Foreign Policy Final

Hagman Failure of the State

According to the dominant rhetoric in the aftermath of the Cold War, African states have fallen prey to criminalisation, globalisation, privatisation and endemic violence that threaten both human and global security. Consequently, academic and policy discourse nowadays portrays post-colonial African states in virtually pathological categories; they are perceived to be threatened by 'collapse -However, we argue that the failed states debate has failed to provide the appropriate analytical tools for a better understanding of contemporary African statehood. For the most part, the debate reveals a dogmatic assumption and wishful thinking that all states will—in the long run— converge towards a model of Western liberal democracy. --Rather than equating the erosion of legal-rational domination (as embodied by the nation-state) to anarchy and social anomy, we call for a more differentiated approach to statehood that renders intelligible variegated trajectories of political authority within and beyond the nation-state -As Lund (2006) points out, political authority in Africa and elsewhere often manifests itself in the form of 'twilight institutions' that transcend conventional dichotomies between 'state' and 'non-state', 'formal' and 'informal' or 'public' and 'private'. For external observers such institutions may seem disorderly, dysfunctional and irrational. However, they must be, as Chabal and Daloz (1999; 155) remind us, understood as 'the outcome of different rationalities and causalities'. Although modern states claim exclusive and universal sovereignty within their territory, bureaucratic, customary, religious and kinship institutions often coexist, each providing particular norms and procedures for managing public affairs and organising collectivities -First, the discursive labels that are used most prominently in the state failure debate gloss over important differences between existing states rather than accounting for these differences. For instance, many so-called 'weak' African states boast security apparatuses that are capable of considerable political repression. On the other hand, unrecognised or de facto states that are described as 'fragile' may enjoy more popular legitimacy than their recognised counterparts. Endogamous factors such as civil war, ethnic identity or authoritarian rule are given precedence over exogamous factors such as the international political economy, external interferences and various transnational forces. Thereby, the institutional breakdown of the African state is implicitly but wrongly linked to a breakdown within African society -Second, because most analysts equate the absence of central government with anarchy, false conclusions are drawn once a state has been classified as 'failed' or 'collapsed'. The prolonged humanitarian disaster in Somalia is a case in point. Yet Somalia also domonstrates that a population can survive despite the absence of a functioning government and public administration by creating and reactivating 'informal systems of adaptation, security and governance in response to the prolonged absence of a central governmen -Third, the 'state convergence' thesis leads to the biased notion that the modern state as it has developed in Europe and North America over recent centuries is 'accomplished', 'mature', and 'stable', while the state in other regions of the world is 'undeveloped', 'pre-modern' and 'fragile' -Somalia not only represents the most protracted case of state collapse, but has witnessed the emergence of multiple local governance systems, both formal and informal, which are seldom recognised internationally or acknowledged in the state failure debate -Despite important variations, a number of common denominators are identifiable across Somali political orders in Ethiopia, Somaliland, Puntland and southern Somalia. First, at local level all Somali territories rely heavily on non-state actors who are embedded in the fabric of Somali society, particularly clan elders and sheikhs, to uphold security. Security, conflict management and justice are strongly decentralised and shouldered by traditional authorities and local politicians, sometimes also businessmen, who amalgamate customary, religious and political norms and practices. -Second, as the case of Somaliland forcefully demonstrates, successful peace and state-building have since 1991 invariably emerged from below— rather than being imposed through a top-down process—and have taken place in the absence of a centralised and legitimate monopoly of violence. The international community's state-building blueprint, according to which externally sponsored peace negotiations give way to a government of national unity, which then pacifies Somalia, has proved unworkable --The multiple political orders observed within the Somali inhabited parts of the Horn of Africa contradict the idea that state collapse and failure are tantamount to anarchy -Following this, we support Herbst's (1997; 140-141) call for the increased recognition and participation of 'sub-national units, be they breakaway regions or simply units such as towns or regions that have been largely abandoned by their own central government' in international politics. Whether we like it or not, current types of African statehood, often considered to be pre-modern aberrations, may well in the end endure and even become models for future political order

Kemp The Nonproliferation Emperor has no clothes

--Scholars have long acknowledged that states may forgo nuclear weapons if their security concerns, domestic politics, and social norms do not favor acquisition.1 These political and cultural factors may be the primary determinants of proliferation, but they are not easily modulated by public policy. As such, policymakers have more often focused on impeding the path to nuclear weapons acquisition by controlling technology. This "supply-side" approach keeps with a long tradition --Technology now dominates how policymakers think about proliferation, and many share the view that, "with the exception of a few advanced industrialized countries, a state's ability to build nuclear weapons generally hinges on its ability to find an international supplier --In this article, I argue that this view is misguided. Alongside a few highly visible programs that relied on technology transfers, the historical record contains many more lesser-known examples of states developing nuclear weapon capabilities without foreign assistance. . A review of just one weapon-enabling technology, the gas centrifuge, found fourteen states that were successful using only a minimum of technical and human resources—resources that I argue are within the reach of many or most of today's developing countries. --If there are no other supply-side constraints, the situation described here leaves policymakers having to look beyond supply-side controls, toward the cultural, normative, and political organization of the world, in search of ways to reduce the demand for nuclear weapons—an approach that has been largely neglected over the last sixty years. -foreign assistance and technology transfers have not been useful in overcoming these limitations. History shows multiple ways in which foreign assistance has been counterproductive: the supplied technology has been poor; the information provided has been incomplete; and programs have been directed toward unnecessary complications that strain the indigenous resources of the state. In general, financially motivated foreign agents have private objectives that differ from the proliferator's strategic objectives and, historically, this has tended to exacerbate organizational limitations. Additionally, foreign assistance has increased signiªcantly the probability that a weapons program will be detected by an intelligence service and, as a consequence, subjected to sanctions, sabotage, or other counterproliferation action. -To the contrary, this article describes a situation that has prevailed for decades without rampant proliferation. Apparently, states seeking a nuclear weapon capability do not necessarily seek to build nuclear weapons. The lack of proliferation in these cases cannot be attributed to technological barriers—motivations must have been key. -Concerning fact (1), a careful reading of history shows that states went to the black market because the offer of assistance was too alluring to pass up, not because they were forced to. In fact, Concerning fact (2), that black-market customers have tended to be states with weaker-than-average technological infrastructure does not mean that these states were unable to muster enough ªfty-year-old technology and general engineering expertise to build centrifuges on their own. -The history of centrifuge development is signiªcant: at least twenty countries have developed or obtained a centrifuge capability. Five depended critically on illicit foreign assistance.69 Two more are too poorly documented to tell.70 The remaining thirteen, which brought their programs to a successful conclusion without depending on the black market, form a basis for assessing what states can do on their own

Sagan the Norms Model

-A third model focuses on norms concerning weapons acquisition, seeing nuclear decisions as serving important symbolic functions-both shaping and reflecting a state's identity According to this perspective, state behavior is determined not by leaders' cold calculations about the national security interests or their parochial bureaucratic interests, but rather by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in interna- tional relations. --From this sociological perspective, military organizations and their weapons can therefore be envisioned as serving functions similar to those of flags, airlines, and Olympic teams: they are part of what modern states believe they have to possess to be legitimate, modern states --The sociologists' arguments highlight the possibility that nuclear weapons programs serve symbolic functions reflecting leaders' perceptions of appropri- ate and modern behavior. The political science literature reminds us, however, that such symbols are often contested and that the resulting norms are spread by power and coercion, and not by the strength of ideas alone. --Existing norms con- cerning the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons (such as those embedded in the NPT) could not have been created without the strong support of the most powerful states in the international system, who believed that the norms served their narrow political interests. Yet, once that effort was successful, these norms shaped states' identities and expectations and even powerful actors became constrained by the norms they had created --A stronger explanation for the French decision to build nuclear weapons emerges when one focuses on French leaders' perceptions of the bomb's sym- bolic significance. The belief that nuclear power and nuclear weapons were deeply linked to a state's position in the international system was present as early as 1951. . It should therefore not be surprising that the governments of both the Fourth and the Fifth Republics vigorously explored alternative means to return France to its historical great power status. Second, although Ukrainian officials continued to be interested in enhancing the state's international prestige, the strength of the NPT regime created a history in which the most recent examples of new or potential nuclear states were so-called "rogue states" such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. This was hardly a nuclear club whose new members would receive international prestige, and during the debate in Kiev, numerous pro-NPT Ukrainian officials insisted that renunciation of nuclear weapons was now the best route to enhance Ukraine's international standing -Focusing on NPT norms raises especially severe concerns about how existing U.S. nuclear first-use doctrine influences potential proliferators' perceptions of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of nuclear weapons possession and use. -The long-term future of the NPT regime is also viewed with more optimism, for the model envisions the possibility of a gradual emergence of a norm against all nuclear weapons possession

Sagan Security Model of Nukes

-According to neorealist theory in political science, states exist in an anarchical international system and must therefore rely on self-help to protect their sovereignty and national security.4 Because of the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, any state that seeks to maintain its national security must balance against any rival state that develops nuclear weapons by gaining access to a nuclear deterrent itself --. This can produce two policies. First, strong states do what they can: they can pursue a form of internal balancing by adopting the costly, but self-sufficient, policy of developing their own nuclear weapons. Second, weak states do what they must: they can join a balancing alliance with a nuclear power, utilizing a promise of nuclear retaliation by that ally as a means of extended deterrence --From this perspective, one can envision the history of nuclear proliferation as a strategic chain reaction. During World War II, none of the major belliger- ents was certain that the development of nuclear weapons was possible, but all knew that other states were already or could soon be working to build the bomb. This fundamental fear was the central impetus for the United States, British, German, Soviet, and Japanese nuclear weapons programs The South African nuclear strategy during this period was designed to use the bomb both as a deterrent against the Soviets and as a tool of blackmail against the United States. If Soviet or Soviet-supported military forces directly threatened South Africa, the regime reportedly planned to an- nounce that it had a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, --South Africa destroyed its small nuclear weapons arsenal in 1991, the theory suggests, because of the radical reduction in the external security threats to the regime. By 1989, the risk of a Soviet-led or sponsored attack on South Africa was virtually eliminated. -Also India gets bomb, then Pakistan immediately feels it needs one --Under realist logic, however, U.S. nonproliferation policy can only slow down, not eliminate, the future spread of nuclear weapons. Efforts to slow down the process may of course be useful, but they will eventually be countered by two very strong structural forces that create an inexorable momentum toward a world of numerous nuclear weapons states. First, the end of the Cold War creates a more uncertain multipolar world in which U.S. nuclear guaran- tees will be considered increasingly less reliable; second, each time one state develops nuclear weapons, it will increase the strategic incentives for neigh- boring states to follow suit.

Hussein as Rational Actor

-Hussein can be seen as a rational actor. Contrary to claims by the Bush administration and other prowar advocates, the record does not show that Saddam Hussein was especially difficult to de- ter. He was a vicious dictator and had international ambitions, but paid atten- tion to limiting risk and took U.S. power very seriously. Hussein's behavior since the first Gulf War showed him to have been successfully deterred at al- most every turn. After the war, Hussein acquiesced in the loss of part of north- ern Iraq rather than fight the United States and Britain to retake it. He also acquiesced in the destruction of his nuclear weapons program by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors in 1991-92, and apparently also eventually suspended his chemical and biological weapons programs for fear of the consequences of discovery.

Mcgwire NATO Expansion a Policy Error Main Argument

-In sum, Russia is not inherently expansionist. -Any Western policy designed to prevent the breakdown of political and civil order in Central and Eastern Europe must therefore provide for the cooperative involve ment of Russia. Europe cannot be made stable without Russian agreement and direct involvement -. For quite some time, a general war in the Balkans seemed a live possibility, and the danger has not yet passed. it. We can, however, be certain that in the event of breakdowns of this kind, the nature of Russian involvement in attempts to resolve or contain the situation will be crucial to the outcome. (Breakdown of order) --There are two issues here. One is the danger of unintended nuclear proliferation (the 'loose nukes' problem), which extends from concern about the control of fissile material, through procedures for dismantling nuclear weapon systems and warheads, to the verification of disarmament agreements. The other issue is the strategic arms reduction process. (Nukes) --The potential Russian threat is reactive, responding to unfavourable events or Western initiatives. The nature of the response will reflect Moscow's assessment of the totality of US policies affecting Russia, the effects of those policies in Central and Eastern Europe, and the political response inside Russia to such developments -. In sum, as long as Russia is constructively engaged with the West, the level of threat in all three categories is relatively low. If Russia limits or withdraws its cooperation, the level will rise sharply. The conclusion is inescapable: from a Western viewpoint, the most immediate threat to security in Europe is the withdrawal of Russian political cooperation. --If Russia feels threatened and withdraws its cooperation, macro-security in Europe will be undermined. So, too, will the micro-security of individual countries in the region, because the nature of Russia's political and strategic interests in the former Soviet republics will change. At the same time, the constraints on Moscow pursuing those redefined interests will be weakened or removed completely, as the security of the homeland assumes its traditional place at the head of Moscow's concerns. And this will happen whether or not internal political forces bring a nationalistic regime to power --The post-Cold War settlement is 'extraordinarily favourable to the West'. Moreover, it has a measure of legitimacy in Russian eyes, because Moscow took part and acquiesced in all the events that produced the settlement. 'This legitimacy is a priceless asset for the West.'46 The West is squandering that asset, as much by its attitudes as by its actions

Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas Kaufmann

-Mature democracies such as the United States are generally believed to be better at making foreign policy than other regime types. Especially, the strong civic institutions and robust marketplaces of ideas in mature democracies are thought to substantially protect them from severe threat inflation and "myths of empire" that could promote excessively risky foreign policy adventures and wars. The market- place of ideas helps to weed out unfounded, mendacious, or self-serving foreign policy arguments because their proponents cannot avoid wide-ranging debate in which their reasoning and evidence are subject to public scrutiny --The marketplace of ideas, however, failed to fulfill this function in the 2002-03 U.S. foreign policy debate over going to war with Iraq. --They made four main arguments to persuade the public of their case against Saddam Hussein: (1) he was an almost uniquely undeterrable aggres- sor who would seek any opportunity to kill Americans virtually regardless of risk to himself or his country; (2) he was cooperating with al-Qa'ida and had even assisted in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States; (3) he was close to acquiring nuclear weapons; and (4) he possessed chemical and biological weapons that could be used to devastating effect against American civilians at home or U.S. troops in the Middle East. -Five Factors Why Bush administration persuaded the public and why the marketplace failed: 1. First, democratic political systems may be inherently vulnerable to issue manipulation. There is reason to believe, however, that median voter logic can often be bypassed by elite manipulation of how issues are framed in debate."1 In this case, the critical manipulation involved redefining the threat posed by Hussein from containing regional aggression to deterring direct terrorist attack on the United States 2. Second, the Bush administration benefited from its control over the govern- ment's intelligence apparatus, which it used to distort the public record by selectively publicizing favorable analyses while suppressing contrary inform- ation 3. Third, the White House enjoys great authority in foreign policy debate, which, in the Iraq case, gave it a credibility advantage over independent criti- cal analyses regardless of the strength of the critics' information or analyses. The authority advantage of the presidency also enhanced the administration's ability to manipulate the framing of the issues. 4. Fourth, the countervailing insti- tutions on which the marketplace of ideas theory relies to check the ability of those in power to control foreign policy debate-especially the press, inde- pendent experts, and opposition parties-failed to do so, and may generally lack the power to fulfill the functions that the theory expects of them 5. Finally, the shock of the September 11 atrocities created a crisis atmosphere that may have reduced public skepticism about both diagnoses of threats and proposed solutions. --Throughout the prewar debate on Iraq, the media were relatively supine, tending to report administration claims credulously, while devoting much lesser effort to investigating the validity of those claims or to reporting the views of experts who were doing so."'55 Administration and prowar advocates also simply got disproportionate distribution. A study of network television news stories on Iraq over two weeks in January-February 2003 found that more than half of the 393 sources quoted were U.S. officials

Posen and Ross Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy Neo-Isolationism

-Neo-isolationism is the least ambitious, and, at least among foreign policy professionals, probably the least popular grand strategy option --The new isolationism subscribes to a fundamentally realist view of international politics and thus focuses on power.7 Its advocates ask: who has the power to threaten the sovereignty of the United States, its territorial integrity, or its safety? They answer that nobody does --The new isolationism is strongly motivated by a particular understanding of nuclear weapons. . But nuclear weapons make it very hard, indeed nearly inconceivable, for any power to win a traditional military victory over the United State --The collapse of the Soviet Union has so reduced the military resources available to its successor states that a counterforce attack on U.S. nuclear forces, an old and exaggerated fear, is out of the question. There can be no politically rational motive for any country large or small to explode a nuclear weapon on North America. U.S. retaliation would be devastating Neo-isola- tionism would argue that those who fear terrorism, especially terrorism with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, can increase U.S. safety by keeping it out of foreign conflicts -Neo-isolationism advises the United States to preserve its freedom of action and strategic independence. Because neo-isolationism proposes that the United States stay out of political conflicts and wars abroad, it has no particular need for political instruments like allliances like NATO. -E. Neo-isolationism generates a rather small force structure. It is unlikely to cost more than two percent of GDP. -The Critique: -The disappearance of the United States from the world stage would likely precipitate a good deal of competition abroad for security. Without a U.S. presence, aspiring regional hegemons would see more opportunities. States formerly defended by the United States would have to look to their own military power; local arms competitions are to be expected. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would intensify if the U.S. nuclear guarantee were withdrawn. , if these predictions about the international environment are correct, as competition intensified U.S. decision-makers would continuously have to reassess whether their original assumptions about the workings of the balance of power in Eurasia and the deterrent power of nuclear weapons were still valid Shedding an active role in international politics, however, increases the risks of unintended consequences and reduces U.S. influence over the management of those consequences, and over issues that we can hardly anticipate.

Selective Engagement

-Selective engagement endeavors to ensure peace among powers that have substantial industrial and military potential-the great powers.'2 By virtue of the great military capabilities that would be brought into play, great power conflicts are much more dangerous to the United States than conflicts else- where. Thus Russia, the wealthier states of the European Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan matter most -The purpose of U.S. engagement should be to affect directly the propensity of these powers to go to war with one another. These wars have the greatest chance of producing large-scale resort to weapons of mass destruction, a global experiment that the United States ought to try to prevent However, selective engagers also recognize that balancing may be tardy, statesmen may miscalculate, and nuclear deterrence could fail. Given the interest in great power peace, the United States should engage itself abroad in order to ensure against these possibilities in the places where the consequences could be the most serious. Balancing happens, but it happens earlier and more easily with a leader -Advocates of selective engagement do start from the premise that U.S. resources are scarce: it is simply impossible to muster sufficient power and will to keep domestic and international peace worldwide, or to preserve the United States as the undisputed leader in a unipolar world -Advocates of selective engagement are concerned with ethnic conflict where it runs the risk of producing a great power war. Fortunately, there are not many places where this seems likely Crtique: Selective engagement has its own problems. First, the strategy lacks a certain romance: will the cool and quiet, steady, long-term exercise of U.S. power in the service of stable great power relations win the political support of any major constituency in the United States? Compared to other strategies, there is relatively little idealism or commitment to principle behind the strategy -Second, the strategy expects the United States to ignore much of the trouble that is likely to occur in the world. America's prestige and reputation might suffer from such apparent lethargy, however, which could limit its ability to persuade others on more important issues -Third, selective engagement does not provide clear guidance on which os- tensibly "minor" issues have implications for great power relations, and thus merit U.S. involvement -Fourth, selective engagement is not as selective as its advocates would have us believe. Europe and Asia matter because that is where the major powers reside; and the Middle East matters because of its oil resources. Much of the world, therefore, matters -Finally, neo-isolationists would argue that there is one huge tension in the selective engagement argument. The United States must maintain substantial military forces, threaten war, and risk war largely for the purpose of preventing war. If the United States goes out into the world to prevent hypothetical wars, it will surely find some real ones.

Lieber and Press Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.

-The concern that a state might transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, however, is among the greatest of these worries, and to many analysts it is the most compelling justification for costly actions—including the use of military force— aimed at preventing proliferation. -The strategy of nuclear attack by proxy hinges on one key question: What is the likelihood that a country could sponsor a nuclear terror attack and remain anonymous? -We conclude that neither a terror group nor a state sponsor would remain anonymous after a nuclear terror attack. We draw this conclusion on the basis of four main findings. First, data on a decade of terrorist incidents reveal a strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are traced back to the perpetrators. --Second, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent (thirty-six of thirty-seven) for incidents that killed ten or more people. --Third, tracing culpability from a guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor is not likely to be difficult: few countries sponsor terrorism; few terrorist groups have state sponsors; each sponsored terror group has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a weapon -This discussion highlights the fundamental conundrum for a country seeking to sponsor nuclear terror: given the incredible risks, it must collaborate with a group that it trusts completely. At the same time, it must choose a terror partner with whom it has weak (and hence untraceable) ties. These two goals are fundamentally contradictory. Only a terrorist group with a long association and deep ties (and a record of effective operations) could be trusted with a nuclear weapon; such a group, however, would be unlikely to stay below the radar of Western intelligence agencies and hide those close ties. --This analysis has two important implications for U.S. foreign policy. First, the fear of terrorist transfer seems greatly exaggerated and does not—in itself—seem to justify costly measures to prevent proliferation. Nuclear proliferation poses risks, so working to prevent it should remain a U.S. foreign policy goal, but the dangers of a state giving nuclear weapons to terrorists have been overstated, and thus arguments for taking costly steps to prevent proliferation on those grounds—as used to justify the invasion of Iraq and fuel the debate over attacking Iran—rest on a shaky foundation --Second, analysts and policymakers should stop understating the ability of the United States to attribute terrorist attacks to their sponsoring states. Such rhetoric not only is untrue, but it also undermines deterrence. States sometimes exaggerate their capabilities to deter an enemy's attacks; but U.S. analysts and leaders, by understating U.S. attribution capabilities, inadvertently increase the odds of catastrophic terrorist attacks on the United States and its allies --Some analysts are skeptical about such sponsored nuclear terrorism, arguing that a state may not be willing to deplete its small nuclear arsenal or stock of precious nuclear materials. More important, a state sponsor would fear that a terrorist organization might use the weapons or materials in ways the state never intended, provoking retaliation that would destroy the regime --Passing nuclear weapons or material to a terrorist group under any circumstances would be a remarkably risky act. A leader who sponsored nuclear terrorism would be wagering his life, the lives of family members, his regime, and his country's fate on the hope that the operation would remain anonymous. If the terror group used the weapon against a different enemy or revealed the source of the weapon, or if the terror group's operatives or senior leadership were penetrated by foreign intelligence, the consequences could be catastrophic for the sponsor. -Lieber: terrorists need to claim credit for attacks to achieve political ends -fundamentally

Mcgwire NATO Expansion a Policy Error Reasons For Expansion

-The prospect of membership' would provide an incentive for the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to (1) strengthen democratization and legal institutions, ensure civilian control of their armed forces, liberalize their economies, and respect human rights, including those of national minorities; and (2) resolve disputes peacefully and contribute to peacekeeping operations. -that collective defence remained an imperative and should be extended to the newly independent democracies. True, the threat NATO had been created to counter had been eliminated, but new threats could arise 'that would require NATO to protect its members and to deter attack'. -NATO needed to incorporate the former members of the Warsaw Pact so as to increase the West's collective defence capability against the potential threat of a resurgent Russsia

Betts The Osirak Fallacy

-as pressure mounts to deal with Iran's nuclear program, some strategists have run out of alternatives to military action, and many point to Israel's 1981 air attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor as a model for action. --this is a widespread misunderstanding of what that strike accomplished. Contrary to prevalent mythology, there is no evidence that Israel's destruction of Osirak delayed the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, and it may have actually accelerated it. --obliterating the Osirak reactor didn't stop the weapons program beause the reactor that was destroyed could not have produced a bomb on its own and was not even necessary for producing a bomb --the reactor's destruction probably increased Saddam's incentive to rush the program through the alterative option of enriching natural uranium. It is unlikely that Saddam would have been able to develop nuclear weapon's faster with the Osirak reactor. -today, a U.S. air campaign against Iran cannot guarantee full destruction of Iran's nuclear capability --a reactor is not even essential for developing a weapon, it is simply one building for one option. -airstrikes on Iran would further alienate non-western governments and Islamic populations around the world. Inflaming Iranian nationalism would turn a populace that si currently divided in its attitudes toward the U.S. into a united front against America. -maybe we should use a carrot and stick approach, offer dilplomatic conessesions if Tehran comes back into compliance with the NPT. If Tehran fully disengages from NPT obligations, U.S. should promote tightening of economic sanctions.

Kagan America, The World and George W. Bush

-prior to Bush there was talk of a doctrine of internatinal community, where the common interests of humanity overrode the individul interest of nations. Clinton saw America as the indepensible nation, and wanted to be active in being the world's policeman, handling humanitarian crises. -Bush wanted to act in teh national interest of America, and not be the world's policeman, less emphasis on Clinton era social work foreign policy the strategy was to turn the United States into something of an offshore balancer, a savior of last resort, or in the words of Richard Haass, a "reluctant sheriff." -The United States, to put it another way, was no longer in the global leadership business, at least not as it had been during the Cold War. In 1990, with communism and the Soviet empire defeated, Jeane Kirk patrick argued that the United States should cease carrying the "unusual burdens" of leadership and, "with a return to normal' times,... again be come a normal nation." -This was the mood when the terrorists struck on September 11,2001. The attacks naturally brought about a shift in the Bush administration's foreign policy, but it was not a doctrinal revolution -The Admnistraton did not abandon its national-interests-based approach. It was just that the protection of even narrowly defined interests? Such as the defense of the homeland. Suddenly required a more expansive and aggressive global strategy. The "strategic pause" was over, and the United States was back in the business of extensive global involvement in what became known as "the war on terror." -Did that mean that the United States was also back in the business of global leadership? The Bush administration believed that it did. Yet there were serious obstacles to returning to the old Cold War style of leadership in a post-Cold War, post-9/11 world -One was the understandable self-absorption of Americans and their leaders after September 11. The first sign that the old solidarity would not be so easily revived came in Afghanistan. U.S. acted quickly without looking to gain an international coalition. They acted quickly and without the alliance-management problems that would have been pain-staking. - Most Americans, regardless of political party, believed that the world shared not only their pain and sorrow but also their fears and anxiety about the terrorist threat and that the world would join with the United States in a common response. Some American observers cling to this illusion even today. -In a world of selfish states and selfish peoples?which is to say, the world that exists?the question is always, "What is in it for us?" The inadequacy of the "war on terror" paradigm stems from the fact that very few nations other than the United States consider terrorism to be their primary challenge. The United States' fight has not been regarded as an international "public good" for which the rest of the world can be grateful. On the contrary, most nations believe that they are doing the United States a favor when they send troops to Afghanistan -The war on terror, in short, has been a source more of division than of unity. The United States, which in the 1990s was already seen by many as a bullying hegemon, came to be viewed after September 11 as a self absorbed, bullying hegemon, heedless of the consequences of its actions. -U.S. is acted unilaterally in war on terror, not with others and in the interest of global security -fundamentally, U.S. has moved from mulitateral liberalism to hardcore, selfish realism.

Donahue Political Economy of Milk

-the federal government spends public money to guarantee high milk prices (aka. "price support purchases").The result is high consumer milk prices. -1922 Capper-Volsted Act — initial steps toward establishing the dairy subsidy system; lobbied for and achieved by dairy cooperatives, or dairy farmers unhappy with their weak bargaining position and, for this reason, joined together to pursue collective action To keep prices high, cooperatives somehow had to prevent "chiseling," or, to use the less colorful term, price competition. Some resorted to road blocks and weaponry to deter cut-rate sales by non-members, but the more astute co-op leaders moved their battle to the political plain. An easy alliance formed between dairy leaders and New Dealers struggling for some kind of solution to the farm crisis. Because of the tight structures of their cooperatives, dairymen were generally better organized than their grain-growing colleagues, and were well positioned to influence any legislation bearing on their interests. With the 1935 amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress decreed that the government would henceforth not only allow price-fixing in the milk market but also enforce fixed prices. The Department of Agriculture stood ready to issue price regulations, or "marketing orders," that would set minimum prices for milk. Federal officials would be dispatched, at cooperatives' request, to ensure that no dealer demanded and no farmer offered a price below the specified minimum. -1935 Agriculture Adjustment Act & WWII price support purchases — Congress allows price-fixing the milk market and also enforcing fixed prices, such that no farmer was selling milk at a lower price. During WWII, the government continued to make price-support purchases to buy an surplus. This helped guarantee the high price of milk for dairy farmers. -the USDA has never challenged a cooperative on its milk price and it only has to enforce prices amongst a few dairy supplies. This is, again, because there are only a few coordinated sellers to deal with, rather than a bunch of competing dairy farmers. -subsidies to the milk industry are hidden — when you as a consumer pay for milk/dairy, you are paying a premium for that product and delivering money to the dairy farmer. The government keeps the prices high, but the government does not directly subsidize the dairy industry, consumers do. (1) removing dairy price supports would be a step toward trade liberalization; in negotiations, our trading partners want more liberal agricultural trade (will we get this under Trump?); the U.S. needs to lower its quotas (non-tariff barrier) on dairy if it wants to do trade negotiations with Europe (note: Europe is also notorious for its agro protection). Essentially, the U.S. needs to drop its quotas if it is asking Europe to do so. (2) current system is inefficient — resources are wasted; consumer money wasted. (3) price supports are inequitable — most $ goes to largest/richest farmers. (4) U.S. remains at the behest of the dairy lobby, tarnishing the democratic system and doing what democracy was meant to do — speak for the public and defend consumers, in this case.

Pape the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism

-what accounts for the rise in suicide terrorism especially from the 1990s onward.First wave studies on this have focused on the irrationality of the act and focus on individual motives, either religious indoctrination or psychological predispositions. --this article shows that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic. Even if many attackers are irrational or fanatical, the leadership groups that recruit them are not. Suicide attacks are designed to achieve specific political purposes, to coerce a target government to change policy, to mobilize additional recruits and financial support. --the strategic logic of suicide terrorism is designed to coerce modern democracies to make significant concessions to national self-determination, often specific territorial goals. --in the past 20 years, suicide terorirsm is on the rise because terorrists have learned that it pays off. --although moderate suicide terrorism led to moderate concessions, these more ambitious suicde terrorist campaigns are not likely to achieve still greater gains and may fail completely. In general, suicide terrorism relies on the threat to inflict low to medium levels of punishment on civilians. In other circumstances, this level of punishment has rarely caused modern national states to surrender significant political goals because modern states are often willing to countenance high costs for high interests. Suicide campaigns are unlikely to comple states to abandon important interests. --coercers have a choice between two strategies, punishment and denial. Punishment coerces by raising the costs or risks of the target society to a level that overwhelmes the value of the interests in dispute. Denial seeks to coerce by demonsrating to the target state that it simply cannot win the dispute regardless of its level of effort, and therefore fighting to the finish is pointless. --for suicide terror, the only coercive strategy available is punishment, as they are usually the weaker party. --suicide terorist's willingness to die magnifies the coercive effetes of punishment because sucide attacks are generally more destructive that other kinds of terrorist attacks. Second suicide attacks are an especially convincing way to signal the likelihood of more pain to come, because suicide itself is a costly signal, one that suggest that the attackers could not have been dettered by the threat of retaliation. The feeling of martyrdom also makes it more plausibile that there will be more attacks -third suicide terrorist organizations are better positioned than other terrorirsts to increase expectations about escalating future costs by deliberately violating norms in the use of violence. --there are three properties that are consistent with strategic logic but not irrational behavior. Timing: nearly all suicide attacks occur in organized, coherent campaigns, not as isolated incidents Nationalist Goals: suicide terrorist camapgins are directed at gaining control of what the terrorists see as their national homeland territory Target Selection: all suicide terrorist campaigns have been aimed at democracies, which make more suitable targets from the terorirst's point of view. Nationalist movements that face nondemocratic opponent use different measuers. --suicide terrorism is associated with gains for the terorirst's political cause about half th time. Of 11 suicide terrorist campaigns completed from 1980 to 2001, six closely correlated with significant policy changes by the target state toward the terorrist's political goals.

Sagan Domestic Politics Model

A second model of nuclear weapons proliferation focuses on the domestic actors who encourage or discourage governments from pursuing the bomb. Whether or not the acquisition of nuclear weapons serves the national interests of a state, it is likely to serve the parochial bureaucratic or political interests of at least some individual actors within the state --Three kinds of actors commonly appear in historical case-studies of proliferation: the state's nuclear energy establishment (which includes officials in state-run laboratories as well as civilian reactor facilities); important units within the professional military (often within the air force, though sometimes in navy bureaucracies interested in nuclear propulsion); and politicians in states in which individual parties or the mass public strongly favor nuclear weapons acquisition. When such actors form coalitions that are strong enough to control the government's decision- making process-either through their direct political power or indirectly through their control of information-nuclear weapons programs are likely to thrive. -- In this literature, bureaucratic actors are not seen as passive recipients of top-down political decisions; instead, they create the conditions that favor weapons acquisition by encouraging extreme perceptions of foreign threats, promoting supportive politicians, and actively lobbying for increased defense spending. --Instead of producing a united Indian effort to acquire a nuclear deterrent, the Chinese nuclear test produced a prolonged bureaucratic battle, fought inside the New Delhi political elite and nuclear energy establishment, between actors who wanted India to develop a nuclear weapons capability as soon as possible and other actors who opposed an Indian bomb and supported global nuclear disarmament and later Indian membership in the NPT --From the domestic model's perspective, one would expect that reversals of weapons decisions occur not when external threats are diminished, but rather when there are major internal political changes -Great Britain-would have strongly encouraged Argen- tina's nuclear ambitions. Instead, the important change was the emergence of liberalizing domestic regimes in both states, governments supported by coali- tions of actors-such as banks, export-oriented firms, and state monetary agencies-who value unimpeded access to international markets and oppose economically unproductive defense and energy enterprises -U.S. needs to empower domestic actors opposed to nuke development, provide alternative sources of prestige

What is a State

A set of institutions that: Holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in a given territory Provides a range of public goods Security Economic stability Basic services (judicial apparatus, bureaucracy, etc.)

NPT Non-Proliferation

Bans the possession of nuclear weapons by any state except for the US, USSR, Britain, France, and China Commits nuclear powers to disarmament Non-nuclear weapon states subject to inspection, receive aid for peacetime uses France and China joined after negotiations Israel, India, and Pakistan not signatories the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a multilateral treaty that bans all nuclear explosions, for both civilian and military purposes, in all environments. It was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996 but has not entered into force as eight specific states have not ratified the treaty.

Capper Volstead Act

Capper-Volstead Act (P.L. 67-146), the Co-operative Marketing Associations Act (7 U.S.C. 291, 292) was adopted by the United States Congress on February 18, 1922. It gave "associations" of persons producing agricultural products certain exemptions from antitrust laws. It is sometimes called the Magna Carta of cooperatives.[1]

Cooperative Security

Cooperative security, therefore, begins with an expansive conception of U.S. interests: the United States has a huge national interest in world peace. 23 Advocates propose to act collectively, through international institutions as much as possible. They presume that democracies will find it easier to work together in cooperative security regimes than would states with less progres- sive domestic polities. -Cooperative security does not view the great powers as a generic security problem. Because most are democracies, or on the road to democracy, and democracies have historically tended not to fall into war with one another, little great power security competition is expected A high level of what one might term "strategic interdependence" is posited. Wars in one place are likely to spread; unsavory military practices employed in one war will be employed in other wars. The use of weapons of mass destruction will beget their use elsewhere; ethnic cleansing will beget more ethnic cleansing. Refugees fleeing the nationalist violence of one country will energize xenophobia in countries of refuge -Cooperative security advocates believe that they now have more effective means to achieve their goals. The United States is presumed, based on the Desert Storm victory, to hold decisive military-technological superiority and thus to be able to wage speedy, low-casualty wars. A cooperative security strategy depends on international organizations to coordinate collective action. They are part of the complicated process of build- ing sufficient credibility to convince all prospective aggressors that they will regularly be met with decisive countervailing power. Cooperative security advocates favor military action for humanitarian pur- poses -Critique: Cooperative security is vulnerable to a range of criticisms. First, individual states are still expected to be able to rise above narrow conceptions of national interest in response to appeals for action on behalf of the collective good, and to engage in what will seem to them as armed altruism. Nevertheless, there will still be defectors and free riders. Major power aggression would still be a problem for cooperative secu- rity, as it was for collective security, if some powers perceive the intrinsic stakes as small and the aggressor as far away and difficult to fight. It seems unlikely, for example, that the NATO allies would ever fight the People's Republic of China over Taiwan, even if the United States wanted to do so. --Third, democracies are problematical partners in a cooperative security proj- ect in a crucial respect: their publics must be persuaded to go to war. --Second, the task of building sufficient general multilateral credibility to deter a series of new and different potential aggressors seems very difficult

Krauthammer the Unipolar Moment

First, it has been assumed that the old bipolar world would beget a multipolar world with power dispersed to new centers in Japan, Germany (and/or "Europe"), China and a diminished Soviet Union/Russia. Second, that the domestic American consensus for an internationalist foreign policy, a consensus radically weakened by the experience in Vietnam, would substantially be restored now that policies and debates inspired by "an inordinate fear of communism" could be safely retired. Third, that in the new post-Soviet strategic environment the threat of war would be dramatically diminished --All three of these assumptions are mistaken. The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies. Second, the internationalist consensus is under renewed assault. The as sault this time comes not only from the usual pockets of post-Vietnam liberal isolationism (e.g., the churches) but from a resurgence of 1930s-style conservative isolationism. And third, the emergence of a new strategic environment, marked by the rise of small aggressive states armed with weapons of mass destruction and possessing the means to deliver them (what might be called Weapon States), makes the coming decades a time of heightened, not diminished the threat of war -The most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is its unipolarity. No doubt, multipolarity will come --There is a sharp distinction to be drawn between real and apparent multilateralism. True multilateralism involves a gen uine coalition of coequal partners of comparable strength and stature?the World War II Big Three coalition, for example. What we have today is pseudo-multilateralism: a dominant great power acts essentially alone, but, embarrassed at the idea and still worshiping at the shrine of collective security, recruits a ship here, a brigade there, and blessings all around to give its unilateral actions a multilateral sheen -It is, moreover, a mistake to view America's exertions abroad as nothing but a drain on its economy. As can be seen in the gulf, America's involvement abroad is in many ways an essen tial pillar of the American economy. The United States is, like Britain before it, a commercial, maritime, trading nation that needs an open, stable world environment in which to thrive. In a world of Saddams, if the United States were to shed its unique superpower role, its economy would be gravely wounded. --= International stability is never a given. It is never the norm. When achieved, it is the product of self-conscious action by the great powers, and most particularly of the greatest power, which now and for the foreseeable future is the United States. If America wants stability, it will have to create it. Communism is indeed finished; the last of the messianic creeds that have haunted this century is quite dead. But there will constantly be new threats disturbing our peace --Can America support its unipolar status? Yes. But will Americans support such unipolar status? That is a more problematic question. For a small but growing chorus of Americans this vision of a unipolar world led by a dynamic America is a nightmare. Hence the second major element of the post-Cold War reality: the revival of American isolation ism. --But there is another great change in international relations. And here we come to the third and most crucial new element in the post-Cold War world: the emergence of a new strategic environment marked by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is a certainty that in the near future there will be a dramatic increase in the number of states armed with biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. --It is of course banal to say that modern technology has shrunk the world. But the obvious corollary, that in a shrunken world the divide between regional superpowers and great powers is radically narrowed, is rarely drawn. Missiles shrink distance. Nuclear (or chemical or biological) devices multiply power. Both can be bought at market. Consequently the geopolitical map is irrevocably altered. - The current Weapon States have deep grievances against the West and the world order that it has established and enforces. They are therefore subversive of the interna tional status quo, which they see as a residue of colonial ism. These resentments fuel an obsessive drive to high tech military development as the only way to leapfrog history and to place themselves on a footing equal to the west.

MFN Status

In international economic relations and international politics, "most favoured nation" (MFN) is a status or level of treatment accorded by one state to another in international trade. The term means the country which is the recipient of this treatment must, nominally, receive equal trade advantages as the "most favoured nation" by the country granting such treatment. (Trade advantages include low tariffs or high import quotas.) In effect, a country that has been accorded MFN status may not be treated less advantageously than any other country with MFN status by the promising country. There is a debate in legal circles whether MFN clauses in bilateral investment treaties include only substantive rules or also procedural protections -Given to China in the 90s, conitnued by Clinton dispite poeple who wanted to put pressure by conidtionally continuing it

Posen The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy

It is time to abandon the United States' hegemonic strategy and replace it with one of restraint. This approach would mean giving up on global reform and sticking to protecting narrow national security interests. -The United States' per capita GDP stands at $48,000, more than five times as large as China's, which means that the U.S. economy can produce cutting-edge products for a steady domestic market. North America is blessed with enviable quantities of raw materials, and about 29 percent of U.S. trade flows to and from its immediate neighbors, Canada and Mexico. The fortuitous geostrategic position of the United States compounds these economic advantages. Its neighbors to the north and south possess only miniscule militaries. Vast oceans to the west and east separate it from potential rivals. And its thousands of nuclear weapons deter other countries from ever entertaining an invasion. -Ironically, however, instead of relying on these inherent advantages for its security, the United States has acted with a profound sense of insecurity, adopting an unnecessarily militarized and forward-leaning foreign policy -That strategy has generated predictable pushback. Since the 1990s, rivals have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing" -- low-grade diplomatic opposition. China and Russia regularly use the rules of liberal international institutions to delegitimize the United States' actions. In the UN Security Council, they wielded their veto power to deny the West resolutions supporting the bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and more recently, they have slowed the effort to isolate Syria -American activism has also generated harder forms of balancing. China has worked assiduously to improve its military, and Russia has sold it modern weapons, such as fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and diesel-electric submarines. Iran and North Korea, meanwhile, have pursued nuclear programs in part to neutralize the United States' overwhelming advantages in conventional fighting power. Such reactions will only grow stronger as emerging economies convert their wealth into military power. -Just as emerging powers have gotten stronger, so, too, have the small states and violent substate entities that the United States has attempted to discipline, democratize, or eliminate. Whether in Somalia, Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya, the U.S. military seems to find itself fighting enemies that prove tougher than expected. Yet Washington seems unable to stay out of conflicts involving substate entities, in part because their elemental nature assaults the internationalist values that U.S. grand strategy is committed to preserving. Having trumpeted the United States' military superiority, U.S. policymakers have a hard time saying no to those who argue that the country's prestige will suffer gravely if the world's leader lets wars great and small run their course. -The enduring strength of these substate groups should give American policymakers pause, since the United States' current grand strategy entails open-ended confrontation with nationalism and other forms of identity politics that insurgents and terrorists feed off of. Officials in Washington, however, have acted as if they can easily undercut the power of identity through democratic processes, freedom of information, and economic development, helped along by the judicious application of military power. In fact, identity is resilient, and foreign peoples react with hostility to outsiders trying to control their lives. -Another problematic response to the United States' grand strategy comes from its friends: free-riding. The Cold War alliances that the country has worked so hard to maintain -- namely, NATO and the U.S. Japanese security agreement -- have provided U.S. partners in Europe and Asia with such a high level of insurance that they have been able to steadily shrink their militaries and outsource their defense to Washington. U.S. security guarantees also encourage plucky allies to challenge more powerful states, confident that Washington will save them in the end -- a classic case of moral hazard. -The United States should replace its unnecessary, ineffective, and expensive hegemonic quest with a more restrained grand strategy. Washington should not retreat into isolationism but refocus its efforts on its three biggest security challenges: preventing a powerful rival from upending the global balance of power, fighting terrorists, and limiting nuclear proliferation. These challenges are not new, but the United States must develop more carefully calculated and discriminating policies to address them.

Bill Clinton Foreign Policy

Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the com~u.nity of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and ~conomic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly In countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper -The end of superpower rivalry had freed the UN and other regional security institutions from their previous Cold War mind-set, and created new opportunities for them to play a more active, collective role. Despite international norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention, the idea that the international community should intervene in a country for the good of its own people gained greater legitimacy. International organizations such as the UN and regional security such as NATO, the OAS, and the OAU would play a role in bestowing legitimacy on the operations and in organizing a collective response. -Clinton would utilize both the multi-national cast and the explicit blessing of international organizations for support in most of these involvements. These largely humanitarian operations during his term met much more congressional opposition, and enjoyed less frequent congressional authorization, than did operations during the Cold War. This involvement suggests that the president had found international organizations to be a useful ally in part to decrease and to overcome the resistance of the national legislature

Primacy

Primacy, like selective engagement, is motivated by both power and peace. But the particular configuration of power is key: this strategy holds that only a preponderance of U.S. power ensures peace.Peace is the result of an imbalance of power in which U.S. capabilities are sufficient, operating on their own, to cow all potential challengers and to comfort all coalition partners --Primacy is most concerned with the trajectories of present and possible future great powers. As with selective engagement, Russia, China, Japan, and the most significant members of the European Union (essentially Germany, France, and Britain), matter most. War among the great powers poses the greatest threat to U.S. security for advocates of primacy as well as those of selective engagement -Advocates of primacy view the rise of a peer competitor from the midst of the great powers to offer the greatest threat to international order and thus the greatest risk of war. The objective for primacy, therefore, is not merely to preserve peace among the great powers, but to preserve U.S. suprem- acy by politically, economically, and militarily outdistancing any global chal- lenger. -Critique: First, the diffusion of economic and technological capabilities-precipitated in part by the open international economic system that the United States supports, in part by the spread of literacy, and in part by the embrace of market economics-suggests that other countries will develop the foundations to com- pete in international politics. New great powers will rise in the future -Second, contrary to the expectations of primacy advocates, it is likely that some states will balance against the United States. They will not wish to remain in a permanent position of military inferiority, just as the United States would struggle to reverse the position if it were imposed even by a benevolent state. Primacy underestimates the power of nationalism. -Third, American insistence on hegemonic leadership can engender resistance that may undermine the long-term effectiveness of any multilateral mecha- nisms that the United States may wish to exploit should challengers actually emerge. -Fourth, primacy carries the logical implication that the United States should be willing to wage preventive war.Will U.S. domestic politics permit a preventive war to forestall the rise of a challenger if other measures have proven insufficient? How will other major powers react to preventive war? -Fifth, the pursuit of primacy poses the constant risk of imperial overstretch

Non Tarrif Barriers

Quotas Countries typically use quotas for the importing and exporting of goods and services. In nontariff barrier procedures, countries agree on specified limits of goods and services that are permitted for importation to a country, typically without restrictions, up to a specified limit. Quotas can also be set for specific time frames. Additionally, quotas are also often used in international trade license agreements. Voluntary Export Restraints Voluntary export restraints are a type of nontariff barrier used by exporting countries. Voluntary export restraints set specified limits of goods and services to be exported to specified countries. These restraints are typically based on availability and political alliance. -subsidies -evironmenta, health, labor standards -all are harder to regulate

Mcgwire NATO Expansion a Policy Error Reasons against Expansion

Reasons Against Expansion: --In Russia, it would bring into question the entire post-Cold War settlement, undercut those who favoured reform and cooperation with the West, galvanize resistance in the Duma to START II and III, and strengthen the non democratic opposition --In Europe, it would draw a new line of division between the 'ins' and the 'outs', foster instability, and ultimately diminish the sense of security of those not included --In NATO, it would degrade the alliance's ability to carry out its primary mission, and involve US security guarantees to countries with serious and national minority problems and unevenly developed systems of govern ment, -the US, it would trigger an extended debate over its indeterminate (but certainly high) cost and would call into question the US commitment to NATO, traditionally regarded as the centrepiece of US foreign policy.

Post Cold War NATO Expansion

Reasons for expansion: Secure the emerging democracies Embed them in international institutions Stable foundation for interdependence Concerns about a resurgent Russia Strong lobbying from CEE states Domestic political benefits of expansion: Electoral politics Reassertion of US leadership

Proliferation Security Initiative

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.[1] Launched by United States President George W. Bush in May 2003 at a meeting in Kraków, Poland, the PSI has now grown to include the endorsement of 103[2] nations around the world, including Russia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Argentina, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, New Zealand, Republic of Korea and Norway. Despite the support of over half of the Members of the United Nations, a number of countries have expressed opposition to the initiative, including India, China and Indonesia Over 100 partner states De facto led by the US Other states provide support and consent for flagged ships to be searched UN Resolution 1540 as complimentary to its goals Exposed AQ Khan proliferation network

Dayton Peace Accords

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Agreement, Dayton Accords, Paris Protocol or Dayton-Paris Agreement, is the peace agreement reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, United States, in November 1995, and formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. These accords put an end to the 3 1⁄2-year-long Bosnian War, one of the Yugoslav Wars.

Desert Storm

The Gulf War (2 August 1990 - 28 February 1991), codenamed Operation Desert Shield (2 August 1990 - 17 January 1991) for operations leading to the buildup of troops and defense of Saudi Arabia and Operation Desert Storm (17 January 1991 - 28 February 1991) in its combat phase, was a war waged by coalition forces from 34 nations led by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The Iraqi Army's occupation of Kuwait that began 2 August 1990 was met with international condemnation, and brought immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by members of the UN Security Council. US President George H. W. Bush deployed US forces into Saudi Arabia, and urged other countries to send their own forces to the scene. An array of nations joined the coalition, the largest military alliance since World War II. The great majority of the coalition's military forces were from the US, with Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and Egypt as leading contributors, in that order. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia paid around US$32 billion of the US$60 billion cost. The initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial and naval bombardment on 17 January 1991, continuing for five weeks. This was followed by a ground assault on 24 February. This was a decisive victory for the coalition forces, who liberated Kuwait and advanced into Iraqi territory. The coalition ceased its advance, and declared a ceasefire 100 hours after the ground campaign started. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq, Kuwait, and areas on Saudi Arabia's border. Iraq launched Scud missiles against coalition military targets in Saudi Arabia and against Israel.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is an agreement on the nuclear program of Iran reached in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—plus Germany),[a] and the European Union. -Reduce uranium stockpile Reduce the number of centrifuges (15 yrs) Limit enrichment activities (15 yrs) Allow IAEA access UN, EU and US sanctions relief

The Partnership For Peace

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) program aimed at creating trust between NATO and other states in Europe and the former Soviet Union; 22 states are members.[1] It was first discussed by the Bulgarian Society Novae, after being proposed as an American initiative at the meeting of NATO defense ministers in Travemünde, Germany, on 20-21 October 1993, and formally launched on 10-11 January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels, Belgium.[2] NATO builds relationships with partners through military-to-military cooperation on training, exercises, disaster planning and response, science and environmental issues, professionalization, policy planning, and relations with civilian government. -1994 Partnership for Peace: offered closer bilateral military ties between NATO and central European countries, including Russia. No article 5 commitment though.

Srebrenica Massacre

The Srebrenica massacre, also known as the Srebrenica genocide[7] (Bosnian: Masakar u Srebrenici; Genocid u Srebrenici), was the July 1995 genocide[8] of more than 8,000[1][9] Muslim Bosniaks, mainly men and boys, in and around the town of Srebrenica during the Bosnian War. The killings were perpetrated by units of the Bosnian Serb Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) under the command of General Ratko Mladić. The Scorpions, a paramilitary unit from Serbia, who had been part of the Serbian Interior Ministry until 1991, also participated in the massacre.[6][10] In April 1993 the United Nations (UN) had declared the besieged enclave of Srebrenica—in the Drina Valley of northeastern Bosnia—a "safe area" under UN protection. However, in July 1995, UNPROFOR's 370[11] Dutchbat soldiers in Srebrenica failed to prevent the town's capture by the VRS—and the subsequent massacre.[12][13][14][15] The Dutch Battalion "Dutchbat" was found guilty by the courts in the Netherlands of failing to protect some of the Bosniak refugees in the Safe Area.[23] Minister Voorhoeve of the Netherlands had ordered that "under no circumstances was Dutchbat allowed to cooperate in the separate treatment of men."[304] A NATO battalion is expected to be able to exercise judgement when confronted with a conflict between rules of engagement and a specific order designed to protect refugees; moreover, it was the Netherlands and not the UN that had effective control of Dutchbat

Taiwan Strait Crisis

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, also called the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis or the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, was the effect of a series of missile "tests" conducted by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the waters surrounding Taiwan including the Taiwan Strait from July 21, 1995, to March 23, 1996. The first set of missiles fired in mid-to-late 1995 were allegedly intended to send a strong signal to the Republic of China (ROC, commonly known as "Taiwan") government under Lee Teng-hui, who had been seen as moving ROC foreign policy away from the One-China policy. The second set of missiles were fired in early 1996, allegedly intending to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election. -The U.S. government responded by staging the biggest display of American military might in Asia since the Vietnam War.[4] President Clinton ordered additional ships into the region in March 1996.[5] Two aircraft carrier battle groups, Carrier Group Seven centered on USS Nimitz, and Carrier Group Five centered on USS Independence, were present in the region.[6] The Nimitz and her battle group sailed through the Taiwan Strait, while the Independence did not.[7] The crisis forced the Chinese leadership to acknowledge its inability to stop U.S. forces from coming to Taiwan's assistance.[8] The PRC's attempts at intimidation were counterproductive. Arousing more anger than fear, it boosted Lee by 5% in the polls, earning him a majority as opposed to a mere plurality.[citation needed] The military tests and exercises also strengthened the argument for further U.S. arms sales to the ROC and led to the strengthening of military ties between the U.S. and Japan, increasing the role Japan would play in defending Taiwan.

Tiannemen Square

The Tiananmen Square protests, commonly known in China as the June Fourth Incident (六四事件)[a] were student-led demonstrations in Beijing in 1989. More broadly, it refers to the popular national movement inspired by the Beijing protests during that period, sometimes referred to as the '89 Democracy Movement (八九民运). The protests were forcibly suppressed after the government declared martial law. In what became widely known as the Tiananmen Square Massacre, troops with assault rifles and tanks killed at least several hundred demonstrators trying to block the military's advance towards Tiananmen Square. The number of civilian deaths has been estimated at anywhere between the hundreds to the thousands -Set against a backdrop of rapid economic development and social changes in post Mao-era China, the protests reflected anxieties about the country's future in the popular consciousness and among the political elite. The reforms of the 1980s had led a nascent market economy which benefited some groups but seriously disaffected others; the one-party political system also faced a challenge of legitimacy. Common grievances at the time included inflation, limited preparedness of graduates for the new economy, and restrictions on political participation. The students called for democracy, greater accountability, freedom of the press, and freedom of speech, though they were loosely organized and their goals varied.[2][3] At the height of the protests, about a million people assembled in the Square The Chinese government was widely condemned internationally for the use of force. Western countries imposed economic sanctions and arms embargoes.[8] The Chinese government initially condemned the protests as a counter-revolutionary riot.[9][10] In the aftermath of the crackdown, the government conducted widespread arrests of protesters and their supporters, suppressed other protests around China, expelled foreign journalists and strictly controlled coverage of the events in the domestic press. The police and internal security forces were strengthened. Officials deemed sympathetic to the protests were demoted or purged.[11] More broadly, the suppression temporarily halted the policies of liberalization in the 1980s. Considered a watershed event, the protests also set the limits on political expression in China well into the 21st century. Its memory is widely associated with questioning the legitimacy of Communist Party rule, and remains one of the most sensitive and most widely censored political topics on mainland China.[12][13] President George H. W. Bush suspended military sales and visits to that country. It was a tepid reaction. George Washington University revealed that, through high-level secret channels on 30 June 1989, the US government conveyed to the government of the People's Republic of China that the events around the Tiananmen Square protests were an "internal affair".[41]

Trade Act of 1974

The Trade Act of 1974 (Pub.L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, enacted January 3, 1975, codified at 19 U.S.C. ch. 12[1]) was passed to help industry in the United States become more competitive or phase workers into other industries or occupations. -The Trade Act of 1974 created fast track authority for the President to negotiate trade agreements that Congress can approve or disapprove but cannot amend or filibuster. The Act provided the President with tariff and non-tariff trade barrier negotiating authority for the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Gerald Ford was the President at the time. It also gave the President broad authority to counteract injurious and unfair foreign trade practices. Section 201 of the Act requires the International Trade Commission to investigate petitions filed by domestic industries or workers claiming injury or threat of injury due to expanding imports. Investigations must be completed within 6 months. If such injury is found, restrictive measures may be implemented. Action under Section 201 is allowed under the GATT escape clause, GATT Article XIX. Section 301 was designed to eliminate unfair foreign trade practices that adversely affect U.S. trade and investment in both goods and services. Under Section 301, the President must determine whether the alleged practices are unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. If the President determines that action is necessary, the law directs that all appropriate and feasible action within the President's power should be taken to secure the elimination of the practice.[7] A Special 301 Report is prepared annually by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) which must identify a list of "Priority Foreign Countries", those countries judged to have inadequate intellectual property laws; these countries may be subject to sanctions. This has been issued every year beginning in 1989 since the enactment of the Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (enacted in 1994).[8]

WTO

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an intergovernmental organization which regulates international trade. The WTO officially commenced on 1 January 1995 under the Marrakesh Agreement, signed by 123 nations on 15 April 1994, replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which commenced in 1948.[5] The WTO deals with regulation of trade between participating countries by providing a framework for negotiating trade agreements and a dispute resolution process aimed at enforcing participants' adherence to WTO agreements, which are signed by representatives of member governments[6]:fol.9-10 and ratified by their parliaments. Among the various functions of the WTO, these are regarded by analysts as the most important: It oversees the implementation, administration and operation of the covered agreements.[39][40] It provides a forum for negotiations and for settling disputes Additionally, it is the WTO's duty to review and propagate the national trade policies, and to ensure the coherence and transparency of trade policies through surveillance in global economic policy-making.[40][42] Another priority of the WTO is the assistance of developing, least-developed and low-income countries in transition to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines through technical cooperation and training. Dispute resolution mechanism, binding arbitration The WTO's dispute-settlement system "is the result of the evolution of rules, procedures and practices developed over almost half a century under the GATT 1947".[59] In 1994, the WTO members agreed on the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) annexed to the "Final Act" signed in Marrakesh in 1994.[60] Dispute settlement is regarded by the WTO as the central pillar of the multilateral trading system, and as a "unique contribution to the stability of the global economy".[61] WTO members have agreed that, if they believe fellow-members are violating trade rules, they will use the multilateral system of settling disputes instead of taking action unilaterally.[62] The operation of the WTO dispute settlement process involves case-specific panels[63] appointed by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB),[64] the Appellate Body,[65] The Director-General and the WTO Secretariat,[66] arbitrators,[67] and advisory experts.[68]

Yugoslav Wars

The Yugoslav Wars were a series of ethnically-based wars and insurgencies fought from 1991 to 2001 inside the territory of the former Yugoslavia. These wars accompanied and/or facilitated the breakup of the Yugoslav state, when its constituent republics declared independence, but the issues of ethnic minorities in the new countries (chiefly Serbs, Croats and Albanians) were still unresolved at the time the republics were recognized internationally. The wars are generally considered to be a series of separate but related military conflicts which occurred in, and affected, most of the former Yugoslav republics Often described as Europe's deadliest conflict since World War II, the conflicts have become infamous for the war crimes involved, including ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and rape. These were the first European conflicts since World War II to be formally judged genocidal in character and many key individual participants were subsequently charged with war crimes.[17] The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the UN to prosecute these crimes -NATO intervention, airstrikes The war ended with the Kumanovo Treaty, with Yugoslav and Serb forces[66] agreeing to withdraw from Kosovo to make way for an international presence.[67][68] The Kosovo Liberation Army disbanded soon after this, with some of its members going on to fight for the UÇPMB in the Preševo Valley[69] and others joining the National Liberation Army (NLA) and Albanian National Army (ANA) during the armed ethnic conflict in Macedonia,[70] while others went on to form the Kosovo Police.[71]

Trade Adjustment Assistance

The trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) is a federal program of the United States government to act as a way to reduce the damaging impact of imports felt by certain sectors of the U.S. economy. The current structure features four components of Trade Adjustment Assistance: for workers, firms, farmers, and communities. Each cabinet-level department was tasked with a different sector of the overall Trade Adjustment Assistance program. The program for workers is the largest, and administered by the U.S. Department of Labor. The program for farmers is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the firms and communities programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Workers who are determined to have lost their jobs because of production shifts overseas or import competition can receive benefits such as relocation assistance, subsidized health care insurance, and extended unemployment benefits. Typically, workers must be enrolled in job training programs to receive the unemployment benefits. Several studies have found mixed results for TAA. A comprehensive evaluation completed in 2012 measured workers who took TAA against those who took standard unemployment benefit started in 70s

Foreign Policy as Social Work Mandelbaum

These failed interventions expressed the view of the worldwide role of the United States that the members of the Clinton foreign policy team brought to office. Their distinctive vision of post-Cold War American foreign policy failed because it did not command public support. Much of the administrations first year was given over to making that painful discovery. Much of the next two years was devoted to coping with the consequences of the failures -The seminal events of the foreign policy of the Clinton adminis tration were three failed military interventions in its first nine months in office: the announced intention, then failure, to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia's Muslims and bomb the Bosnian Serbs in May 1993; the deaths of 18 U.S. Army rangers at the hands of a mob in Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3; and the turning back of a ship carrying military trainers in response to demonstrations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on October 12. Together they set the tone and established much of the agenda of the foreign policy of the United States from 1993 through 1995. --The abortive interventions shared several features. Each involved small, poor, weak countries far from the crucial centers that had dominated American foreign policy during the Cold War. Whereas previous administrations had been concerned with the powerful and potentially dangerous members of the international community, which constitute its core, the Clinton administration turned its at tention to the international periphery --In these peripheral areas the administration was preoccupied not with relations with neighboring countries, the usual subject of foreign policy, but rather with the social, political, and economic conditions within borders. It aimed to relieve the suffering caused by ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, starvation in Somalia, and oppression in Haiti. Historically the foreign policy of the United States has centered on American interests, defined as developments that could affect the lives of American citizens. Nothing that occurred in these three countries fit that criterion. Instead, the Clinton interventions were intended to promote American values --In this they were wrong. The American public had supported intervention in poor, distant reaches of the Third World during the Cold War, and would no doubt do so again, but only on behalf of traditional American national interests -This was the great lesson to emerge from the fiascoes of Clinton s first year. It can be illustrated by comparing two Caribbean invasions, ten years apart, in which the United States sought to remove an un friendly government: the Reagan administrations dispatch offerees to Grenada in 1983 and the Clinton administration s efforts to intervene in Haiti in 1993 and 1994. By most criteria Haiti is the more important of the two: larger, closer, a source of refugees, and a country that the United States had occupied from 1915 to 1934. Yet the invasion of Grenada was less controversial, cause it was in teh context of the Cold War. --By the standards of Mother Teresa, the Clinton foreign policy could claim modest success. At the end of 1995 Haitians and Bosnians were better off, or at least less likely to be killed, than had been the case 15 months earlier. (Of the administrations three abortive interventions in 1993, the one in which the United States may have accomplished the most was Somalia, where, by some estimates, American interven tion saved half a million lives. That had been the aim and was thus partly the achievement of the Bush administration -Clinton didn't sell these policies well ot the American public, tried to tie Haiti to American national interest, which was ludicrous. Instead, he could have been honest and done a values approach. -On the other hand, the Clinton team did not succeed in estab lishing Lake's commitment to "helping the helpless" as the dominant principle of American foreign policy. Meanwhile, political support for the organization it had hoped would be an instrument of its new foreign policy, the United Nations, fell sharply, in part because the administration sought to deflect responsibility for its own failures in Bosnia and Somalia onto the international organition --The more traditional standard by which the foreign policy of a great power is evaluated is its relations with the most important members of the international system. Here the Clinton perfor mance could not be judged a success. The real legacy of the Bush ad ministration was not Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. It was, instead, unprecedentedly good American relations with all the other major centers of power: Western Europe, Japan, China, and Russia. Three years later, those relations were worse in every way -- The pattern is a familiar one for American politicians. With its close attention to Ireland and Israel (Italy was unaccountably omit ted), the Clinton administration was pursuing the foreign policy of many a big-city mayor. With its emphasis on securing contracts abroad for American firms, it was conducting the international eco nomic policy common to governors. -Making American foreign policy by attending to the wishes of Amer ican interest groups did, however, interfere with the pursuit of larger American interests in the cases of Japan, North Korea, and Russia -Mandel: immediate threat (Cold War, Communist Cuba) the fact that this was perceived justified intervention in public eyes. Somalia, Bosnia, no immediate threat to natl security so hard to justify. Clinton era interventions were essential social work on a foreign policy scale. In the post cold-war world, we don't know how to engage with the world, are looking for ways to engage in the world. These interventions are part of the search. Lack of a common enemy, of context of cold war to inspire policy.

Nattering NATO Negativism Why Expansion is Good Ball

This article argues that there are good reasons to expand NATO. Central European states have legitimate security concerns, and so does Russia. An expanded NATO's value rests on its ability to reassure its new members, Russia, and other countries in the region that they are secure from intimidation and attack from each other. This could be achieved by a web of political commitments that NATO expansion and cooperation with Russia would establish. -NATO's military deterrent function is secondary. NATO should expand only if it is reconfigured to serve as an alliance that reassures all status quo states, including Russia and others not formally a part of it. If its focus remains primarily to coordinate military plans for deterring attacks on its members alone, its expansion will most likely exacerbate security relations in Europe --This argument has certain counterintuitive implications for European security. First, the Central European states, albeit unintentionally, pose as much of a threat to European security as Russia does. Second, NATO expansion should be con figured to enhance, not diminish, Russian prestige. Third, NATO expansion should lead to a reduction, not an increase, in NATO military forces in Europe --Some measures mentioned previously should reassure Russia. One is reduction in NATO force levels. Another is close consultations among the NATO four with Russia over Central European affairs. If regular diplomacy can work after the Cold War, it ought to be able to work in reassuring Russia that NATO policies are not aimed at restricting legitimate levels of Russian influence in the region - Central European states would search for security without the alliance: The trouble with the logic of the NATO expansion opponents is that they do not consider what action Eastern European states might take in the absence of a NATO commitment. Just as Russia will supposedly fear for its security if NATO is expanded, Central European states will fear for their security if NATO does not expand.59 A number of unsettling dynamics may occur. --Democratization reinforces peace: Since the candidate NATO members are democr tizing states, NATO membership could help consolidate their democratic institutions in ways that are beneficial for Western and Russian security, incentives to become more democratic --Membership could restrain Central European statesBut the risk of a Central European state provoking a crisis is diminished by a variety of institutional restraints and controls that NATO membership would impose. --NA TO members could and should reduce their forces: If NATO expands, there are three reasons why NATO members should reduce the size of their forces in Europe. First, by adding the former Warsaw Pact members to NATO, the alliance will be obligated to reduce its force levels under the CFE TreatySecond, NATO intends to modernize new members' forces to make them less offence-oriented. Such forces will be compatible with NATO equipment and less threatening to Russia and other neighbours. Third, if the size of the alliance is increased and the Russians and other Central European countries are reassured, the security environment should improve in Europe.

Ikenberry The Illusion of Geopoltics

Walter Russell Mead paints a disturbing portrait of the United States' geopolitical predicament. As he sees it, an increasingly formidable coalition of illiberal powers -- China, Iran, and Russia -- is determined to undo the post-Cold War settlement and the U.S.-led global order that stands behind it -Mead also mischaracterizes the thrust of U.S. foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War, he argues, the United States has ignored geopolitical issues involving territory and spheres of influence and instead adopted a Pollyannaish emphasis on building the global order. But this is a false dichotomy. The United States does not focus on issues of global order, such as arms control and trade, because it assumes that geopolitical conflict is gone forever; it undertakes such efforts precisely because it wants to manage great-power competition. Order building is not premised on the end of geopolitics; it is about how to answer the big questions of geopolitics. -Alliances, partnerships, multilateralism, democracy -- these are the tools of U.S. leadership, and they are winning, not losing, the twenty-first-century struggles over geopolitics and the world order. -- This vision misses a deeper reality. In matters of geopolitics (not to mention demographics, politics, and ideas), the United States has a decisive advantage over China, Iran, and Russia. Although the United States will no doubt come down from the peak of hegemony that it occupied during the unipolar era, its power is still unrivaled. -- Indeed, Washington enjoys a unique ability to win friends and influence states. According to a study led by the political scientist Brett Ashley Leeds, the United States boasts military partnerships with more than 60 countries, whereas Russia counts eight formal allies and China has just one -- Then there are the nuclear weapons. These arms, which the United States, China, and Russia all possess (and Iran is seeking), help the United States in two ways. First, thanks to the logic of mutual assured destruction, they radically reduce the likelihood of great-power war. -- Geographic isolation has also given the United States reason to champion universal principles that allow it to access various regions of the world. The country has long promoted the open-door policy and the principle of self-determination and opposed colonialism -- less out of a sense of idealism than due to the practical realities of keeping Europe, Asia, and the Middle East open for trade and diplomacy. Fortunately, the liberal principles that Washington has pushed enjoy near-universal appeal, because they have tended to be a good fit with the modernizing forces of economic growth and social advancement. -Geographic isolation has also given the United States reason to champion universal principles that allow it to access various regions of the world. The country has long promoted the open-door policy and the principle of self-determination and opposed colonialism -- less out of a sense of idealism than due to the practical realities of keeping Europe, Asia, and the Middle East open for trade and diplomacy. -It was during these postwar years that geopolitics and order building converged. A liberal international framework was the answer that statesmen such as Dean Acheson, George Kennan, and George Marshall offered to the challenge of Soviet expansionism. The system they built strengthened and enriched the United States and its allies, to the detriment of its illiberal opponents. It also stabilized the world economy and established mechanisms for tackling global problems. The end of the Cold War has not changed the logic behind this project. -While the rise of democratic states makes life more difficult for China and Russia, it makes the world safer for the United States. Those two powers may count as U.S. rivals, but the rivalry takes place on a very uneven playing field: the United States has the most friends, and the most capable ones, too. Washington and its allies account for 75 percent of global military spending. Democratization has put China and Russia in a geopolitical box. - After the Cold War, when the United States was the world's sole superpower, other global powers, oceans away, did not even attempt to balance against it. In fact, the United States' geographic position has led other countries to worry more about abandonment than domination. Allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East have sought to draw the United States into playing a greater role in their regions. The result is what the historian Geir Lundestad has called an "empire by invitation." -Across a wide range of issues, China and Russia are acting more like established great powers than revisionist ones. And China and Russia are using global rules and institutions to advance their own interests. Their struggles with the United States revolve around gaining voice within the existing order and manipulating it to suit their needs. They wish to enhance their positions within the system, but they are not trying to replace it. -- In the age of liberal order, revisionist struggles are a fool's errand. Indeed, China and Russia know this. They do not have grand visions of an alternative order. For them, international relations are mainly about the search for commerce and resources, the protection of their sovereignty, and, where possible, regional domination. -- In fact, although they resent that the United States stands at the top of the current geopolitical system, they embrace the underlying logic of that framework, and with good reason. Openness gives them access to trade, investment, and technology from other societies. Rules give them tools to protect their sovereignty and interests. -Under these circumstances, the United States should not give up its efforts to strengthen the liberal order. The world that Washington inhabits today is one it should welcome. And the grand strategy it should pursue is the one it has followed for decades: deep global engagement. It is a strategy in which the United States ties itself to the regions of the world through trade, alliances, multilateral institutions, and diplomacy It is a strategy in which the United States establishes leadership not simply through the exercise of power but also through sustained efforts at global problem solving and rule making. It created a world that is friendly to American interests, and it is made friendly because, as President John F. Kennedy once said, it is a world "where the weak are safe and the strong are just."

Anti-Dumping Duties

What is an 'Anti-Dumping Duty' An anti-dumping duty is a protectionist tariff that a domestic government imposes on foreign imports that it believes are priced below fair market value. Dumping is a process where a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on its own home market. To protect local businesses and markets, many countries impose stiff duties on products they believe are being dumped in their national market.

State Building

domestic and/or foreign actors construct government institutions Weberian understanding of "state" does not always involve nation-building -top down Process state-building conducted by the International Community (IC) and the U.S. or "practitioners" state-building follows state collapse and failed and ineffective institutions state-building objective is to overcome local hostilities to ensure 'peace' and 'security' and to provide political order. overall: practitioners believe institution building will lead to order (social and political security) in society.

Nation Building

domestic/and or foreign actors construct government institutions AND loyalties to the state sense of "we-ness" does not always accompany state-building focus: state AND society state as "idea" state-building + nation-building nation-building constructs a public that legitimizes the state overall: national attachments must accompany state institutions for security and political order.

NAFTA

he North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA; Spanish: Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte, TLCAN; French: Accord de libre-échange nord-américain, ALÉNA) is an agreement signed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States, creating a trilateral trade bloc in North America. The agreement came into force on January 1, 1994.[4] It superseded the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and Canada Free trade zone NOT a customs union The goal of NAFTA was to eliminate barriers to trade and investment between the U.S., Canada and Mexico. The implementation of NAFTA on January 1, 1994 brought the immediate elimination of tariffs on more than one-half of Mexico's exports to the U.S. and more than one-third of U.S. exports to Mexico. Within 10 years of the implementation of the agreement, all U.S.-Mexico tariffs would be eliminated except for some U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico that were to be phased out within 15 years.[11] Most U.S.-Canada trade was already duty-free. NAFTA also sought to eliminate non-tariff trade barriers and to protect the intellectual property rights on traded products.

Cross King Cotton

origins: 1935 Agricultural Adjustment Act (just like for milk!) overall: the U.S. has not significantly reformed agricultural support policies; the U.S. continues to support markets that are not internationally competitive (remember: industries lacking a comparative advantage will want domestic protection). how agricultural subsidies hurt 'developing' countries: US Cotton Subsidies is the only WTO decision involving the challenge of a domestic agricultural subsidy. the affected state must show that the subsidy directly affects the state, and it is difficult to prove "serious prejudice." In the case of the WTO challenge, the US defended itself saying that other factors, not cotton subsidies, were the issue: including plunges in the world market price of cotton. The complexity of non-tariff barrier issues, and how difficult it is to directly tie a state's subsidies to "serious prejudices," means that smaller, less wealthy countries will be unable to pursue grievances on the world stage (like in the WTO).