Ethical Theories

normative ethics

A branch of ethical theory that contrasts with metaethics, the other main branch of ethical theory. Roughly speaking, normative ethics, unlike metaethics, attempts to provide moral guidance. It's concerned with questions of the following kind: What is actually right and wrong? How do we tell right from wrong? What makes an action right or wrong? How, morally speaking, should I live my life? What sort of person should I be? What sort of character traits should I (and others) cultivate? Normative ethical theories divide into two kinds, both of which are defined in this glossary: aretaic ethical theories, and deontic ethical theories.

metaethics

A branch of moral theory concerned with logical, semantic, metaphysical, and epistemological issues in ethics; also with the relation between moral action and rational action. (Metaethics contrasts, usefully though not sharply, with normative ethics.) The following are examples of metaethical questions: Is morality objective? Is moral knowledge possible? Is amoral behavior irrational? What does the term "morally wrong" mean? Can that term be sharply defined? Are any moral judgments true? Can moral judgments be derived from scientific judgments? Are judgments about right and wrong reducible to judgments about, say, pleasure and pain? How do moral judgments differ from legal, prudential, and aesthetic judgments?

Act Utilitarianism

A brand of consequentialism: An act, A, is morally right if and only if A will produce at least as much utility as any other act the agent (the person who does A) could do instead. (In other words, if there's another available action which, if performed by the agent, would yield more utility that A will yield, then A is morally wrong; otherwise, A is morally right.)

moral realism

A common brand of moral objectivism.

Meaningful declarative sentence

A declarative sentence that asserts a proposition, or succeeds in saying something true or false. (Don't confuse being meaningful with being true. A false sentence is just as meaningful as a true one.) If a declarative sentence fails to assert a proposition--if it states nothing that's either true or false--then it's meaningless or nonsensical. According to Emotivists, ethical sentences are meaningless declarative sentences--they're declarative by virtue of their grammatical form, but meaningless because they fail to assert anything true or false.

moral skepticism

A family of views opposed, either directly or indirectly, to moral objectivism and moral relativism. The two leading members of this family are the following: Skepticism about the justification of moral beliefs: No moral judgment warrants our acceptance. That is, we have no good evidence for any moral judgment, and hence no sufficient reason for believing any such judgment to be true. And, Skepticism about moral truth: There's no such thing about moral truth. This is so even if "moral truth" is short for "moral truth, soundness, correctness, and the like." Thus, anytime we say "S is morally wrong," "X is morally required," etc., we fail to state a truth. The judgment "Capital punishment is morally wrong" is no truer than "capital punishment is morally right." Neither judgment is true in the least.

supervenience

A relation that can hold between two properties or two types of properties. Roughly, one property supervenes (occur later than a specified or implied event or action, typically in such a way as to change the situation) on another if and only if the object that has the first property has it in virtue of having the second property. Less, roughly, properties of one kind--call it kind A--are said to supervene on (or to be supervienient on) properties of another kind, B, if and only if two objects (actions, events) cannot differ in their A-properties unless they also differ in their B-properties. For example: to say that moral properties supervene on natural properties is to say that two actions cannot differ in their moral properties without also differing in their natural properties. If the first action is morally right, then unless the second action differs from the first one in its natural properties, it too is morally right.

truth claim

A sentence or utterance the primary function of which is to state a fact or convey information. To call an utterance a truth claim is to contrast it with such utterances as "Horray!," "Shut the door," and "Are we there yet?," the function of which is not to state facts. (Note: don't confuse truth-claims with truths. Every truth claim is either true or false, but not every truth claim is true. Truth claims purport to assert a truth, but some of them fail to do so.)

Magnetism of Moral Judgments

A term coined by C.L. Stevenson to refer to the following: If I sincerely judge (or believe) that an action A is morally good or obligatory, I'll have a tendency, if only a slight one, to do A. Similarly, if I sincerely judge that A is wrong, I'll have a tendency to refrain from doing A. This tendency is so common that if we find a person who says that A is morally good but who has absolutely no tendency to do A, we are inclined to believe that he is not sincere in what he says--he does not really believe that A is morally good. In fact, some philosophers have argued that it's essential to sincerity believing that A is morally good that one be moved to some extent to do A. Such philosophers are called internalists, because they see motivation as "logically internal" to moral beliefs.

Ruth Benedict

A twentieth century anthropologist who defends cultural relativism.

A. J. Ayer

A twentieth century non-cognitivist, or; Moral judgments are grammatically disguised expressions of emotion.

situational relativism

According to this thesis, an act that's morally wrong in one situation might be morally right in another; thus, moral appraisals must be sensitive to circumstances. (It is morally wrong of me to shoot Mildred? I suppose it is if she's a harmless, innocent person, but probably it isn't if she's trying to kill me.) This thesis differs from moral relativism; to confuse the two is to commit a serious error. Equally serious is the error of thinking that situational relativism conflicts with moral objectivism. (it's a rare moral objectivist who doesn't accept situational relativism.) Still another error is that of assuming that situational relativism is something recent, something that came on the scene in only the past century or so. All of the following philosophers endorsed situational relativism: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Thomas Aquinas, Richard Cumberland, John Locke, Catharine Trotter Cockburn, and Richard Price.

John Stuart Mill

Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness

The distinction between morality and "Victorian morality" and; The distinction between moral relativism and situational relativism

Among the distinction commonly overlooked by those who defend cultural relativism are...

open-question argument G.E. Moore

An argument that purports to show that moral predicates are not synonymous with (value-free) descriptive predicates. It goes as follows: 1. For any Moral Predicate ("MP"), and any Descriptive Predicate ("DP"), the Moral Predicate is synonymous with, or analytically equivalent to, the Descriptive Predicate only if the question "Such and Such is DP, but is such and such also MP?" is logically closed. That is, to sincerely ask it is to betray linguistic or conceptual confusion. 2. For any MP and any DP can one sincerely ask "such and such is DP but is such and such also MP?" without betraying any linguistic or conceptual confusion. The question is logically open rather than closed. 3. Therefore (from 1 and 2) no moral predicate is synonymous with or analytically equivalent to and descriptive predicate.

Greatest Happiness of the greatest number

An unfortunate phrase often used in formulating utilitarianism. It results in the following common, but implausible, version of the that thesis: An action is morally right if and only if it produces the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This thesis is problematic in three ways: (a) it's very non-utilitarian in spirit; (b) it's hard to interpret; and, on some readings, (c) it's impossible to apply (even in principle) in many situations.

Consequentialst Ethical Theory

Any deontic (relating to duty/obligation) ethical theory that embraces, or amounts to a version of, consequentialism, the view that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends entirely on the consequences of the action (rather than on, say, the motives from which the action springs). A prime example is act utilitarianism. Well known supporters are Jeremy Bentham, J.S. Mill, and Peter Singer.

naturalistic ethical theory

Any moral theory that accords with ethical naturalism. Thus, given that "ethical naturalism" is ambiguous, so too is "naturalistic ethical theory." For example, some philosophers count Emotivism as a naturalistic ethical theory.

Moral Absolutist

Believes that many ordinary moral rules are not only universally valid but indefeasible; they cannot be overridden by other moral considerations, even in extreme circumstances

moral liberalism

Believes that morality directly addresses actions that are inconsiderate or harmful to others. It does not directly address sexual behavior, styles of dress, marital customs, the use of intoxicants, and many other things moral conservatives are concerned with. (They say "anything is morally OK as long as it doesn't hurt anyone else)

Error Theorist (or nihilist)

Contends that all moral judgments are false

Mackie's Central Point

Contrary to what most people think, moral judgments are never true. This is because they imply or presuppose that moral rightness, wrongness, etc. are objectively prescriptive properties. But, moral rightness, wrongness, etc. are not objectively prescriptive properties. No such property exists.

The difference between Error Theory and Emotivism

Error theory is a cognitivist theory saying moral statements, though they are always false, are capable of being true or false. Emotivism is a noncognitivist theory saying moral statements have no truth-value. They are not right or wrong merely utterances of emotion.

methodological contextualism

Every custom, belief, or action must be studied in the context of the culture in which it occurs. That is, we must study it in the light of the history and traditions, problems and opportunities, and total body of customs of the society in which it is found. Otherwise, we will gain little insight into other cultures.

Gilbert Harman

Famous for his argument that no moral judgment is explanatorily relevant to any natural fact

Harman's argument for moral relativism

Harman's six steps: 1) The inner judgments imply that the relevant agent has a motivational reason to comply with the judgment, 2) We imply that the agent is within the motivational reach of our own morality concerning the action, 3) The inner judgments sound odd because the agent is outside the reach of our own morality, 4) Inner judgments carry two implications a. the implication of motivation, and b. the implication of endorsement, 5) This is because every existing morality, including the speaker's, is a product of social conventions--of tacit agreements reached through a process of implicit bargaining. These conventions are numerous and varied, and the moral reasons they generate have no motivational force for those who do not accept the conventions, 6)Owing mainly to implication E, the truth of any inner judgment is relative to the existence of considerations that are not only motivational for the agent judged but morally endorsed by the speaker. But, considerations with both of those characteristics often will not exist, depending on who the speaker is judging. This results in a brand of moral relativism, at least with regard to this limited class of moral judgments.

Pigden's Doppelganger Objection

If every moral judgment is false, then the judgment (a) "Killing the innocent is morally wrong" is false. But, then the following judgments, all or some of which are moral judgments, must be true: (b) "It is not the case that killing the innocent is morally wrong"; (c) "killing the innocent is not morally wrong""; and (d) "killing the innocent is morally permissible." After all, if (a) is false, (b) must be true. But then, (c) and (d) must be true as well, because (b) guarantees (c), which in turn entails (d). Therefore contrary to Mackie's theory, not every moral judgment is false.

Harman's Inner Judgment Relativism

Inner judgments imply that the agent being judged has reasons to do what the judgment prescribes. (it would be silly for me to say "You morally ought to do X " if you have no reason to do X) But, reasons are tied to rationality, and rationality to "motivational attitudes," meaning individual goals or desires. (You have a reason to do X only if you have goals or desires through which you could be moved to do X. If you have no such goals or desires, how could there be any reason for you to do X?) So, in saying that inner judgments imply that the relevant agent has reasons to do as the judgment prescribes, we mean that such judgments entail the existence of considerations that are capable of moving the agent, through his motivational attitudes, to perform the prescribed action. To keep this in mind, let us say that inner judgments imply that the relevant agent has "motivational reasons" to comply with the judgment.

understand utility as pleasure itself, and together with exemption from pain

J. S. Mill (author of Utilitarianism) asserts that every utilitarian from Epicurus to Bentham...

thick (versus thin) moral concepts

Many moral concepts, e.g., "rude," "cruel," "brutal," "honest," "cowardly," "gracious," "courageous," and "treacherous," are called thick because they are "thicker" with descriptive information--i.e., they have more descriptive content--than such (thin) moral concepts as "good," "bad," "right," "wrong," and "ought." (For instance: the sentence "Alf is treacherous" conveys more nonmoral information about Alf than does the sentence "Alf is bad.") Thick moral concepts are important because, arguably, they "express a union of fact and value. The way these notions are applied is determined by what the world is like (for instance: by how someone has behaved), and yet, at the same time, their application usually involves a certain valuation of the situation, of persons or actions. Phillipa Foot's critique of noncognitivism makes important use of thick moral concepts.

moral relativism

Moral judgments are genuine judgments, or truth-claims, some of which are true. However, every such judgment is somehow indexed, or relativized, to a particular person, group, or society. Either the truth or such judgments is a relative, rather than an ordinary, form of truth; or else the content of such judgments is such that they--the moral judgments--tacitly refer to a particular person or to a particular group, culture, etc.

Emotivism

Moral judgments are grammatically disguised expressions of emotion.

A.J. Ayer's Fourth Step

Moral judgments are not synthetic, Why? Synthetic statements are empirically verifiable, but moral judgments are not. "In our language, sentences which contain normative ethical symbols are not equivalent to sentences which express psychological propositions, or indeed empirical propositions of any kind. Normative ethical symbols are indefinable in factual terms. Normative ethical concepts are irreducible to empirical concepts. The fundamental ethical concepts are unanalyzable, inasmuch as there is no criterion by which one can test the validity of the judgments in which they occur.

The Argument from Queerness

One of the skeptical philosophers we've read defends and employs the claim that there are no objectively prescriptive properties answering to any moral terms. He/she defends this claim using...

moral objectivism

Some moral judgments are not only true (or sound, or correct, etc.) but free from human and other sorts of caprice, variability, and the like. This is true owing to various facts about those judgments, the most important of which are these: 1) They, the moral judgments in question, are true. (or if they are not, that's only because "true" is the wrong success-term for the moral assertions. In that case the judgments are sound, wise, valid, correct, warranted, or the like. 2) In asserting the judgments we are not saying, in whole or in part, that the action (institution, etc.) they are about is the object of this or that psychological state (e.g. of a belief, a felling, a wish, or a desire) of this or that actual or "near actual" (i.e., not-too-idealized) person(s). 2/for instance, in asserting "x is morally right" we are not saying that we--or the human race, or all intelligent people--believe something about x or wish that x would come about. 3)The judgments are in no way indexed, or relativized, to just one segment of the human race. More precisely, the truth they possess is not relative, as opposed to an ordinary, form of truth; nor are they indexed to a limited portion of the human race through their content--e.g., through a tacit reference to an existing person, culture, or society.

prescriptive (or intrinsically motivating)

Suppose action A has a property (P), that's prescriptive. This means that anyone who recognizes or acknowledges A's possession of P is thereby furnished independently of his particular desires, pro-attitudes, and the like, with a good reason, or a motive, or both, to do or refrain from one or more actions (normally A itself). The idea here is that action A's possession of P--i.e. the fact that A possesses P--itself provides reasons or motives. It does not rely on, say, a desire to do P-ish things.

objective property

Suppose that X has a property, P, that's objective. This means that " is possessed by X independently of anyone's say so. More fully, X's possession of P is not constituted by anyone's opinions, desires, feelings, choices, or conventions.

Covert Synonymy

Synonymy that is not obvious and not detectable through any quick or easy linguistic test. Suppose that linguistically competent people cannot immediately see, or detect through a simple test that two terms have the same sense. But suppose those same people, given sufficient reflection and experience with the two terms, would conclude that the two terms have the same sense. Then, the two terms are covertly synonymous.

Magnetism

The following feature of moral judgments: If I sincerely judge that an action X is obligatory or morally good, I'll have a tendency, if only a slight one, to do X. Similarly, if I judge that X is wrong, I'll have a tendency to refrain from doing X.

Agent Relativism

The idea that we should evaluate an action relative to the person cultural, social, and moral context.

noncognitivism

The rejection of cognitivism. Noncognitivists maintain that moral judgments, meaning the things we call moral judgments, are not really judgments in the ordinary sense. That is, they are not truth-claims; their main function is not to state facts but to express emotions, issue commands, or the like.

Ethnocentrism

The uncritical belief in the superiority of one's own culture. Ethnocentric people believe, on no sufficient grounds, that the norms, laws, customs, habits, etc. of their own culture are the best or the most "natural" ones. They are quick to look down on customs that differ from their own.

Error Theory

The view that all moral judgments are false. According to this view, to say that something is morally right, wrong, or obligatory is always to utter a falsehood--much like saying that something is a unicorn. The statement "this is a unicorn" is perfectly meaningful--it has truth conditions; it is capable of being true of false.

moral absolutism

The view that many ordinary moral rules are not only universally valid but indefeasible: they cannot be overridden by other moral considerations, even in extreme circumstances. The words "ordinary" and "rules" are important. The absolutist's point is not that moral principles are indefeasible, but that we can find many indefeasible truths even among moral rules. Also, we can find plenty of them among ordinary moral rules--those we learned from our parents and schoolteachers. Such rules include "Stealing is wrong," "Honesty is right," Law-breaking is unethical," and "Paying one's debts is obligatory." According to absolutists, many such rules are indefeasible as they stand; there is no need either to alter the act-descriptions--for instance, by replacing "stealing" with "stealing merely for the sake of stealing"--or to insert "normally" or "prima facie" before the words "wrong," right," and so on.

Cognitivism

The view that moral judgments are just that--genuine judgments (or truth claims), meaning that their main function is to state facts or convey information, and that they have truth value (i.e. each is either "true" or "false"). Moral objectivists, relativists, and error theorists are ------.

Emotivism

The view that moral statements are not really statements at all, but grammatically disguised expressions of emotion. Although moral judgments have the grammatical form of propositions, they do not really assert anything--they are incapable of being true or false. The sentence "murder is wrong" is simply a way of venting a negative emotion and, perhaps, of influencing others to share it. It's must like uttering "Murder--Boo!" Likewise to say "Charity is good!" is much like uttering "Charity--Hooray!" David Hume, A.J. Ayer, and C.L. Stevenson.

Situational Relativist

Thinks that moral decisions must be sensitive to circumstances

universally valid moral judgment

To say that a moral judgment is universally valid is to say, in essence, that it has features (1) They, the moral judgments in question are true (Or if they are not that's only because "true" is the wrong success-term for moral assertions. In that case the judgments are sound, wise, valid, correct, warranted, or the like.) and (3) The judgments are in no way indexed, or relativised, to just one segment of the human race. More precisely the truth they possess is not a relative, as opposed to an ordinary, form of truth; nor are they indexed to a limited portion of the human race through their content--e.g. through a tacit reference to an existing person, culture, or society. in the entry "moral objectivism"; hence that it's not "relative" in the way moral relativists say it is.

Analytic

True of False by definition, or simply by virtue of the meaning of its terms

naturalism

a philosophical viewpoint according to which everything arises from natural properties and causes, and supernatural or spiritual explanations are excluded or discounted

objectively prescriptive

a property is objectively prescriptive if and only if it is both objective and prescriptive (or, to use alternative terms, only if it is both objective and intrinsically motivating)

synthetic

having truth or falsity determinable by recourse to experience.

Cultural Relativism

is the most prevalent form of moral relativism. Moral judgments are culturally relative rather than objective. More precisely, moral judgments are genuine judgments, or truth-claims, some of which are true. However, every such judgment is somehow indexed, or relativized, to a particular culture. The result, roughly put, is that whatever is right or wrong in one culture is not so in others.

Moral subjectivism

moral judgments are personal reports about likes or dislikes (or feelings of approval, tendencies to feel approval, etc.) So, "X is wrong" is a meaningful statement, and thus either true or false. It's true or false depending on the speaker's likes and dislikes.

deontology

the study of the nature of duty and obligation