket, like the baggage identification tags, bore the name "Holt," while the driver's license carried respondent's correct name, "Royer." When the detectives asked about the discrepancy, Royer explained that a friend had made the reservation in the name of "Holt." Royer became noticeably more nervous during this conversation, whereupon the detectives informed Royer that they were in fact narcotics investigators and that they had reason to suspect him of transporting narcotics. The detectives did not return his airline ticket and identification but asked Royer to accompany them to a room, approximately 40 feet away, adjacent to the concourse. Royer said nothing in response but went with the officers as he had been asked to do. The room was later described by Detective Johnson as a "large storage closet," located in the stewardesses' lounge and containing a small desk and two chairs. Without Royer's consent or agreement, Detective Johnson, using Royer's baggage check stubs, retrieved the "Holt" luggage from the airline and brought it to the room where respondent and Detective Magdalena were waiting. Royer was asked if he would consent to a search of the suitcases. Without orally responding to this request, Royer produced a key and unlocked one of the suitcases, which one detective then opened without seeking further assent from Royer. Marihuana was found in that suitcase. According to Detective Johnson, Royer stated that he did not know the combination to the lock on the second suitcase. When asked if he objected to the detective opening the second suitcase, Royer said "[n]o, go ahead," and did not object when the detective [460 U.S. 491, 495] explained that the suitcase might have to be broken open. The suitcase was pried open by the officers and more marihuana was found. Royer was then told that he was under arrest. Approximately 15 minutes had elapsed from the time the detectives initially approached respondent until his arrest upon the discovery of the contraband. Prior to his trial for felony possession of marihuana, 3 Royer made a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of the suitcases. The trial court found that Royer's consent to the search was "freely and voluntarily given," and that, regardless of the consent, the warrantless search was reasonable because "the officer doesn't have the time to run out and get a search warrant because the plane is going to take off." 4Following the denial of the motion to suppress, Royer changed his plea from "not guilty" to "nolo contendere," specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. 5Royer was convicted.

Baity v. State

-Reasonable suspicion stop -Baity was suspicious and had a crow bar/cash box at 04:56 am. The offense is burglary of a coin operated machine; the punishment, enhanced under the provisions of Article 63, Vernon's Ann.P.C., life. The State's evidence reflects that on March 3, 1969, around 4:56 a. m., Officer Jesse Mathis of the Wichita Falls City Police, an officer with 13 years' experience, was patrolling in the downtown business area on a routine building check. While in an alley next to the Piccadilly Cafeteria he observed a man enter the alley about sixty feet from his patrol car with its lights on, then suddenly turn back out of the alley. His suspicions were aroused by such furtive movement in the early morning hours. He sped up his vehicle and observed the man on Eighth Street "walking fast with his coat pulled up tight * * * walking *307 real fast." Officer Mathis followed to determine who it was. He then recognized the appellant whom he knew personally and whom he knew had "a record of many arrests" for theft and burglary. At this point the officer's suspicions were thoroughly aroused. As he drove near the appellant he called out "Hey, stop" or "Come here." The appellant at this point stopped and turned, at which time Mathis observed a nail bar[1] protruding from the appellant's coat. Appellant then approached the officer's patrol car and the officer noticed he had possession of some other object under his coat. When the officer inquired what it was the appellant replied it was a coin or money box. After some investigation the officer took the appellant to the Piccadilly Cafeteria where it was determined there were pry marks on a coin operated cigarette machine which had been broken and entered with the coin box missing. The coin box taken from the appellant fit the machine and contained over $30.00. The owner of the machine testified he had not given anyone permission to break and enter such machine and take money therefrom. L. J. Russell, Chef at the Piccadilly, related that the appellant, a former employee, had appeared at the cafeteria after he had gone to work on the morning in question and before the cafeteria opened and prior to the time of the arrest. He testified appellant stated he had come to pay a $1.00 loan to Russell; that when Russell reminded him he had already repaid $1.00 the appellant left; that when he (Russell) entered the building he did not notice the cigarette machine in the condition in which it was later discovered. In his first ground of error appellant contends the court erred in admitting into evidence Officer Mathis' testimony that he observed the appellant in possession of a crow or nail bar and a coin box and that appellant had stated he had a coin or money box. This contention is based on the claim that appellant's warrantless arrest was without probable cause and that the search incident thereto was illegal. Appellant urges the arrest occurred the moment that he was stopped by the officer and at that time the officer had no knowledge of any crime having been committed. The State, relying upon the officer's testimony, contends the arrest did not occur until after the officer determined the money box did not belong to the appellant, and that what occurred earlier did not result from a custodial interrogation. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, the Supreme Court considered "serious questions concerning the role of the Fourth Amendment in the confrontation on the street between the citizen and the policeman investigating suspicious circumstances." There the Court held that under certain circumstances the police may seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons even if there is no probable cause for arrest. While no limited search or "frisk" for weapons is here involved and our scope of inquiry need not extend that far, what was said in Terry is most important.

Weeks v. US:

"Exclusionary Rule" was first created by the US Supreme Court based on this case. As written, the rule applied only to the actions of federal officers.

Katz v. U.S. 389 US 347 (1967):

-Case law which allows for categories of evidence for which a search may be conducted. Also refers to the fact that the 4th, amendment protects people, not places. What a person exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not subject of 4th. Amendment protection.... -Telephone booth expectation of privacy.

Beaver v. City of Federal Way:

-Each use of force on a person that is a seizure is the application of force and must be objectively reasonable). (Taser). -Objectively reasonable: amount of force use and extent of the injury.

Duran v. City of Douglas, Arizona

-First Amendment. (disrespectful to police ) -Mere boisterous conduct was alone insufficient to give a police officer any cause to detain the plaintiff. Plaintiff Ralph Duran directed a series of expletives and an obscene hand gesture at defendant Gilbert Aguilar, a police officer. Officer Aguilar responded by detaining and arresting Duran, who, along with his wife, now brings this lawsuit for injuries he suffered during the incident. 2 * In the late evening of November 18, 1987, Aguilar and another officer of the Douglas, Arizona, Police Department were dispatched to a downtown hotel in response to a bartender's complaints about an unruly patron. The officers arrived to find Duran intoxicated and threatening the bartender. Aguilar and Duran exchanged a few heated words, following which Aguilar escorted Duran out. Duran left the bar in an automobile driven by his wife, Alice. 3 Soon thereafter, while out on patrol, Aguilar observed a car with a passenger who was directing an obscene gesture toward him through an open window. Aguilar did not know the passenger's identity at that time because the car had darkly-tinted glass, making it impossible to observe its occupants except through the open window. It was, however, the car driven by Alice Duran, who was taking her husband home. Duran's obscene gesture caught Aguilar's eye, and Aguilar began following the car. As he followed the Durans down a rural highway beyond the Douglas city limits, Ralph Duran began yelling profanities in Spanish and continued to make obscene gestures. At this point, Aguilar identified the passenger as the man he had confronted at the bar. Believing that Duran was "probably not going to be friendly," Aguilar Depo. (Sept. 13, 1988), CR 33, at 80-81, Aguilar called for backup and prepared to make a traffic stop. Aguilar and backup officer Rudy Salazar followed the Durans' car into a mobile home park, where it stopped in front of what turned out to be their residence. Aguilar does not contend that Duran was yelling or otherwise causing a disturbance when the car drove into the park. Nevertheless, Aguilar initiated a traffic stop by turning on his emergency lights. Aguilar ordered Duran to step away from the car, to which Duran replied "I don't have to." Aguilar Affidavit, CR 104, at 3. Aguilar then told Duran that the reason for the traffic stop was to find out why Duran had yelled profanities and made an obscene gesture toward him. Aguilar Depo. at 85-86. Duran responded with further profanities in both Spanish and English. In response, Aguilar decided to arrest Duran for disorderly conduct. Id. at 91-92. A scuffle ensued, during which Aguilar and Duran were injured before Duran was subdued and shackled. After his transport to the police station, it was discovered that Duran had a dislocated elbow requiring hospitalization. Duran claims to have suffered some permanent loss of range in his elbow. 6 The Durans brought this action for damages stemming from the allegedly unlawful stop and arrest against Aguilar, Salazar, the City of Douglas and various other police officers and city officials. The Durans filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a determination of liability as to defendant Aguilar under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982). Aguilar countered with his own motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. Following a hearing, the district court entered a single order ruling in favor of the Durans on both motions. Aguilar appeals the district court's order.1

Baskin v. Smith:

handcuffing too tightly and failing to double lock the handcuff may lead to excessive force.

In Re Gault:

6th. Amendment.

Garrity v. New Jersey

Criminal v. Administrative investigation (e.g. Peace Officer involved in shooting) Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 385 › Garrity v. New Jersey Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) Justia Opinion Summary and Annotations Less" data-collapsed_text="Read more" data-section="diminished-text" data-collapsed_class="text-diminished" data-expanded_class="text-extended" id="summary-read-more" style="box-sizing: border-box; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); color: rgb(226, 35, 26); text-decoration: none; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; position: relative; margin-bottom: 0px; font-weight: 700; line-height: 1; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle; -webkit-appearance: none; transition-property: color, background-color, border-color; transition-duration: 0.25s; transition-timing-function: ease; padding: 0.6em 1em; font-size: 0.9375rem; border-color: currentcolor; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px; border-radius: 4px;">Read more OpinionsAudio & Media Syllabus Case U.S. Supreme CourtGarrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) Garrity v. New Jersey No. 13 Argued November 10, 1966 Decided January 16, 1967 385 U.S. 493 Syllabus Appellants, police officers in certain New Jersey boroughs, were questioned during the course of a state investigation concerning alleged traffic ticket "fixing." Each officer was first warned that: anything he said might be used against him in a state criminal proceeding; he could refuse to answer if the disclosure would tend to incriminate him; if he refused to answer, he would be subject to removal from office. The officers' answers to the questions were used over their objections in subsequent prosecutions, which resulted in their convictions. The State Supreme Court, on appeal, upheld the convictions despite the claim that the statements of the officers were coerced by reason of the fact that, if they refused to answer, they could, under the New Jersey forfeiture of office statute, lose their positions. That statute provides that a public employee shall be removed from office if he refuses to testify or answer any material question before any commission or body which has the right to inquire about matters relating to his office or employment on the ground that his answer may incriminate him. On the ground that the only real issue in the case was the voluntariness of the statements, the State Supreme Court declined to pass upon the constitutionality of the statute, though the statute was considered relevant for the bearing it had on the voluntary character of the statements used to convict the officers. The officers appealed to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), and the question of jurisdiction was postponed to a hearing on the merits. Held: 1. The forfeiture of office statute is too tangentially involved to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S. C. § 1257(2). The only bearing it had was whether, valid or not, the choice between being discharged under it for refusal to answer and self-incrimination rendered the statements products of coercion. The appeal is dismissed, the papers are treated as a petition for certiorari, and certiorari is granted. Pp. 385 U. S. 495-496. 2. The threat of removal from public office under the forfeiture of office statute to induce the petitioners to forgo the privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Fourteenth Amendment rendered the resulting statements involuntary, and therefore inadmissible in the state criminal proceedings. Pp. 385 U. S. 496-500. Page 385 U. S. 494

Bumper v. N. Carolina

If there is coercion there cannot be consent. Petitioner was tried for rape in North Carolina, an offense punishable by death unless the jury recommends life imprisonment. The prosecution was permitted to challenge for cause all prospective jurors who stated that they were opposed to capital punishment or had conscientious scruples against imposing the death penalty. A rifle which was introduced at the trial was obtained by a search of petitioner's grandmother's house, where he resided. Four officers appeared at the home, announced that they had a warrant to search it, and were told by the owner to "[g]o ahead." At the hearing on a motion to suppress, which was denied, the prosecutor stated that he did not rely on a warrant to justify the search, but on consent. The jury found petitioner guilty, but recommended life imprisonment, and the State Supreme Court affirmed. Held: 1. Petitioner has adduced no evidence to support his claim that a jury from which those who are opposed to capital punishment or have conscientious scruples against imposing the death penalty are excluded for cause is necessarily "prosecution prone," warranting reversal of his conviction for denial of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury. Witherspoon v. Illinois, ante, p.391 U. S. 510. P. 391 U. S. 545. 2. A search cannot be justified as lawful on the basis of consent when that "consent" has been given only after the official conducting the search has asserted that he possesses a warrant; there is no consent under such circumstances. Pp. 391 U. S. 546-550. 3. Because the rifle, which was erroneously admitted into evidence, was plainly damaging against petitioner, its admission was not harmless error. Chapman v. California, 38

US v. Robinson

Search Arrested person clothing upon arrest.

Howard v. State (1979):

when contraband (marihuana) is recovered as a result of unlawful arrest, the contraband seize falls under the "fruit of poisonous tree doctrine."

Illionis v. Gates (1983):

Totally circumstances. Veracity of information and trust on informant. Anonymous letter regarding drug sales is not enough for warrant. Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 462 › Illinois v. Gates Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) Justia Opinion Summary and Annotations Less" data-collapsed_text="Read more" data-section="diminished-text" data-collapsed_class="text-diminished" data-expanded_class="text-extended" id="summary-read-more" style="box-sizing: border-box; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); color: rgb(226, 35, 26); text-decoration: none; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; position: relative; margin-bottom: 0px; font-weight: 700; line-height: 1; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle; -webkit-appearance: none; transition-property: color, background-color, border-color; transition-duration: 0.25s; transition-timing-function: ease; padding: 0.6em 1em; font-size: 0.9375rem; border-color: currentcolor; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px; border-radius: 4px;">Read more OpinionsAudio & Media Syllabus Case U.S. Supreme CourtIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) Illinois v. Gates No. 81-430 Argued October 13, 1982 Reargued March 1, 1983 Decided June 8, 1983 462 U.S. 213 Syllabus On May 3, 1978, the Police Department of Bloomingdale, Ill., received an anonymous letter which included statements that respondents, husband and wife, were engaged in selling drugs; that the wife would drive their car to Florida on May 3 to be loaded with drugs, and the husband would fly down in a few days to drive the car back; that the car's trunk would be loaded with drugs; and that respondents presently had over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement. Acting on the tip, a police officer determined respondents' address and learned that the husband made a reservation on a May 5 flight to Florida. Arrangements for surveillance of the flight were made with an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the surveillance disclosed that the husband took the flight, stayed overnight in a motel room registered in the wife's name, and left the following morning with a woman in a car bearing an Illinois license plate issued to the husband, heading north on an interstate highway used by travelers to the Bloomingdale area. A search warrant for respondents' residence and automobile was then obtained from an Illinois state court judge, based on the Bloomingdale police officer's affidavit setting forth the foregoing facts and a copy of the anonymous letter. When respondents arrived at their home, the police were waiting, and discovered marihuana and other contraband in respondents' car trunk and home. Prior to respondents' trial on charges of violating state drug laws, the trial court ordered suppression of all the items seized, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the letter and affidavit were inadequate to sustain a determination of probable cause for issuance of the search warrant under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, since they failed to satisfy the "two-pronged test" of (1) revealing the informant's "basis of knowledge" and (2) providing sufficient facts to establish either the informant's "veracity" or the "reliability" of the informant's report. Held: 1. The question -- which this Court requested the parties to address -- whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment should be modified so as, for example, not to require exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable Page 462 U. S. 214 belief that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment, will not be decided in this case, since it was not presented to or decided by the Illinois courts. Although prior decisions interpreting the "not pressed or passed on below" rule have not involved a State's failure to raise a defense to a federal right or remedy asserted below, the purposes underlying the rule are, for the most part, as applicable in such a case as in one where a party fails to assert a federal right. The fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the federal exclusionary rule does not affect the application of the "not pressed or passed on below" rule. Nor does the State's repeated opposition to respondents' substantive Fourth Amendment claims suffice to have raised the separate question whether the exclusionary rule should be modified. The extent of the continued vitality of the rule is an issue of unusual significance, and adhering scrupulously to the customary limitations on this Court's discretion promotes respect for its adjudicatory process and the stability of its decisions, and lessens the threat of untoward practical ramifications not foreseen at the time of decision. Pp. 462 U. S. 217-224. 2. The rigid "two-pronged test" under Aguilarand Spinelli for determining whether an informant's tip establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant is abandoned, and the "totality of the circumstances" approach that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations is substituted in its place. The elements under the "two-pronged test" concerning the informant's "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of knowledge" should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the common sense, practical question whether there is "probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. This flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach that has developed from Aguilar and Spinelli. Pp. 462 U. S. 230-241. 3. The judge issuing the warrant had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause to search respondents' home and car existed. Under the "totality of the circumstances" analysis, corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work is of significant value. Cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307. Here, even standing alone, the facts obtained through the independent investigation of the Bloomingdale police officer and the DEA at least suggested that Page 462 U. S. 215 respondents were involved in drug trafficking. In addition, the judge could rely on the anonymous letter, which had been corroborated in major part by the police officer's efforts. Pp. 462 U. S. 241-246. 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887, reversed. REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 462 U. S. 246. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 462 U. S. 274. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 462 U. S. 291. Page 462 U. S. 216

Michigan v. Long

The ruling had two results. First, it allowed police to search a detainee's car without first obtaining a warrant or placing the driver under arrest, if the officers had a reasonable fear of physical harm. Second, If the lower court clearly stated it had based its decision on "adequate and independent state grounds," the Supreme Court would not take the case. Two police officers, patrolling in a rural area at night, observed a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. When the car swerved into a ditch, the officers stopped to investigate and were met by respondent, the only occupant of the car, at the rear of the car. Respondent, who "appeared to be under the influence of something," did not respond to initial requests to produce his license and registration, and when he began walking toward the open door of the car, apparently to obtain the registration, the officers followed him and saw a hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's side of the car. The officers then stopped respondent and subjected him to a patdown search, which revealed no weapons. One of the officers shined his flashlight into the car, saw something protruding from under the armrest on the front seat, and, upon lifting the armrest, saw an open pouch that contained what appeared to be marihuana. Respondent was then arrested for possession of marihuana. A further search of the car's interior revealed no more contraband, but the officers decided to impound the vehicle, and more marihuana was found in the trunk. The Michigan state trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress the marihuana taken from both the car's interior and its trunk, and he was convicted of possession of marihuana. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the search of the passenger compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, and that the search of the trunk was valid as an inventory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364. However, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that Terry did not justify the passenger compartment search, and that the marihuana found in the trunk was the "fruit" of the illegal search of the car's interior.

California v. Greenwood

Warrantless search of garbage is justified if left outside the cartilage of home.

US v. Mattlock:

a land lord cannot give consent to have tenant apartment searched. Respondent was arrested in the front yard of a house in which he lived along with a Mrs. Graff (daughter of the lessees) and others. The arresting officers, who did not ask him which room he occupied or whether he would consent to a search, were then admitted to the house by Mrs. Graff and, with her consent but without a warrant, searched the house, including a bedroom, which Mrs. Graff told them was jointly occupied by respondent and herself, and in a closet of which the officers found and seized money. Respondent was indicted for bank robbery, and moved to suppress the seized money as evidence. The District Court held that, where consent by a third person is relied upon as justification for a search, the Government must show, inter alia, not only that it reasonably appeared to the officers that the person had authority to consent, but also that the person had actual authority to permit the search, and that the Government had not satisfactorily proved that Mrs. Graff had such authority. Although Mrs. Graff's statements to the officers that she and respondent occupied the same bedroom were deemed admissible to prove the officers' good faith belief, they were held to be inadmissible extrajudicial statements to prove the truth of the facts therein averred, and the same was held to be true of statements by both Mrs. Graff and respondent that they were married, which was not the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: 1. When the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. Pp. 415 U. S. 169-172. 2. It was error to exclude from evidence at the suppression hearings Mrs. Graff's out-of-court statements respecting the joint occupancy of the bedroom, as well as the evidence that both respondent and Mrs. Graff had represented themselves as husband and wife. Pp. 415 U. S. 172-177. Page 415 U. S. 165 (a) There is no automatic rule against receiving hearsay evidence in suppression hearings (where the trial court itself can accord such evidence such weight as it deems desirable), and under the circumstances here, where the District Court as satisfied that Mrs. Graff's out-of-court statements had, in fact, been made and nothing in the record raised doubts about their truthfulness, there was no apparent reason to exclude the declarations in the course of resolving the issues raised at the suppression hearings. Pp. 415 U. S. 172-176. (b) Mrs. Graff's statements were against her penal interest, since extramarital cohabitation is a state crime. Thus, they carried their own indicia of reliability and should have been admitted as evidence at the suppression hearings, even if they would not have been admissible at respondent's trial. Pp. 415 U. S. 176-177. 3. Although, given the admissibility of the excluded statements, the Government apparently sustained its burden of proof as to Mrs. Graff's authority to consent to the search, the District Court should reconsider the sufficiency of the evidence in light of this Court's opinion. Pp. 415 U. S. 177-178. 476 F.2d 1083, reversed and remanded. WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 415 U. S. 178. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 415 U. S. 188.

Wong Sun v. U.S

"Fruit of Poisonous Tree." Syllabus In a trial in a Federal District Court without a jury, petitioners were convicted of fraudulent and knowing transportation and concealment of illegally imported heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §174. Although the Court of Appeals held that the arrests of both petitioners without warrants were illegal, because not based on "probable cause" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment nor "reasonable grounds" within the meaning of the Narcotics Control Act of 1956, it affirmed their convictions, notwithstanding the admission in evidence over their timely objections of (1) statements made orally by petitioner Toy in his bedroom at the time of his arrest; (2) heroin surrendered to the agents by a third party as a result of those statements; and (3) unsigned statements made by each petitioner several days after his arrest, and after being lawfully arraigned and released on his own recognizance. The Court of Appeals held that these items were not the fruits of the illegal arrests, and, therefore, were properly admitted in evidence. Held: 1. On the record in this case, there was neither reasonable grounds nor probable cause for Toy's arrest, since the information upon which it was based was too vague and came from too untested a source to accept it as probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant; and this defect was not cured by the fact that Toy fled when a supposed customer at his door early in the morning revealed that he was a narcotics agent. Pp.371 U. S. 479-484. 2. On the record in this case, the statements made by Toy in his bedroom at the time of his unlawful arrest were the fruits of the agents' unlawful action, and they should have been excluded from evidence. Pp. 371 U. S. 484-487. 3. The narcotics taken from a third party as a result of statements made by Toy at the time of his arrest were likewise fruits of the unlawful arrest, and they should not have been admitted as evidence against Toy. Pp.371 U. S. 487-488. Page 371 U. S. 472 4. After exclusion of the foregoing items of improperly admitted evidence, the only proofs remaining to sustain Toy's conviction are his and his codefendant's unsigned statements; any admissions of guilt in Toy's statement require corroboration; no reference to Toy in his codefendant's statement constitutes admissible evidence corroborating any admission by Toy, and Toy's conviction must be set aside for lack of competent evidence to support it. Pp. 371 U. S. 488-491. 5. In view of the fact that, after his unlawful arrest, petitioner Wong Sun had been lawfully arraigned and released on his own recognizance and had returned voluntarily several days later when he made his unsigned statement, the connection between his unlawful arrest and the making of that statement was so attenuated that the unsigned statement was not the fruit of the unlawful arrest and, therefore, it was properly admitted in evidence. P. 371 U. S. 491. 6. The seizure of the narcotics admitted in evidence invaded no right of privacy of person or premises which would entitle Wong Sun to object to its use at his trial. Pp.371 U. S. 491-492. 7. Any references to Wong Sun in his codefendant's statement were incompetent to corroborate Wong Sun's admissions, and Wong Sun is entitled to a new trial, because it is not clear from the record whether or not the trial court relied upon his codefendant's statement as a source of corroboration of Wong Sun's confession.

Graham v. Connor:

("immediate" v. "possible") Factors as risk prioritized ranked by Chew v Gates. Only case used when evaluating use of force. (Taser) Objectively reasonable: amount of force use and extent of the injury. police officers must apply constitutional Lee appropriate levels of force based on the unique circumstance of each case, in the same basic wave that in objectively reasonable officer would use in the same circumstances. objectively reasonable standard, split-second judgment in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving no luxury of 20/20 vision. the case also established the doctrine that the Judiciary may not use the due process clause and said I can borrow Pacific constitutional provision. 835 (A) PC States any peace officer who has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense may use reasonable Force to effect the arrest, to prevent Escape or to overcome the resistance. A peace officer who makes or attempt to make an arrest need not to retreat or distance from his efforts by reason of the resistance or threaten resistance of the person being arrested, nor shall such officer be deemed an aggressor or lose his right to self-defense by the use of reasonable Force to arrest or to prevent Escape or to overcome resistance.

Aguilar v. Texas

(heroin & narcotics) 2 Prong Rule: 2 prong rule (Informant Credibility and Information Reliable) The affidavit given by police officers to obtain a state search warrant stated that: "Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin . . . and other narcotics . . . are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law." The affidavit provided no further information concerning either the undisclosed informant or the reliability of the information. The warrant was issued, a search made, and the evidence obtained was admitted at the trial at which petitioner was found guilty of possessing heroin. Held: 1. The standard of reasonableness for obtaining a search warrant is the same under the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments.Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, followed. P. 378 U. S. 110. 2. Although an affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances relied on by the person providing the information and some of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant, whose identity was not disclosed, was creditable or his information reliable.Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, followed. Pp. 378 U. S. 110-115.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007):

-4th Amendment Risk/Benefit Standard. -"[I]n judging whether [officer's] actions were reasonable, we must consider the risk of bodily harm that [officer's] actions posed to [suspect] in light of the threat to the public that [officer] was trying to eliminate." (Taser.

California v. Acevedo

-Marihuana found in container in trunk based on good intel. -Carrol doctrine.

Beck v. Ohio:

-Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the officer would warrant a belief by a reasonable man. -Arrested for past activities with not informant support.

Tennessee v.Garner

4th. Amendment. /Use of force due to scape of felony suspect, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that felony suspect die. fleeing Felon: deadly force may not be used unless it is necessary to prevent escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.

Miranda v. Arizona:

5th. Amendment/ Miranda's rights. evidence obtained by the police during a Custodial interrogation of a suspect can't be used in court unless the suspect was informed of his or her rights prior to interrogation. In custody is when freedom is significantly deprive to be equivalent to an arrest. Interrogation is the use of words or actions to incite an incriminating response from an average person. custody interrogation equals Miranda

Chimel v. California:

Arms reach Rule. Search incidental to lawful arrest Police officers, armed with an arrest warrant but not a search warrant, were admitted to petitioner's home by his wife, where they awaited petitioner's arrival. When he entered, he was served with the warrant. Although he denied the officers' request to "look around," they conducted a search of the entire house "on the basis of the lawful arrest." At petitioner's trial on burglary charges, items taken from his home were admitted over objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. His conviction was affirmed by the California appellate courts, which held, despite their acceptance of petitioner's contention that the arrest warrant was invalid, that, since the arresting officers had procured the warrant "in good faith," and since, in any event, they had had sufficient information to constitute probable cause for the arrest, the arrest was lawful. The courts also held that the search was justified as incident to a valid arrest. Held: Assuming the arrest was valid, the warrantless search of petitioner's house cannot be constitutionally justified as incident to that arrest. Pp. 395 U. S. 755-768. (a) An arresting officer may search the arrestee's person to discover and remove weapons and to seize evidence to prevent its concealment or destruction, and may search the area "within the immediate control" of the person arrested, meaning the area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Pp. 395 U. S. 762-763. (b) For the routine search of rooms other than that in which an arrest occurs, or for searching desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself, absent well recognized exceptions, a search warrant is required. P. 395 U. S. 763. (c) While the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest depends upon "the facts and circumstances -- the total atmosphere of the case," those facts and circumstances must be viewed in the light of established Fourth Amendment principles, and the only reasoned distinction is one between (1) a search of the person arrested and the area within his reach, and (2) more extensive searches. Pp. 395 U. S. 765-766.

Steagald v. US and Hudson v. State:

Arrest warrant does not give police the authority to enter the home of a third person, even if the police has a reason to believe the wanted person is present in that home. Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 451 › Steagald v. United States Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) Justia Opinion Summary and Annotations Less" data-collapsed_text="Read more" data-section="diminished-text" data-collapsed_class="text-diminished" data-expanded_class="text-extended" id="summary-read-more" style="box-sizing: border-box; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); color: rgb(226, 35, 26); text-decoration: none; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; position: relative; margin-bottom: 0px; font-weight: 700; line-height: 1; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle; -webkit-appearance: none; transition-property: color, background-color, border-color; transition-duration: 0.25s; transition-timing-function: ease; padding: 0.6em 1em; font-size: 0.9375rem; border-color: currentcolor; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px; border-radius: 4px;">Read more OpinionsAudio & Media Syllabus Case U.S. Supreme CourtSteagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) Steagald v. United States No. 79-6777 Argued January 14, 1981 Decided April 21, 1981 451 U.S. 204 Syllabus Pursuant to an arrest warrant for one Lyons, Drug Enforcement Administration agents entered petitioner's home to search for Lyons without first obtaining a search warrant. In the course of searching the home, the agents found cocaine and other incriminating evidence, but did not find Lyons. Petitioner was then arrested and indicted on federal drug charges. His pretrial motion to suppress all evidence uncovered during the search of his home on the ground that it was illegally obtained because the agents had failed to obtain a search warrant was denied by the District Court, and petitioner was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: 1. The Government is precluded from contending in this Court that petitioner lacked an expectation of privacy in his searched home sufficient to prevail on his Fourth Amendment claim where this argument was never raised in the courts below, but, rather, the Government had made contrary assertions in those courts, and acquiesced in their contrary findings. Pp.451 U. S. 208-211. 2. The search in question violated the Fourth Amendment where it took place in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. Pp. 451 U. S. 211-222. (a) Absent exigent circumstances or consent, a home may not be searched without a warrant. Two distinct interests were implicated by the search in this case -- Lyons' interest in being free from an unreasonable seizure and petitioner's interest in being free from an unreasonable search of his home. Because the arrest warrant for Lyons addressed only the former interest, the search of petitioner's home was no more reasonable from petitioner's perspective than it would have been if conducted in the absence of any warrant. The search therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 451 U. S. 211-216. (b) Common law, contrary to the Government's assertion, does not furnish precedent for upholding the search in question, but rather sheds little light on the narrow issue presented of whether an arrest warrant, as opposed to a search warrant, is adequate to protect the Fourth Amendment interests of persons not named in the warrant when their home is searched without their consent and in the absence of exigent Page 451 U. S. 205 circumstances. Moreover, the history of the Fourth Amendment strongly suggests that its Framers would not have sanctioned the search in question. Pp. 451 U. S. 217-220. (e) A search warrant requirement, under the circumstances of this case, will not significantly impede effective law enforcement efforts. An arrest warrant alone suffices to enter a suspect's own residence, and, if probable cause exists, no warrant is required to apprehend a suspected felon in a public place. Moreover, the exigent circumstances doctrine significantly limits the situations in which a search warrant is needed. And in those situations in which a search warrant is necessary, the inconvenience incurred by the police is generally insignificant. In any event, whatever practical problems there are in requiring a search warrant in cases such as this, they cannot outweigh the constitutional interest at stake in protecting the right of presumptively innocent people to be secure in their homes from unjustified forcible intrusions by the government. Pp. 451 U. S. 220-222. 606 F.2d 540 and 615 F.2d 642, reversed and remanded. MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., concurred in the judgment. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, J., joined, post, p.

Mapp v. Ohio:

Exclusionary Rule. Appellant stands convicted of knowingly having had in her possession and under her control certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and photographs in violation of § 2905.34 of Ohio's Revised Code.[n1] As officially stated in the syllabus to its opinion, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that her conviction was valid though "based primarily upon the introduction in evidence of lewd and lascivious books and pictures unlawfully seized during an unlawful search of defendant's home. . . ." 170 Ohio St. 427-428, 166 N.E.2d 387, 388.[p644] On May 23, 1957, three Cleveland police officers arrived at appellant's residence in that city pursuant to information that a person [was] hiding out in the home, who was wanted for questioning in connection with a recent bombing, and that there was a large amount of policy paraphernalia being hidden in the home. Miss Mapp and her daughter by a former marriage lived on the top floor of the two-family dwelling. Upon their arrival at that house, the officers knocked on the door and demanded entrance, but appellant, after telephoning her attorney, refused to admit them without a search warrant. They advised their headquarters of the situation and undertook a surveillance of the house. The officers again sought entrance some three hours later when four or more additional officers arrived on the scene. When Miss Mapp did not come to the door immediately, at least one of the several doors to the house was forcibly opened[n2] and the policemen gained admittance. Meanwhile Miss Mapp's attorney arrived, but the officers, having secured their own entry, and continuing in their defiance of the law, would permit him neither to see Miss Mapp nor to enter the house. It appears that Miss Mapp was halfway down the stairs from the upper floor to the front door when the officers, in this highhanded manner, broke into the hall. She demanded to see the search warrant. A paper, claimed to be a warrant, was held up by one of the officers. She grabbed the "warrant" and placed it in her bosom. A struggle ensued in which the officers recovered the piece of paper and as a result of which they handcuffed appellant because she had been "belligerent"[p645] in resisting their official rescue of the "warrant" from her person. Running roughshod over appellant, a policeman "grabbed" her, "twisted [her] hand," and she "yelled [and] pleaded with him" because "it was hurting." Appellant, in handcuffs, was then forcibly taken upstairs to her bedroom where the officers searched a dresser, a chest of drawers, a closet and some suitcases. They also looked into a photo album and through personal papers belonging to the appellant. The search spread to the rest of the second floor including the child's bedroom, the living room, the kitchen and a dinette. The basement of the building and a trunk found therein were also searched. The obscene materials for possession of which she was ultimately convicted were discovered in the course of that widespread search. At the trial, no search warrant was produced by the prosecution, nor was the failure to produce one explained or accounted for. At best, "There is, in the record, considerable doubt as to whether there ever was any warrant for the search of defendant's home." 170 Ohio St. at 430, 166 N.E.2d at 389. The Ohio Supreme Court believed a "reasonable argument" could be made that the conviction should be reversed "because the 'methods' employed to obtain the [evidence] . . . were such as to 'offend "a sense of justice,"'" but the court found determinative the fact that the evidence had not been taken "from defendant's person by the use of brutal or offensive physical force against defendant." 170 Ohio St. at 431, 166 N.E.2d at 389-390. The State says that, even if the search were made without authority, or otherwise unreasonably, it is not prevented from using the unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial, citing Wolf v. Colorado,338 U.S. 25 (1949), in which this Court did indeed hold that, in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime, the Fourteenth Amendment[p646] does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. At p. 33. On this appeal, of which we have noted probable jurisdiction, 364 U.S. 868, it is urged once again that we review that holding.[n3] I Seventy-five years ago, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), considering the Fourth[n4] and Fifth Amendments as running "almost into each other"[n5] on the facts before it, this Court held that the doctrines of those Amendments apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,[p647] that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property. . . . Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation . . . [of those Amendments]. The Court noted that

Mincey v. Arizona:

Murder Exception (Warrant to search even for murder cases). An undercover police officer and petitioner Mincey were shot during a drug bust. Mincey was tried and convicted of murder, assault, and drug offenses.Mincey's motions to suppress the fruits of a four-day search of his home, and his statements while in intensive care at the hospital were denied by the trial court and the Arizona Supreme Court.The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held that the four-day search violated Mincey's Fourth Amendment rights. It noted that the Arizona Supreme Court's "murder scene exception" is not a valid exception to the warrant requirement.The Court also held that Mincey's hospital statements were not voluntary. They were obtained in violation of Miranda, and were not the result of Mincey's rational intellect and free will.Mincey v. Arizona Case Brief Statement of the Facts: The Undercover Drug Deal Gone Bad Officer Headricks, operating undercover, made a narcotics deal with petitioner Mincey and indicated that he would return to Mincey's apartment with money to complete the transaction. Headricks later returned with nine plainclothes police officers. Headricks knocked on Mincey's door, and one of Mincey's friends answered. Although the friend tried to keep the nine officers out, Headricks was able to slip into the apartment and meet Mincey in the bedroom. Shots were then fired and Headricks stumbled out of the bedroom, collapsing on the floor. Officers proceeded to the bedroom where they found Mincey on the floor, seriously wounded. Mincey was later charged with murder, assault, and narcotics offenses. The Four-Day Search of Mincey's Apartment Immediately following the shooting, the officers on the scene made sure there were no further victims in the apartment. Beyond that, however, they left any further search to other detectives per police procedure. The homicide detectives who took over the crime scene began a search for evidence. The search took four days, during which detectives went extensively through the entire apartment, even cutting up parts of Mincey's carpet. The 200 to 300 pieces of evidence obtained were used at Mincey's trial. The Hospital Interrogation of Mincey At 8pm on the evening of the shooting, a detective visited Mincey's hospital room. Mincey was barely conscious and encumbered by various tubes and needles. The detective read Mincey his Miranda warnings and began an interrogation. Although Mincey requested a lawyer and that the detective stop questioning him, the detective persisted in questioning Mincey for four hours. Procedural History: Mincey moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the four-day search, and his statements during the hospital interrogation. The trial court denied those motions. A jury then convicted Mincey on all charges.On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the murder and assault convictions, but affirmed the narcotics convictions.With regard to Mincey's motions, the court held that the search was valid under a "murder scene exception" to the Fourth Amendment. It also held that Mincey's statements were voluntary for impeachment purposes.The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue and Holding: Is a four-day warrantless search of a murder suspect's apartment consistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? No.Can statements made by an intensive care patient who repeatedly asked for counsel and to cease questioning be considered voluntary? No. Judgment: The judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is reversed and remanded. Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied: A "murder scene exception" to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does not exist. Accordingly, a warrantless four-day search of a suspect's home violates the Fourth Amendment in the absence of exigency or some other proper exception to the warrant requirement.The statements of a barely conscious intensive care patient, who repeatedly asked for counsel and to cease questioning, cannot be considered voluntary. Accordingly, such statements cannot be used at trial for any purpose. Reasoning: The Warrantless Four-Day Search Violated the Fourth Amendment The three arguments supporting the Arizona Supreme Court's new "murder scene exception" to the warrant requirement are unpersuasive. First, Mincey did not waive any right to privacy by virtue of shooting Officer Headricks. Also, the notion that the four-day search was no more intrusive than the original entry of the nine officers into the apartment is not persuasive given how extensive the four-day search was. Second, the fact that Mincey's apartment was a murder scene does not mean that an emergency situation existed such that a warrant was not required. Finally, the purported "murder scene exception" is not permissible because it is narrowly defined. The opposite appears to be true in this case, where the searching officers had unbridled access to Mincey's entire home. In sum, the "murder scene exception" is inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and therefore cannot be used to justify warrantless searches. The Hospital Statements Were Not Voluntary While statements obtained in violation of Miranda may still be admissible to impeach the person making the statements, the statements must be the result of rational intellect and free will. In this case, the circumstances of the hospital questioning and Mincey's condition make clear that his statements were not the product of such rational thought and free will. Accordingly, they were involuntary, and the use of those statements for any purpose at trial violates Mincey's due process rights. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions: Concurring Opinion (Marshall): Litigants do not have a federal habeas corpus remedy for Fourth Amendment violations adjudicated in state courts, pursuant to Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In order to clear such issues out of the Court's docket, the Court should reconsider the Stone decision. Concurring in part, and Dissenting in part Opinion (Rehnquist): The Court was correct in finding a Fourth Amendment violation in the four-day search. However, the Court should not have substituted its own judgment for that of the trial court with regard to the voluntariness of Mincey's hospital statements. The trial court is far closer to the facts and deserves deference regarding such fact-intensive inquiries. Significance: Mincey v. Arizona had a significant impact on law enforcement's ability to search a murder scene without a warrant. Prior to Mincey, courts generally did not impose requirements on murder scene searches. However, Justice Stewart's careful application of the Fourth Amendment in Mincey now ensures that the parameters of a murder scene search are defined by a neutral magistrate, rather than by an interested police officer in search of incriminating evidence.

Lippert v. Texas

Non-occupant present at house does not justify frisk/search/arrest by mere presence. Justia › US Law › Case Law › Texas Case Law › Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Decisions › 1984 › Lippert v. State Receive free daily summaries of new opinions from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Enter your email. Subscribe Lippert v. StateAnnotate this Case 664 S.W.2d 712 (1984) John L. LIPPERT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. No. 023-83. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc. February 1, 1984. *714 Michael M. Fricke, Port Lavaca, for appellant. Dan W. Heard, Dist. Atty. and Mark R. Kelly, Asst. Dist. Atty., Port Lavaca, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State. Before the court en banc. OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW ONION, Presiding Judge. Appellant was convicted of the possession of a controlled substance, to-wit: methamphetamine, with intent to deliver. After the jury's verdict of guilty, the court assessed punishment at 10 years' imprisonment, probated. On appeal appellant contended the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure of his person in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See also Article I, § 9, Tex. Const. Appellant argued that the search was unconstitutional because it was done without a warrant, without probable cause, without consent, and was not incident to a valid arrest. Appellant contends the search occurred after he entered premises where a search warrant was being executed. Distinguishing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979), and extending Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981), to include a non-occupant under the circumstances, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the search and seizure of the controlled substance and affirmed the conviction. Lippert v. State, 653 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.App. - 13th Dist. 1982). We granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to consider the correctness of such holding. On March 25, 1981, Sgt. Melvin Blake of the Port Lavaca Police Department obtained a combination search and arrest warrant from a justice of the peace. The warrant authorized the search of a residence on North Virginia Street in Port Lavaca. The warrant also authorized the arrest and search of "each suspected party named in said affidavit." The affidavit for warrant, sworn to by Blake, after describing the place to be searched, reads: "Said suspected place is in charge of and controlled by each of the following named parties (hereinafter called `suspected party,' whether one or more), to-wit: Sherry Fourtner, and Mike (last name unknown but sound is phonetically similar to `Euling'), and person or persons whose names, identities and descriptions are unknown to affiant."[1] On March 27, 1981, Blake and Calhoun County deputy sheriffs Mike Gibson and *715 Milt Smith went to a residence on North Virginia to execute the warrant. It was after 8:30 p.m. and dark. Receiving no response to their knocks at the back door, the officers forced entry into the kitchen. The room was dark. Without lights they proceeded into the dining room, the living room and down the hall to the front bedroom. Forcing the door, the officers found Sheri Fourtner,[2] Michael Ulen and Bobby Myers. Deputy Gibson revealed that narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia were in open view. The two men were handcuffed and removed to the living room and the lights in the house were turned on. Fourtner was detained briefly in the bedroom[3] because she was identified as being in charge of the residence. She was later moved to the living room. Sgt. Blake, who was not in uniform at the time of the search, testified that about 15 minutes after the officers commenced the execution of the warrant he was in the dining room when he turned and saw the appellant and Kathy Wise standing in the doorway between the kitchen and dining room. He did not know whether appellant and Wise had just come into the house or had been hiding therein.[4] Blake had seen appellant and his car at the residence on "several" occasions during his surveillance of the place. Appellant asked "What's going on?" Blake told appellant a drug raid was on and to assume the position to place his hands on the wall. Appellant, wearing a brown jacket, was frisked. The frisk was fruitless. Blake found no weapons or narcotics. He expressly stated he was looking only for weapons.[5] Blake stated he did not arrest appellant, but detained him, told him he could not leave. Appellant and Wise were ordered to the living room to sit on the floor with the others who had been arrested. They were not handcuffed. Wise, who was not frisked or searched, stated she had arrived in her car just behind appellant. She had come to the house to do her washing. They entered the house together, and were immediately confronted by Blake. Appellant was frisked, and she recalled that appellant then asked to leave and Blake refused. Deputy Mike Gibson recounted details of the search. He related appellant and Wise were not in the house when the search commenced, but stated he did not see appellant enter the house. During his prior surveillance of the residence, he did not see appellant or his peach colored car. Deputy Milt Smith testified that appellant arrived at the residence 15 to 30 minutes after the search began. None of the officers executing the search saw appellant's car at the time of their arrival to execute the search warrant.[6] Deputy Vivian Richards was summoned to transport the prisoners to the police station. He arrived at the residence and found appellant in the living room. Richards had no knowledge of what had previously transpired. As a matter of routine procedure before placing a person in a squad car, and at officer Smith's instruction, Richards searched appellant for weapons in the living room "for my safety." In appellant's right front shirt pocket Richards found a hard red plastic or vinyl case, six or seven inches *716 long. Richards opened the case and found two plastic bags with white powder and one brown glass vial with a gold chain and spoon attached containing a white substance. The chain of custody was established and the white powder or substance was shown by the chemist to be methamphetamine. It was this controlled substance that appellant claims was the fruit of the illegal second search. Appellant initially argues that he did not specifically come within the provisions of the combination search and arrest warrant.[7] The warrant authorized the arrest of those persons named in the affidavit. The appellant was not named in the affidavit. The State argues that a warrant need not contain the name of the offender whose name is unknown, if the warrant authorizes the arrest of unnamed persons for whom probable cause exists to believe are in possession of narcotic drugs. The State relies upon Dawson v. State, 477 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Cr.App.1972), and Walthall v. State, 594 S.W.2d 74 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). In Dawson this court wrote: "Hence, a search warrant properly issued on the basis of probable cause for the search of certain premises for narcotic drugs, named or unnamed, for whom probable cause exists to believe are in possession of the narcotic drugs ...." (Emphasis supplied.) See also Pecina v. State, 516 S.W.2d 401(Tex.Cr.App.1974). In Walthall this court stated: "Appellant's final contention regarding the validity of the warrant is that the warrant fails to describe the persons to be arrested in sufficient detail. The warrant orders the arrest of `the person or persons commercially exhibiting the said motion picture film or possessing the same with the intent to distribute.' It is not necessary to include the name of the offender in the search warrant. If his name is unknown, it is sufficient to describe him, and if his identity is also unknown, it is sufficient to aver that the premises are in control of `parties unknown to the affiants.' See 51 Tex. Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, Sec. 23, pp. 664-665; Rice v. State, 548 S.W.2d 725(Tex.Cr.App.1977); Hernandez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). The warrant in this case sufficiently describes the offender, and the description is limited to those persons in control of the film in question. Appellant's contention is without merit. (Emphasis supplied.) The combination search and arrest warrant and the supporting affidavit in the instant case do not contain any reference to appellant or any information which would constitute probable cause that he possessed methamphetamine or other controlled substance. Further, from the record it appears appellant was not one of those persons who was "in charge of and controlled" the described premises whose "names, identities and description are unknown to affiant" as set out in the affidavit. The warrant authorized the officers, inter alia, "... also to arrest and bring before me each suspected party named in said affidavit." There was no provision to bring before the magistrate all persons found on said premises or making escape therefrom.[8] We agree with the Court of Appeals that the warrant did not specifically authorize appellant's arrest. Nevertheless, the State relies upon various Texas cases which hold that an officer executing a valid search warrant has the right and duty to search persons found on the premises during the execution of the warrant. Hernandez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 831(Tex.Cr.App.1968); Johnson v. State, 440 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Guzman v. State, 461 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Guerra v. State, 496 S.W.2d 92 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Brown v. State, 498 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Cr.App.1973); Martinez v. State, 504 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). And the cases have made clear that there can be no *717 meaningful distinction between persons found on the premises by officers when they initiate their search and persons who enter the premises after the search commences. Johnson v. State, supra; Martinez v. State, supra; Fisher v. State, 493 S.W.2d 841(Tex.Cr.App.1973); Rice v. State, 548 S.W.2d 725 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). The continued validity of these cases has been cast in doubt by Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979). See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981). In Rodriquez v. State, 614 S.W.2d 448 (Tex.Cr. App.1981), this court indicated Hernandez and Johnson were "no longer the law" in light of Ybarra. See also Christian v. State, 592 S.W.2d 625 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). In Ybarra a search warrant was issued which authorized the search of a tavern and the bartender known as "Greg," who was suspected of selling heroin. Entering the tavern, the officers announced their purpose and advised they were going to conduct a cursory search for weapons. The patrons were searched.[9] The officer who searched Ybarra, a customer, felt a cigarette pack with objects in it in Ybarra's pants pocket. He did not remove the same. After patting down other customers, the officer again frisked Ybarra and found heroin in the cigarette pack. In reversing the judgment of conviction, the Supreme Court wrote: "It is true that the police possessed a warrant based on probable cause to search the tavern in which Ybarra happened to be at the time the warrant was executed. But, a person's mere propenquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1902, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917. Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises where the person may happen to be. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the `legitimate expectations of privacy' of persons, not places. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-143, 148-149, 99 S. Ct. 421, 427-430, 433, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-352, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576. "* * * "... [A]lthough the search warrant, issued upon probable cause, gave the officers authority to search the premises and to search `Greg,' it gave them no authority whatever to invade the constitutional protections possessed individually by the tavern's customers. "Notwithstanding the absence of probable cause to search Ybarra, the State argues that the action of the police in searching him and seizing what was found in his pocket was nonetheless constitutionally permissible. We are asked to find that the first patdown search of Ybarra constituted a reasonable frisk for weapons under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889]. If this finding is made, it is then possible to conclude, the State argues, that the second search of Ybarra was constitutionally justified. The argument is that the patdown yielded probable cause to believe that Ybarra was carrying narcotics, and that this probable cause constitutionally supported the second search, no warrant being required in light of the exigencies of the situation coupled with the ease with which Ybarra could have disposed of the illegal substance. "We are unable to take even the first step required by this argument. The initial frisk of Ybarra was simply not supported by a reasonable belief that he was *718 armed and presently dangerous, a belief which this Court has invariably held must form the predicate to a patdown of a person for weapons. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 [92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612]; Terry v. Ohio, supra, [392 U.S.] at 21-24, 27 [88 S. Ct. at 1879-81, 1883]. When the police entered the Aurora Tap Tavern on March 1, 1976, the lighting was sufficient for them to observe the customers. Upon seeing Ybarra, they neither recognized him as a person with a criminal history nor had any particular reason to believe that he might be inclined to assault them. Moreover, as Police Agent Johnson later testified, Ybarra, whose hands were empty, gave no indication of possessing a weapon, made no gestures or other actions indicative of an intent to commit an assault, and acted generally in a manner that was not threatening. At the suppression hearing, the most Agent Johnson could point to was that Ybarra was wearing a ¾-length lumber jacket, clothing which the State admits could be expected on almost any tavern patron in Illinois in early March. In short, the State is unable to articulate any specific fact that would have justified a police officer at the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was armed and dangerous. "The Terry case created an exception to the requirement of probable cause, an exception whose `narrow scope' this Court `has been careful to maintain.' Under that doctrine a law enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, may conduct a patdown to find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the possession of the person he has accosted. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, supra (at night, in high-crime district, lone police officer approached person believed by officer to possess gun and narcotics). Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow a generalized `cursory search for weapons' or, indeed, any search whatever for anything but weapons. The `narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place. "What has been said largely disposes of the State's second and alternative argument in this case. Emphasizing the important governmental interest `in effectively controlling traffic in dangerous, hard drugs' and the ease with which the evidence of narcotics possession may be concealed or moved around from person to person, the State contends that the Terry `reasonable belief or suspicion' standard should be made applicable to aid the evidence-gathering function of the search warrant. More precisely, we are asked to construe the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to permit evidence searches of persons who, at the commencement of the search, are on `compact' premises subject to a search warrant, at least where the police have a `reasonable belief' that such persons `are connected with' drug trafficking and `may be concealing or carrying away the contraband.' "(Emphasis supplied.) Noting that a similar argument 30 years ago in United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 583-587, 68 S. Ct. 222, 223-225, 92 L. Ed. 210, was rejected, the Court set aside the judgment stating: "... [W]e conclude that the searches of Ybarra and the seizure of what was in his pocket contravened the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments....." (Emphasis supplied.) In the instant case the Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish Ybarra because the tavern there was public and the premises in the instant case were private. The private versus public distinction is fallacious and ignores the real teachings of Ybarra. State v. Broadnox, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 654 P.2d 96, 101 (1982). See also State v. Broadnox, 25 Wash. App. 704, 612 P.2d 391, 398 (Div. 1-1980) (Rengold, J., dissenting.) Regardless of the setting, Ybarra makes clear that constitutional protections are possessed individually. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect persons, not places. *719 Ybarra was on the premises of the tavern when the search warrant was being executed. In United States v. Cole, 628 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.1980), the defendant drove up to the subject premises (a duplex family dwelling)[10] as the officers arrived to execute a search warrant. As the defendant got out of his truck, an officer immediately frisked him for weapons, uncovering a small pistol in his belt which was seized and formed the basis of count five of the indictment, one of the counts upon which he was convicted. In finding that the frisk violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and in setting aside the conviction based on count five, the Court wrote: "The officer's pat-down of appellant cannot be justified by appellant's mere presence on the premises during the execution of the warrant. `[A] person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.' Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 342, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 245 (1979). Mere presence neither obviates nor satisfies the requirement of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), that specific articulable facts support an inference that the suspect might be armed and dangerous. Ybarra, supra, 444 U.S. at 92, 100 S. Ct. at 343, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 246-47. See also U.S. v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1100 (5th Cir.1976) (en banc). "Nor does the fact that the officers testified that they had previously received information of an undisclosed nature about appellant constitute reason to search under Terry. Without knowledge of the content of that information the court cannot assess the reasonableness of the inference of dangerousness. The exceptions to the requirement of a warrant are narrow and jealously guarded, and `"the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it."` Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2591, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 242 (1979), quoting U.S. v. Jeffers, 343 U.S. 48, 51, 72 S. Ct. 93, 95, 96 L. Ed. 59, 64 (1951). This burden was not met by testimony that the officers involved had prior information about appellant, absent proof that the information was of a sort from which an inference of dangerousness could reasonably be drawn." In United States v. Clay, 640 F.2d 157 (8th Cir.1981), the defendant approached his cousin's house and knocked on the door while officers were inside the house executing a search warrant. An armed officer dressed in a T-shirt and blue jeans opened the door. The defendant hesitated, took a step or two backwards, but did not run. The officer drew his revolver and ordered the defendant inside. He was frisked and a gun was found which formed the basis of the prosecution against him. On appeal the conviction was reversed. The court held that while the warrant authorized the officers to be on the premises the warrant did not authorize the search of anyone that came to the door during the time of the search. The officer having no reasonable suspicion the defendant was involved in any criminal activity or that he was armed and presently dangerous as required for a proper "pat down" search, and there being no nexus established between the contraband discovered during the search and the defendant at the time he was stopped and frisked, the conviction could not stand. In State v. Peters, 5 Kan.App.2d 44, 611 P.2d 178 (1980), it was held that, absent probable cause, a warrant to search premises of residence did not authorize search of defendant, who coincidentally entered the residence after execution of the warrant, but who was not the owner or occupant of the residence and made no threat or gesture which caused the police to fear for their safety. See also State of Washington v. Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 654 P.2d 96(1982); Bell v. State, 608 P.2d 1159 (Okl.Cr. App.1980). *720 In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that if the evidence that a citizen's residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an invasion of the citizen's privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home. In State v. Broadnax, supra, 654 P.2d at p. 103, the Washington Supreme Court wrote: "... In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981), the Court did permit officers executing a residential search warrant todetain the occupant of the home while the search was completed. The basis for that limited intrusion was that [t]he connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant. Summers, at 703-04, 101 S. Ct. at 2594. Thus, an occupant's constructive control over the premises which is the subject of a search warrant provides a sufficient connection with the suspected illegal activities to permit a detention of that individual. A footnote in Summers, however, suggests that while occupants of private residence may be `seized' while a proper search of the premises is conducted, any search of those occupants or others on the premises must meet the standards of Ybarra. Summers, at 695-96 n. 4, 101 S. Ct. at 2590 n. 4. "When Summers is read in conjunction with Ybarra, it becomes clear that persons not directly associated with the premises and not named in the warrant cannot be detained or searched without some independent factors tying those persons to the illegal activities being investigated. In other words, `mere presence' is not enough; there must be `presence plus' to justify the detention or search of an individual, other than an occupant, at the scene of a valid execution of a search warrant. See generally Carr, Michigan v. Summers: Detentions Permitted While Search Warrant is Executed, 8 Search & Seizure L.Rep. 115-19 (1981).... "* * * "A person's mere presence at the scene of suspected criminal activity does not entitle police officers to search that individual. Neither may the police seize an individual, other than an occupant of the premises so as to make him available in case probable cause is later developed to arrest him. "* * * "Absent some independent factors tying petitioner to the illegal activities on the premises, it was no more likely he was engaged in the criminal enterprise than that he was an innocent visitor on the premises. See United States v. Vilhotti, supra (323 F. Supp. 425 [S.D.N.Y. 1971]). The discovery of contraband during the execution of a search warrant does not alone establish probable cause to arrest all persons present." (Emphasis supplied.) The Court of Appeals in the instant case sought to extend Summers to authorize the detention of a non-occupant during the execution of a valid search warrant, given the circumstances of the case and appellant's relationship with the house and its occupants. This relationship is based on the mere fact that one officer observed appellant park his car and walk to the house on several occasions during the officer's surveillance of the house. For the reasons set out by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Broadnax, supra, and quoted above, we do not agree that Summers can be extended to a non-occupant under the circumstances of this case to justify a search unless the standards of Ybarra are met. The Court of Appeals erred in both attempting to distinguish Ybarra and extending Summers. The appellant in the instant case was not a target of the warrant. When the appellant entered the house in question during *721 the execution of the search warrant or was observed there by Officer Blake some 15 minutes or so after the officers had entered, he asked what was happening. There was no flight, no furtive gestures or sudden movements towards a pocket or other place where a weapon might be concealed. There were no threats made and no attempt made to resist detention. The appellant was not shown to be committing or about to commit any criminal offense, nor to be under the influence of alcoholic beverages or drugs. There is no showing that Officer Blake or other officers knew of any prior criminal record of the appellant, including drug arrests or convictions,[11] or had any reasonable suspicion that appellant was armed and dangerous.[12] Nevertheless, appellant was caused to place his hands on the wall and was frisked. Officer Blake stated he was searching only for weapons for his own safety. The frisk was fruitless. No weapons or contraband were found. Appellant then asked to leave, but was detained for investigation. There was not established any nexus between the appellant and the contraband found in the house and no showing that the appellant was an owner or occupant of the residence being searched. Officer Blake did say he suspected appellant to be involved in narcotics. This appears to be based solely upon the fact that Blake had seen appellant, whose name he did not know,[13] and his car on "several" occasions at the residence in question. Blake stated this was not the reason he initially frisked appellant, but admitted that after the first fruitless frisk he detained the appellant because he had a hunch or suspicion that he might be involved in narcotics.[14] Under the rationale of Terry v. Ohio, supra, the officer had no justification for the initial stop and frisk. Even if it can be argued there was justification for the first frisk when that frisk proved fruitless, the officer could not validly continue to detain the appellant and subject him to a second frisk or search. If in the course of a pat-down frisk the officer satisfies himself that the suspect has no weapons, the officer has no valid reason to further invade the suspect's right to be free of police intrusion absent probable cause to arrest. Terry v. Ohio, supra; United States v. Thompson, 597 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.1979); State v. Allen, 93 Wash. 2d 170, 606 P.2d 1235, 1236-37 (1980). The

Wrehen v. US

Not a pretextual stop, traffic stop is permisible as long as a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for suspected traffic violation.

Heitman v. Texas

Police jimmied a locked briefcase during an inventory and found meth. Exclusionary rule.

Payton v. New York

Prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest.

Carrol v. U.S

Search of Vehicle based on probable cause (vehicle mobility). The legislative history of 6 of the act supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, November 23, 1921, c. 134, 42 Stat. 223, which makes it a misdemeanor for any officer of the United States to search a private dwelling without a search warrant or to search any other building or property without a search warrant, maliciously and without reasonable cause, shows clearly the intent of Congress to make a distinction as to the necessity for a search warrant in the searching of private dwellings and in the searching of automobiles or other road vehicles, in the enforcement of the Prohibition Act. P. 267 U. S. 144. 2. The Fourth Amendment denounces only such searches or seizures as are unreasonable, and it is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens. P. 267 U. S. 147. 3. Search without a warrant of an automobile, and seizure therein of liquor subject to seizure and destruction under the Prohibition Act, do not violate the Amendment, if made upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the officer, that the vehicle contains such contraband liquor. P.267 U. S. 149. 4. Various acts of Congress are cited to show that, practically since the beginning of the Government, the Fourth Amendment has been construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search for contraband in a store, dwelling-house, or other structure Page 267 U. S. 133 for the search of which a warrant may readily be obtained, and a search of a ship, wagon, automobile, or other vehicle which may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. P. 267 U. S. 150. 5. Section 26, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, provides that, when an officer "shall discover any person in the act" of transporting intoxicating liquor in any automobile, or other vehicle, in violation of law, it shall be his duty to seize the liquor and thereupon to take possession of the vehicle and arrest the person in charge of it, and that, upon conviction of such person, the court shall order the liquor destroyed, and, except for good cause shown, shall order a public sale, etc. of the other property seized. Held: (a) That the primary purpose is the seizure and destruction of the contraband liquor, and the provisions for forfeiture of the vehicle and arrest of the transporter are merely incidental. P. 267 U. S. 153. (b) Hence, the right to search an automobile for illicit liquor and to seize the liquor, if found, and thereupon to seize the vehicle also and to arrest the offender, does not depend upon the right to arrest the offender in the first instance, and therefore it is not determined by the degree of his offence -- whether a misdemeanor under § 29, Title II of the Act, because of being his first or second offence, or a felony because it is his third, and the rule allowing arrest without warrant for misdemeanor only when the offence is committed in the officer's presence, but for a felony when the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony, is not the test of the validity of such search and seizure. Pp. 267 U. S. 155, 267 U. S. 156. (c) The seizure is legal if the officer, in stopping and searching the vehicle, has reasonable or probable cause for believing that contraband liquor is being illegally transported in it. P. 267 U. S. 155. (d) The language of § 26 -- when an officer shall "discover " any person in the act of transporting, etc. -- does not limit him to what he learns of the contents of a passing automobile by the use of his senses at the time. P. 267 U. S. 158. (e) The section thus construed is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. P. 267 U. S. 159. 6. Probable cause held to exist where prohibition officers, while patrolling a highway much used in illegal transportation of liquor, stopped and searched an automobile upon the faith of information previously obtained by them that the car and its occupants, identified by the officers, were engaged in the illegal business of "bootlegging." P. 267 U. S. 159. Page 267 U. S. 134 7. When contraband liquor, seized from an automobile and used in the conviction of those in charge of the transportation, was shown at the trial to have been taken in a search justified by probable cause, held that the Court's refusal to return he liquor on defendants' motion before trial, even if erroneous because probable cause was not then proven, was not a substantial reason for . reversing the conviction. P. 267 U. S. 162. 8. The Court notices judicially that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit, and that Detroit, and its neighborhood along the Detroit River, which is the international boundary, is one of the most active centers for introducing illegally into this country spirituous liquors for distribution into the interior. P. 267 U. S. 160. Affirmed. This is a writ of error to the District Court under Section 238 of the Judicial Code. The plaintiffs in error, hereafter to be called the defendants, George Carroll and John Kiro, were indicted and convicted for transporting in an automobile intoxicating spirituous liquor, to-wit: 68 quarts of so-called bonded whiskey and gin, in violation of the National Prohibition Act. The ground on which they assail the conviction is that the trial court admitted in evidence two of the 68 bottles, one of whiskey and one of gin, found by searching the automobile. It is contended that the search and seizure were in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore that use of the liquor as evidence was not proper. Before the trial, a motion was made by the defendants that all the liquor seized be returned to the defendant Carroll, who owned the automobile. This motion was denied. The search and seizure were made by Cronenwett, Scully and Thayer, federal prohibition agents, and one Peterson, a state officer, in December, 1921, as the car was going westward on the highway between Detroit and Grand Rapids at a point 16 miles outside of Grand Rapids. The facts leading to the search and seizure were as follows: on September 29th, Cronenwett and Scully were in an apartment in Grand Rapids. Three men came to that apartment, a man named Kruska and the two defendants, Page 267 U. S. 135 Carroll and Kiro. Cronenwett was introduced to them as one Stafford, working in the Michigan Chair Company in Grand Rapids, who wished to buy three cases of whiskey. The price was fixed at $13 a case. The three men said they had to go to the east end of Grand Rapids to get the liquor and that they would be back in half or three-quarters of an hour. They went away, and in a short time Kruska came back and said they could not get it that night, that the man who had it was not in, but that they would deliver it the next day. They had come to the apartment in an automobile known as an Oldsmobile Roadster, the number of which Cronenwett then identified, a did Scully. The proposed vendors did not return the next day, and the evidence disclosed no explanation of their failure to do so. One may surmise that it was suspicion of the real character of the proposed purchaser, whom Carroll subsequently called by his first name when arrested in December following. Cronenwett and his subordinates were engaged in patrolling the road leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids, looking for violations of the Prohibition Act. This seems to have been their regular tour of duty. On the 6th of October, Carroll and Kiro, going eastward from Grand Rapids in the same Oldsmobile Roadster, passed Cronenwett and Scully some distance out from Grand Rapids. Cronenwett called to Scully, who was taking lunch, that the Carroll boys had passed them going toward Detroit, and sought with Scully to catch up with them to see where they were going. The officers followed as far as East Lansing, half way to Detroit, but there lost trace of them. On the 15th of December, some two months later, Scully and Cronenwett, on their regular tour of duty, with Peterson, the State officer, were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia, on the road to Detroit, when Kiro and Carroll met and passed them in the same automobile, coming from the direction of Detroit to Grand Rapids. The government agents turned Page 267 U. S. 136 their car and followed the defendants to a point some sixteen miles east of Grand Rapids, where they stopped them and searched the car. They found behind the upholstering of the seats, the filling of which had been removed, 68 bottles. These had labels on them, part purporting to be certificates of English chemists that the contents were blended Scotch whiskeys, and the rest that the contents were Gordon gin made in London. When an expert witness was called to prove the contents, defendants admitted the nature of them to be whiskey and gin. When the defendants were arrested, Carroll said to Cronenwett, "Take the liquor and give us one more chance and I will make it right with you," and he pulled out a roll of bills, of which one was for $10. Peterson and another took the two defendants and the liquor and the car to Grand Rapids, while Cronenwett, Thayer and Scully remained on the road looking for other cars of whose coming they had information. The officers were not anticipating that the defendants would be coming through on the highway at that particular time, but when they met them there, they believed they were carrying liquor, and hence the search, seizure and arrest

US v. Edwards

Search of clothing in jail incidental to lawful arrest is lawful even with lapse of time.

Terry v. Ohio:

Stop and Frisk. (pat down for weapons) officer May detain a person based on reasonable suspicion that the person is committing, is about to commit or has just committed a crime and may Frisk that person based on a reasonable suspicious the person might have a weapon. Factual basis for suspicious must be articulated. U.S. Supreme CourtTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) Terry v. Ohio No. 67 Argued December 12, 1967 Decided June 10, 1968 392 U.S. 1 Syllabus A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were charged with carrying Page 392 U. S. 2 concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons. Though the trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that petitioner and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the officer, for his own protection, had the right to pat down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The court distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. Petitioner and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no substantial constitutional question" was involved.

Brown v. Texas:

Stop could be lawful based on reasonable suspicion, but cannot be charge with failure to ID.

Minnesota v. Dickerson:

Strengthens Terry v. Ohio (Stop and Frisk) ADVOCATES Michael O. Freemanon behalf of the Petitioner Richard H. Seamonfor the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner Peter W. Gormanon behalf of the Respondent Facts of the case On November 9, 1989, while exiting an apartment building with a history of cocaine trafficking, Timothy Dickerson spotted police officers and turned to walk in the opposite direction. In response, the officers commanded Dickerson to stop and proceeded to frisk him. An officer discovered a lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket, and, upon further tactile investigation, formed the belief that it was cocaine. The officer reached into Dickerson's pocket and confirmed that the lump was in fact a small bag of cocaine. Consequently, Dickerson was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He requested that the cocaine be excluded from evidence, but the trial court denied his request and he was found guilty. Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. Question When a police officer detects contraband through his or her sense of touch during a protective patdown search, does the Fourth Amendment permit its seizure and subsequent introduction into evidence? Was the police officer who frisked Dickerson adhering to the Fourth Amendment when he formed the belief, through his sense of touch, that the lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket was cocaine?