Fourth Amendment 2

carpenter notes

*The various courts of appeals relied on Supreme Court precedence of Smith V Maryland and US V miller. -in smith, the Supreme Court held that the installation and use of a pen register was not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. the court emphasized that an individual has no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial, for such numbers are knowingly and voluntarily provided to a telephone company whenever an individual decides to place a phone call -in miller, a defendants subpoenaed Financial materials were held to be business records of the bank, and not the respondents private papers for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment *Grady v North Carolina- the courthouse that requiring a convicted sex offender to wear a monitoring device was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment

O'connor v johnson

-sixth amendment interests Facts: believing that false written statements had been made in the applications for liquor licenses for patricks lounge, the police applied for a search warrant to obtain the business records of patricks lounge. The accountant indicated that the business records of th former owners were in the possession of attorney o'connor, petitioner in this case. The police then obtained a warrant to search petitioners office fot these records. Petitioner refused to permit the search and indicated that all his records concerning patricks lounge were contained in a box and his work product file. After petitioner applied to this court for a writ of prohibition to quash the search warrant, respondent amended his order so that the court would deterine which documents were protected by the attorney -client privilege or the work product doctrine Issue: the reasonableness of searching an attorneys office for document and files of a particular client to find evidence of criminal wrongdoing Rule: it is unreasonable, in any case, to permit law enforcement officers to peruse miscellaneous docs in an attorneys office while attempting to locate documents listed in a search warrant -attornys must respond faithfully and promptly, while still being allowed the opportunity to assert applicable privileges by a motion to quash

carpenter cont

Holding: given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user's claim to Fourth Amendment protection. whether the government employees its own surveillance technology as in Jones or leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through csli. the location information obtained from Carpenters Wireless carriers was the product of a search -having found that the acquisition of carpenters CSLI was a search, we also conclude that the gov must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such records -in light of the deeply revealing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such info is gathered by a third party does not make it any less deserving of fourth amendment protection Reasoning: allowing government access to cell site records contravenes that expectation. although such records are generated for commercial purposes, that distinction does not negate Carpenters anticipation of privacy and his physical location. mapping a cell phone's location over the course of 127 days provides an all-encompassing record of the holders whereabouts. as with GPS information, the timestamp data provides an intimate window into a person's life, revealing not only his particular movements but through them is familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations - unlike the bugged container in knotts or the car in jones, a cell phone Is almost a feature of human anatomy and tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner - given the unique nature of cell phone location information, the fact that the government obtained the information from a third party it does not overcome Carpenter's claim to fourth amendment protection - we do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras - the government acquired the cell site records pursuant to a court order issued under the stored Communications act, which required the government to show reasonable grounds for believing that the records were relevant and material to an ongoing investigation. That showing falls well short of the probable cause required for warrant Kennedy dissent -You're the only question necessary to decide is whether the government searched anything of Carpenters when it used compulsory process to obtain cell site records from Carpenter's cell phone service providers. the Court's decisions in Miller and Smith dictate that the answer is no Thomas dissent - this case should not turn on whether a search occurred, it should turn instead on Whose property was searched. the records belong to Metro PCS and Sprint Alito dissent - the broad principles that the court seems to embrace will be applied across the board. all subpoenas duces tecum and all other orders compelling the production of documents will require a demonstration of probable cause - and the stored Communications act, Congress address the specific problem that issue in this case. if the American people now think that the ACT is inadequate or needs updating, they can turn to their elected representatives to adopt more protective provisions Gorsuch descent - I do not agree with the Court's decision today to keep Smith and Miller on life support and supplement them with a new and multi-layered inquiry that seems to be only katz squared. I would look to a more traditional Fourth Amendment approach

karo cont

reasoning: the actual placement of the beeper into the can violated no ones fourth amendment rights. The can into which the beeper was placed belonged at the time to the DEA, AND BY NO STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION COULD IT BE SAID THAT RESPONDENTS THEN HAD ANY LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION of privacy in it. The ether and the original 10 cans, on the other hand, belonged to and were in the possession of, the informant, who had given his consent to any invasion of those items that occurred. Thus, even if there had been no substitution of cans and the agents had placed the beeper into one of the original 10 cans, informants consent was sufficient to validate the placement of the beeper in teh can -the mere transfer to karo of a can containing an unmonitored beeper infringed no privacy interest. It conveyed no info that karo wished to keep private, for it conveyed no info -we likewise do nto believe that the transfer of the container constituted a seizure. Although the can may have contained an unknown and unwanted foreign object, it cannpt be said that anyone's possessory interest was interfered with in a meaningful way -the monitoring of an electronic device such as a beeper is, of course, less intrusive than a full scale search, but it does reveal a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the gov is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant. The case is thus not like knotts, for there the beeper told the authority nothing about the interior of knotts' cabin. The info obtained in knotts was voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look. Here, the monitoring indicated that the beeper was inside the house, a fact that could not have been visually verified -indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of fourth amendment oversight -as we have said, by maintaining the beeper the agents verified that the ether wa actually located in the taos house and that it remained there while the warrant was sought. This info was obtained without a warrant and would therefore be inadmissible at trial against those with privacy interest in the house- horton, harley, steele, and roth. That info, which was included in the warrant affidavit, would also invalidate the warrant ofr the search of the house if it proved to be critical to establishing probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. However, if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause, the warrant was nevertheless valid -it erquires only a casual examination of the warrant affidavit, which in relevant respects consists of undisputed factual assertions, to conclude that the officers could have secured the warrant without relying on the beeper to locate the ether in the house sought to be searched. The affidavit recounted the months-long tracking of the evidence, including the visual and beeper surveillance of hortons pickup -Two of the four respondents who had standing to object to the search of the residents, steel and roth, had no interest in any of the arguably private places in which the Beeper was monitored prior to its arrival in taos. the evidence seized in the house would be admissible against them - assuming for present purposes that prior to its arrival at the second Warehouse the beaver was illegally used to locate thee ether in a house or other place in which Horton or Harley had a justifiable claim to privacy, we are confident that such used of the Beeper does not taint its later use and locating The Ether and tracking it to taos. the movement of The Ether from the first Warehouse was undetected, but by monitoring the Beeper the agents discovered that it had been moved to the second storage facility. no prior monitoring of the Beeper contributed to this discovery; using the Beeper for this purpose was thus untainted by any possible prior illegality. the Beeper informed the agents only that The Ether was somewhere in the warehouse, it did not identify the specific Locker in which the Aether was located. monitoring the Beeper revealed nothing about the contents of the locker that Horton and Harley had rented and hence was not a surge of that Locker. the locker was identified only when agents traversing in the public part of the facility found that the smell of ether was coming from a specific Locker - the agent set up visual surveillance of that locker. the truck was observed departing and was tracked visually and by people to the vicinity of the house in taos. because locating The Ether and the warehouse was not an illegal search, and because the ether was seen being loaded into Horton's truck, which then traveled the public highways, it is evident that under knotts there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment as to anyone with or without standing to complain about monitoring the Beeper while it was located in Horton's truck

Misplaced confidence

•Just as the reasonable expectation of privacy does not extend to utterances lawfully overheard by an officer, so too and accused will not be heard to complain if a party with whom he engages in conversation repeats his statements or permits Law Enforcement Officers to overhear or record the conversation -courts have held routinely that no right of the accused is violated when a party to a phone conversation permits a government agent to listen or record the conversation •the same principle is applicable to face-to-face conversation which is overheard by means of a microphone hidden on one of the participants -In on lee v US, the accused was unaware of the conversents status as a government agent, nor was he aware that the conversation was being broadcasted to a second agent situated outside of the laundry. the Supreme Court sustained the admission of the testimony because the accused had consented to the entry and thereby assumed the risk of divulgence •Lopez v US- the agent recorded the conversation with the petitioner without the knowledge of the latter. this reporting was admitted into evidence. the court found no violation of the petitioners Fourth Amendment rights -the device was used only to obtain the most reliable evidence possible of a conversation and which the government's own agent was a participant and which that agent was fully entitled to disclose •US v white= if nothing in the Constitution protected an individual from the decision of a confidant to testify respecting statements made by the accused, for constitutional purposes no different result is required if the agent instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations with the defendant, either simultaneously records them with electronic equipment that he is carrying on his person, or carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations either toto recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the transmitting frequency

US v knotts

-electronic tracking Facts: A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver. a beaver was placed on a 5 gallon drum containing chloroform purchased by one of respondents co-defendants. by monitoring the progress of a car carrying the chloroform, law enforcement was able to trace the can of chloroform from its place of purchase in Minnesota to respondents cabin near wisconsin. co-defendant Armstrong pleaded guilty and testified for the government at trial. Armstrong purchase chloroform and when he made the purchase, officers follow the car and which the chloroform had been placed, maintaining contact by using both visual surveillance and a monitor which received the signals sent from the beeper. relying on the location of the chloroform derived through the use of the Beeper and additional information obtained during 3 days of intermittent visual surveillance of respondents cabin, officers secured a search warrant. during execution of the warrant, officers discovered a fully operable drug laboratory in the cabin Issue: whether such use of a beeper violated respondents rights secured by the Fourth Amendment Rule: one has a lesser expectation of privacy and a motor vehicle because it's function is transportation and it seldom serves as ones residence or as the respository of personal effects. a car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. it travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view - a person traveling in a car on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another

Andresen v maryland

-fifth amendment interest Issue: whether the introduction into evidence of a persons business records, seized during a search of his offices, violates the fifth amendments command that no peron shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself Reasoning: petitioner was not asked to say or to do anything. The records seized contained statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing. The search for and seizure of these records were conducted by law enforcement personnel. Finally, when these records were introduced at trial, they were authenticated by a handwriting expert, not by petitioner. Any compulsion of petitioner to spek, other than the inherent psychological pressure to respond at trial to unfavorable evidence, was not present -in this case, petitioner, at the time he recorded his communication, at the time of the search, adn at the time the records were admitted at trial, was not subjected to the cruel trilemma of self accusation, perjury, or contempt. Indeed, he was never required to say or to do anything under penalty of sanction. Similarly, permitting the admission ot the records in question does not convert our accusatorial system of justice into an inquisitorial system. There is no chance in this case of petitioners statements being self-deprecatory and untrustworthy because they were extracted from him- they were already in existence and had been made voluntarily Rule: a party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production. Although the fifth amendment may protect an individual from complying with a subpoena for the production of his personal records in his possession because the very act of production may constitute a compulsory authentication of incriminating info, a seizure of the same materials by law enforcement officers differs in a crucial respect- the individual against whom the search is directed is not required to aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of incriminating evidence -there is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of property, to ender them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the principles of the cases in which other property may be seized, and if they be adequately described in the affidavit and warrant -unless incriminating testimony is compelled, any invasion of privacy is outside the scope of the fifth amendments protection, saying that the fifth amendment protects against compelled self incrimination not the disclosure of private info Holding: we hold that the search of an individuals office for business records, their seizure, and subsequent intro into evidence does not offend the fifth amendmentts prescription that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself

Zurcher v stanford daily

-first amendment interets Facts: stanford daily, a student newspaper published at stanford, carried articles and photographs devoted to the hospital protect and the violent clash between demonstrators and police. The photos carried the byline of a daily staff member and indicated that he had been at the east end of the hospital hallway where he could have photographed the assault on the nine officers. The next day, the DA's office secured a warrant from the municipal court for an immediate search of the daily's offices for negatives, film and pictures showing the events and occurrences at the hospital. The search pursuant to the warrant was conducted later that day by four police. The dailys photographic labs, filing cabinets, desks, and waste paper baskets were searched. Locked drawers and rooms were not open. The officers had not been advised by the staff that the areas they were searching contained confidential materials. The search revealed only the photos that had already been published. A month later the daily and various members of its staff, respondents here, brought a civil action against the police who conducted the search. The complaint alleged that the search of the dailys office had deprived respondents under color of state law of rights secured to them by the first, fourth, and 14th amendments Issue: how the fourth amendment is to be construed and applied to the third party search, teh recurring situation where state authorities have probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or other evidence of crime is located on identified property but do not them have probable cause to believe that the owner or possessor of the property is himself implicated in the crime that has occurred or is occurring Rule: valid warrants may be issued to search any property, whether or not occupied by a third party, at which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime will be found. Nothing on teh face of the amendment suggests that a third party search warrant should not normally issue. There is no apparent basis in the language of the amendment for also imposing the requirements for a valid arrest- probable cause to believe that the third party is implicated -the courts apply the warrant requirements with particular exactitude when first amendment interests would be endangered by the search. As we see it, no more than this is required where the warrant requested is for the seizure of criminal evidence reasonably believed to be on the premises occupied by a newspaper

US v karo

-in knotts, we held that the warrantless monitoring of an electronic tracking device (beeper) inside a container of chemicals did not violate the fourth amendment when it revealed no info that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance Issue: whether installation of a beeper in a container of chemicals with the consent of the original owner constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment when the container is delivered to a buyer having no knowledge of the presence of the beeper -whether monitoring of a beeper falls within the ambit of he fourth amendment when it reveals info that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance -whether a warrant was required to authorize either the installation of the beeper or its subsequent monitoring Facts: agent rottinger learned that karo ordered 50 gallons of ether from government informant carl. The gov obtained a court order authorizing the installation and monitoring of a beeper in one of the cans of ether. With carl;s consent, agents substituted their own can containing a beeper for one of the cans in the shipment. Agents saw karo pick up the ether. They then followed karo to his house using visual beeper surveillance. At one point later that day, ageents determined that it had been moved undetected to hortons house, where they located it using the beeper. Agent torringer could smell the ether from the public sidewalk near hortons residence. Two days later, agents discovered hat the ether had once again been moved, and using the beeper they located it at the residence of hortons father. The next day, the beeper was no longer transmitting from hortons fathers house, and agents traced the beeper to a commercial storage facility. Agents obtained a subpoena for the records of the storage company and learned that locker 143 had been rented by horton. Using he p=beeper, agents confirmed that the ether was indeed in one of the lockers in the row containing locker 143, and using their noses they detected the odor of other emanating from locke 143. Agents obtained an order authorizing installation of an entry tone alarm into he door jamb of the locker so they would be able to tell when the door was opened. Agents ceased visual and beeper surveillance, relying instead on the entry tone alarm. Agents applied for an obtained a warrant to search the taos residence based in part on info derived through use of the beeper. The warrant was executed. Karo was indicted for conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute

TLO notes

A critical factor in school detentions and searches is the government official responsible WHERE, AS IN TLO, THE SEARCH IS CONDUCted exclusively by a school official, the relaxed standards of that decision control -The same result may be reached when the search is initiated by a school official who subsequently eengages the assistance of a lw enforcement officer -But if the search is initiated by a law enforcement officer, the more stringent probable cause standard will apply

jardines cont

Holding: the government's use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is therefore affirmed reasoning: the officers were gathering information in an area belonging to the respondents and immediately surrounding his house, in the curtilage of the house, which we have held enjoys protection as part of the home itself. and they gather that information by physically entering and occupying the area to engage in conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner - the right to retreat would be significantly diminished if the police could enter a man's property to observe his Repose from just outside the front window - but introducing a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence is something else. there is no customary invitation to do that. the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a search - here, their behavior objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a search, which is not what anyone would think he had license to do - we need not decide whether the officer is investigation of respondents home violated his expectation of privacy under katz. that the officers learned what they learned only by physically intruding on the hardeen's property together evidence is enough to establish that a search occurred Kagan concurrence - was this activity a trespass? Yes, as the court holds today. Was it also an invasion of privacy? Yes, that as well Alito dissent -the courts decision is also inconsistent with the reasonable expectation of privacy test that the court adopted in katz. A reasonable person understands that odors emanating from a house may be detected from locations that are open to the public The jardines decision has become more broadly relevant to searches arguably occurring within the curtilage of a dwelling without a warrant -In collins v virginia, the court was called upon to decide whether a warrantless search otherwise constitutionally permitted under the vehicle expectation would be legal were the vehicle located within the curtilage

New jersey v TLO

Issue: the appropriateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for searches carried out in violation of the fourth amendment by public school authorities Holding: the search that gave rise to the case now did not violate the fourth amendment -choplicks decision to open TLO's purse was reasonable -we cannot conclude that the search for marijuana was unreasonable in any respect Facts: a teacher discovered two girls smoking in a bathroom. One of the girls was the respondent TLO, who at that time was a 14 year old freshman. The two met with assistant vice principal choplick. Choplick asked TLO to come into his private office and demanded to see her purse. Choplick also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers. Suspecting that a closer examination of the purse might yield further evidence of drug use, choplick proceeded to search the purse thoroughly. The search revealed a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, anumber of empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one dollar bills, an index card that appeaerd to be a list of students who owed TLO money, and two letters that implicated TLO in marijuana dealing. Choplick notified TLO's mother and the police and turned the evidence of drug dealing over to the police. Contending that choplicks search of her purse violated the fourth amendment, TLO moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse as well as her confession, which, she argued, was tainted by the allegedly unlawful search

Florida v harris

Issue: we consider how a court should determine if the alert of a drug detection dog during a traffic stop provides probable cause to search a vehicle Facts: wheetly was on a routine patrol with aldo, a german shepherd trained to detect certain narcotics. Wheetley pulled over respondents truck because it had an expired license plate. On approaching the drivers side door, wheetley saw that harris was visibly nervous, unable to sit still, shaking and breathing rapidly. Wheatley also noticed an open can of beer in the trucks cup holder. Wheetley retrieved aldo from the patrol car and walked him around harris's truck for a free air sniff. Aldo alerted at the drivers side door handle. Wheetley concluded, based principally on aldos alert, that he had probable cause to search the truck. His search did not turn up any of the drugs aldo was trained to detect. But it did reveal 200 loose psudeophedrine pulls Rule: a police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when teh facts available to him would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present. The test for probable caues is not reducible to precise definition or quantification. All we have required is the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent people, did not technicians act -in evaluating whether the state has met this practical and common sensical standard, we have consistently looked to the totality of the circumstances -if a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dogs alert provides probable cause to search. The same is true, even in the absence of formal certification, if the dog has recently and successfully completed a training program that evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs

Safford unified school district #1 v redding

Issue: whether a 13 year old students fourth amendment right was violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra and underpants by school officials acting on reasonable suspicion that she had brought forbidden prescription and over the counter drugs to school Holding: because there were no reasons to suspect the drugs presented a danger or were concealed in her underwear, we hold that the search did violate the constitution, but because there is reason to question the clarity with which the right was established, the official who ordered the unconstitutional search is entitled to qualified immunity from liability -this suspicion of wilsons was enough to justify a search of savanas backpack and outer clothing. The look into savanas bag, in her presence and in the privacy of wilsons offic, was not excessively intrusive, any more than romeros subsequent search of her outer clothing Facts: the assistant principal of the school, wilson, came into the room and asked savana to go to his office. Wilson then showed savana four white prescription strength ibuprofen 400 mg pills, and one over the counter blue naproxen 200 mg pill. Wilson then told savana that he had received a report that she was giving these pills to fellow students; savana denied it and agreed to let wilson search her belongings. Rhelen, an administrative assistant, came into the office, and together with wilson they search savanas backpack, finding nothing. Romero and the nurse, peggy, asked savana to remove her jacket, socks, and shoes, leaving her in stretch pants and a t shirt (both without pockets), which she was then asked to remove. Finally, savana was told to pull her bra out and to the side and shake it, and to pull out the elastic on her underpants, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic area to some degree. No pills were found. Savanas mother filed suit against safford school, willson, helen, and peggy for conducting a strip search in violation of savanas fourth amendment rights

Carpenter v US

Issue: whether the government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive Chronicle of the user's past movements Facts: each time the phone connects to a cell site, it generates a timestamped record known as cell site location information (CSLI). police officers arrested for men suspected of robbing a series of Radio Shacks and T-Mobile stores. the prosecutors applied for court orders under the store Communications act to obtain cell phone records for petitioner. judges issued two orders directing Carpenters Wireless carriers to disclose clsi for his phone. Carpenter move to suppress the cell site data provided by the wireless carriers. he argued that the government's seizure of the records violated the Fourth Amendment because they had been obtained without a warrant supported by probable cause. and the government's view, the location records clinched the case: they confirmed that Carpenter was right where the robbery was at the exact time of the robbery. the government's Primary contention to the contrary is that the third party Doctrine governs this case. and it's few, cell site records are fair game because they are business records created and maintained by the wireless carriers Rule: a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy and information he voluntarily turns over to third parties - a person does not surrender all fourth amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere. to the contrary, what one seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, May be constitutionally protected. individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements -the court usually requires some quamtum of individualized suspicion before a search or seizure may take place

Kyllo v US

Issue: whether the use of a thermal imaging device aimed at a private home from a public Street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a search within a meaning of the Fourth Amendment Facts: agent William came to suspect that marijuana was being grown in the home belonging to petitioner. indoor marijuana growth typically requires high intensity lamps. in order to determine whether an amount of heat was emanating from petitioners home consistent with the use of such lamps, agent William used a thermal imager to scan the house. the scan of the house took only a few minutes and was performed from the passenger seat of the agent's car across the street from the house. the agent concluded that petitioner was using lights to grow marijuana and his house, which indeed he was. based on tips from informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of petitioners home and the agent found an indoor growing operation involving more than 100 plants Holding: we think that obtaining by sense enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, constitutes a search, at least where as here the technology in question is not in general public use the information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a search Rule: thermal imaging observations of the intimate details of a home are impermissible - whereas here the government uses a device that is not in general public use to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant Stevens dissent - there is a distinction of constitutional magnitude between through the wall surveillance that gives the Observer or listen or direct access to information in a private area, on the one hand, and the thought processes used to draw inferences from information in the public domain, on the other hand - even if the device could reliably show extraordinary differences in the amount of heat leaving his home, drawing the inference that there was something suspicious occurring inside the residents does not qualify as through the wall surveillance, much less a Fourth Amendment violation

Florida v jardines

Issue: whether using a drug sniffing dog on a homeowners porch to investigate the contents of the home is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment Facts: detective william received an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in the home of respondent. One month later, the dept of drug enforcement administration sent a joint surveillence team to hardines home. Det william then approached jardines home accompanied by det douglas, a trained canine handler who had just arrived at the scene with his drug sniffing dog. As the dog approachd jardines front porch, he apparently sensed one of the odors he had been trained to detect. He left the scene after informing detecting william that there had been a positive alert for narcotics. On the basis of what he had learned at home, det williams applied for and received a warrant to search the residence. The search revealed marijuana plants, and he was charged with trafficking in cannabis. Jardines moved to suppressed the marijuana plants on the ground that the canine investigation was an unreasonable search Rule: the fourth amendment provides in relevant part that the right of the people to be secure in Their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. when the government obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses, papers, or effects, a search within the original meaning of the fourth amendment has undoubtedly occurred. my reason of our decision in katz, property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violation, but though katz maybe the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the Amendments protections when the government does engage in a physical intrusion of the constitutionally protected area - at the Amendments very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion - be there for regard the area immediately surrounding an associated with the home, what our case is called the curtilage, as part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes - the front porch is the classic Exemplar of an area adjacent to the home and to which the activity of home life extends - the police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is no more than any private citizen might do - whether the officer's conduct was an objectively reasonable search depends on whether the officers had and implied license to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they entered

harris cont

Reasoning: a finding of a drug detection dogs reliability cannot depend on the states satisfaction in multiple, independent evidentiary requirements. No more for dogs than for human informants is such an inflexible checklist the way to prove reliability and thus establish probable cause -if a dog on patrol fails to alert to a car containing drugs, the mistake usually will go undetected because the officer will not initiate a search. Field data thus may not capture a dogs false negatives. Conversely (and more relevant here), if the dog alerts to a car in which the officer finds no narcotics, the dog may not have made a mistake at all. Field data thus may markedly overstate a dogs real false positives -evidence of a dogs satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert Holding: the record in this case amply supported teh trial courts determination that aldo's alert gave wheetley probable cause to search harris's truck. -because training records established aldo's reliability in detecting drugs and harris failed to undermine that showing, we agree with the trial court that wheetley had probable cause to search harris's truck Harris thus indicates that in all cases in which the issue is the presence of probable cause, the flexible, common sense standard of gates controls

TLO 3

Reasoning: although thi court may take notice of the difficulty of mainaining discipline in the public schools today, the situation is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no legitimate expectations of privacy -schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds -the warrant requirement in particular is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools -the school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search. Probable cause is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search. -the relevance of TLO's possession of cigarettters to the question whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her denial that she smoked supplied the necessary nexus between the item searched for and the infraction under investigation. Thus, if choplick in fact had a reasonable suspicion that TLO had cigarettes in her purse, the search was justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if found, would constitute mere evidence of a violation -choplicks suspicion that there were cigarettes in the purse was not an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, rather it was the sort of common sense conclusion about human behavior upon which practical people- including government officials- are entitled to rely. But the requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty -the discovery of thee rolling papers concededly gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that TLO was carrying marijuana as well as cigarettes in her purse. This suspicion justified further exploration of TLO's purse, which tuned up more evidence of drug related activities. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the search to a separate zippered compartment of the purse; and when a search of that compartment revealed an index card containing a list of people who owe me money as well as two letters, an inference that TLO was involved in marijuana trafficking was substantial enough to justify choplick in examining the letters to determine whether they contained any further evidence Brennan concurrence -teachers, like all government officials, must conform their conduct to the fourth amendments protections of personal privacy and personal security -in adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and unnecessary, departure from generally applicable fourth amendment standards, the court carves out a broad exception to standards that this court has developed over years of considering fourth amendment problems

o'connor v johnson cont

Reasoning: even if it were possible to meet the particularity requirement regarding the place to be searched, the file would still contain some confidential information that is immune from seizure under the atty-client privilege or the work product docttrine. Once that info is revealed to the police, the privileges are lose, and the info cannot be erased from the minds of the people -it will not unreasonably burden prosecutors offices and effective law enforcement to require officers to proceed by subpoena duces tecum in seeking documents held by an attorney -we find this measure necessary to protect the overriding interest of our society in preserving the atty-client privilege, client confidentiality, the work product doctrine, and the constitutional right to counsel The search of an attorneys office for evidence implicating a client gives rise to sixth as well as fourth amendment implications

Zurcher v stanford daily cont

Reasoning: search warrants are often employed early in an investigation, perhaps before the identity of an likely criminal and certainly before all the perpetrators are or could be known. The seemingly blameless third party in possession of the fruits or evidence may not be innocent at all. It is likely that the real culprits will have access to the property, and the delay involved in employing the subpoena duces tecum, offering as if does the opportunity to litigate its validity, could easily result in the disappearance of the evidence, whatever the good faith of the third party -the framers did not forbid warrants where the press was involved, did not require special showings that subpoenas would be impractical, and did not insist that the owner of the place to be searched, if connected with the press, must be shown to be implicated in the offense being investigated. Properly administered, the perconditions for a warrant-probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness- should afford sufficient protection against the harms that are assuredly threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices -nor, if the requirements of specificity and reasonableness are properly applied, policed, and observed, will there be any occasion or opportunity for officers to rummage at large in newspaper files or to intrude into or to deter normal editorial and publication decisions. Nor are we convinced that confidential sources will disappear and that the press will suppress news because of fears of warranted searches Steward dissent -it seems to me self evidence that police searches of newspaper offices burden the freedom of press

knotts cont

Reasoning: the governmental surveillance conducted by means of the Beeper in this case amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and highways. we have commented more than once on the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile: one has a lesser expectation of privacy and a motor vehicle because it's function is transportation and it seldom serves as ones residence or as the respository of personal effects. a car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. it travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view - respondent, as the owner of the cabin and surrounding premises to which the driver drove, undoubtedly had the traditional expectation of privacy within a Dwelling Place in so far as the cabin was concerned - but no such expectation of privacy extended to the visual observation of the car driving on his premises after leaving a public highway, nor to movements of objects such as the drum of chloroform outside the cabin in the Open Fields - the fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance, but on the use of the Beeper does not alter the situation. nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at Birth with such enhancement as Science and Technology afforded them in this case - there is no indication that the Beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the movement of the drum within the cabin or in any way that would not have been visible to the naked eye from the outside of the cabin Holding: did monitoring the Beeper signals complained of by respondent invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on his part? or the reasons previously stated, we hold that they did not. since they did not, there was neither a search nor a seizure within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment Brennan concurrence - I am not at all sure that, for purposes of the fourth amendment, there is a constitutionally significant difference Between planting a beeper and an object in the possession of a criminal suspect and purposefully arranging that he be sold an object that, unknown to him, already has a beeper installed inside it Blackmun concurrence - for me, the present case does not concern the Open Fields Doctrine and I regard these references and citations as unnecessary for the Court's decision Stevens concurrence -alth althoughough the augmentation in this ca se was unobjectionable, it by no means follows that the use of electronic detection techniques does not implicate especially sensitive concerns

karo 3

Rule: a search occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed -a seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individuals possessory interests in that property. The existence of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question of whether the fourth amendment has been violated, however, for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation Holding: we conclude that fourth amendment interest of karo or of any other respondent was infringed by the installation of the beeper. Rather, any impairment of their privacy interests that may have occurred was occasioned by the monitoring of the beeper - under the circumstances it is clear that the warrant affidavit, after striking the facts about monitoring the Beeper while it was in the taos residents, contained sufficient untainted information to furnish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. the evidence seized in the house should not have been suppressed with respect to any of the respondents Critical to the outcome in knotts and karo was the determination whether the tracking device revealed information from within a constitutionally protected area

Safford unified school district #1 v redding cont

Rule: the school setting requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search, and held that for searches by school officials a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a fourth amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause. We have thus applied a standard of reasonable suspicion to determine the legality of a school administrators search of a student, and have held that a school search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction -the required knowledge component of probable cause for school searches could as readily be described as a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing -when the categorically extreme intrusiveness of a search down to the body of an adolescent requires some justification in suspected facts, general background possibilities fall short; a reasonable search that extensive calls for suspicion that it will pay off -we do mean to make it clear that the TLO concern to limit a school search to reasonable scope requires the support of reasonable suspicion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing before search can reasonably make teh quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts. The meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions Reasoning: staff members identified savana and marissa as part of an unusually rowdy group at the schools opening dance, during which alcohol and cigarettes were found in the girls bathroom. Wilson knew that jordan had told the principal that before the dance, he had been at a party at savanas house where alcohol was served. Marissas statement that the pills came from savana was thus sufficiently plausible to warrant suspicion that savana was involved in pill distribution -if a student is reasonably suspected of giving out contraband pills, she is reasonably suspected of carrying them on her person and in the carryall that has become an item of student uniform in most places today -the very fact of savanas pulling her underwear away from her body in the presence of the two officials who were able to seee her necessarily exposed breasts and pelvic area to some degree, and both subjective and reasonable societal expectaitions of personal privacy support the treatment of such a search as categorically distinct, requiring distinct elements of justification on the part of school authorities for getting beyond a search of ouer clothing and belongings -savanas subjective expectation of privacy against such a search is inherent in her account of itt as embarrassing, frightening and humiliating. The reasonableness of her expectation (required by the fourth amendment standard) is indicated by the consistent experiences of other young people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure -the indignity of the search does not outlaw it, but it does implicate the rule of reasonableness as stated in TLO, that the search as actually conducted be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place -the content of the suspicion failed to match teh degree of intrusion. Wilson had no reason to suspect that large amounts of the drugs were being passed around, or that individual students were receiving great numbers of pills -nor could wilson have suspected that savana was hiding common painkillers in her underwear -what was missing from the suspected facts that pointed to savana was any indication of danger to the students from the power of the drugs or their quantity, and any reason to suppose that savana was carrying pills in her underwear Thomas concurrence -i would hold that search of savana di dnot violate the fourth amendment -had the suspected infraction involved a street drug, the majority implis that it woul dhave approved the scope of the search

Illinois v caballes

Rule: the use of a well trained narcotics detention dog- one that does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view- during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests Holding: the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of respondeents car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion on respondents privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement Reasoning: critical to the decision in kyllo was the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activity- in that case, intimate details in a home, such as at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath. The legitimate expectation that info about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondents hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in teh trunk of his car. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no info other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the fourth amendment Souter dissent -i would hold that using the dog for the purposes of determining the presence of marijuana in the cars trunk was a search unauthorized as an incident of the speeding stop and unjustified on any other ground Ginsberg dissent -the unwarranted and nonconsensual expansion of the seizure here from the routine traffic stop to a drug investigation broadened the scope of the investtigation in a manner that, in my judgment, runs afoul of the fourth amendment

TLO cont

Rule: to hold that the fourth amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches. Although the underlying command of the fourth amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place -against the childs interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds -where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a fourth amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard -the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be cased on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider whether the action was justified at its inception; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction