HIST 369

In 1914, who was in charge of the war effort in France, the civilians or the military?

By 1914, the President is not using very many of the powers that the constitution of 1875 grants him. On paper, the President has a great deal of powers. However, by then political convention made it impossible for the President to use these powers. So, by 1914, the President was delegating military authority to a General. The conduct of operations would be the responsibility of military leaders. The civilian government was responsible for overall military strategy, while the military was responsible for implementing that strategy. Of course, this is a very broad. In the late summer and early fall of 1914, the civilian government fled Paris, as the Germans were close to occupying Paris. The military leaders, under Joseph Joffre, had to step in to fill the void, and started making decisions. Through the fall of 1914, it looked like that the military was going to seize power. However, by the fall of 1914 and the spring of 1915, the civilian politicians quickly reasserted themselves as being in control of the overall war. Throughout the war, there were some nasty conflicts between the military and the civilian gov't. However, the de facto rule was that the civilian politicians were in overall charge.

According to Lanthier, why did some countries like Romania and Yugoslavia acquire more territory, then other nations like Hungary?

Many of the better-off nations were better able to play the diplomatic state.

IN BRIEF, what was the government and administration like in the Russian Empire up to 1905?

See also: Tsarist absolutism From its initial creation until the 1905 Revolution, the Russian Empire was controlled by its tsar/emperor as an absolute monarch, under the system of tsarist autocracy. After the Revolution of 1905, Russia developed a new type of government which became difficult to categorize. In the Almanach de Gotha for 1910, Russia was described as "a constitutional monarchy under an autocratic tsar". This contradiction in terms demonstrated the difficulty of precisely defining the system, essentially transitional and meanwhile sui generis, established in the Russian Empire after October 1905. Before this date, the fundamental laws of Russia described the power of the Emperor as "autocratic and unlimited". After October 1905, while the imperial style was still "Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias", the fundamental laws were remodeled by removing the word unlimited. While the emperor retained many of his old prerogatives, including an absolute veto over all legislation, he equally agreed to the establishment of an elected parliament, without whose consent no laws were to be enacted in Russia. Not that the regime in Russia had become in any true sense constitutional, far less parliamentary. But the "unlimited autocracy" had given place to a "self-limited autocracy". Whether this autocracy was to be permanently limited by the new changes, or only at the continuing discretion of the autocrat, became a subject of heated controversy between conflicting parties in the state. Provisionally, then, the Russian governmental system may perhaps be best defined as "a limited monarchy under an autocratic emperor". Conservatism was the reigning ideology for most of the Russian leadership, albeit with some reformist activities from time to time. The structure of conservative thought was based upon antirationalism of the intellectuals, religiosity rooted in the Russian Orthodox Church, traditionalism rooted in the landed estates worked by serfs, and militarism rooted in the Army officer corps.[55] Regarding irrationality, Russia avoided the full force of the European Enlightenment, which gave priority to rationalism, preferring the romanticism of an idealized nation state that reflected the beliefs, values and behavior of the distinctive people.[56] The distinctly liberal notion of "progress" was replaced by a conservative notion of modernization based on the incorporation of modern technology to serve the established system. The promise of modernization in the service of autocracy frightened the socialist intellectual Alexander Herzen who warned of a Russia governed by "Genghis Khan with a telegraph."[57] Tsar/Emperor Main article: Tsar § Russia Peter the Great changed his title from Tsar in 1721, when he was declared Emperor of all Russia. While later rulers did not discard this new title, the ruler of Russia was commonly known as Tsar or Tsaritsa until the imperial system was abolished during the February Revolution of 1917. Prior to the issuance of the October Manifesto, the tsar ruled as an absolute monarch, subject to only two limitations on his authority (both of which were intended to protect the existing system): the Emperor and his consort must both belong to the Russian Orthodox Church, and he must obey the laws of succession (Pauline Laws) established by Paul I. Beyond this, the power of the Russian Autocrat was virtually limitless. On 17 October 1905, the situation changed: the ruler voluntarily limited his legislative power by decreeing that no measure was to become law without the consent of the Imperial Duma, a freely elected national assembly established by the Organic Law issued on 28 April 1906. However, he retained the right to disband the newly established Duma, and he exercised this right more than once. He also retained an absolute veto over all legislation, and only he could initiate any changes to the Organic Law itself. His ministers were responsible solely to him, and not to the Duma or any other authority, which could question but not remove them. Thus, while the tsar's personal powers were limited in scope after 28 April 1906, it still remained formidable.

World Revolution after 1917

The October Revolution of 1917 in Russia sparked a revolutionary wave of socialist and communist uprisings across Europe, most notably the German Revolution, the Hungarian Revolution, Biennio Rosso and the revolutionary war in Finland with the short lived Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic, which made large gains and met with considerable success in the early stages; see also Revolutions of 1917-23. Particularly in the years 1918-1919, it seemed plausible that capitalism would soon be swept from the European continent forever. Given the fact that European powers controlled the majority of Earth's land surface at the time, such an event could have meant the end of capitalism not just in Europe, but everywhere. Additionally, the Comintern, founded in March 1919, began as an independent international organization of communists from various countries around the world that evolved after the Russian Civil War into an essentially Soviet-sponsored agency responsible for coordinating the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism worldwide. With the prospect of world revolution so close at hand, Marxists were dominated by a feeling of overwhelming optimism, which in the end proved to be quite premature. The European revolutions were crushed one by one, until eventually the Russian revolutionaries found themselves to be the only survivors. Since they had been relying on the idea that an underdeveloped and agrarian country like Russia would be able to build socialism with help from successful revolutionary governments in the more industrialized parts of Europe, they found themselves in a crisis once it became clear that no such help would arrive; see Socialism in one country. After those events and up until the present day, the international situation never came quite so close to a world revolution again. As fascism grew in Europe in the 1930s, instead of immediate revolution, the Comintern opted for a Popular Front with liberal capitalists against fascism; then, at the height of World War II in 1943, the Comintern was disbanded on the request of the Soviet Union's Western allies.

According to Lanthier, what were some areas that were resistant to Gleichschaltung?

The churches, in particular the ROman Catholic church. Now, there is considerable tension between the various German churches and the Nazi dictatorship. The Nazi party leadership do NOT like Christianity, or the hristian churches. However, Nazi leaders are pragmatic enough to realize that the German people are still very wedded to their church. As such, teh Nazi leadership tend to be very mum about Nazi leadership. In particular, the churches tend to be very quiet. Many church leaders do not like the Nazi, but keep their mouths shut. There were some people, clergy and pastors, that were very much against the Nazi's and spoke, out, but most churches became apolitical. In addition, the military was for the most part initially resistant to the Nazi party. The Nazi's know they need the military support, particularly from the Prussian junker aristocrats who dominate the officer class. Nevertheless, by 1939, most of the military has been "coordinated".

According to Professor Lanthier, what was the major division between the urban and the rural in Europe?

The division between the cities and the countryside. In the cities, life was looking like In the country, many people were still living in very traditional lifestyles that was similar to the 1800s, and even in the 1700s.

In "Day Four: Monday, 27 July", p. 239-263, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, when then Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov met with the then German ambassador to Moscow Friedrich Pourtalès, and then with Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Moscow Szapáry, on the morning of Monday, July 72, what was the outcome?

(p. 241) ¶3 In St Petersburg on Monday morning Sazonov met with the German ambassador, then with the Austrian. Both ambassadors found him surprisingly positive and optimistic. Sazonov seemed relieved that Austria had yet to take any hostile steps against Serbia and encouraged by Austria's declaration of its territorial désinteressement. He assured Count Pourtalès of his readiness to go to the limit in accommodating the Austrians if it meant bringing the crisis to a peaceful conclusion. He proposed that they 'build a golden bridge' for them--and the means they adopted to create this were immaterial to him.5[5.] The only necessity was that those points in the Austrian demands that infringed upon Serbian sovereignty be moderated: could they not find some way of giving the Serbs the lesson they deserved without infringing on their sovereignty? When Pourtalès criticized the Serbs for failing to behave in a civilized manner--and insisted that they would have to give guarantees to Europe for their good behaviour in the future--Sazonov's objections, he reported, were much more feeble than they had been in previous days. ¶4 The German ambassador noted a striking change in Sazonov's attitude. He attributed this to Austria's declaration that it did not intend to make any territorial acquisitions and to Germany's energetic refutation of the insinuation that it had prodded Austria into fomenting a conflict. Sazonov, trying to find a way out, was now prepared to recognize the justice of Austria's complaints against Serbia. And the Russian government was trying to quiet opinion--although there was little apparent enthusiasm for war in Russia. When the troops recalled from the camp at Krasnoje Selo marched through the streets of St Petersburg, the people of the city regarded them with indifference, and no one seemed to think of applauding them. Last night- (p. 242) ¶1-there had been another clash between the police and working men, although it was difficult to obtain much information about this because the government was no longer permitting anything to be published on the demonstrations. Generally, the public appeared to be in a dejected mood.6[6.] So the word to Berlin was that the Russians appeared to be backing away from a confrontation and--perhaps desperately--seeking an accommodation. ¶2 Pourtalès did not encourage Sazonov's hope that Austria might moderate the terms of the ultimatum. Instead, he advised him to speak directly with the Austrian ambassador on the issue. This Sazonov did almost immediately. After meeting with hom Count Szápáry confirmed the conclusion of his German colleague: Sazonov's manner on Monday contrasted vividly with the one that he had displayed on Friday, when they had done over the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Although he said that it might be unwise for him to admit it to the Austrian ambassador, the Russian foreign minister confessed that he had 'no heart' for the Balkan Slavs, who were a heavy burden for Russia and who had no conception of what Russia had already suffered on their behalf.7[7.] He accepted that Austria's aim of preserving itself and defending itself against the propaganda which threatened its integrity was perfectly legitimate. The Austrian note to Serbia, however, was not the most desirable way to achieve this, and he proposed to go through it with the ambassador point-by-point. ¶3 Szápáry made it clear that he was not authorized to discuss the note or to interpret it, but said that he would be interested to hear what the foreign minister had to say about it. Sazonov surprised the ambassador by declaring that seven of the ten points raised no particular difficulty. However, those referring to the collaboration of Austrian officials in Serbia and the dismissal of Serbian officers and officials named by Austria were--in their present form--unacceptable. Some other means ought to be found for dealing with those who could be proved guilty of complicity in the crime. Serbia could not accept the demands as formulated without risking the overthrow of the Karakjeordjevic dynasty--and surely Austria would prefer that regime to an 'anarchist witches cauldron'? The whole affair, he argued, ame down to one 'of words' and surely it was possible to find a way to overcome their differences. Would Austria accept the mediation of the king of Italy? Or of England?8[8.] ¶4 Szápáry concluded that the Russians had travelled a considerable distance over the last three days. They had moved from a discourteous rejection of Austria's plans for dealing with Serbia to a search for an acceptable mediator- (p. 243) ¶1-Although there was an energetic military influence still at work in Russia which must not be overlooked, there seemed not great urgency. Sazonov declared himself to be much comforted by their conversation and promised to report this to the tsar when he was scheduled to see him at a diplomatic reception this coming Wednesday. ¶2 Things seemed to be coming together. Russia now appeared to be reluctant to confront Austria and offered to build a 'golden bridge' if the Austrians would agree to some form of mediation. And that mediation would only be asked to find a way to moderate the two or three most contentious demands. The Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum, the details of which became known throughout the day on Monday, seemed to confer on the Austrians a great diplomatic victory. " (Martel 2014, 241-243).

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, how did Chamberlain react to the invasion of Poland?

(p. 343) ¶1 ... As late as the afternoon of 2 September, Chamberlain and Halifax, too, were still prepared to contemplate a conference if German troops withdrew from Poland. That evening in Parliament, Chamberlain was left in no doubt, however, that the prospect of any further negotiations with Hitler would bring down his government. Facing a revolt in his cabinet, he committed himself to sending an ultimatum that Germany withdraw its troops from Poland forthwith, to be presented in Berlin at 9 a.m. the following morning. Hitler was given two hours to respond. ¶2 Next morning, at 11.15 a.m. on 3 September 1939, people throughout Britain clustered around their radio sets to hear Chamberlain, in a mournful monotone, tell them that no response had been received to the ultimatum 'and that consequently this country is at war with Germany'. A wail of air-raid sirens immediately afterwards turned out to be a false alarm, but gave a foretaste of what was to come. Largely as a result of Bonnet's foot-dragging, the declaration of war was not synchronized. Instead there was a lag of nearly six hours before, at 5 o'clock that afternoon, the French eventually followed suit. ¶3 The road to the hell of another war had been a twisted one. It had indeed been 'paved with the good intentions' of the appeasers. Chamberlain told the British House of Commons on 3 September: 'Everything I have worked for, everything that I have hoped for, everything that I have believed in during my public life, has crashed into ruins.' If from the best of motives, appeasement had been, as Churchill put it, a 'sad tale of wrong judgements formed by well-meaning and capable people' amounting to 'a line of milestones to disaster'. The appeasers, in Britain and in France, were no doubt 'well-meaning'. But their upbringing, experience and political schooling left them utterly unprepared to encounter a gangster on the international stage. They were simply no match for Hitler. ..." (Kershaw 2015, 343).

In "Day Two: Saturday, 25 July", p. 188-213, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was Serbia's reply, issued on 25 July, to Austria's demands?

(p. 206) ¶1 ... There then followed a point-by-point response to the ten demands in the Austrian note: 1. When the Skuptschina meets next time in the ordinary way, a paragraph will be inserted in the Press-law, threatening severe punishment to whoever incites to hatred or contempt against the monarchy, and to all publications whose general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. When the forthcoming revision of the constitution takes place, an addition will be made to Article XXII of the constitutional law, by which it will be possible to confiscate such publications, a thing that cannot be done according to the present determinations of the Article. 2. The government has no proofs, nor does the Note of the Imp. and Roy. government give any such proofs, according to which the "Narodna odbrana' and similar societies have up to this time committed criminal actions, such as are here in question, through any of their members. Still the Royal government will comply with the demand of the Imp. and Roy. government and dissolve the 'Narodna odbrana' and every other society, which shows itself hostile to Austria-Hungary. 3. The Royal Servian government promises to remove without delay from public instruction in Servia, all propaganda, that might be considered as directed against Austria-Hungary, if the Imp. and Roy. government will demonstrate such propaganda. 4. The Royal government is also prepared to dismiss from military and civil service all officers and officials of whom judicial inquiry will affirm that they have been guilty of actions against the territorial integrity of the monarchy; the government expects that to make inquiry possible the Imp. and Roy. government will without delay communicate the names of these officers and officials and the deeds they are accused of. 5. The Royal government confesses that it does not quite understand the sense and the extent of the Imp. and Roy. government's demand, according to which the Royal Servian government is to approve on its own territory the collaboration of organs of the Imp. and Roy. government, but it declares that it would consent to such collaboration, inasmuch as it was based upon the principle of nations rights and penal procedure and would not violate friendly and neighbourly relations. (p. 207) 6. The Royal government considers it a duty to order judicial proceedings against all those persons, who were or were supposed to be implicated in the crime of the 15/28^26 June and who would be found on Serivan territory. But the government cannot consent to the collaboration of organs of the Imp. and Roy. government, delegated for this express purpose, as this would be a violation of the constitution and of the law of penal procedure. But the Austro-Hungarian organs might in some cases be informed of the results of the inquiry. 7. The Royal government ordered the arrest of Major Voislav Trankosić on the very evening, when it received the Note. As to Milan Ciganović, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and who up to the 15 June was employed in the Railways Direction (as aspirant), the authorities have not been able to find him and a warrant was issued against him. The Imp. and Roy. government is requested to communicate the grounds, on which these persons are suspected and the results of the inquiry of Sarajevo that regard them, with as little delay as possible, so that an inquiry can be instituted. 8. The Royal government will extend the measures, which already exist against the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the frontier. It need not be said that the Royal government will immediately institute an inquiry and will use the severity of the law against those officials of the frontier service on the line Sabac Loznica who have neglected their duty and have allowed the criminals to cross the frontier. 9. The Royal government will very willingly give explanations on the ennunciations of its officials in Servia and in foreign countries, made in interviews after the crime of Sarajevo, which the Imp. and Roy. government declares to be hostile, if the Imp. and Roy. government will show up these speeches and give us the proofs that they were really held by the functionaries in question. The Royal government will cause the material for this research to be collected. 10. The Royal government will inform the Imp. and Roy. government of the execution of the measures promised in this Note, and will communicate the ordering and carrying out of every point, except where this Note already brings things to a close.47[47.]" (Martel 2014, 206-207).

How did Commanders and Generals try to break through the Trench Warfare?

"More and More!" Principle Commanders were stumped. The trenches prevented flanking maneuvres. It was a deadlock. So, they resorted with sheer attrition. They just piled on more and more soldiers, artillery, and machine guns.

Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov[a] (22 April 1870[1] - 21 January 1924), better known by his alias Lenin

A Russian revolutionary, politician, and political theorist. He served as head of government of Soviet Russia from 1917 to 1922 and of the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1924. Under his administration, Russia and then the wider Soviet Union became a one-party communist stategoverned by the Russian Communist Party. Ideologically a communist, he developed a variant of Marxism known as Leninism; his ideas were posthumously codified as Marxism-Leninism. Born to a moderately prosperous middle-class family in Simbirsk, Lenin embraced revolutionary socialist politics following his brother's 1887 execution. Expelled from Kazan Imperial University for participating in protests against the Russian Empire's Tsarist government, he devoted the following years to a law degree. He moved to Saint Petersburg in 1893 and became a senior Marxist activist. In 1897, he was arrested for sedition and exiled to Shushenskoye for three years, where he married Nadezhda Krupskaya. After his exile, he moved to Western Europe, where he became a prominent theorist in the Marxist Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP). In 1903, he took a key role in a RSDLP ideological split, leading the Bolshevik faction against Julius Martov's Mensheviks. Encouraging insurrection during Russia's failed Revolution of 1905, he later campaigned for the First World War to be transformed into a Europe-wide proletarian revolution, which as a Marxist he believed would cause the overthrow of capitalism and its replacement with socialism. After the 1917 February Revolution ousted the Tsar and established a Provisional Government, he returned to Russia to play a leading role in the October Revolution, in which the Bolsheviks overthrew the new regime. Lenin's Bolshevik government initially shared power with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, elected soviets, and a multi-party Constituent Assembly, although by 1918 it had centralised power in the new Communist Party. Lenin's administration redistributed land among the peasantry and nationalised banks and large-scale industry. It withdrew from the First World War by signing a treaty with the Central Powers and promoted world revolution through the Communist International. Opponents were suppressed in the Red Terror, a violent campaign administered by the state security services; tens of thousands were killed or interned in concentration camps. His administration defeated rightand left-wing anti-Bolshevik armies in the Russian Civil War from 1917 to 1922 and oversaw the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921. Responding to wartime devastation, famine, and popular uprisings, in 1921 Lenin encouraged economic growth through the market-oriented New Economic Policy. Several non-Russian nations secured independence after 1917, but three re-united with Russia through the formation of the Soviet Union in 1922. In increasingly poor health, Lenin died at his dacha in Gorki, with Joseph Stalin succeeding him as the pre-eminent figure in the Soviet government. Widely considered one of the most significant and influential figures of the 20th century, Lenin was the posthumous subject of a pervasive personality cultwithin the Soviet Union until its dissolution in 1991. He became an ideological figurehead behind Marxism-Leninism and thus a prominent influence over the international communist movement. A controversial and highly divisive individual, Lenin is viewed by supporters as a champion of socialism and the working class, while critics on both the left and right emphasize his role as founder and leader of an authoritarian regime responsible for political repression and mass killings.

Decline and modernization of the Ottoman Empire (1828-1908)

During the Tanzimat period (1839-1876), the government's series of constitutional reforms led to a fairly modern conscripted army, banking system reforms, the decriminalization of homosexuality, the replacement of religious law with secular law[92] and guilds with modern factories. The Ottoman Ministry of Post was established in Istanbul on 23 October 1840.[93][94] Samuel Morse received a Turkish patent for the telegraph in 1847, which was issued by Sultan Abdülmecid who personally tested the new invention.[95] Following this successful test, work on the first Turkish telegraph line (Istanbul-Edirne-Şumnu)[96] began on 9 August 1847.[97] The reformist period peaked with the Constitution, called the Kanûn-u Esâsî. The empire's First Constitutional era was short-lived. The parliament survived for only two years before the sultan suspended it. The Christian population of the empire, owing to their higher educational levels, started to pull ahead of the Muslim majority, leading to much resentment on the part of the latter.[98] In 1861, there were 571 primary and 94 secondary schools for Ottoman Christians with 140,000 pupils in total, a figure that vastly exceeded the number of Muslim children in school at the same time, who were further hindered by the amount of time spent learning Arabic and Islamic theology.[98]Stone further suggested that the Arabic alphabet, which Turkish was written in until 1928, was very ill-suited to reflect the sounds of the Turkish language (which is a Turkic as opposed to Semitic language), which imposed a further difficulty on Turkish children.[98] In turn, the higher educational levels of the Christians allowed them to play a larger role in the economy, with the rise in prominence of groups such as the Sursock family indicative of this shift in influence.[99][98] In 1911, of the 654 wholesale companies in Istanbul, 528 were owned by ethnic Greeks.[98] In many cases, Christians and also Jews were able to gain protection from European consuls and citizenship, meaning they were protected from Ottoman law and not subject to the same economic regulations as their Muslim comrades.[100] The Crimean War (1853-1856) was part of a long-running contest between the major European powers for influence over territories of the declining Ottoman Empire. The financial burden of the war led the Ottoman state to issue foreign loans amounting to 5 million pounds sterling on 4 August 1854.[104][105] The war caused an exodus of the Crimean Tatars, about 200,000 of whom moved to the Ottoman Empire in continuing waves of emigration.[106] Toward the end of the Caucasian Wars, 90% of the Circassianswere ethnically cleansed[107] and exiled from their homelands in the Caucasus and fled to the Ottoman Empire,[108] resulting in the settlement of 500,000 to 700,000 Circassians in Turkey.[109][page needed][110][111] Some Circassian organisations give much higher numbers, totaling 1-1.5 million deported or killed. Crimean Tartar refugees in the late 19th century played an especially notable role in seeking to modernize Ottoman education and in first promoting both Pan-Turkicism and a sense of Turkish nationalism.[112] In this period, the Ottoman Empire spent only small amounts of public funds on education; for example in 1860-61 only 0.2 per cent of the total budget was invested in education.[113] As the Ottoman state attempted to modernize its infrastructure and army in response to threats from the outside, it also opened itself up to a different kind of threat: that of creditors. Indeed, as the historian Eugene Rogan has written, "the single greatest threat to the independence of the Middle East" in the nineteenth century "was not the armies of Europe but its banks."[114] The Ottoman state, which had begun taking on debt with the Crimean War, was forced to declare bankruptcy in 1875.[115] By 1881, the Ottoman Empire agreed to have its debt controlled by an institution known as the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, a council of European men with presidency alternating between France and Britain. The body controlled swaths of the Ottoman economy, and used its position to ensure that European capital continued to penetrate the empire, often to the detriment of local Ottoman interests.[115] The Ottoman bashi-bazouks brutally suppressed the Bulgarian uprising of 1876, massacring up to 100,000 people in the process.[116] The Russo-Turkish War (1877-78)ended with a decisive victory for Russia. As a result, Ottoman holdings in Europe declined sharply: Bulgaria was established as an independent principality inside the Ottoman Empire; Romania achieved full independence; and Serbia and Montenegro finally gained complete independence, but with smaller territories. In 1878, Austria-Hungary unilaterally occupied the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Novi Pazar. British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli advocated for restoring the Ottoman territories on the Balkan Peninsula during the Congress of Berlin, and in return Britain assumed the administration of Cyprus in 1878.[117] Britain later sent troops to Egypt in 1882 to put down the Urabi Revolt - Sultan Abdul Hamid II was too paranoid to mobilize his own army, fearing this would result in a coup d'état - effectively gaining control in both territories. Abdul Hamid II, popularly known as "Abdul Hamid the Damned" on the account of his cruelty and paranoia, was so fearful of the threat of a coup that he did not allow his army to conduct war games, lest this serve as the cover for a coup, but he did see the need for military mobilization. In 1883, a German military mission under General Baron Colmar von der Goltz arrived to train the Ottoman Army, leading to the so-called "Goltz generation" of German-trained officers who were to play a notable role in the politics of the last years of the empire.[118] From 1894 to 1896, between 100,000 and 300,000 Armenians living throughout the empire were killed in what became known as the Hamidian massacres.[119] As the Ottoman Empire gradually shrank in size, some 7-9 million Muslims from its former territories in the Caucasus, Crimea, Balkans, and the Mediterranean islands migrated to Anatolia and Eastern Thrace.[120] After the Empire lost the First Balkan War (1912-13), it lost all its Balkan territories except East Thrace (European Turkey). This resulted in around 400,000 Muslims fleeing with the retreating Ottoman armies (with many dying from cholera brought by the soldiers), and with some 400,000 non-Muslims fleeing territory still under Ottoman rule.[121] Justin McCarthy estimates that during the period 1821 to 1922 several million Muslims died in the Balkans, with the expulsion of a similar number.[122][123][124]

How many men did Russia have when have in arms by 1917?

Roughly 15 million

According to Lanthier, what made Stalin's seizure of power easier?

Stalin stepped into a role that had already been established by Lenin and the Bolshevik's. The Communist Party had established a terror apparatus, and Stalin simply built upon that for his own purposes.

How did Germans use Zeppelins in WWI?

The German airships were operated by the Army and Navy as two entirely separate organizations.

In 1900 Germany, who controlled the treasury of the government?

The Reichstag, whose members had been elected by adult German men. This problematizes any idea that Germans preferred authoritarian governments.

History

The Tatar Yoke and the Mongol ideas and administrative system are credited with bringing the culture exhibiting some characteristics of an oriental despotism to Russia.[1][b] Absolutism in Russia gradually developed during the 17th century and 18th centuries, replacing the despotism of the Grand Duchy of Moscow. Ivan III built upon Byzantine traditions and laid foundations for the tsarist autocracy, a system that with some variations would govern Russia for centuries.[2][3] After a period of disorder known as a Time of Troubles, the first monarch of the Romanov dynasty, Michael of Russia, was elected to the throne by a Zemsky Sobor(or "assembly of the land"). During Michael's reign, when the Romanov dynasty was still weak, such assemblies were summoned annually. However, the Romanov dynasty consolidated absolute power in Russia during the reign of Peter the Great, who reduced the power of the nobility and strengthened the central power of the tsar, establishing a bureaucratic civil service based on the Table of Ranks but theoretically open to all classes of the society, in place of the nobility-only mestnichestvo which Feodor III had abolished in 1682 at the request of the highest boyars.[4][5][6] Peter I also strengthened the state's control over the church (the Orthodox Church).[4]Peter's reform caused a series of palace coups seeking to restore the power of the nobility.[7] To end them, Catherine the Great, whose reign is often regarded as the high point of absolutism in Russia, in 1785 issued the Charter to the Nobility, legally affirming the rights and privileges they had acquired in preceding years, and the Charter of the Towns, establishing municipal self-government. This placated the powerful members of society; however, in fact, the real power rested with the state's bureaucracy.[7] This was built on by later Tsars. Alexander I established the State council as advisory legislative body. Although Alexander II established a system of elected local self-government (Zemstvo) and an independent judicial system, Russia did not have a national-level representative assembly (Duma) or a constitution until the 1905 Revolution.[8] The system was abolished after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Features The person of the tsar himself, a sovereign with absolute authority, stood at the center of the tsarist autocracy.[9] The rights of state power in their entire extent belonged to the tsar. The autocrat further entrusted power to persons and institutions, acting in his name, by his orders, and within the limits laid down for them by law. The purpose of the system was to supposedly benefit the entire country of Russia.[9] A metaphor existed likening the tsar to a father, and all of the subjects of the Empire, to his children; this metaphor even appeared in Orthodox primers.[10] This metaphor is present in the common Russian expression "царь-батюшка", literally "tsar-dear father". Furthermore, unlike the theoretical separation of church and state in West European monarchies, the Russian Empire combined monarchy with the supreme authority on religious issues (see Church reform of Peter I and caesaropapism for details). Another key feature related to patrimonialism. In Russia the tsar owned a much higher proportion of the state (lands, enterprises, etc.) than did Western monarchs.[11][12][13][14][15][16] The tsarist autocracy had many supporters within Russia. Major Russian advocates and theorists of the autocracy included writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky,[3][17] Mikhail Katkov,[18] Konstantin Aksakov,[19] Nikolay Karamzin,[17] Konstantin Pobedonostsev[3][9] and Pyotr Semyonov. They all argued that a strong and prosperous Russia needed a strong tsar, and that philosophies of republicanism and liberal democracy did not fit Russia.[3]

How costly is attrition warfare?

The costliest strategy.

The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Russian: Всероссийская Чрезвычайная Комиссия), abbreviated as VChK (Russian: ВЧК, Ve-Che-Ka) and commonly known as Cheka (from the initialism ChK)

The first of a succession of Soviet secret police organizations. Established on December 5 (Old Style) 1917 by the Sovnarkom,[1] it came under the leadership of Felix Dzerzhinsky, a Polish aristocrat-turned-communist.[2][3] By late 1918, hundreds of Cheka committees had sprung up in various cities at the oblast, guberniya, raion, uyezd, and volost levels. Initially formed to fight against counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs, as well as financial speculators, the Cheka had its own classifications. Those counter-revolutionaries fell under these categories: 1 any civil or military servicemen suspected of working for Imperial Russia; 2 families of officers-volunteers (including children);[citation needed] 3 all clergy; 4 workers and peasants who were under suspicion of not supporting the Soviet government;[citation needed] 5 any other person whose private property was valued at over 10,000 rubles.[citation needed] As its name implied, the Extraordinary Commission had virtually unlimited powers and could interpret them in any way it wished. No standard procedures were ever set up, except that the Commission was supposed to send the arrested to the Military-Revolutionary tribunals if outside of a war zone. This left an opportunity for a wide range of interpretations, as the whole country was in total chaos. At the direction of Lenin, the Cheka performed mass arrests, imprisonments, and executions of "enemies of the people". In this, the Cheka said that they targeted "class enemies" such as the bourgeoisie, and members of the clergy; the first organized mass repression began against the libertarians and socialists of Petrograd in April 1918. Over the next few months, 800 were arrested and shot without trial.[citation needed] Within a month, the Cheka had extended its repression to all political opponents of the communist government, including anarchists and others on the left. Many victims of Cheka repression were "bourgeois hostages" rounded up and held in readiness for summary execution in reprisal for any alleged counter-revolutionary act. Wholesale, indiscriminate arrests became an integral part of the system.[21] The Cheka used trucks disguised as delivery trucks, called "Black Marias", for the secret arrest and transport of prisoners.[22] It was during the Red Terror that the Cheka, hoping to avoid the bloody aftermath of having half-dead victims writhing on the floor, developed a technique for execution known later by the German words "Nackenschuss" or "Genickschuss", a shot to the nape of the neck, which caused minimal blood loss and instant death. The victim's head was bent forward, and the executioner fired slightly downward at point blank range. This had become the standard method used later by the NKVD to liquidate Joseph Stalin's purge victims and others.[23]

What were some consequences of the Enabling Act?

Under the Act, the government had acquired the authority to pass laws without either parliamentary consent or control. These laws could (with certain exceptions) even deviate from the Constitution. The Act effectively eliminated the Reichstag as active players in German politics. While its existence was protected by the Enabling Act, for all intents and purposes it reduced the Reichstag to a mere stage for Hitler's speeches. It only met sporadically until the end of World War II, held no debates and enacted only a few laws. Within three months of the passage of the Enabling Act, all parties except the Nazi Party were banned or pressured into dissolving themselves, followed on 14 July by a law that made the Nazi Party the only legally permitted party in the country. With this, Hitler had fulfilled what he had promised in earlier campaign speeches: "I set for myself one aim ... to sweep these thirty parties out of Germany!"[19] During the negotiations between the government and the political parties, it was agreed that the government should inform the Reichstag parties of legislative measures passed under the Enabling Act. For this purpose, a working committee was set up, co-chaired by Hitler and Centre Party chairman Kaas. However, this committee met only three times without any major impact, and rapidly became a dead letter even before all other parties were banned. Though the Act had formally given legislative powers to the government as a whole, these powers were for all intents and purposes exercised by Hitler himself. After its passage, there were no longer serious deliberations in Cabinet meetings. Its meetings became more and more infrequent after 1934, and it never met in full after 1938. Due to the great care that Hitler took to give his dictatorship an appearance of legality, the Enabling Act was renewed twice, in 1937 and 1941. However, its renewal was practically assured since all other parties were banned. Voters were presented with a single list of Nazis and Nazi-approved "guest" candidates under far-from-secret conditions. In 1942, the Reichstag passed a law giving Hitler power of life and death over every citizen, effectively extending the provisions of the Enabling Act for the duration of the war.[20] Ironically, two, and possibly three, of the penultimate measures Hitler took to consolidate his power in 1934 violated the Enabling Act. In February 1934, the Reichsrat, representing the states, was abolished even though Article 2 of the Enabling Act specifically protected the existence of both the Reichstag and the Reichsrat. It can be argued that the Enabling Act had been breached two weeks earlier by the Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich, which transferred the states' powers to the Reich and effectively left the Reichsrat impotent. Article 2 stated that laws passed under the Enabling Act could not affect the institutions of either chamber. In August, Hindenburg died, and Hitler seized the president's powers for himself in accordance with a law passed the previous day. Article 2 stated that the president's powers were to remain "undisturbed," which has long been interpreted to mean that it forbade Hitler from tampering with the presidency. A 1932 amendment to the constitution made the president of the High Court of Justice, not the chancellor, first in the line of succession to the presidency—and even then on an interim basis pending new elections.[15] However, the Enabling Act provided no remedy for any violations of Article 2, and these actions were never challenged in court. British historian Richard J. Evans in his book, The Coming of the Third Reich, argued that the Enabling Act may have been invalid. He contended that Göring's refusal to even acknowledge the Communist seats for the purposes of a quorum was an "illegal act." (Even if the Communists had been present and voting, the atmosphere of the sitting was such that the Act would have still passed with, at the very least, 68.7 percent support.) He also argued that the act's passage in the Reichsrat was tainted by the overthrow of the state governments.[16]

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the aim of the pogroms launched by the Reichskristallnacht?

(p. 334) ¶3 The aim of the pogroms was to speed up Jewish imeigration. In this they succeeded. Half a million Jews, most of them completely assimilated before the Nazis gained power, had remained in Germany, despite the horrendous climate of growing persecution. Now tens of thousands of them poured over neighbouring borders to find refuge in western Europe, many of them then across the Channel to England or over the Atlantic to the safety of the United States. ..." (Kershaw 2015, 334). (p. 335)

In chapter 4 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the significance of the Treaty of Locarno?

(p. 180) ¶2 The decisive step in establishing Franco-German détente was the Treaty of Locarno signed on 16 October 1925. The terms had been negotiated by Stresemann, Briand and Chamberlain on board the Orange Blossom during a five-hour boat ride on Lago Maggiore. Germany, France and Belgium undertook not to attack each other. Great Britain and Italy stood as guarantors. The central component was the guarantee by the five powers of Germany' western borders and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. The treaty paved the way for Germany's accession to the League of Nations in 1926, while the improved international relations created by 'the spirit of Locarno' offered hope among West Europeans for lasting peace. The French were happy that Britain was now formally guaranteeing their security. For Briand, this was the vital gain. Britain welcomed the détente and the confinement of its future responsibilities in Europe to the Rhine frontier. For Stresemann, Locarno was a necessary step towards a longer-term goal of German resurgence. With diplomatic isolation removed, the prospects of bringing about the early withdrawal of Allied troops from the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland (scheduled for 1935) were brighter. Beyond that, it might now prove possible to win back Eupen-Malmédy from Belgium, acquire the Saar again, ease reparations and end Allied military control in Germany. The loss of Alsace-Lorraine had to be accepted, it was true, but Stresemann pointed out that this was an inevitable corollary of German military weakness. And he had conceded nothing on the question of German eastern borders. (p. 181) ¶1 Each of the western powers had grounds for satisfaction in the outcome of Locarno. In eastern Europe the response was different. Poland in particular felt let down by the western powers, especially by its ally, France. Poland's position was significantly weakened, the country more isolated than it had been, precariously squeezed between the Soviet Union and Germany. There had been no 'eastern Locarno'. Germany had explicitly ruled out any guarantee for Poland's frontiers. Neither Britain, which wanted no engagement in eastern Europe, nor France, despite its alliances, dating back to 1921, with Poland and with the 'little Entente' of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, had strong enough motives to insist upon such a guarantee. Both had greater interest in binding Germany more closely to the west and ruling out any likelihood of it strengthening ties with the Soviet Union -- advocated by some voices in Germany, recalling the merits of the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 which had established flourishing trading relations (as well as hidden military cooperation) of significant benefit to both countries. Germany's strident nationalists were predictably unhappy with Locarno. Stresemann himself sought to assuage his right-wing critics by leaving open the question of 'correcting' the eastern frontiers, with the prospect that at some point Danzig, the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia would return to Germany. He gave assurances that force would not be contemplated. His own presumption was that patient diplomacy alone would bring this about in time." (Kershaw 2015, 180-181)

Why did the New Imperialism not mean that the Great Powers tried to annex other smaller European nations?

All the European Nations realized that any war in Europe could ignite a massive conflagration between the Great Powers. Such a massive European war was not profitable, so no European Great Power tried to challenge each other.

According to Lanthier, what was the effect of WWI on the European discourse and popular views?

Many at the time divided history as "before the war" and "after the war."

What are 2 ways of interpreting the unification of Italy?

One way to interpret the Italian unification is FIRST, as the bringing together of the Italian people into a united country. HOWEVER, a second way to view it is that a small-number of well-educated, ambitious political people used the discourse of ethno-nationalism to conquer and subjugate their regions.

In 1935, why did Mussolini side with Hitler?

Mussolini looking west for support, and wanted them to back him up which didn't really happen. In fact, he was shocked to see how willing France and Britain was to step aside and give Hitler what he wanted. He saw this as weakness, a reluctance to do anything/say anything that might upset Hitler. So he found it smarter to link up with the strong and fearful state of Germany.

What did Hitler do to Czechoslovakia in 1938?

Hitler attempted to annex Sudetenland. This led to full-fledged international crisis.

According to Professor Lanthier, how industrialized was France?

France was more industrialized than Austria-Hungary and Russia, but lagged behind Germany and the UK. Industry was limited to pockets like Paris and along the Belgium border. However, industry was developing quickly.

When he became the chief figure of the German Revolution, what was Friedrich Ebert's approach to policy in 1918-1919?

Ebert was careful to try to make sure of working with more right-wing parties, in order to avoid any accusations that the Republic was a socialist creation. Once the Republic is established, Ebert wants very slow. For him, the biggest threat was some sort of communist revolution. Therefore, he is quick to use large-scale violence against anyone that is an enemy.

What was the Great Powers attitude toward the Balkans pre-1914?

Prior to 1914, the Great Powers, in general, were involved in keeping the peace in the Balkans, as they did not want any conflict in the region drawing in the Great Powers.

In "Day Three: Sunday, 26 July (page 213)", p. 213-238, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, who was General Helmuth von Moltke?

(p. 228) ¶4 Moltke, 66 years old in 1914, was the nephew of the great military hero of the Franco-Prussian war, his namesake, Count Helmuth von Moltke. Moltke 'the younger' had entered the army in 1869 and quickly distinguished himself in the battle of Sedan. After the war, he attended the War Academy and was appointed to the general staff in 1880. He then serves as his uncle's personal adjutant until the elder's death in 1891, whereupon the kaiser appointed him as his personal aide-de-camp. The two formed a close, friendly relationship that would last into the First World War. Although Moltke was certainly well-qualified for the position, he had many critics within the high command of the army and it was largely because of his friendship with the aiser that he was appointed to replace General Alfred von Schlieffen as chief of the general staff in 1906. ¶5 Moltke did not fit the stereotypical image of a Prussian general. He was 'philosophical', devoted to the works of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Spencer; a dedicated reader of high literature; a player of the cello and a painter. He was honest, earnest, and hard-working--but he was also anti-Semitic, racist, xenophobic, and a dabbler in the occult.38[38.] His wife was a follower of the Austrian spiritualist Rudolf Steiner and his 'anthroposophy', which postulated the existence of a spiritual world that could be accessed by- (p. 229) ¶1-human beings through the development of their imagination and intuition. Onc, on board the Hohenzollern, he lectured the kaiser and his entourage on anthroposophy and theosophy. He was warned to stop dabbling in the occult once he became chief of staff. His philosophical and spiritual interests were shared by Conrad, the chief of the Austrian general staff, which drew the two men closer together."(Martel 2014, 228-229).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what is the time-frame of Week One?

"Week One: 28 June--5 July" (Martel 2014, 82)

Jean Raphaël Adrien René Viviani (French pronunciation: ​[ʁəne vivjaˈni])

(8 November 1863 - 7 September 1925) was a French politician of the Third Republic, who served as Prime Minister for the first year of World War I. He was born in Sidi Bel Abbès, in French Algeria. In France he sought to protect the rights of socialists and trade union workers.

What were some of the weaknesses of the League of Nations in terms of Origins and structure?

The origins of the League as an organisation created by the Allied powers as part of the peace settlement to end the First World War led to it being viewed as a "League of Victors".[192][193] The League's neutrality tended to manifest itself as indecision. It required a unanimous vote of nine, later fifteen, Council members to enact a resolution; hence, conclusive and effective action was difficult, if not impossible. It was also slow in coming to its decisions, as certain ones required the unanimous consent of the entire Assembly. This problem mainly stemmed from the fact that the primary members of the League of Nations were not willing to accept the possibility of their fate being decided by other countries, and by enforcing unanimous voting had effectively given themselves veto power.[194][195]

What happened after the German REvolution in 1918?

There is now a civilian government that has never before given full responsibility for managing the country is now being left to its own devices in a critical situation. They are completely caught off guard, and they are reacting as quickly as possible. For example, after the armistice, there has to be a massive demobilization of the army. In addition, the provisional government still has to figure out the constitution of the republic.

In "Day One: Friday, 24 July", p. 165-187, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, in the meeting between Russian foreign minister Sazonov and Pourtalès, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg on July 24, 1918, what did Sazonov believe he said, and what did Pourtalès claim he heard? How did this affect German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollwegg?

(p. 174) ¶2 Sazonov believed that he had stated the Russian position clearly and forcefully to the German ambassador. Pourtalès reported that the foreign minister was 'very much excited' and refused to be persuaded by the ambassador's arguments. When Pourtalès tried to argue that Russia could not possibly act as 'the advocate of regicides', Sazonov replied that the situation had nothing whatever to do with the monarchical principle. Now, almost a month since the assassination, the horror of the deed had receded. The atmosphere had changed. ¶3 Given the forcefulness with which he expressed his views, Sazonov might have been surprised had he seen the ambassador's report of their conversation. Pourtalès, instead of focusing on the apparent willingness of Russia to resort to war, advised that the reference to Austria 'devouring' Serbia meant that Russia- (p. 175) ¶1-would take up arms only if Austria attempted to acquire Serbian territory. He concluded that Sazonov's desire to 'Europeanize' the dispute meant that the 'immediate intervention' of Russia was not to be anticipated.16[16.] ¶2 Count Friedrich von Pourtalès, an aristocratic cousin of Bethmann Hollweg, conducted diplomacy in the style of the grand seigneur. When he arrived in St Petersburg in 1907 he brought with him seventeen vanloads of furniture. He had risen to ambassadorial rank largely because of his success in colouring report to fit what he believed Berlin wished to hear. In his diary, he draw a rather different conclusion from the meeting: his impressions was that the council of ministers had considered the possibility of a breach with Austria-Hungary and Germany and were resolved 'not to hang back from an armed conflict'.17[17.] ¶3 Bethmann Hollweg believed what Pourtàles told him. The effect of the ultimatum had not been unfavourable: it was crucial to Sazonov, although angry, had not committed himself. The chancellor was not worried about the prospect of an Austro-Serbian conflict: Paris was 'aghast' at the cold shoulder they had received from London; everything now depended on whether Russia mobilized immediately.18[18.]" (martel 2015, 174-175).

In chapter 4 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what changed in March 1930 in Germany to give the Nazi's a chance for supreme power?

(p. 193) ¶4 By then, economic difficulties were mounting. Unemployment in- (p. 194) ¶1-Germany had reached the 3 million mark in January 1929, up a million from the previous year and accounting for 14 percent of the working population. The Communists, who had increased their support at the polls to over 10 percent in the 1928 elections, were finding ready hacking among many of the unemployed and, following the new Stalinist line adopted by the Comintern, were turning their fire on the Social Democrats, ludicrously vilified as 'social fascists'. In the countryside, the crisis in the agrarian economy was causing a great deal of political disaffection. ¶2 Somewhat to their own surprise, and without any sustained agitation on their part, the Nazis found that they were garnering considerable support in the countryside of northern and eastern Germany. The party membership had been growing, in fact, even during the years in the political wilderness, and now stood at over 100,000 -- a good activist basis with which to exploit the growing unrest. The favourable publicity they received in the conservative press for their shirll campaign against the revised reparations scheme presented in the Young Plan also helped their cause. The Nazis, though still far from a mainstream party, increased their share of the vote in a number of regional elections in 1929. The following June, with the Depression now hitting, Hitler's party won over 14 percent of the vote in state elections in Saxony -- nearly six times higher than its vote in the 1928 Reichstag election. ¶3 Shortly afterwards, Müller's successor as Chancellor, the Centre Party politician Heinrich Brüning, dissolved the Reichstag after it had rejected his proposals for swingeing cuts in public expenditure. No attempt was made to find a democratic solution to the financial difficulties. Instead, Brüning sought to push through his deflationary measures by presidential decree. The absolutely crucial position of the Reich President had been held since 1925 by the war hero Field Marshal von Hindenburg. Although sworn to uphold the democratic republic, Hindenburg, a pillar of the old monarchist regime, was no democrat but saw himself rather as a type of ersatz-Kaiser. Replacing the Social Democrat Chancellor, Müller, with Brüning, known from soundings ot be favourably disposed to governing with the backing of presidential decree, hd in fact been planned months earlier as part of a strategy to undermine Social Democracy and introduce- (p. 195) ¶1-government without parliamentary pluralism. Hindenburg, Brüning and the conservative elites who backed their move, were not for a moment contemplating a government run by the Nazis -- seen as primitives, vulgar, loud-mouthed populists, not the sort ot manage the German state. What they wanted was essentially to turn the clock back, with or without the monarchy, to a type of Bismarckian constitutional arrangement in which government was beyond the control of parliament -- most of all beyond the control of the bared Social Democrats. The aim of Hindenburg, Brüning and the conservative elites was a sort of anti-democratic semi-authoritarianism managed by those elites. ¶2 With Brüning's accession to the Chancellorship, and HIndenburg's readiness to bypass parliament, a serious blow had been inflicted to the democratic state in Germany already before the slide into Depression. A further major blow followed in the reichstag election on 14 September 1930. Brüning's decision to go to the country backfired spectacularly. Hitler's party achieved an astonishing electoral breakthrough, winning 19.3 percent of the vote and gaining 107 seats in the new Reichstag. All at once the Nazis were on the map, now the second largest party in the German parliament. A vote for the Nazis was no longer a wasted ballot for a minor fringe party. Mass support, bringing an inflow of funding to engage in further radical agitation, grew rapidly. The bandwagon was rolling. A Hitler Chancellorship still seemed a remote possibility. But with the fateful decision to move to rule by presidential decree, and with the election success of the Nazis in 1930, the death knell for German democracy was sounding. And with that, uncertainty in Europe as a hole was bound to be magnified. The uneasy equilibrium of the past few years would be in jeopardy." (Kershaw 2015, 194-195)

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what happened to end the Prime Ministership of Stjepan Radić?

(p. 236) ¶1 ... on June 14, 1928, internecine bitterness crested when a Serbian delegate drew his pistol in parliament and shot four Croatian deputies. Radić was among them. Three of the victims, including Radić's nephew, died almost instantly. Radić himself lingered a few months before succumbing to his wounds. By then, too, the South Slav kingdom appeared on the threshold of disintegration ...." (Sachar 2015, 236)

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what happened when Kirov was assassinated?

(p. 270) ¶3 ... in December 1934 Kirov was shot dead in his office in Leningrad. ¶4 ... Whatever the lingering suspicions, Stalins' involvement in the assassination was never proved. But he was quick to turn the murder of Kirov to hsi own advantage. He gave the state police (NKVD) authority to arrest, try and execute at will. Zinoviev and Lev- (p. 271) ¶1-Kamenev, who had also earlier supported Trotsky, were sentenced to long periods win prison. More than 30,000 real or supposed opponents in Leningrad were deported to Siberia or other remote areas. Nearly 300,000 party members were expelled over the following five months. Stalin's munting paranoia would not have been lessened if he read police reports soon after Kirov's assassination. 'They killed Kirov. We will kill Stalin' was a refrain doing the rounds, along with other expressions of the desirability of getting rid of Stalin. ¶2 The dictator's suspicions by now knew no bounds. The NKVD told him in 1936 that Trotsky had links from abroad with supporters of Zinoviev, Kamenev and another former adversary, Nikolai Bukharin. Stalin had Zinoviev and Kamenev taken from prison, retried now in public -- the first show trial -- for alleged 'terrorist activities' including assassinations, which had Stalin himself next on the list after Kirov. Zinoviev and Kamenev were sentenced to death and shot in August 1936. These were the first of the early Bolshevik leaders, one-time members of the party's Central Committee, to be purged -- but far from the last. Bukharin's own show trial and inevitable execution were to follow in 1938. Members of the Central Committee themselves now lived in dread, and with good reason; no fewer than 110 out of 139 members, deemed 'unreliable', were arrested -- a move arrested were party and state leaders practically all over the national republics of the Soviet union. Of 1,966 delegates at the 1934 Party Congress, 1,108 were arrested. Stalin was destroying the Comunist Party itself as an independent power base. Managers, scientists and engineers also fell victim in large numbers to the purges -- one reason why economic growth came to an end after 1937. ¶3 The purges, once unleashed, took on their own momentum. In 1937 the NKVD gave the Politburo a target of quarter of a million to be arrested. Over 70,000 would be shot, the rest sentenced to long spells in prison or a labour camp. By the end of 1938, when the purges subsided ... , the target had been massively exceeded. Arrests had reached close to a million and a half, and nearly 700,000 had been shot. Even the purger-in-chief, Stalin's head of police since 1936, Nikolai Yezhov, nicknamed the "Iron Hedgehog', was arrested in- (p. 272) ¶1-1939 and executed the following year. By 1939 the total number of prisoners in gaols and in labour camps and colonies, where conditions were closer to death than life, was almost 3 million. The death rate through starvation, overwork and arbitrary execution was colossal." (Kershaw 2015, 270-272).

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what economic pressures convinced the western democracies of Britain and France to pursue appeasement with Germany?

(p. 319) ¶2 For the western democracies, rearmament was a necessary evil, a reaction to the mounting threat from Italy and, especially, Germany (as well as, in the Far East, Japan). Their international finance, trade and business could only be damaged by war and huge continental, if not global, disruption. Their interests lay in sustaining peace. This priority was reinforced in British eyes by the mounting and costly difficulties they faced in sustaining control over some of their overseas possessions. India, where they had to contend with continued pressure for independence, remained a major problem. Beyond this, beginning in 1936 (and lasting for fully three years), they were engaged in the brutal suppression of a big Arab insurrection against colonial rule and Jewish settlement in the mandated territory in Palestine. ¶3 It was not that the resources needed for the defence of the United Kingdom were hugely diverted to the empire; French resources for the defence of their own colonies were even more subjugated to the pressing requirements of building up home defences against the obvious growing danger from across the Rhine. Nevertheless, imperial defence still meant that men and resources had to be provided. Britain's political and military leaders fully realized that the country's global defence commitments were greatly overstretched. Simultaneous war in three separate theatres, against Italy, Germany and Japan, would present the nightmare scenario. This dire prospect drove, the policy of appeasement -- assuaging potential enemies -- in which Britain took the lead and France followed. ... (p. 321) ... ¶2 The economic case for appeasement appealed even more to French ministers following the fall of Blum's Popular front government in 1937. The austerity policies introduced in the attempt to stabilize state finances were incompatible with an expanded armaments programme. The Finance Minister, Georges Bonnet, indicated that it was impossible to provide both guns and butter. Big rearmament programmes would have to be cut back. France's liberal economy, he argued, could simply not compete with Germany's unconstrained spending on armaments. The defence budget for 1938 was actually reduced as a result. Armed forces chiefs compaliend in vain ¶3 The threat from the air, viewed in France as elsewhere as the greatest danger in any future war, was especially worrying. The restructuring of France's recently nationalized aircraft industry created production problems to add to the financial constraints. Only 370 aircraft were built in 1937, compared with Germany's 5,606. The Air Minister, Pierre Cot, widely viewed as a left-wing radical and unpopular because of his advocacy of a close alliance with the Soviet Union, said he needed a 60 percent increase in his budget to galvanize aircraft production. Given financial constraints, that was out of the question. Unsurprisingly, the French air force was gloomy about its prospects in a coming war. Its chief predicted in early 1938 that should war break out that year 'the French air force would be annihilated in a few days'. Acutely aware of both economic and military weakness, France's leaders were temperamentally attuned to the policy being forged in London of buying time through finding a way to come to terms with Hitler's Germany" (Kershaw 2015, 319-321).

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what did Germany do to the rest of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939?

(p. 336) ¶5 ... German troops had completed what Hitler had wanted the previous summer -- the invasion of the remainder of Czechoslovakia on 15 March. A 'Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia' was- (p. 337) ¶1-established. The Slovaks set up their own autonomous state. Czechoslovakia, the most successful of the new democracies that had emerged from the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, disappeared from the map. After the German entry into Prague there could be no further illusions about Hitler as merely a nationalist politician aiming to incorporate ethnic Germans within an extended REich. This was plain imperialist conquest. The western democracies at last saw Hitler in his true colours. Appeasement was dead. ..." (Kershaw 2015, 336-337).

In "the Killing", p. 49-81, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what were the origins of the "Narodna Obdrana" and the "Union or Death".

(p. 58) ¶2 The Narodna Odbrana was formed in Belgrade on 8 october 1908, the day after Austria-Hungary proclaimed its annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Immediately after the proclamation the Serbian foreign minister, Milovan Milovanović, invited twenty civic leaders to meet at the city hall. Here they were persuaded by a leading dramatist, Branislav Nušić, to form a society dedicated to defending the Serbian 'idea'. The fledgling group immediately succeeded in procuring funds, producing propaganda, and attracting members. It soon established a national organization. An officer of the Serbian army, General Bozho Janković, chaired a central committee in Belgrade which took responsibility for coordinating the activities of district committees, which in turn directed the activities of local committees. B 1914 over 400 local committees had been established, and where no committee had been formed 'confidential men' were identified to act in their place. Under the guise of cultural, gymnastic, shooting, and sporting societies, the Nardona Odbrana aimed to undermine the loyalty of Serbs to the Austrian regime in the occupied provinces. Its members undertook to spy on Austrian officials and train to engage in guerrilla action against the authorities. It encouraged young Bosnians to come to Belgrade, where it assisted them in finding jobs or with the funds necessary to enable them to continue their education--as it had done with Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež ¶3 The Narodna Odbrana succeeded in establishing a highly visible presence in Serbia before 1914, engaging in public activities and attracting leading politicians, officials, and military men to serve openly on its committees. Two of the more prominent figures in the organization, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, and major Voiya Tankosić, were instrumental in the formation- [p. 59] ¶1-of another, secret, society that grew out of the Narodna and from which it actively recruited its members. 'Union or Death' was formed on 29 May 1911, on the eighth anniversary of the assassination of the Serbian king and queen, Aleksander and Draga, by the officers who had participated in the murders: 'the Men of 29 May'. Dimitrijević and Tankosić were two of the leading regicides. The new organization was created 'with the object of realizing the national ideal: the union of all Serbs', which was to be accomplished through the instrument of the Kingdom of Serbia, and through 'terrorist action, which it preferred to 'intellectual propaganda'. Theirs was to be a clear departure from the tactics of the Narodna Odbrana. Union or Death aimed to 'organize revolutionary action in all the territories inhabited by Serbs' and was prepared to use 'every means available to combat the adversaries of the national idea'.6[6.]" (Martel 2014, 58-59).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what did Count Contrad von Hötzendorff, chief of the general staff of Austria-Hungary, propose in response to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.

(p. 85) ¶2 On Monday the 29th the bodies of Franz Ferdinand and Sophie left Sarajevo left for Trieste. On the same day Count Conrad von Hötzendorff, the chief of the general staff, proposed to Count Berchtold that they attack Serbia immediately, without warning. His advice came as to surprise to the Austrian foreign minister. The general had been preaching war for years." (Martel 2014, 85).

Georg Friedrich Karl Freiherr (From 1914, Graf) von Hertling (31 August 1843 - 4 January 1919)

A German politician who served as the Minister-President of Bavaria 1912-1917 and then as Minister-President of Prussia and Chancellor of the German Empire from 1917 to 1918. He was the first party politician to hold the office.

According to Lanthier, was there such a thing as the "will to war" circa 1914?

A VERY qualified YES. Most populations were supportive and/or tolerant of states going to war.

Aktion T4 (German, pronounced [akˈtsi̯oːn teː fiːɐ])

A postwar name for mass murder through involuntary euthanasia in Nazi Germany.[4][b] The name T4 is an abbreviation of Tiergartenstraße 4, a street address of the Chancellery department set up in the spring of 1940, in the Berlin borough of Tiergarten, which recruited and paid personnel associated with T4.[5][6][7][c] Certain German physicians were authorised to select patients "deemed incurably sick, after most critical medical examination" and then administer to them a "mercy death" (Gnadentod).[8] In October 1939, Adolf Hitler signed a "euthanasia note", backdated to 1 September 1939, which authorised his physician Karl Brandt and Reichsleiter Philipp Bouhler to implement the programme. The killings took place from September 1939 until the end of the war in 1945; from 275,000 to 300,000 people were killed in psychiatric hospitals in Germany and Austria, occupied Poland and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (now the Czech Republic).[9][10][11] The number of victims was originally recorded as 70,273 but this number has been increased by the discovery of victims listed in the archives of the former East Germany.[12][d] About half of those killed were taken from church-run asylums, often with the approval of the Protestant or Catholic authorities of the institutions.[14][15] The Holy Seeannounced on 2 December 1940 that the policy was contrary to the natural and positive Divine law and that "the direct killing of an innocent person because of mental or physical defects is not allowed" but the declaration was not upheld by some Catholic authorities in Germany. In the summer of 1941, protests were led in Germany by the Bishop of Münster, Clemens von Galen, whose intervention led to "the strongest, most explicit and most widespread protest movement against any policy since the beginning of the Third Reich", according to Richard J. Evans.[16] Several reasons have been suggested for the killings, including eugenics, compassion, reducing suffering, racial hygiene and saving money.[17][18] Physicians in German and Austrian asylums continued many of the practices of Aktion T4 until the defeat of Germany in 1945, in spite of its official cessation in August 1941. The informal continuation of the policy led to 93,521 "beds emptied" by the end of 1941.[19][20][e] Technology developed under Aktion T4 was taken over by the medical division of the Reich Interior Ministry, particularly the use of lethal gas to kill large numbers of people, along with the personnel of Aktion T4, who participated in Operation Reinhard.[23] The programme was authorised by Hitler but the killings have since come to be viewed as murders in Germany. The number of people killed was about 200,000 in Germany and Austria, with about 100,000 victims in other European countries.[f]

The October Revolution,[a] officially known in Soviet historiography as the Great October Socialist Revolution[b] and commonly referred to as the October Uprising, the October Coup, the Bolshevik Revolution,[2] the Bolshevik Coup or the Red October

A revolution in Russia led by the Bolshevik Party of Vladimir Lenin that was instrumental in the larger Russian Revolution of 1917. It took place with an armed insurrection in Petrograd on 7 November (25 October, O.S.) 1917. The Bolshevik Party and the left fraction of Socialist Revolutionary Party - a fraction calling to stop the war and land to the peasants with overwhelming support from the countryside - actually had a majority in the Russian population. It followed and capitalized on the February Revolution of the same year, which overthrew the Tsarist autocracy and resulted in a provisional government after a transfer of power proclaimed by Grand Duke Michael, the younger brother of Tsar Nicholas II, who declined to take power after the Tsar stepped down. During this time, urban workers began to organize into councils (soviets) wherein revolutionaries criticized the provisional government and its actions. After the Congress of Soviets, now the governing body, had its second session, it elected members of the Bolsheviks and other left wing groups such as the Left Socialist Revolutionaries to important positions within the new state of affairs. This immediately initiated the establishment of the Russian Soviet Republic. On 17 July 1918, the Tsar and his family were executed. The revolution was led by the Bolsheviks, who used their influence in the Petrograd Soviet to organize the armed forces. Bolshevik Red Guards forces under the Military Revolutionary Committee began the occupation of government buildings on 7 November 1917 (New Style). The following day, the Winter Palace (the seat of the Provisional government located in Petrograd, then capital of Russia) was captured. The slogan of the October revolution was All Power to the Soviets, meaning all power to democratic elected councils from below. This turned out to be replaced with all power to Sovnarkom, a Bolshevik controlled government. The free elections to the soviets were gradually abandoned step by step. By 1920 there were no free elections but delegates appointed by a party state. The long-awaited Constituent Assembly elections were held on 12 November 1917. In contrast to their majority in the Soviets, the Bolsheviks only won 175 seats in the 715-seat legislative body, coming in second behind the Socialist Revolutionary Party, which won 370 seats, although the SR Party no longer existed as a whole party by that time, as the Left SRs had gone into coalition with the Bolsheviks from October 1917 to March 1918. The Constituent Assembly was to first meet on 28 November 1917, but its convocation was delayed until 5 January 1918 by the Bolsheviks. On its first and only day in session, the Constituent Assembly came into conflict with the Soviets, and it rejected Soviet decrees on peace and land, resulting in the Constituent Assembly being dissolved the next day by order of the Congress of Soviets.[3] As the revolution was not universally recognized, there followed the struggles of the Russian Civil War (1917-22) and the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922.

Thomas Woodrow Wilson (December 28, 1856 - February 3, 1924)

An American statesman, lawyer, and academic who served as the 28th president of the United States from 1913 to 1921. A member of the Democratic Party, Wilson served as the president of Princeton University and as the 34th governor of New Jersey before winning the 1912 presidential election. As president, he oversaw the passage of progressive legislative policies unparalleled until the New Deal in 1933. He also led the United States during World War I, establishing an activist foreign policy known as "Wilsonianism." Born in Staunton, Virginia, Wilson spent his early years in Augusta, Georgia, and Columbia, South Carolina. After earning a Ph.D. in political science from Johns Hopkins University, Wilson taught at various schools before becoming the president of Princeton. As governor of New Jersey from 1911 to 1913, Wilson broke with party bosses and won the passage of several progressive reforms. His success in New Jersey gave him a national reputation as a progressive reformer, and he won the presidential nomination at the 1912 Democratic National Convention. Wilson defeated incumbent Republican President William Howard Taft and Progressive Party nominee Theodore Roosevelt to win the 1912 presidential election, becoming the first Southerner to be elected president since the American Civil War. During his first term, Wilson presided over the passage of his progressive New Freedomdomestic agenda. His first major priority was the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913, which lowered tariffs and implemented a federal income tax. Later tax acts implemented a federal estate tax and raised the top income tax rate to 77 percent. Wilson also presided over the passage of the Federal Reserve Act, which created a central banking system in the form of the Federal Reserve System. Two major laws, the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act, were passed to regulate and break up large business interests known as trusts. To the disappointment of his African-American supporters, Wilson allowed some of his Cabinet members to segregate their departments. Upon the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Wilson maintained a policy of neutrality between the Allied Powers and the Central Powers. He won re-election by a narrow margin in the presidential election of 1916, defeating Republican nominee Charles Evans Hughes. In early 1917, Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war against Germany after Germany implemented a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, and Congress complied. Wilson presided over war-time mobilization but devoted much of his efforts to foreign affairs, developing the Fourteen Points as a basis for post-war peace. After Germany signed an armistice in November 1918, Wilson and other Allied leaders took part in the Paris Peace Conference, where Wilson advocated for the establishment of a multilateral organization known as the League of Nations. The League of Nations was incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties with the defeated Central Powers, but Wilson was unable to convince the Senate to ratify that treaty or allow the United States to join the League. Wilson suffered a severe stroke in October 1919 and was incapacitated for the remainder of his presidency. He retired from public office in 1921, and died in 1924. Scholars generally rankWilson as one of the better U.S. presidents,[1][2] though he has received strong criticism for his actions regarding racial segregation.[3]

According to Professor Lanthier, what were 2 major portions of Europe?

Europe could be divided into the "European Core" and the "European periphery." The European Core referred to the industrialized nations, primarily located in the West. Great Brit., the first nation to industrialize, was the richest nation, while Germany and France were working to catch up. To the east, in countries like Russia and in Scandinavia, industrialization had lagged behind.

What was the response to the 1917 French Army mutinies?

From 8 June, the military authorities took swift and decisive action: mass arrests were followed by mass trials.[11] Those arrested were selected by their own officers and NCOs, with the implicit consent of the rank and file.[3] There were 3,427 conseils de guerre (courts-martial).[11] In 1967, research by Pedroncini found 2,878 sentences of hard labour and 629 death sentences, but only 43 executions were carried out. The relative lack of rigour in repressing the mutinies provoked adverse reactions among some of the French Army's divisional commanders.[14] Pétain and French President Raymond Poincaré, on the other hand, made it their policy to mend the French Army's morale and to avoid acting in a way that could aggravate the morale. Activists in some Russian units in France had been spreading word of the revolution underway in Russia and encouraging other Russians and Frenchmen to join them. The rebellious First Russian Brigade was encircled by loyal Russian troops in September 1917 at Camp de La Courtine and bombarded with cannon, killing 8 men and wounding 28. That episode became the basis of widespread false rumours that the French had bombarded French units.[15] The troops (about 10,000 men) were demobilised and transferred into labor battalions, and the ringleaders were sent to North Africa in penal servitude.[16] Along with the deterrent of military justice, Pétain offered two incentives: more regular and longer leave and an end to grand offensives "until the arrival of tanks and Americans on the front".[17] Pétain launched only limited attacks with massed artillery against German strongholds, like Fort La Malmaison. They were taken with minimal French casualties. As to the mutinous soldiers, they were motivated by despair, not by politics or pacifism. They feared that infantry offensives could never prevail over the fire of machine guns and artillery. Pétain restored morale by a combination of rest periods, frequent rotations of the front-line units and regular home furloughs.[18]

What was the problem with Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary?

Germany was definitely the more powerful member of the alliance. Austria-Hungary's own foreign policies often risked dragging Germany into other wars.

Who were the first people trying to figure out who started World War I?

Governments, trying to use propaganda to present their actions as self-defence.

According to Professor Lanthier, what, in general, was the relationship between the Great Powers?

Highly competitive. Many of the leaders of the Great Powers, felt themselves in great competition with each other.

How was Hitler feeling in 1937-1938?

Hitler starting to feel quite confident, that he could get away with quite a lot without having France/Britain trying to stop him.

What are some of the historical assessments of the War Guilt Clause?

In 1926, Robert C. Binkley and A. C. Mahr of Stanford University, wrote that German accusations of the article assigning war guilt were "ill-founded" and "mistaken". The article was more "an assumption of liability to pay damages than an admission of war guilt" and compared it with "a man who undertakes to pay all the cost of a motor accident than to the plea of guilty entered by an accused criminal". They wrote that "it is absurd" to charge the reparation articles of the treaty with any "political meaning" and the legal interpretation "is the only one that can stand". They concluded that German opposition "is based upon a text which has no legal validity whatsoever, and which Germany never signed at all."[76] Sidney Fay was the "most outspoken and influential critic" of the article. In 1928, he concluded that all of Europe shared the blame for the war and that Germany had no intention of launching a general European war in 1914.[77] In 1937, E. H. Carr commented that "in the passion of the moment" the Allied Powers had "failed to realize that this extorted admission of guilt could prove nothing, and must excite bitter resentment in German minds." He concluded "German men of learning set to work to demonstrate the guiltlessness of their country, fondly believing that, if this could be established, the whole fabric of the treaty would collapse."[78] René Albrecht-Carrié wrote in May 1940, that "article 231 gave rise to an unfortunate controversy, unfortunate because it served to raise a false issue." He wrote that the German inter-warargument "rested on her responsibility for the out-break of the war" and if that guilt could be disproved then the legal requirement to pay reparations would disappear.[68] In 1942, Luigi Albertini published The Origins of the War of 1914 and concluded that Germany was primarily responsible for the outbreak of the war.[79][80] Albertini's work, rather than spurring on new debate, was the culmination of the first research phase into the war guilt question.[81]The issue came back between 1959 and 1969, when Fritz Fischer in Germany's Aims in the First World War and War of Illusions "destroyed the consensus about shared responsibility for the First World War" and "placed the blame ... firmly on the shoulders of the Wilhelmine elite." By the 1970s, his work "had emerged as the new orthodoxy on the origins of the First World War".[82] In the 1980s, James Joll led a new wave of First World War research concluding "that the origins of the First World War were "complex and varied" although "by December 1912" Germany had decided to go to war.[83] In 1978, Marks re-examined the reparation clauses of the treaty and wrote that "the much-criticized 'war guilt clause', Article 231, which was designed to lay a legal basis for reparations, in fact makes no mention of war guilt" but only specified that Germany was to pay for the damages caused by the war they imposed upon the allies and "that Germany committed an act of aggression against Belgium is beyond dispute". "Technically, Britain entered" the war and French troops entered Belgium "to honor" the "legal obligation" to defend Belgium under the 1839 Treaty of London and that "Germany openly acknowledged her responsibility in regard to Belgium on August 4, 1914 and May 7, 1919." Marks also wrote that "the same clause, mutatis mutandis" was incorporated "in the treaties with Austria and Hungary, neither of whom interpreted it as declaration of war guilt."[35] Wolfgang Mommsen wrote that "Austria and Hungary, understandably paid no attention to this aspect of the draft treaty".[41] In 1986, Marks wrote that the German foreign office, supported by military and civilian notables, "focused on Article 231 ... hoping that, if one could refute German responsibility for the war, not only reparations but the entire treaty would collapse".[84] Manfred Boemeke, Gerald Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser wrote that "pragmatic requirements characteristically influenced the shaping of the much misunderstood Article 231. That paragraph reflected the presumed legal necessity to define German responsibility for the war in order to specify and limit the Reich's obligations".[85] P.M.H. Bell wrote that despite the article not using the term 'guilt', and while "it may be that its drafters did not intend to convey a moral judgement of Germany", the article has "almost universally" became known as the war guilt clause of the treaty.[67] Margaret MacMillanwrote that the German public's interpretation of Article 231 as unequivocally ascribing the fault for the war to Germany and her allies, "came to be the object of particular loathing in Germany and the cause of uneasy consciences among the Allies." The Allies never expected such a hostile reaction, for "no one thought there would be any difficulty over the clauses themselves."[50] Stephen Neff wrote that "the term 'war guilt' is a slightly unfortunate one, since to lawyers, the term 'guilt' primarily connotes criminal liability" while "the responsibility of Germany envisaged in the Versailles Treaty ... was civil in nature, comparable to the indemnity obligation of classical just-war theory."[31] Louise Slavicek wrote that while "the article was an honest reflection of the treaty-writers' beliefs, including such a clause in the peace settlement was undiplomatic, to say the least."[86] Diane Kunz wrote that "rather than being seen as an American lawyer's clever attempt to limit actual German financial responsibility by buying off French politicians and their public with the sop of a piece of paper" Article 231 "became an easily exploitable open sore".[87] Ian Kershaw wrote that the "national disgrace" felt over the article and "defeat, revolution, and the establishment of democracy", had "fostered a climate in which a counter-revolutionary set of ideas could gain wide currency" and "enhanced the creation of a mood in which" extreme nationalist ideas could gain a wider audience and take hold.[88] Elazar Barkan argues that by "forcing an admission of war guilt at Versailles, rather than healing, the victors instigated resentment that contributed to the rise of Fascism."[89] Norman Davies wrote that the article invited Germany "to accept sole guilt for the preceding war".[90]Klaus Schwabe wrote that the article's influence went far beyond the discussion of war guilt. By "refusing to acknowledge Germany's 'war guilt' the new German government implicitly exonerated the old monarchial order" and more importantly failed "to dissociate itself from the old regime." In doing so "it undermined its claim that post-revolutionary Germany was a historic new democratic beginning deserving credit at the peace conference."[91]

Repudiation of debt at the Russian Revolution

In February 1918, after the Russian Revolution, the repudiation of the debt by the Soviet government shocked international finance and triggered unanimous condemnation by the governments of the great powers. The British, and especially the French, had lost millions of pounds of foreign investment in Russia. The revolutionary Russia completely fell out of the world economy and sealed itself up in isolation, which would not be disturbed until the need to fight with others nations arose during the Second World War.[1]

According to Professor Lanthier, what were some changes occurring in 1900 Russia?

Industrialization was occurring, albeit mainly in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Most of the rest of Russia was still agricultural and urbanity.

What is essential to maintain a war?

LOGISTICS

According to Lanthier, what was Brüning's attitude toward democracy?

Like quite a few Germans, Bruning was not supportive of representative democracy.

According to Lanthier, what happened to the female labour force after the war?

Like what happened in the previous European history, women were seen as a mobile labour force.

What are the 2 defining weapons of the WWI battlefield?

Machine guns and artillery

What was key in the French general strategy that led to the French defeat and occupation in WWII?

Many French generals were not prepared for a modern war. They didn't what to do with highly sophisticated weapons at their disposal. For example, tanks. The French didn't know how to use tanks, the Germans did

According to Lanthier, was there a simple explanation for the cause of World War I?

No. The causes of World War I is a very widespread, and different historians have different views.

Was Italy a great power by 1900?

Not really. While it was in some ways it was an important player, the numbers of troops, the GDP, the industrialization, Italy was lagging behind. While it clearly is not a member of the Great Powers, it does rank as number 6.

According to Lanthier, why are some of the state-making exercises considered to be such failures in the Paris Peace Conference in 1918?

One of the criticisms is that many of the new countries were too small to defend themselves, and because they did not reflect their ethnic make-up. For example, in the Sudetentland, there is a large German-speaking population that found themselves a minority in the new Czechoslovakia. Many ethnic groups spread out, and there was no way to create a nice nation-state for a single ethnic group. In Eastern Europe, there is a wide-spread ethnic crazy-quilt, a powder-keg.

According to Professor Lanthier, who were the main decision-makers of the Paris Peace Conference, and who were largely responsible for creating a new post-WWI reality of Europe.

Prime Minister Lloyd George of Great Britain, Prime Minister Clemenceau of France, and President Wilson of the USA.

Could the ottoman Empire be considered a Great Power in Europe?

Probably not. A Great Power is defined by a country being able to project force abroad. The Ottoman Empire did not have the capacity to do so.

Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini (Italian: [beˈniːto mussoˈliːni];[1] 29 July 1883 - 28 April 1945)

Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Italy from his golpe in 1922 to 1943, and Duce of Fascism from 1919 to his execution in 1945 during the Italian civil war. As dictator of Italy and founder of fascism, Mussolini inspired several totalitarian rulers such as Adolf Hitler.[2][3][4] A journalist and politician, Mussolini had been a leading member of the National Directorate of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) from 1910 to 1914,[5]but was expelled from the PSI for advocating military intervention in World War I, in opposition to the party's stance on neutrality. Mussolini served in the Royal Italian Army during the war until he was wounded and discharged in 1917. Mussolini denounced the PSI, his views now centering on nationalism instead of socialism and later founded the fascist movement which came to oppose egalitarianism[6] and class conflict, instead advocating "revolutionary nationalism" transcending class lines.[7] Following the March on Rome in October 1922, Mussolini became the youngest Prime Minister in Italian history until the appointment of Matteo Renzi in February 2014. After removing all political opposition through his secret police and outlawing labor strikes,[8] Mussolini and his followers consolidated their power through a series of laws that transformed the nation into a one-party dictatorship. Within five years, Mussolini had established dictatorial authority by both legal and extraordinary means and aspired to create a totalitarianstate. In 1929, Mussolini signed the Lateran Treaty with the Vatican, ending decades of struggle between the Italian state and the Papacy, and recognized the independence of Vatican City. Mussolini's foreign policy aimed to expand the sphere of influence of Italian fascism. In 1923, he began the "Pacification of Libya" and ordered the bombing of Corfu in retaliation for the murder of an Italian general. In 1936, Mussolini formed Italian East Africa (AOI) by merging Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia following the Abyssinian crisis and the Second Italo-Ethiopian War. In 1939, Italian forces occupied Albania. Between 1936 and 1939, Mussolini ordered the successful Italian military intervention in Spain in favor of Francisco Franco during the Spanish civil war. At the same time, Mussolini's Italy tried to avoid the outbreak of a second global war and took part in the Stresa front, the Lytton Report, the Treaty of Lausanne, the Four-Power Pactand the Munich Agreement. However, Italy distanced Britain and France by forming the axis powers with Germany and Japan. Germany invaded Polandon 1 September 1939, resulting in declarations of war by France and the UK and the start of World War II. On 10 June 1940—with the Fall of France imminent—Italy officially entered the war and occupied parts of south-east France, Corsica and Tunisia. Mussolini planned to concentrate Italian forces on a major offensive against the British Empire in Africa and the Middle East, while expecting the collapse of the UK in the European theatre. The Italians invaded Egypt, bombed Mandatory Palestine, and occupied British Somaliland with initial success. However, the British government refused to accept proposals for a peace that would involve accepting Axis victories in Eastern and Western Europe; plans for an invasion of the UK did not proceed and the war continued. In October 1940, Mussolini sent Italian forces into Greece, starting the Greco-Italian War. The British air force prevented the Italian invasion and allowed the Greeks to push the Italians back to Albania.[9] The Balkan campaign was significantly prolonged until the definition of the Axis occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbourforced Mussolini to send an Italian army in Russia and declare war on the United States.[10] Mussolini was aware that Italy, whose resources were reduced by the campaigns of the 1930s, was not ready for a long conflict against three superpowers but opted to remain in the conflict to not abandon the fascist imperial ambitions.[11] In 1943, Italy suffered major disasters: by February the Red Army had completely destroyed the Italian Army in Russia; in May the Axis collapsed in North Africa despite previous Italian resistance at the second battle of El Alamein. On 9 July the Anglo-Americans invaded Sicily; and by the 16th it became clear the German summer offensive in the USSR had failed. As a consequence, early on 25 July, the Grand Council of Fascism passed a motion of no confidence for Mussolini; later that day the King dismissed him as head of government and had him placed in custody, appointing Pietro Badoglio to succeed him as Prime Minister. After the king agreed the armistice with the allies, on 12 September 1943 Mussolini was rescued from captivity in the Gran Sasso raid by Germanparatroopers and Waffen-SS commandos led by Major Otto-Harald Mors. Adolf Hitler, after meeting with the rescued former dictator, then put Mussolini in charge of a puppet regime in northern Italy, the Italian Social Republic (Italian: Repubblica Sociale Italiana, RSI),[12] informally known as the Salò Republic. In late April 1945, in the wake of near total defeat, Mussolini and his mistress Clara Petacci attempted to flee to Switzerland,[13]but both were captured by Italian communist partisans and summarily executed by firing squad on 28 April 1945 near Lake Como. His body was then taken to

Victoria (Alexandrina Victoria; 24 May 1819 - 22 January 1901)

Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland from 20 June 1837 until her death. On 1 May 1876, she adopted the additional title of Empress of India. Victoria was the daughter of Prince Edward, Duke of Kent and Strathearn, the fourth son of King George III. Both the Duke and the King died in 1820, and Victoria was raised under close supervision by her mother, Princess Victoria of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld. She inherited the throne at the age of 18, after her father's three elder brothers had all died, leaving no surviving legitimate children. The United Kingdom was already an established constitutional monarchy, in which the sovereign held relatively little direct political power. Privately, Victoria attempted to influence government policy and ministerial appointments; publicly, she became a national icon who was identified with strict standards of personal morality. Victoria married her first cousin Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha in 1840. Their nine children married into royal and noble families across the continent, tying them together, earning her the sobriquet "the grandmother of Europe", and spreading haemophilia to several royal families. After Albert's death in 1861, Victoria plunged into deep mourning and avoided public appearances. As a result of her seclusion, republicanism temporarily gained strength, but in the latter half of her reign, her popularity recovered. Her Golden and Diamond Jubilees were times of public celebration. Her reign of 63 years and seven months was longer than that of any of her predecessors and is known as the Victorian era. It was a period of industrial, cultural, political, scientific, and military change within the United Kingdom, and was marked by a great expansion of the British Empire. She was the last British monarch of the House of Hanover. Her son and successor, Edward VII, initiated the House of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, the line of his father.

How did control of the railway network help the Bolsheviks win the Russian Civil War (1918-20)?

The Bolsheviks controlled the hub of the Russian railway network, which radiated outwards from Moscow. This enabled the Bolsheviks to rush reinforcements to battle fronts where they were threatened. The Whites, by contrast, had to operate around the circumference of Bolshevik-held territory. Communication between the different White armies was extremely limited, and as a result it was all but impossible for White commanders to coordinate their strategies.

How did the Italians fair in World War I?

The Italians had numerical superiority, but this advantage was lost, not only because of the difficult terrain in which the fighting took place, but also because of the strategies and tactics employed.[143] Field Marshal Luigi Cadorna, a staunch proponent of the frontal assault, had dreams of breaking into the Slovenian plateau, taking Ljubljana and threatening Vienna. On the Trentino front, the Austro-Hungarians took advantage of the mountainous terrain, which favoured the defender. After an initial strategic retreat, the front remained largely unchanged, while Austrian Kaiserschützen and Standschützen engaged Italian Alpini in bitter hand-to-hand combat throughout the summer. The Austro-Hungarians counterattacked in the Altopiano of Asiago, towards Verona and Padua, in the spring of 1916 (Strafexpedition), but made little progress and were defeated by the Italians.[144] Beginning in 1915, the Italians under Cadorna mounted eleven offensives on the Isonzo front along the Isonzo (Soča) River, northeast of Trieste. Of this eleven offensives, five were won by Italy, three remained inconclusive, and other three were repelled by the Austro-Hungarians, who held the higher ground. In the summer of 1916, after the Battle of Doberdò, the Italians captured the town of Gorizia. After this victory, the front remained static for over a year, despite several Italian offensives, centred on the Banjšice and Karst Plateau east of Gorizia. The Central Powers launched a crushing offensive on 26 October 1917, spearheaded by the Germans, and achieved a victory at Caporetto (Kobarid). The Italian Army was routed and retreated more than 100 kilometres (62 mi) to reorganise. The new Italian chief of staff, Armando Diaz, ordered the Army to stop their retreat and defend the Monte Grappa summit, where fortified defenses were constructed; the Italians repelled the Austro-Hungarian and German Army, and stabilised the front at the Piave River. Since the Italian Army had suffered heavy losses in the Battle of Caporetto, the Italian Government ordered conscription of the so-called '99 Boys (Ragazzi del '99): all males born in 1899 and prior, who were 18 years old or older. In 1918, the Austro-Hungarians failed to break through in a series of battles on the Piave and were finally decisively defeated in the Battle of Vittorio Veneto in October. On 1 November, the Italian Navy destroyed much of the Austro-Hungarian fleet stationed in Pula, preventing it from being handed over to the new State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. On 3 November, the Italians invaded Trieste from the sea. On the same day, the Armistice of Villa Giusti was signed. By mid-November 1918, the Italian military occupied the entire former Austrian Littoral and had seized control of the portion of Dalmatia that had been guaranteed to Italy by the London Pact.[145] By the end of hostilities in November 1918,[146]Admiral Enrico Millo declared himself Italy's Governor of Dalmatia.[146] Austria-Hungary surrendered on 11 November 1918.[147][148]

What were some of the economic challenges faced by the Russian Empire in 1917?

The multiple demands of protracted warfare subjected the entire economic system of the Russian Empire to immense and ultimately intolerable strain. Nevertheless, the war witnessed the emergence of new sectors of industry, and aggregate economic decline set in only after 1916. The war effort exposed shortcomings in the traditional system of military production and procurement, which new war industry committees sought to exploit on behalf of the private sector. Rural consumers suffered shortages of basic goods, with knock-on effects in the supply of foodstuffs to the urban sector. Mobilisation also raised questions about demobilisation, allowing civil servants and technical specialists to articulate a non-market, technocratic vision of economic development. Russia lacked a coordinated and coherent government economic policy, because each minister reported directly to the Tsar without discussing programmes and policies in cabinet. Disagreements and turf wars were commonplace.[4] Financial policy remained the preserve of the Ministry of Finances, which met the costs of the war largely through a mixture of domestic and foreign borrowing and currency emission. By 1916 the inflationary consequences of war became plain for all to see. Although taxation contributed little to the financial war effort, important - if belated -initiatives included the levy of a war profits tax and the introduction of an income tax.[5] In general, economic policy was driven by the need to mobilise resources for the war effort (see below). The government introduced tight controls over foreign trade, in order to reserve scarce foreign currency to pay for imported rifles, machine guns, optical equipment and other vital items. Other key policy decisions were determined by the need to evacuate industrial equipment and even entire factories from the western borderlands after the debacle of the "great retreat" in 1915. This inevitably imposed an additional burden on the already overstretched railway system.[6] By the middle of 1915, difficulties in the supply of raw materials and fuel (which remained a weak link) led the government to give priority to firms working for the war effort. These regulatory measures were supported by some members who worked for voluntary organisations, for example, the war industry committees (see below) and by Zemgor. Regulatory measures were opposed by provincial merchants who disputed the charges about speculation and profiteering that were levelled against them, and who sympathised with peasant food producers who were doubly disadvantaged by fixed grain procurement prices on the one hand, and the inflation in the price of consumer goods on the other (see below).[7] The most comprehensive and still unsurpassed analysis of the theoretical basis of economic regulation during the war belonged to Iakov Bukshpan (1887-1939). Bukshpan identified the chief features of government intervention and was attracted to the possibilities that might be realised by centralised planning after the war.[8] Other commentators argued that Germany had adopted an effective wartime economic policy by controlling the supply of inputs (including imports, and labour) and coordinating outputs, including the rapid conversion of civilian industry to defence production).[9]

What were some short-term causes of the February Revolution, ak.a. The March revolution?

The revolution was provoked by Russian military failures during the First World War,[10]as well as public dissatisfaction with the way the country was run on the home front. The economic challenges faced due to fighting a total war also contributed. In August 1914, all classes supported[11] and virtually all political deputies voted in favour of the war.[12] The declaration of war was followed by a revival of nationalism across Russian society, which temporarily reduced internal strife.[10] The army achieved some early victories (such as in Galicia in 1915 and with the Brusilov Offensive in 1916) but also suffered major defeats, notably Tannenberg in August 1914, the Winter Battle in Masuria in February 1915 and the loss of Russian Poland during May to August 1915. Nearly six million casualties—dead, wounded and missing—had been accrued by January 1917. Mutinies sprang up more often (most due to simple war-weariness), morale was at its lowest, and the newly called up officers and commanders were at times very incompetent. Like all major armies, Russia's armed forces had inadequate supply.[13] The pre-revolution desertion rate ran at around 34,000 a month.[14] Meanwhile, the wartime alliance of industry, Duma (lower house of parliament) and Stavka (Military High Command) started to work outside the Tsar's control.[15] In an attempt to boost morale and repair his reputation as a leader, Nicholas announced in the summer of 1915 that he would take personal command of the army, in defiance of almost universal advice to the contrary.[7] The result was disastrous on three grounds. Firstly, it associated the monarchy with the unpopular war; secondly, Nicholas proved to be a poor leader of men on the front, often irritating his own commanders with his interference;[16] and thirdly, being at the front made him unavailable to govern. This left the reins of power to his wife, the German Tsarina Alexandra, who was unpopular and accused of being a spy and under the thumb of her confidant, Grigori Rasputin, himself so unpopular that he was assassinated by members of the nobility in December 1916.[10] The Tsarina proved an ineffective ruler in a time of war, announcing a rapid succession of different Prime Ministers and angering the Duma.[10] The lack of strong leadership is illustrated by a telegram from Octobrist politician Mikhail Rodzianko to the Tsar on 26 February O.S. (11 March N.S), 1917, in which Rodzianko begged for a minister with the "confidence of the country" be instated immediately. Delay, he wrote, would be "tantamount to death".[17] On the home front, a famine loomed and commodities became scarce due to the overstretched railroad network. Meanwhile, refugees from German-occupied Russia came in their millions.[18] The Russian economy, which had just seen one of the highest growth rates in Europe, was blocked from the continent's markets by the war. Though industry did not collapse, it was considerably strained and when inflation soared, wages could not keep up.[19] The Duma, which was composed of liberal deputies, warned Tsar Nicholas II of the impending danger and counselled him to form a new constitutional government, like the one he had dissolved after some short-term attempts in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution. The Tsar ignored the advice.[5]Historian Edward Acton argues that "by stubbornly refusing to reach any modus vivendi with the Progressive Bloc of the Duma... Nicholas undermined the loyalty of even those closest to the throne [and] opened an unbridgeable breach between himself and public opinion."[7] In short, the Tsar no longer had the support of the military, the nobility or the Duma (collectively the élites), or the Russian people. The result was revolution.[20]

According to Professor Lanthier, what is the marker of a Great Power?

The size of an army and navy, and up-to-date technology.

According to Lathier, why did the October Revolution so successful?

The tendency is that the Provisional Government made some signifciant mistakes which the Bolsheviks exploited. The Provisional Government failed to address the needs of the average Russian person, a peasant. Lenin had promised "Peace, Land, and Bread.", which is what the peasants wanted. The average Russian did not seen this as their conflict. While they were supportive in 1914 initially, three years of slaughter had turned them against the war. However, the Provisional Government refused to negotiate peace and kept Russia in the war, which turned the populace against them. In addition, the Provisional Government delayed in land redistribution. These mistakes turned the population against them.

What affected the Military Objectives towards the End of the War?

The unexpected collapse of tsarist Russia in early 1917 caused another fundamental change in the political situation and thus also in the war aims discussion. The cry for a "peace without annexations and contributions" propagated by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies council spread like wildfire in all of Europe and put pressure on the Social Democrats as well, who had become increasingly alienated from their constituency due to their support of the governmental course of war. On 19 April, the SPD thus adopted a resolution in which they declared their solidarity with the Petrograd council and its demands. In May 1917, Philipp Scheidemann (1865-1939) threatened a revolutionary coup if the government did not give up its annexationist war aims and cease pursuing a war of conquest. This change in direction in fact amounted to a termination of the Kriegszielmehrheit. The so-called "Scheidemann peace" (Scheidemannfrieden) was hotly debated in public and led to frequent coarse insults directed at the SPD delegates by conservatives, nationalist liberals and Zentrum alike.[27] Nevertheless, the large Reichstag parties gradually started to come together during the course of the year and began to strive for domestic reforms and a speedy peace agreement. In his much-noted speech of 6 July 1916, the Zentrum politician Matthias Erzberger - once a fervent supporter of a Siegfrieden - demanded a balancing peace. On Erzberger's initiative, the cross-party group Interfraktioneller Ausschuss was founded a few days later, consisting of the political left and the Zentrum party, in order to discuss the possibilities of a negotiated peace (Verhandlungsfrieden).[28] The extreme right, meanwhile, persisted on its radical course of war and founded the Deutsche Vaterlandspartei. With the foundation of the Vaterlandspartei by Alfred von Tirpitz (1949-1930), Wolfgang Kapp (1858-1922) and Alfred Hugenberg (1865-1951), the war aim discussion became even more racially and ideologically charged. The group was a rallying point for radical nationalists and increased greatly in membership until the end of the war. After the peace of Brest-Litovsk, its leaders demanded excessive territorial expansion in the east, while simultaneously pursuing war aims in Western Europe, characterized by anti-Semitic, anti-Britannic and anti-American rhetoric.[29] The peace resolution of July 1917 was the first result of this new kind of agreement. It demanded a "peace through negotiation and a permanent reconciliation of the nations", which precluded "forcible territorial gains as well as political and economic or financial violations".[30] This, however, was opposed to the stance advocated by both the chancellor and the military supreme command, namely by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who - notwithstanding their ever-sinking chances of winning the war - kept holding on to their annexationist war aims, as did the conservatives and the large industrial associations.[31] The civilian leadership, and probably the Emperor himself, were willing, during the autumn of 1917, to contemplate a negotiated peace in the west on a status quo ante basis, even with some concessions on the Reichsland, and with a restoration of Belgium - all that at the expense of Russia. But this willingness was not put to the test, since French and British leaders refused to follow the leads suggested by Aristide Briand (1862-1932), Paul Painlevé (1863-1933) and Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, Marquess of Lansdowne (1845-1927) after various secret contacts with German and Austrian emissaries.[32] With the October Revolution and the seizure of power by the extreme left in Russia, Germany's prospects suddenly seemed to be looking up again. Disqualifying the country as a factor of power in the war, Russia's withdrawal offered an advantage against the Entente and even made a quick ending of the war seem possible. The American president Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) took this as a point of departure in order to draw up the tenets for a European peace order on the basis of disarmament, free trade, the return of all occupied territories, as well as the preservation of the right to self-determination of all nations. Wilson's offer of peace did not, however, accord with the ideas of the German military leadership, which regarded the breakdown of the Russian multi-ethnic state as a new opportunity to further extend its territories in the east. This objective also determined the peace talks with Russia at Brest-Litovsk, which resulted in large parts of Russia falling into German hands. The tremendous series of successes in the east inspired new hopes for a victorious peace in the west, and only the USPD refused to support the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Given the Russian capitulation, German war aims reached completely new heights in 1918, including extensive plans for conquest and spheres of influence in Eastern and South Eastern Europe. As a consequence, German strategists developed the concept of a greater area ruled by Germany from the Bay of Biscay in France to the Ural Mountains. Thus, Ludendorff's dream of an empire in Eastern Europe came to replace the "Concept for Central Europe" (Mitteleuropa-Konzept) advocated earlier in the war.[33] This newly kindled anticipation of victory was to be brief, however. In August, the overwhelming superiority of the Allied troops became clear and the German defeat inevitable.

What was the significance of Fritz Fischer's thesis?

Theorist and author National Socialism After World War II, Fischer re-evaluated his previous beliefs, and decided that the popular explanations of National Socialism offered by such historians as Friedrich Meinecke in which Adolf Hitler was just a Betriebsunfall (an occupational accident, meaning 'a spanner in the works') of history were unacceptable.[4] In 1949, at the first post-war German Historians' Congress in Munich, Fischer strongly criticized the Lutheran tradition in German life, accusing the Lutheran church of glorifying the state at the expense of individual liberties and thus helping to bring about Nazi Germany.[4] Fischer complained that the Lutheran church had for too long glorified the state as a divinely sanctioned institution that could do no wrong, and thus paved the way for National Socialism.[5] Fischer rejected the then popular argument in Germany that Nazi Germany had been the result of the Treaty of Versailles, and instead argued that the origins of Nazi Germany predated 1914, and were the result of long-standing ambitions of the German power elite.[1] Fischer thesis In the 1950s, Fischer examined all of the Imperial German government archives in their entirety relating to The Great War. (This had previously been done by Karl Kautsky, Professor Walther Schucking and Count Max Montgelas and published at Charlottenburg in November 1919 in a collection known as The Kautsky Documents. In 1924 this large book was published in English.[6] A further book by Count Mongelas, The Case for the Central Powers was published in London the following year.) The American Klaus Epstein noted, when Fischer published his findings in 1961, that in his opinion Fischer instantly rendered obsolete every book previously published on the subject of responsibility for the First World War, and German aims in that war.[7] Fischer's own position on German responsibility for World War I has become known as the "Fischer thesis." In 1961, Fischer, who by then had risen to the rank of full professor at the University of Hamburg, rocked the history profession with his first postwar book, Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegzielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-1918 (published in English as Germany's Aims in the First World War), in which he argued that Germany had deliberately instigated World War I in an attempt to become a world power.[1] In this book, which was primarily concerned with the role played in the formation of German foreign policy by domestic pressure groups, Fischer argued that various pressure groups in German society had ambitions for aggressive imperialist policy in Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East.[1]In Fischer's opinion, the "September Program" of September 1914 calling for the annexation of parts of Europe and Africa was an attempt at compromise between the demands of the lobbying groups in German society for wide-ranging territorial expansion.[1] Fischer argued that the German government used the crisis caused by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the summer of 1914 to act on plans for a war against France and Russia, to create Mitteleuropa, a German-dominated Europe, and Mittelafrika, a German-dominated Africa.[8] Though Fischer argued that the German government did not want a war with Britain, they were ready to run the risk in pursuit of Mitteleuropa and Mittelafrika.[8] The book was preceded by Fischer's groundbreaking 1959 article in the Historische Zeitschrift in which he first published the arguments that he expanded upon in his 1961 book. In The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History, Philip Bobbitt has written that after Fischer published it became "impossible to maintain" that World War I had been a "ghastly mistake" rather than the consequence of German policy.[9] For most Germans, it was acceptable to believe that Germany had caused World War II, but not World War I, which was still widely regarded as a war forced upon Germany by its encircling enemies. Fischer was the first German historian to publish documents showing that the German chancellor Dr. Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg had made plans in September 1914 (after the war began) to annex all of Belgium, part of France and part of Russia.[1] Fischer suggested that there was continuity in German foreign policy from 1900 to the Second World War, implying that Germany was responsible for both world wars. These ideas were expanded in his later books Krieg der Illusionen (War of Illusions), Bündnis der Eliten (From Kaiserreich to Third Reich) and Hitler war kein Betriebsunfall (Hitler Was No Chance Accident).[1] Though Fischer was an expert on the Imperial era, his work was important in the debate about the foreign policy of the Third Reich. In his 1969 book War of Illusions (Krieg der Illusionen), Fischer offered a detailed study of German politics from 1911 to 1914 in which he offered a Primat der Innenpolitik (Primacy of Domestic Politics) analysis of German foreign policy.[1] In Fischer's view, the Imperial German state saw itself under siege by rising demands for democracy at home and looked to distract democratic strivings through a policy of aggression abroad.[1] Fischer was the first German historian to support the negative version of the Sonderweg ("special path") interpretation of German history, which holds that the way German society developed from the Reformation (or from a later time, such as the establishment of the German Reich of 1871) inexorably culminated in the Third Reich.[1] In Fischer's view, while 19th-century German society moved forwards economically and industrially, it did not do so politically. For Fischer, German foreign policy before 1914 was largely motivated by the efforts of the reactionary German elite to distract the public from casting their votes for the Social Democrats and to make Germany the world's greatest power at the expense of France, Britain and Russia.[1] The German elite that caused World War I was also responsible for the failure of the Weimar Republic, which opened the way for the Third Reich. This traditional German elite, in Fischer's analysis, was dominated by a racist, imperialist and capitalist ideology that was little different from the beliefs of the Nazis.[1] For this reason, Fischer called Bethmann-Hollweg the "Hitler of 1914." Fischer's claims set off the so-called "Fischer Controversy" of the early 1960s when German historians led by Gerhard Ritter attempted to rebut Fischer. The Australian historian John Moses noted in 1999 that the documentary evidence introduced by Fischer is extremely persuasive in arguing that Germany was responsible for World War I.[1] In 1990, The Economist advised its readers to examine Fischer's "well documented" book to examine why people in Eastern Europe feared the prospect of German unification.[10] Fischer with his analytical model caused a revolution in German historiography.[8] Fischer's Primat der Innenpolitikheuristic, with its examination of the "inputs" into German foreign policy by domestic pressure groups and their interaction with the imperialist ideas of the German elite, forced a re-evaluation of German foreign policy in the Imperial era.[8]Fischer's discovery of Imperial German government documents advocating as a war aim the ethnic cleansing of Russian Poland and subsequent German colonization, to provide Germany with Lebensraum (living space) led many to argue that similar schemes pursued by the Nazis in World War II were not due solely to Adolf Hitler's ideas but rather reflected widely held German aspirations that long pre-dated Hitler.[8][11][12] Many German historians in the 1960s such as Gerhard Ritter who liked to argue that Hitler was just a 'Betriebsunfall' (an unfortunate accident) of history with no real connection to German history, were outraged by Fischer's publication of these documents and attacked his work as "anti-German".[13]

In chapter 4 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what were Stalin's origins?

(p. 115) ¶4 ... Born in 1878 in the small Goergian village of Gori, he was christened Josip Djugashvili. ... (p. 116) ¶1 ... His mother, hoping that the boy eventually would qualify for the priesthood ... enrolled him in a local church school. Afterward, when the boy reached adolescence, she managed to register him in the Tiflis Seminary. ... By the early twentieth century, however, its decisive influence on the future Stalin was essentially its lessons of survival among bullying classmates and punitive priest-teachers. Indeed, it was not a coincidence that the school also was beginning to achieve notoriety as the cradle of atheists and revolutionaries. By Stalin's own later acknowledgment, in was in the the seminary's dormitories and study halls that he and others of his classmates secretly became familiar with the writings of Karl Marx. ¶2 Thereafter, prowling Tiflis's railway depots and workshops, the teenage Stalin found an eager audience for his newly developed Marxist rhetoric. Yet it was not long, too, before his "extracurricular" activity was reported to the seminary administration. He was promptly expelled, together with some 20 other student radicals. Afterward, adopting the sobriquet of "Koba" (a fictitious Caucasian Robin Hood), Stalin soon emerged as the leader of his fellow expellees, devising protection rackets nd controlling the streets in Tiflis's lower-middle-lcass residential districts.17[17.] Two years later, in 1901, he shifted his activities to Batum, a Georgian town on the Black Sea coat that a Rothschild-owned oil pipeline and refinery lately had transformed into a major international port. Finding work in the refinery, Stalin and his cronies allowed little time to pass before they set about dunning the company for pay raises. They were refused. Three months later, the refinery mysteriously caught fire. In the winter of 1902-3, however, when Stalin hinted of future "accidents, the Rothschild management had the precocious extortionist arrested, and a local court sentenced him to five years of Siberian exile. ¶3 But 19 months later still, at the onset of the October 1905 unrest, Stalin used false papers and his new false name to escape confinement and make his way back to Batum. There, he established his first meaningful contact with experienced Social Democratic emissaries and, in turn, promptly won their admiration as a gang leader who could raise money for the party. Indeed, when the 1905 "Octobrist" uprising failed and most of his companions were forced into hiding, Stalin remained in Batum to become the godfather of a small but useful extortion operation on the party's behalf. It was an enterprise that soon came to resemble a moderately successful Mafia- (p. 117) ¶1-family, engaging in currency counterfeiting, shakedowns, and protection rackets--even several bank robberies.18[18.] ¶2 In March 1908, the tsarist police tracked Stalin down and once again sentenced him to Siberian exile. But four months later, he escaped yet again, and for the ensuing half-decade his life devolved into one of plain and simple criminality. Although the young "mafioso's" feats were admired and exploited by the Social Democrats, the political ideology in his lawlessness was less than sophisticated.19[19.] It wa snot until his ninth arrest, in 1913, and his ensuing sentence to a four-year term of exile in Siberia that the comradeship Stalin developed among his Russian fellow prisoners finally transformed him from a provincial Georgian hooligan into a committed anti-tsarist revolutionary. Indeed, the period of the ensuing Russian Civil War climaxed the "making" of the authentic Stalin. In late 1917, shortly after the Kerensky government released him from prison, the successor Bolshevik regime appointed him director-general of food supplies for south Russia. During the ensuing months, reacting to the escalating conflict between "Reds" and "Whites," the young revolutionary transcended his essentially civilian role. In the process, too, he revealed the animating motif of his future career. ¶3 the clue was provided during hte struggle for Tsaritsyn As a key strategic city on the Lower Volga, Tsaritsyn (later to be retitled Stalingrad) was the gateway to the grain and oil of the north Caucasus. When the city seemed in danger of falling to White counterrevolutionaries, Lenin promoted Stalin from is status of food "director-general" for civilians to that of "commissar of supply," with sweeping military powers. Accordingly, in APril 1918, in an armored train containing 400 Red Guards, Stalin arrived at Tsaritsyn to find the city rife with chaos and betrayal. At that point, suspecting counterrevolutionary activity among a group of some 200 ex-tsarist officers whom Trotsky had recruited (p. 114), Stalin immediately ordered the "traitors" herded onto a Volga barge and towed out to mid-river. At his orders, the bage's portals then were opened, and the vessel promptly sank with all it shuman cargo. "Death solves all problems," Stalin confided ot his shocked comrades. "No man, no problem." ¶4 Shortly afterward, Lenin had Stalin transferred to Moscow, assigning him to a series of increasingly pivotal administrative responsibilities: as commissar for nationalities, as commissar of the workers' and peasants' inspectorate,- (p. 118) ¶1-then, successively, to the supreme revolutionary military council, to the Orgburo, to the Politburo (the latter functioning as the unofficial inner sanctum of the party leadership). Finally, in April 22, Lenin appointed Stalin commissar of the Communist Secretariat, with the mandate of staffing the party's--in effect, the Communist state's--expanding bureaucracy. Indeed, in future years, Stalin used his latest position to recommend the appointment of some 10,000 party officials throughout the nation--and in the process converted the Secretariat into the de facto engine room of the Communist Party.21[21.] ¶2 Some of these appointees had been with Stalin since his early days in the Bolshevik underground. Grigori Ordzhonikidze ("Servo"), a veteran of the original "Georgian Mafia," would become Stalin's choice as commissar of heavy industry. Kliment Voroshilov, also one of Stalin's early cronies, eventually would replace Trotsky as commissar of defense (p. 113). Feliks Dzerzhinski, founder of the "Cheka"--the early Bolshevik political police--wa sa man whom Stalin had befriended in 1917. Another veteran comrade, Andrei Vyshinski, would become the chief prosecutor during the nation's subsequent "Great Terror" (pp. 124, 128-29). In this fashion, mistrustful of intellectuals, Stalin brought the clan-based and vendetta-ridden politics of the Caucasus into the Kremlin itself.22[22.] But even as he remembered his friends, it soon became evident that he would also not forget his critics or suspected rivals." (Sachar 2014, 115-118).

In chapter 3 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was a huge problem for the Allies in imposing terms upon Germany on post-WWI?

(p. 118) ¶3 A problem for the Allies was that many Germans did not recognize that their country had been military defeated. Germany was undestroyed after four years of war. No Allied troops had stood on German soil at the Armistice, though German forces at that time still occupied much of Belgium, and Luxembourg. German soldiers were welcomed home with festive flags and flowers. The Prussian War Ministry declared soon after the Armistice that 'our field-grey heroes return to the Heimat undefeated'. It was untrue. But the sentiment was repeated by the high Command of the Army; then in December 1918 by no less a person than the new Socialist head of government, Friedrich Ebert. The legend soon to be put about by the counter-revolutionary Right, that the troops at the front had been stabbed in the back by- (p. 119) ¶1-labour unrest fomented by revolutionary socialists at home, could germinate in fertile soil. ¶2 When the Allied terms were announced in early may 1919, the palpable shock in Germany was much greater than it would have been had its military defeat been obvious. The terms were severe -- though not as harsh as those that the Germans had imposed on the Russians at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, adn too lenient for the liking of French public opinion, thirsting for much more dragonican punitive measures. Germany was to lose some 13 percent of its pre-war territory in Europe (including rich agricultural and industrial regions, mainly in the east), resulting in the exclusion of around 10 percent of its pre-war population of 65 million. In economic terms, the losses were damaging but not irreparable. The real damage was political and psychological -- the heavy blow to national pride and prestige. ¶3 The sense of humiliation was heightened by the Allied stipulations for demilitarization. The once mighty German army, which had still managed to put about 4.5 million men in the field in 1918, was to be reduced to a mere 100,000 men, and conscription was barred. The navy (whose ships and submarines had been taken into Allied hands or destroyed after the Armistice) was reduced to 15,000 men. No submarines were to be permitted in future. And Germany was banned from having a military air force. ¶4 The anger in Germany at the territorial changes was immense, and it crossed political and ideological boundaries. The Treaty of Versailles was denounced as a victor's Diktat, 'I am in no doubt that the Treaty must be revised,' wrote the diplomat Berhard von Bülow in 1920. 'We must use the monstrosity of the Treaty and the impossibility of implementing so many of its stipulations in order to bring down the entire Versailles Peace.'" (Kershaw 2015, 118-119).

In chapter 4 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, in 1922, what were Stalin's objectives for the Soviet Union?

(p. 127) ¶3 Personal politics aside, Stalin's objective for the Soviet Union actually was not dissimilar to that of the late Lenin, or even of the exiled Trotsky. It was to regear his party and nation for an epic campaign of "building socialism." For almost a decade, Russia's class revolution had been stalled in midcourse. In the grim aftermath of revolution and civil war, the nation had undergone widespread privation. Confronting the Ukraining famine that had taken the lives of between 2 and 3 million people (p. 115), Lenin and Trotsky had bowed to economic realities and suspended their original plans for the collectivization of Russian agriculture. Rather, in 1921, a "New Economic Policy" had been inaugurated (p. 115), allowing peasant farmers a cautious and qualified leeway to sell their own produce for private gain and permitting a modest differentiation of salaries between workers and managers. Stalin himself had been one of the firmest supporters of the NEP. ¶4 By the latter 1920s, however, if NEP quasi-capitalism had given the Soviet economy a breathing space, it had not yet achieved its goal of sustaining a tolerable standard of living for the nation's overwhelmingly agrarian population.- (p. 128) ¶1-The so-called kulaks--farmers who had ended up owning supportable tracts of land--were distending the rural economy because of their ability to out-produce and underprice the harassed majority of mini-plot peasants. These latter, in any case, were breaking under the strain of the NEP's compulsory loans, taxes, and requisitions. Indeed, fully a decade after the overthrow of the tsarist empire, the Soviet Union appeared no closer after the overthrow of the tsarist empire, the Soviet Union appeared no closer than before the revolution to the party's widely proclaimed goal of an authentically socialist society. In Stalin's prognosis, a "coherent' program could be delayed no longer, an agenda that would sustain a viable agricultural population, feed the cities, raise industrial output, and, perhaps most importantly, build a widely based proletarian class that would function as guarantor of the Marxist revolution. ¶2 But the party secretary was influenced by still another factor that weighed on him as heavily as Marxis theory, economic pragmatism, or even political opportunism. This was national security. In a revealing speech to Soviet technocrats and leading business executives, given on February 4, 1931, Stalin expressly vowed that Russian backwardness would never again play into the hands of the nation's enemies: [O]ld Russia ... was ceaselessly beaten for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans, she was beaten by Turkish Beys, she was beaten by Swedish feudal lords, she was beaten by the Polish-Lithuanian Pans [gentry], she was beaten by Anglo-French capitalists, she was beaten ... by all--for her backwardness. For military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for political backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness. She was beaten because to beat her was profitable and went unpunished.36[36.] It was essentially these multiple political, economic, and security considerations that Stalin, in April 1929, had requested and received Central Committee endorsement for his program." (Sachar 2014, 127-128).

In chapter 4 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what is the significance of the Hague Conference in August 1929?

(p. 183) ¶3 The Hague Conference in August 1929, which had met to reach agreement on the reparations and the evacuation of the Rhineland, bore the title: 'The Conference on the Liquidation of the War'. It sounded like the commencement of a bright new future. In fact, 1929 proved to be the exact halfway point between the two vast conflagrations that shaped Europe's modern history." (Kershaw 2015, 183)

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, describe Leopold ANton Johann Sigismund Joseph Korsinus Ferdinand, Count von Berchtold.

(p. 93) ¶3 Few expected the conscientious and cautious foreign minister of Austria-Hungary to disagree with the Hungarian premier's advice. By the summer of 1914 Leopold ANton Johann Sigismund Joseph Korsinus Ferdinand, Count von Berchtold, was widely regarded as intelligent but weak, hard-working but unambitious, charming but effete. He was one of the richest men in Austria-Hungary: a nobleman who had inherited vast estates in Moravia, at the intersection between Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks--and then married the daughter of a rich Magyar aristocrat. He had been educated privately, at home, until reaching the age of 20. Besides classical Latin and Greek, he became fluent in Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, and French. He entered the diplomatic service at the age of 30 in 1893, serving in Paris and London before being appointed ambassador to St. Petersburg in 1906. He chose to retire from the service in 1911, preferring to tend to his estates, collect art and other treasures, and to establish a first-class stable of- (p. 94) ¶1-racing horses rather than continuing to deal with the tiresome work of diplomacy. He was reluctantly persuaded to come out of retirement and serve as foreign minister when Count Aehrenthal died in February 1912. ¶2 After more than two years in office, Berchtold's reputation for prudence had been confirmed. He had demonstrated his commitment to upholding the status quo. In the succession of Balkan crises that arose after he assumed office, he had moved closer to Britain, accepting the vision of Sir Edward Grey's 'concert of Europe' to resolve diplomatic difficulties. He had become frustrated with the lack of support offered by Germany--with its support for Italy during the war with Turkey and with its opposition to his initiatives to- (p. 95) ¶1-draw Bulgaria into the Triple Alliances. Berchtold was especially annoyed when, in the spring of 1914, he had suggests the possibility of using force to prevent the unification of Serbia with Montenegro. The idea left the kaiser 'completely cold'; Vienna was 'crazy' to consider it.24[24.]" (Martel 2014, 93-95).

Alexsei Grigoryevich Stakhanov (Russian: Алексе́й Григо́рьевич Стаха́нов, IPA: [stɐˈxanəf]; 3 January 1906 - 5 November 1977)

A Russian Soviet miner, Hero of Socialist Labor (1970), and a member of the CPSU (1936). He became a celebrity in 1935 as part of what became known as the Stakhanovite movement - a campaign intended to increase worker productivity and to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist economic system.

What was significant about the summer of 1914?

Almost everyone being called upon to war do so. Even the socialist movements, and the worker labour groups, which many middle-class tended to fear, were willing to contribute to their various nationalities.

What is a key asset of Germany's industrialization that affected war effort?

Due to its unique path to industrialization, the German government had a very close, cooperate relationship with banks and industries. This close relationship was beneficial throughout WWI. The German arms industry was able to provide its soldiers for what it needs. Germany also a good researcha and development sector.

What kind of technological military advancements arose by 1914?

European armies had developed new weapons, like the machine gun, large cannons, which gave defenders major advantage over the offense. A particularly significant technological change was the existence of railroads. Railroads gave armies the ability to rapidly mobilize and deploy in the field faster than ever before, and to provide those armies with major logistical support. Before, armies would take days, if not weeks, to march to the frontline. Now, it would take hours. This meant that the pace of operations was a lot faster than before, and which meant that speed became essential. Military commanders had to act fast, otherwise their enemy would seize the initiative. In addition, railroads allowed the transportation of massive pieces of artillery that was before impossible.

According to Lanthier, what was a significant feature which determined whether or not various institutions or political factions co-operate or not?

Individual agents making choices. It is possible for the various agents in 1914 to make choices that defuse tensions, provided the outside circumstances are willing to cooperate.

How did the First World War affect the human experience of war?

It revealed the utter limits of human endurance in a way never before seen. The combination of rabid nationalism with industrial science and technology unleashed devastation and suffering in a way never before seen.

What was a popular attitude among Europeans regarding the United States?

Many Europeans did not have a strong opinion the United States, and often had an attitude of benign neglect. The United States, at the time, had become a regional great power, but it kept its focus on the Americas. The U.S. had a strong isolationist stance, and so endeavored to avoid engaging in international politics, and so did not attract many European's attentions.

In general, what was the chief cause of WWII?

Much more straightforward affair as far as causes are concerned than WWI. Aggressive expansionist Germany that attacked its neighbours

What was the war like in the eastern front?

The Germans were very successful in pushing the poorly organized Russians back.

What were some reasons used to censor information from the public in France?

The idea was to prevent demoralization of the public. As such, anything that was not very patriotic or uplifting could be seen as demoralizing. In addition, the government was concerned about the threat of revolution.

Schlieffen Plan

The name given, after the First World War, to German war plans and the influence of Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen and his thinking on the invasion of France and Belgium on 4 August 1914. Schlieffen was Chief of the General Staff of the German Army from 1891 to 1906. In 1905 and 1906, Schlieffen devised an army deployment plan for a war-winning offensive against the French Third Republic. After losing the First World War, German official historians of the Reichsarchiv and other writers described the plan as a blueprint for victory. Generaloberst (Colonel-General) Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, succeeded Schlieffen as Chief of the German General Staff in 1906 and was dismissed after the First Battle of the Marne (5-12 September 1914). German historians claimed that Moltke had ruined the plan by meddling with it. Post-war writing by senior German officers like Hermann von Kuhl, Gerhard Tappen, Wilhelm Groener and the Reichsarchiv historians led by the former Oberstleutnant(Lieutenant-Colonel) Wolfgang Förster, managed to establish a commonly accepted narrative that it was Moltke the Younger's failure to follow the blueprint, rather than German strategic miscalculation, that condemned the belligerents to four years of attrition warfare instead of the quick, decisive conflict it should have been. In 1956, Gerhard Ritter published Der Schlieffenplan: Kritik eines Mythos (The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth), which began a period of revision when the details of the supposed Schlieffen Plan were subjected to scrutiny and contextualisation. Treating the plan as a blueprint was rejected, because this was contrary to the tradition of Prussian war planning established by Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, in which military operations were considered to be inherently unpredictable. Mobilisation and deployment plans were essential but campaign plans were pointless; rather than attempting to dictate to subordinate commanders, the commander gave the intent of the operation and subordinates achieved it through Auftragstaktik (mission-type tactics). In writings from the 1970s, Martin van Creveld, John Keegan, Hew Strachan and others, studied the practical aspects of an invasion of France through Belgium and Luxembourg. They judged that the physical constraints of German, Belgian and French railways and the Belgian and northern French road networks made it impossible to move enough troops far enough and fast enough for them to fight a decisive battle if the French retreated from the frontier. Most of the pre-1914 planning of the German General Staff was secret and the documents were destroyed when the deployment plans were superseded every April. The bombing of Potsdam in April 1945 destroyed the Prussian army archive and only incomplete records and other documents survived. Some records became available after the fall of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), making an outline of German war planning possible for the first time, proving wrong much post-1918 writing. In the 2000s, a document, RH61/v.96, was discovered in the trove inherited from the GDR, which had been used in a 1930s study of pre-war German General Staff war planning. Inferences that Schlieffen's war planning was solely offensive were found to have been made by extrapolating his writings and speeches on tactics into grand strategy. From a 1999 article in War in History and in Inventing the Schlieffen Plan (2002) to The Real German War Plan, 1906-1914 (2011), Terence Zuber engaged in a debate with Terence Holmes, Annika Mombauer, Robert Foley, Gerhard Gross, Holger Herwig and others, with his proposition that the Schlieffen Plan was a myth concocted in the 1920s by partial writers, intent on exculpating themselves and proving that German war planning did not cause the First World War, a view which was supported by Strachan.

According to Professor Lanthier, what is the major issue with the Paris Peace Conference?

The problem is that the people back then were not the hyper-specialized diplomats who had a deep background in foreign affairs, and surrounded experts and aids. Many of the diplomats and representatives were very poorly informed about the countries whose fates they were deciding. However, this was what was done, and the representatives did what they could with the information they had. It's just that the information was either wrong or incomplete.

According to Professor Lanthier, what is the common perception about the German people's view of the WEimar Republic?

There is a widespread perception that Weimar Germany was "a republic without republicans" or "a democracy without democrats." Professor Lanthier says that this is overly reductionistic. There is a sizeable group of Germans that is not happy with the republic, and yearn for a more authoritarian group. However, there is also a large number of Germans getting involved in elections. Remember, the old empire did have some democratic elements. People did vote in their provincial and local assemblies. This meant that the transition to a full-fledged republic was easier.

What was the level of violence in the 1932 Reichstag elections?

There was widespread violence going on, as Nazi paramilitary SA units clash with the Communist paramilitary groups. Hitler promises that, if the Nazi's can form a governemnt, he will restore law and order. This is a sensible promise to make, as Hitler is the one ordering the violence!

According to Professor Lanthier, how long does this truce last in the Great Powers?

This truce seems for the most part to hold, for the most part. However, there are significant breaks, such as the occasional mutiny or strikes. It's only in the fall of 1918 that Germany starts to face significant revolution. The exception of course is Russia, which in 1917 saw the collapse of the Tsar and the establishment of the Bolshevik government.

What was the background of the Hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic

To pay for the large costs of the ongoing First World War, Germany suspended the gold standard (the convertibility of its currency to gold) when the war broke out. Unlike France, which imposed its first income tax to pay for the war, German Emperor Wilhelm IIand the German parliament decided unanimously to fund the war entirely by borrowing,[1] a decision criticized by financial experts such as Hjalmar Schacht as a dangerous risk for currency devaluation.[2] The government believed that it would be able to pay off the debt by winning the war, when it would be able to annex resource-rich industrial territory in the west and east. Also, it would be able to impose massive reparations on the defeated Allies.[3] The exchange rate of the mark against the US dollar thus steadily devalued from 4.2 to 7.9 marks per dollar, a preliminary to the extreme postwar inflation.[4] The strategy failed when Germany lost the war. The new Weimar Republic was saddled with a massive war debt that it could not afford. That was worsened by the fact that it was printing money without economic resources to back it.[3] The Treaty of Versailles, with its demand for reparations, further accelerated the decline in the value of the mark, so that 48 paper marks were required to buy a US dollar by late 1919.[5] German currency was relatively stable at about 90 marks per dollar during the first half of 1921.[6] Because the WWI Western Front had been mostly in France and Belgium, Germany came out of the war with most of its industrial infrastructure intact. It was in a better position to become the dominant economic force on the European continent.[7] In April 1921, the Reparations Commission announced the "London payment plan", under which Germany would pay reparations in gold or foreign currency in annual installments of 2 billion gold marks, plus 26% of the value of Germany's exports; this was accepted by Germany after an Allied ultimatum the following month.[8] The first payment was made when it came due in June 1921.[9] It marked the beginning of an increasingly rapid devaluation of the mark, which fell in value to approximately 330 marks per dollar.[5] The total reparations demanded were 132 billion gold marks, but Germany had to pay only 50 billion marks.[10] Since reparations were required to be repaid in hard currency, not the rapidly depreciating paper mark, one strategy that Germany used was the mass printing of bank notes to buy foreign currency, which was then used to pay reparations, greatly exacerbating the inflation of the paper mark.[11][12] Late in 1922, Germany failed to pay France an installment of reparations on time, and France responded in January 1923 by sending troops to occupy the Ruhr, Germany's main industrial region. The German government ordered a policy of passive resistance in the Ruhr. Workers were told to do nothing which helped the invaders in any way. What this meant in practice was a general strike. But all the workers on strike had to be given financial support. The government paid its way by printing more and more banknotes. Germany was soon awash with paper money. The result was a hyperinflation.[13] A loaf of bread that in Berlin cost around 160 Marks at the end of 1922 cost 200,000,000,000 Marks less than a year later [14]

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, describe the system of alliances that Germany and Austria-Hungary forged from 1879-1913.

(p. 10) ¶4 "The 'system of alliances' had begun decades ago, in 1879, when Bismark proposed that Germany and Austria-Hungary should recognize that the differences that had led them to war in 1866 were now dead and buried. They shared a mutual interest--and that interest was peace. An alliance between them would enable them to thwart any ambitions France might have to reverse the decision of 1879-1, or any ambitions Russia might have to dominate south-eastern Europe. The terms were purely defensive: 'Should, contrary to their hope, and against the loyal desire of the two High COntracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia, the High Contracting Parties are bound to come to the assistance one of- (p. 11) ¶1-the other with the whole war strength of their Empires'; 'Should one of the High Contracting Parties be attacked by another Power, the other ... binds itself not only not to support the aggressor against its high Ally, but to observe at least a benevolent neutral attitude ...'. In other words, if Russia attacked either of them, they would join together in defending themselves; if France were to attack Germany, Austria-Hungary would keep out of it.12[12.] ¶2 The alliance was expanded three years later to include Italy. Here too the arrangement was purely defensive. 'In case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, should be attacked by France ... the two other Contracting Parties shall be bound to lend help and assistance with all their forces to the Party attacked. This same obligation shall devolve upon Italy in case of any aggression withotu direct provocation by France against Germany.'13[13.] And, if one of them should be attacked by two or more Great Powers, the other two would come to its assistance. The agreement also provided for the three Powers to 'take counsel together in ample time as to the military measures to be taken with a view to eventual cooperation'. But the three never came together to coordinate their military plans, and their general staffs were aware of one another's strategy only in broad outline. There were no precise commitments to one another, only vague promises that could not be relied on. ¶3 The first treaty of alliance was to last for five years, until 1887. It was renewed then, and repeatedly, in 1891, 1902, 1906, and 1913. Although the terms were revised slightly at each renewal, the fundamental nature of the alliance as defensive, and providing for cooperation in the case of aggression on the part of Russia and/or France, remained unchanged.14[14.] The most significant development between 1879 and 1913 came in the 1880s when Romania--secretly--joined the alliance." (Martel 2014, 10-11).

In chapter 4 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, when and where was Sergei Kirov exactly assassinated?

(p. 135) ¶2 At 4:00 p.m. on December 1, 1934, an undersized and seemingly frail man in his early thirties entered Leningrad's Smolny Institute. A former school for daughters of the tsarist gentry, the "Smolny" after the Bolshevik Revolution had been converted into COmmunist Party headquarters for the Leningrad District. On this December afternoon, however, despite the Smolny's importance as a party never center, the guard posts flanking its collage of outer doors were unaccountably empty. Indeed, entering the ornate foyer, the visitor--later to be identified as one Leonid Nikolaev--continued to move freely past interior guard psts that were also unmanned. Reaching the central staircase, still unchallenged, he proceeded to the third floor. There, he loitered in a darkened hall corner, his hand resting on a Nagant army-issue automatic pistol in his coat pocket. (p. 136) ¶1 Only minutes before, Serge Kirov, after working at home to complete a report on a recent Central Party committee meeting in Moscow, had himself returned to the Smolny. Climbing the stairs to the third floors, Kirov entered the office of his aide, Mikhail Chudov. For some 20 minutes, the two men discussed the prospective report. Subsequently, Kirov left Chudov's office for his own adjoining executive suite. It was 4:30 p.n. As Kirov approached the door, Nikolaev, the little visitor, suddenly moved from his corner hiding place. Withdrawing his pistol, he proceeded then to fire two bullets directly into the party secretary's back. Kirov slumped to the floor. His assailant immediately attempted to fire a shot into his own head; but a carpenter working in the hall nearby threw himself at Nikolaev, and the gun went astray. Nikolaev then collapsed in a dead faint beside the prostrate Kirov. Within seconds, party officials were running out of their offices toward the two men. Several of them carried the stricken Kirov, who was breathing stertorously, to a sofa in his own office. Minutes later, he expired. Nikolaev, still unconscious, was kept pinioned to the hall floor." (Sachar 2014, 135-136).

In "Day One: Friday, 24 July", p. 165-187, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what did the Austria-Hungarian government demand from the Serbian government by Sunday, July 26?

(p. 166) ¶1 "... the Serbian government was required to declare on Sunday, the 26th of July that:1[1.] The Royal Servian government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is the entirety of the ambitions, whose ultimate aim it is to disjoin parts of the territory belonging to the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy and regrets sincerely the horrible consequences of these criminal ambitions. The Royal Servian government regrets that Servian officers and officials have taken part in the propaganda above-mentioned and thereby imperilled the friendly and neighbourly relations, which the ROyal government ahd solemnly promised to cultivate in its declaration of the 31st March 1909. The Royal government, which condemns and rejects every thought and every attempt to interfere on behalf of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it a duty to warn officers, officials and indeed all the inhabitants of the kingdom, that it will in future use great severity against such persons, as will be found guilty of similar doings, which the government will make every effort to suppress. The Royal Servian government will overmore pledge itself to the following: 1. To suppress every publication likely to inspire hatred and contempt against the monarchy or whose general tendencies are directed against the integrity of the latter; 2. To begin immediately dissolving the society called: Narodna odbrana, to seize all its means of propaganda and to act in the same way against all the societies and associations in Servia, which are busy with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary; the Royal government will take the necessary measures to prevent these societies continuing their efforts under another name or in another form; 3. To eliminate with delay from public instruction everything that serves or might serve the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, both were teachers or books are concerned; 4. To remove from military service and from the administration all officers and officials who are guilty of having taken part in the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whose names and the proofs of whose guilt the Imp. and Roy. government will communicate to the Royal government; (p. 167) 5. To consent that Imp. and Roy. officials assist in Servia in the suppressing of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy; 6. To have a judicial inquiry instituted against all those who took part in the plot of the 28th June, if they are to be found on Servian territory; the Imp. and Roy. governments will delegate organs who will take an active part in these inquiries; 7. To arrest without delay major Volja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganovic, a Servian government official, both compromised by the results of the inquiry; 8. To take effective measures so as to prevent the Servian authorities from taking part in the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the frontier; to dismiss from service and severely punish those organs of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica, who helped the perpetrators of the crime of Sarajevo to reach Bosnia in safety. 9. To give the Imp. and Roy. government an explanation of the unjustified remarks of high Servian functionaries in Servian as well as in foreign countries, who, notwithstanding their official positions, did not hesitate to speak in hostile terms of Austria-Hungary in interviews given just after the event of the 28th June; 10. To inform the Imp. and Roy. government without delay that the measures summed up in the above points have been carried out." (Martel 2015, 166-167).

The Eastern Front or Eastern Theater of World War I (German: Ostfront, Russian: Восточный фронт, Vostochnıy front)

A theatre of operations that encompassed at its greatest extent the entire frontier between the Russian Empire and Romania on one side and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire and the German Empire on the other. It stretched from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south, involved most of Eastern Europe and stretched deep into Central Europe as well. The term contrasts with "Western Front", which was being fought in Belgium and France. During 1910, Russian General Yuri Danilov developed "Plan 19" under which four armies would invade East Prussia. This plan was criticised as Austria-Hungary could be a greater threat than the German Empire. So instead of four armies invading East Prussia, the Russians planned to send two armies to East Prussia, and two armies to defend against Austro-Hungarian forces invading from Galicia. In the opening months of the war, the Imperial Russian Army attempted an invasion of eastern Prussia in the northwestern theater, only to be beaten back by the Germans after some initial success. At the same time, in the south, they successfully invaded Galicia, defeating the Austro-Hungarian forces there.[17] In Russian Poland, the Germans failed to take Warsaw. But by 1915, the German and Austro-Hungarian armies were on the advance, dealing the Russians heavy casualties in Galicia and in Poland, forcing it to retreat. Grand Duke Nicholas was sacked from his position as the commander-in-chief and replaced by the Tsar himself.[18] Several offensives against the Germans in 1916 failed, including Lake Naroch Offensive and the Baranovichi Offensive. However, General Aleksei Brusilov oversaw a highly successful operation against Austria-Hungary that became known as the Brusilov Offensive, which saw the Russian Army make large gains.[19][20][21] The Kingdom of Romania entered the war in August 1916. The Entente promised the region of Transylvania (which was part of Austria-Hungary) in return for Romanian support. The Romanian Army invaded Transylvania and had initial successes, but was forced to stop and was pushed back by the Germans and Austro-Hungarians when Bulgaria attacked them in the south. Meanwhile, a revolution occurred in Russia in February 1917 (one of the several causes being the hardships of the war). Tsar Nicholas II was forced to abdicate and a Russian Provisional Government was founded, with Georgy Lvov as its first leader, who was eventually replaced by Alexander Kerensky. The newly formed Russian Republic continued to fight the war alongside Romania and the rest of the Entente until it was overthrown by the Bolsheviks in October 1917. Kerensky oversaw the July Offensive, which was largely a failure and caused a collapse in the Russian Army. The new government established by the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers, taking it out of the war and making large territorial concessions. Romania was also forced to surrender and signed a similar treaty, though both of the treaties were nullified with the surrender of the Central Powers in November 1918.

In chapter 4 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the impact of the idea of eugenics?

(p. 176) ¶4 It was not a German peculiarity. The Eugenics Society in Britain, founded in 1926, quickly gained about 800 members, mainly from elites in science, culture and politics, who were obsessed with the biological improvement of the population and whose influence ran beyond their numbers. Eugenics societies existed also in Scandinavia, Spain, the Soviet Union and elsewhere. Sterilization of mental patients to improve the quality of the population -- and to save money at the same time -- was mooted beyond German borders. A Swedish Institute- (p. 177) ¶1-for Racial Biology had been founded, for example, in Uppsala in 1922. But the obsession with racial quality was nonetheless especially marked in Germany. As early as 1920 a criminal lawyer, Karl Binding, and a psychiatrist, Alfred Hoche, had mooted what was then still the extreme view of a small minority, that 'the destruction of life not worth living' should be legally permitted. 'The emphasis on quality rather than quantity in the composition of the nation is psychologically connected with the reduction in our food-producing area', it was claimed in an address to the German Association for Psychiatry in 1925 -- linking population policy with a lack of 'living-space' (Lebensraum, a term later associated with Nazi ideology). Two years later the declining German birth rate was described as 'the most fearful of the many symbols of the decline of our culture', brought about by 'the victory of the city over the peasantry' and the emancipation of women, and bound to lead eventually to 'the fall of the white race'. ¶2 Highly influential in promoting cultural pessimism was Oswald Spengler's Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West), the first volume of which had appeared in 1918, just before the end of the war, and the second four years later. Spengler's laboriously developed comparison of historical cultures used a biological analogy of life cycles to argue, in somewhat mystical terms, that Western culture was condemned to decline under the impact of materialism, which could only be combated by the power of a strong state united in the hands of an elite. The German middle classes had bought more than 100,000 copies of the convoluted work by 1926. Easier reading than Spengler, but again promoting the mood of cultural pessimism and exploited by the political Right, was Hans Grimm's 1926 novel Volk ohne Raum (People without Space), which implied that overpopulation was at the root of Germany's economic woes and could only be overcome through a 'struggle for existence' to conquer new land (which, touching on nostalgia for empire, he envisaged as being in Africa). The novel sold over 2000,000 copies between 1926 and 1933, many, no doubt, to supporters of the growing Nazi Movement. ¶3 Only a relatively small minority of Germany's population of 60 million were avid readers of Spengler or Grimm. Nonetheless, the influence of such writers, and other with opportunities to expound their views in newspapers or other publications, or, like clergymen- (p. 178) ¶1-and schoolteachers, serving as 'mulitpliers' of opinion, should not be underrated. Nor should their potential to shape attitudes that could later be popularized by fascism." (Kershaw 2015, 176-178)

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how successful was the system of alliances in Europe pre-1914?

(p. 19) ¶2 Europe had successfully weathered a number of storms by June 1914, and there was no reason to believe that future difficulties might present problems that could not be overcome by negotiation. It was not in spite of the system of alliances that peace was maintained, but because of it. No Great Power on its own felt strong enough to challenge an adversary, given the combined might of the other side. And allies acted as a drag on one another by indicating their unwillingness to risk war over issues in which they had no clear and immediate interest at stake." (Martel 2014, 19).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how is the year 1914 characterized?

(p. 1) "¶1 1914 was the year of Peace in Europe. The last war fought between Great Powers on European soil had ended forty-three years before, in 1871. That war, the Franco-Prussian, was now but a distant memory, remembered only by an elderly few. The conflicts in which Germans, French, Russians, Italians, Austrians, and British had participated occurred in far-off places in Manchuria, South Africa, Indochina, and North Africa And those who had fought in them were mainly professional soldiers and volunteers, not conscripts. The most recent wars had been fought by Turks, Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks, and Romanians in 1912 and 1913. To western, central, and northern Europeans the Balkans hardly seemed to count as 'Europe', and with fewer than 100,000 killed, the wars there seemed to amount to amount to little more than skirmishes. They certainly did not appear to be a warning of things to come as much as a vestige of a past that civilized Europeans had put behind them. (Martel 2014, 1).

In chapter 4 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, how did the Soviet's and the Bolshevik's take power?

(p. 107) ¶3 ... the [newly-formed] provisional government faced a serious rival. This was the "Soviet [or council] of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," a group of Marxist militants that had spun off from its parent Social Democratic Party and had set about formulating its own, militantly collectivist, legislative agenda. The Soviet had assembled in St. Petersburg's Tauride Palace, across from the main hall where the "official" (if liberalized) Duma itself was holding its sessions. The uneasy relationship between Duma and SOviet produced a bicephalous arrangement that soon became dysfunctional, and all the more as the Duma's newly formed cabinet offered no political blueprint for extricating Russia from a widely detested war. ¶4 Moreover, within the Soviet's ranks, the Bolshevik minority, committed to an immediate root-and-branch collectivization of the Russian economy (p. 110), was positioning itself as the Left's most radical faction. Its emergence was a consequence less of its economic program, however, and still less of its modest numbers, than of the audacity and ruthlessness of its guiding spirit, Vladimir Lenin. The son of middle-class parents, a lawyer, and a prominent spokesman for Russia's Social Democratic Party, Lenin had taken up temporary residence in England in 1903 to assume the chairmanship of the party's Bolshevik component, before returning to Russia shortly before the war to nuture the Bolsheviki on Russian soil. (p. 108) ¶1 Now, on January 18, 1918, aware that the ballot-counting int he recently completed Russian election for a constitutional assembly had produced no clear majority for any parts, much less for the Soviet--and still less for the Soviet's Bolshevik faction--Lenin resolved to lead his core of dedicated followers in a preemptive move. Hence, as the assembly gathered at the Tauride Palace, Bolshevik soldiers and sailors packed the galleries, training their rifles and machine guns menacingly on the delegates and launching into a bedlam of imprecations and threats that effectively terminated further legislative proceedings. Within hours, a Bolshevik-dominated "Soviet of People's Commissars" replaced the Constituent Assembly. In this fashion, defying all national expectations and the modus operandi of almost all of Europe's earlier political upheavals, Lenin had well and truly maneuvered his minority of dedicated followers into a controlling political leadership of the largest nation in Europe." (Sachar 2014, 107-108).

In chapter 3 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what factors contributed to the Bolshevik's victory in the Civil War?

(p. 109) ¶2 The anti-Soviet campaigns, reaching their climax in 1919, took place largely in the peripheral regions of the former Russian Empire. The key to ultimate victory by the Reds, however, was their control of the large central core zone of Russia, together with superior organizational capacity and utter ruthlessness as well as divisions among their opponents. The vast territory gave the Reds access to huge manpower reserves (conscripted with the help of a good dose of terror in the countryside) and footdstuffs, ruthlessly extracted from an increasingly truculent but brutally cowed peasantry. This made possible the rapid expansion of the Red Army, which grew from a mere 430,000 men in October 1918 to 5,300,000 by the end of 1920. Badly equipped, ill-provisioned and often undisciplined though it was, the huge mass army, commanded by 75,000 former officers of the Tsarist army, marshalled by ferocious discipline, and fighting to defend the revolution, was more than a match for the numerically weaker and less cohesive White forces. Although the popularity of the Soviet state (which had been built heavily upon promise of land reform for the overwhelmingly peasant population) was rapidly declining, Bolshevik supremacy, the suppression of opposition parties, and ruthless terror against any who offered resistance meant that there was little alternative to compliance. ¶3 In any case, the Whites put forward little by way of a social programme that could favourably compete with that of the Bolsheviks. The White leaders, conservative Russian nationalists whose only objective seemed to be to turn the clock back to the pre-revolutionary period, were unable to win much support from non-Russian nationalists in peripheral regions. Ukraine, for instance, had a population of some 32 million, largely peasant, fervent Ukrainian nationalists who could not be mobilized for the Greater Russian cause. The Whites lacked not just a coherent programme; they were also organizationally weaker than the Soviets, could raise only smaller armies,suffered from poor communications, and had no coordinated military strategy. Yet- (p. 110) ¶1-the outcome of the civil war was far from a foregone conclusion. It took three years of the most bitter and bloody conflict before the Red Army was assured of outright victory. It would, nevertheless, have been against al the odds had Bolshevism not ultimately prevailed." (Kershaw 2015, 109-110).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what did France and Russia do to counter the Triple Alliance?

(p. 11) ¶4 The Russians learned of the alliance shortly after it was formed, the French a few years later. The Italians gave the French the precise details of the agreement when it was renewed in 1887. When it became clear that Britain was actively cooperating with the Triple Alliance, Russia and France began to discuss the possibility of a counter-alliance. Had they known that Britain had made secret arrangements for cooperation with Italy and Austria-Hungary in the Mediterranean, they might have moved more quickly than they did. After years of fitful negotiations the Russians and the French agreed to counter the Triple Alliance -- now, as far as they were concerned, a quintuple alliance -- with one of their own. (p. 12) ¶1 In 1891 the foreign ministers of Russia and France exchanged letters that led to a formal agreement the following year. As the Russian letter stated, it was the situation in Europe created by 'the open renewal of the Triple Alliance and the more or less probable adhesion of Great Britain to the political aims which that alliance pursues' that led them to their arrangement. They came together because they were united in their desire to maintain the peace, 'which forms the object of their sincerest aspirations'. They agreed to act to act together on any questions that might 'jeopardize the general peace' and to reach an understanding on what measures they might take if one of them were threatened with aggression.15[15.] ¶2 At first no more than a vague agreement to come to an agreement on measures to adopt in response to a threat of aggression aimed at one of them, by 1893-1894 the arrangement had grown teeth. The Franco-Russian alliance became formalized and a military convention established.16[16.] Like the Triple Alliance, it was purely defensive. The two Powers declared that they were 'animated by an equal desire to preserve peace, and [had] no other object than to meet the necessities of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance'. IF Germany were to attack either of them the other promised to attack Germany in support of its ally. If Germany supported an Italian attack on France, Russia promised to employ all available forces to attack Germany; if Germany supported an Austrian attack on Russia, France promised to employ all available forces to fight Germany. If any of the Powers of the Triple Alliance were to mobilize, France and Russia were to mobilize immediately in response 'without the necessity of any previous concert' and were to move the whole of their forces as close as possible to their frontiers. France promised to mobilize 1,300,000 men; Russia 700,000-800,000. Their general staffs were to cooperate in preparing and facilitating the execution of these military commitments.17[17.] ¶3 No time limit was established for the Franco-Russian alliance: it was to last as long as the Triple Alliance endured. Thus, for more than twenty years, Europe was divided into two armed camps, roughly equal in military power, but obliged to act only in the event that the other side commited an act of aggression. ..." (Martel 2014, 11-12).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what view about inter-state relations did Count István Tisza de Borosjenő et Szeged, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Hungary, have?

(p. 100) ¶3 Tisza shared the popular social-Darwinist views of relations among states. He wrote in an essay 'From Sadowa to Sedan' that there are some territories that are within the sphere of interest of several states. 'For such territories, world history knows only one solution, force, until this solution leads to a final result that forces the weaker adversary to reconciliation and to the appropriate modification of its aspirations.'31[31.] He was prepared to fight--if the conditions were right." (Martel 2014, 100).

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", in 1900 Europe, what was the portrayal of enemies?

(p. 17) ... ¶2 In most countries the imagery of enemies, internal as well as external, was built into rhetoric that was reaching new levels of aggression. The mass media stirred animosities -- usually intensely xenophobic and often outrightly racist -- that governments were glad to encourage. The South African War of 1899-1902 gave a new boost to extreme nationalistic belligerence, dubbed 'jingoism', in Great Britain. In Germany the conservative government whipped up nationalist fervour in the so-called 'Hottentot election' of 1907 to besmirch the Social Democrat opponents with alleged lack of patriotism. (That the Social Democrats actually increased the size of their vote -- though losing substantial numbers of seats -- indicates that as in Britain, jingoism had far greater currency among the middle classes than among workers.)" (Kershaw 2015, 17).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, who was appointed as the German ambassador in London in 1912? What was his reputation just prior to the July Crisis ?

(p. 113) ¶2 When in 1912 Bethmann Hollweg had proposed to appoint an official at the Wilhelmstrasse, Wilhelm von Stumm, as ambassador in London the kaiser had refused. 'No! He is far too afraid of the English! And hates my Fleet!' He would only appoint someone 'who has My trust, obeys My will, carries out My orders'.56[56.] The kaiser believed he knew someone he could trust. ¶3 Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky was born in 1860, the son of the fifth Prince Lichnowsky. The family estates in Silesia and Austria had made them rich: their holdings were fertile and contained rich deposits of coal. The young- (p. 114) ¶1-prince entered military service in the exclusively aristocratic Leibgardehusarenregiment at the age of 22, but within a year he moved to the foreign ministry. A succession of minor diplomatic postings soon followed, during which time he came to be patronized by Prince Bülow while serving under him at Bucharest--when it was widely believed that he had become Princess Bülow's lover. ¶2 ALthough the family possessed considerable holdings in Austria (over 4,000 hectares around Grätz) Lichnowsky had little respect for the Austrian system. It was too feudal and too clerical for his states. He complained that Austria was ruled by 'a pitiable old man and his unruly nephew and a Roman-Slavic priesthood'.57[57.] Although the Austrians neither loved nor understood the new German empire, he believed that they were essential to Germany's political and strategic position in Europe. Fortunately, as Lichnowsky saw it, the Austrians had little choice but to continue to rely upon their alliance with Germany, giving the Germans a relatively free diplomatic hand. ¶3 Lichnowsky returned to berlin and by 1900 was a councillor in the political division--one of six or seven working directly under the secretary of state. His most important role was as head of the appointments board, where he was responsible for testing candidates for admission to the service and for advising the chancellor on appointments to legations and embassies. When he failed to be appointed to an ambassadorship of his own after several years at the Wilhelmstrasse, he took indefinite leave from the service. He had come into his inheritance in 1901 and became a very wealthy man. A few years later, at the age of 44, he married Mechtilde, the Countess of Arco-Zinebbe--a direct descendant of the Habsburg empress, Maria Theresa. When she gave birth to a son the following year, the kaiser insisted on being made his godfather, and the son was named Wilhelm. ¶4 For years they led lives of cultured aristocrats, dividing their time between Berlin and their estates. Mechtilde established herself as a distinguished writier of novels, plays and assorted works. He devoted himself to his books (his library at Grätz contained over 15,000 volumes). They were connoisseurs of good food and conversation, holding lavish dinner parties where writers, artists, scholars, and businessmen mingled with nobles and and aristocrats. Still, Lichnowsky hoped that he would return to the diplomatic service and an appointment as ambassador one day. When the Paris embassy was vacated in 1910 he expected to receive the appointment. When it failed to come he petitioned to be granted formal release from the service. (p. 115) ¶1 Then, in 1912, Lichnowsky published an article on Anglo-German relations. He was responding to a former British prime minister and foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, who had written that a large fleet was not necessary for Germany, whereas for Britain it was a matter of life and death. Lichnowsky replied that Germany could not leave itself defenceless against the British navy and that the existence of the German fleet was a fact of life that the British would have to learn to accept. It was this article that convinced the kaiser that he had found his man for the embassy in London. But Bethmann Hollweg, as staid and conservative as always, argued that Princess Lichnowsky was unsuitable for an ambassador's wife: 'she is consumed by her interests (almost exclusively art, music, and more especially the theatre), has little understanding of her husband's social position, gives him no support in this direction and therefore has not known how to establish herself in either the Berlin or the Silesian society'.58[58.] The kaiser, as usual, prevailed and after some delay Lichnowsky was appointed ambassador in October 1912. ¶2 Lichnowsky immediately set out to establish friendly relations with the leading statesmen of Britain. He and Mechtilde were soon on good terms with the prime minister and his wife--Herbert and Margot Asquish--and were frequent weekend guests at the Asquith country house on the Thames. He quickly formed a warm and respectful relationship with the foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey. And Lichnowsky went to great efforts to be accepted into court circles and the society of English businessmen. ¶3 Within two years of his appointment to London, Lichnowsky believed that he had accomplished much that he had aimed for. By midsummer 1914 Anglo-German relations seemed to be much better than they had been for years. The two states had cooperated in the Balkans during the wars of the previous year, had come to an arrangement over the future disposition of Portuguese colonies in Africa, and settled their differences over the 'berlin to Baghdad' railway. He was feeling pleased and optimistic about their relations in the future." (Martel 2014, 115)

In "Day Three: Sunday, 26 July (page 213)", p. 213-238, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how did the British respond to the telegram that Russia's was preparing to publish the authorization to mobilize 1,100,000 men for war?

(p. 215) ¶4 Grey was already at his cottage by the time the telegram was received and it was left to the permanent under-secretary of state, Sir Arthur Nicholson, to decide how to respond to Buchanan's warning. Nicholson, who as ambassador to Russia had been instrumental in promulgating the Anglo-Russian entente, had thus far taken a cautious position on the crisis, advising against anything that might propel Russia forward against Austria and Germany. But he did fear the consequences if Britain let Russia down. In April he had told Buchanan that he favoured the negotiations for a naval agreement with- (p. 216) ¶1-Russia because he believed a more definite arrangement might be necessary to keep Russia onside: 'I do not know how much longer we shall be able to follow our present policy of dancing on a tight rope, and not be compelled to take up some definite line or other. I am also haunted by the same fear as you--lest Russia should become tired of us and strike a bargain with Germany.'3[3.] ¶2 Nicolson now thought he could see a general European war looming if they did not act immediately. He suggested to Grey that they take up Sazonov's apparent willingness to participate in a conference to deal with the crisis. He proposed that Berlin, Paris, and Rome ought to be asked to authorize their ambassadors in London to meet in a conference chaired by- (p. 217) ¶1-Grey. Pending this, Vienna, Belgrade, and St Petersburg should be asked to abstain from active military operations. He explained that he believed this was the only hope left of avoiding a general conflict.4[4.] ¶2 Nicolson drafted the instructions to Britain's ambassadors and by mid-afternoon Grey had taken time off from his fishing to wire his approval. Half an hour later the instructions were sent out. The under-secretary admitted that he was not optimistic: 'but in any case we shall have done our utmost'. ..." (Martel 2014, 216-217).

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what was the ethnic make-up of the new Yugoslavia in 1920?

(p. 231) ¶4 ... In 1920, the three peoples that gave their new state its initial name, "the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," comprised approximately 4.3 million Serbs, 2.9 million Croats, and slightly over 1 million Slovenes. The remaining 4.4 million (some 29 percent of the population) embraced a heterogeneity of Albanians, Montenegrins, Bosnains, Macedonains, Hungarians, Turks, Romanians, Italians, and Roma ("gypsies")." (Sachar 2015, 231)

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, when and how did King Aleksander assume total control over the nation?

(p. 236) ¶2 During the next months, with the continuing lockstep of intercommunal accusations and imprecations, functional legislation in the South Slav parliamanet ground to a halt. Eventually, n January 6, 1929, after urgent consultations with legal experts, King leksandar suspended parliament altogether and assumed personal rule over his nation. Once the king acted, moreover, he acted decisively, not only suspending parliament but abolishing the constitution, the kingdom's political parties, and authorizing police action against "divisive" organizations, chiefly those based predominantly on nationality or religion. In the process, the king's most decisive innovation was to eliminate the fledgling state's 33 provinces and substitute for them 9 regional units that deliberately cut across ethnic and religious divisions, including those of his native Serbia. By this measure, Aleksandar manifestly sought to prove that he was not a Serbian chauvinist, that he was determined to foster a new political template for his country. Indeed, he went so far as to replace the state's title--the "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes"--and to announce that henceforth the realm would be known as the "Kingdom of Yugoslavia." ¶3 But in his effort to dispense with the South Slav nation's initial neo-federalism, did Aleksandar become a nonarcho-fascist?21[21.] His decree abolishing the constitution apparently gave all his subsequent edicts the force of absolutism. In the process, too, the king did not hesitate to muzzle the nation's press, or to- (p. 237) ¶1-apply an iron fist to his political enemies. Although these latter included first and foremost spokesmen for Croatian autonomy, whose parties and political activities he banned altogether, Yugoslavia's other ethnic blocs, including Slovenes, Dalmatians, Montenegrins, Bosnians, Herzegoinians, and Macedonians--whether ROman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, Muslims, or Jews--also were subjected to political harassment and new constraints on their educational and communal institutions. ¶2 it was not long, too, before the king's political police were allowed widening discretion to intimidate his critics. One particularly notorious incident claimed the life of Milan Sufflay, a respected professor of history the University of Zagreb and an outspoken Croatian nationalist. On several occasions in the latter 1920s, the government had imprisoned Sufflay for reputed political incitement. At first, the confinements were short; but no sooner was the professor released than he embarked again on fiery press criticism of the royal dictatorship. At least, on February 19, 1931, members of the king's intelligence service waylaid Sufflay outside his home and clubbed him to death. The episode aroused outrage both in Yugoslavia and abroad. Albert Einstein and Heinrich Mann were among the international figures whose protests appeared in leading European and American newspapers. ¶3 It was of note, however, that most of Yugoslavia's private citizens seemed to accept the royal dictatorship with less protest than did their politicians and intellectuals, let alone their clamorous émigré communities abroad. Even non-Serbs appeared at first to prefer Aleksandar's efficient and comparatively graft-free administration. It did not escape them that, for all his repressive measures, the king had authorized a number of enlightened innovations, among them a significant increase of openings for women in government and a progressive tax schedule. Moreover, an effective program of land reform, initiated in the mid-1920s, was dramatically enlarged after 1928 and applied equitably to all sectors of the population.22[22.]" (Sachar 2015, 237)

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the first disturbance to the delicate post-WWI international order?

(p. 249) ¶2 "The first disturbance to the international order actually emerged far away from Europe, with the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in September 1931. When China appleaded for international support to condemn this outrage, the League belatedly set up a commission to explore the entire background to the conflict and make suggestions for a settlement. The commission took nearly a year to report, finally denouncing Japan's action though at the same time pressing China to acknowledge what the commission regarded as legitimate japanese interests in Manchuria. However cautious, the judgement was in any case out of date by the time it was delivered. By 1932 a Japanese puppet state in Manchuria, renamed Manchukuo, had been established in the large, economically vital region. The League had no coercive power to force Japan to give up its conquered territory, and China was too weak and divided to attempt an armed reconquest. Japanese aggression was vilified in world opinion. But that was to no avail, other than to ensure that, alienated by international condemnation, Japan withdrew for the League of Nations in February 1933. The country's diplomatic isolation encouraged the rise of shirll nationalism there as Japan tilted sharply towards rule by a military oligarchy set on expansion. Manchuria had laid bare the feebleness of the League of Nations. This in turn advertised the weakness of Britain and France, the two dominant countries in the League. Upholding British naval strength in the Far East meant further pressure on Britain's already overstretched defence resources. It was an inducement to appeasement, both in the Far East and in Europe. (p. 250) ¶1 The League's central concern, to reduce the prospects of international conflict through a system of collective security based on an agreement to disarm, had by then proved an unmitigated failure ..." (Kershaw 2015, 249-250).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what brought the end of the war for Germany?

(p. 60) ¶2 Numerical superiority of men and weaponry on the western front had until now always lain with the Allies. And German losses had been far higher on the western than the eastern front. But the elimination of Russia from the war had freed no fewer than forty-four German divisions to be transferred to the west. Ludendorff, in effect running Germany, saw the chance of a conclusive victory in the west through a massive spring offensive in 1918, code-named Operation Michael, centred more or less on the line of the Somme, before the Americans could enter the fighting. The biggest artillery bombardment of the war, from 6,600 guns, began the offensive on 21 March. The shocked and outnumbered ALlied troops were pushed back nearly 40 miles almost to Amiens. But there was no collapse. And the German infantry could make only slow progress, especially in the northern part of the front. Casualties were very high. The Germans lost almost 40,000 men, a quarter of them killed, on the first day of the offensive. British losses were only marginally lower. Taking German and Allied losses together, the bloodletting was the worst in a single day of the war, worse even than on the first day of the Somme. By the time the offensive was halted on 5 April, total german losses, by now irreplaceable, amounted to 239,000 men. The British and French had between them lost 338,000 men -- nearly a quarter of them taken prisoner. The overall losses within two weeks matched those at Verdun over a period of five months. ¶3 This marked the beginning of the end for Germany. A follow-up offensive in pril, in Flanders, aimed at capturing the Belgian ports, again ran out of steam after early German successes. Despite the losses (a further 150,000 men) the Allies could still find reserves. But the Germans were down to their last reserves, dredged up for final attacks in the spring and summer on old fighting territory -- the Chemin des Dames once more, as far as the marne (where the first great battle of the war had taken place). By June 1918 American troops had joined ALlied ranks -- and were arriving at the rate of 200,000 a month. A big- (p. 61) ¶1-French counter-attack on the Marne, involving hundreds of Renault tanks back by air cover, then swiftly mopped up 30,000 German prisoners. German morale started to crack, and before long it was collapsing. The gains in the march offensive were wipe out in Allied advances in late August and September. By early October the Allies were over the heavily fortified Hindenburg Line and the Germans were in full retreat. Germany was by now militarily as good as finished--not that the population at home was aware that defeat was imminent, since the worst had been concealed from it by propaganda that had continued to campaign for peace only after victory." (Kershaw 2015, 60-61).

By 1917, how many Russian soldiers had been killed, and captured?

1.5 million, and 2 million wounded.

What problems did Germany encournter in fighting the battle of Britain?

Britain had a superior air force, with better aircraft flown by better trained pilots?

According to Professor Lanthier, why did the Weimar Republic government permit the inflation of the 1920s to go on for so long?

First, imposing austerity measures to deal with hyperinflation would have been politically unpopular, and in a democratic government, and so they didn't want to risk losing re=election. Also, many Germans did not want to pay of reparations demanded in Versailles. To the Germans of all political stripes, Versailles and the demanded reparations, was wrong, and any attempts to undermine these reparations is seen as a good thing. In addition, the German government was hoping to go before the Allies and use hyperinflation as a means of renegotiating the terms of the Versailles reparations. The German politicians did this on purpose, but they didn't expect it would get as bad as they did.

According to Professor Lantier, during the time of War Communism, what happened to food that led t to the famine of the 1920s?

Food was primarily taken from the peasants and given to the military, which was necessary to win the civil war and enforce the government's will, and the factories, as that is where the industrial workers who are making munitions are located, and where the workers soviets, which the Bolsheviks depended upon for support, are located.

According to Lanthier, what did Brüning start to do in 1931 to combat the Depression?

In 1931, Brüning was using more and more executive decrees, which was legal in the weimar constitution. These decrees were originally intended as a short-term emergency measure. However, Brüning's wider and wider use of these decrees set a precedent that authoritarian tendencies were acceptable, and it signaled a breakdown in democratic government.

Why is determining the "will to War' more difficult in the Western nations?

In the eastern countries like Russia and Germany, where there were autocratic rulers, finding out the figures who made the choice to go to war is relatively easy. However, n the western nations in Britain and France, the leaders and politicians are democratically elected, and they therefore were VERY sensitive to public opinion. Therefore, in order to understand why the political leaders of the Western nations went to war, one must acknowledge that they would only do so if they had public support. Thus, one has to ask why would the public support war.

According to Lanthier, what were key events in the spring of 1933 that saw the rise of the Nazi's?

Jan. 30th 1933: Hitler appointed Chancellor. Feb. 27th: Reichstag fire. Feb. 28th: Decree for the Protection of the People and State. March 23rd: law to Remedy the Distress of the People & State ("Enabling Law").

According to Lanthier, what were some key moments in the rise of Hitler's power in the summer of 1934?

June 29-30, 1934: "Night of the Long Knives". Murder of SA leader Ernst Röhm. July 1934: Hitler becomes "Führer + Reich Chancellor" Gleichschaltung (coordination).

How vital was the American contribution in WWII?

Much more important than in WWI. This time, Americans actually did a lot to help the British and soviets defeat Nazi Germany

How did social-darwinism, and the newspapers, affect the attitudes about war?

Social Darwinism became very fashionable. At this time, widespread literacy meant that many people could read. Widespread newspapers meant that a lot of people were reading news that was heavily nationalistic and often jingoistic. People tended to see things in terms of social darwinism?

How did machine guns and artillery affect soldiers?

Soldiers could die from the unseen machine guns bullets or artillery fire. There is no way to foresee and defend from this attack. So, soldiers adopt a DEFENSIVE posture. It is better to allow the enemy to attack, as the defending solder has trenches, machine guns and artillery for defense. Commanders now struggle with how to attack.

Is it fair to say that the German Hyperinflation in the 1920s a real economic crisis?

The Hyperinflation of the 1920s in Germany was not a real economic crisis. The fundamentals of the German economy was quite sound. Finally, the whole thing was settled, and everything calmed down. Therefore, it is specious to compare this to the great depression.

In the early 20th century, what were the Great Powers in Europe?

The UK, the French Republic, the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire. Italy was a weird case. Sometimes it was considered a part of the Great Powers, but often it lagged behind.

In "Day Three: Sunday, 26 July (page 213)", p. 213-238, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, on the evening of Sunday July 26, what did the German ambassador to London Lichnowsky, Sir Grey's then-private secretary William George Tyrrell, and the permanent under-secretary of state, Sir Arthur Nicholson, SEEM to agree upon

(p. 220) ¶4 Finally, on Sunday evening, Lichnowsky was able to sit down at the Foreign Office with Nicolson and Sir William Tyrrell, Grey's private secretary. He used his report on this meeting to do everything he could to persuade Berlin to agree to the proposed conference. Nicolson and Tyrrell believed, he said, that this was the only way to avoid a general war. Moreover, they virtually promised that Austria would get what it wanted at a conference: the Serbs would more likely to give in to the combined pressure of the Powers than to submit to Austrian threats. The absolute prerequisite was a cessation of military activities because once the Serbian frontier was crossed 'all would be lost'. No Russian government could tolerate such a step. Russia would be forced to attack Austria or lose its status among Balkan nations forever. ¶2 According to Lichnowsky, Tyrrell, who had met with Grey before he left London on Saturday and who was fully cognizant of is views, emphasized- (p. 221) ¶1-the importance of Serbian territory remaining inviolate until the question of the conference was settled. Otherwise a world war was inevitable. 'Localization', the ambassador once again stressed, was 'wholly impossible' and must now be abandoned as impractical. On the other hand, he promised the chancellor that if Germany and Britain between them were to succeed in preserving peace in Europe, Anglo-German relations would be placed on a secure foundation 'for all time' (mmerwährende Zeiten). ¶2 Lichnowsky attempted to present Berlin with a stark choice: preserve the peace and achieve Bethmann Hollweg's goal of an Anglo-German partnership for the future or involve the German people in a struggle in which 'they have nothing to win and everything to lose'.17[17.] Nicolson, reporting on the meeting to Grey, noted that the ambassador 'was very excited'.18[18.] (Martel 2014, 220-221).

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, on what basis did the Serbs calim leadership of the "South Slav" a.k.a. Yugoslav Confederation.

(p. 226) ¶2 ... the Serb's eventual claim to Yugoslav leadership lay in their record of self-sacrifice during the ensuing World War [1]. They bore the brunt of Austiran retaliation for the Sarajevo assassination with a tenacity and stoicism exceeded by no other wartime nation. Indeed, it was not until october 1915 that the Habsburg army, against ferocious Serbian resistance, managed to conquer Belgrade, the Serbian capital, which lay just across the Danube from integral Austria. From then on, however, the Serbs endured the full horror of Austrian occupation. Thousands of their citizens were rounded up and consigned to forced-labor camps, many of them eventually to die of their privation. ¶3 By then, too, the little nation's army, together with its ailing, half-paralyzed king, Petar I, and other members fo the Serbian government, as well as tens of thousands of civilians, had embarked on a historic exodus through neighboring Montenegro, Albania, and Macedonia. Under the military leadership of Serbia's Prince Regent Aleksandar, who functioned as his father's surrogate, the trek was carried out over snow-clad mountains and through vertiginous defiles, in extremes of cold and heat, of illness and starvation, all in an effort to reach the Macedonian coast and rescue by units of the British and French navies. Of the soldiers and civilians who participated in the epic three-month journey, enduring a nightmare of typhus, dysentery, and mountain frost, at least 70,000 -- men, women, children -- expired in the ordeal. In December 1915, when the survivors finally straggled into the Macedonian port of Salonika, they had been reduced to living skeletons. More than half- (p. 227) ¶1-of them had to be carried off by Allied naval vessels for convalescence in the military hospitals of Corfu and Corsica. ¶2 Even afterward, Serbian soldiers hardly had been nursed back to health when they were returned to battle action in the final Allied offensive on the Balkan front in 1918. By the time the Habsburg government sued for peace, the war had cost Serbia an estimated 1.25 million dead--almost one-quarter of its population, and close to two-thirds of its male population between the ages of 15 and 55.2[2.] In perspective, the odyssey of the Serbs' courage and sacrifice rivaled any comparable saga in history and was immortalized ever after in their people's folklore." (Sachar 2015, 226-227)

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", how did Germany's rise to power challenge the balance of power among the European Great Powers, and how did Britain, France, and Russia respond to this?

(p. 25) ... ¶3 In 1914 the increasingly uneasy balance among the major powers of Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary, bound up in rival systems of alliance, still held, but only just. One ominous long-term development, leading to growing tension, had been the emergence during the 1890s of Germany's ambitions to become a world power. The direct challenge was to Great Britain's world-power status. Rivalry between Germany and Britain intensified. But on the continent of Europe itself a strong Germany (which had been allied with Austria-Hungary since 1879 and with Italy since- (p. 26) ¶1-1882) posed the biggest threat to France and Russia. Common interest brought a somewhat unlikely rapprochement between the latter two countries -- one a republic, the other a monarchist autocracy -- which led to an alliance signed in 1894 directly aimed at neutralizing Germany's challenge. Just over a decade later, Germany's position had been strengthened by the resounding defeat in 1905 -- surprising to many at the time -- of Russia at the hands of Japan, the up-and-coming power in the Far East, which shook the foundations of the Tsarist Empire. The autocracy only narrowly survived the internal turmoil that followed the defeat. Remarkably, however, under shrewd economic and political management, the following years were a boom time in Russia. With the help of large French loans, the economy grew impressively. Military rebuilding made rapid progress. And long-existing hopes of gaining control over the Bosphorus at the expense of the crumbling Ottoman Empire were revived -- prospects enhanced by the hugely improved relations of Russia with Britain. ¶2 The two had traditionally been rivals. Britain had long been keen, to the point of war in the Crimea in 1854, to avoid Russian domination of the Turkish Straits -- the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, crucial to control of the Mediterranean and entry to the Middle East -- and to head off any potential threat to the vital colony of India that might arise from Russian expansion in central Asia. But Russia's weakness after the defeat by Japan brought a readiness to come to terms with Britain in a convention signed in 1907, which stipulated their respective spheres of influence in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet -- areas of potential conflict. Although this did not directly affect Germany, it certainly did so indirectly. The agreement between Russia and BRitain, building upon the earlier Franco-Russian alliance and the Entente Cordiale of 1904 between France and Britain (aimed directly at German power), reshaped the structure of power-politics in Europe. Germany and its main ally, Austria-Hungary -- Italy, not even a great power, even if its leaders harboured such a pretence, was a flakier ally -- found themselves facing the newly created (and in the light of past enmities remarkable) entente of Britain, France and Russia. The understandable feeling within Germany that the Reich was encircled by its enemies grew ever stronger." (Kershaw 2015, 25-26).

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what were the two primary aspects that kept the Hitler movement going?

(p. 285) ¶2 The twin aspects of 'removal of the Jews' (an idea that meant different things to different people at different times) and 'living space" (Lebensraum), entailing preparation for military conflict at some point in the foreseeable future to secure Germany's future economic basis and supremacy in Europe (an idea capable of embracing various notions of german expansion), served to sustain a relentless ideological dynamic. This ideological drive was not remotely matched in Mussolini's Italy and was completely different in essence from what underpinned the manic upheavals in the Soviet Union. It follow no coherent plan or timetabled blueprint. But both the direction and the inexorable momentum of radicalization were intrinsic to the Nazi system." (Kershaw 285).

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what did Hitler discuss with the commanders-in-chief of the Germany's military on 5 November 1937?

(p. 315) ¶1 In Berlin on the dark and dreary late afternoon of 5 November 1937 the commanders-in-chief of Germany's army, air force and navy -- General Werner von Fritsch, General Hermann Göring (also head of the Four-Year Plan) and Admiral Erich Raeder -- made their way to the Reich Chancellery to learn Hitler's decision on the allocation of steel to the three services. At least, that is what they thought they were going to learn. ¶2 Hitler addressed them for two hours, though not about the allocation of steel. At first there was little new. They had heard many times from him before that Germany's future economic security could be assured not by dependence on the vagaries of international markets but only through the acquisition of 'living space' (Lebensraum). The idea itself, a variant of imperialist ideology reinforced by Germany's exposure to economic blockade during the First World War and one of Hitler's obsessions since the mid-1920s, implied, of course, expansion and the risk, if into the certainty, of armed conflict at some point. This in itself worried neither the military leaders nor the others present, the War Minister, Werner von Blomberg, the Foreign Minister, Konstantin von Neurath, and Hitler's Wehrmacht adjutant, Colonel Friedrich Hossbanch. What 'living space' meant in practice had been left open. It covered various notions of future expansion. None necessarily signified war in the near future. What Hitler went on to say, however, was that he was contemplating precisely that possibility. Time wa snot on Germany's side. The current advantage in armaments would not last. He was determined to act by 1943-4 at the latest, but undre certain circumstances much earlier. ¶3 He raised the possibility of attacking Austria and Czechoslovakia even during the coming year, 1938. That worried some of his small audience a great deal. It wa snot that they were concerned about asserting German supremacy in central Europe or economic dominance of the Danube region (specially favoured by Göring). It was the prospect of war between Germany and the western powers that triggered their alarm. Germanyw as nowhere near prepared for a major war, and they knew it. What they had heard left Blomberg, Neurath- (p. 316) ¶1-and, above all, Fritsch nervous. Three months later the sceptics were gone. Hitler had removed all of them from their posts." (Kershaw 2015, 315-316).

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, how was Germany's steel production in 1937?

(p. 317) ¶2 As 1937 drew to a close, the arms race among Europe's most powerful countries was an increasingly crucial determinant of the actions of governments. Hitler's meeting with his military leaders had ostensibly been about steel allocation. And, indeed, the shortages of steel were creating major difficulties for the German rearmament programme. Steel production was far too low for the demands of the army, it was imposing drastic constraints on aircraft production, and it left the building of warships lagging far behind the navy's projected targets. The growing steel crisis had led to the latter months of 1937 to the ousting of the Economics Minister, Hjalmar Schacht, who had master-minded the economic recovery after 1933 but had more recently raises weighty objections to a military spending programme that was running out of control. Göring, head of the Four-Year Plan -- the crucial rearmaments programme laid down in autumn 1936 -- was now effectively in charge of the economy and interested in economic management solely to maximize rearmament production and make Germany ready for war in the shortest possible time, regardless of cost. When the industrial barons of the Ruhr baulked at the costs of smelting the low-grade iron ores to meet his targets of domestic production, he commissioned three state-owned steelworks to do precisely that. ¶3 Leaders of German big business, not for the most part enthusiastic about Hitler before he had gained power, had been swift converts thereafter, eagerly eyeing the vast profits to be made from a revitalized economy, an armaments boom, and the anticipated domination of easterna nd south-eastern Europe. Reluctant though the Ruhr steel barons were to invest in low-grade iron ores, they were nonetheless major beneficiaries of the vast state expenditure on rearmament. A huge concern such as the chemicals giant IG Farben had already seen its profits soar under the demands of the Four-Year Plan, and eye-watering possibilities lay in store as booty from German conquest. Its bosses could be certain to favour expansion into Austria and Czechoslovakia, both of which offered the prospect of major economic gain in the near future -- acquisition, not least, of raw materials and industrial potential, ever more urgently needed to sustain the armaments drive in an economy under massive strain. (p. 318) ¶1 Supply bottlenecks and acute labour shortages were already building up. Over subsequent months the problems would become increasingly severe. Eventually, they would even bring warnings of an imminent collapse in the Reich's finances. Any 'normal' government would have felt compelled to address the difficulties by rining in expenditure to avoid economic disaster. But the Nazi regime wa sin no way 'normal'. Hitler's own unchanged view, coming to be shared by weighty sections of the military-industrial complex, was that only war -- and the acquisition of new economic resources -- would solve Germany's problems. Far from acting as a brake on Hitler's drive to war, Germany's mounting economic problems reinforced his conviction that war was an urgent necessity." (Kershaw 2015, 317-318).

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what did Hitler do to Austria in 1938?

(p. 329) ¶2 Believing that Hitler wanted the incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany but no more, Neville Chamberlain flew twice to Germany in mid-September for talks with Hitler. ... ... (p. 330) ¶1-... the Munich Agreement, signed on 30 September 1938. The Czechs were not represented at the gathering of the big powers that proceeded to break up their country. The two western democracies had forced another democracy to submit to the bullying of a dictator." (Kershaw 2015, 329-330).

In "the Killing", p. 49-81, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how did Franz Ferdinand react to the fact that his wife was routinely humiliated in court circles due to her background?

(p. 71) ¶4 These arrangements were more than a mere annoyance to Franz Ferdinand. By 1914 hsi bad temper had become legendary in Austrian court and military circles. He frequently flew into a rage over the smallest matter, with one of his close friends describing him as 'unbalanced in everything: he did nothing like other people'.10[10.] Once, when travelling on the imperial train on his way to meet the German kaiser, something in his carriage proved to be unsatisfactory--whereupon he draw his sword and hacked the upholstery to pieces. Although close friends and family found him to be genial, kind, and loyal, he was abbrasive and cold to outsiders. He seemed unwilling to make- (p. 72) ¶1-any effort to cultivate popular affection among those he was to rule over. The contrast with his uncle was striking: although austere and remote, by 1914, having ruled for sixty-six years, the emperor Franz Joseph was now regarded with affection as the 'father' of the Dual Monarchy. His portrait and statues were to be found everywhere. ¶2 Franz Ferdinand was incensed at having to deal with the humiliation endured by his wife. But when the emperor appointed him to the position of inspector-general of the imperial army he saw the possibility that Sophie might at last be accorded the treatment befitting an empress. The visit to Sarajevo offered just such an opportunity. Rather than--literally--taking a back seat to her husband the archduke, as wife of the inspector-general of the k.u.k. (kaiserlich and königlich, 'imperial and royal') army she would sit at his side in an open carriage during the procession, and take a place of honour next to him when he spoke at the city hall. Thus the archduke was determined that the entire affair of his visit should be kept as 'military' as possible--and if this meant ignoring and offending the civilian authorities, so be it. He had little use for the 'politicians' in any case." (Martel 2014, 71-72).

According to Professor Lanthier, what is the historical assessment of many people of the Paris Peace Conference?

A failure, and a main source of the outbreak of WWII. Professor Lanthier argues that this interpretation is very anachronistic, the "myth of Versailles," wherein some arrogant old men made terrible mistakes that paved the road for WWII? Lanthier argues that such a myth does not take into account all sorts of other causes of WWII, and that blaming the whole war on a single event is reductionistic.

According to Lanthier, what changed about the perception of women in WWI?

A lot of people, particularly in Western European countries, both men and women, created a new kind of woman. Many believed that women growing up in the 1920s, after the war, was fundamentally different to women prior to the war.

The Kiel mutiny (German: Kieler Matrosenaufstand)?

A major revolt by sailors of the German High Seas Fleet on 3 November 1918. The revolt triggered the German revolution which was to sweep aside the monarchy within a few days. It ultimately led to the end of the German Empire and to the establishment of the Weimar Republic.

The Crimean War (French: Guerre de Crimée; Russian: Кры́мская война́, romanized: Krymskaya voyna or Russian: Восто́чная война́, romanized: Vostochnaya voyna, lit. 'Eastern War'; Turkish: Kırım Savaşı; Italian: Guerra di Crimea)

A military conflict fought from October 1853 to February 1856[6] in which the Russian Empire lost to an alliance of the Ottoman Empire, France, Britain and Sardinia. The immediate cause involved the rights of Christian minorities in the Holy Land, which was a part of the Ottoman Empire. The French promoted the rights of Roman Catholics, while Russia promoted those of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The longer-term causes involved the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the unwillingness of Britain and France to allow Russia to gain territory and power at Ottoman expense. It has widely been noted that the causes, in one case involving an argument over a key, have never revealed a "greater confusion of purpose", yet they led to a war noted for its "notoriously incompetent international butchery".[7] While the churches worked out their differences and came to an agreement, Nicholas I of Russia and the French Emperor Napoleon III refused to back down. Nicholas issued an ultimatum that the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire be placed under his protection. Britain attempted to mediate and arranged a compromise that Nicholas agreed to. When the Ottomans demanded changes, Nicholas refused and prepared for war. Having obtained promises of support from France and Britain, the Ottomans declared war on Russia in October 1853. The war started in the Balkans in July 1853, when Russian troops occupied the Danubian Principalities[6] (part of modern Romania), which were under Ottoman suzerainty, then began to cross the Danube. Led by Omar Pasha, the Ottomans fought a strong defensive campaign and stopped the advance at Silistra. A separate action on the fort town of Kars in eastern Anatolia led to a siege, and a Turkish attempt to reinforce the garrison was destroyed by a Russian fleet at Sinop. Fearing an Ottoman collapse, France and Britain rushed forces to Gallipoli. They then moved north to Varna in June 1854, arriving just in time for the Russians to abandon Silistra. Aside from a minor skirmish at Köstence (today Constanța), there was little for the allies to do. Karl Marx quipped, "there they are, the French doing nothing and the British helping them as fast as possible".[8] Frustrated by the wasted effort, and with demands for action from their citizens, the allied force decided to attack Russia's main naval base in the Black Sea at Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula. After extended preparations, the forces landed on the peninsula in September 1854 and marched their way to a point south of Sevastopol after the successful Battle of the Alma. The Russians counterattacked on 25 October in what became the Battle of Balaclava and were repulsed, but at the cost of seriously depleting the British Army forces. A second counterattack, at Inkerman, ended in stalemate. The front settled into a siege and led to brutal conditions for troops on both sides. Smaller military actions took place in the Baltic, the Caucasus, the White Sea, and the North Pacific. Sevastopol fell after eleven months, and neutral countries began to join the Allied cause. Isolated and facing a bleak prospect of invasion from the west if the war continued, Russia sued for peace in March 1856. France and Britain welcomed this development, as the conflict was growing unpopular at home. The Treaty of Paris, signed on 30 March 1856, ended the war. It forbade Russia from basing warships in the Black Sea. The Ottoman vassal states of Wallachia and Moldavia became largely independent. Christians there were granted a degree of official equality, and the Orthodox Church regained control of the Christian churches in dispute.[9]:415 The Crimean War was one of the first conflicts in which the military used modern technologies such as explosive naval shells, railways, and telegraphs.[10](Preface) The war was one of the first to be documented extensively in written reports and photographs. As the legend of the "Charge of the Light Brigade" demonstrates, the war quickly became an iconic symbol of logistical, medical and tactical failures and mismanagement. The reaction in the UK was a demand for professionalisation, most famously achieved by Florence Nightingale, who gained worldwide attention for pioneering modern nursing while treating the wounded. The Crimean War proved to be the moment of truth for Nikolaevan Russia.[clarification needed] The humiliation forced Russia's educated elites to identify the Empire's problems and to recognize the need for fundamental transformations aimed at modernizing and restoring Russia's position in the ranks of European powers. Historians have studied the role of the Crimean War as a catalyst for the reforms of Russia's social institutions: serfdom, justice, local self-government, education, and military service. More recently, scholars have also turned their attention to the impact of the Crimean War on the development of Russian nationalistic discourse.

The Kapp Putsch, also known as the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch after its leaders Wolfgang Kapp and Walther von Lüttwitz?

An attempted coup on 13 March 1920 which aimed to undo the German Revolution of 1918-1919, overthrow the Weimar Republic and establish an autocratic government in its place. It was supported by parts of the Reichswehr (Military) and nationalist and monarchist factions. The coup took place in the capital, Berlin, and the legitimate German government was forced to flee the city. The coup failed after a few days, when large sections of the German population followed a call by the government to join a general strike. Most civil servants refused to cooperate with Kapp and his allies. Despite its failure, the putsch had significant consequences for the future of the Weimar Republic. It was one of the causes of the Ruhr uprising of March 1920, which the government suppressed by military force, whilst dealing leniently with those behind the putsch. These events polarized the electorate, resulting in a shift in the majority after the June Reichstag elections.

How does Artillery affect WWI?

Artillery dominated the battlefields of trench warfare. An infantry attack was rarely successful if it advanced beyond the range of its supporting artillery. In addition to bombarding the enemy infantry in the trenches, the artillery could be used to precede infantry advances with a creeping barrage, or engage in counter-battery duels to try to destroy the enemy's guns. Artillery mainly fired fragmentation, high-explosive, shrapnel or, later in the war, gas shells. The British experimented with firing thermite incendiary shells, to set trees and ruins alight. However, all armies experienced shell shortages during the first year or two of World War I, due to underestimating their usage in intensive combat. This knowledge had been gained by the combatant nations in the Russo-Japanese War, when daily artillery fire consumed ten times more than daily factory output, but had not been applied.

How did leadership help the Bolsheviks win the Russian Civil War (1918-20)?

As a result of its participation in the First World War, Russia was awash with munitions and other war material at the time of the October Revolutoin. In 1917-18 almost all of the arsenal of the old Tsarist army -- one estimate suggests something like 1.5 million rifles, 12,000 artillery pieces and 28 million shells -- fell into Bolshevik hands. The Bolsheviks did not of course, rely solely on this windfall. Russia's main engineering and armaments factories were located with Sovdepia and this gave them the capacity to manufacture new weapons.

Why did the Treaty of London of 1839 trigger Britain's involvement in World War I?

Belgium's de facto independence had been established through nine years of intermittent fighting. The co-signatories of the Treaty of London—Great Britain, Austria, France, the German Confederation (led by Prussia), Russia, and the Netherlands—now officially recognised the independent Kingdom of Belgium, and at Britain's insistence agreed to its neutrality. The treaty was a fundamental "lawmaking" treaty that became a cornerstone of European international law; it was especially important in the events leading up to World War I.[15] On 31 July 1914 the mobilisation of the Belgian Army was ordered, and the Belgian King at the same time publicly called Europe's attention to the fact that Germany, Great Britain and France were solemnly bound to respect and to defend the neutrality of his country.[16] When the German Empire invaded Belgium in August 1914 in violation of the treaty, the British declared war on 4 August.[17][18] Informed by the British ambassador that Britain would go to war with Germany over the latter's violation of Belgian neutrality, German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg exclaimed that he could not believe that Britain and Germany would be going to war over a mere "scrap of paper".[19]

Why did the British not commit to a firm alliance by 1914?

Britain did not really want to commit to a firm military alliance. Britain was an island nation, and Britain's foreign policy was to keep Europe disunited, to prevent anyone from threatening their island nation. It finally took the threat of Germany challenging the balance of power which got Britain's interest in the first place.

What was the British economy like in 1900?

Britain, by 1900 was still the overall largest and wealthiest country, but it's lead was being challenged by the United States and Germany. Britain was so economically developed that most people were living in towns and cities, compared to other people.

Why was Brüning so desperate to cut spending, and reduce the risk of inflation in the 1930s?

Brüning was worried about the hyper-inflation in the 1920s. Many German politicians, remembering the hyper-inflation crisis, were more concerned with inflation than they wer ein unemployment.

What were some of the economic motivations of New Imperialism?

By 1870, it became necessary for European industrialized nations to expand their markets globally in order to sell products that they could not sell domestically on the continent. Businessmen and bankers had excess capital to invest, and foreign investments offered the incentive of greater profits, despite the risks. The need for cheap labor and a steady supply of raw materials, such as oil, rubber, and manganese for steel, required that the industrial nations maintain firm control over these unexplored areas. Only by directly controlling these regions, which meant setting up colonies under their direct control, could the industrial economy work effectively—or so the imperialists thought. The economic gains of the new imperialism were limited, however, because the new colonies were too poor to spend money on European goods.

After 1916, what was the picture of German politics?

By the end of 1916, the peace between the military and the civilians was started to fray. Nevertheless, the Social Democratic Party was pliable, and willing to work with the government. The leaders of the SDP is now the largest party in the Reichstag. The SDP wants to attract mainstream German electorate, and cooperating with the war-effort is seen as the best way to do that.

What changed about the relationship between the Reichstag and the military in July 1917?

Deputies in 1917 realized just how badly the war is getting. In July 1917, the Reichstag passes a peace resolution. This resolution states that Germany was not fighting for territorial again, merely to protect territory that it already controlled. This is clearly an example of civilian politicians trying to reassert control of foreign policy and the overall war aims. THis is also the beginning of a period of political confrontation between the military and its supporters on the Right, and the SDP-dominated Reichstag and its supporters on the Left.

According to Professor Lanthier, what made the Bolsheviks so successful?

First, they were lead by a very talented revolutionaries, who were ideologically motivated to be the vanguard of a revolution. Also, they were very good at creating a simple public message that the people could get behind: "bread, land, peace." In addition, the Bolsheviks were willing to work with the Soviets, who were democratically elected representative councils, with the aim of taking power, and then sidelining the Soviets.

According to Lanthier, what was the psychological impact of Zeppelin's?

It was the first time that civilians in cities faced significant aerial bombardment, and the shape and appearance of the blimps was also quite terrifying. In addition, thei prelude of the blimp created a fear that aerial bombardment could cause mass civilian casualties.

How did railroads aggravate the possibility of an outbreak of war among the European Great Powers circa 1914?

Railroads meant that armies could be mobilized and deployed VERY rapidly. This meant aht commanders had to respond quickly to enemy movements. Seizing the initiative was vital. Therefore, governments were quite willing to grand field commanders greater discretion in mobilizing and deploying forces.

Race to the Sea

Took place from about 17 September - 19 October 1914, after the Battle of the Frontiers (7 August - 13 September) and the German advance into France, which had been stopped at the First Battle of the Marne (5-12 September) and was followed by the First Battle of the Aisne (13-28 September), a Franco-British counter-offensive. The term describes reciprocal attempts by the Franco-British and German armies to envelop the northern flank of the opposing army through the provinces of Picardy, Artois and Flanders, rather than an attempt to advance northwards to the sea. The "race" ended on the North Sea coast of Belgium around 19 October, when the last open area from Dixmude to the North Sea was occupied by Belgian troops who had retreated after the Siege of Antwerp (28 September - 10 October). The outflanking attempts had resulted in a number of encounter battles but neither side was able to gain a decisive victory.

Tsarist autocracy

(Russian: царское самодержавие, transcr. tsarskoye samoderzhaviye) is a form of autocracy (later absolute monarchy) specific to the Grand Duchy of Moscow, which later became Tsardom of Russia and the Russian Empire.[b] In it, all power and wealth is controlled (and distributed) by the Tsar. They had more power than constitutional monarchs, who are usually vested by law and counterbalanced by a legislative authority; they even had more authority on religious issues compared to Western monarchs. In Russia, it originated during the time of Ivan III (1440−1505), and was abolished after the Russian Revolution of 1917.

In chapter 3 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, how was demobilization in Britain after World War I?

(p. 94) ¶2 Early demobilization of the soldiers in Britain had, in fact, been fairly smooth. From 3.5 million at the Armistice in 1918, the army fell in size to 370,000 men by 1920. An immediate post-war economic boom meant that by the summer of 1919 four-fifths of the soldiers had been discharged, and most of those had found work (sometimes at the expense of women employed during the war). But the boom ended as quickly as it had begun. By the autumn of 1920 it was over. Deflationary policies (following those in the USA), introduced to protect sterling, had a drastic effect on living standards. Wages, which had initially kept up with rising prices, fell sharply. Class tensions remained high. In 1919, 35 million days had been lost in industrial disputes. In 1921 the figure was 86 million. Unemployment doubled over the three months from December 1920 to March 1921. By the summer, 2 million were without work. Most of the unemployed lived in squalid, dilapidated accommodation. Homes for heroes had been promised in 1918. But by 1923, 822,000 new houses were needed just to cover the basic housing shortage- -- greater than in 1919 -- let alone replace millions of desolate slum dwellings. ¶3 By 1921, coutless former soldiers, many of them badly disabled, were living in dire poverty, begging on the streets or trying to eke out a llving by selling matches and mementoes, eating at food kitchens, sometimes forced to sleep in doorways or on park benches. 'We were no longer heroes, were simply "unemployed"' was one former officer's bitter commentary. 'Ex-servicemen were continually coming to the door selling boot-laces and asking for cast-off shirts and socks,' remembered Robert Graves, poet, writer and former front-line officer. 'Patriots, especially of the female variety, were as much discredited in- (p. 95) ¶1-1919 as in 1914 they had been honoured,' recalled Vera Brittain, who had left a comfortable upper-middle-class background and volunteered to nurse the wounded at the front. She saw 'a world denuded of prospects and left arid and pointless'." (Kershaw 2015, 94-95).

WHat happened to the value of the Reichsmarks compared to the US dollar from 1914-1924?

1914: 1 US $ = 4.2 Reichsmarks 1918: 1 US $ = 14 Reichsmarks 1921: 1 US $ = 65 Reichsmarks 1922: 1 US $ = 192 Reichsmarks 1924: 1 US $ = 4 billion Reichsmarks

Sir George William Buchanan, GCB, GCMG, GCVO, PC (25 November 1854 - 20 December 1924)

A British diplomat. Born in Copenhagen, Denmark, he was the youngest son of Sir Andrew Buchanan, 1st Baronet, diplomat and Frances, daughter of Very Rev Edward Mellish by Elizabeth Leigh. Buchanan entered diplomatic service in 1876, and served as Second Secretary in Tokyo, Viennaand Bern, and as Secretary in Rome. By 1899 he was serving on the Venezuelan Boundary Commission, and later that year he was appointed Chargé d'affaires at Darmstadt and Karlsruhe. In late 1901 he moved to Berlin, where he was appointed First Secretary at the British embassy.[1]From 1903 to 1908 he was Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Bulgaria, and in 1909 he was appointed as Minister to the Netherlands and Luxembourg.[2] Invested with the Knight's Grand Cross of Royal Victorian Order in 1909, he was next sworn to the Privy Council. In 1910 Buchanan was appointed as the British Ambassador to Russia. He kept abreast of the political developments in Russia and met some of the leading liberal reformists in the country. When the Dardanelles were guaranteed by Germany to the Turks, Italy sent two secret documents via the British diplomatic corps from Sir Michael Rodd to Sir George at St Petersburg. In it was the evidence that Russia needed to persuade Italy to support her Serbian policy in the Balkans. On 4 March 1915 Imperiali, the Italian envoy to London presented the documents to Sir Edward Greyon an authority of 16 February from Sonnino, their foreign minister. France attached great importance to Italy's decision to join the allies. Buchanan was able to bring Count Sazonov to the negotiating table. It has been suggested that this was secretly encouraged by the then Liberal government in London: The British Ambassador George Buchanan was only too aware of the court's `pro-German sympathies'. He complained to the Duma President, M.V. Rodzianko, in November 1916 that he found it difficult to get an audience at court, and expressed his view `that Germany is using Alexandra Fedorovna to set the Tsar against the Allies. Elsewhere, however, Buchanan stated his view that the Empress was `the unwitting instrument of Germany'.[3] Buchanan had developed a strong bond with the Tsar, Nicholas II, and attempted to convince him that granting some constitutional reform would stave off revolution. Buchanan actively supported the Duma in its efforts to change Russia's stately system during war-time. Nicholas's opinion of him was under the Tsarina's sway. Knowing that there were plots to stage a palace coup to replace him, Sir George formally requested an audience with the Tsar in the troubled early days of 1917. At his last meeting with Nicholas he pleaded with him in 'undiplomatic' language: "I can but plead as my excuse the fact that I have throughout been inspired by my feelings of devotion for Your Majesty and the Empress. If I were to see a friend walking through a wood on a dark night along a path which I knew ended in a precipice, would it not be my duty, sir, to warn him of his danger? And is it not equally my duty to warn Your Majesty of the abyss that lies ahead of you? You have, sir, come to the parting of the ways, and you have now to choose between two paths. The one will lead you to victory and a glorious peace - the other to revolution and disaster. Let me implore Your Majesty to choose the former."[4] Although the Tsar was touched by the Ambassador's devotion, he allowed his wife's malevolent attitudes to outweigh the sensible advice he had been given. After the collapse of the Autocracy (see Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich of Russia), he developed close relations with the liberal Provisional Government led initially by George Lvov and later by Alexander Kerensky that was formed after the February Revolution. At the same time, Buchanan developed a fear of the dangers of Bolshevism and its growing support; he feared the Russian Provisional Government would be toppled and tried to warn of the fragility of the Government and the dangers of a Bolshevik revolution. Buchanan had reported to London: "They are more active and better organized than any other group, and until they and the ideas which they represent are finally squashed, the country will remain a prey to anarchy and disorder. If the Government are not strong enough to put down the Bolsheviks by force, at the risk of breaking altogether with the soviet, the only alternative will be a Bolshevik Government."[5] However, after the events of the October Revolution and the Bolsheviks ascension to power he was widely criticized for failing to ensure that the Tsar Nicholas II and his family were evacuated from Russia before their execution by the Bolsheviks at Ekaterinburg in 1918. It is now known that this was not his fault but that of the Tsar's first cousin, King George V who, fearful of revolutionary trends in Britain and the stability of his own throne, persuaded the Lloyd George government to rescind the offer they had made to provide sanctuary for the Imperial Family.[6] Buchanan was disappointed that the fledgling democracy offered by the Provisional Government was strangled by the Bolshevik coup. At the beginning of December 1918, Buchanan fell ill and for the good of his health he agreed that it was best he left Russia. The family left St Petersburg on 26 December 1918, arriving back in Leith in Scotland on 17 January 1919.[7] His health collapsed soon after, forcing him to spend time recovering in Cornwall. After his recovery, he was disappointed that after all his years of service he was not given a peerage and only offered a two-year ambassadorship in Rome. He accepted the post, serving as ambassador to the Kingdom of Italy from 1919-21. While in Italy his wife was found to have terminal cancer; she died in April 1921 soon after the family's return to England.[8] Sir George's autobiography, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories, was published in 1923. It is believed that he had to leave out some of what he knew under threat of losing his pension. He died in 1924.

According to Professor Lanthier, what was the government system like in Germany.

A hybrid system. There was still a very powerful autocratic monarch. However, there was a functioning parliament, and there was some dedication to democratic ideals. Germany was still a relatively young country, only being unified in 1871. Democratic institutions were relatively young and untested in the country. The Kaiser could appoint the Chancellor, who ran the government and appointed the ministers. The Chancellor was only responsible to the Kaiser, not to the Reichstag. However, Professor Lanthier wants to stress any stereotyping of Germans as a people who gravitate toward authoritarian tendencies.

In 1900, what was the attitude among German men about democratic elections and processes?

German men often embraced democracy, and they turned out in large numbers to vote for members of the Reichstag. Also, in town and city councils, and in state governments, there was a widespread willingness to participate in democratic elections.

What were some of the problems that Germany faced in WWI for its economy?

Germany was a more complex kind of nation-state when compared to the other countries. There was a fragmentation of administration. Germany was a federal state, which meant that there was a fragmented administration. This meant that the federal government had to struggle to coordinate with provincial governments, and then in turn local municipal governments. This meant that there was a lot of committees and bureaucracies set up, which often duplicated each other or conflicted each other.

How important was industry in WWII?

Industry was vitally important. WWII was a fully industrialized war, with both the Axis and the Allies racing to access raw materials, convert those raw materials into useable products, and then ship those products to the front line where they could be use in battle. To that end, both sides aimed to fully mobilize their entire economies. The Allied industrial machine that had huge advantage over whatever Germany could produce

According to Professor Lanthier, what distinguished 1900 Russia from the other European countries?

Russia was ruled by an absolute monarchy. There is not constitutional checks on the Czar, and there are fewer safeguards for free speech and intellectual activity. Also, Russia was far less economically developed than the rest of Europe, even Austro-Hungary.

Why the Nazi soviet non-aggression pact came as a huge shock and disheartening surprise to British and France?

The development had been fairly unexpected. The UK and France both hoped that stalin would stand up to an aggressive Germany in some way at some point. They were fairly certain that Stalin would not cut a deal with Hitler

How did the requirements of a modern, industrialized military contribute to World War I?

There was a growing gap between the diplomats and the military leadership of large industrialized armies. By 1914, control of the situation had shifted from diplomats and statesmen to military planners.

What was the attitude of many Europeans toward Russia?

There were a lot of people who saw Russia, and see the size. To many Europeans, Russia seemed to be this massive country, with a massive population which could be used to create massive military power. Of course, some of this was the exaggerated fears of many Europeans.

Briefly describe the 1935 Nuremberg Laws

They were laws that prevented jews from marrying/having intercourse with non jews. The were done in a clean and civilized way, a scientific way so people went along with it

What happened in late 1916 regarding the Intensification of the Domestic War Aim Discussion?

Up until the late fall of 1916, state censorship officials were required to prevent a public war aims discussion in order to preserve the prevailing societal truce (Burgfrieden).[17] On 18 November 1916, this ban was lifted by the supreme military command, because it expected to be able to influence public opinion better that way. The repeal of press censorship towards the end of 1916 marked the beginning of a rapid intensification in the war aim discussion, as well as a division within German society between proponents of a negotiated peace (Verständigungsfrieden) and a victorious peace (Siegfrieden). As early as July 1916, the Independent Committee for a German Peace (Unabhängiger Ausschuß für einen Deutschen Frieden) was formed, which consisted mainly of the leading heads of the "war aim majority" (Kriegszielmehrheit) and whose propaganda measures were financed by representatives of the heavy industries. The increasingly dire war situation, however, did not lead to more moderate war aims among the annexationist groups. On the contrary, it led to even more extensive territorial claims, in line with the proposed Siegfrieden.[18] The leadership around Bethmann-Hollweg was not willing to counter the excessive agitation of the War Aim Movement for a long time. This, however, emphasized the growing contrast between the Chancellor and the Chief of Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn (1861-1922). As early as September 1914, the latter had demanded extensive clarification of the adverse military situation after the Battle of the Marne on behalf of the German public. This, however, was rejected by Bethmann-Hollweg and led to the remarkable situation which saw the highest-ranking military officer pushing for a more moderate conduct of war, while a civil politician insisted on the further perpetuation of the earlier war aims. Bethmann-Hollweg was under a lot of domestic pressure, however, and was thus forced to hide any weaknesses; the Pan-German League (Alldeutsche Verband) had already publicly called the Chancellor a slacker (Flaumacher) and considered his politics to be too feeble and soft.[19] Last but not least, Bethmann-Hollweg feared a slump in public opinion: He believed that a peace without a due reward (Siegespreis) would not be acceptable to the population after the sacrifices (Blutopfer) already made during the war. Indeed, internally, he had already started to move away from the Septemberprogramm and was pursuing far less extensive war aims behind closed doors.[20] In the face of domestic circumstances, however, the chancellor was forced to continue his ambivalent tactics in order to both appease the Social Democrats (SPD) in their demands for a defensive war and keep his promise for annexations in the western and eastern territories to the Kriegszielmehrheit.[21] In the midst of an increasingly desperate war situation, the unstable truce slowly started to fall apart. The Social Democrats had invoked the right to national self-defense with their statement of 4 August 1914 and their agreement to take up further war loans, and at the same time, laid the sole responsibility for the beginning of the war on Russia. During the first half of the war, the government's position was still easily accepted by the majority. While annexations were officially precluded, the status quo was really only accepted in the west, and extensions of territories in the east were not out of the question. Beyond the surface of the party's demonstrative unity, resistance against the demands for radical annexations was spreading through the party base, as well as in parts of the SPD leadership, because they were increasingly perceived as contrary to the general demand for a defensive war. Out of the initially small opposition within the SPD Reichstag group which supported the governmental course of action, a new faction called the Sozialdemokratische Arbeitsgemeinschaft was founded in March 1916 when numerous delegates voted against new war loans at the height of the Battle of Verdun with its extremely high losses. In April 1917, the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland, USPD) was founded, which called for a peace treaty without any demands for annexations and passionately appealed for an end to the human slaughter (Menschenschlächterei).[22] Even though the SPD, which had now changed its name to the Majority Social Democratic Party (Mehrheitssozialdemokratische Partei, MSPD), continued to grant further war loans, it also pushed for peace as well as domestic reforms within the German Reich. In July 1916, tensions were also rising between the military Chief of Staff Erich von Falkenhayn and General Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg (1847-1934) and his own chief of staff Erich von Ludendorff (1865-1937) because Falkenhayn did not believe that the German armed forces would be strong enough to defeat both Russia in the east and win the war in the west.[23] The failure at Verdun and further losses in the east eventually led to Falkenhayn's resignation in August 1916 and the rise of the military generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff.[24]Bethmann-Hollweg's hope for the reinforcement of a possible negotiated peace through the appointment of Hindenburg and Ludendorff proved a mistake, however, and the change of leadership actually turned out to strengthen the War Aim Movement.[25] In the face of its futile military position, the government was eventually forced to submit a joint peace offer with Austria in November 1916, facilitated by the United States. However, the conditions for this offer were so outrageous - Belgium was still to be under the political and economic influence of the German Reich, as were the French ore deposits in Longwy-Briey - that its rejection was predictable and even for the German government, it was only of tactical use.[26] On the one hand, it aimed at investigating the conditions for a negotiated peace and preparing the German public for disillusionment with regard to the eventual peace agreement. On the other hand, a rejection could also be used as a pretense to end the war through unrestricted submarine warfare, which was then taken up with the highest praises by the German public in February 1917. This approach, however, turned out to become another catastrophic mistake for the Germans, since the United States' entry into the war had become inevitable, and with it, the German defeat.

In "Day Six: Wednesday, 29 July ", p. 284-310, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how did the German general staff summarize their view?

(p. 287) ¶2 On Wednesday the German general staff summarized their view of the situation for the chancellor.6[6.] The generals left no doubt where they stood: for the past five years the Austrians had 'with a patience approaching weakness' put up with continual provocations from a people who engaged in regicide at home and in the murder of princes abroad. In spite of the threat to its national stability it was only after the crime of Sarajevo that Austria resorted to extreme measures 'in order to burn with a glowing iron a cancer that has constantly threatened to poison the body of Europe'. IT would seem reasonable that all Europe should be grateful to the Austrians for properly chastising such a mischief-maker and restoring order to eh Balkans. But Russia was choosing to align itself with a 'criminal nation' (verbrecherischen Landes) and thereby create a thunder-cloud that threatened to break over Europe at any moment. The Austrians, who had given their assurances that they would neither make any territorial acquisitions at Serbia's expense nor infringe upon its sovereignty, were only taking such steps as were necessary to compel the Serbs to live up to their promises. ¶3 The general staff argued that the quarrel between Austria and Serbia ought to have been regarded as a purely private one--and would have been had Russia not intruded. Austria had mobilized only a portion of its armed forces against Serbia: eight army corps, just enough to conduct a punitive expedition. But Russia had responded by making preparations to mobilize twelve army corps in the districts of Kiev, Odessa, and moscow, and was preparing to undertake similar measures in the north, along the German border and the Baltic. And then the Russians had announced that they would mobilize if Austria advanced into Serbia because they could not permit the destruction of Serbia. ¶4 What would be the consequences of Russia's step? If the Austrians advanced into Serbia they would face not only the Serbian army but the vastly superior strength of Russia. Thus, they could not contemplate fighting Serbia without securing themselves against an attack by Russia. This would force them to mobilize the other half of their army--at which point a collision between Austria and Russia would become inevitable. And that would be the casus foederis for Germany, who, if it were not to be false to its word and permit Russia to annihilate its ally, must mobilize. If Germany- (p. 288) ¶1-were to mobile, this would compel Russia to mobilize in the remaining military districts. The Russians would then claims that they were being attacked by Germany, thus obliging France to support them-- and the mutual butchery of the civilized nations of Europe would begin'. ¶2 According to the general staff, Russia had cunningly contrived the entire situation. By giving repeated assurances that it was not mobilizing but only preparing for it, Russia was now ready to move its armies forward within days of issuing the mobilization order. This had placed Austria in a desperate position, Germany in an invidious one. By forcing Austria and Germany to mobilize against them, the Russians would be able to proclaim to the world that they did not want war, that Germany had brought it about. Unless a miracle were to prevent it, war was about to 'annihilate for decades the civilization of almost all Europe'. ¶3 Germany must live up to its responsibilities. If it failed to come to the assistance of its ally at such a decisive moment, it would violate the deeply rooted feelings of fidelity 'which are among the most beautiful traits of the German character'. The French had now begun to undertake preparatory military measures, demonstrating that they and the Russians were moving hand-in-hand. When the collision between Austria and Russia became inevitable, Germany would have to mobilize and prepare to take up the fight on two fronts. This placed Germany in a difficult position: the further that Russia and France got with their preparations the quicker they would be able to mobilize. The situation was becoming more unfavourable to Germany with each passing day. Allowing this to continue would "lead to disastrous consequences for us'. (Martel 2014, 287-288)

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what sweeping changes occurred in 4 February 1938?

(p. 326) ¶3 On 4 February 1938 sweeping changes in the political and military leadership of the German Reich were suddenly announced in Berlin. Blomberg, the War Minister, and Fritsch, the commander-in-chief othe army, had been dismissed. Hitler himself had taken over at the head of a restructured high command of the Wehrmacht. His own supremacy was as a result even further enhanced. The position of the military leadership was significantly weakened. Those voicing fears of being plunged into war against the western powers were greatly outnumbered by Hitler loyalists, won over by huge spending on rearmament, restoring prestige and Germany's enhanced international standing. Other powerful elites in the economy or in the high ranks of the state bureaucracy, whose hopes of a resurgent German dominance had never vanished, had overwhelmingly aligned themselves with Hitler's regime. The assertive foreign policy, exploiting the weakness and divisions of the western democracies, had made Hitler a hugely popular dictator. The masses gave him the plebiscitary backing that enormously boosted his standing at home and abroad. An enormous,- (p. 327) ¶1-multi-layered Nazi Movement provided the organizational underpinning of his rule and the apparatus to ensure the constnat mobilization of mass support. The dictatorship was strong, secure, and not threatened by any significant opposition. The potential for organized resistance had long ago been quashed. Only a military coup could effectively challenge Hitler's mastery. Of that there was as yet no sign. ¶2 In the major restructuring of the regime's leadership in early February 1938 the other big departure, alongside the military figures Blomberg and Fritsch, was that of the conservative Neurath, replaced as Foreign Minister at a critical juncture by the hawkish Ribbentrop. He was known to echo Hitler's own views and, since his failure as ambassador in London, was bitterly anti-British. Further widespread changes were made in the upper ranks of the officer and diplomatic corps. Hitler now had personnel in key positions who were attuned to his high-risk foreign policy. Possible constraints on any decisions he might make had dwindled to insignificance. The likelihood of one bold move to be undertaken very soon was surmised by those around Hitler. The Austrian Chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, ought to be 'trembling', one high-ranking officer in Hitler's entourage noted privately in his diary." (Kershaw 2015, 326-327).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, why did the second revolution of 1917 which occurred around 7 November (the October Revolution in the old Russian calendar) succeed?

(p. 81) ¶3 Even after the deposition of th Tsar and the establishment of the Provisional Government of 'revolutionary democracy' in March- (p. 82) ¶1-1917, the situation remained highly unstable. The fluid conditions over the following months and the further prosecution of a war irredeemably lost created the climate in which the second, far more radical, revolution could take place. ¶2 By this point, in October 1917 (in the old Russian calendar) the organizational framework available for channelling and leading the revolution was at hand. This proved, in contrast to 1905, a decisive factor in the success of this revolution. The Bolshevik Party had as yet no mass base outside small parts of teh working class. But it did have a tightly knit, fanatical leadership core with a preconceived programme that saw the destruction of the old system not as an end in itself but as merely the prelude to the building of an entirely new society. The Bolshevik party had emerged as the larger faction of the divided Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, which had been founded in 1899 but had later split into a larger revolutionary (Bolshevik) and a smaller reformist (Menshevik) wing. VLadimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better known by his soubriquet Lenin (who had been exiled to Siberia in the late 1890s, and had then lived mainly outside Russia until 1917), had envisaged the party as the vanguard of the working class and advocated tight discipline and complete loyalty behind the aim of overthrowing the Tsar. Lenin's next objective was to establish, through ruthless deployment of terror against 'class enemies', a 'provisional revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry'. In APril 1917 the charismatic Bolshevik leader had been transported from his Swiss exile to the revolutionary chaos of Petrograd by the Germans, who were hoping to undermine the wavering Russian will to continue fighting by fomenting further unrest and agitation for peace. In the light of later events it was one of the great 'own-goals' of history. Amid government repression of the Bolsheviks, Lenin was forced to retreat in July to Finland (a semi-autonomous part of the Russian Empire since 1809 and, after the toppling of the Tsar, voicing even more strident demands for independence). But as state power evaporated he returned to Petrograd to lead the second revolution. ¶3 What bound the close-knit Bolshevik Party leadership and its committed members together was a utopian ideology of salvation, the vision of a future classless society free of conflict. But what gave the- (p. 83) ¶1-Bolsheviks the potential to reach out to a wide constituency was less ethereal and more pragmatic: the promise of peace, bread, distribution of land, ownership and control of the factories, and law in the hands of the people. Politically, the Bolsheviks demanded all power to the soviets (which had meanwhile been set up in all the major cities). The unpopularity of Alexander Kerensky's Provisional Government amid further acute shortages, rocketing inflation and huge bloodshed in the last disastrous offensive played into the hands of the Bolsheviks. Control of the Petrograd soviet (run by Leon Trotsky, born Lev Davidovich Bronshtein, a gifted organizer and demagogue who preached the need for permanent revolution) provided the launch pad for the October revolution, which eventually led to the complete Bolshevik takeover of the soviets. It would require ruthless internal terror against class enemies and over two years of the most brutal civil war imaginable before the powerful forces of reaction and counter-revolution were defeated and Russia was set firmly on the path to complete political, social, economic and ideological transformation. But it was plain form the start: the Bolshevik Revolution was an event of world-historical significance. What it had produced was an absolutely new kind of state and society. Reports of what was happening in Russia sent shock waves throughout Europe that would reverberate for decades." (Kershaw 2015, 81-83)

In the Introduction of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", how is Europe's twentieth century, particularly the first half, characterized?

"Europe's twentieth century was a century of war. Two world wars followed by over forty years of 'cold war' -- itself the direct product of the Second World War -- defined the age. It was an extraordinarily dramatic, tragic and endlessly fascinating period, its history one of huge upheaval and astounding transformation. During the twentieth century, Europe went to hell and back. The continent, which for nearly one hundred years after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 had prided itself on being the apogee of civilization, fell between 1914 and 1945 into the pit of barbarism. But a calamitous self-destructive era was followed by previously unimaginable stability and prosperity -- though at the heavy price of unbridgeable political division. Thereafter, a reunified Europe, facing huge internal pressures from intensified globalization and serious external challenges, experienced increasing inbuilt tensions even before the financial crash of 2008 plunged the continent into a new, still unresolved, crisis." (Kershaw 2015, 1).

In the preface of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", what purpose does the introduction serve?

"The introduction, 'Euroope's Era of Self-Destruction', lays out the framework of interpretation of this volume as well as indicating the approach to the second volume (yet to be written). ..." (Kershaw 2015, xxiv).

Why did the UK Prime Minister Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Daladier both agree to the Munich agreement?

Both had another reason to buy time and delay inevitable. Also, there was no desire for war in Britain or France. Rather, there was almost a desperate desire for peace. Remember devastation of the great war, and how much those two countries had suffered between 1914-1918. Large numbers of people desperate to not see another great war break out in their time.

According to Lanthier, who were three senior Bolsheviks who were victims of the Great Purges (1936-1938)?

Bukharin, Zynoviev, and Kamenev: Early Bolshevik revolutionaries and victims of Stalin's Great Purges (1936-38).

Why were the British so concentrated in the Eastern mediterranean?

Egypt and the Suez Canal. At the time, the British controlled the Suez Canal, which allowed them relatively easy access to India and Asia, massively expanding the reach of the British navy and giving Britain massive force projection abilities. To protect the canal, the British were very concerned in keeping the Russians out of the mediterranean.

Pre-1914, what was the attitudes among the various classes in general?

In general, middle- and upper-class people were much more enthused and supportive of war, while the lower-class and workers were not quite willing.

According to Professor Lanthier, was World War I really a global war, or really just a European Civil War?

While some historians see WWI as just a European Civil War, this was a war which was fought globally. Remember, the European powers were globe-spanning imperial empires. As such, the colonies fought the war as well. May colonials were pressed into service by their colonial masters. One region that is particularly overlooked, there was widespread fighting on Africa.

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what were some of the reasons for a lack of will to engage in war in 1914 Europe?

(p. 1) "¶3 What was there to fight over? With the defeat of France and the creation of a united Germany in 1871, the boundaries of the Great Powers seemed to be set. Although some in France called for revanche against Germany and the return of the 'lost provinces' of Alsace and Lorraine, their voices became- (p. 2) ¶1-fewer and less strident over time. By 1914 their recovery had ceased to be a political issue. No one in Austria-Hungary proposed to avenge the lost war to Prussia of 1866, and o one in Denmark dreamed of recovering their lost province of Schleswig and Holstein. The recreation of the Polish state that had disappeared in the late eighteenth-century was not on the landscape of practical politics: the governments of Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary were working harder than ever to turn their Poels into loyal subjects. A few Italians proclaimed their mission to be the incorporation of Italia irredenta-- 'unredeemed Italy' -- into the unified Italian monarchy, but the 'recovery' of the TYrol and Trentino by war with Austria-Hungary was proposed by no one who mattered in Italy. Officially, Italy was loyal to its alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, and if more Italians were to be incorporated into the monarchy this would be achieved only by the peaceful assent of the Austrians." (Martel 2014, 1-2).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what did Jagow do on 18th July?

(p. 146) ¶2 On Saturday the 19th Jagow requested the exact particulars of the route to be taken by the kaiser, cruising on board the Hohenzollern, from the 23rd on. That was the date now set for presentation of the Austrian note at Belgrade. As Germany aimed to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia 'we cannot afford to alarm the world by the premature return of His Majesty'. But after the 23rd the kaiser had to be within reach in case of unforeseen circumstances which might make important decisions--such as mobilization--necessary." (Martel 2014, 146).

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", what was done to the mobilize popular support in response to left-wing elements?

(p. 16) ... ¶2 Not only in response to the perceived threat from left-wing movements, but also to help governments with little or no mass backing to widen the base of their support, populist counter-movements emerged. These were often sponsored directly or indirectly by industrialists or landholders keen to deflect potential class-based opposition into more controllable channels. They sought to 'nationalize' the masses, to instil in them assertive nationalist, imperialist and racist sentiments intended to benefit the political status quo. To some extent they were successful. Belligerent nationalism, vicious antisemitism and other brands of racism were commonplace outside the minority drawn to the doctrines of international socialism. The spread of basic education, the growth of literacy, and cheap popular newspapers offered the possibility of extending such influence. Mass politics was opening up to new forms of mobilization on the Right, as well as on the Left. Old certainties were starting to dissolve. The political establishment of the old conservative and liberal elites sensed new insecurity." (Kershaw 2015, 16).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what policy did the emperor of Austria-Hungary take toward Serbia by July 10th, 1914?

(p. 127) ¶3 On Friday the 10th, Berchtold briefed Tschirschky on his meeting with Franz Joseph at Ischl on Thursday. The Emperor wished to express his gratitude to the kaiser for his support and he shared Germany's opinion that they must put an end to the 'intolerable conditions' that existed with Serbia. The emperor favoured putting concrete demands to the Serbian government, and Berchtold nwo agreed that his would be preferable to the odium that Austria would ncur if it were to attack without warning. Putting demands forward would place Serbia in the wrong and make it easier for the British and the Romanians to remain neutral.82[82.]" (Martel 2014, 127).

In chapter 4 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was a vital basis for Germany's post-WWI recovery?

(p. 151) ¶3 A vital basis for Germany's recovery had been the stabilization of the currency, ruined b the hyperinflation. Linked to this stabilization was regulation of the thorny issue of reparations, which lay at the root of so much of the economic and political turmoil of 1922-3." (Kershaw 2015, 151).

In "Day Two: Saturday, 25 July", p. 188-213, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, who was in charge of German foreign policy in 25 July, 1914?

(p. 204) ¶2 The immediate supervision of German foreign policy rested in the hands of the secretary of state, not those of the chancellor. Bethmann Hollweg remained on his estate at Hohenfinow, rather than taking charge of the situation himself--although he did have a special telegraph line put in to improve his communications. Jagow knew where the chancellor stood on the issue of British neutrality and he assured Lichnowsky that he agreed with his suggestions. Germany, he said, was prepared to join the other great Powers in initiating a mediation 'subject to our well-known alliance obligations' should a conflict develop between Austria and Russia.41[41.]" (Martel 2014, 204).

In "Day Three: Sunday, 26 July (page 213)", p. 213-238, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, 24 hours after the deadline had expired, what was the possibility of war?

(p. 227) ¶3 Twenty-four hours after the expiry of the Austrian deadline, not only had war not broken out, but it now appeared that a new diplomatic initiative might be launched. But this would depend on the kaiser."(Martel 2014, 227).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, if a real crisis emerged between Austria and Serbia, what kind of help would Serbia expect from the other great powers?

(p. 89) ¶4 Serbia had no ally, but Austria had two, perhaps three. In fact Serbia, created as a principality following the Napoleonic wars, had enjoyed friendly relations with Austria throughout most of the nineteenth century. Austria promoted Serbia as a buffer between itself and Russia; later, between itself and Russia's client state, Bulgaria. For several decades following the Crimean War, Austria acted as Serbia's patron, Russia as Bulgaria's. In 1881 Austria and Serbia had signed a secret alliance and Serbia played the part of loyal client until the 1890s. The Russians, who had never shown any particular affection for the Serbs, had placed their Balkan hopes on Bulgaria until it turned to Austria for support. Bulgaria appeared a more useful buffer against Russian expansion into the Balkans; the Austrians were happy to support it. In July 1914 it was unclear whether Serbia could hope for more than sympathy from Russia in any contest with Austria." (Martel 2014, 89).

Fritz Fischer (5 March 1908 - 1 December 1999)

A German historian best known for his analysis of the causes of World War I. In the early 1960s Fischer advanced the controversial thesis that responsibility for the outbreak of the war rested solely on Imperial Germany. He has been described by The Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing as the most important German historian of the 20th century.

What was the opinion on the Russian home front of how the war was managed?

In Russia, many Russians felt the war was being severely mismanaged. Despite censorship, rumours abounded that there the military was being severe short-changed in terms of ammunition, and that certain individuals were profiting from the war at the expense of Russian soldiers?

What inspired the trenches of WWI?

In the face of modern warfare, digging in was standard practice by the start of WWI. To attack frontally was to court crippling losses, so an outflanking operation was the preferred method of attack against an entrenched enemy. After the Battle of the Aisne in September 1914, an extended series of attempted flanking moves, and matching extensions to the fortified defensive lines, developed into the "race to the sea", by the end of which German and Allied armies had produced a matched pair of trench lines from the Swiss border in the south to the North Sea coast of Belgium. Trench warfare prevailed on the Western Front from late 1914 until the Germans launched their Spring Offensive on 21 March 1918. After the buildup of forces in 1915, the Western Front became a stalemated struggle between equals, to be decided by attrition. Frontal assaults, and their associated casualties, became inevitable because the continuous trench lines had no open flanks. Casualties of the defenders matched those of the attackers, as vast reserves were expended in costly counter-attacks or exposed to the attacker's massed artillery. There were periods in which rigid trench warfare broke down, such as during the Battle of the Somme, but the lines never moved very far. The war would be won by the side that was able to commit the last reserves to the Western Front.

In the 16th century, what was the great world power?

The Ottoman Empire.

Stakhanovite movement

The term Stakhanovite originated in the Soviet Union and referred to workers who modelled themselves after Alexey Stakhanov. These workers took pride in their ability to produce more than was required, by working harder and more efficiently, thus strengthening the Communist state. The Stakhanovite Movement was encouraged due to the idea of socialist emulation. It began in the coal industry but later spread to many other industries in the Soviet Union. The movement eventually encountered resistance as the increased productivity led to increased demands on workers. The Stakhanovite movement began during the Soviet second 5-year plan in 1935 as a new stage of socialist competition. The emergence of the Stakhanovite movement can only be understood with the knowledge of the rapid industrialization and forced collectivization that had transpired seven years prior.[1] The movement took its name from Aleksei Grigorievich Stakhanov, who had mined 102 tons of coal in less than 6 hours (14 times his quota) on 31 August 1935.[2] However, Stakhanovite followers would soon "break" his record.[2] On February 1, 1936, it was reported that Nikita Izotov had mined 640 tons of coal in a single shift.[3] The Stakhanovite movement, supported and led by the Communist Party, soon spread over other industries of the Soviet Union.[4] Pioneers of the movement included Alexander Busygin (automobile industry), Nikolai Smetanin (shoe industry), Yevdokiya and Maria Vinogradov (textile industry), I.I.Gudov (machine tool industry), V.S.Musinsky (timber industry), Pyotr Krivonos (railroad),[5] Pasha Angelina (honored as the first Soviet woman to operate a tractor), Konstantin Borin and Maria Demchenko (agriculture) and many others.[6] On November 14-17, 1935, the 1st All-Union Stakhanovite Conference took place at the Kremlin. The conference emphasized the outstanding role of the Stakhanovite movement in the socialist reconstruction of the national economy. In December 1935 the plenum of the Communist Party's Central Committee specifically discussed aspects of developing industry and transport systems in light of the Stakhanovite movement.[citation needed] In accordance with the decisions of the plenum, the Soviets organized a wide network of industrial training and created special courses for foremen of socialist labor. In 1936 a number of industrial and technical conferences revised the projected production capacities of different industries and increased their outputs. They also introduced Stakhanovite contests in many industries to find the best workers and encourage competition between them.[7] Female Stakhanovites emerged more seldom than male ones, but a quarter of all trade-union women were designated as "norm-breaking".[4] A preponderance of rural Stakhanovites were women, working as milkmaids, calf tenders, and fieldworkers.[8] The Soviet authorities claimed that the Stakhanovite movement had caused a significant increase in labor productivity. It was reported that during the first five-year plan (1929-1932) industrial labor productivity increased 41%. During the second five-year plan (1933-1937) it reportedly increased 82%. The discussion of the draft constitution in the 1930s was used to encourage a second wind for the movement.[9] During World War II the Stakhanovites used different methods to increase productivity, such as working several machine-tools at a time and combining professions. The Stakhanovites organized the two-hundreders movement [ru] (Russian: двухсотники, or dvukhsotniki; 200% or more of quota in a single shift)[10] Opposition to the movement merited the label of "wrecker".[11] Not all workers were excited about the Stakhanovites and the demand for increased productivity. Some groups held Aleksei Grigorievich Stakhanov responsible for making their lives harder and even threatened him for it.[12] In the de-Stalinization era, which sought to undo much of what was done during Stalin's régime, the Stakhanovite movement was declared a Stalinist propaganda maneuver; workers would receive the best equipment and most favorable conditions so that the best results could be achieved. After Stalin's death in March 1953 "brigades of socialist labor" replaced Stakhanovism. In 1988 the Soviet newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda stated that the widely propagandized personal achievements of Stakhanov were puffery. The paper insisted that Stakhanov had used a number of helpers on support work, while the output was tallied for him alone. Stakhanov's approach had eventually led to the increased productivity by means of a better organization of the work, including specialization and task sequencing, according to the Soviet state media.[13]

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, overall, overall, who was responsible for foreign policy in Britain in 1914?

(p. 42) ¶1 ... in Britain .. constitutionally, the decision was still up to the monarch. But in reality the king's power to decide had eroded to the point that his authority was practically non-existent. The decision would be up to parliament. But how would parliament decide? Who held sway? Who had the information upon which to make--if not decisions--recommendations on war and peace that carried conviction? ¶2 By June 1914 not power, but influence, was vested largely in the hands of one man: Sir Edward Grey. The 52-year-old foreign secretary was a parliamentarian of considerable experience. He had been elected to the House of Common in 1885 and retained his seat successfully ever since--just short of thirty years. ..." ... (p. 45) ¶ the question of who in Britain was in the position to decide between war and peace was not as easily answered as it was in the case of the other European powers. Technically, the decision was still the monarch's to make. But practically, as the 'constitution' (which did not exist) had evolved over the last two centuries, the king could only act upon the advice of his prime minister 'in cabinet'. A declaration of war against the wishes of the government was a practical impossibility--it was never considered. The converse--a refusal to declare war when the government advised it--wa equally out of the question. So the real decision between war and peace came down to the cabinet. And here, with the support of the prime minister, Sir Edward Grey dominated the scene. ..." (Martel 2014, 42-45)

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how influential was Sir Edward Grey in Britain's foreign policies?

(p. 44) ¶4 By the summer of 1914 Sir Edward Grey had established himself as a reassuring figure. He had been at the helm of foreign affairs for almost nine years--the longest continuous service in that office since Lord Castlereagh a century before. He had successfully managed a succession of crises, had built upon the entente with France by establishing one with Russia, and his convening and chairmanship of the London conference that resulted in a peaceful conclusion to the first Balkan war--ust when it seemed that it might escalate into a general European conflict--cemented his reputation as one of Europe's leading statesmen. And one who was dedicated above all to upholding the long European peace. ... (p. 45) ¶ ... By the summer of 1914 friend and foe alike referred not to the government's foreign policy, but to Grey's. He enjoyed the support of most of the Liberal party, and a good deal of support among the Unionist as well. His advice, while not the law, carried more weight than that of anyone else in Britain. And he was staunchly, determinedly, on the side of peace." (Martel 2014, 44-45).

In chapter 4 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, from where did the "secretariat" of the Communist administration come from?

(p. 115) ¶3 ... In the winter of 1921-22, Lenin had established the office of party "secretariat" to provide a repository of personnel for the expanding government bureaucracy. In the spring, he appointed Joseph stalin as the secretariat's first commissar. Ostensibly, Stalin's task was to serve as liaison with the multitiered Soviet governing apparatus, to assess its needs and provide it with reliable Communist staffers. But, in his hands, the office rapidly became a cache basin for his own political loyalists." (Sachar 2014, 115).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was the view of the Triple Entente for the risk of war by 13 July?

(p. 135) ¶4 Apart from a few murmurs of disquiet in London and St. Petersburg there was nothing to suggest that the Entente intended to stand up for Serbia. British, French, and Russian diplomats counselled moderation on the part of Belgrade and advised the government to restrain its press. In the meantime, the Entente continued to wait for the Austrian response, hoping that it might be reasonable and measured. No one predicted that the Austrians were devising demands that no sovereign state could be expected to swallow." (Martel 2014, 135).

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what stopped the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1932 from being effective, and how did Hitler exploit it?

(p. 251) ¶1 ... much of the German population, especially those who had lived through the First World War, retained a pathological fear of another war. Where Hitler pulled a masterstroke was in persuading them for years that he was striving for peace, not war, that rearmament was the best way to secure German defence, and that he wanted no more than 'equal rights' with the western powers in terms of military strength. If these would not disarm, eh argued, basic equity as well as the pride and prestige of a great nation demanded that Germany should be permitted to rebuild its armed forces, reduced to puny levels at the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, to similar levels. For many, not just in Nazi ranks, it was a compelling argument. ¶2 This turned out to be the decisive issue that vitiated all attempts by the Disarmament Conference, which first met in Geneva on 2 February 1932 ..., to arrive at an international settlement. There were, of course many daunting technical problems involved in attempting to regulate a global trade in arms, restrict arms spending by national governments and persuade countries to put their faith in security through disarmament. But a bigger obstacle by far was that some major countries -- Japan, Soviet Russia, Italy and Germany among them -- simply lacked the will to disarm. This problem was compounded by a further major difficulty that preoccupied France and Great Britain especially: what was the permissible level of armaments in Germany? Understandably, having been invaded twice in living memory from over the Rhine, France's paramount national interest was in security. No disarmament was acceptable that would jeopardize this in the slightest. Britain on the other hand, the main driving-force behind disarmament proposals, took the more realistic view that general disarmament would actually create security. The- (p. 252) ¶1-French were unconvinced, and were not likely to change their stance given Britain's avoidance of a guarantee to put its own army in the field to aid France in the event of German attack. ¶2 The fundamental division between the two major western powers on disarmament policy played into Hitler's hands. It offered a prime opportunity for him to exploit what he could portray as a basic unfairness of principle behind the high-minded rhetoric of the Disarmament Conference: the western democracies were themselves unwilling either to reduce their own armament levels to those imposed upon Germany, or to permit Germany to rearm to the levels that they were demanding as a prerequisite for their own security. Unbending national interest (also on the part of the smaller countries), with each country rooted to guarantees of security that it was impossible to provide, wrecked any hope of a general agreement. ¶3 The Conference was already on the way to arguing itself into oblivion when Hitler, fully in line with the wishes of the German army leadership and Foreign Office, seized the moment to withdraw Germany both from the Conference and from the League itself on 14 October 1933. With his unerring eye for a propaganda coup, eh did not miss the chance to follow up the withdrawal with a plebiscite that brought him an official 95 percent vote of support for his move, greatly strengthening his standing among the German people. After the German withdrawal, disarmament was a dead letter, even though the Conference staggered on in an exhausted fashion until it was finally put out of its misery in June 1934. ..." (Kershaw 2015, 251-252).

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what was the origin of the plot to assassinate King Aleksandar.

(p. 250) ¶2 In early September 1934, in the Hungarian border town of Nagykanizsa, in an apartment rented by a certain "Emil Horvath," nine Croatian visitors engaged in a lottery. "Horvath's" actual name was Gustav Perčec, and he was a senior Ustašist official, as were his visitors, most of whom had come to Nagykanizsa from Janka Puszta, the Ustašta's principal training camp in Hungary. Three of the men -- Zvonimir Pospišil, Mijo Kralj, and Ivan Rajić--now picked the lottery's "winning" black cubes. With his congratulations, Perčec announced that the trio was "chosen" to help liberate Croatia. Immediately, the three responded to Perčec's benediction by repeating the Ustašist oath: "Failing in my assignment, I shall accept death as my penalty, so help me God, Amen."46[46.] The "assignment" was not specified; but everyone in the room knew that it was nothing less than the assassination of Yugoslavia's King Alexksandar." (Sachar 2015, 250.)

November 1932 German federal election

Federal elections were held in Germany on 6 November 1932.[1] They saw a four percent drop in votes for the Nazi Party and slight increases for the Communists and the national conservative DNVP. It was the last free and fair all-German election before the Nazi seizure of power on 30 January 1933, as the following elections of March 1933 were already accompanied by massive suppression, especially against Communist and Social Democratic politicians. The results of the November 1932 election were a great disappointment for the Nazis. Although they emerged once more as the largest party by far, they had fewer seats than before, and failed to form a government coalition in the Reichstagparliament. Previously, Chancellor Franz von Papen, a former member of the Catholic Centre Party, had governed without parliamentary support relying on legislative decrees promulgated by Reich President Paul von Hindenburg according to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. However, on 12 September 1932 Papen had to ask Hindenburg to dissolve the parliament in order to preempt a motion of no confidence tabled by the Communist Party, which was expected to pass (since the Nazis were expected to vote in favour, as they also desired new elections). Following this dissolution of parliament in September, the election of November 1932 was held. The DNVP, which had backed Papen, gained 15 seats as a result. After the election, Chancellor Papen urged Hindenburg to continue to govern by emergency decrees. Nevertheless, on 3 December he was superseded by his Defence Minister Kurt von Schleicher who in talks with the left wing of the Nazi Party led by Gregor Strasser tried to build up a Third Position (Querfront) strategy. These plans failed when in turn Hitler disempowered Strasser and approached Papen for coalition talks. Papen obtained Hindenburg's consent to form the Hitler Cabinet on 30 January 1933. The next free elections were not held until 1949 in West Germany and March 1990 in East Germany; by the time of the first postwar elections in East Germany in May 1949, a Communist regime was rapidly consolidating. The next free all-German elections took place in December 1990 after reunification.

In 1932, why did Hindenburg and the other traditionalists on the center-right permit Hitler

Hindenburg and the other traditionalist, center-right politicians do not like the newcoming Nazi's. However, the Nazi's are very popular with the common German people. The center-right parties think that they can cut a deal with the Nazi's, using the Nazi popularity to benefit the old traditional right, while keeping the Hitler's contained. Hitler was appointed chancellor, but only 2 other Nazi's were in cabinet. After Chancellor Papen left office, he secretly told Hitler that he still held considerable sway with President Hindenburg and that he would make Hitler chancellor as long as he, Papen, could be the vice chancellor. Another notable event was the publication of the Industrielleneingabe, a letter signed by 22 important representatives of industry, finance and agriculture, asking Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as chancellor. Hindenburg reluctantly agreed to appoint Hitler as chancellor after the parliamentary elections of July and November 1932 had not resulted in the formation of a majority government. Hitler headed a short-lived coalition government formed by the NSDAP and the German National People's Party (DNVP).

Why were so many people excited to go to war?

One simple explanation, of course, was that practically no one, from the ordinary citizen to the heads of government and military generals, imagined or could begin to imagine the reality of the war that would unfold. There was little awareness of the terrible effects of modern weapons or the fact that they would result in a long war, although books, articles and newspapers did refer to the negative impact a conflict might have. Western military observers largely ignored the lessons of attrition and the difficulty of carrying out speedy offensives that were evident in the Russo-Japanese and Balkan wars. The "short war illusion" was, in part, a consequence of the lessons being drawn from history: the most recent war between the major European powers, the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, which remained a relatively fresh memory for the populations of 1914, had only lasted from 19 July 1870 to 29 January 1871, around six months. There was an awareness of the earlier Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, particularly among Europe's military; indeed, the Napoleonic wars received especial attention. But although this earlier period of warfare lasted cumulatively more than twenty years, it was made up of a series of much shorter individual wars and between them there had also been brief phases of peace. Before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the future belligerents' plans all envisaged a rapid conflict whose outcome would be decided by one or two decisive large battles.

If the Ottoman Empire was so weak, hen why didn't the European Powers directly challenge the Ottoman Empire for control of territories?

The European powers were in constant competition with each other, and no one wanted to make the big move to challenge the Ottomans, as it could invite another European power to challenge. The conflict in the Crimean War, and the constant tensions in China, proved the European fears was well-founded.

What were some of the weaknesses of the League of Nations in terms of Pacifism and disarmament

The League of Nations lacked an armed force of its own and depended on the Great Powers to enforce its resolutions, which they were very unwilling to do.[207] Its two most important members, Britain and France, were reluctant to use sanctions and even more reluctant to resort to military action on behalf of the League. Immediately after the First World War, pacifism became a strong force among both the people and governments of the two countries. The British Conservatives were especially tepid to the League and preferred, when in government, to negotiate treaties without the involvement of that organisation.[208]Moreover, the League's advocacy of disarmament for Britain, France, and its other members, while at the same time advocating collective security, meant that the League was depriving itself of the only forceful means by which it could uphold its authority.[209] When the British cabinet discussed the concept of the League during the First World War, Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, circulated a memorandum on the subject. He started by saying, "Generally it appears to me that any such scheme is dangerous to us, because it will create a sense of security which is wholly fictitious".[210] He attacked the British pre-war faith in the sanctity of treaties as delusional and concluded by claiming: It [a League of Nations] will only result in failure and the longer that failure is postponed the more certain it is that this country will have been lulled to sleep. It will put a very strong lever into the hands of the well-meaning idealists who are to be found in almost every Government, who deprecate expenditure on armaments, and, in the course of time, it will almost certainly result in this country being caught at a disadvantage.[210] The Foreign Office minister Sir Eyre Crowe also wrote a memorandum to the British cabinet claiming that "a solemn league and covenant" would just be "a treaty, like other treaties". "What is there to ensure that it will not, like other treaties, be broken?" Crowe went on to express scepticism of the planned "pledge of common action" against aggressors because he believed the actions of individual states would still be determined by national interests and the balance of power. He also criticised the proposal for League economic sanctions because it would be ineffectual and that "It is all a question of real military preponderance". Universal disarmament was a practical impossibility, Crowe warned.[210]

According to Professor Lanthier, what was the side-effect of President Wilson's emphasis on the idea of national self-determination?

The idea of the Wilsonian notion of "national self-determination" generated very high-hopes among people, which were quite unrealistic.

According to Lanthier, what was the general opinion among women about working in traditionally male industries during the war?

There is impossible to generalize. Some absolutely hated it, and wanted to go back. Others very much enjoyed it. Many, however, saw a glimpse of greater female autonomy, and many women exercised this autonomy after the war. However, it is important NOT to blow this out of proportion.

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what were the greatest challenges faced by Theobald Theodor Friedrich Alfred von Bethmann Hollweg when he was Chancellor of the German Empire?

p. 111) ¶3 In office, Bethman Hollweg's two greatest challenges were the kaiser and the Reichstag--the national parliament created by the constitution of imperial Germany in 1871. He bridled at Wilhelm's personal interventions into administrative and policy matters that the kaiser knew little about, and he found uncongenial the political manoeuvring required to manage the Reichstag. Elected by universal manhood suffrage and the secret ballot, the Reichstag was becoming increasingly difficult to deal with. A born administrator, Bethman Hollweg attempted to govern from the centre, but depended on the Right for support. He found it increasingly difficult to pursue the kind of moderate, modernizing, reformist policies that he preferred. ¶4 Bethmann Hollweg also found it difficult to deal with Wilhelm II's dream of building a great navy. He regarded it as far more important that Germany, surrounded by potential enemies in Europe, should have a strong army. The price of building a great high-seas fleet was starving the army o the funds it needed, while challenging the British empire and pushing it closer to France and Russia. Until now Bethmann Hollweg pursued two goals in defence and foreign policy: building a stronger army and reaching an accommodation with Britain by offering an arrangement in which Germany recognized British naval superiority in exchange for a promise of neutrality in the event of a European war. At the time of the assassination Bethmann Hollweg was actively engaged in promoting agreements with Britain concerning the future disposition of the Portuguese colonies in Africa and over the future of the 'Berlin to Baghdad' railway in the Middle East." (Martel 2014, 111)

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", how militarized were the Great Powers of Europe by 1914?

¶2 "... While the hawkish Chief of the General staff, Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, supported by the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Leopold Berchtold, pressed for imediate war against Serbia, the head of government in the Hungarian half of the empire, Count István Tisza, urged caution, fearing 'the dreadful calamity of a European war'. This lack of unity among the rulers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the very reason that a guarantee of German backing was sought. The Austrians thought the German army was invincible; German backing was a solid guarantee, even if a European war were to arise from action against Serbia. And the Austrians had the impression from Berlin that if war was unavoidable, the timing could not be more propitious. ¶3 However, the Habsburg Empire knew only two speeds: slow and dead-stop. Many of the men needed for service in the army were at the time even more urgently required to get in the harvest. So an immediate response was impossible. It was pointed out, already two days after the assassination, that at least a further sixteen days would be necessary to mobilize the armed forces for a strike against Serbia. As it was, the protracted Austrian response amounted to a slow-burning fuse that eventually prompted all the great powers to become involved. As the crisis deep end, actions were influenced by mentalities, aims, ambitions and fears that had been long in the making." (Kershaw 2015, 30).

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", on whom does the author blame for World War 1?

¶2 "the lion's share of the responsibility falls on those powers whose irreconcilable interests and ambitions were most geared to the risk of a general European war and whose diplomatic brinkmanship during the crisis rested ultimately on their willingness to use their military muscle. As breaking point was reached in July 1914, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia had been the decisive forces in the crisis. Germany's role was the most crucial of all." (Kershaw 2015, 24).

In chapter 4 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what is chapter 4 entitled?

"Chapter Four - Who Killed Sergei Kirov?"

In the Introduction of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", what four major elements brought about the various crises during the first half of the twentieth century in Europe?

"The chapters that follow explore the reasons for this immeasurable catastrophe. They locate these in four interlocking major elements of comprehensive crises, unique to these decades: (1) an explosion of ethnic-racist nationalism; (2) bitter and irreconcilable demands for territorial revisionism; (3) acute class conflict -- now given concrete focus through the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia; and (4) a protracted crisis of capitalism (which many observers thought was terminal). Bolshevism's triumph was a vital new component after 1917. So was the almost constant state of crisis of capitalism, alleviated for only a brief few years in the mid-1920s. The other elements had been present before 1914, though in far less acute form. None had been a primary cause of the First World War. But the new virulence of each was a crucial outcome of that war. Their lethal interaction now spawned an era of extraordinary violence, leading to a Second World War far more destructive even than the First. Worst affected from the interlinkage of the four elements were central, eastern and south-eastern Europe -- for the most part the poorest regions of the continent. Western Europe fared better (though Spain was an important exception)." (Kershaw 2015, 2).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what is the time-frame of Week Four?

"Week Four: 20-23 July" (Martel 2014, 150).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what is the time-frame of Week Three?

"Week Three: 13-19 July" (Martel 2014, 134)

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what is the time-frame of Week Two?

"Week Two: 6-12 July" (Martel 2014, 82)

In chapter 3 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what legacy competed with pacifism after World War I?

(p. 102) ¶3 Not all, however, felt that way. There was an altogether different and competing legacy of Europe's great conflagration -- a legacy that glorified war and welcomed violence and hatred. For many, the war simply did not end in November 1918. The culture shock of defeat, of revolution and the triumph of socialism, and the paranoid fears of 'Red Terror' in horror stories spread by refugees fleeing from the Russian Civil War fed a brutal mentality in which the killing and maiming of those viewed as responsible for the disaster became a duty a duty, necessity and pleasure -- a normal way of life." (Kershaw 2015, 102).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was, in general, the view of the assassination of Ferdinand among the 'Triple Entente'?

(p. 103) ¶4 These developments barely seemed to register with the so-called 'Triple Entente'. When the French cabinet met the first time following the assassination on Tuesday, the 30th of June, the situation arising from Sarajevo was barely mentioned. Raymond Poincaré did not alter his plans to attend a number of public functions in which he was expected to participate in his ceremonial role as president of the French republic. After offering expressions of regret and condolence for the outrage and the deaths, Britain, France, and Russia appeared content to sit back and wait for events to unfold." (Martel 2014, 103).

In chapter 3 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, where was the epicentre of the new extreme counter-revolutionary groups?

(p. 104) ¶2 The epicentre of the new and extreme counter-revolutionary violence, greater than anything witnessed here since the Thirty Years War of the seventeenth century, was located nevertheless in central and eastern Europe. Here, whole societies, not just soldiers returning from years of exposure to killing and inured to bloodshed and suffering had been brutalized. Scorched-earth policies and the deportation of civilians had been part of the war on the eastern front. And there the fighting did not stop in November 1918 but flowed without break into fierce border conflicts in Poland and into the Russian Civil War -- of a horror that sent shock waves convulsing throughout eastern and central Europe." (Kershaw 2015, 104).

In chapter 3 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what motivated the extremely violent counter-revolutionary movements in post-WWI Europe?

(p. 104) ¶3 Preventing Bolshevism from spreading to their own homelands was a crucial motive of counter-revolutionaries, some of whom readily participated in the anti-Bolshevik campaigns in the Baltic and elsewhere. But the violence was not simply a reaction to what was happening in Russia. The left-wing revolutions that swept the lands of the defeated Central Powers encountered opposition everywhere. Armed paramilitary organizations gathered strength amid the political chaos. Their leaders had invariably experienced the slaughter at the front, often in the east, during the First World War. What had horrified most Europeans had been for these men an exhilarating experience. They heroized fighting and extolled killing. When they came home, it was to a world that they did not understand, a world, as one put it, 'turned upside down'. They felt a sense of betrayal, or simply saw no future in a return to mundane, often poverty-stricken, civilian life. Many who felt like this found their way into the racial violence of paramilitary politics, burgeoning especially between the east of Germany and the west of Russia, and from the Baltic to the Balkans. The German Freikorps (freebooters, at government expense), often under aristocratic leadership, are estimated to have attracted between 200000 and 400,000 men. They operated where border conflicts, radical ethnic nationalism, the threat of Bolshevism and a visceral hatred of Jews created a potent mix of violent emotions. (p. 105) ¶1 Around a quarter of the 225,000 German officers returning home in 1918, mainly lower-ranking from middle-class backgrounds, joined one or other of the paramilitary Freikorps units. So did a large number of unemployed former soldiers and landless labourers, hoping to acquire some land in the east and meanwhile contenting themselves with what they could plunder. War veterans were, however, outnumbered by activists too young to have fought in the war, though sharing a similar mentality with those disaffected by the peace -- a 'war youth generation' fed on militaristic values and expectations of national glory. ¶2 The paramilitary recruits looked for ways to uphold -- or try to recreate -- the camaraderie, the 'trench community', the male bonds, and the sheer excitement of armed conflict. They recalled, or imagined, a sense of unity, of patriotic fervour, of commitment to a cause worth fighting and dying for. And this greatly magnified the bitterness they now felt towards those who, in their eyes, had demanded the enormous human sacrifice that had brought not victory and glory but defeat and humiliation. It enormously heightened the thirst for revenge that these paramilitary recruits felt against those deemed responsible for loss of parts of their homeland and those they viewed as creating a world opposed to all that they stood for -- a world shaped by disorder, lack of authority, injustice, chaos (seen as fomented by the 'Reds') and 'effeminate' democracy. Their response was extreme violence. ¶3 The new upsurge of violence had no clear or coherent ideology. Greed, envy, thirst for material gain, desire to grab land all played their part. The violence itself owed far more to untrammelled activism than to a preconceived view of a future society or the form of the state. But it was ideological just the same; targeted and not random, aimed at the revolutionary forces -- mainly perceived as internal enemies -- that threatened to destroy the values they held dear." (Kershaw 2015, 104-105).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what did need Austria need for any military action against Serbia?

(p. 105) ¶3 Any possibility that Austria could use the assassination to 'solve' its Serbian problem 'once and for all' depended on the support of Germany. Count Tisa had made it clear that he would not consent to any dramatic steps being taken against Serbia without a promise of such support. It was to determine the extent of German support that Berchtold, on 4 July, despatches his chef de cabinet at the foreign ministry, Count Alexander Hoyos, to Berlin on a special mission. He was to take with him the emperor's personal letter to the kaiser, along with the revised Matscheko memorandum." (Martel 2014, 105).

In chapter 4 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what events led to the abdication of the Tsar?

(p. 107) ¶2 In January 1917, rumors began circulating that the tsar once again was preparing to prorogue the Duma, the contentious and ineffectual debating assembly that masqueraded as the nation's imperial parliament. The prospect of yet another dissolution, the third within 11 years, was intolerable even for conservative legislators. In February, a splinter group of rightist delegates joined the centrist Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) to demand the tsar's abdication. The issue was forced less than a month later whne the palace garrison laid down its arms, refusing any longer to defend a manifestly bankrupt regime. It was at this point, on March 16, that the tsar gave up all further pretense to imperial authority and relinquished his throne. Within the week, the Duma simply declared itself the nation's "provisional government" and proceeded with the business of organizing a nation-wide election for a constitutional assembly." (Sachar 2014, 107).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what did Kaiser Wilhelm communicate to Szögyény on July 5, 1914 that would have vast implicaitons on Austria's actions against

(p. 108) ¶3 Kaiser Wilhelm expressed some apprehensions. If Austria were to undertake severe measures against Serbia--which he expected them to do--it could lead to serious complications. Nevertheless, he authorized Szögyény to convey to the emperor that Austria could rely on the full support of Germany. Russia was bound to be hostile, but he had been preparing against this 'for years'. He did not believe that Russia was ready for war at the moment but would attempt to incite France and Britain against Austria and fan the flames in the Balkans. Even if it came to war with Russia, Germany would, the ambassador wrote, 'stand at our side'. He would regret it if Austria failed to seize the coment 'which is so favourable to us'.48[48.] ¶4 The kaiser's words would afterwards become legendary as the 'blank cheque'--even though there was no menton of a cheque, blank or otherwise. What he meant by standing at Austria's side and giving his 'full support' remained to be seen. The kaiser told the ambassador that he would have to discuss the situation with his chancellor before his assurances could be considered official." (Martel 2014, 108).

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", what did the World Fair opening in Paris in 1900 symbolize?

(p. 11) ... ¶2 When the great World Fair opened in Paris in 1900, it was intended to exhibit a flourishing civilization, with Europe at its heart, and to sing a loud paean of praise to progress. An age of new technology was on show. Huge machines impressed people by their power and speed. The brilliance of the 'Palace of Electricity', lit by 5,000 light bulbs, quite literally dazzled its visitors. Twenty-four European nations, along with African, Asian, and latin American countries and the United States, displayed their elaborate pavilions -- visited over the next six months, often in awestruck admiration, by no fewer than 50 million people. Eastern Europe, most notably Russia with its nine pavilions, enjoyed a strong presence. And the European 'civilizing mission' featured prominently. With imperialism at its height, the lavishly exotic depictions of faraway colonial possessions conveyed an overwhelming impression of European world dominance. Commerce, prosperity and peace seemed to offer the unlimited continuation of this dominance. The future looked bright." (Kershaw 2015, 11)

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", did the optimism symbolized by the 1900 World Fair in Paris seem justified?

(p. 11) ... ¶3 The optimism appeared justified. Compared with what had gone- (p. 12) ¶1-before, let alone with what was to come, the nineteenth century had been peaceful. There had been no general, continental war in Europe since Napoleon's era had ended in 1815. War in distant Crimea between 1853 and 1856, like the brief wars that had culminated in German and Italian unification in 1871, had not threatened the general peace of the continent. A decade after the great Paris exhibition a British writer, Norman Angell, published an international best-seller, The Great Illusion, in which he even went so far as to claim that the modern wealth flowing from commerce and a globally interwoven economy made war pointless. Many, not just in Britain, agreed. It was difficult to imagine that prosperity, peace and stability would not continue into the indefinite future, that they could be swept away so soon and so rapidly." (Kershaw 2015, 11-12).

In chapter 4 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, in 1922, where does the name "Communist" Party come from?

(p. 113) ¶1 ... in April 1918, ... the Central Committee of the "Communist Party--a popular title lately adopted the Soviet government to designate the triumph of "pure" socialism over Menshevik-Bolshevik factionalism ..." (Sachar 2014, 113).

In chapter 4 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, from where di the "White" armies originate?

(p. 113) ¶2 In "integral" Russia itself, moreover, antirevolutionary troop units moved to wrest back political leadership on behalf of the tsarist dynasty. Thus, General M.V. Alekseev, a former imperial chief of military staff, began organizing a "White"--loyalist--army immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution. Soon, besides Lavr Kornilov in Russia, other former tsarist military commanders,--Anton Denikin in southern Ukraine and Crimea, Nikolai Yudenich in the Baltic regions, Alexander Kolchak in Siberia--raised antirevolutionary armies of their own and established "White" enclaves throughout the vast, formerly tsarist Eurasian land mass. Indeed, for months at a time, the functional authority of Lenin's regime was reduced essentially to the areas immediately adjacent to Petrograd (St. Petersburg) and Moscow." (Sachar 2014, 113).

In chapter 3 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the problem with applying Wilson's central ideal of "self-determination" to post-WWI Europe?

(p. 115) ¶3 Wilson's central ideal, which underlaid the deliberations in Paris, was self-determination.' The term was susceptible to different meanings and Wilson was content to be vague about its definition, not least since its implications for maintaining power in the colonies were barely palatable to the major imperial powers, Britain and France. For Wilson, self-determination essentially meant government derived from popular sovereignty - the right of a people to have their own state, which would ideally evolve over time and not result from violent revolution. ¶4 In the disastrous conditions of post-war Europe, however, self-determination - a revolutionary concept - was a demand for the immediate future, not a long-term aspiration. The Bolsheviks had in fact been the first to use the concept. But their interest in self-determination was purely instrumental. Their support for nationalist movements was extended in order to undermine and destroy the existing multi-national empires in Europe and more generally to weaken or overthrow imperialism. However, in Stalin's words, 'when- (p. 116) ¶1-the right of self-determination conflicts with another, a higher right -- the right of the working class that has come to power to consolidate that power', then 'the right of self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the working class in exercising its right to dictatorship'. As this made abundantly plain, 'national self-determination' in the emerging Soviet Union was to become wholly subordinated to the centralizing power of the Bolshevik state. ¶2 The vision of self-determination that underpinned the deliberations at the Versailles COnference in 1919 (to which the Soviets were not invited) ran completely counter to the Bolshevik interpretation. It was to be the framework for a world order based on liberal democracy -- government by popular consent in a state resting on popular sovereignty. The underlying problem, however, was that precisely in the most unsettled parts of the continent the claim to popular sovereignty was based on ethnic nationalism. And most of the territories of the fallen empires contained more than one nationality staking a claim to land, resources and political representation. In the countries of western Europe (as in the USA) the state had over tiem shaped the nation; association with the institutions of the state had gradually formed a national consciousness. But in most of central, eastern and southern Europe, national consciousness. But in most of central, eastern and southern Europe, national consciousness had emerged from the demands of a people defined by ethnicity, language and culture to establish a state than represented -- often exclusively -- their interests. How was self-determination to be squared with competing claims to a sovereign nation state?" (Kershaw 2015, 115-116).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was the German ambassador Lichnowsky's goal when talking to Sir Edward Grey?

(p. 115) ¶4 Lichnowsky returned to London from a brief vacation in Germany on Monday, 6 July and proceeded immediately to the foreign office. Acting on instructions from Bethmann Hollweg, he arranged to meet with Sir Edward Grey that afternoon in order to persuade him that Britain and Germany should agree to 'localize' any dispute between Austria and Serbia." (Martel 2014, 115)

In chapter 3 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, from where did the deepest source of anger and resentment come from in Germany?

(p. 120) ¶3 The deepest anger and resentment of all were reserved for Article 231 of the Treaty, and its implications. Article 231, later commonly known as 'the war guilt clause', deemed that Germany and its allies were responsible for the war. It provided the legal basis for Germany's liability to pay reparations for war damages -- vehemently demanded by a baying public opinion in both France and Britain. The amount of reparations was left ot an Allied Commission to determine and, in 1921, was eventually fixed at 132 billion gold marks. Huge though the sum was, it could have been repaid over time without crippling the German economy. Inthe event, most of it would never be paid.- (p. 121) ¶1 Reparations were, in fact, not primarily an economic problem. The real damage was political. They remained for over a decade a cancer in German politics -- sometimes receding, at other times recurring to attack the nation's political health through inciting further nationalist agitation. By the time the reparations were in practice written off, in 1932, Germany was in crisis again and a more dangerous nationalist menace than ever before was looming." (Kershaw 2015, 120-121).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what policy did the government of Austria-Hungary take toward Serbia by July 8th, 1914?

(p. 122) ¶4 By the morning of Wednesday, the 8th of July, the government of Austria-Hungary--with the possible exception of Tisza--seemed prepared for war. At the Ballhausplatz, officials began to draft an ultimatum to Serbia. But a new impediment to quick action then surfaced. Conrad had discovered two days earlier that key military units at Agram, Graz, Pressburg, Cracow, Temesvár, Innsbruck, and Budapest were on leave and were not scheduled to return to barracks until 25 July. They had been released when landowners complained that they could not bring in the annual harvest without their help. To recall them publicly at this moment would be regarded as preparatory to war--when it was too early for such a signal to be sent." (Martel 2014, 122)

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", what kind of social change was seen as the most dangerous?

(p. 13) ... ¶3 The key change, and one that elites in every country viewed as a- (p. 14) ¶1-fundamental threat to their power, had been the rise of working-class political parties and trade unions. The 'Second International' of European socialist parties had been instituted in 1889 as an umbrella organizaiton to coordinate the programmatic demands o fnational parties. Most of these parties remained wedded in one form or another to the revolutionary doctrine enunciated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Their attack on the innately exploitative nature of capitalism, and their propagation of a new society based upon equality and the fair distribution of wealth, had obvious and growing appeal for large numbers of the poor and deprived industrial working class. Attempts by ruling elites to proscribe or suppress worker parties and the growing trade unions had failed. Workers were now organizing the defence of their interests better than ever before. The rapid expansion of trade unions reflected this. By 1914 trade unions in Britain had over 4 million members, in Germany more than 2.5 million, and in France about a million." (Kershaw 2015, 13-14).

In chapter 4 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, in 1922, what was the background of Sergei Kirov?

(p. 133) ¶3 ... Born Sergei Kostrikov in the provincial Caucasus town of Urzhum, he was the only son of a ne'er-do-well father who had abandoned his family when his child was eight months old. After his mother died six years later, the boy was given over to an orphanage. In 1901, however, a group of influential benefactors provided him with a scholarship to an industrial school in Kazan. Four years later, upon completing his course of studies, he was taken on as an "engineer's assistant" in Tomsk. It was also in Tomsk, however, that the young man became a Marxist and joined the underground Social Democratic Party. He paid the price. During the ensuing 1905 Octobrist uprising, he was arrested for "incitement" and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Nevertheless, upon release, and after changing his name to "Kirov," the youthful revolutionary lost no time in resuming his career as a Bolshevik propagandist. Indeed, from then on, nothing deterred him in his radical commitments, not even a second, three-year term of tsarist imprisonment. In the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, moreover, Kirov served with distinction as a Red infantry officer in the ensuing civil war. In 1921, he was appointed party secretary for Azerbaijan. ¶4 It was in the Caucasus, too, that Kirov came to know and respect Stalin, himself recently appointed as the party's first secretary. In 1926, Stalin rewarded the younger man's competence and loyalty by promoting him to the key party secretaryship for the District of Leningrad. Extending from the Estonian border to the Arctic Ocean, this "district" in the 1920s and early 1930s encompassed the largest industrial proletariat in the Soviet Union. Again, Kirov fully justified his appointment, presiding over the party's affairs with unsurpassed energy- (p. 134) ¶1-and efficiency. He also provided with a ruthlessness that rivaled Stalin's, for his bailwick included the notorious Baltic-White Sea Canal construction project. Between 1929 and 1933, it was in this vast undertaking that approximately a quarter million laborers, predominantly deported kulaks, worked under appalling conditions, tens of thousands of them to die of their ordeal.50[50.] ¶2 By the early 1930s, Kirov was functioning not only as party secretary in Leningrad but as a newly elected member of the Communist Central Committee and, subsequently, of the Politburo. Dynamic, handsome, a compelling orator, he had already become a figure of national prominence. Indeed, in 1932, Kirov's views already commanded enough respect within the party to dissuade the Politburo from authorizing the punishment of Mikahil Ryutin (p. 131). Aside from this tactical disagreement, however, Stalin had no "objective" reason to distrust Kirov, for the younger man's personal devotion seemingly had remained intact, and he had not identified himself either with the party's "Right" or "Left." Yet, in Stalin's mind, was trust eclipsed by a mounting jealousy?"" (Sachar 2014, 133-134).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how predictable was the outbreak of war by 13 July?

(p. 134) ¶4 Two weeks after the assassination, by 13 July, it was still far from clear how events would unfold. One of Austria's hopes was dashed. The special emissary sent from Vienna to Sarajevo to investigate the assassination reported that he had been unable to find any proof that the Serbian government was implicated in the crime.94[94.] The Austrians responsible for putting together the case against Serbia now had to refocus their efforts: instead of accusing it of complicity in the crime itself, they would have to demonstrate that Serbia had failed to live up to its promise of 1909 that it- (p. 135) ¶1-would live on good terms with the Dual Monarchy. This was going to make the public-relations battle in Europe much more difficult." (Martel 2014, 134-135)

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, why did Austrio-Hungarian Emperor Franz Joseph, Foreign Minister Berchtold, and Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza consider war to be a viable option?

(p. 135) ¶3 Franz Joseph, Berchtold, and Tisza had good reason to believe that the moment was opportune. The political situation and social unrest within the powers of the Entente made it seem unlikely that Austria would face a determined and united response. In Russia, most attention was focused on the strikes of working men that were gathering momentum in the major cities. Since the beginning of the year, sixteen new strikes had broken out every day, totalling 3,534. The police deemed 2,565 of these to be 'political'. Out of 242,000 industrial workers n St. Petersburg, 180,000 were now on strike. In Frane the sensational trial of Madame Caillaux--the wife of an important cabinet minister accused of killing a journalist--was set to begin on 20 July and promised to absorb the attention of the press and the French people when it did. In Britain the politicians were most concerned that a civil war might break out in Ulster over the Home Rule Bill. The chancellor of the exchequer, David Lloyd George, declared in a speech that the situation in Ireland, combined with an impending strike by railwaymen, transport workers, and miners, presented the gravest situation that any British government had dealt with 'for centuries.'" (Martel 2014, 135).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what did the Russian foreign minister Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov think of Austria-Hungary's response to Serbia circa 17 July?

(p. 136) ¶3 In St Petersburg, however, the Russian foreign minister was taking a very different line. Although Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov condemned the assassination, he also criticized the Austrian administration in Bosnia for permitting attacks on Serbians in itas aftermath. He dismissed those loyal to the Austrian regime there as amounting to little more than a few 'Mohammedans and Catholics'. And he denied that the assassination was part of a plot to create a Greater Serbia for which the Serbian government could beheld responsible. The assassination was perpetrated by immature young men acting on their own. The German ambassador believed that Sazonov's attitude could only be explained by his 'implicabale [unversöhnlichen] hatred' of Austria, 'a hatred which is absolutely clouding more and more all clear and calm judgement here.'.98[98.]" (Martel 2014, 136).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what did Tisza do to the ultimatum on 13 July, and what difficulties did Austria-Hungarian foreign minister Berthold face ?

(p. 137) ¶2 On the same day that Berchtold received the report that the assassination could not be traced back to the Serbian government he broke the bad news to Tschirschky. Austria could not release the results of the inquiry; it could do no more than publicize the general trend of Serbian policy and the results it produced. Nevertheless, Berchtold resolved to act: he would try to reach agreement with Tisza the next day, and ask for Franz Joseph's authorization of the ultimatum to Serbia on the following day. They would then present it immediately to Belgrade--ideally, just hours before the French president and premier were scheduled to baord the France for their visit to St. petersburg.100[100.] (p. 138) ¶1 Tisza disrupted Berchtold's plan. Although he agreed on the fundamentals of the ultimatum--including a forty-eight-hour limit for a response--he insisted that the final draft be submitted to the two governments before it was presented to Serbia. This could not happen before the 19th." (Martel 2014, 137-138).

In chapter 4 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what was the effect of the December Law?

(p. 139) ¶3 ... it was under the harsh guidelines of the "December Law" that the NKVD moved without delay against the alleged "Leningrad terrorist center." On December 28-29, 1934, besides Nikolaev himself, 13 others--mainly the "delinquent guards" at the Smolny, as well as Borisov's police escort during the latter's fatal "automobile accident"--were tried by a secret "antiterrorist" court. The subsequent published account of the trial stated only that the defendants had confessed their crime, after which they had immediately been shot. Sixty-six other suspects were rounded up within the first two weeks of Kirov's assassination, including Nikolaev's pitiable and wholly innocent wife, his divorced former wife, his brother and sister-in-law, and other relatives and close friends. Most of these also were tried, summarily found guilty, and executed. Nikolaev's distraught second wife initially was confined to an institution for the mentally ill, but, months later, she too was shot. A sister, a cousin, another sister-in-law, and Nikolaev's 64-year-old mother, a semiliterate charwoman at the Leningrad tramway depot, were given harsh prison sentences for the crime of "passive collusion."" (Sachar 2014, 139).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what two events occurred to cause Britain to rethink its neutrality with regard to Europe?

(p. 14) "¶2 ... in 1905 ... a French military mission was sent to Morocco to 'assist' the Moroccans in reforming their administration. ... The sultan appealed to the Germans for their assistance in resisting the French. And the Germans agreed: on 31 March the kaiser and his entourage disembarked at Tangier, riding through the streets on a magnificent hose, with a military band marching and playing behind him. He announced that Germany would support the independence of the regime in Morocco and that Germany would protect its interests there." ... ¶4 ... By May the British began to hint that they might be prepared to discuss the possibility of turning the entente into an alliance. And the- (p. 15) ¶1-French foreign secretary, who had been the architect of the entente, welcomed the prospect. But when the Germans got wind of it they insisted that he be forced out of office--and the French premier, fearing it would end in war, agreed to force his resignation. Germany appeared to have scored a decisive diplomatic victory: the Triple Alliance was supreme in Europe, the Franco-Russian alliance was shown to be hollow, and the Anglo-French entente useless. The Gmerans confidently called for an international conference to settle the Moroccan dispute. ¶2 The balance of power that had been established by the alliance system a decade earlier now appeared to have shattered. ... Things got even worse for Russia when the Baltic fleet finally arrived off the coast of Japan in May [1915]--where it was annihilated almost immediately Two months later when the kaiser met with the tsar in Sweden her persuaded him to sign the defensive alliance that he had proposed the year before. ¶3 France's humiliation in Morocco and Russia's humiliation in the Far East prompted Britain to rethink its diplomatic situation. With the Franco-Russian alliance no longer in a position to counter the weight of the Triple Alliance in Europe, combined with the possibility that the new German naval fleet might cooperate with Britains' traditional rivals outside Europe, the future was beginning to look bleak for the British empire. ..." (Martel 2014, 14-15).

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", how did socialism manifest in the more economic advanced countries of 1900s Europe?

(p. 14) ... ¶3 In the more economically advanced parts of Europe, organized socialism, whatever the rhetoric, constrained outright militancy and channelled it into parliamentary, not revolutionary, action. Jean Jaurès in France gained a major following by advocating, despite the rhetoric of his Socialist Party, nto revolution, but a parliamentary route to socialism. The German Social Democratic Party, though rhetorically- (p. 15) ¶1-bound to its Marxist doctrine, sought in practice to win power through the ballot box. In Britain the Labour Party (which adopted the name in 1906) had grown out of the trade unions and reflected their pragmatic concerns for worker interests rather than any revolutionary utopianism. The Marxist message was largely ignored in favour of the non-revolutionary message that capitalism did not need to be overthrown since it could be reformed, to the eventual benefit of the working class. State power, it was presumed, could be transformed by peaceful means to represent working-class interests. Workers in much of wester, northern and central Europe were poor, but less outrightly impoverished and less militaristic than they had been in previous times. They had more to lose than their chains. They largely fell in line behind their reformist leaders." (Kershaw 2015, 14-15).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what cemented the positions of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente?

(p. 15) "¶4 By the time that the [Moroccan] conference was convened at Algeciras in Spain in January 1906 what amounted to a diplomatic revolution had occurred. The sunny prospects for German diplomacy disappeared. France was bolstered- (p. 16) ¶1-by British support. Italy had secretly agreed to recognize the special interests of France in Morocco in exchange for similar recognition of Italy's interests in Libya. Austria-Hungary counselled germany to act with moderation. The tsar's advisers had persuaded him that a defensive alliance with Germany would mean the abandonment of france, the destruction of the balance of power in Europe, and the encouragement of German expansion into the Middle East. The conference proved to be a humiliation for German diplomacy. ¶2 It seemed that Britain had succeeded in restoring the balance of powers established in the mid-1890s. To those who managed British policy, the conclusion was clear: the Triple Alliance had grown stronger, and only the prospect of British intervention on the side of France and Russia could maintain the precarious balance between the two alliances. Over the course of the next two years Britain and Russia negotiated an agreement to resolve their differences in Central Asia--in Tibet, Afghanistan, Persia, and the Gulf. Following the Anglo-Russian Convention of August 1907, observers and participants began to refer to the Triple Alliance as facing the 'Triple Entente'. ... Stability had been restored, the balance recalibrated. The two great alliances again faced one another in Europe, with Britain informally attached to France and Russia." (Martel 2014, 15-16).

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", how did socialism manifest in the less economic advanced countries of 1900s Europe?

(p. 15) ... ¶2 In less well-developed parts of the continent, the situation was different. The confrontation with the power of the state was more stark. There was little or no diffusion of power through intermediary organizations or social structures that gave citizens a stake in their state. Power was largely despotic and top-down, based heavily upon coercion, with an entrenched ruling caste, corrupt officialdom, and weak or non-existent representative institutions. Notions of the seemingly unlimited progress of civilization built on benign state authority and respect for the law, which later formed part of the sense of a lost 'golden age' among the middle classes in central, northern and western Europe, looked bizarre from the southern and eastern periphery of the continent. Strikes, riots and localized insurrections against state power and 'bourgeois rule' increased in Catalonia and the Basque Country, for example, in the first years of the twentieth century. Anarchism, often involving sporadic antis-tate violence, had much support among the landless labourers of Andalusia. In southern Italy, where corrupt state officials were in the pockets of the estate-holders, violent rural unrest was endemic. Bands of brigands roaming the countryside blended crime with popular protest in defending peasants and landless labourers against the power of the state and big landowners. Alarm among Europe's leaders at the threat they saw from a revolutionary working class was especially acute during a big wave of industrial strikes and upheavals in 1905. In Russia, faced with a revolution that came close to toppling the Tsar, the heavy hand of state repression- (p. 16) ¶1-turned into outright counter-revolutionary violence that year, when soldiers in St. Petersburg massacred two hundred workers and injured hundreds more. The revolution was suppressed. Concessions, more cosmetic than transformational, were made to parliamentary representation, but power was retained by the Tsar and his appointed ministers. To the powerless, especially to those leading the socialist movement, whatever its doctrinal divisions, it seemed obvious. Tsarist autocracy could not be reformed. It had to be overthrown. The result was the intensified, raw radicalism of Russian socialism." (Kershaw 2015, 15-16).

In chapter 4 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the cause of the Great Depression

(p. 150) ¶4 There is no need to be a disciple of Karl Marx to recognize the extent to which economic forces determined the course of Europe's post-war development. These were understood by few, if any, economists and practically no political leaders, let alone b the mass of ordinary people whose lives they determined. Even today economist disagree about the precise causes of the Great Depression, and why it was so widespread, so deep and so long-lasting. The essentials seem nevertheless clear enough. The direct cause of the crash was the greatly overheated American economy during the boom of the 'roaring twenties'. The overheating had its roots in cheap money that flowed into consumer spending -- sales of automobiles and electrical goods led the way -- and eventually into stocks and shares that seemed to be on an endless upward curve. When the bubble burst in 1929, the fallout in Europe reflected structural economic weaknesses that had left the continent extremely vulnerable. In particular, the post-war economic dependence upon the United States was part of a highly disturbed- (p. 151) ¶1-global economy, in which the pre-war controls and balances no longer operated." (Kershaw 2015, 150-151).

In chapter 4 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the European economy like circa 1925-1929?

(p. 153) ¶2 ... in the mid-1920s, ... the European economy was recovering strongly. Industrial production rose by over 20 per cent between 1925 and 1929. There was above-average growth in Germany, Belgium, France, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Czechoslovakia; also (from a modest base) in Hungary, Romania, Poland and Latvia. Growth in France and Belgium was helped by currency depreciation. France's expansion built upon the extraordinarily quick economic recovery it had made in the early 1920s. Industrial production increased by more than a quarter between 1925 and 1929, while per capita income was nearly a fifth higher. On the even of the Great Depression French exports were about 50 per cent higher than before the war. Belgium, too, saw an impressive rise of about a third in industrial production, and a big increase in exports. The most remarkable growth, after the calamities of its civil war, took place in the Soviet Union, though here, of course, the market forces of the international economy did not operate. ¶3 In the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Greece and Austria, however, economic growth remained sluggish. Fascist Italy suffered from a significant overvaluation of the lira, pushed through by Mussolini for prestige reasons. Unemployment and wage cuts, only partly offset by public works and agricultural subsidies, followed. Primo de Rivera's dictatorship in Spain also brought trouble upon itself. High tariff protection, largely cutting off Spain from international markets, and the overvalued peseta left the Spanish economy in worsening difficulties by 1929. Denmark and Norway, too, suffered from overvalued currencies. The British economy showed a spurt in growth in 1928-9. However, although there had been expansion in newer industries such as car manufacturing, chemicals and electrical goods, the traditional industrial heartlands of coal, steel, textiles and shipbuilding had remained depressed throughout the 1920s. In Europe as a whole, nonetheless, by 1929 recovery from the immediate post-war blight had been a success story. Driven especially by the American boom, international trade had risen by over 20 per cent." (Kershaw 2015, 153).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how aware and composed were the leaders and statesmen of the Entente and the Triple Alliance by 22 July, 1914?

(p. 156) ¶3 On the eve of the crises the Entente and the Triple Alliance were both in disarray. Dire warnings of a world conflagration, predictions of war between the Slav races and the multinational monarchy were counterbalanced by talk of moderation, assurances of peaceful intentions, and suggestions of quiet diplomatic discussions resolving the dispute. Entente diplomats were aware that demands were about to be made on Serbia, but exactly when they would be presented and how far they would go remained uncertain. The French ambassador in Berlin, Jules Cambon, was convinced that Germany had no intention 'of playing the role of mediator' and intended to support Austria with all of its authority.150[150.] But the ambassador in London, his older brother Paul--who always referred to Jules as 'mon cher enfant'--continued to believe that Germany would restrain Austria because no German interests were involved. For his part, Sir Edward Grey was prepared to urge Serbia to give Austria assurances that it would prevent future plots from forming if Austria could prove that the assassination had been prepared and organized on Serbian territory. ¶4 the Italian foreign minister saw things more clearly than ost. San Giuliano warned the British ambassador that Austria's demands had been carefully drafted in order to be unacceptable to Serbia. He had now abandoned any hope that the emperor might act as a moderating influence: Austria was determined to take this opportunity to crush Serbia. He assured the French ambassador that Germany 'would make no effort to restrain Austria'. Vienna seemed to believe that Russia would stand by and let Serbia 'be violated'. Once the Austrian ultimatum was presented, he predicted that Austria 'will make it a duty to obtain what she has demanded'.151[151.] Everyone would find out the next day, on Thursday, 23 July, which was more accurate--San Giuliano's gloomy prediction or Grey's hope for moderation.152[152.]" (Martel 2014, 156).

In chapter 4 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what happened to the unemployment rate in many European countries when rationalized, mass-production techniques were introduced into industry?

(p. 157) ¶3 ... A consequence in Germany of the far-reaching rationalization of industrial production was that unemployment, which had remained low during the early 1920s, more than trebled in 1925-6 to over 2 million (10 percent of the working population). Similar levels of unemployment were not- (p. 158) ¶1-uncommon elsewhere in Europe. In countries where growth was slow, such as Denmark and Norway unemployment reached 17-18 per cent. It was high, too, in the older breaches of heavy industry and textiles, which faced increased competition in world markets and where rapid expansion had led to overcapacity. Unemployment in Britain never fell below 1 million even before the slump." (Kershaw 2015, 157-158)

In "Day One: Friday, 24 July", p. 165-187, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what happened to all European governments on 24 July, 1914?

(p. 165) ¶1 On the morning of 24 July all European governments received copies of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Four days earlier, Austria's ambassadors and ministers had received their copies of the note, along with an explanation of the Austrian position, and instructions on how they were to proceed. The only change made between Monday and Thursday was the delay in the presentation of Serbia of one hour in order to be certain tha Poincaré and Viviani had left St Petersburg. Nothing that anyone said or did during that week altered the course that had been agreed upon in Vienna by the common ministerial council on Sunday the 19th." (Martel 2015, 165).

In "Day One: Friday, 24 July", p. 165-187, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what did the Russian foreign minister Sazonov do after he found out Austria issued its ultimatum to Serbia in a meeting with Count Frigyes Szapáry de Szapár, Muraszombat et Széchy-Sziget, the Austro-Hungarian diplomat of Hungarian origin serving as ambassador at St. Petersburg?

(p. 168) ¶3 "Following their meeting, Sazonov immediately placed a telephone call to the tsar--an unprecedented step. The Austrians, he told Nicholas, had to know that Serbia could not possibly comply with their demands, and that they must therefore intend to attack Serbia. Nor would they have presented such an ultimatum without the backing of Germany. THe tsar directed that the council of ministers, which was scheduled to meet at 3 p.m. in order to discuss the strikes plaguing Russia, instead focus their discussion on Russia's response to the ultimatum. ¶4 Before the council met, Sazonov arranged to meet with the British and French ambassadors at the French embassy. When they convened over lunch at 12.30, Sazonov explain that he believed it urgent that war was imminent. Austria's conduct was provocative and immoral. Some of the demands were impossible for Serbia to accept. As Germany must have been consulted by Austria beforehand and must be cooperating with it, he hoped that Britain would likewise proclaim its solidarity with Russia and France.5[5.] ¶5 THe French ambassador, Maurice Paléologue, made it clear that France would support Russia diplomatically and fulfil its obligations under the- (p. 169) ¶1-terms of the alliance if the necessity arose. He advised Paris that only the 'solidarity of the Triple Entente' could deter the provocation of the 'Germanic Powers'.6[6.] His opinion would come as no surprise to officials at the Quai d'Orsay." (Martel 2015, 168-169)

In "Day One: Friday, 24 July", p. 165-187, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, who was the most powerful figure in the Russian council of ministers, and what role did he advocate Russia play in the upcoming conflict involving Serbia and Russia on July 24, 1918?

(p. 172) ¶4 Others at the meeting argued there would be difficulties in rising to the challenge of fighting a major war, but Russia was prepared for them. The meeting was chaired by the weak and ineffectual premier, Ivan Goremykin. Critically important were the views of the most powerful figure in the government, Aleksandr Krivoshein, the minister of agriculture. He had established himself as someone able to make connections and build coalitions within the fractious Duma, and impressed the tsar in doing so. Since 1912 he had also come to be regarded, along with the minister of war, as leading a war party in the council. He advised his fellow ministers to 'believe more in the Russian people and their age-old love for the homeland, which was greater than any accidental preparedness or unpreparedness for war'.11[11.] (p. 173) ¶1 Krivoshein believed that the government must act boldly in standing up to Germany and Austria: firmness, not conciliation, was most likely to prevent war. If the government failed to act boldly when Russia's vital interests were at stake, he warned, 'public and parliamentary opinion would fail to understand why'.12[12.] The heads of the army and the navy explained that while the reforms instituted following the Russo-Japanese war had yet to be completed, and although the Russian army had yet to achieve numerical superiority over the central powers, there was no military reason why Russia could not stand firm. The council agreed to back Serbia in spite of the risks." (Martel 2015, 172-173).

In chapter 4 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, how did the Great Depression impact culture in Europe?

(p. 174) ¶3 The Great Depression of the early 1930s had by then proved a cultural watershed. As the critique of all that was new, threatening and 'modern' swelled under the impact of the crisis, the assault on- (p. 175) ¶1-'degenerate' cultural forms became a powerful part of the armoury of fascism. This reaction was most extreme in Germany, not least because the artistic experimentation there during the 1920s had been so radical. However, the appeal of the fascist Right, not just in Germany, was culturally anchored not in the attempt to turn the clock back to some mythical traditional era, but to harness an image of 'traditional' cultural values -- in practice often much distorted -- to the vision of an alternative, utopian future. This vision was itself 'modern' in its way, certainly in its exploitation of technological progress for political ends. But its version of 'modernity' was one that utterly rejected the ideas of liberal pluralism, individualism, democracy and freedom which had spread throughout Europe since the French Revolution of 1789, Central to the utopian vision of fascism was national rebirth through redemption from the 'decadent', 'diseased' forms of modernity. This meant the ruthless expunging of the avant-garde artistic creativity of a pluralist society." (Kershaw 2015, 174-175)

In "Day One: Friday, 24 July", p. 165-187, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was the view reached by the French ambassadors in Berlin (Jules Cambon), London (Paul Cambon) and St Petersburg (Maurice Paléologue) regarding the situation on July 24, 1918?

(p. 178) ¶1 The French ambassadors in Berlin and St Petersburg arrived at fundamentally the same conclusion on the first day of the crisis. Cambon and Paléologue both reported that Germany seemed determined to support Austria and must have known the terms of the ultimatum and approved of it in advance. Only 'the solidarity of the Triple Entente' could prevent the Germanic powers from pursuing their provocative attitude.22[22.] From London, Paul Cambon added his voice to the chorus: he and the Russian ambassador there agreed that Austria would not have despatched the ultimatum without the agreement of Berlin beforehand. If Germany had wished to stop Austria it could have done so. The situation was as grave as could be imagined "and we see no way of arresting the course of events'.23[23.] Paul Cambon predicted that in two days Austria would march into Serbia because the Serbians could not possibly accept the Austrian demands; Russia would then be compelled to react." (Martel 2015, 178).

In "Day One: Friday, 24 July", p. 165-187, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how influential were the French ambassadors in Berlin (Jules Cambon), London (Paul Cambon), Rome (Camille Barrière), and St Petersburg (Maurice Paléologue) regarding the situation on July 24, 1918?

(p. 179) ¶1 That the three ambassadors shared the same perspective was not surprising. They, along with the ambassador at Rome, camille Barrère, had formed a kind of diplomatic cabinet over the last decade. With a series of ever-changing, weak, and usually uninstructed foreign ministers, they had filled the gap. By July 1914 they were more accustomed to telling the Quai d'Orsay what policy should be than they were to follow directions they received from paris. The Cambons and Paléologue had all studied together at the famous Lycée Louis-le-Grand (whose graduates included Voltaire, Robespierre, and Victor Hugo, as well as Raymond Poincaré and Jean Jaurès). Jules Cambon had married Paléologue's sister. Though they varied on the extent to which a rappochement with Germany was possible, they were all committed to the view that the alliance with Russia was essential for- (p. 180) ¶1-France's position in Europe, and that the entente with Britain was essential for France's future overseas." (Martel 2015, 179-180).

In "Day One: Friday, 24 July", p. 165-187, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, by the end of July 24, 1918, what was the state of the relationship between the member states of the Triple Alliance?

(p. 186) ¶3 After almost a month of encouraging, prodding, and cajoling, the Germans had failed to move the Austrians any closer to the italians. Their warnings that something must be done in order to bind Italy closer to the alliance had been ignored. The Austrians had offered nothing. In fact, they had made it quite clear that they did not intend to offer any compensation to the Italians both because they did not believe that the terms of the alliance warranted it and because they themselves had disavowed any intention of acquiring Serbian territory. ¶4 The first day of the crisis found the Triple Alliance in disarray. But it was still far from clear what form Italy's complaints would take and how far its reservations might influence the policies of Germany and Austria. In recognition of the political difficulties faced by the Italian government in opposing any movement for national unification, the German and Austrian ambassadors had been authorized to bribe journalists. This was referred to euphemistically as 'financially influencing the local press'. By 24 July this initiative had accomplished little, if anything. ¶5 The other initiative, to shore up the partnership with Romania by bringing Bulgaria into the Triple Alliance, was stalled. King Karl, although sympathetic, faced insurmountable political opposition to publicizing ROmania's membership in the alliance. And although the kaiser had swallowed his contempt for King Ferdinand of Bulgaria and authorized discussions of- (p. 187) ¶1-an alliance in Sofia, these had gotten nowhere by 24 July. The kaiser now gave his permission for a new initiative: to take advantage of Turkey's apparent desire to join the alliance.44[44.]" (Martel 2014, 186-187).

In "Day Two: Saturday, 25 July", p. 188-213, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, by the end of July 24, 1918, what was the view of Austria on July 25 regarding the events on July 24?

(p. 188) ¶3 Nothing had happened on Friday the 24th to persuade Austria to alter its course. That the Russians complained about the note was no surprise. The reports received in Vienna from St Petersburg were actually quite encouraging: the Russians, although angry and bitter, seemed likely to respond slowly and carefully. According to the Austrian ambassador, Sazonov appeared saddened and depressed, complaining that the Austrians seemed to want war, that they were burning their bridges behind them and setting fire to Europe. But instead of threatening the Austrians with war, Sazonov only warned them that Russia would not permit them to 'devour' Serbia--from which the German ambassador concluded that this, along with the proposal to bring the dispute before a European 'court', indicated that Russia was not likely to undertake a 'warlike response'.1[1.] Sazonov did little more than warn that Austria would encounter the combined displeasure of the Entente." (Martel 2014, 188).

In "Day Two: Saturday, 25 July", p. 188-213, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, by midday of July 25, what steps had the Russians determined to take in response to Austria?

(p. 190) ¶2 By midday Saturday the Russians seemed to have reached a decision. They prepared to take dramatic military steps. In the morning at Krasnoe Selo, Tsar Nicholas presided over a meeting of the Russian Grand council--which included those who had met as the Council of Ministers on Friday, but added members of the royal family and high-ranking officials. The council agreed to mobilize the thirteen army corps designated to take action against Austria-Hungary. And by the afternoon the preparations to mobilize in the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan had begun.5[5.] The German military attaché reported that the regiments had been recalled to their garrisons, that summer manoeuvres had been cancelled, and that military cadets were to be commissioned immediately rather than later in the autumn. He anticipated that all necessary preparations were being made for mobilization against Austria.6[6.] ¶3 What the council had agreed upon, and the tsar had approved, was to declare 'the period preparatory to war'. This had been defined on 2 March 1913 as 'a period of diplomatic tension which precedes the beginning of war operations'. The council was acting on information that preparatory measures for mobilization were already under way in Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Serbian minister in St. Petersburg reported to Belgrade that Russia was preparing to launch an offensive against Austria-Hungary if it attacked Serbia. The tsar believed that Russia and France could defeat the Triple ALliance, and that the war might end in the partition of Austria-Hungary. Spalakjovic suggested that the moment had arrived to 'achieve the full unification of the Serbs' and that it would be desirable if Austria attacked Serbia.7[7.]" (Martel 2014, 190).

In chapter 4 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the political situation in Germany like in the later 1920s?

(p. 192) There seemed no undue cause for worry in Germany during the 'golden years' of the later 1920s. There was strong economic growth. Living standards were improving. Germany was now part of the League of nations. The western borders had been settled at Locarno. Four changes of government between 19925 and 1927 did not affect- (p. 193) ¶1-the sense that, after the huge upheaval of the early 1920s, democracy was bedding down. The political extremes had lost support. Communist backing had fallen to 9 per cent in 1924, with a corresponding rise in votes for the moderate Social Democrats. The extreme right had fragmented after Hitler's attempted putsch in November 1923. Although, on leaving prison the following year, he had refounded his Nazi Party, it remained on the outer fringes of politics. In the opinion of one observer in 1927, it was no more than a 'splinter group incapable of exerting any noticeable influence on the great mass of the population and the course of political events.' ¶2 The general election of 1928 reflected more settled times. The conservative Right, much of it half-heartedly democratic at best, lost heavily. That the Nazis were finished as a political force seemed proven by their miserable return of only 2.6 per cent of the popular vote, giving them only twelve seats in parliament. The chief winners were the Social Democrats, who gained just short of 30 percent of the votes and were by far the largest party in a 'grand coalition' with the two Catholic and two liberal parties. Under Hermann Müller, the SOcial Democrats headed the government for the first time since 1920. Democracy in Germany seemed to face good prospects." (Kershaw 2015, 192-193)

In "Day Two: Saturday, 25 July", p. 188-213, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, by midday of July 25, what was the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov's immediate aim in meeting with Pourtalès, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg on July 25, 1918? Why did Pourtalès not accede to Sazonov's demand?

(p. 193) ¶1 Sazonov's immediate aim was to extend the deadline. REcognizing that the Austrians would not agree to this on their own, he attempted to get Germany to put pressure on them. And to persuade Germany he was prepared to threaten war. ¶2 Pourtalès dismissed this as a hollow threat. The fact that only once during their long interview did Sazonov allude to the possibility of an armed intervention by Russia led him to conclude that no 'precipitate steps' in the direction of war were likely at present. The ambassador did not know that the Russian Council of Ministers had already decided to advise the tsar to authorize a partial mobilization directed against Austria. Instead of taking the threat seriously, and in spite of Sazonov's 'excited mood', Pourtalès concluded that the foreign minister's real aim was to temporize--and thus his proposal to involve Europe. He anticipated no immediate intervention on Russia's part; it was likely to take up arms only if Austria attempted to acquire Serbian territory.14[14.] ¶3 When Sazonov warned against Austria 'devouring' Serbia, he had an unintended effect. He seemed to confirm Tisza's argument that if Austria-Hungary promised not to take any Serbian territory, Russia might refrain from military intervention. ..." (Martel 2014, 193).

In "Day Two: Saturday, 25 July", p. 188-213, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, by the afternoon of July 25, what idea had Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov communicated to the ambassador's of the other Great Powers, and what had he NOT communicated?

(p. 194) ¶2 ... by Saturday afternoon, with the deadline looming in only a few hours, it seemed possible that a general European war could still be delayed or averted. If Europe were to become involved in an attempt to settle the crisis diplomatically, even an Austrian invasion might not lead immediately to war. Russia-according to the foreign minister--was prepared to countenance an Austrian invasion and occupation of Serbia. Sazonov had still not suggested to anyone--not to the Austrians or the Germans; not to the British or the French--that Russia would immediately go to war if Austria attacked Serbia." (Martel 2014, 194).

In "Day Two: Saturday, 25 July", p. 188-213, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, by the afternoon of July 25 1914, what suggestion had the British Foreign Minister Grey advocated to resolve the July Crisis, and what was the response of the Russian ambassador in London, Count Aleksandr Benckendorff?

(p. 196) ¶3 Grey refused to choose. He was unwilling to give the kind of unconditional promise of support that Russia was seeking. But neither did he propose to stand on the sidelines. The 'sudden, brusque and peremptory character' of the Austrian demands on Serbia made it 'almost inevitable' that Russia and Austria would shortly mobilize their forces against one another.24[24.] This scenario suggested to him that there was still an opportunity to avert war: Britain and France, Germany and Italy could, he suggested, 'hold the hand' of their partners in attempting to mediate the dispute. ¶4 The Russian ambassador in London, Count Aleksandr Benckendorff, disliked Grey's suggestion. A career diplomat, Benckendorff had followed his father's footsteps when he joined the diplomatic service in 1868 at the age of 19. Appointed ambassador to London in 1903 he worked hard to promote the idea of an entente with Britain. He was one of those moderate progressives who believe that a closer relationship with Britain would promote constitutionalism in Russia and stimulate political reform and economic development. A rapprochemnet with Britain was worth the- (p. 197) ¶1-the price of abandoning some of Russia's ambitions in Central Asia, and combined with the French alliance it would strengthen Russia's ability to withstand Austro-German expansionism in the Balkans and the Middle East.25[25.] ¶2 By 1914 Benckendorff believed that he had accomplishe dmost of his goals. He had established himself in British society: he was a frequent weekend guest of King George V and enjoyed close friendships with leaders of the Liberal government--the prime minister, Herbert Asquith, and the first lord of the admiralty, Winston Churchill, as well as important figures within the Unionist opposition. But he now feared that his work might be undone. He feared that Greys proposed four-Power mediation would give Germany the impression that Britain and France had become detached from Russia. He pleaded with Grey to give some indication to Germany that Britain would not stand aside if there was a war." (Martel 2014, 196-197).

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, how did the Coration Republican Peasnt Party interact with the the Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian government?

(p. 234) ¶1 The Corfu Declaration notwithstanding, it soon became evident that the electoral process created as many problems for the new kingdom as it solved. The Serbs represented a homogenous people that had ben independent for decades. They had made no secret of their intention to "amalgamate" the government apparatus and the military command into the preexisting Serbian administration, and to impose a school curriculum that gave priority to Serbia's history and Eastern Orthodox religious culture.16[16.] But the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, under the leadership of Stjepan Radić, saw no further need to cooperate with Serbia's politicians, much less to acknowledge the legitimacy of a Serbian-dominated state. Hence, in the national parliament, Radić and his followers managed tenaciously and consistently to disrupt the assembly's sessions and to sabotage the application of its intermittent legislation within Croatia itself." (Sachar 2015, 234)

In the Introduction of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", of the four major elements that brought about the various crises during the first half of the twentieth century in Europe, what caused "(1) an explosion of ethnic-racist nationalism" in eastern Europe compared to the West?

(p. 2) ... ¶3 The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires at the end of the First World War, and the immense violent upheavals of the Russian Civil War that followed directly on the Revolution, unleashed new forces of extreme nationalism in which identity with the nation was usually defined ethnically. Nationalist and ethnic conflict was especially endemic in the poorer eastern half of the continent -- the regions of long-standing ethnically mixed communities. Often nationalist hatred singled out Jews as special scapegoats for resentment and social misery. There were more Jews in central and eastern than western Europe, and they were mainly less well integrated and of a lower social class than their co-religionists in west European countries. These central and east European regions, far more so than Germany, were the traditional heartlands of vicious antisemitism. The greater ethnic homogeneity that generally existed in western Europe, and the fact that its nation states had usually evolved over a lengthy period of time, meant that the tensions there, though not completely absent, were less great than to the east." (Kershaw 2015, 2).

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", what was the connection between Eugenics and Social Darwinism?

(p. 20) ... ¶2 Eugenics appeared to offer the potential to 'breed out' of society the characteristics that produced criminality, alcoholism, prostitution and other forms of 'deviant' behaviour. It blended into the classic imperialist ideology of 'social darwinism', which rested upon assumptions that certain racial types were inherently superior to others. Galton himself wrote in 1908 that the first object of eugenics was to limit the birth rate of 'the unfit'. Elimination of the 'unhealthy' would over time, it was presumed, produce a fitter, healthier, 'better' society. Fears of racial degeneration through social welfare measures that encouraged procreation among the 'inferior' parts of society fed into notions of national efficiency." (Kershaw 2015, 20).

In "Day Two: Saturday, 25 July", p. 188-213, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, by the afternoon of July 25 1914, what affect had the proposal of the Entente powers had upon Germany and Austria?

(p. 202) ¶4 Paradoxically, the proposal of the Entente powers that the deadline be extended may actually have prompted Germany and Austria to act even more quickly. And Grey's hint that France might be counted upon to restrain Russia if Germany did the same with Austria may also have had the opposite effect to the one he intended: the Wilhelmstrasse concluded that France would attempt to avoid a general conflict.36[36.] The German ambassador was reporting from Paris that although the press there condemned the Austrian ultimatum, Germany's statement advocating 'localization' had made a great impression.37[37.] The Austrian ambassador was equally optimistic: the attitude of the French press was not as hostile as might have been expected, and there was a 'certain understanding of our demands'.38[38.] ALl the more reason, then, for Austria to act quickly and decisively--because without the promise of support from France or Britain, how likely was it that Russia would risk war?" (Martel 2014, 202).

In "Day Two: Saturday, 25 July", p. 188-213, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what did Serbia's reply, issued on 25 July, really amount to?

(p. 207) ¶2 What did the reply amount to? The Serbs were willing to swallow every demand that had been made upon them with the exception of points 5 and 6 in the Austrian ultimatum. In response to the demand that Serbia agree to allow Austrian officials to assist 'in the suppressing of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy' the Serbs expressed some uncertainty concerning the role of Austrian officials in- (p. 208) ¶1-conducting investigations on Serbian territory. But even here they expressed their willingness to collaborate with Austrian officials as long as this was based upon the principle of national rights and penal procedure. On point 6, where the Austrians had demanded not only that a judicial inquiry be instituted against all those who had participated in the plot of 28th June but that Austria would 'delegate representatives who will take an active part in these enquiries' on serbian soil, the Serbs agreed to institute judicial proceedings against those accused of participating, but would not consent to direct Austrian participation as this would violate the Serbian constitution and 'the law of penal procedure'. (Martel 2014, 207-208)

In "Day Two: Saturday, 25 July", p. 188-213, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was Austria's response, and in particular the Austria-Hungarian foreign minister Berchtold's response, to the Serbian reply on July 25?

(p. 208) ¶4 Berchtold's instructions to Giesl in Belgrade had been crystal-clear: nothing other than complete acceptance of each of the demands in their entirety would suffice. When the Austrian minister received the Serb reply at 5.58 on Saturday afternoon, he could see instantly that their submission was not complete. He announced that Austria was breaking off diplomatic relations with Serbia and immediately ordered the staff of the legation to leave for the railway station. By 6.30 the Austrians were on a train bound for the border. As arranged beforehand, when Giesl reached Semlin, the first train-stop in Austrian territory, he telephoned Budapest to inform the government that the Serb reply was unsatisfactory.51 His message was then forwarded to Vienna and Ischl. ¶5 Was war now imminent Giesl reported that the Serb government and diplomatic corps had already left Belgrade and that a general mobilization of Serb forces had been proclaimed at 3 p.n. Excitement gripped Vienna as soon as the news became known. Tisza, who had earlier had his reservations- (p. 209) ¶1-about taking dramatic and drastic action against Serbia, was now fully committed to the cause. He had urged Franz Joseph the day before to order mobilization at once if the Serb answer was deemed unsatisfactory. 'The slightest delay or hesitation', he warned the emperor, 'would gravely injure the reputation of the Monarchy for boldness and initiative.'52[52.] That evening, in the Kaiservilla at Bad Ischl, Franz Joseph signed the orders for mobilization of thirteen army corps." (Martel 2014, 208)

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", in 1900 Europe, what was the portrayal of enemies?

(p. 21) ¶2 Europe before the First World War, despite its superficial peacefulness, bore the seeds of the later explosion of violence. Enmities and hatreds -- nationalist, religious, ethnic, class -- defaced practically every society. The Balkans and the Russian Empire were particularly violent parts of the continent. After the failed revolution in Russia in 1905, proto-fascist gangs, often supported by the police, took savage revenge on their enemies. Amid the wild outrages, Jews suffered worst. Over 3,000 murders of Jews in 690 pogroms were reported in October 1905. In Odessa the most appalling pogrom of all left 800 Jews murdered, 5,000 injured and more than 100,000 homeless. Counter-revolutionary reprisals resulted in the execution of 15,000 opponents of the Tsarist regime. Worse still was the situation in the Ottoman Empire, stretching over much fo the Near and Middle East, ruled by the Turks since the fifteenth century, though no win terminal decline. Some estimates suggest that well over 80,000 Armenians were killed in the Ottoman Empire between 1894 and 1896 during the brutal repression under Sultan Abdul-Hamid II. The slaught was prompted by Turkish fears of rising Armenian nationalism, fuelled also by economic discontent, religious and class antagonism, and was even tolerated by the police. Massacres of Armenians continued sporadically in the Ottoman Empire. In 1909 a further 15,000-20,000 were murdered." (Kershaw 2015, 21).

In "Day Three: Sunday, 26 July (page 213)", p. 213-238, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how urgently did the various ambassadors and statesmen deal with the July Crisis?

(p. 214) ¶6 How urgent was the situation? In London, Sir Edward Grey had left twon to go to hsi cottage at Itchen Abbas to spend Sunday fly-fishing. The Russian ambassadors to Germany, Austria, and France had yet to return to- (p. 215) ¶1--their posts. The British ambassador to Germany was still on vacation. Kaiser Wilhelm was on his annual yachting cruise of the Baltic. Emperor Franz Joseph was at his hunting lodge at Bad Ischl. The French premier and president were visiting Stockholm. The Italian foreign minister was still taking his cure at Fiuggi; the Austrian minister of war was on vacation. The chiefs of the German and Austrian general staffs remained on leave; the chief of the Serbian general staff was relaxing at an Austrian spa." (Martel 2014, 214-215).

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, which of the new states formed in post-WWI was the most precarious?

(p. 224) ¶1 Among postwar Europe's constellation of "successor states," the newly sovereign or enlarged nations that had been carved out of the moribund empires of the prewar period, it was the South Slav "Kingdom of the Serb,s Croats, and Slovenes" that soon was revealed as the most precarious. None of its fellow beneficiaries, neither Czechoslovakia, Poland, nor Rumania, encompassed a more complex or contentious amalgam of peoples: six, at least, with an equivalent scattering of regional subcultures." (Sachar 2015, 224)

In "Day Three: Sunday, 26 July (page 213)", p. 213-238, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how did the Austro-Hungarian government interpret Russia's actions by the late afternoon of Sunday, 26 July?

(p. 226) ¶2 From Vienna, the German ambassador reported that Sazonov's declaration that Russia would go to war with Austria if it were to devour Serbia was being interpreted to mean that Russia would not go beyond diplomatic action.30[30.] Tschirschky confidently assured the British ambassador that Russia would keep quiet during Austria's 'chastisement of Serbia'.31[31.] At the same time Pourtalès was reporting from St Petersburg that Sazonov had lost his nerve. Austro-German diplomats on Sunday took Sazonov's improved demeanour as proof that Russia was prepared to back down--in spite of the military preparations that had begun." (Martel 2014, 226).

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what kind of state did the South Slav delegatiosn in exile during WWI agree to form?

(p. 228) ¶3 By July 20, 1917, these rival South Slav delegations finally hammered out a diplomatic compromise, to be known ever after as teh "Corfu Declaration." Acknowledging that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were of the same blood and language, and (presumably) shared the same aspirations for functional cooperation, the document proclaimed that their respective populations would constitute a future state to be known as the "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" and to be governed by a constitutional monarchy under the Serbs' current Karađorđević dynasty (p. 232). Indeed, during the ensuing months, self-appointed assemblies were convened in others of the Habsburg South slav provinces, including Temesvar, Vojvodina, and bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the formerly independent kingdom of Montenegro. In these conclaves, the delegates similarly voted their endorsement of the Corfu Declaration. Finally, on October 29, 1918, as the Habsburg Empire underwent its climactic dissolution, a "National Council of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," meeting in Zagreb, Croatia, proclaimed the "formal" independence of their conglomerate nation.6[6.]" (Sachar 2015, 228)

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, why did Wilson agree to recognize Yugoslavia's territorial claims?

(p. 229) ¶3 ... Wilson was motivated not only by his widely proclaimed ideal of national "self-determination" nor even by the charm and eloquence of old Nikola Pašić (who lost no opportunity to regale Wilson with accounts of Serbian wartime sacrifices). In como with the French, the American president also was influenced by his indignation at Italian post-armistice aggressiveness in the Adriatic Basin.9[9.] He had not been a signatory of the secret Treaty of London (p. 37), after all ,and hence did not regard the United States as bound by the document's generous concession to the Italians of "Venezia Giulia" (the ancient imperial Roman enclave encircling both sides of the upper Adriatic)." (Sachar 2015, 229)

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what style of government did Kaiser Wilhelm II insist on carrying out?

(p. 23) ¶2 By the time Wilhelm acceded to the throne he was well known in court circles for two things: his ambition and his temperament. He made no secret of the fact that he wanted to be known for accomplishing great things, to be a worthy descendant of Otto I and Friedrich der Große (Frederick the Great). In order to realize this dream he believed that he would have to rule 'in person'--unlike his grandfather, who had left most of the real- (p. 24) ¶1-work of politics, administration, and diplomacy to his chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. His determination to rule personally led him to clash with the man who most Germans believed responsible for the victorious wars of unification and the creation of the German empire. Bismarck realized too late that he was not indispensable and that he had underestimated the will of the young kaiser, who dismissed him from office in 1890. ¶2 Bismarck's dismissal demonstrated that Wilhelm's talk of personal rule was more than mere words. It also showed that his anger at slights he perceived could have dramatic consequences: Bismarck's patronizing manner had wounded and provoked him. Few of his advisers would dare to disagree with him from that time forward. When they believed him to be wrong in pursuing his own agenda the best they could do was to try and manage him--to appease him in some way or to keep him at arm's length, out of the loop of decisions where he might decide policy based on his emotional state rather than the needs of the government." (Martel 2014, 23-24).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was the make-up of the government of the German Empire under Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1914?

(p. 23) ¶3 ".. According to the constitution of the empire created in 1871, the ... kaiser ... alone was given the authority 'to declare war and to conclude peace'.27[27.] He had the unilateral right to declare that a 'state of war' existed if he deemed the security of the empire to be at risk. He was emperor of Germany, king of Prussia, supreme war lord ... and commander-in-chief of the navy. He had the authority to appoint and dismiss his chancellor at will, regardless of politics, public opinion, the Reichstag, or the Bundesrat. In fact all of his senior ministers served at his will and were answerable only to him. He, not his chancellor or his ministers, controlled appointments to the army and navy. The chief of his general staff and the head of his navy reported to him, not to the chancellor. When advice between his civilian and his military advisers conflicted--as it frequently did--he was the final arbiter." (Martel 2014, 23).

In "Day Three: Sunday, 26 July (page 213)", p. 213-238, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how were civilian-military relations in the Italian government by 1914?

(p. 231) ¶2 In Italy the gap between the military on the one hand, and the politicians and diplomats on the other, was even wider than elsewhere. Successive chiefs of staff in Italy were never given access to the terms of the Triple Alliance. When the minister of war asked for the details of the recently renewed Triple Alliance in 1912, San Giuliano dismissed the request by simply informing him that it contained no military provisions. Strategic plans and diplomatic policies could head off in entirely different directions. When General Luigi Cadorna was appointed to replace Pollio on 29 July, he continued to plan and prepare for a war against France--in spite of the fact that since the assassination San Giuliano had warned repeatedly that Italy might not participate in a war against the Entente. Since the Austrian ultimatum of the 23rd, his reluctance to commit Italy had become more and more pronounced. His reluctance generated increasing concern in Berlin--and increasing frustration with Vienna's unwillingness to do much, if anything, to secure Italian cooperation." (Martel 2014, 231).

In "Day Three: Sunday, 26 July (page 213)", p. 213-238, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, when the german ambassador to rome Hans von Flotow met with the Italian minister of Foreign Affairs Antonino Paternò Castello, Marchese di San Giuliano on the afternoon of Sunday July 26, what was the outcome?

(p. 233) ¶3 Flotow met again with San Giuliano on Sunday afternoon in Fiuggi Fonte. The Italian foreign minister repeated his objections to the manner in which Austria had proceeded against Serbia. The Austrians, he said, could use the same arguments and procedures against Italy: they could cite Italy's irredentist ambitions, along with the fact that these ambitions were supported by the press and various organizations. Nor did San Giuliano believe the Austrian promises that they would not claim any Serbian territory--and therefore he proposed that discussions should begin at once on the subject of how Italy might be compensated for Austria's gains. Bu Mérey's illness combined with his opposition to any accommodation of Italy made this almost impossible to negotiate at Rome." (Martel 2014, 233).

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what was the ethnic make-up of the new Yugoslavia in 1920?

(p. 233) ¶3 The November 1920 constitutional elections were free, secret, and direct. But he also ensured that the elections were based on the proportionate model adopted by most of continental Europe, rather than the constituency--majority-based--model prevailing in the Anglo-Saxon world. For the South Slavs, the choice turned out to be a particularly awkward fit. The constitutional convention's 419 elected delegates may well have reflected the demography of the new South Slav state, but they also reflected its endemic factiousness. The Serbian parties managed to win a plurality and to elect the vetteran Nikola Pašić as the kingdom's first prime minister; but the Croatas, essentially united in their own Republican Peasantry Party, achieved a compact (if distant-second) minority of 56 deputies; and the rest of the South Slav nationalities trailed too far back to engineer a workable coalition either with the Croats, slovenes or any other of the state's minority delegates.15[15.]" (Sachar 2015, 233)

In "Day Three: Sunday, 26 July (page 213)", p. 213-238, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, when Count Berthold, Joint Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, asked K.u.k. Feldmarschall Franz Xaver Joseph Graf[1] Conrad von Hötzendorf, Field Marshal and Chief of the General Staff of the military of the Austro-Hungarian Armyand Navy in 1914, for when a declaration of war on Serbia on Sunday July 26, should be declared, what happened?

(p. 237) ¶2 ... Given the increasing pressures on Vienna to agree to one of the two proposals for mediation or negotiation, and given Italy's inexorable demands for compensation to be promised in advance, Berchtold was now anxious that war should be declared as soon as possible. ¶3 On Sunday he asked the chief of the general staff when he wanted the declaration to be made. Conrad's answer was not what Berchtold wanted to hear: the chief of the general staff wanted to put off the declaration until the was ready to commence operations--until about the 12th of August. This was more than two weeks away. In the meantime, the pressures to negotiate with Russia and/or Serbia would continue to mount. Berchtold told him that the diplomatic situation would not hold that long, although he could perhaps manage to defer the declaration of war for a few days. Conrad insisted that he needed to know definitely what attitude Russia would take beforehand--and he would need this information that he was asking for the impossible. Conrad explained that if the Russians were going to go against Austria, it would be necessary to proceed against them from the start; if they were not, he could proceed against Serbia directly. And he raised a third possibility: Russia might not go after Austria now but delay an attack until- (p. 238) ¶1-sometimes later; if so, Austria would then find itself in the north, having already committed its forces against Serbia in the south.54[54.]" (Martel 2014, 237-238).

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what did Aleksandar do to try to ease the political deadlock and economic crisis in 1931?

(p. 238) ¶2 Eventually, it was the combination of political deadlock and economic crisis that threatened the nation's royal dictatorship--and the survivability of the Yugoslav experiment altogether. In 1931, seeking to defuse mounting public unrest, the king decided to reissue the constitution and cancel the ban on parliament.24[24.] But his other political initiatives were grudging. The secret ballot wa snot reinstated. A revised electoral law, palpably inspired by Mussolini's "Enabling Act" of 1923 (p. 49), decreed that a party winning a plurality of votes in a national election would subsequently be awarded two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies; and the king himself would appoint half the members in Yugoslavia's--largely consultative--parliamanetary upper house. ¶3 Indeed, by the early 1930s the nation's political life had been atomized. The newly named Croatian Peasant Party had grown both in numbers and intransigence, and its current leader, Vladko Macek (the political successor to the murdered Radic), functioned in effect as his province's uncrowned king.25[25.] In Slovenia the People's Party, under the chairmanship of Anton Korosec, a Catholic priest and undisguised enemy of the king, attracted the majority of his region's voters. So, too, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, did the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, under hte direction of Mehmet Spaho. Whatever their professed acceptance of the Yugoslav state, these regional parties remained obdurate, indeed, all but lockstepped, in their political and cultural parochialism." (Sachar 2015, 238)

In "Day Three: Sunday, 26 July (page 213)", p. 213-238, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, when Count Berthold, Joint Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, by the end of Sunday July 26, what has changed about diplomacy?

(p. 238) ¶2 Military considerations were now beginning to influence diplomacy. The Serbs had ordered the mobilization of their forces to the end of the day on Saturday; the Austrians began mobilizing theirs on Sunday; the Russians had taken the first steps towards a mobilization--although it remained unclear exactly what these consisted of, and where they were to be taken; the German fleet was ordered to return to Germany from its annual manoeuvres in Norway; Luxembourg called up its reserves. The intersection of diplomacy and strategy lay in the German response to Russia's action: Bethmann Hollweg warned that a Russian mobilization meant a German mobilization, and that German mobilization meant war. How, then, were Russia's actions to be interpreted? On Sunday, both the Russian foreign minister and minister of war assured the Germans that the steps they were taking did not mean mobilization--not a horse, not a reservist, had been called up into service. There was still a chance for diplomacy to avert a cataclysm." (Martel 2014, 237-238).

In "Day Four: Monday, 27 July", p. 239-263, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how did the July Crisis look on the morning of Monday, the 27th of July?

(p. 239) ¶1 By the time the diplomats, politicians, and officials arrived at their offices on the morning of Monday, the 27th of July, more than thirty-six hours had elapsed since the Austrian deadline to Serbia had expired. And yet--at least to the naked eye-nothing much had happened as a consequence. True, the Austrian legation had packed up and left Belgrade, Austria had severed diplomatic relations with Serbia and had announced a partial mobilization. But there had been no declaration of war, no shots fired in anger or in error, no wider mobilization of European armies. Most of the action occurred behind the scenes, at the Foreign Office, the Ballhausplatz, teh Wilhelmstrasse, the Consulta, the Quai d'Orsay, and at the Chorister's Bridge. Even on Sunday there had been discussion and negotiations, but these had been largely inconclusive and left most of the crucial questions hanging. Perhaps they would be answered today." (Martel 2014, 239).

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", what actions did Germany take to turn the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand into World War 1?

(p. 24) ... ¶3 Germany combined its own ambitions to be the dominant power on the European continent with a mounting, almost paranoid, fear of Russian ascendancy and eventual hegemony. To establish the former and prevent the latter, Germany was prepared to risk a general European conflagration. On 6 July 1914 Germany gave an unconditional guarantee of support to Austria-hungary (the 'blank cheque', as it is usually known). This was on the assumption that limited action against Serbia would swiftly follow as punishment for the murder by Serbian nationalists of the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, Sophie, during a state visit to Sarajevo on 28 June. But it was only an assumption. The guarantee imposed no veto on Austria's retaliatory measures, though the danger of a wider conflict and the involvement of Europe's great powers were both evident. Germany's encouragement of an Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, delivered on 23 July and designed in advance to make acceptance impossible, was then decisive in converting an ideally localized issue into a general European crisis. ..." (Kershaw 2015, 24).

Nicholas II or Nikolai II (Russian: Никола́й II Алекса́ндрович, tr. Nikolai II Aleksandrovich; 18 May [O.S. 6 May] 1868 - 17 July 1918),

Known as Saint Nicholas the Passion-Bearer in the Russian Orthodox Church, was the last Emperor of Russia, ruling from 1 November 1894 until his forced abdication on 15 March 1917.[1] His reign saw the fall of the Russian Empire from one of the foremost great powers of the world to economic and military collapse. He was given the nickname Nicholas the Bloody or Vile Nicholas by his political adversaries due to the Khodynka Tragedy, anti-Semitic pogroms, Bloody Sunday, the violent suppression of the 1905 Russian Revolution, the execution of political opponents, and his perceived responsibility for the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).[2][3] Soviet historians portrayed Nicholas as a weak and incompetent leader whose decisions led to military defeats and the deaths of millions of his subjects.[4] Russia was defeated in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, which saw the annihilation of the Russian Baltic Fleet at the Battle of Tsushima, the loss of Russian influence over Manchuria and Korea, and the Japanese annexation to the north of South Sakhalin Island. The Anglo-Russian Entente was designed to counter the German Empire's attempts to gain influence in the Middle East, but it also ended the Great Game of confrontation between Russia and Britain. When all diplomatic efforts to prevent the First World War failed, Nicholas approved the mobilization of the Russian Army on 30 July 1914, which gave Germany formal grounds to declare war on Russia on 1 August 1914.[5] An estimated 3.3 million Russians were killed in World War I.[6] The Imperial Army's severe losses, the High Command's incompetent management of the war effort, and lack of food and supplies on the home front were all leading causes of the fall of the House of Romanov. Following the February Revolution of 1917, Nicholas abdicated on behalf of himself and his son and heir, Alexei. He and his family were imprisoned and transferred to Tobolsk in late summer 1917.[7] On 30 April 1918, Nicholas, Alexandra, and their daughter Maria were handed over to the local Ural Soviet council in Ekaterinburg; the rest of the captives followed on 23 May.[8] Nicholas and his family were executed by their Bolshevik guards on the night of 16/17 July 1918.[9] The remains of the imperial family were later found, exhumed, identified and re-interred with an elaborate state and church ceremony in St. Petersburg on 17 July 1998. In 1981, Nicholas, his wife, and their children were recognized as martyrs by the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia in New York City.[10] On 15 August 2000,[11] they were canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church as passion bearers, commemorating believers who face death in a Christ-like manner.[12]

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what convinced France to support the "Little Entente"?

(p. 241) ¶2 In 1933-1934, however, with the rise and consolidation of Naiz rule in Germany, the Frnech government almost overnight found itself obliged to give renewed and urgent attention to an enhanced relationship with the "Little Entente," and this time including Yugoslavia. France's Foreign Minister Luis Barthou was the statesman who made it his diplomatic priority to energize his nation's "eastern policy." ..." (Sachar 2015, 241)

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what was the origins of the Ustaša?

(p. 244) ¶4 ... from the tension of Yugoslavia's intercommunal relations, in 1929, soon after the establishment of King Aleksandar's dictatorship, that one Ante Pavelic, a 40-year-old Croatina lawyer, embarked on a round of visits to his compatriots both in their provincial communities and in surrounding lands. Not for Pavelic the comparatively peaceful (if stubborn) Croatian Peasant Party of the late Stjepan Radic. He was intent,- (p. 245) ¶1-rather, on establishing an Ustaša (insurgent_ movement--a "Croatian Revolutionary Organization." From this earliest school years, Pavelic had been marinated in his people's anti-Serb embitterment. Before the war, as a law student at the University of Zagreb, he had joined the implacably anti-Serb "Frankist" Party, a faction that had been organized in 1902 by a Croatian-Jewish journalist, Josip Frank, and dedicated uncompromisingly to Croatian self-government. ¶2 In the postwar, spared the defunct Habsburg connection, Pavelic maintained the late Frank's legacy and mission both as a practicing attorney in Zagreb and as a deputy in the Croatian Diet. As a lawyer, he defended charges of treason. As a politician, he operated in tandem with Frank's son-in-law, Eugen ("Slavko") Kvaternik, to establish a network of ultranationalist Croatian student societies, those that subsequently functioned as the ideological nucleus of the Ustaša.31[31.] Between 1929 and 1931--again jointly with Kvaternik--Pavelic succeded in forming Ustašist cells both throughout Croatian Dalmatia and among Croats living in Slovenia and Macedonia, and later in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Italy (pp. 250, 259)." (Sachar 2015, 244-245.)

In "Day Four: Monday, 27 July", p. 239-263, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was the military situation as interpreted by the German leadership, in particular then German chancellor Bethmann Hollweg?

(p. 248) ¶3 The military situation was uncertain and confusing. In spite of Germany's best efforts to gather accurate intelligence on Russia's moves, by Monday afternoon the chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, could tell the kaiser only that based on the most recent reports Russia did not yet seem to be mobilizing. Equally perplexing was the information that Austria, which had begun mobilizing the day before, would not be able to begin war operations against Serbia until the 12th of August. The chief of the German general staff told his wife that the situation remained 'extremely obscure' and that it would be another two weeks before anything definite would be known.23[23.] Any remaining hope that quick and decisive action on the part of Austria might forestall a determined response by Russia and its Entente partners now seemed to have evaporated. Jagow told the Austrian ambassador that he deeply regretted their delay in undertaking military action.24[24.] ¶4 Bethmann Hollweg admitted to the kaiser that he found the diplomatic situation as unclear as the military situation. He did believe, however, that Britain, France, and Italy all desired peace. The fact that Serbia appeared to have accepted almost all of the points in the Austrian ultimatum further complicated things, because it appeared that Austria-Hungary was close to accomplishing everything it wanted. But for now Bethmann Hollweg had- (p. 249) ¶1-repeated his instructions to all German diplomats that they were to continue to adhere to the line that the Austro-Serbian conflict concerned those two states alone.25[25.] In the meantime Jagow sought detailed information from Austria in order to refute British assertions that the Serbian reply indicated their willingness to comply with the chief points contained in the Austrian note.26[26.]" (Martel 2014, 248-249).

In "Day Four: Monday, 27 July", p. 239-263, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what view of the July Crisis the British foreign minister Grey discuss to his colleagues on Monday, 27 July?

(p. 251) ¶2 Grey explained to the House that what he had done was unusual, that normally one would undertake the preliminary step of determining whether such a proposal would be well received before making it. But the gravity of the situation of the shortness of the time available meant that the risk of proposing something that might be unwelcome or ineffective could not be avoided. He felt, however, that the Serbian reply was such that it should at least provide the basis on which a 'friendly and impartial group of Powers' should be able to arrange a settlement that would be generally acceptable. On the other hand, it ought to be obvious to anyone that if the dispute ceased to be one between Austria-Hungary and Serbia alone and involved another Great Power it can but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of Europe at one below'.33[33.] ¶3 Grey was addressing his colleagues in the cabinet as much as members of parliament and European diplomats. He was well aware that few of his colleagues believed there was any British interest involved in the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. John Burns, the president of the board of trade, complained that no one could understand why 'four Great Powers should fight over Serbia', and he was determined to have 'nothing to do with such a criminal folly'.34[34.] A more important member of the cabinet, Herbert Samuel (president of the local government board) told his wife after the cabinet met on Monday evening that he was feeling pessimistic about the situation but that they were doing their best 'to localize the conflict'.35[35.] More important still, the chancellor of the exchequer, Lloyd George, assured C.P. Scott of the manchester Guardian after the meeting that 'there could be no question of our taking part in any war in the first instance'. Lloyd George assured him him that he knew of no minister who would be in favour of it.36[36.] Complications might arise if the German fleet attacked French towns along the Channel--but even so hoped that if Germany and Austria went to war with France and Russia, Britain might 'pair' with Italy and agree that the two of them should both keep out of it." (Martel 2014, 251).

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what did Hitler do in 1935 to encourage further armament?

(p. 252) ¶3 In march 1935 Hitler felt confident enough to announce the creation of a new and large Wehrmacht of thirty-six divisions (about 550,000 men), and the reintroduction of general military service. The existence of a German air force -- already as large, Hitler claimed (with notable exaggeration), as Britain's -- was also made public. Both steps were in plain defiance of the Versailles Treaty. The western democracies protested; but that was all. Hiters' move had nevertheless unnerved them. They stepped up sharply their own spending on rearmament. ¶4 Alarmed by German rearmament, the leaders of Britain, France and Italy, meeting in April 1935 in Stresa, northern Italy, had agreed to- (p. 253) ¶1-uphold the Treaty of Locarno of 1925. But no more than two months alter, Britain undermined even this fig leaf of international solidarity by agreeing to a bilateral naval treaty proposed by Germany, limiting the relative size of their fleets. The British hoped that the naval Agreement would be a step towards a wider regulation and curtailing of German rearmament. It was a vain hope. In fact, the Naval Agreement amounted to a further nail in the coffin of Versailles, this time with the direct connivance of one of the major powers behind the post-war settlement. Germany rejonced. France, in particular, grimaced as Britain independently and unnecessarily gave Hitler a further boost to this prestige." (Kershaw 2015, 252-253).

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what fatally wounded the League of Nations?

(p. 254) ¶1 In fact, events not in the centre of Europe but far to the south were to undermine the international order, fatally wounding the League of Nations and laying the path for closer ties between Italy and Germany. On 3 October 1935, Italy invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia as it was later more commonly called). ... ... ¶3 Internationally, the war in Ethiopia sounded the death knell of the League of Nations as an international vehicle to promote European peace and security. The League imposed economic sanctions on italy. They were limited indeed. The export of foie gras to Italy was banned, for example, whereas export of iron, steel, coal and oil was not. When news leaked out of a proposed deal, b which the FOreign Ministers of Britain and France, Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval, agreed to reward Mussolini's aggression by giving Italy around two-thirds of Ethiopia, the outcry, especially in Britain, was enormous, The two- (p. 255) ¶1-most important members of the League were agreeing to the carve-up of another member state that had been invaded by a further member state in an unprovoked act of war. ¶2 Relations between Britain and France were temporarily strained. But the damage to the standing of the League was far greater. The smaller nations of Europe saw the powerlessness of the League. They reconsidered their own commitment and looked to alternative routes to security. Switzerland confirmed its neutrality though in effect it looked to Italy as a counter-weight to the influence of France and Germany. Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia lost faith in France's reliability. Scandinavian countries, together with Spain, Switzerland and the Netherlands, no longer saw merit in committing themselves to a sanctions regime when the League's main players were seeking to reward aggression with territorial gains. Following Ethiopia, the League was reduced to idealistic irrelevance. As an instrument intended to uphold and secure the peace of Europe, it was dead -- even if, bizarrely, its last publication under the heading of 'disarmament' was to appear only in June 1940 at the very moment when German armed might was in the process of destroying France." (Kershaw 2015, 254-255).

In "Day Four: Monday, 27 July", p. 239-263, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how did Bethmann Hollweg respond to Lichnowsky's?

(p. 255) ¶2 By the end of the day, Lichnowsky's arguments appeared to have convinced Bethmann Hollweg. Shortly before midnight the chancellor instructed the ambassador in Vienna that Germany could no longer oppose the conference suggested by Grey 'a limine' (at the outset). Were they to refuse every proposal for meditation 'we should be held responsible for the conflagration by the whole world'.45[45.] Serbia's decision to yield to Austria's demands to such a very great degree had complicated the situation. The position of the German government would be made impossible within Germany itself unless it appeared that it had been forced into war. Therefore, Germany unless it appeared that it had been forced into war. Therefore, Germany could not refuse a mediatory role and must submit Grey's proposal for the consideration of the Austrian government. To Lichnowsky, Bethmann Hollweg wrote that Germany had initiated the proposed mediation at Vienna 'along the lines desired by Sir Edward Grey'.46[46.] ¶3 What this actually meant however, and what it would mean, was unclear. Bethmann Hollweg followed up his terse announcement to Lichnowsky with a longer explanation of his position on the proposed mediation. If, as appeared to be the case, Grey was now asking Germany to persuade Austria to accept the Serbian reply as satisfactory, he could not possibly do so. Whether the Serbs had gone as far as possible in meeting the demands of Austria he could not yet say, although the fact that they had undertaken mobilization before handing in their reply was suspicious. Nor did he believe it to be reasonable to assume--as Grey did--that the Austrians aimed to crush Serbia, as they had disavowed any intention of acquiring Serbian territory and promised not to infringe upon its integrity. It was not only Austria's right but its duty to secure itself against the undermining of its existence through the Greater Serbian propaganda that had resulted in the crime of Sarajevo. This had 'absolutely nothing to do with a policy of prestige or with playing off the Triple Alliance against the Triple Entente'.47[47.]" (Martel 2014, 255).

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, who benefited the most from the Ethiopian War?

(p. 255) ¶3 The main beneficiary from the Ethiopian War was Germany. Mussolini had up to this point been distinctly cool towards Hitler. The Italian leader was as wary as the western powers about German expansionist aims, especially towards Austria. In 1934, assassination of the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, he had even moved Italian troops to the Brenner Pass in the Alps as a warning to Hitler. As late as April 1935, Italy had aligned itself with the western democracies in the 'Stresa Front', aimed at containing any German western expansion, and particularly any moves to dominate Austria. But during the Ethiopian War, Italy found itself largely friendless, facing sanctions, and making only hesitant military progress. Hitler kept Germany neutral during this war. But he offered no backing to the League. Mussolini needed friends; Hitler could use them. In January 1936 Mussolini shifted ground. He signalled that Stresa was dead in his view, that he would not oppose Austria falling under German sway, and that he would offer no support to France and Britain should Hitler wish to react to the ratification, forthcoming in Paris, of the mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union. Hitler was alert. It- (p. 256) ¶1-meant he could contemplate an early move to remilitarize the Rhineland -- an essential step in German western defence and important for rearmament, but a flagrant assault on the 1925 Locarno Treaty that had guaranteed the post-war settlement in western Europe." (Kershaw 2015, 255-256).

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, when and how did Hitler remilitarize the Rhineland?

(p. 256) ¶2 "... On 7 March 1936 a force of 22,000 German troops entered the demilitarized zone. A mere 3,000 men out of the assembled force of 30,000 troops had been ordered to advance deep into the Rhineland, backed by police units. There was no military confrontation. As Hitler had guessed, the western democracies protested after the event, but otherwise did nothing. He had got away with his biggest triumph to date." (Kershaw 2015, 256).

In "Day Four: Monday, 27 July", p. 239-263, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, was there, or was there not, confusion regarding on how to deal with the July Crisis on Monday, 27 July?

(p. 256) ¶4 By the end of the day, there was more confusion than clarity, more questions than answers. Did Germany's forwarding of the Grey proposal to Vienna indicate german support for the initiative--as Bethmann Hollweg's instructions seemed to suggest? Or was this manoeuvre merely a subterfuge--as Jagow seemed to have explained to Szögyény? And where did the kaiser stand on the apparent difference between the two? Before Wilhelm met with his advisers that afternoon Moltke wrote to his wife that the situation was obscure and that nothing definite would be known for another fortnight. At the meeting nothing of any consequence was decided.- (p. 257) ¶1-General Plessen recorded in his diary that Germany stilled hoped to localize the war, that Britain was likely to remain neutral, and that the whole thing was likely to blow over.50[50.] About the only clear and decisive action that came out of the meeting arose from the kaiser's belief that it was 'absolutely necessary' that Austria should come to an understanding with Italy on the compensation issue immediately.51[51.] ¶2 Nor was the confusion limited to Berlin. In St Petersburg the French ambassador told the British ambassador that Sazonov had decided to propose a direct conversation between Russia and Austria concerning modifications to be made in the Austrian demands on Serbia. When this news was received in London it bewildered officials at the Foreign Office. The permanent under-secretary, Sir Arthur Nicolson, complained that this meant that Sazonov had made one suggestion and two proposals--each different from the other--on three consecutive days: -on Saturday the 25th he suggested that if Serbia appealed to the Powers, Russia would stand aside and leave the qeustion in the hands of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany; -on Sunday the 26th he proposed to the Austrian ambassador that Britain and Italy should collaborate with Austria with the aim of putting an end to the present tension; -today, on Monday the 27th he now proposed to converse directly with Vienna. 'One really does not know where one is with M. Sazonov,' he grumbled, 'and i told Count Benckendorff so this afternoon'52[52.]" (Martel 2014, 256-257).

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what did Hitler do after the remilitarization of the Rhineland?

(p. 258) ¶2 At the end of march 1936 Hitler staged a plebiscite to ratify the Rhineland action. It brought him the 99 per cent vote of support so dear to dictators. Of course, it was a contrived result. But there can be no doubt that in reality an overwhelming proportion of the German population enthusiastically welcomed Hitler's move -- certainly once it was clear that it would not lead to war. The dictator's popularity at home soared to new heights. This boosted his dominance over the traditional German ruling elites. His boldness had paid off. Their doubts had proven to be mistaken. The army, in particular, was father beholden to Hitler. The dictator's own egomania knew no bounds. He thought himself practically infallible, whle for those who had wavered during the tense days preceding the march into the Rhineland he had nothing but contempt." (Kershaw 2015, 258).

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what was the effect of the assassination of Aleksandar II on the various ethnic groups in Yugoslavia?

(p. 258) ¶2 The speed of the dynastic transition was influenced at least in part by fear of an outbreak of Serbian reprisals against the cCroats, and by the specter of a full-blown civil war. Yet, almost miraculously, the fear was unrealized. The assassin, lada, was a Bulgarian, not a Croat; and, in Croatia itself, the population appeared as stunned and alarmed as the Serbs. Indeed, three days after the murders, when Aleksandar's body was returned to Yugoslavia, its flag-draped coffin first lay in state in Zagreb, beneath the rotunda of Croatia's provincial diet. Whether out of curiosity or respect, an estimated 200,000 Croats filed by while the Yogslav flag flew at half mast over Croatia's other public buildings. When the casket was escorted to Belgrade for the national funeral in the Memorial Church of Saint George, Prime Minister Nikola Uzunovićhad a fiery Slovenian nationalist prelate, Monsignor Anton Korošec, released from prison to attend the ceremonies. "We ought to work and live for Yugoslavia now," Korošec was quoted later. "Everything else is forgotten."52[52.] In December, the government also released from house arrest Vladko Maček, the veteran Croatian deputy to the slain Stjepan Radić. Maček similarly appealed for unity." (Sachar 2015, 258.)

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what did Hitler do after the remilitarization of the Rhineland?

(p. 258) ¶4 As Britain and France continued to try to wrestle with diplomatic partners who did not play by established rules, the dictators of Germany and italy edged closer together. At the beginning of 1936 relations between the two had still been far less than cordial. By the autumn, the creation of what Mussolini, on 1 November, proclaimed as the Rome-berlin Axis was forged. Mussolini, though he did not yet see it, was moving from senior dictator to junior partner. The two expansionist powers, each ruled by unpredictable leaders wielding near absolute power in their countrie,s posed a mounting- (p. 259) ¶1-dual threat to Europe's peace. Now deprived of Italian support, Austria had agreed in July to terms that heavily increased German influence on the country. And, even before it had been formally constituted, the Axis was to work in Spain. Both Hitler and Mussolini had already decided to provide military support to the nationalist rebellion led by General Francisco Franco." (Kershaw 2015, 258-259).

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what ler had completed a lengthy memorandum was the memorandum that Hitler completed in 1936?

(p. 259) ¶3 By the end of August 1936, Hitler had completed a lengthy memorandum laying down the direction of the German economy over the following four years, stipulating a programme aimed at maximizing domestic production geared toward a rapid acceleration of rearmament. The background was the mounting economic pressure within Germany over previous months. Food imports had temporarily taken priority over imports of raw materials needed for rearmament. Prominent voices were pressing the leadership to curtail rearmament and reorientate the economy. A decision was needed. ¶4 Hitler made it. He chose guns over butter. His reasoning was political, not economic. His memorandum on the 'Four-Year Plan' began by asserting that Bolshevism would be at the centre of a new worldwide- (p. 260) ¶1-conflict. Even though it could not be known when it would take place, a showdown with the Soviet Union, he declared, was inevitable. He ended the memorandum by setting out two tasks: 'I. The German armed forces must be operational within four years. II. The German economy must be fit for war within four years.' It was not a timetable for war. But from now on, Germany could not free itself from the track on which it was travelling. Short of removing Hitler from power, there could be no reversal to a peacetime economy built upon international trade. The choice had been for an intensive programme of economic autarchy to build up armed strength in readiness for conflict. The points were set. The track led towards war. The dictators were starting to shape Europe's destiny." (Kershaw 2015, 259-260).

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", did the entangling web of alliances instigate WWI?

(p. 26) ¶3 The opposing alliances, seen by the British Foreign Office as serving- (p. 27) ¶1-(like later nuclear weaponry) as a deterrent to aggression, came to determine that when war erupted, it would be general and not localized. The alliances did not ,however, cause the war. There had been a number of serious crises over the previous decade, though these had not led to war. Tension between the great powers had been fairly swiftly defused when Germany had challenged French assertions of power in Morocco in 1905, again following the peremptory Austrian annexation in 1908 of Bosnia-Herzegovina (formally still part of the Ottoman Empire, though occupied by Austria for the previous thirty years), and in 1911 after the Germans had provoked the French by sending a gunboat to the Moroccan port of Agadir. When war did break out in the chronically unstable Balkans in 1912, as an alliance of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece (a self-styled Balkan League) sought to take advantage of Ottoman weakness, followed by another war the next year between members of the Balkan League when Bulgaria attacked Serbia over the spoils of the first war, the great powers ensured that regional conflict did not lead to a general conflagration." (Kershaw 2015, 26-27).

According to Professor Lanthier, what was the major industry / lifestyle in Europe at the early 20th century?

Most of Europe remains rural, engaged in agriculture. While there are some exceptions, like Great Britain, most European countries had populations living in rural locations, working in agriculture. Countries like Belgium and Great Britain, which were the first two countries to industrialize (Great Brit. was the first), had a larger portion of their populations living in the cities. The rest were primarily agricultural workers.

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what are some underlying similarities between the more conventional dictatorships of the 1930s, the ones that were NOT Germany, Russia, and Italy?

(p. 260) ¶3 All dictatorships shared a number of features -- the elimination (or severe restriction) of pluralist forms of political representation, limits on (or abolition of) personal freedoms, control over the mass media, the termination (or strict limitation) of any judicial independence, and heavy-handed repression of political dissidents through extended police powers. And all dictatorships resorted to forms of pseudo-representation. Apart from the Soviet Union, where 'dictatorship of the proletariat' based its claim to legitimacy on class, dictatorial regimes invariably asserted that they represented 'the nation' or 'the people', that they embodied popular sovereignty and were acting in the national interest. Some form of national assembly or parliament, however rigged, controlled or manipulated, was normally retained. Actual power invariably resided, however, in the rule of a 'strong man', whose authority rested on the backing of the military and- (p. 261) ¶1-security forces. In all dictatorships the role of the military was decisive. And apart from the Soviet Union, the military was without exception ideologically national-conservative and vehemently anti-socialist in character. For most dictatorships, essentially negative aims of quelling internal unrest, restoring 'order', and sustaining the existing power of elites, sufficed. They posed no international danger." (Kershaw 2015, 260-261).

In chapter 7 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, what was the effect of the assassination of Aleksandar II on Mussolini and Italy

(p. 261) ¶2 years before, as a yong editor, Mussolini had confided to his admirer, Led aRafanelli: I desire to be somebody, do you understand me? ... I want ot rise to the top. .. The background in which I was raised enslaved me. ... I must rise, I must make a leap forward, to the top.56[56.] By the winter of 1934-35, shrewdly exploiting the effort of the versailles Powers to defend their new cordon sanitaire of successor states, and Hitler's preference to avoid a rupture with Italy, Mussolini apparently had taken a giant step toward fulfilling his youthful dream. Among the continent's rival sets of adversaries, he had seized the moment to emerge as the most courted government leader in Europe." (Sachar 2015, 261.)

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what are some features of the dictatorships of the 1930s of Germany, Russia, and Italy?

(p. 264) ¶3 Undeniably, despite their ideological difference,s there were notable similarities in the methods of rule of the three dynamic dictatorships -- their complete regimentation of society, their terrorization of opponents- (p. 265) ¶1-and minorities, their adulation of a leader and their relentless mobilization by a monopoly party. They were different forms of a completely new, modern type of dictatorship -- the complete antithesis to liberal democracy. They were all revolutionary, if by that term we understand a major political upheaval driven by the utopian aim of changing society fundamentally. Correspondingly, they all made in principle (the practice varied) a 'total claim' on the individual. They were not content simply to use repression as a means of control, but sought to mobilize behind an exclusive ideology to 'educate' people into becoming committed believers, to claim them souls as well as body. Each of the regimes was, therefore, dynamic in ways that 'conventional' authoritarianism was not. But how alike in practice were these dictatorships?" (Kershaw 2015, 264-265).

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what there ONLY dissent and opposition to Stalinism and the Five-Year Plans? What effects did this have on society?

(p. 266) ¶3 There was, however, not just dissent and opposition to what was happening. There was also idealism and commitment. The vast and rapid industrialization programme mobilized millions across the Soviet Union. Countless party members, and young communists being groomed for party activism in the youth movement, the Komsomol (in contrast to the youth movements in Italy and Germany, still at that time an elite body rather than the mass organization it was to become by the late 1930s), worked ceaselessly to spread the vision of a coming socialist utopia. Of course, the image of a united people striving to attain such a future paradise was contrived, and could scarcely offer great compensation or comfort to the huge majority of the population struggling under the yoke of daily anxieties, material deprivation and oppression. Even so, there was no shortage of enthusiasts. Young urban workers, intellectuals and Jews (disproportionately drawn across Europe to socialism as the path to freedom from discrimination- (p. 267) ¶1-and persecution) were particularly likely to be attracted to the vision of the brave new world under construction. The enormous building projects -- dam,s power stations, the Moscow underground, even new cities such as Magnitogorsk in the Urals -- were seen as a hugely positive, visible sign of an astonishing transformation that was under way, a tangible indicator of progress, of what Soviet society could produce. The idealism that participation in building the new utopia produced was not a phantasm. ¶2 The feeling of integration in the building of a new society was coupled with real, material, here-and-now expectations, not just distant utopian advantages that commitment to the regime could bring. The immense mobilization behind the industrialization programme demanded huge numbers of activists who could build careers, improve their living standards and, not least, wield substantial power in their striving to make the system work. Half a million party members were recruited between 1934 and 1939. Most were poorly educated and inexperienced. These newcomers now moved ing eat numbers into the lower ranks of administrative authority -- and they liked the taste of power, as well as the status and privileges it brought them. Supervisors, foremen and managers were needed in the factories, not just workers. (Nearly 30 million peasants poured into towns from the countryside during the 1930s, attracted by the chance of increased income but unaware of their forthcoming subservience to brutal authority.) The often unbridled ambitions of low-ranking administrators could be served if they in turn served the regime. Ruthlessness for the cause merely mirrored what was happening above them. Despotic managers could, and often did, treat their charges like dirt, knowing that this would bring no sanction, indeed would be welcomed, as long as targets were met. And careers depended on those targets being met. Failure, however, arbitrarily it was defined, was too grim to contemplate. It was the core of a system reliant upon millions of 'little Stalins' who made the regime work at the grassroots. Localized rule operated, however, only on a one-way basis: through orders from the top and responsibility from the bottom." (Kershaw 2015, 266-267).

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, how did Stalin centralize power around himself?

(p. 267) ¶3 Stalin's control of the party apparatus as General Secretary ensured rigid centralization of command. All the crucial levels of power and organization were in his hands. A formidable bureaucratic- (p. 268) ¶1-apparatus -- more and more at the arbitrary whim of Stalin's growing despotism, but increasing in size despite unbureaucratic inroads into its work -- was capable of micro-management from the very centre. Telegrams from Stalin himself dealt even with trivial matters, he could, for instance, order someone in a party or state agency at the other end of the enormous country to supply desperately needed mails to a building site. The party dominated the state in the Soviet Union; and stalin dominated the party. In fact, his autocracy completely undermined the party's institutional framework of collective rule at the top. ... ¶3 At the grass-roots level, Stalin's autocracy prompted a huge turnover of party membership. An army of new party officials replaced the older cadres. The owed their positions to the openings offered to them by the drastic changes in Stalin's 'revolution from above'. This in turn encouraged servile acceptance of his untrammelled authority, which was bolstered from the early 1930s onwards by the manufacture of a 'heroic' personality cult around the leader." (Kershaw 2015, 267-268).

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the overall goal of Mussolini?

(p. 275) ¶4 'Everything in the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state'. Those had been Mussolini's words in October 1925. The extent of state social and economic controls introduced by every belligerent country during the First World War had encouraged a growing belief, not just in Italy, that national strength could not only be sustained through total control of society by the state. The subsequent demonstrable weakness of liberal political systems to cope with the immense problems that were the legacy of the great conflagration had bolstered- (p. 276) ¶1-such views. Mussolini's most prominent theorist, Giovani Gentile, professor of philosophy in Rome and since 1923 the regime's Education Minister, spoke not of the Fascist movement's 'totalitarian will' but of the 'totalitarian state'. For Gentile, nothing beyond the state had significance. It embraced all facets of society. It was the embodiment of the national will. The 'totallitarian' essence of Italian Fascism concerned itself 'not only with political organization and political tendency, but with the whole will and thought and feeling of the nation'. However vague and however unrealizable in practice, the idea was novel for its time." (Kershaw 275-276).

In 1934, what was Mussolini's attitude toward Hitler?

Mussolini looking west for support, and wanted them to back him up which didn't really happen. There was a really fluid international situation, with no blocks or alliances. French and British tended to work together but their relationship was also a bit uncomfortable and clumsy.

Did everyone hate World War I?

NO. There were a significant number of men who saw their war-time experience as positive. This would become quickly apparent in the Twenties and Thirties.

In "Day Six: Wednesday, 29 July ", p. 284-310, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was the view from Berlin on Wednesday?

(p. 286) ¶5 The view from Berlin on Wednesday morning was cloudy. On the one hand, with the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, the crisis seemed close to a resolution. Austria had publicly disavowed any intention of taking Serbian territory, and therefore its action could--or should--be regarded only as a reasonable and understandable step to remove the most persistent threat to the cohesiveness of the Habsburg monarchy. The kaiser believed that a European war could be avoided as long as Russia was prepared to accept Austria's assurances and permit it to give the Serbs the lesson they needed in order to keep them in check in the future." (Martel 2014, 286)

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, why did Franz Joseph Ferdinand, Emperor of Austria-Hungary,

(p. 29) ¶3 After 1867 caution became Franz Joseph's watchword. The 'dual' alliance proposed by Bismarck appealed to him because it seemed to guarantee that Austria-Hungary would be able to live in peace. Promising Germany assistance in the event of a war with France meant little: they shared no common frontier, and there was little that Austria-Hungary could be expected to do to assist Germany. In exchange for this Austria-Hungary received the promise of full military assistance if attacked by Russia. Nothing was more symbolic of Franz Joseph's wish to keep the peace than his willingness to join Austria's recent enemies, Germany and Italy, in the Triple Alliance." (Martel 2014, 29).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what were the personal characteristics and reputation of Franz Joseph Ferdinand, Emperor of Austria-Hungary, by 1914?

(p. 29) ¶5 Those around Franz Joseph regarded him as kind and well-meaning, if rather dull and not particularly bright. He appears never to have read a book. None of his secretaries, advisers, or ministers ever recorded a witty remark or spirited argument. As the years went by, he engendered affection and came to be seen as a father-figure to his people. He became the personal symbol of empire. By 1914 he was the venerable old man, the reliable statesman: status, photographs, and portraits of him were everywhere. His likeness adorned dinner plates, teacups, coffee mugs, drinking glasses, and beer steins." (Martel 2014, 29).

In "Day Six: Wednesday, 29 July ", p. 284-312, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was Grey's position on the July crisis?

(p. 290) ¶3 Grey found himself opposited by almost everyone in the cabinet at every turn--the only ones prepared to support him were the prime minister, Asquith, and the first lord of the admiralty, Churchill. Grey tried to argue that at the very least Britain was obligated to uphold the neutrality of Belgium, and he used a report prepared by the Law Officers in 1870 of British obligations under the treaty of 1839 to support his stand. The vast majority of the cabinet disagreed: whether Britain should intervene to uphold Belgian neutrality was a matter of policy, not law. ¶4 After carefully reviewing the situation from all points of view the cabinet 'decided not to decide'.10[10.] Most in the cabinet believed this to be prudent: 'if both sides do not know what we shall do, both will be less willing to run risks.'11[11.] Grey was instructed to inform both the French and the German ambassadors that Britain was unable to make any promises. As the prime minister reported to the king: 'After much discussion it was agreed that Sir E. Grey should be authorised to inform the German and French Ambassador that at this stage we were unable to pledge ourselves in advance, either under all conditions to stand aside, or in any conditions to join in.'12[12.] At the same time it also seemed prudent to prepare for the worst: Churchill was to send a 'warning' telegram to the fleet authorizing preparations for an immediate mobilization; the First Squadron was moved to concentrate at Scapa Flow; the Committee of Imperial Defence was directed to implement the 'precautionary stage' of the British War Book." (Martel 2014, 290)

In chapter 6 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, how does Kershaw compare the dictatorships of Germany, Italy, and Russia in the 1930s?

(p. 290) ¶4 The three dynamic relationships -- Stalin's Soviet Union, Mussolin's Italy and Hitler's Germany -- were in practice quite distinctive forms of rule even though they had a number of structural features in- (p. 291) ¶1-common. Stalin's regime stands out plainly from the other twoi, which share more similar characteristics (and some 'borrowings' by Nazi Germany from Fascist Italy) though also dispalying crucial differneces. Each made a 'total claim' on its citizens. This was not realized in practice and most weakly accomplished in Fascist Italy -- paradoxically the only one of the three regimes explicitly to declare that it was building a 'totalitarian state'. However, the 'total claim' unquestionably had huge consequences for the behaviour of citizens in such heavily orchestrated and controlled societies. 'Political space' and forms of organized social activity, even compared with those in other dictatorships of the era let alone liberal democracies, effectively ceased to exist outside what was permitted and managed by the regime itself.A ceaseless attempt was made in each of the three regimes to mould attitudes and behaviour according to exclusive ideological tenets. Identity with the regime was underpinned and reinforced through emphasis on the 'enemy within' -- the 'outsiders' whose very existence shaped the creation of a community of 'sindiders', of those who 'belonged'. ¶2 The penetration of society by regime values was lowest in Italy, in all probability greatest in Germany. The success of indoctrination was variable, though most apparent in all three regimes among the young. In each instance, the regime had substantial success in mobilizing large numbers of idealists and gaining extensive popular support. Quantifying the support is impossible, given the repression of all opposition on which each regime rested and the lack of freedom of expression. Fro the imprecise indicators available, Nazi Germany had the ghreatest level of popular support, Italy was some idstance behind, while the SOviet Union was the most coerced population, suggestive of the least authentic support. ¶3 Each deployed the heavy hand of terroristic repression. For those terrorized by the police state, the ideological or structural differences between the regimes were a matter of the purest indifferences. Even so, they mattered. The Soviet union exerted an extraordinary level of terror directed at its own citizens, far more than the other two regimes, an arbitrary, unpredictable deterrence not replicated elsewhere. Nazi terror focused on quashing organized political opposition then, increasingly, on weak and small minorities -- Jews, especially, and- (p. 292) ¶1-other racial or social 'outsider' groups. The worst of Fascist terror was reserved for Italy's African colonies. At home, once the early street violence of castor oil and the cudgel had waned, the application of terror was mild in comparison with that of the other two regimes, concentrating on eliminating known opponents but otherwise largely content with a strategy of containment. ¶2 Where Fascist Italy was also weakest was in its ideological dynamism and its militarization. Much of the mobilization of society was little more than superficial. After more than a decade of Fascist rule, the gap between rhetoric and reality was sizeable. The aim of a totality of state and society had remained illusory. There was little underlying driving purpose behind the regime. Even colonial war and victory in Abyssinia, popular thought he triumph was, had only a superficial hold over Italian mentalities and could mobilize the population only for a short time. Whatever the belligerence of Mussolini and the Fascist leader, there was little fixation among the Itallian people on the prospect of war and military glory, and certainly little willingness to endure war's hardships and suffering. The Italian armed forces were capable at best of brief campaigns against inferior opponents, but they were completely unequipped fora major war. A technologically backward armaments industry was not capable of keeping up with the pace of rearmament in other countries. ¶3 the ideological driving-force in the Soviet Union was, in contrast to Italy, extremely strong. Enormous advanced, at colossal human cost, had been made to mobilize the state-run economy, restructure agricultural production and industrialize at breakneck speed. The presumption of war at some point before too long lay behind the extraordinary pace of these developments. Unlike Germany, and even Italy, however, the focus was on preparing the economy and society for the military defence of the Soviet Union, rather than external aggression (though, admittedly, occupation of the Baltic countries and, perhaps, western Poland was envisaged as part of building a defence cordon). As Stalin knew only too well, rearmament was only in its early stages. The Soviet Union was nowhere near ready for a major conflict, while he himself inflicted grave damage on the Red Army's leadership through the great purges. (p. 293) ¶1 The ideological dynamism of Hitler's regime stands out from the other two regimes both in the sharpness of focus of its intensifying persecution of internal 'enemies', most obviously Jews, and in its heated preparations for military conflict in the foreseeable future -- preparations that were plainly aggressive, not defensive, in nature. Germany had the most advanced economy on the European continent, one being increasingly and rapidly tailored for war. ANd it had the most efficient military leadership. ¶2 Although, between them, all three dictatorships were to play a disproportionately large role in shaping the future of the European continent in the years that followed, the leaders of the western democracies unsurprisingly and correctly saw Germany as the overwhelming mance. Stalin was at this stage regarded as mainly a danger to his own people. Mussolini was chiefly a danger to the subjugated peoples of Italy's colonial territories in Afric and a source of unpredictability in the mediterranean. Hitler was a danger to German jews -- but from an international perspective above all a huge and growing danger to the peace of Europe. ¶3 Meanwhile a chance presented itself in 1936 for a prior clash of the most powerful dictatorship in a conflict that many soon saw as a harbinger of a greater showdown to come. In July 1936 General Franco launched his rebellion against the Spanish republic. Within a short time he had gained military support from Hitler and Mussolini, while Stalin provided military backing for the republican forces. The- (p. 294) ¶1-dictators, on opposite sides of the Spanish Civil War, were flexing their muscles. The western democracies would once more come to reveal their weakness. The involvement of the major powers in the Civil War was the clearest sign, beyond the national tragedy for Spain's people, that Europe's international order was collapsing. The danger of the continent becoming engulfed in a new conflagration was growing ever stronger." (Kershaw 290-294).

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, how did the western democracies' actions pave the way to WWII?

(p. 295) ¶1 ... " 'The road to Hell ... is paved with good intentions.' That is the best gloss that can be placed on the way the western democracies tried to deal with Hitler. Their flawed attempts to accommodate the German expansionist drive allowed Hitler to dictate events to which they could only weakly react. His blackmailer's response to their concessions was to ask for more. ..." (Kershaw 2015, 295).

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what were some of the reasons for the Left's defeat in Europe in the 1930s?

(p. 296) ¶3 The defeat of the Left took place on a continental scale, even if national structures had conditioned its specific nature. It was partly a reflection of crippling divisions, the decisive one between its social democratic and its communist wings (though unity on the Left did not prevent its defeat in Austria). The communist Left was itself disunited, sometimes broken into rival fractions, and its major representation completely dominated by the interests of the Soviet Union. The defeat- (p. 297) ¶1-of the Left also reflected the visceral detestation of socialist ideology and intense fear of communism in the upper and middle classes, the peasantry and parts of the working class itself. Whereas nationalists of whatever variety held out an appeal to all sections of society, the Left, whether socialist or communist, looked in the first instance to advancing the interests of a specific social group, the industrial working class. But the class politics of socialism, let alone the communist aim of a 'dictatorship of the proletariat', had self-evidently limited appeal to all those -- the majority of the population -- who saw themselves as certain loser should the Left triumph." (Kershaw 2015, 296-297).

In "Day Six: Wednesday, 29 July ", p. 284-312, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what instructions did Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg issue to German chancellor to St Petersburg Poutalès

(p. 296) ¶4 Bethmann Hollweg issued precise instructions to Pourtalès that afternoon. The ambassador was to tell Sazonov that if Russia continued to mobilize, Germany would be forced to do the same. At that point 'a European war could scarcely be prevented'.23[23.] The reports coming from Russia were putting the chancellor in an invidious position. On Tuesday evening the kaiser had repeated that he no longer believed war to be necessary.24[24.] But at the same time Moltke submitted a secret situation report to Bethmann Hollweg, arguing that germany was out of options and must act within the next seventy-two hours: even a partial Russian mobilization must be countered by Germany.25[25.] And the minister of war pressed the point, demanding that Germany ought to declare an 'imminent danger of war' (the drohende Kriegsgefahr). Bethmann Hollweg opposed this, arguing- (p. 297) ¶1-that Russia must appear to be the aggressor, for the sake of public opinion in Germany and in Britain. By late Wednesday afternoon the German government had still not made a decision."" (Martel 2014, 296-297)

In the Introduction of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", of the four major elements that brought about the various crises during the first half of the twentieth century in Europe, what caused "(2) bitter and irreconcilable demands for territorial revisionism"?

(p. 3) ... ¶2 Nationalist conflicts and ethnic-racial tensions were greatly intensified by the territorial settlement of Europe that followed the First World War. The architects of the Versailles and Trianon Treaties in 1919-20, however good their intentions, faced insuperable problems in attempting to satisfy the territorial demands of the new countries formed out of the wreckage of the old empires. Ethnic minorities formed sizeable parts of most of the new states in central, eastern and south-eastern Europe, offering a potential base for serious political disturbance. Almost everywhere, borders were disputed and the demands of ethnic minorities, which usually faced discrimination from the majority population, were unresolved. These Versailles border reallocations moreover fostered dangerously simmering resentments in countries that felt themselves unfairly treated. Although Italy ahd no internal ethnic divisions (apart from the largely German-speaking population of South Tyrol, annexed after the end of the war), nationalists and fascists could exploit the sense of injustice that a country on the side of the victorious powers in the First World War should be deprived of the gains it aspired to in territory that would soon be called Yugoslavia. Far more dangerous for Europe's lasting peace, the deep anger in Germany -- like Italy, lacking internal ethnic divisions -- at the truncation of territory after the war, and the demands for revision of the Versailles Treaty, later fed into the growing support for Nazism, and- (p. 4) ¶1-outside the Reich's borders encouraged the resentment of German ethnic minorities in Poland, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere." (Kershaw 2015, 3-4).

In "Day Six: Wednesday, 29 July ", p. 284-312, of Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what were the principles that the German State Secretary of the German Foreign Office, Jagow, propose to operate under with regard to Belgium if war broke out?

(p. 303) ¶2 In order to avoid a misunderstanding, Jagow outlined the principles upon which Germany proposed to proceed: 1 Germany contemplated no hostile action against Belgium and would bind itself to guarantee its sovereignty and independence at the end of hostilities--should Belgium adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality during the conflict. Moreover, Germany would look upon with favour any claims Belgium might have for territorial compensation at the expense of France. 2 Germany would evacuate Belgian territory at the conclusion of peace. 3 If Belgium were to adopt a friendly attitude, Germany would be willing to buy for cash all the necessities required for its troops and to reimburse Belgium for any damages caused by them. If Belgium were to oppose Germany as an enemy and place obstacles in its way--by using its Meuse fortifications for resistance, by destroying railroads, roads, or tunnels--then Germany would be compelled to regard it as an enemy. In that case Germany could make no promise and would leave the future of their relations 'to the decision of arms'. The German minister at Brussels was to insist on an 'unequivocal' reply to this within the next twenty-four hours.41[41.]" (Martel 2014, 303)

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was the make-up of the government of Austria-Hungary under Emperor Franz Joseph Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary in 1914?

(p. 31) "¶2 Despite its provisions for broadly representative assemblies in Austria and Hungary, the constitution left the emperor in a position to determine the country's fate: The "Fundamental Law Concerning the Exercise of Administrative and Executive Power' of December 1867 was absolutely clear. According to the first article of the constitution, 'The Emperor is sacred, inviolable, and cannot be held accountable.' Article 5 gave him 'supreme command of the armed forces' and the right to 'declare war, and conclude peace'.38[38.] In spite of receding from public view, and in spite of his increasingly distant relationship with the decision-making process, every important politician, diplomatist, and strategist recognized that Franz Joseph would have the final word." (Martel 2014, 31).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, overall, what was Emperor Franz Joseph Ferdinand's aim?

(p. 31) ¶3 Above all, the emperor aimed to preserve the "Habsburg' in the monarchy. Only the dynastic principle was capable of keeping the empire intact--nothing else would suffice. He did not regard his empire as ramshackle, incoherent, and doomed to disintegrate. 'The monarchy', he assured a confident in 1904, 'is not an artificial creation but an organic body. It is a place of refuge, an asylum for all those fragmented nations scattered over central Europe who, if left to their own resources would lead a pitiful existence, becoming the plaything of more powerful neighbours.'39[39.]" (Martel 2014, 31).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, overall, overall, what was the make-up of the government of the Third French Republic under President Raymond Poincaré? Who had control over the decision to go to war?

(p. 40) ¶4 Unlike the monarchies of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, final authority to decide between war and peace in France was not vested in- (p. 41) ¶1-a single man. The process provided for in france was linked to the responsibility for making foreign and military policy. And here the role of the president was vital: he was responsible for negotiating and ratifying treaties; he was not even obliged to inform parliament except as he deemed it in the national interest; he could sign alliances and give guarantees to foreign powers without legislative approval--or even its knowledge. He was commander-in-chief of the armed forces. While the president had to seek parliamentary approval for a declaration of war, the powers given to him in the constitutional arrangements of 1875 gave him the pivotal role.49[49.] Insofar as one man above all others was in a position to decide between war and peace that man was Raymond Poincaré. And Poincaré's policy was steadfastly peaceful and conservative, to maintain the balance of power in Europe through the system of alliances." (Martel 2014, 40-41)

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, how was Italy's attempt to rearm for war in the late 1930s?

(p. 318) ¶2 The other European country rearming for the purpose of external aggression was Germany's Axis partner, Italy. The pace of its rearmament was, however, crassly different from that in Germany. Stell production, as in Germany, imposed sharp restrictions on the scale of rearmament. So did dwindling currency reserves. Italian industrialists were happy to maximize their profits from producing arms, but unwilling to risk long-term investment for short-term gain. Poor management and bad mistakes in the commissioning of weapons led to weaknesses both in technology and performance. And many of Italy's scarce resources were wasted through involvement in the civil war in Spain, which was lasting much longer than Mussolini had foreseen when he had been so quick aid to Franco. By the end of 1937, the combination of problems in the Italian economy was beginning to impose significant constraints on rearmament. The state lacked both the industrial capacity and financial strength to push through a rapid increase in rearmament. In fact, as other countries were intensifying their rearmament programmes, Italy actually saw a drop of 20 percent in military spending in 1937-38 compared with the previous year. Mussolini was envisaging up to five years before Italy would be prepared for war. Even that reckoning was optimistic." (Kershaw 2015, 318).

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, how was the USSR's attempt to rearm for war in the late 1930s?

(p. 318) ¶3 The Soviet leadership had from 1936 reacted even more allergically tot he growing danger to their country from Germany, allied most likely, it was presumed, with other "fascist' and 'imperialist' powers. With all branches of industrial production in the hands of the state in a closed economy and under a brutal dictatorship, there were no- (p. 319) ¶1-constraints on an all-out rearmament drive. Output was nonetheless hampered by inefficiencies, disputes over areas of competence between industry and the army, and structural problems in converting civilian to military production. On top of that came the disastrous purges -- themselves at least in part a reflection of Stalin's paranoia about 'internal enemies' who were allegedly threatening Soviet defences. Unsurprisingly, foreign Kremlinj0-watchers took it as axiomatic that the Soviet Union had been seriously weakened and was, certainly for the foreseeable future, not a force to be reckoned with. Despite the massive advances in the rearmament drive, o the basis of the intelligence they were receiving the Soviet leaders deemed that the gap with Germany, especially in the critical sphere of the quality of air armaments, was widening, not narrowing. It was a worrying thought." (Kershaw 2015, 318-319).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, overall, what was the attitude of Tsar Nicholas II toward ruling?

(p. 32) ¶3 Nicholas inherited the Romanov view of the tsarist autocracy. He believed that God had chosen him and his family to rule over their domains ,and that he was personally responsible to God for the fate of the empire. This meant that he would make his decisions on the basis of his Christian conscience, informed by the powers of reason that God had granted him. He saw himself as father to his people and believed that they were loyal to him: especially the peasants of the land, who were dedicated monarchists. They distrusted--as he did--the industrial workers of the cities who had lost their connection with the soil, and the bureaucrats who had lost their connection with the soul of HOly Mother Russia." (Martel 2014, 32)

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what did Hitler do to Austria in 1938?

(p. 327) ¶3 ... [in March] the AUstrian government capitulated to intense pressure from Berlin, German troops crossed the Austrian border, and legislation to incorporate Austrian into a Greater Germany was hastily drawn up. On 15 March, before a vast, ecstatic crowd in Vienna's Heldenplatz, Hitler announced 'the entry of my homeland into the German Reich'. As he had forseen, the western democracies lamely protested but otherwise did nothing. Nor did the subsequent ferociously brutal persecution of Austrian Jews and political opponents of the Nazis elicit any reaction from Paris or London, or deter the hopes of Neville Chamberlain that it might be possible 'some day for us to start peace talks again with the Germans'." (Kershaw 2015, 327).

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the best route to deterring Hitler?

(p. 334) ¶2 the prospect of a 'grand alliance' had indeed been the best option of deterring Hitler. Whether it could have translated into action is another matter. The Soviet Union's position was that it would fulfil its treaty obligations to the Czechs once the French had acted to fulfil its treaty obligations to the Czechs once the French had acted to fulfil theirs -- something hardly likely to happen. Even had the Soviet Union acted, the ROmanians and Poles would not have permitted Soviet troops to cross their soil. The Romanians had incidated, however, that they would allow SOviet planes to overfly their territory. The Soviet air force was positioned to offer assistance to Czechoslovakia,had the French engaged in the defence of the country, and a partial mobilization of Red Army troops did take place. But Stalin remained cautious throughout the crisis, awaiting developments, wary of becoming involved in a clash of 'imperialist powers'. The potential threat to Germany from east as well as west that a 'grand alliance' would have posed never materialized. ¶2 Deterrence through a 'grand alliance' could also have encouraged the nascent opposition within Germany. A plot to arrest Hitler in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia had been taking shape over the summer, centred on the military leadership and high officials in the Foreign Ministry. The Munich Agreement blew away any prospect of the plotters acting. The best guess is that the plot would have come to nothing anyway, or, even if it had been carried out, would not have succeeded. But there is at least the possibility that had Hitler -- against some weighty military advice -- struck against Czechoslovakia, resulting in a much-dreaded war on two fronts, he would have emerged significantly weakened if he had not been overthrown." (Kershaw 2015, 334).

In chapter 3 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the economic cost of the war?

(p. 95) ¶3 The economic cost of the war was immense--over six times the total of all countries' national debt from the end of the eighteenth century until 1914. In countries most directly affected by the fighting, production after the war was drastically reduced from what it had been in 1913. The United Kingdom, by contrast, fared much better. Its government indebtedness, even so, was around six times higher in 1918 than it had been in 1913, and its total net debt to the United States, the highest among the ALlies, standing at nearly 4.5 billion dollars by 1922, now meant, as for most of Europe, lasting independence on credit from the USA. Neutral countries were also economically buffeted by the war. Mostly, like Sweden, they had been able to expand their economies to cope with wartime demands. The impact on neutral Spain, however, was to intensify its economic problems and to deepen the social, ideological and political fissures already present in the country." (Kershaw 2015, 95)

In "Day Eight: Wednesday, 29 July ", p. 335-358, what was the general mood in Europe regarding the prospect of war among the Great Powers?

(p. 335) ¶1 By Friday people throughout Europe began to panic at the prospect of war among the Great Powers. Smaller states began preparing for the worst. The government of the Netherlands ordered the mobilization of all of its land forces. The Bundesrat in Switzerland summoned all three divisions of the Swiss army--the Elite, the Landwehr, and the Landsturm--to ready themselves for mobilization. In Belgium troops currently absent from their garrisons were being sent back to their quarters via special trains commandeered for the purpose, and orders had gone out in preparation for calling to the colours the last three annual drafts of reserves. The government issued a decree prohibiting the export of grain, cattle, horses, fodder, and automobiles. ¶2 The internationalist, pacifist, and socialist movements at least realized that time was quickly running out. An emergency meeting of the Bureau international de la paix was convened in Brussels on Friday. Approximately fifty representatives attended, representing every state in Europe except Austria. They agreed to send telegrams to the governments concerned, pleading that they restrain themselves.1[1.] Socialists in the House of Commons in Britain passed a resolution denouncing a war into which every European Power would be dragged because of secret alliances that had never been sanctioned by, or communicated to, the people. They supported yesterday's resolution of the International Socialist Bureau calling upon all workers to unite to prevent their governments from embarking on war." (Martel 2014, 335)

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what events occurred throughout March and the summer of 1939 in Europe to escalate the outbreak of war?

(p. 337) ¶2 On the rebound from the German occupation of the leftovers of Czechoslovakia and feeling deeply that he had been duped, Chamberlain on 31 March 1939 offered Poland, viewed as Germany's likely next victim, a guarantee of British military support should it be attacked. The french, effectively without a foreign policy of their own, went along with the British move. The Soviets were still not considered suitable allies in any attempt to confront Hitler with the possibility of a two-front war. Given notice of the guarantee only hours before it was announced, angry Soviet leaders were more than ever convinced that Chamberlain was playing a long game that would ultimately result in what he wanted: a war between Germany and the Soviet Union. ¶3 Deterrence was the key intention of the guarantee. Chamberlain had finally come round to trying to deter Hitler from further acts of aggression. His hope was that even now Hitler would see sense and settle his territorial demands without force. But Chamberlain had chosen a poor basis and relinquished Britain's initiative at the same time. He knew that Britain could do nothing militarily to prevent the Germans overrunning Poland, which, his advisers were telling him, would be accomplished within three months of an invasion. But after refusing the previous summer to give a similar guarantee to a democracy that had been ready to fight and was allied with France and the Soviet Union, he now bound Britain to the fate of Poland. Yet Poland (as Churchill put it) 'with hyena appetite had only six months before joined int he pillage and destruction of the Czechoslovak State', and was a country geographically exposed and militarily ill-equipped- (p. 338) ¶1-to withstand a German onslaught. Whether Britain entered a new war would from now on lie in the hands of Germany and Poland. ¶2 The guarantee was never going to deter Hitler. Its effect, indeed, was to provoke him. Raging against the British, eh promised to 'cook them a stew that they'll choke on'. By early April he had authorized a military directive for the destruction of Poland any time after 1 September 1939. Polish obduracy on Danzig and the Corridor did the rest. The contours of the crisis that would reach its climax in the high summer of 1939 were set. ¶3 Meanwhile Mussolini, feeling upstaged by Hitler's Prague coup and not to be left out of land-grabbing, showed off what there was of Italian armed might by annexing Albania in April. Britain and France responded by extending their guarantee to Romania and Greece. Badly executed though the Italian attack on Albania had been, it was paraded as a great triumph that, as Dino Grandi, a leading Fascist, put it, would 'open the ancient paths of the ROman conquests in the east to the Italy of Mussolini'. The roads that the Italians started to build in the small, poverty-stricken country led towards Greece. Should war come, Italy's intention was that the British were to be driven from the Mediterranean. Tensions in southern Europe, too, were starting to foment. " (Kershaw 2015, 337-338).

In "Day Eight: Wednesday, 29 July ", p. 335-358, what did Imperial Foreign Minister Count Berchold, and the rest of the Austrian common ministerial council, agree to do?

(p. 340) ¶3 In Vienna at 9 a.m. Berchtold convened a meeting of the common ministerial council. The Austrian and Hungarian prime ministerial council. The Austrian and Hungarian prime ministers were present, along with the minister of finance, the minister of war, and several others. Berchtold explained that the Grey proposal for a conference à quatre was back on the agenda and that the German chancellor was insisting that this must be carefully considered: if Austria-Hungary declined every sort of mediation. Germany and Austria would find themselves opposed by a coalition of the whole of Europe as neither Italy nor Romania would stand by the alliance. Bethmann Hllweg was arguing that Austria's political prestige and military honour could be satisfied by the occupation of Belgrade and other points, while the humiliation of Serbia would weaken Russia's position in the Balkans.16[16.] ¶4 Berchtold reported that he had consulted the emperor on this and that they had agreed it was now impossible to stop hostilities against Serbia. Austria could, however, do its best to appear to be meeting Britain's wishes and avoid giving offence to the German chancellor. The Foreign Office was currently drafting a response according to the following principles: 1 Warlike operations against Serbia must continue. 2 Austria could not negotiate the British proposal unless the russian mobilization ceased. 3 Austria demanded the 'integral' acceptance of its demands, on which it was not prepared to negotiate. (p. 341) ¶1 Berchtold warned that in a conference such as that proposed by Grey it was inevitable that the other Powers involved would attempt to reduce the demands made by Austria-Hungary. In this instance France, Britain, and Italy were likely take Russia's part; Austria could not even count on the support of the German ambassador in London. If everything that Austria had undertaken were to result in no more than a gain in 'prestige', all of their work to this point would have been in vain. A mere occupation of Belgrade would be of no use--even if Russia were prepared to allow it. This was all a fraud (Flitterwerk). Russia would pose as the saviour of Serbia--which would remain intact--and in two or three years they could expect the Serbs to attack again in circumstances far less favourable to Austria. Thus, he proposed to respond courteously to the British offer while insisting on Austria's conditions and avoiding a discussion of the merits of the case." (Martel 2014, 340-341)

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact?

(p. 341) ¶3 ... On 19 August Stalin finally signalled that he was prepared to reach an agreement with Germany. Hitler made arrangements without delay to send Ribbentrop to Moscow. Four days alter Molotov and Ribbentrop put their signatures to a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany. Hitler made arrangements without delay to send Ribbentrop to Moscow. Four days later Molotov and Ribbentrop put their signatures to a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany. A secret protocol delineated spheres of interest in the Baltic, Romania and Poland with a view to 'a territorial and political transformation' in these regions. It was the most cynical deal imaginable. It made eminent sense, however, to both parties. Germany had sealed its eastern front. The Soviet Union had bought precious time to consolidate its defences." (Kershaw 2015, 341).

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what were the consequences of the Munich Agreement, and the Malenkov-Ribbentrop Pact?

(p. 341) ¶4 With that, nothing stood in the way of an imminent German invasion of Poland. Hitler still harboured faint hopes that Britain and France would back away from their commitment to the Poles. But he- (p. 342) ¶1-was prepared to go ahead anyway, even if it meant war with the western democracies. His contempt for them had been confirmed the previous summer. 'Our enemies are small worms,' he told his generals. 'I saw them in Munich.' His chief concern was to avoid any last-minute intervention that might result in a second 'Munich' and prevent his demolition of Poland. ¶2 When Hitler's high-risk policy had threatened war with the western powers during the previous year, an embryonic opposition had emerged among the elites in the military and Foreign Ministry. The Munich Conference had the undermined whatever chances of success such opposition might have had. A year later those who continued secretly to oppose Hitler's headlong rush towards war and, they prophesied, ultimate disaster, lacked any prospect of challenging him. Army leaders, divided in their views on war in 1938, now said and did nothing, where they entertained any doubts at all. Fatalistically, if not enthusiastically, they backed Hitler. That was crucial. Internally, nothing stood in the way of Hitler's determination to go to war." (Kershaw 2015, 341-342).

In chapter 7 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, when did Hitler invade Poland?

(p. 342) ¶3 ... The attack should, in fact, have taken place on 26 August. Hitler had given the mobilization orders for the army the previous afternoon, but he was forced to cancel the attack a few hours later after mussolini had informed his Axis partner that Italy was currently in no position to enter the war alongside Germany. If embarrassing for Mussolini, it was no more than a passing setback for Hitler. He soon fixed a new date for the attack. Early on the morning of 1 September 1939 German troops crossed the Polish border." (Kershaw 2015, 342).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, overall, what was the make-up of the government of the Russian Empire under Tsar Nicholas II in 1914?

(p. 35) "¶1 Even with the revisions to the 'Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire' instituted in 1906 Nicholas II--like his fellow monarchs in Germany and Austria-Hungary--retained ultimate control of military affairs and foreign policy. The new constitutional arrangements fell well short of establishing a democratic regime in Russia. The lower house, the Duma, was elected by a complicated system of indirect voting and was far from representative of the Russian people as a whole. And while the Duma was given the right to create legislation and some control over the budget, the tsar could veto anything it did. The tsar himself appointed half the members of the upper house, the State Council. The tsar retained his sovereignty, which was justified as coming from God and history. Nevertheless, the tsar was horrified at having to agree to any reductions to his autocratic powers and was ashamed that he would not be able to pass on what he regarded as his birthright to his son. ¶2 The powers that the tsar retained were considerable. He remained commander-in-chief of both army and navy. All of his ministers were appointed by im and answerable to him, not to the prime minister, and certainly not to the Duma. The new constitution enshrined his right to declare a state of emergency and to set aside civil rights. The direction of foreign affairs remained solely his responsibility. The power to make war continued to rest solely in his hands." (Martel 2014, 35)

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, overall, what was the primary goal of Tsar Nicholas II in the years leading up to 1914?

(p. 35) ¶4 Everything that Nicholas II undertook in the years before 1914 was based on his perception that Russia needed peace and that it was ambition enough for the empire to remain intact and for the tsarist state to endure. By June- (p. 36) ¶1-1914 Russia head, for the twenty years of his reign, remained at peace in Europe. He intended to continue to live in peace for the foreseeable future." (Martel 2014, 35-36)

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", what encouraged the leaders of the Great Powers of Europe to accept war in 1914?

(p. 37) ... ¶3 The readiness to risk war was encouraged by the belief on all sides that it would be short. ..." (Kershaw 2015, 37).

In the Introduction of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", of the four major elements that brought about the various crises during the first half of the twentieth century in Europe, what caused "(3) acute class conflict"?

(p. 4) ... ¶2 The shrill nationalism that emerged after the First World War gained momentum not just from ethnic rivalry but also from class conflict. A sense of national unity could be immeasurably sharpened by a focus on supposed class 'enemies' within and outside the nation state. The immense economic upheaval that followed the war and the dire consequences of the slump of the 1930s greatly intensified class antagonism throughout Europe. Class conflict, frequently violent, had of course punctuated the entire industrial era. But it was made far more acute, compared with the pre-war years, by the Russian Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet Union. This provided an alternative model of society, one that had overthrown capitalism and created a 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. Elimination of the capitalist class, expropriation by the state of the means of production, and land redistribution on a massive scale were attractive propositions after 1917 for wide sections of the impoverished masses. But the presence of Soviet communism also split the political Left, fatally weakening it, at the same time as it hugely strengthened extreme nationalist right-wing forces. Revitalized elements from the Right could direct the violent energies of those who felt threatened by Bolshevism -- in the main the traditional propertied elites, the middle classes and the landholding peasantry -- into new, highly aggressive political movements." (Kershaw 2015, 4).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was Norman Angell's 1914 book The Great Illusion?

(p. 4) ¶4 Among the most popular books in Europe before 1914 was Norman Angell's The Great Illusion. He first published his ideas in a 1909 pamphlet entitled 'Europe's Optical Illusion'. He argued that it was a mistake to believe that a victorious war could be made to pay for itself. To the surprise of many, he seemed to prove that the indemnity imposed by Germany on France at the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian war had actually damaged the German economy while stimulating the French. In contrast with the old mercantilist view, wealth could no longer be found in 'gold' but in goods and in the exchange of goods. The futility of indemnities was that the vanquished could pay only if rehabilitated. Wars of conquest no longer served any purpose: they were expensive, wasteful, divisive, and counter-productive. The seizure of Alsace provided no benefit to the German people or state--because Alsace, if it were to function successfully, had to- (p. 5) ¶1-be left in possession of its wealth. All of this demonstrated the interdependence of modern economies and that everyone was hurt by war.1[1.] The modern capitalist had no country and knew 'that arms and conquests and jugglery with frontiers serve no ends of his, and may very well defeat them'.2[2. ]" (Martel 2014, 4-5).

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", what was at the root of the extraordinary jubilation felt by many Europeans at the outbreak of World War 1?

(p. 40) ... ¶2 At the root of such extraordinary emotions, years of nationalist indoctrination in schools and universities, during military service, in patriotic organizations and lobby-groups, and in the popular press had done their job. In the upper and middle classes, especially, and among intellectuals and students, nationalist fervour was widely prevalent. For many, too, war was welcome as national regeneration, as a liberation from the perceived moral decadence of contemporary society. The Italian Futurist Manifesto had expressed this graphically and radically in 1909: 'We want to glorify war, the only source of hygiene in the world -- militarism, patriotism, the destructive act.' War was seen as heroic, adventurous, manly -- the antidote to national decline. There was a sense of national unity, with internal divisions temporarily overcome. For German intellectuals, the new unity seemed the embodiment of 'the spirit of 1914', almost a sense of religious awakening. It reinforced their feeling that german culture was not simply different form, but was superior to, French civilization with its roots in revolution and republicanism, let alone the materialistic democracy of Britain. The values of the superior culture had to be defended and, if need be, enforced upon the rest of Europe." (Kershaw 2015, 40).

According to Professor Lanthier, how did many people view the role of government by the time of World War I?

This was the time of small government, where there were relatively light government.

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", what convinced supporters of international socialism, and reluctant members of the working class, to support their nation-states in War in 1914?

(p. 41) ... ¶4 What won supporters of international socialism to back nationalistic war was the belief that the war was defensive, and unavoidable. It was seen as a war that had reluctantly to be fought -- and for freedom, not imperialist domination. Later generations would look back and see the war as a pointless squandering of human life on an immense- (p. 42) ¶1-scale. In August 1914 it did not seem pointless at all. Workers were ready to fight -- and die -- for their country alongside their compatriots and Allies in what they saw as a righteous war of self-defence against aggression from foreign enemies. As army conscripts they had been indoctrinated in patriotism and discipline. They now turned out to be patriots first, socialists second. ¶2 In Germany defence against the forces of the detested Tsarist autocracy motivated and united socialists. The Social Democrats had staged big anti-war rallies in German cities, attended in all by an estimated half a million peace-demonstrators, in the last days of July. they were nevertheless anxious to emphasize that workers were ready to defend the Fatherland in its hour of need. That need was a 'war against Tsarism'. When Germany declared war following Russian mobilization, the mood switched abruptly to one of patriotic defence. German-speaking socialists in Austria backed the war for the same reason. Russian socialists, too, ignoring the Bolshevik anti-war stance, rallied round the cause of defence of 'Mother Russia' against Germans viewed as "trampling on all the rules of humanity'. Strikes were halted, pacifists and internationalists forced into exile. French socialists felt the same about defence of the patrie against invasion by the hated Germans. The British Labour Party also accepted that the war had to be fought till Germany was defeated." (Kershaw 2015, 41-42).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, how did war drive technological change, and did that technological change in terms affect war?

(p. 45) ¶3 War as the driver of technological change introduced novel weaponry and methods of mass killing that marked the face fo the future. Poison gas came into wide use from 1915 onwards after the Germans had deployed it in the spring of that year during the attack on Allied positions near Ypres. Tanks made their debut on the Somme as part of the British offensive in 1916 and by 1918 were being used in major battlefield formations. Submarines became from 1915 onwards a significant weapon in the German campaign against Allied shipping and changed the nature of the war at sea. Not least, rapid development of aircraft technology exposed civilians of towns and cities as well as fighting forces at the fronts to the terrifying prospect of aerial bombardment, of which the bombs dropped on Liège in Belgium by a German Zeppelin airship as early as 6 August 1914 were a foretaste. In their exposure to bombing, and in many other ways, civilians would from now on be incorporated in the war efforts as never before, both in working for the war effort and as enemy targets. War propaganda used the mass media to instil hatred of entire peoples. Belligerent states mobilized their populations in new ways. War was becoming total. The French press coined the term 'la guerre totale' -- total war -- in 1917 to capture the fact that front and homeland were bound together in the war effort." (Kershaw 2015, 45).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the fallout of the Battle of the Marne (French: Première bataille de la Marne, also known as the Miracle of the Marne, Le Miracle de la Marne)?

(p. 47) ¶2 When, at the crucial battle of the Marne, fought on 6-9 September, the French halted the German advance little over 50 kilometres from Paris, the entire strategy for rapid victory based on the Schlieffen Plan (by which the Germans had hoped swiftly to defeat the French before turning on the Russians) had failed. In the west, the time for swift offensives was over. Defence was the order of the day. Troops on both sides dug in and started to construct trenches--at first primitive, later becoming far more elaborate defensive formations. Before long these rean in an almost unbroken line form the Channel coast to the Swiss borders. Vast numbers of troops had to adjust to an unspeakable existence in the trenches--vermin-ridden quagmires of mud, built in zig-zagging rows, fronted by big reels of barbed write, with adjunct trenches leading back to supply depots and field hospitals. By the end of September the stalemate on the western front that would last a further four long years, until 1918, was in place." (Kershaw 2015, 47).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the war like on the Eastern Front at the outbreak?

(p. 47) ¶4 In the east, where the war, over a much longer and less densely populated front, never became so immobilized as on the western front, the situation had developed in more promising fashion for the Central Powers. Under the command of General Paul von Hindenburg, brought out of retirement and backed by an able, if sometimes impetuous, Chief of Staff of the Eighth Army, Major General Erich Ludendorff, in late August the Germans inflicted a heavy defeat on the Russian Second Army near Tannenberg in East Prussia. Germans were fighting on home soil here, repelling a Russian incursion. What they saw of Russian devastation during the fortnight's occupation of part of East Prussia confirmed existing anti-Russian prejudice and- (p. 48) ¶1-contributed to the ferocity of the fighting. Russian losses were high -- almost 100,000 in all, 50,000 dead or wounded, another 50,000 taken prisoner. Only a short time later, between 8 and 15 September, in the battle of the Masurian Lakes, the Russians lost a further 100,000 men, 30,000 of them taken prisoner. Farther south, facing the Austrians, they had greater success in their attack on Galicia. The Austrians had found themselves overwhelmed by far larger Russian forces by 3 September, suffering huge losses and being forced into a humiliating retreat." (Kershaw 2015, 47-48).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what brought Turkey into the war?

(p. 49) ¶2 The war was set to widen. On 29 October Turkish ships, without provocation, attacked Russian naval bases in the Black Sea. When the Russian as responded by declaring war on Turkey in early November, Turkish troops invaded Russia through the Caucasus, but by the end of the year were forced back. The defeat cost them at least 75,000 men, dead as much from disease and cold as through Russian arms. But the Turks enjoyed a major triumph the following year, 1915. This was in repelling an ill-fated, badly planned, ineptly executed attempt by the Allies, instigated by Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty (in effect, minister for the British Navy), to invade Turkey by landing a large force at Gallipoli in the Dardanelles in April of that year. Almost half a million Allied soldiers -- including Indian, Australian, new Zealand, French and Senegalese troops -- took part in the Gallipoli campaign. Turkish defence of the homeland, which established the heroic reputation of its commander, Mustapha Kema Pasha (later better known as Atatürk), was ferocious and the heavily fortified shore proved impenetrable. For the Allies, it was an unmitigated disaster. By December, when they were forced to abort the operation and begin evacuation, their casualties were close to a quarter of a million, with around 50,000 dead (many of disease). The Turks lost a similar number." (Kershaw 2015, 49).

In the Introduction of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", what was needed from the four elements, "(1) an explosion of ethnic-racist nationalism; (2) bitter and irreconcilable demands for territorial revisionism; (3) acute class conflict -- now given concrete focus through the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia; and (4) a protracted crisis of capitalism (which many observers thought was terminal)", to bring about World War II?

(p. 5) ... ¶4 What was needed, therefore, to engender the comprehensive political, socio-economic and ideological-cultural crisis that brought Europe to the verge of self-destruction was the intermeshing of the four components of the crisis. In one degree or another, such interaction affected- (p. 6) ¶1-most European countries, even in western Europe. But in one country, especially -- Germany -- all four elements were present in their most extreme form, reinforcing each other with explosive effect. And when Adolf Hitler, exploiting the comprehensive crisis in masterly fashion and with ideas of overcoming it by use of force, was able to cement his dictatorial control over the German state, the odds on general catastrophe in Europe shortened markedly. Since Germany's military as well as economic potential was so great (if temporarily diminished after the First World War) and since its revisionist claims and expansionist ambitions directly impinged upon the territorial integrity and political independence of so many other countries, the probability that Europe's crisis would end in a cataclysmic new war became increasingly high. It was no surprise that the crisis would come to a head in central and eastern Europe, the most destabilized parts of the continent, nor that, once war had begun, the lands in the east would turn into the theatre of the greatest destruction and grotesque and inhumanity." (Kershaw 2015, 5-6).

In the Introduction of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", of the four major elements that brought about the various crises during the first half of the twentieth century in Europe, what caused "(4) a protracted crisis of capitalism (which many observers thought was terminal)."?

(p. 5) ¶1 The fourth component, underpinning and interacting with the other three elements, was the lasting crisis of capitalism between the wars. The massive disturbance to the world economy caused by the First World War, the serious weakness of the major European economies of Britain, France and Germany, and the reluctance of the one outstanding economic power, the USA, to engage fully with European reconstruction, spelled disaster. Europe's problems were compounded by the worldwide repercussions of the war. Japan expanded its markets in the Far East, not least in China -- wracked by political chaos -- at the expense of the Europeans. The British Empire faced mounting political as well as economic challenges, must obviously in India where the growth of an indigenous textile industry and consequent loss of export markets added to Britain's economic woes. And Russia effectively disappeared from the world economy in the wake of revolution and civil war. Capitalism's crisis was global, but especially damaging in Europe." (Kershaw 2015, 5).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what did Germany do on 1915 in order to stabilize the Eastern front?

(p. 50) ¶4 In the east, however, Germany had to cope with the ever more apparent military weakness of its main ally, Austria-Hungary. During a disastrous Austrian offensive in the depth of winter 1914-15 in the mountainous heights of the Carpathians some 800,000, including the- (p. 51) ¶1-last well-trainees reserves, were lost. Many froze to death or succumbed to illness. Tens of thousands went into captivity. Desertion rates rose. The central Powers were depending ever more on German military strength, in both east and west. ¶2 For Austria the situation worsened still further when on 23 May 1915 Italy joined the war on the side of the British, French and Russian Entente, opening up a southern front. Remarkably, weakened though they had become, the Austro-Hungarians held out well against the Italians. The Germans were meanwhile inflicting serious defeats on the Russians, in February in the Masurian Lake district of East Prussia (with Russian losses of 92,000 men), then in spring and summer in Poland. Galicia was wrested from the Russians in June, most of the remainder of Congress Poland (formerly ruled by Russia) in July and August. Warsaw itself fell to the Germans on a 4 August 1915. When the greater summer offensive ran out of steam, the Germans had also conquered the Courland (the coastal part of western Latvia) and Lithuania. Between may and September the Tsarist forces suffered astounding losses of over 2 million men, more than 900,000 of them captured. ¶3 In the autumn the Central Powers also strengthened their position in the Balkans. Serbia, the initial source of the conflict, was finally invaded by German and Austro-Hungarian divisions in early October. Bulgaria, which had committed itself to the war on the side of the Central Powers a month earlier, also sent forces to join the Serbian campaign. By the beginning of November, Serbia was under the control of the Central Powers. A land route for weapons supplies to the Ottoman Empire had been gained. With Russia seriously weakened, the Balkans under control and even the enfeebled Austrians holding the Italians at bay in the south, Germany was now in a substantially better position than had been the case a year earlier to try to force victory in the west. Still, time did not favour the Germans. A push for victory in the west could not wait long." (Kershaw 2015, 50-51).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what did Germany do on 1915 in order to stabilize the Western front?

(p. 51) ¶4 Falkenhayn's plan was to break the French by a massive assault on Verdun, the centre of a big network of fortresses on the Meuse, abou t200 kilometres east of Paris. To inflict a devastating defeat on the French at Verdun. He thought, would be a major step towards overall victory in the west. Verdun was under intense siege from February to- (p. 52) ¶1-July 1916, and further heavy fighting continued until December. For the French, the defence of Verdun became the symbol of the fight for France itself. Losses were enormous over 700,000 men -- 377,000 French (162,000 dead) and 337,000 German (143,000 dead). But there was no German breakthrough. For the French, their country was saved. For the Germans, the huge losses had been for nothing. And by mid-July the scene of the greatest carnage had already shifted to the Somme." (Kershaw 2015, 51-52).

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what overall policy did the Austria-Hungarian Emperor Franz Joseph choose to deal with the fall-out of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914

(p. 97) ¶5 On Thursday, the 2nd of July, the emperor wrote the letter, expressing his regret that he would be deprived of the opportunity to speak directly with the kaiser about the political situation. In place of a conversation, he was enclosing a memorandum--the Matscheko memorandum--drafted, he said, before the catastrophe of Sarajevo. The crime committed against his nephew (no mention of the duchess) ahd resulted directly from the agitation conducted by 'Russian and Serbian Panslavists' who were determined to weaken the Triple Alliance and 'shatter my empire'. It might prove- (p. 98) ¶1-impossible to prove the complicity of the Serbian government in the conspiracy but it was clear that the plot had been well organized and could be traced back to Belgrade. There was no doubt that the aim of the Serbian government was to unite all south-Slavs under the Serbian flag, encouraging crimes such as the one perpetrated at Sarajevo and posing a lasting danger 'to my house and to my countries'.27[27.] ¶2 An international crisis was now on the agenda. How was it proposed that the dangers posed by Panslavism by avoided? Serbia must be isolated and reduced in size. Only a few days after the killing Austria had delineated its aim and explained it to Germany." (Martel 2014, 97-98).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, describe the Somme Offensive of mid-July 1916?

(p. 52) ¶2 Here, British and DOminion troops formed the mainstay of the 'big push'. If Verdun was seen later to symbolize the horror of the war for the French, the Somme acquired equally symbolic status in British memory. But there was a difference, Verdun could be remembered as a mighty but necessary patriotic sacrifice to save France. British and Dominion troops at the Somme were not fighting to stave off an attack on their homeland. To many, it was probably unclear just what they were fighting for. The plan of the offensive was largely the work of General (later Field Marshal) Sir Douglas Haig, since December 1915 the British commander-in-chief. The aim of the offensive had, in effect, been altered from its original conception. Initially foreseen as a mainly French-led offensive intended to produce a decisive breakthrough, it had been converted into a chiefly British-led attack to relieve the pressure on the French at Verdun. The Germans, it was hoped, would be worn down and significantly weakened. The crucial drive for victory would, however, have to wait. Whatever patriotic rallying-cries and morale-boosting addresses the troops about to go 'over the top' on the somme heard from their officers, for most of them strategic aims were most likely less important than survival. But tens of thousands would not survive even the first day of the offensive. The Somme came for the British to symbolize the pointlessness of such immense loss of life. ¶3 After an intensive heavy bombardment lasting over a week, on 1 July 1916, the very first day of the battle, the British and dominion forces ost 57,470 men, including 19,240 dead and 35,493 wounded. It was the most catastrophic single day in British military history. That it might bring the great breakthrough was swiftly revealed as a costly delusion. When the fighting on the Somme petered out toward the end of November in rain, sleet, snow and mud, British and Dominion troops had gained a stri of about 10 kilometres along a- (p. 53) ¶1-35 kilometre stretch of the front, and the French about twice as much territory. For that, over a million men had been killed or wounded. British and Dominion casualties had amounted to 439,654 men (127,751 of them killed), while French casualties totalled 204,353 and German some 465,000. In the horrendous scale of its losses, and for so little the Somme was the most terrible battle on the western front during the First World War. " (Kershaw 2015, 52-53).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what happened during the Brusilov offensive of 1916?

(p. 53) ¶2 A third huge offensive that year, this time on the eastern front, was named after a Russian general, Aleksey ALekseyevich Brusilov. It was a bold strike that began on 4 June 1916 against Austrian positions on a wide sector of the southern front between the Pripet Marches (straddling southern Belarus and northern Ukraine) and Romania. Brusilov's immediate and massive success owed something to his careful preparations. It owed still more to Austrina ineptitude, abetted by poor morale. Within two days, the Austro-Hungarian front was in a state of collapse. Reinforcements were rushed back from the offensive that had been opened up in northern Italy. German reserves, too, were brought in to head off a total debacle. But by the end of September the Central Powers had been pushed back some 90 kilometres on a broad front. The Austro-Hungarians had by then lost 750,000 men, 380,000 of them captured. German losses were also huge, around 250,000. Yet the Brusilov Offensive, though triumphant for the Russians, had also been at an enormous cost, with losses approaching half a million men during the first ten days, and around a million overall. The jubilation in Russia at the great victory hid the widening cracks behind the facade. Russia, as events were soon to prove, was nearing the end even faster than Austria-Hungary. ¶3 An immediate outcome of the Brusilov Offensive was to bring Romania into the war on 27 August on the side of the Entente. The Romanians were hoping for big gains at the expense of Hungary after what they took to be the increasingly certain defeat of the Central Powers. Such hopes were rapidly dashed when the Central Powers dispatched an army, under German leadership, which drove back the Romanians from the advances they had made. By the beginning of 1917, the Central Powers had occupied Bucharest and much of Romania, including the strategically important Ploesti oilfields." (Kershaw 2015, 53).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what did the Germans do on the sea to try to starve out the British?

(p. 54) ¶1 ... The problem of the tightening Allied blockade had remained unresolved. But the German surface fleet had been able to do little about it. For all the money poured into the building of huge battle fleets both by the British and the Germans before the war, the sole major engagement at sea, the battle of Jutland on 31 May 1916, had proved inconclusive. The Germans sank more ships -- fourteen, compared with eleven that they lost -- and had fewer casualties (3,058 to 6,768 on the British side). But the losses crippled teh smaller German fleet for months, effectively ruling out its deployment for the rest of the war, whereas the British fleet was capable of continuing the blockade. Attention, therefore, turned increasingly to the prospect of extending the use of U-boats not only to end the blockade, but to bring about a decisive shift in war fortunes. The German naval leadership reckoned that U-boats could sink 600,000 tons of shipping a month -- a rate that would force Britain to a state of collapse within five months, before the USA could make any difference to the outcome of the war. But if the U-boat war did not succeed, and America joined the conflict, the prospects for Germany would significantly worsen. ¶2 The gamble was taken. From 1 February 1917, Germany began unrestricted submarine warfare. Allied and neutral shipping in British waters could now attacked without warning. It was a catastrophic mistake. The US President, Woodrow Wilson, looking to cement American leadership in the post-war world, had up to this point wanted 'peace without victory' and had avoided committing his- (p. 55) ¶1-country to supporting one side or the other in the destructive European conflict. The German decision to unleash the U-boats abruptly terminated such a strategy. Within two days, Wilson broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. The inevitable sinking of American ships by U-boats helped to prompt the US declaration of war on Germany on 6 April 1917 (though it would be spring 1918 before the American Expeditionary Force was in a position to join the fighting on the western front). But only in April and June 1917 did the U-boats sink the required monthly tonnage, which in any event was based upon optimistic notions of British vulnerability. The U-boat war proved a failure. Even worse, Germany had a new and powerful enemy in the Americans." (Kershaw 2015, 54-55).

In "the Killing", p. 49-81, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was the nature of the relationship between Serbia and Austria-Hungary by 1913?

(p. 54) ¶2 This was to be a special 'moment' for Serbia. The nation and the national idea seemed to be riding the wave of history. In the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 Serbia had succeeded in defeating first Turkey and then Bulgaria.- ([. 55) ¶1 Inthe process, it had doubled its territory and increased its population by 50 per cent (from 3 to 4.5 million). The dream of a Greater Serbia, of a restored Serbian empire that would unite all Serbs, suddenly seemed now to be within reach--were it not for Austria-Hungary's opposition to it. Not only had the Austrians occupied and then annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina--containing over 2 million Serbs--but they had denied Serbia its goal of acquiring an outlet on the Adriatic Sea. ¶2 When Serbia joined Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece in attacking and defeating Turkey in the first Balkan war, one of the fruits of victory was then to set it free of its landlocked condition. Access to the sea would mean greater freedom for its commerce, which remained largely dependent on Austro-Hungarian railways. At the conference of ambassadors which met in London to bring about an end to the war, Austria had succeeded in getting sufficient diplomatic support from the other great European powers to create an independent Albanian state that it hoped would block forever Serbia's path to the Adriatic. Fused with these nationalist aspirations and hatreds were the ideas of Kropotkin, Bakunin, Herzen, and other anarchist and revolutionary ideologues that were imbibed by the young émigrés who arrived in Serbia between 1908 and 1914." (Martel 2014, 54-55).

According to Professor Lanthier, how did the League of Nations actually impact European diplomacy?

The Europeans did send representatives to the league of nations, and did participate in the forums. However, many of the great European powers also just still conducted diplomacy in the old fashioned, secretive way.

In "the Killing", p. 49-81, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was the overall goal of the ensuing violence, as understood by Vladimir Gacinovic?

(p. 54) ¶2 This was to be a special 'moment' for Serbia. The nation and the national idea seemed to be riding the wave of history. In the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 Serbia had succeeded in defeating first Turkey and then Bulgaria.- ([. 55) ¶1 Inthe process, it had doubled its territory and increased its population by 50 per cent (from 3 to 4.5 million). The dream of a Greater Serbia, of a restored Serbian empire that would unite all Serbs, suddenly seemed now to be within reach--were it not for Austria-Hungary's opposition to it. Not only had the Austrians occupied and then annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina--containing over 2 million Serbs--but they had denied Serbia its goal of acquiring an outlet on the Adriatic Sea. ¶2 When Serbia joined Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece in attacking and defeating Turkey in the first Balkan war, one of the fruits of victory was then to set it free of its landlocked condition. Access to the sea would mean greater freedom for its commerce, which remained largely dependent on Austro-Hungarian railways. At the conference of ambassadors which met in London to bring about an end to the war, Austria had succeeded in getting sufficient diplomatic support from the other great European powers to create an independent Albanian state that it hoped would block forever Serbia's path to the Adriatic. Fused with these nationalist aspirations and hatreds were the ideas of Kropotkin, Bakunin, Herzen, and other anarchist and revolutionary ideologues that were imbibed by the young émigrés who arrived in Serbia between 1908 and 1914." (Martel 2014, 54-55).

In "the Killing", p. 49-81, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was the overall goal of the ensuing violence, as understood by Vladimir Gacinovic?

(p. 55) ¶4 While studying in Vienna, Gacinovic adopted Prince Peter Kropotkin as his guiding light. Gacinovic was less interested in the core anarchist philosophy of 'mutual aid' based on cooperation among small groups and the dismantling of the centralized state, then he was in Kropotkin's defence of- (p. 56) ¶1-violence as a legitimate means to a noble end. The end that Cacinovic had in mind was the creation of a Greater Serbia--and Kropotkin had outlined the means by which this might be attained. 'Propaganda by deed' could be a powerful weapon: Kropotkin argued that a dramatic act of violence or martyrdom could succeed in arousing ordinary people from their lethargy and awaken their natural, but latent, rebellious instincts. ..." (Martel 2014, 55-56).

In "the Killing", p. 49-81, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was the nature of the relationship between Serbia and Austria-Hungary by 1913?

(p. 56) ¶2 The government of Austria-Hungary had raised the volatile temperature of Serbian politics by deciding (in 1910) to formalize the annexation of the occupied provinces through the proclamation of a constitution." (Martel 2014, 56).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the outcome of the war for Russia in 1917?

(p. 57) ¶3 In Russia the unrest, swelling for months in the wake of enormous losses at the front and ever worsening, deep privation at home, exploded into revolution in March 1917 (February in the old Russian calendar). The Tsar was toppled. The new Provisional Government that took office in such conditions of crisis felt it had to fight on, despite the evident war-weariness of the troops, to secure a 'peace without defeat'. Its Minister of War (later head of government), Alexander Kerensky, even gave his name to an ill-fated offensive in July across a long front in Galicia and Bukovina. This took place, however, amid continued political upheaval, gathering opposition to the war at home, and failing morale among the troops as revolutionary fervour filtered outwards from Petrograd to soldiers at the front. Following teh failure of the Kerensky Offensive, weakened Russian forces were in no position to counter a German attack on Riga in September 1917 (August in the old calendar). The last Russo-German battle of the war ended with Riga under German occupation. By November (October in the old calendar) the Provisional Government, too, had- (p. 58) ¶1-fallen in a second revolution that brought the Bolsheviks to power. This would soon dramatically change the political constellation of Europe. More immediately, it promised to change war fortunes, for on 20 December 1917, five days after concluding an armistice with the Germans, the new Bolshevik leadership began the painful process of negotiating a peace treaty with Germany." (Kershaw 2015, 57-58).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what were Wilson's Fourteen Points?

(p. 58) ¶2 This formed the backcloth to President Woodrow Wilson's declaration on 8 January 1918 of his Fourteen Points -- an idealistic outline of what he thought might bring an end to the war and serve as the basis for a durable peace in Europe. With the end to Russian involvement in the war imminent, Wilson saw an opportunity to press for as overall conclusion of hostilities and to offer the basis for a general negotiation of peace terms. Among hsi proposals were removal of economic barriers to free trade; disarmament; 'adjustment' (as he vaguely put it) of colonial claims; evacuation of occupied territories (including Russia, which was offered a 'sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing', and 'assistance also of every kind that she may need'); readjustment of Italy's borders 'along clearly recognisable lines of nationality'; opportunity for the 'autonomous development' of the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires; creation of an independent Polish states; and the association of nations to guarantee 'political independence and territorial integrity'. For all its apparent precision, much of Wilson's declaration was inevitably left open-ended, imprecise and subject to differing interpretation or dispute. The terms 'self-determination' and 'democracy did not appear in the Fourteen Points. Nonetheless,they both soon came to be viewed as the cornerstone of the liberal vision that Wilson was advancing, and an encouragement for nationalist aspirations in Europe." (Kershaw 2015, 58)

In "the Killing", p. 49-81, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, from where did the term "Black Hand" come from?

(p. 59) ¶2 ALthough the name "Union or Death" succinctly summarized the nature of the organization, it has come to be more dramatically known as the 'Black Hand' (Tsrna Ruka) because of teh symbol they adopted, which featured a- (p. 60) ¶1-death's head, a dagger, a bomb, and poison, all symbolizing the ethos of the organization." (Martel 2014, 59-60).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what did the Treaty of Brest-Titovsk, and the Treaty of Bucharest, allow Germany to do?

(p. 59) ¶3 The unexpectedly swift easing of the military situation in the east offered improved prospects for Germany in the west. The consequences would reveal themselves in 1918. More immediately, there was the possibility of intervention to clear up the inconclusive but troublesome, Italian front. Since 1915, when they joined the war on the side of the Entente, the Italians had been battling more or less continuously with the Austro-Hungarian army, along the Isonzo River, running from the Alps to the Adriatic, near Trieste. In October 1917 the Germans sent down reinforcements to help the Austrians. The twelfth, and decisive, battle of Isonzo (which the Italians called the battle of Caporetto) began on 24 October. The Italians were routed and within a month had been relentlessly drive back around 80 kilometres. The Italian army, made up of conscripts -- more than half of them peasants or agricultural workers from southern Italy -- predominantly in the front-line infantry, simply had no stomach for the fight. They were badly led, ill-equipped and inadequately fed. By- (p. 60) ¶1 10 November 1917, Italian losses were no fewer than 305,000. The casualty rate of dead (10,000) and wounded (30,000) was relatively low. The vast majority (265,000) had deserted or allowed themselves to be captured. It was little wonder that Caporetto became a day of infamy in Italian history." (Kershaw 2015, 59-60).

In "the Killing", p. 49-81, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, why did the Black Hand's attempt to assassinate the governor of Bosnia, General Oskar Potiorek in mid-January 1914?

(p. 61) ¶5 ... [Mustafa Golubić and Mehmed Mehmedbašić] nerves' failed them? When their train crossed the frontier into Austria from Ragusa the would-be assassins feared that their guns would be discovered by customs officials; panicking, they threw the weapons out of the window and the conspiracy disintregrated." (Martel 2014, 61).

In "the Killing", p. 49-81, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, when did Gavrilo Princip, Nedjo Čabrinović, and Trifko Grabež start to discuss the assassination of the archduke of Franz Ferdinand?

(p. 62) ¶2 "Princip returned to Bosnia from Belgrade during the winter of 1913-14, having contacted Gaćinović while they were both in Sarajevo. In March, Princip moved back to Belgrade to complete his studies, where he learned of the archduke's visit and began discussing the assassination with Čabrinović and Grabež. The would-be killers quickly identified the things they would need if they were to succeed in their mission: weapons; means by which to get into Bosnia with their weapons; and additional accomplices--because the archduke was certain to be well guarded." (Martel 2014, 62).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, when did the war finally end?

(p. 62) ¶2 In the early days of November, with the armies of the Central Powers in complete disarray and their governments in turmoil, it was obvious that the end of the great conflagration was fast approaching. When the kaiser's regime fell on 9 November and the new German government indicated its readiness to accept President Wilson's Fourteen Points as the basis for peace negotiations, the war could at last be stopped. On 11 November at the headquarters of marshal Foch, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies, in the forest of Compiègne, the Centre Party politician Matthias Erzberger, at the head of a German delegation, put his signature to the Armistice that finally put an end to the fighting. The guns fell silent at the eleventh hour of the eleventh month." (Kershaw 2015, 62).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, how widespread was pacifism?

(p. 7) ¶2 By 1914 pacifists were to be found everywhere in Europe. One survey listed 190 peace societies, responsible for publishing twenty-three journals or reviews in ten languages. Over 600 groups representing some one million members supported the work of the International Peace Bureau. ... ... ¶4 By late 1914 pacifism had spread far beyond its beginnings as a religious-humanitarian movement. The movement now included legislators, jurists, economists, lawyers, teachers; hundreds of organizations were involved; (p. 8) ¶1-annual congresses and conferences were held; trust funds and prizes were established; buildings were built. While 'realist' diplomats and strategists might sneer at the movement no politician dared any longer to denounce the idea of arbitration and disarmament in public." (Martel 2014, 7-8).

In "the Killing", p. 49-81, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what kind of view did archduke Franz Ferdinand about the 1867 constitution of the Austria-Hungarian Empire? What was Ferdinand's view of Magyar representation?

(p. 73) ¶3 While the emperor persisted in his belief that the arrangements of 1867 were reasonable and workable and that it would be dangerous to reopen the constitutional discussion, the archduke argued that fundamental reforms were necessary. What he believed to be needed was a new federalism that would recognize, in particular, the rights and responsibilities of Czechs, Romanians, and Slavs, who, under the arrangements of 1867, were relatively disenfranchised. In the Hungarian parliament of 1914, for example, eight million non-Magyars were represented by forty-two disputes; eight and one-half million Magyars by 392. One antidote to this, which was contemplated by the archduke, was to introduce universal suffrage; another was to divide the monarchy into fifteen autonomous states based on nationality, but with German as the common language and with the emperor heading a central government, with a small federal parliament elected on the basis of population. This proposal was bound to alienate the Magyars, who- (p. 74) ¶1-currently enjoyed equal status with the Germans in the monarchy and predominant status over the minorities within Hungary. ¶2 Franz Ferdinand did not care: he despised the Magyars When attending a regimental dinner in Hungary where the hussars performed their traditional csardas he declared 'Just look at that animal dance! That's one of the first things I shall do away with!'12[12.] And look forward to inheriting the throne, he did: he secretly had a full-sized portrait painted of himself--in full regalia as emperor." (Martel 2014, 73-74).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what changes in the state-apparatus was necessitated by the burdens of WWI?

(p. 76) ¶2 All of this necessitated controlled economies and greatly increased state spending. Military spending alone reached unprecedented levels, towards the end of the war -- 59 percent of Germany's gross domestic product, 54 percent of France's, 50 percent of Britain's (though les advanced economies, such as those of Russia, Austria-Hungary or the Ottoman Empire could extract less). New or extended forms of taxation were imposed on citizens. Britain was relatively successful in financing war costs through taxation, though Germany and especially France were more reluctant to tax their citizens, imagining that the enemy would pay reparations for the conflict after victory. Most of the war financing came from loans. The Allies borrowed mainly from America. Austria borrowed to some extent from Germany. But, as the war went on, it became impossible for Germany to borrow from anywhere abroad. The German war effort had increasingly to be financed by domestic war loans. War-bond drives were deployed by all the belligerent states. Everywhere, state indebtedness hugely increased. When- (p. 77) ¶1-neither loans nor taxation sufficed, states printed money, storing up problems for a later day. ¶2 As state direction of the economy and intervention in civilian life intensified, the state apparatus grew in size. Bureaucracies expanded. So did levels of surveillance, coercion and repression. Enemy 'aliens' were interned. In some areas, particularly in eastern Europe, whole populations were displaced. When the Russians retreated from western Poland and Lithuania in 1915, leaving 'scorched earth' behind them as they went, they had deported at least 300,000 Lithuanians, 250,000 Latvians, 350,000 Jews (who were notably ill-treated) and 743,000 Poles into the Russian interior. By early 1917 some 6 million displaced persons in Russia -- refugees from the Caucasus and borderlands in the west, as well as those deported by force -- had been added to the masses suffering growing misery in Russian cities." (Kershaw 2015, 76-77).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was the origins of the socialist movement?

(p. 8) ¶3 "Pacifist ideas and organizations were largely the work of middle-class intellectuals, professionals, and activists. But a strong and determined anti-war movement had also grown within European working-class organizations since the turn of the century. Karl marx and Friedrich Engels had proclaimed in the Communist Manifesto of 1848 that 'the working man has 1864 expressly for the purpose of establishing unity among the working classes of the world. But war itself, according to Marx, was not inherently wrong: each was to be judged by whether it hastened or delayed progress in achieving the classless society. And he dismissed pacifists as a bunch of 'hypocritical phrasemongers, [a] squint-eyed set of Manchester humbugs'.11[11.]- (p. 9) ¶1-The greatest obstacle to the proletarian revolution was the reactionary regime of tsarist Russia." (Martel 2014, 8-9).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, why did the 1905 revolution fail?

(p. 80) ¶2 The attempted Russian revolution in 1905 had failed because there had been no cohesion to link the discontents of striking workers, rebellious peasants asn those of soldiers and sailors, only a relatively small number of whom mutinied. There had been a ack, too, of unifying revolutionary leadership. The Tsar had bought off the revolution partly through concessions towards constitutional government that soon proved to be little more than cosmetic. Repression did the rest. The Tsarist political police, the Okhrana, was efficient in arresting revolutionary leaders or banishing them to remote exile, infiltrating their organizations, closing down seditious newspapers, putting down strikes and executing peasant rebel leaders. The regime had, for now, staved off its destruction. ..." (Kershaw 2015, 80)

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what happened during the bitter winter of 1916-17 in Russia

(p. 80) ¶3 During the bitter winter of 1916-17, while many Russian peasants hoarded food or sold it at high prices, the big industrial centres had suffered from an acute shortage of provisions and fuel. Transport was close to collapse. The state finances were in ruins. Inflation was rampant. Wages (apart fro those of skilled munitions workers) could not keep pace with galloping prices. Many people were near starvation. But a privileged minority was still doing well out of the war -- a source of intense resentment. Big protest strikes in January 1917 took place in Petrograd (formerly St Petersburg) and other cities in which anger about living standards was linked to anti-war feeling and- (p. 81) ¶1-opposition to Tsarist rule. When working women took to the streets on 8 March (23 February in the old Russian calendar) to protest that they had no bread, it sparked mass strikes and demonstrations by armaments workers. Soldiers and sailors supported the workers' insurrection in Petrograd. Firing on demonstrators in Petrograd could not end the strike of over 200,000 workers. And the government was powerless to defuse what was tantamount to a growing military strike within the armed forces. Orders to suppress the mutinies fell on deaf ears. The situation rapidly ran out of the control of the Tsarist authorities. In conditions on anarchy, workers elected their own form of representative government, a soviet (or council). Order rapidly collapsed. THe soldiers also elected soviets to represent them, demanding the removal of the Tsar. When leading officers and politicians agreed that the Tsar had to go, he went, abdicating on 15 March." (Kershaw 2015, 80-81)

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, why did the first revolution of 1917, the March Revolution (the February Revolution in the old Russian calendar) succeed?

(p. 81) ¶1 The war had produced the conditions whereby the burning anger directed at the Tsar and the system of rule he represented, which was held to blame for their misery, transcended for the time being the divided interests of workers and peasants. The revolutionary forces in the industrial working class in 1917 temporarily linked with those among the peasantry. Even together, these may have proved insufficient to topple the system, as had been the case in 1905. But, crucially, the war allied their interest with those of the growing numbers of massively disaffected troops at the front. Once the disaffection spread to the front, onc the soldiers were unwilling to fight any longer, and once their revolutionary fervour blended with that of the home front, the regime wa living on borrowed time. The groundwell of discontent at the enormous losses and unbearable hardships coalesced into an explosion of opposition to the war that swept away the system held to blame for it. A regime that had relied upon repression and coercion, with few intermediary structures to integrate the mass of the population into unenforced support for it, found itself with hardly any friends as the pressures mounted before the dam-walls burst in 1917." (Kershaw 2015, 81)

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what happened on 28 June?

(p. 82) ¶1 On the morning of 28 June Judge Leo Pfeffer took his daughter ot the Appel Quay to view the royal procession. They were nearly when the grenade thrown by Čabrinović exploded. The judge sent his daughter home and walked to the city hall. He was called to the first-aid room, where he met the blooeding Čabrinovc. By the time the bloodied and bruised Princip arrived, the judge had been assigned to interview the assassins and report to Vienna. By evening Princip had been charged with the assassination. Along with Čabrinović, he was taken to the military prison and put in chains. Neither expressed remorse for their actions, although Princip did say he was sorry about the duchess, whom he had not intended to kill.1[1.] ¶2 Ilić was arrested that afternoon. All of Čabrinovc's faily was rounded up and taken to jail--along with all of the employees who worked in their café. Mehmedbašić, Čabrinović, Popoović, and Grabež managed to flee Sarajevo. Grabež was arrested when he arrived at the Serbian frontier because he lacked the special permit require for travelling. It took several days, until 3 July, before the police were able to track down and arrest Čabrinović and Popović. Mehmedbašić managed to elude them escaping to Montenegro. ¶3 On the evening of the assassination, crowds of young Croatian and Muslim men began to gather and march through Sarajevo, singing the Bosnian anthem and shouting 'Down with the Serbs'. Around 10 p.m. about one hundred of them began stoning the Hotel Europa, owned by a prominent Serb and frequented by Serbian intellectuals." (Martel 2014, 82)

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what happened to the German state as WWI went on?

(p. 85) ¶2 The longer the war went on, the more the nature of the German state itself had been called into question. The political system where ministers were responsible to the Kaiser, not to parliament, had already been rejected by socialists before the war but was upheld by strong forces that resisted any move towards democracy. Worsening war fortunes resulted in a growing clamour on the Left not simply to end the relentless bloodshed but to remove those held responsible and to introduce democratic parliamentary government. More and more Germans aw a system of rule resting upon militarism, class privilege and unchecked power, embodied by the divisive figure of the Kaiser -- a system that had taken Germany into a disastrous war -- as unreformable. It had to be replaced. Democracy had to be established. The people who had borne the pain, suffering and privations of the war had to have their political voice heard. By the autumn of 1918 the legitimacy of the state system in Imperial Germany had all but collapsed." (Kershaw 2015, 85)

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what did Count Contrad von Hötzendorff, chief of the general staff of Austria-Hungary, have as an attitude to war?

(p. 86) ... ¶2 A decade later, in the third edition of Taktic, he attacked pacifist 'dreamers'. War was inevitable. The state had to maintain a strong army and cultivate a warlike spirit (kriegerischer Geist) in order to survive. Recognizing that all life wa a struggle for existence constituted the only 'real and rational- (p. 87) ¶1-basis for policy making. ... Whoever remains blind to the mounting danger, or whoever recognizes it but remains too indolent to arm himself, and is too undecided to deliver the blow at the proper moment, deserves his fate.9[9.]" (Martel 2014, 86-87).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, when did Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicate, and the German Empire collapse into the Weimar Republic?

(p. 86) ¶2 ... [By November 1918], the generals made plain to the Kaiser, the very symbol of the older order, that he had to go. Reluctantly, he went During the night of 9-10 November, Kaiser Wilhelm II left the military headquarters in Spa, in Belgium, for exile in Holland (where he would remain until his death in 19410. His abdication was announced prematurely, since his formal renunciation of the thorne only followed on 28 November. Even before he departed, a republic had been hastily proclaimed from the balcony of the Reichstag in berlin. Equally without actual constitutional legitimacy, the Chancellor, max von baden appointed his own successor, the SOcialist leader, Friedrich Ebert. Constitutional niceties did not matter in the revolutionary moment. Germany was on its way, amid turmoil that would last for months, to the establishment of a fully fledged parliamentary democracy." (Kershaw 2015, 86)

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, when did the first inklings of crisis between Austria and Syria emerge?

(p. 89) ¶ Within forty-eight hours of the assassination the spectre of a crisis between Austria and Serbia began to emerge. The Austrians would point to the responsibility of the Serbian government for the killings; the Serbs would proclaim their innocence. The Austrians woud point to Serbian sponsorship of a 'Greater Serbia' as the root cause of the unrest in Bosnia; the Serbs would claim that Austria's opposition to the legitimate aspirations of the Serbian people was the cause of the problem." (Martel 2014, 89).

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, when Emperor Karl abdicate, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapse?

(p. 89) ¶3 After the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian army, with little on their minds but saving their own skins, were routed by Italians at Vittorio Veneto in October 1918, the empire was on its last legs. The army now disintegrated. Emperor Karl agreed in late October to troops joining their now national forces. It was no more than a recognition of what was happening on the ground, as Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Croats and others deserted and left for home. By late October, with extraordinary speed, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and what would become Yugoslavia were proclaiming their independence. Austria's armistice with Italy on 3 November marked the end of its war effort. Emperor Karl reluctantly renounced his powers (though ot his claim to the throne) on 11 November and spent the remaining three years of his life exiled in Switzerland and, infally, Madeira. Five centuries of Habsburg rule were over." (Kershaw 2015, 89)

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, if a real crisis emerged between Austria and Serbia, what kind of help would the Austria-Hungarian Empire expect from the other great powers BASED SOLELY ON APPEARANCE?

(p. 89) ¶5 Austria, by contrast, enjoyed the longest-standign alliance in Europe through its agreement with Germany. The 'Dual Alliance' would celebrate its thirty-fifth anniversary in October 1914. The Italians had made it a Triple Alliance by joining the combination in 1882 and the Romanians had secretly sign on the following year. The Triple Alliance had been renewed five times since, giving the Austrians every reason to believe that in nay diplomatic- (p. 90) ¶1-crisis arising from the assassination they would enjoy political support that the Serbs could not hope to match. ¶2 Appearances were deceiving. Italy had outstanding claims against Austria: the 'unredeemed' Italian-speaking peoples of the Trentino who remained outside of Italy--Italia irredenta--as well as the multi-ethnic city of Trieste on the Adriatic, whose governing language was Italian. Once united, Italy had developed expansionist aspirations along the Adriatic--where it could claim to be the heir to the Venetian empire. Many Italians regarded Austria as an enemy. And the secret adherence of Romania to the Triple Alliance was politically complicated: the large Romanian population in Hungary was restive under the Magyar domination--to the point that the Romanian government dare not make public its alliance with Austria. ¶3 So support for Austria in the Balkans boiled down to Germany, and the signs were not encouraging. When Berchtold met with the German ambassador in Vienna on 30 June, Heinrich Leopold von Tschirschky und Bögendorff preached caution. Many Austrians wished for a final reckoning with the Serbs, but he advised them not to act in haste." (Martel 2014, 89-90)

In chapter 2 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, when Emperor Karl abdicate, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapse?

(p. 90) ¶1 ... The dismembering of the Ottoman Empire to the south of Turkey itself -- most of the former possessions in the Balkans had gained independence in the 180s and the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 brough the final loss of Ottoman territories in Europe -- followed defeat, when the wartime Turkish leaders had fled on board a German submarine for Odessa, and eventually berlin. Within the Ottoman Empire, too, however, growing adversity to the war had caused an insurmountable crisis of state legitimacy. The high level of desertion pointed to an increasingly parlous state of morale in the Turkish army. The shaky and unwieldy Ottoman Empire had overstretched itself in its war effort. It came away empty-handed in its attempts to make territorial gains in the Caucasus. And in the Middle East, an Arab revolt form 1916 onwards (greatly abetted by the British and French, keen to advance their imperialist interests) meant that Ottoman administration scarcely functioned in the southern part of the empire. ¶2 In the Turkish heartlands, meanwhile, the problems were mounting alarmingly. Losses at the front were massive. Estimates put Turkish deaths as high as 2.5 million, three times those of Britain. The scale of such losses, accompanied at home by a collapsing currency, soaring prices, and acute shortages of food and other commodities undermined the already tottering foundations of the Ottoman Empire. The Armistice brought no end to the suffering and violence in Turkey, which was soon plunged into a war of independence that lasted until 1923, when a wrecked country eventually emerged from the ruins as an independent sovereign state. The Armistice brought no end to the suffering and violence in Turkey, which was soon plunged into a war of independence that lasted until 1923, when a wrecked country eventually emerged from the ruins as an independent sovereign state. And the takeover of Ottoman possession in the Middle East by the western imperialist powers, Britain and France, was accompanied by huge anti-colonial unrest, waves of protest and endemic violence that equally saw no abrupt break with the end of the war. The consequences for the indefinite future were enormous." (Kershaw 2015, 90)

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what overtures did Serbian Prime Minister Nikoa Pašić do to try to allay a negative Austria-Hungarian reaction?

(p. 92) ¶2 Could the situation be defused? Would the Serbian government cooperate with an Austrian investigation into the roots of the conspiracy? The Serbian prime minister, Nikola Pašić, who was no friend of the 'Men of 19 May' and its connection with the Black Hand, knew that the most zealous nationalists were plotting to overthrow him. He had been trying to improve relations with Austria-Hungary. On Wednesday he instructed Serbian representatives to explain that his government had taken steps to suppress anarchic elements within Serbia, and that it would now redouble its vigilance and take the severest measures against them. 'Moreover, Serbia will do everything in her power and use all the means at her disposal in order to restrain the feelings of ill-balanced people within her frontiers.'21[21.]" (Martel 2014, 92)

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, what was the situation like in July 1?

(p. 93) ¶2 By Wednesday, 1 July, things seemed to be moving slowly and judiciously. Since martial law had been declared in Bosnia, calm had been restored. Attacks on Serb businesses and institutions had ceased. Serbia had promised to restrain its hotheads. The memorial for the archduke and duchess in Vienna was to be a low-key affair. Only a couple of extremist right-wing newspapers in Austria and Hungary were calling for revenge on Serbia; most preached caution. The minister-president (prime minister) of Hungary, Count István Tisza de Borosjenő et Szeged, wrote directly to the emperor to urge that the assassination not be used as an excuse for a 'reckoning' with Serbia. It would be a fatal mistake to proceed unless they could prove the complicity of the Serbian government in the plot. He warned that the strategic outlook was bleak: Romania was virtually lost to the Triple Alliance and Bulgaria was still too exhausted from its war with Serbia to be counted on.23[23.]" (Martel 2014, 93)

In chapter 3 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, what was the doll toll overall of World War I?

(p. 95) ¶2 ... The United Kingdom's military dead numbered 750,000 (a further 180,000 dead from across the empire), Italy's almost half a million, France's 1.3 million, Austria-Hungary's almost 1.5 million, France's 1.3 million, Austria-Hungary's almost 1.5 million, Russia's around 1.8 million, germany's just over 2 million. Some of the smaller countries suffered worst in proportionate terms. One in three Serbs and Romanians sent into battle was killed or died of injuries or disease. The proportion of the dead among the fighting troops from the major belligerent countries ranged between 11-12 per cent (Russia, Italy and the United Kingdom) and 15-16 per cent (France, Germany and Austria-Hungary). The wounded, disabled and incapacitated greatly outnumbered the dead in all countries. The overall death toll was more than twice as high as the combined total from all major wars between 1790 and 1914. The influenza epidemic of 1918-19 then caused deaths worldwide twice as high as those on European battlefields during the war. To add to the horrific toll were the victims of related post-war violence and border conflicts." (Kershaw 2015, 95).

What was the status of the monarch by 1900 Britain?

The government of Britain was a constitutional monarchy. The Queen was largely a symbolic role. She was a symbol of stability. For many people, the idea of a long-lasting figure is seen as an important figure.

Theobald Theodor Friedrich Alfred von Bethmann-Hollweg

29 November 1856 - 1 January 1921) was a German politician who was the Chancellor of the German Empire from 1909 to 1917.

Henri Philippe Benoni Omer Joseph Pétain (24 April 1856 - 23 July 1951), generally known as Philippe Pétain (French: [fi.lip pe.tɛ̃]), Marshal Pétain (Maréchal Pétain) and The Old Marshal (Le Vieux Maréchal)

A French general officer who attained the position of Marshal of France at the end of World War I, during which he became known as The Lion of Verdun, and in World War II served as the Chief of State of Vichy France from 1940 to 1944. Pétain, who was 84 years old in 1940, ranks as France's oldest head of state. During World War I Pétain led the French Army to victory at the nine-month-long Battle of Verdun. After the failed Nivelle Offensive and subsequent mutinies he was appointed Commander-in-Chief and succeeded in repairing the army's confidence. Pétain remained in command throughout the war and emerged as a national hero. During the interwar period he was head of the peacetime French Army, commanded joint Franco-Spanish operations during the Rif War and served twice as a government Minister. With the imminent Fall of France in June 1940 in World War II, Pétain was appointed President of the Ministerial Council by President Lebrun at Bordeaux, and the Cabinet resolved to sign an armistice agreement with Germany. The entire government subsequently moved briefly to Clermont-Ferrand, then to the spa town of Vichy in central France. His government voted to transform the discredited French Third Republic into the French State, an authoritarian regime that collaborated with the Nazis and the Axis Powers. After the war, Pétain was tried and convicted for treason. He was originally sentenced to death, but due to his age and World War I service his sentence was commuted to life in prison.

Marshal Joseph Jacques Césaire Joffre (French: [ʒɔsɛf ʒɔfʁ]; 12 January 1852 - 3 January 1931)

A French general who served as Commander-in-Chief of French forces on the Western Front from the start of World War I until the end of 1916. He is best known for regrouping the retreating allied armies to defeat the Germans at the strategically decisive First Battle of the Marne in September 1914. His political position waned after unsuccessful offensives in 1915, the German attack on Verdun in 1916, and the disappointing results of the Anglo-French offensive on the Somme in 1916. At the end of 1916 he was promoted to Marshal of France, the first such promotion under the Third Republic, and moved to an advisory role, from which he quickly resigned. Later in the war he led an important mission to the United States. His popularity led to his nickname Papa Joffre.

Attrition warfare

A military strategy consisting of belligerent attempts to win a war by wearing down the enemy to the point of collapse through continuous losses in personnel and materiel. The war will usually be won by the side with greater such resources. The word attrition comes from the Latin root atterere to rub against, similar to the "grinding down" of the opponent's forces in attrition warfare.

Georges Eugène Benjamin Clemenceau[1] (French pronunciation: ​[ʒɔʁʒ bɛ̃ʒamɛ̃ klemɑ̃so];[2]28 September 1841 - 24 November 1929)

A French politician who was Prime Minister of France during the First World War. A leading independent Radical, he played a central role in the politics of the French Third Republic. Clemenceau was Prime Minister of France from 1906 to 1909 and from 1917 to 1920. Demanding a total victory over Germany, he wanted reparations, colonies, Alsace-Lorraine, and strict rules to prevent Germany from rearming. He achieved these goals in the Treaty of Versailles imposed on Germany at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Nicknamed "Père la Victoire" (Father Victory) or "Le Tigre" (The Tiger), in the 1920s he continued his harsh position against Germany, though not quite as much as the President Raymond Poincaré. He obtained mutual defense treaties with Britain and the United States, to unite against German aggression, but these never took effect.

Heinrich Aloysius Maria Elisabeth Brüning (26 November 1885 - 30 March 1970)

A German Centre Party politician and academic, who served as Chancellor of Germany during the Weimar Republic from 1930 to 1932. A political scientist and Christian social activist with a PhD on the implications of nationalizing the British railway system, he entered politics in the 1920s and was elected to the Reichstag in 1924. Shortly after Brüning took office as Chancellor on 30 March 1930 he was confronted by an economic crisis caused by the Great Depression. Brüning responded with a tightening of credit and a rollback of all wage and salary increases. These policies increased unemployment and made Brüning highly unpopular, losing him support in the Reichstag. As a result, Brüning established a so-called presidential government, basing his government's authority on presidential emergency decrees invoking President Paul von Hindenburg's constitutional powers. Brüning announced his cabinet's resignation on 30 May 1932, after his policies of distributing land to unemployed workers had led him into conflict with the President and the Prussian land owners, and the President therefore had refused to sign further decrees. Fearing arrest after the Nazi regime's ascent to power, Brüning fled Germany in 1934. After staying in Switzerland and the United Kingdom, he eventually settled in the United States. He lived in difficult economic conditions for his first years as a refugee from Nazism, but became a visiting professor at Harvard Universityin 1937 and was the Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Government at Harvard from 1939 to 1952. He warned[citation needed] the American public about Hitler's plans for war, and later about Soviet aggression and plans for expansion. He briefly returned to Germany in 1951 to take up a post as professor of political science at the University of Cologne, but returned to the United States in 1955 and lived out his days in retirement in Vermont. He became a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1938. Brüning remains a controversial figure in Germany's history, as historians debate whether he was the 'last bulwark of the Weimar Republic' or the 'Republic's undertaker', or both. Scholars are divided over how much room for manoeuvre he had during the depression and period of great political instability.[1] While he intended to protect the Republic's government, his policies, notably his use of emergency powers, also contributed to the gradual demise of the Weimar Republic during his chancellorship.

Paul Ludwig Hans Anton von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg), known generally as Paul von Hindenburg (German: [ˈpaʊl fɔn ˈhɪndn̩bʊʁk]; 2 October 1847 - 2 August 1934)

A German Generalfeldmarschall (field marshal) and statesman who commanded the Imperial German Army during the second half of World War Ibefore later being elected President of the Weimar Republic in 1925. He played a key role in the Nazi "Seizure of Power" in January 1933 when, under pressure from advisers, he appointed Adolf Hitler chancellor of a "Government of National Concentration", even though the Nazis were a minority in both the cabinet and the Reichstag. Born to a family of minor Prussian nobility, Paul von Hindenburg joined the Prussian army in 1866 where he thereafter saw combat during the Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian conflict. Despite retiring with the rank of General of the Infantry in 1911,[1] he was recalled to military service at the age of 66 following the outbreak of World War I in July 1914. On August 1914, he received nationwide attention as the victor of the Battle of Tannenberg. Upon later being named Chief of the General Staff in 1916,[1] his popularity among the German public exponentially increased to the point of giving rise to an enormous personality cult. As Kaiser Wilhelm II increasingly delegated his power as Supreme Warlord to the Army High Command, Hindenburg and his deputy, General Erich Ludendorff, ultimately established a de facto military dictatorship that dominated Germany for the rest of the war. Hindenburg retired again in 1919, but returned to public life in 1925 to be elected the second President of Germany. In 1932, he was persuaded to run for re-election even though he was 84 years old and in poor health, because he was considered the only candidate who could defeat Hitler. Hindenburg was re-elected in a runoff. He was opposed to Hitler and was a major player in the increasing political instability in the Weimar Republic that ended with Hitler's rise to power. He dissolved the Reichstag twice in 1932 and finally agreed to appoint Hitler Chancellor of Germany in January 1933. Hindenburg did this to satisfy Hitler's demands that he should play a part in the Weimar government, for Hitler was the leader of the Nazi party, which had won a plurality in the November 1932 elections (no party achieved a majority). In February he approved the Reichstag Fire Decree, which suspended various civil liberties, and in March he signed the Enabling Act of 1933, which gave Hitler's regime arbitrary powers. Hindenburg died the following year, after which Hitler declared himself Führer und Reichskanzler, or Supreme Leader and Chancellor, which superseded both the President and Chancellor.

Erich Friedrich Wilhelm Ludendorff (9 April 1865 - 20 December 1937)

A German general, the victor of the Battle of Liège and the Battle of Tannenberg. From August 1916, his appointment as Quartermaster general (German: Erster Generalquartiermeister) made him the leader (along with Paul von Hindenburg) of the German war efforts during World War I. The failure of Germany's great Spring Offensive in 1918 in its quest for total victory was his great strategic failure and he was forced out in October 1918.[1] After the war, Ludendorff became a prominent nationalist leader, and a promoter of the Stab-in-the-back myth, which posited that the German loss in World War I was caused by the betrayal of the German Army by Marxists, Bolsheviks, and Jews who were furthermore responsible for the disadvantageous settlement negotiated for Germany in the Treaty of Versailles. He took part in the failed Kapp Putsch (coup d'état) with Wolfgang Kapp in 1920 and the Beer Hall Putsch of Adolf Hitler in 1923, and in 1925, he ran unsuccessfully for the office of President of Germany against his former superior Hindenburg. From 1924 to 1928, he represented the German Völkisch Freedom Party in the Reichstag(legislature). Consistently pursuing a purely military line of thought after the war, Ludendorff developed the theory of "Total War", which he published as Der totale Krieg (The Total War) in 1935. In this work, he argued that the entire physical and moral forces of the nation should be mobilized, because peace was merely an interval between wars.[2] Ludendorff was a recipient of the Grand Cross of the Iron Cross and the Pour le Mérite.

Walther Rathenau (29 September 1867 - 24 June 1922)

A German industrialist, banker, intellectual, and politician, who served as German Foreign Minister during the Weimar Republic. Rathenau initiated the Treaty of Rapallo, which removed major obstacles to trading with Soviet Russia. Although Russia was already aiding Germany's secret rearmament programme, right-wing nationalist groups branded Rathenau a revolutionary, when he was in fact a moderate liberal who openly condemned Soviet methods. They also resented his background as a successful Jewish businessman. Two months after signing the treaty, he was assassinated in Berlin by the right-wing terrorist group Organisation Consul. Some members of the public viewed Rathenau as a democratic martyr until the Nazis banned all commemorations of him.

Friedrich Ebert (German pronunciation: [ˈeːbɐt]; 4 February 1871 - 28 February 1925)

A German politician of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the first President of Germany from 1919 until his death in office in 1925. Ebert was elected leader of the SPD on the death in 1913 of August Bebel. In 1914, shortly after he assumed leadership, the party became deeply divided over Ebert's support of war loans to finance the German war effort in World War I. A moderate social democrat, Ebert was in favour of the Burgfrieden, a political policy that sought to suppress squabbles over domestic issues among political parties during wartime in order to concentrate all forces in society on the successful conclusion of the war effort. He tried to isolate those in the party opposed to the war, but could not prevent a split. Ebert was a pivotal figure in the German Revolution of 1918-19. When Germany became a republic at the end of World War I, he became its first chancellor. His policies at that time were primarily aimed at restoring peace and order in Germany and containing the more extreme elements of the revolutionary left. In order to accomplish these goals, he allied himself with conservative and nationalistic political forces, in particular the leadership of the military under General Wilhelm Groener and the right wing Freikorps. With their help, Ebert's government crushed a number of socialist and communist uprisings as well as those from the right, including the Kapp Putsch. This has made him a controversial historical figure.

Grigori Yefimovich Rasputin (/ræˈspjuːtɪn/;[1] Russian: Григо́рий Ефи́мович Распу́тин [ɡrʲɪˈɡorʲɪj jɪˈfʲiməvʲɪtɕ rɐˈsputʲɪn]; 22 January [O.S. 9 January] 1869 - 30 December [O.S. 17 December] 1916)

A Russian mystic and self-proclaimed holy man who befriended the family of Tsar Nicholas II, the last monarch of Russia, and gained considerable influence in late imperial Russia. Born to a peasant family in the Siberian village of Pokrovskoye, Tyumen Oblast, Rasputin had a religious conversion experience after taking a pilgrimage to a monastery in 1897. He has been described as a monk or as a "strannik" (wanderer, or pilgrim), though he held no official position in the Russian Orthodox Church. After traveling to St. Petersburg, either in 1903 or the winter of 1904-05, Rasputin captivated some church and social leaders. He became a society figure, and met the Tsar in November 1905. In late 1906, Rasputin began acting as a healer for Alexei, the Tsar and his wife Alexandra's only son, who suffered from hemophilia. At court, he was a divisive figure, seen by some Russians as a mystic, visionary, and prophet, and by others as a religious charlatan. The high point of Rasputin's power was in 1915, when Nicholas II left St Petersburg to oversee Russian armies fighting World War I, increasing both Alexandra and Rasputin's influence. As Russian defeats in the war mounted, however, both Rasputin and Alexandra became increasingly unpopular. In the early morning of 30 December [O.S. 17 December] 1916, Rasputin was assassinated by a group of conservative noblemen who opposed his influence over Alexandra and the Tsar. Historians often suggest that Rasputin's terrible reputation helped discredit the tsarist government, and thus helped precipitate the overthrow of the Romanov dynasty, which happened a few weeks after he was assassinated. Very little about Rasputin's life and influence is certain, however, as accounts have often been based on hearsay, rumor, and legend.

Pavel Trofimovich Morozov (Russian: Па́вел Трофи́мович Моро́зов; 14 November 1918 - 3 September 1932), better known by the diminutive Pavlik

A Soviet youth praised by the Soviet press as a martyr. His story, dated to 1932, is that of a 13-year-old boy who denounced his father to the authorities and was in turn killed by his family. His story was a subject of reading, songs, plays, a symphonic poem, a full-length operaand six biographies. The cult had a huge impact on the moral norms of generations of children, who were encouraged to inform on their parents.[1] There is very little original evidence related to the story, much of it hearsay provided by second-hand witnesses. According to modern research, the story (denunciation, trial) is most likely false, although Pavlik was a real child who was killed. Morozov's story was the basis of Bezhin Meadow, an unreleased film from 1937 that was directed by Sergei Eisenstein, as well as the 2015 Latvian film Dawn.

The Battle of the Marne (French: Première bataille de la Marne, also known as the Miracle of the Marne, Le Miracle de la Marne).

A World War I battle fought from 6-10 September 1914.[1] It resulted in an Allied victory against the German armies in the west. The battle was the culmination of the German advance into France and pursuit of the Allied armies which followed the Battle of the Frontiers in August and had reached the eastern outskirts of Paris. A counter-attack by six French armies and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) along the Marne River forced the Imperial German Army to retreat northwest, leading to the First Battle of the Aisne and the Race to the Sea. The battle was a victory for the Allied Powers but led to four years of trench warfare stalemate on the Western Front.

Wilsonianism or Wilsonian

A certain type of ideologicalperspective on foreign policy. The term comes from the ideology of United States PresidentWoodrow Wilson and his famous Fourteen Points that he believed would help create world peace if implemented. Wilsonianism is a form of liberal internationalism.[1] Wilson learned from American history and applied that knowledge to his international relations. Wilson's principles expressed the values of democracy and capitalism. Principles -Common principles that are often associated with "Wilsonianism" include: -Emphasis on self-determination of peoples;[3][4] -Advocacy of the spread of democracy;[5] -Advocacy of the spread of capitalism;[6] -Opposition to isolationism and non-interventionism;[7] -In favor of intervention.[8][9]

The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (Russian: Петроградский Совет рабочих и солдатских депутатов, Petrogradskiy soviet rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov)

A city council of Petrograd (Saint Petersburg), the capital of the Russian Empire. For brevity, it is usually called the Petrograd Soviet (Russian: Петроградский совет, Petrogradskiy soviet). The soviet was established in March 1917 after the February Revolution as a representative body of the city's workers and soldiers, while the city already had its well established city council, the Saint Petersburg City Duma (Central Duma). During the revolutionary days, the council tried to extend its jurisdiction nationwide as a rival power center to the Provisional Government, creating what in Soviet historiography is known as the Dvoyevlastiye (Dual power). Its committees were key components during the Russian Revolution and some of them led the armed revolt of the October Revolution.

The German Revolution or November Revolution (German: Novemberrevolution)

A civil conflict in the German Empire at the end of the First World War that resulted in the replacement of the German federalconstitutional monarchy with a democratic parliamentary republic that later became known as the Weimar Republic. The revolutionary period lasted from November 1918 until the adoption in August 1919 of the Weimar Constitution. The causes of the revolution were the extreme burdens suffered by the population during the four years of war, the strong impact of the defeat on the German Empire and the social tensions between the general population and the elite of aristocrats and bourgeoisie who held power and had just lost the war. The roots of the revolution lay in the German Empire's defeat in the First World War and the social tensions that came to a head shortly thereafter. The first acts of revolution were triggered by the policies of the German Supreme Command of the Army and its lack of coordination with the Naval Command. In the face of defeat, the Naval Command insisted on trying to precipitate a climactic battle with the British Royal Navy by means of its naval order of 24 October 1918. The battle never took place. Instead of obeying their orders to begin preparations to fight the British, German sailors led a revolt in the naval ports of Wilhelmshaven on 29 October 1918, followed by the Kiel mutiny in the first days of November. These disturbances spread the spirit of civil unrest across Germany and ultimately led to the proclamation of a republic on 9 November 1918. Shortly thereafter, Emperor Wilhelm II abdicated his throne and fled the country. The revolutionaries, inspired by socialist ideas, did not hand over power to Soviet-style councils as the Bolsheviks had done in Russia, because the leadership of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) opposed their creation. The SPD opted instead for a national assembly that would form the basis for a parliamentary system of government.[1] Fearing an all-out civil war in Germany between militant workers and reactionary conservatives, the SPD did not plan to strip the old German upper classes completely of their power and privileges. Instead, it sought to integrate them into the new social democratic system. In this endeavour, SPD leftists sought an alliance with the German Supreme Command. This allowed the army and the Freikorps(nationalist militias) to quell the communist Spartacist uprising of 4-15 January 1919 by force. The same alliance of political forces succeeded in suppressing uprisings of the left in other parts of Germany, with the result that the country was completely pacified by late 1919. Elections for the new Weimar National Assembly were held on 19 January 1919. The revolution ended on 11 August 1919, when the Weimar Constitution was adopted.

Sergei Mironovich Kirov[a] (born Kostrikov;[b] 27 March [O.S. 15 March] 1886 - 1 December 1934)

A close, personal friend to Joseph Stalin, and a prominent early Bolshevik leader in the Soviet Union. Kirov rose through the Communist Party ranks to become head of the party organisation in Leningrad. On 1 December 1934, Kirov was shot and killed by a gunman at his offices in the Smolny Institute. There is a widespread belief that Joseph Stalin and elements of the NKVD were behind Kirov's assassination, but evidence for this claim remains lacking.[1] Kirov's death was later used as a pretext for Stalin's escalation of repression against dissident elements of the Party, and disarming of the Party (every Party member was issued a revolver up to that time, when Stalin had them all taken away), culminating in the Great Purge of the late 1930s in which many of the Old Bolsheviks were arrested, expelled from the party, and executed.[2]Complicity in Kirov's assassination was a common charge to which the accused confessed in the show trials of the period. The cities of Kirov, Kirovohrad, Kirovakan, and Kirovabad, as well as a few Kirovsks, were renamed in Kirov's honour after his assassination. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kirovakan and Kirovabad returned to their original names: Vanadzor and Ganja, respectively. In order to comply with decommunisation laws, Kirovohrad was renamed in July 2016 by the Ukrainian parliament to Kropyvnytskyi.[3]

Otto Eduard Leopold, Prince of Bismarck, Duke of Lauenburg (Born von Bismarck-Schönhausen; German: Otto Eduard Leopold Fürst[3]von Bismarck, Herzog zu Lauenburg; 1 April 1815 - 30 July 1898), known as Otto von Bismarck (German: [ˈɔtoː fɔn ˈbɪsmark]).

A conservative Prussian statesman who dominated German and European affairs from the 1860s until 1890 and was the first Chancellor of the German Empire between 1871 and 1890. In 1862, King Wilhelm I appointed Bismarck as Minister President of Prussia, a position he would hold until 1890, with the exception of a short break in 1873. He provoked three short, decisive wars against Denmark, Austria, and France. Following the victory against Austria, he abolished the supranational German Confederation and instead formed the North German Confederation as the first German national state in 1867, leading it as Federal Chancellor. This aligned the smaller North German states behind Prussia. Later receiving the support of the independent South German states in the Confederation's defeat of France, he formed the German Empire in 1871, unifying Germany with himself as Imperial Chancellor, while retaining control of Prussia at the same time. The new German nation excluded Austria, which had been Prussia's main opponent for predominance among the German states. With that accomplished by 1871, he skillfully used balance of powerdiplomacy to maintain Germany's position in a Europe which, despite many disputes and war scares, remained at peace. For historian Eric Hobsbawm, it was Bismarck who "remained undisputed world champion at the game of multilateral diplomatic chess for almost twenty years after 1871, [and] devoted himself exclusively, and successfully, to maintaining peace between the powers".[4] However, his annexation of Alsace-Lorraine gave new fuel to French nationalism and promoted Germanophobia in France.[5] This helped set the stage for the First World War. Bismarck's diplomacy of realpolitik and powerful rule at home gained him the nickname the "Iron Chancellor". German unification and its rapid economic growth was the foundation to his foreign policy. He disliked colonialism but reluctantly built an overseas empire when it was demanded by both elite and mass opinion. Juggling a very complex interlocking series of conferences, negotiations and alliances, he used his diplomatic skills to maintain Germany's position and used the balance of power to keep Europe at peace in the 1870s and 1880s. A master of complex politics at home, Bismarck created the first welfare state in the modern world, with the goal of gaining working class support that might otherwise go to his Socialist enemies.[6] In the 1870s, he allied himself with the Liberals (who were low-tariff and anti-Catholic) and fought the Catholic Church in what was called the Kulturkampf("culture struggle"). He lost that battle as the Catholics responded by forming a powerful Centre party and using universal male suffrage to gain a bloc of seats. Bismarck then reversed himself, ended the Kulturkampf, broke with the Liberals, imposed protective tariffs, and formed a political alliance with the Centre Party to fight the Socialists. A devout Lutheran, he was loyal to his king, who argued with Bismarck but in the end supported him against the advice of his wife and his heir. While the Reichstag, Germany's parliament, was elected by universal male suffrage, it did not have much control of government policy. Bismarck distrusted democracy and ruled through a strong, well-trained bureaucracy with power in the hands of a traditional Junker elite that consisted of the landed nobility in eastern Prussia. Under Wilhelm I, Bismarck largely controlled domestic and foreign affairs, until he was removed by the young Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1890, at the age of seventy-five. Bismarck - a Junker himself - was strong-willed, outspoken and overbearing, but he could also be polite, charming and witty. Occasionally he displayed a violent temper, and he kept his power by melodramatically threatening resignation time and again, which cowed Wilhelm I. He possessed not only a long-term national and international vision but also the short-term ability to juggle complex developments. As the leader of what historians call "revolutionary conservatism",[7]Bismarck became a hero to German nationalists; they built many monuments honoring the founder of the new Reich. Many historians praise him as a visionary who was instrumental in uniting Germany and, once that had been accomplished, kept the peace in Europe through adroit diplomacy.

Austria-Hungary, often referred to as the Austro-Hungarian Empire or the Dual Monarchy

A constitutional monarchy in Central and Eastern Europe between 1867 and 1918. It was formed when the Austrian Empire adopted a new constitution, as a result Austria (Cisleithania) and Hungary (Transleithania) were placed on equal footing. It dissolved into several new states at the end of the First World War. The union was established by the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 on 30 March 1867 in the aftermath of the Austro-Prussian War. It consisted of two monarchies (Austria and Hungary), and one autonomous region: the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia under the Hungarian crown, which negotiated the Croatian-Hungarian Settlement in 1868. It was ruled by the House of Habsburg, and constituted the last phase in the constitutional evolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Following the 1867 reforms, the Austrian and Hungarian states were co-equal in power. Foreign and military affairs came under joint oversight, but all other governmental faculties were divided between respective states. Austria-Hungary was a multinational state and one of Europe's major powers at the time. Austria-Hungary was geographically the second-largest country in Europe after the Russian Empire, at 621,538 km2 (239,977 sq mi),[7] and the third-most populous (after Russia and the German Empire). The Empire built up the fourth-largest machine building industry of the world, after the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom.[8] Austria-Hungary also became the world's third largest manufacturer and exporter of electric home appliances, electric industrial appliances and power generation apparatus for power plants, after the United States and the German Empire.[9][10] After 1878, Bosnia and Herzegovina was under Austro-Hungarian military and civilian rule[11] until it was fully annexed in 1908, provoking the Bosnian crisis among the other powers.[12] The northern part of the Ottoman Sanjak of Novi Pazar was also under de facto joint occupation during that period but the Austro-Hungarian army withdrew as part of their annexation of Bosnia.[13] The annexation of Bosnia also led to Islam being recognized as an official state religion due to Bosnia's Muslimpopulation.[14] Austria-Hungary was one of the Central Powers in World War I which started when it declared war on the Kingdom of Serbia on 28 July 1914. It was already effectively dissolved by the time the military authorities signed the armistice of Villa Giusti on 3 November 1918. The Kingdom of Hungary and the First Austrian Republic were treated as its successors de jure, whereas the independence of the West Slavs and South Slavs of the Empire as the First Czechoslovak Republic, the Second Polish Republic and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, respectively, and most of the territorial demands of the Kingdom of Romania were also recognized by the victorious powers in 1920.

The German Center Party (German: Deutsche Zentrumspartei or just Zentrum)

A lay Catholic political party in Germany, primarily influential during the Kaiserreich and the Weimar Republic. In English it is often called the Catholic Centre Party. Formed in 1870, it successfully battled the Kulturkampf which Chancellor Otto von Bismarck launched in Prussia to reduce the power of the Catholic Church. It soon won a quarter of the seats in the Reichstag (Imperial Parliament), and its middle position on most issues allowed it to play a decisive role in the formation of majorities.[1] In the early days of the Weimar Republic, the Centre Party was the second-largest party in the Reichstag. After the Reichstag Fire in early 1933, the Centre Party was one of the ones who voted for the Enabling Act, which granted dictatorial powers to Adolf Hitler. By this vote, the Centre Party effectively destroyed itself, as the Nazi Party became the only legally permitted party in the country shortly thereafter. After World War II, the party was refounded, but could not rise again to its former importance, as most of its members joined the new Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The Centre Party was represented in the German parliament until 1957. It exists as a marginal party, mainly based in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia.

Operation Michael

A major German military offensive during the First World War that began the Spring Offensive on 21 March 1918. It was launched from the Hindenburg Line, in the vicinity of Saint-Quentin, France. Its goal was to break through the Allied (Entente) lines and advance in a north-westerly direction to seize the Channel Ports, which supplied the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and to drive the BEF into the sea. Two days later General Erich Ludendorff, the chief of the German General Staff, adjusted his plan and pushed for an offensive due west, along the whole of the British front north of the River Somme. This was designed to first separate the French and British Armies before continuing with the original concept of pushing the BEF into the sea. The offensive ended at Villers-Bretonneux, to the east of the Allied communications centre at Amiens, where the Allies managed to halt the German advance; the German Army had suffered many casualties and was unable to maintain supplies to the advancing troops. Much of the ground fought over was the wilderness left by the Battle of the Sommein 1916. The action was therefore officially named by the British Battles Nomenclature Committee as The First Battles of the Somme, 1918, whilst the French call it the Second Battle of Picardy (2ème Bataille de Picardie). The failure of the offensive marked the beginning of the end of the First World War for Germany. The arrival in France of large reinforcements from the United States replaced Entente casualties but the German Army was unable to recover from its losses before these reinforcements took the field. Operation Michael failed to achieve its objectives and the German advance was reversed during the Second Battle of the Somme, 1918 (21 August - 3 September) in the Allied Hundred Days Offensive.[a]

The Russian Civil War (Russian: Гражда́нская война́ в Росси́и, tr.Grazhdanskaya voyna v Rossii; 7 November 1917 - 25 October 1922)

A multi-party civil war in the former Russian Empireimmediately after the two Russian Revolutions of 1917, as many factions vied to determine Russia's political future. The two largest combatant groups were the Red Army, fighting for the Bolshevik form of socialism led by Vladimir Lenin, and the loosely allied forces known as the White Army, which included diverse interests favouring political monarchism, economic capitalism and alternative forms of socialism, each with democratic and anti-democratic variants. In addition, rival militant socialists and non-ideological Green armies fought against both the Bolsheviks and the Whites. Eight foreign nations intervened against the Red Army, notably the former Allied military forces from the World War and the pro-German armies.[6] The Red Army eventually defeated the White Armed Forces of South Russia in Ukraine and the army led by Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak to the east in Siberia in 1919. The remains of the White forces commanded by Pyotr Nikolayevich Wrangel were beaten in Crimea and evacuated in late 1920. Lesser battles of the war continued on the periphery for two more years, and minor skirmishes with the remnants of the White forces in the Far East continued well into 1923. The war ended in 1923 in the sense that Bolshevik communist control of the newly formed Soviet Union was now assured, although armed national resistance in Central Asia was not completely crushed until 1934. There were an estimated 7,000,000-12,000,000 casualties during the war, mostly civilians. The Russian Civil War has been described by some as the greatest national catastrophe that Europe had yet seen.[7] Many pro-independence movements emerged after the break-up of the Russian Empire and fought in the war.[8] Several parts of the former Russian Empire—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—were established as sovereign states, with their own civil wars and wars of independence. The rest of the former Russian Empire was consolidated into the Soviet Union shortly afterwards.

The Russian Civil War (Russian: Гражда́нская война́ в Росси́и, tr.Grazhdanskaya voyna v Rossii; 7 November 1917 - 25 October 1922)

A multi-party civil war in the former Russian Empireimmediately after the two Russian Revolutions of 1917, as many factions vied to determine Russia's political future. The two largest combatant groups were the Red Army, fighting for the Bolshevik form of socialism led by Vladimir Lenin, and the loosely allied forces known as the White Army, which included diverse interests favouring political monarchism, economic capitalism and alternative forms of socialism, each with democratic and anti-democratic variants. In addition, rival militant socialists and non-ideological Green armies fought against both the Bolsheviks and the Whites. Eight foreign nations intervened against the Red Army, notably the former Allied military forces from the World War and the pro-German armies.[6] The Red Army eventually defeated the White Armed Forces of South Russia in Ukraine and the army led by Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak to the east in Siberia in 1919. The remains of the White forces commanded by Pyotr Nikolayevich Wrangel were beaten in Crimea and evacuated in late 1920. Lesser battles of the war continued on the periphery for two more years, and minor skirmishes with the remnants of the White forces in the Far Eastcontinued well into 1923. The war ended in 1923 in the sense that Bolshevik communist control of the newly formed Soviet Union was now assured, although armed national resistance in Central Asia was not completely crushed until 1934. There were an estimated 7,000,000-12,000,000 casualties during the war, mostly civilians. The Russian Civil War has been described by some as the greatest national catastrophe that Europe had yet seen.[7] Many pro-independence movements emerged after the break-up of the Russian Empire and fought in the war.[8] Several parts of the former Russian Empire—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—were established as sovereign states, with their own civil wars and wars of independence. The rest of the former Russian Empire was consolidated into the Soviet Union shortly afterwards.

"The Great Game"

A political and diplomatic confrontation that existed for most of the 19th century between the British Empire and the Russian Empire over Afghanistan and neighbouring territories in Central and Southern Asia. Russia was fearful of British commercial and military inroads into Central Asia, and Britain was fearful of Russia adding "the jewel in the crown", India, to the vast empire that Russia was building in Asia. This resulted in an atmosphere of distrust and the constant threat of war between the two empires.[1][2][3] Britain made it a high priority to protect all the approaches to India, and the "great game" is primarily how the British did this in terms of a possible Russian threat. Historians with access to the archives have concluded that Russia had no plans involving India, as the Russians repeatedly stated.[4] The Great Game began on 12 January 1830 when Lord Ellenborough, the President of the Board of Control for India, tasked Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General, to establish a new trade route to the Emirate of Bukhara.[2][3][5] Britain intended to gain control over the Emirate of Afghanistan and make it a protectorate, and to use the Ottoman Empire, the Persian Empire, the Khanate of Khiva, and the Emirate of Bukhara as buffer states between both empires. This would protect India and also key British sea trade routes by stopping Russia from gaining a port on the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean.[2][3] Russia proposed Afghanistan as the neutral zone.[6] The results included the failed First Anglo-Afghan War of 1838, the First Anglo-Sikh War of 1845, the Second Anglo-Sikh Warof 1848, the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878, and the annexation of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand by Russia. Historians consider the end of the Great Game to be 10 September 1895 signing of the Pamir Boundary Commission protocols,[7] when the border between Afghanistan and the Russian empire was defined.[8][9][10][11]:p14

The 1918 Spring Offensive, or Kaiserschlacht ("Kaiser's Battle"), also known as the Ludendorff Offensive?

A series of German attacks along the Western Frontduring the First World War, beginning on 21 March 1918, which marked the deepest advances by either side since 1914. The Germans had realised that their only remaining chance of victory was to defeat the Allies before the overwhelming human and matériel resources of the United States could be fully deployed. They also had the temporary advantage in numbers afforded by the nearly 50 divisions which had been freed by the Russian withdrawal from the war by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. There were four German offensives, codenamed Michael, Georgette, Gneisenau, and Blücher-Yorck. Michael was the main attack, which was intended to break through the Allied lines, outflank the British forces (which held the front from the Somme River to the English Channel) and defeat the British Army. Once that was achieved, it was hoped that the French would seek armistice terms. The other offensives were subsidiary to Michael and were designed to divert Allied forces from the main offensive effort on the Somme. No clear objective was established before the start of the offensives and once the operations were underway, the targets of the attacks were constantly changed according to the battlefield (tactical) situation. The Allies concentrated their main forces in the essential areas (the approaches to the Channel Ports and the rail junction of Amiens), leaving strategically worthless ground, which had been devastated by years of conflict, lightly defended. The Germans were unable to move supplies and reinforcements fast enough to maintain their advance. The fast-moving stormtroopers leading the attack could not carry enough food and ammunition to sustain themselves for long, and all the German offensives petered out, partly for lack of supplies. By late April 1918, the danger of a German breakthrough had passed. The German Army had suffered heavy casualties and now occupied ground of dubious value, which would prove impossible to hold with such depleted units. In August 1918, the Allies began a counteroffensive with the support of 1-2 million fresh American troops and using improved artillery techniques and operational methods. This Hundred Days Offensive resulted in the Germans retreating or being driven from all of the ground that they had taken in the Spring Offensive, the collapse of the Hindenburg Line, and the capitulation of the German Empire that November.

The Moscow Trials

A series of show trials held in the Soviet Union at the instigation of Joseph Stalin between 1936 and 1938 against so-called Trotskyists and members of Right Opposition of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. There were three Moscow Trials: the Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center (Zinoviev-Kamenev Trial, aka "Trial of the Sixteen," 1936), the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center (Pyatakov-Radek Trial, 1937), and the Case of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" (Bukharin-Rykov Trial, aka "Trial of the Twenty-One," 1938). The defendants of these were Old Bolshevik party leaders and top officials of the Soviet secret police. Most defendants were charged under Article 58 of the RSFSR Penal Code with conspiring with the western powers to assassinate Stalin and other Soviet leaders, dismember the Soviet Union, and restore capitalism. The Moscow Trials led to the execution of many of the defendants. They are generally seen as part of Stalin's Great Purge, an attempt to rid the party of current or prior oppositionists, especially but not exclusively Trotskyists, and any leading Bolshevik cadre from the time of the Russian Revolution or earlier, who might even potentially become a figurehead for the growing discontent in the Soviet populace resulting from Stalin's mismanagement of the economy.[citation needed]Stalin's hasty industrialisation during the period of the First Five Year Plan and the brutality of the forced collectivisation of agriculture had led to an acute economic and political crisis in 1928-33, a part of the global problem known as the Great Depression, and to enormous suffering on the part of the Soviet workers and peasants. Stalin was acutely conscious of this fact and took steps to prevent it taking the form of an opposition inside the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to his increasingly autocratic rule.[1]

The Russian famine of 1921-22, also known as the Povolzhye famine

A severe famine in Russia which began early in the spring of 1921 and lasted through 1922. This famine killed an estimated 5 million people, primarily affecting the Volga and Ural River regions,[1][2]and peasants resorted to cannibalism.[3][4][5] The famine resulted from combined effects of economic disturbance through the disturbances of the Russian Revolution—and Russian Civil War with its policy of War Communism, especially prodrazvyorstka, exacerbated by rail systems that could not distribute food efficiently. One of Russia's intermittent droughts in 1921 aggravated the situation to a national catastrophe. Hunger was so severe that it was likely seed-grain would be eaten rather than sown. At one point relief agencies had to give grain to railroad staff to get their supplies moved.

The Treaty of London of 1839, also called the First Treaty of London, the Convention of 1839, the Treaty of Separation, the Quintuple Treaty of 1839, or the Treaty of the XXIV articles,

A treaty signed on 19 April 1839 between the Concert of Europe, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Kingdom of Belgium. It was a direct follow-up to the 1831 Treaty of the XVIII Articles which the Netherlands had refused to sign, and the result of negotiations at the London Conference of 1838-1839.[1] Under the treaty, the European powers recognized and guaranteed the independence and neutrality of Belgium and established the full independence of the German-speaking part of Luxembourg. Article VII required Belgium to remain perpetually neutral, and by implication committed the signatory powers to guard that neutrality in the event of invasion.

According to Professor Lanthier, why did the wrod "soviet" included in the Soviet Constitution?

According to the revolutionary ideals, the "soviets", the democratically elected grassroots councils of soldiers and workers that arose in the Russian Revolution, were necessary for the Bolsheviks to seize and maintain power. Thus, in the Constitution, the idea was that these soviets, in the COngress of SOviets, were being elected by the people, and would govern the people. However, the reality was that the Communist Party maintained complete control of the soviets. Only members of the Communist Party could be in those chambers. This meant that the USSR was in reality run by the Communist Party Politburo.

What happened after the Battle of the Marne?

After the battle of the Marne the German Armies retreated for up to 90 kilometres (56 mi) and lost 11,717 prisoners, 30 field guns and 100 machine-guns to the French and 3,500 prisoners to the British before reaching the Aisne. The German retreat ended their hope of pushing the French beyond the Verdun-Marne-Paris line and winning a quick victory. Following the battle and the failures by both sides to turn the opponent's northern flank during the Race to the Sea, the war of movement ended with the Germans and the Allied Powers facing each other across a stationary front line. Both sides were faced with the prospect of costly siege warfare operations if they chose to continue an offensive strategy in France.

What was Walter Rathenau's career after WWI?

After the war Rathenau was brought into the government by Finance Minister Joseph Wirth in March 1920 as a member of the Socialization Committee and subsequently attended the Spa Conference on Disarmament as a technical assistant (July 1920). When Wirth became chancellor in May 1921, he appointed Rathenau to the Ministry of Reconstruction. Here Rathenau organized an extensive program of rationalization for German industry and launched his new "foreign policy of fulfillment," that is, reconciliation with the victorious powers by negotiating on the basis of the established peace treaty (Wiesbaden, October 1921; Cannes, January 1922). He became foreign minister in January 1922. The most memorable event of his brief tenure of office was a pact of peace with the Soviets, the Treaty of Rapallo, signed unexpectedly under the strain of failing reparations talks at the Genoa Conference in April 1922. The hope for international reconciliation was shattered, however, by the virulent attacks of a chauvinistic, anti-Semitic, and antirepublican right, which climaxed in the assassination of Rathenau by two young nationalists in Berlin on June 24, 1922.

How did the web of alliances contribute to World War i?

Although general narratives of the war tend to emphasize the importance of Alliances in binding the major powers to act in the event of a crisis such as the July Crisis, historians like Margaret MacMillan warn against the argument that alliances forced the great powers to act as they did: "What we tend to think of as fixed alliances before the First World War were nothing of the sort. They were much more loose, much more porous, much more capable of change."[98] The most important alliances in Europe required participants to agree to collective defence if attacked. Some represented formal alliances, but the Triple Entente represented only a frame of mind: -German-Austrian treaty (1879) or Dual Alliance -The Franco-Russian Alliance (1894) -The addition of Italy to the Germany and Austrian alliance in 1882, forming the "Triple Alliance". -Treaty of London, 1839, guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium There are three notable exceptions that demonstrate that alliances did not in themselves force the great powers to act: -The "Entente Cordiale" between Britain and France in 1905 included a secret agreement that left the northern coast of France and the Channel to be defended by the British navy, and the separate "entente" between Britain and Russia (1907) that formed the so-called Triple Entente. However, the Triple Entente did not in fact force Britain to mobilise because it was not a military treaty. -Moreover, general narratives of the war regularly misstate that Russia was allied to Serbia. Clive Ponting noted: "Russia had no treaty of alliance with Serbia and was under no obligation to support it diplomatically, let alone go to its defence".[99] -Italy, despite being part of the Triple Alliance, did not enter the war to defend its alliance partners.

The Enabling Act (German: Ermächtigungsgesetz) of 1933, formally titled Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich ("Law to Remedy the Distress of People and Reich")

An amendment passed on 23 March 1933 to the Weimar Constitution[citation needed] that gave the German Cabinet — in effect, Chancellor Adolf Hitler — the power to enact laws without the involvement of the Reichstag. The Enabling Act gave Hitler plenary powers and followed on the heels of the Reichstag Fire Decree, which had abolished most civil liberties and transferred state powers to the Reich government. The combined effect of the two laws was to transform Hitler's government into a legal dictatorship. The act passed in both the Reichstag and Reichsrat on 23 March 1933,[2][3][4] and was signed by PresidentPaul von Hindenburg later that day. The act stated that it was to last four years unless renewed by the Reichstag , which occurred twice. The law was enacted by the Reichstag (meeting at the Kroll Opera House), where non-Nazi members were surrounded and threatened by members of the SA and the SS. The Communists had already been repressed and were not allowed to be present or to vote, and some Social Democrats were kept away as well. In the end most of those present voted for the act, except for the Social Democrats, who voted against it.[5]

The Reichstag fire (German: Reichstagsbrand)

An arson attack on the Reichstag building, home of the German parliament in Berlin, on Monday 27 February 1933, precisely four weeks after Adolf Hitler was sworn in as Chancellor of Germany. Hitler's government stated that Marinus van der Lubbe, a Dutch council communist, was found near the building, and they attributed the fire to communist agitators in general—though a German court decided later that year that van der Lubbe had acted alone, as he claimed. After the fire, the Reichstag Fire Decree was passed. The Nazi Party used the fire as a pretext that communists were plotting against the German government, and the event is considered pivotal in the establishment of Nazi Germany. The term "Reichstag fire" has come to refer to false flag actions facilitated by an authority to promote their own interests through popular approval of retribution or retraction of civil rights.

The New Economic Policy (NEP) (Russian: новая экономическая политика, novaya ekonomicheskaya politika)

An economic policy of Soviet Russia proposed by Vladimir Lenin in 1921 as a temporary expedient. Lenin characterized the NEP in 1922 as an economic system that would include "a free market and capitalism, both subject to state control", while socialized state enterprises would operate on "a profit basis".[1] The NEP represented a more market-oriented economic policy (deemed necessary after the Russian Civil War of 1918 to 1922) to foster the economy of the country, which had suffered severely since 1914. The Soviet authorities partially revoked the complete nationalization of industry (established during the period of War Communism of 1918 to 1921) and introduced a system of mixed economy which allowed private individuals to own small enterprises,[2] while the state continued to control banks, foreign trade, and large industries.[3] In addition, the NEP abolished prodrazvyorstka (forced grain-requisition)[2] and introduced prodnalog: a tax on farmers, payable in the form of raw agricultural product.[4] The Bolshevik government adopted the NEP in the course of the 10th Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party (March 1921) and promulgated it by a decree on 21 March 1921: "On the Replacement of Prodrazvyorstka by Prodnalog". Further decrees refined the policy. Other policies included monetary reform (1922-1924) and the attraction of foreign capital. The NEP policy created a new category of people called NEPmen (нэпманы) (nouveau riches). Joseph Stalin abolished the NEP in 1928.

How did the unification of Germany in 1871 contribute to World War I?

The unification of Germany destabilized the Congress of Vienna system that established in a balance of power after the Napoleonic Era. The rise of Germany threatened the status quo. In addition, Germany's geopolitical location in the middle of Europe made it VERy difficult to defend.

The League of Nations, abbreviated as LN or LoN, (French: Société des Nations, [sɔsjete de nasjɔ̃] abbreviated as "SDN" or "SdN" and meaning "Society of Nations")

An intergovernmental organisation founded on 10 January 1920 as a result of the Paris Peace Conference that ended the First World War. It was the first worldwide intergovernmental organisation whose principal mission was to maintain world peace.[1] Its primary goals, as stated in its Covenant, included preventing wars through collective security and disarmament and settling international disputes through negotiation and arbitration.[2] Other issues in this and related treaties included labour conditions, just treatment of native inhabitants,human and drug trafficking, the arms trade, global health, prisoners of war, and protection of minorities in Europe.[3] At its greatest extent from 28 September 1934 to 23 February 1935, it had 58 members. The diplomatic philosophy behind the League represented a fundamental shift from the preceding hundred years. The League lacked its own armed force and depended on the victorious Great Powers of World War I(France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan were the permanent members of the executive Council) to enforce its resolutions, keep to its economic sanctions, or provide an army when needed. The Great Powers were often reluctant to do so. Sanctions could hurt League members, so they were reluctant to comply with them. During the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, when the League accused Italian soldiers of targeting Red Cross medical tents, Benito Mussolini responded that "the League is very well when sparrows shout, but no good at all when eagles fall out."[4] After some notable successes and some early failures in the 1920s, the League ultimately proved incapable of preventing aggression by the Axis powers in the 1930s. The credibility of the organization was weakened by the fact that the United States never officially joined the League and the Soviet Union joined late and was soon expelled after invading Finland.[5][6][7][8] Germany withdrew from the League, as did Japan, Italy, Spain and others. The onset of the Second World War showed that the League had failed its primary purpose, which was to prevent any future world war. The League lasted for 26 years; the United Nations (UN) replaced it after the end of the Second World War and inherited several agencies and organisations founded by the League.

The Communist International (Comintern), known also as the Third International (1919-1943)

An international organization that advocated world communism. The Comintern resolved at its Second Congress to "struggle by all available means, including armed force, for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and the creation of an international Soviet republic as a transition stage to the complete abolition of the state".[1] The Comintern had been preceded by the 1916 dissolution of the Second International. The Comintern held seven World Congresses in Moscow between 1919 and 1935. During that period, it also conducted thirteen Enlarged Plenums of its governing Executive Committee, which had much the same function as the somewhat larger and more grandiose Congresses. The Comintern was officially dissolved by Joseph Stalin in 1943 to avoid antagonizing its allies the United States and the United Kingdom.

What were some of the weaknesses of the League of Nations in terms of Collective security?

Another important weakness grew from the contradiction between the idea of collective security that formed the basis of the League and international relations between individual states.[201] The League's collective security system required nations to act, if necessary, against states they considered friendly, and in a way that might endanger their national interests, to support states for which they had no normal affinity.[201] This weakness was exposed during the Abyssinia Crisis, when Britain and France had to balance maintaining the security they had attempted to create for themselves in Europe "to defend against the enemies of internal order",[202] in which Italy's support played a pivotal role, with their obligations to Abyssinia as a member of the League.[203] On 23 June 1936, in the wake of the collapse of League efforts to restrain Italy's war against Abyssinia, the British Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, told the House of Commons that collective security had failed ultimately because of the reluctance of nearly all the nations in Europe to proceed to what I might call military sanctions ... The real reason, or the main reason, was that we discovered in the process of weeks that there was no country except the aggressor country which was ready for war ... [I]f collective action is to be a reality and not merely a thing to be talked about, it means not only that every country is to be ready for war; but must be ready to go to war at once. That is a terrible thing, but it is an essential part of collective security.[170] Ultimately, Britain and France both abandoned the concept of collective security in favour of appeasement in the face of growing German militarism under Hitler.[204] In this context, the League of Nations was also the institution where the first international debate on terrorism took place following the 1934 assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in Marseille, France, showing its conspiratorial features, many of which are detectable in the discourse of terrorism among states after 9/11.[205] American diplomatic historian Samuel Flagg Bemis originally supported the League, but after two decades changed his mind: The League of Nations has been a disappointing failure.... It has been a failure, not because the United States did not join it; but because the great powers have been unwilling to apply sanctions except where it suited their individual national interests to do so, and because Democracy, on which the original concepts of the League rested for support, has collapsed over half the world.[206]

According to Professor Lanthier, what did the government

As WWI went on, belligerent governments realized that maintaining the war-effort required large-scale economic planning. Imports, transportation, mining, distribution, etc., all came under some kind of government control and supervision. To do this, governments created massive bureaucracies to monitor all aspect of life. This was the first glimpse of what would become the modern "big government." All of a sudden, the government takes great pride in having a massive bureaucracy, with hundreds of thousands of employees, to co-ordinate and manage the war effort.

According to Lanthier, what did Hitler do after the July 1932 German federal election in the Reichstag?

At the July 1932 Elections, the Nazis became the largest party in the Reichstag, yet without a majority. Hitler withdrew support for Papen and demanded the Chancellorship. He was refused by Hindenburg.[62]

According to Professor Lanthier, what were European cities like in the dawn of the 20th century?

At the turn of the twentieth century, there were large cities that were providing middle-class people with all sorts of entertainment. There were major urban centres where there was a modern consumer society, and a leisure society for those who were fortunate enough to have the money to pay for it. There were beautiful, spatious downtown-centers, affluent cores meant for affluent people. Further away, there were the residents of the middle class. Further still, were the rural regions. However, this was before the time of the automobile, so there wasn't widespread suburban sprawl.

According to Professor Lanthier, what was Austria-Hungary's status of the Great Power?

Austria-Hungary was seen as a strange power by 1900-Europeans, an unstable amalgamation of various conflicting groups that would eventually collapse. This attitude is seen in contemporary historians. Of course, Professor Lanthier disagrees. He points out that Vienna in the 1900 showed a successful blend of various groups, a multi-cultural metropolis where the fusion of so many different groups and styles gave rise to all sorts of innovations. However, Lanthier agrees that Austria-Hungary, in term of numbers, like GDP, military strength, and so forth, was the weakest, poorest, and least economically developed of the Great Powers. Austria-Hungary's various ethnicities were a constant source of friction. There was no numerically dominant ethnic group in Austria-Hungary. While the German-speaking Austrians were the dominant in terms of political and cultural influence, they were in no way the numerically dominant group. Other groups often challenged Austrian supremacy.

According to Professor Lanthier, What was the comparative military strength of the Great Powers prior to World War I in terms of standing professional armies?

Austria-Hungary's permanent army: 450,000 men. Austria-Hungary was the smallest army. Germany: 840,000 men. The most professional army, and the best equipped. France: 540,000 men. Not as well-equipped as the Germans. Great Britain: 125,000, the British Expeditionary Force. Britain was primarily Russia: >1 million men, with a very large reserve. Remember, this is all just standing professional armies.

Why did many leaders in the 1920s view World War 1 as an accident?

Because if the whole thing was an accident, than no one is guilty, which means that everyone can just move on, and no one has to hold anyone accountability. It also encouraged a cautionary approach to foreign policy. ALso, if one is willing to concede that Germany was not entirely to blame for the war, then that meant that Germany did not need to be antagonized. This was important if one wanted to integrate Germany into the rest of Europe.

According to Lanthier, why was their the impression that women left the home to work during and after WWI?

Before, many lower-class women were working in factories already, primarily textiles. Textiles were considered low-skilled, and were thus badly paid. Heavy industry, however, was considered skilled and better paid. However, in 1914 when war broke out, the lack of men required women to SHIFT into heavy industry. In addition, many women during the war were working in jobs that were in the public eye, like driving buses, selling bus tickets in public. People in their daily lives saw women in the public doing jobs. These things created the impression that women had left the home in the millions.

What was military spending like in UK and Germany by 1917?

Both countries were all in, as they had to be. Military spending accounted for more than half of germany's national income, and for ⅓ of the UK's national income.

In geopolitical terms, what was Britain's status?

Britain's massive colonial empire spanned roughly a fifth of the globe. This empire gave Britain access to resources that was in far in excess to the other powers.

According to Lanthier, what opportunity did the Great Depression provide to Brüning?

Brüning saw this as an opportunity to get rid of the War Reparations. These Reparations were extremely unpopular. The Great Depression. Also, Compared to other nations of the time, the Weimar republic had a very advanced welfare system. However, many of the more traditional elite did not support the WElfare system, and the Great Depression saw this as an opportunity to get rid of the welfare state.

How did the Germans fair in World War I by 1918?

By September 1918, the Central Powers were exhausted from fighting, and the American forces were pouring into France at a rate of 10,000 a day. The decisive Allied counteroffensive, known as the Hundred Days Offensive, began on 8 August 1918—what Ludendorff called the "Black Day of the German army." The Allied armies advanced steadily as German defenses faltered.[13] Although German armies were still on enemy soil as the war ended, the generals, the civilian leadership—and indeed the soldiers and the people—knew all was hopeless. They started looking for scapegoats. The hunger and popular dissatisfaction with the war precipitated revolution throughout Germany. By 11 November Germany had virtually surrendered, the Kaiser and all the royal families had abdicated, and the Empire had been replaced by the Weimar Republic.

In WWI Germany, who exactly was making the key decisions for the war? Was it a civilian government, or was it the military men?

Germany became a quasi-military dictatorship. This happened when Hindenburg became chief of the General Staff in 1916. Ironically, it was the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, who thought it was a good idea to appoint Paul von Hindenburg as the commander-in-chief due to his successes in the East. Also, the presence of Hindenburg would also shore up the popularity of the government with the German people, because Hindenburg was very popular. However, what Bethmann-Hollweg did not realize was that Hindenburg and Ludendorff aimed to take control of more and more of the German government, with the aim of getting all of Germany to commit to the war.

Who was Jagow?

Gottlieb von Jagow (22 June 1863, Berlin - 11 January 1935, Potsdam) was a German diplomat. He served as the State Secretary of the German Foreign Office between January 1913 and 1916. In 1913, he was appointed Secretary of State for Germany. He played an active part in the negotiations preceding the outbreak of World War I, and was, in particular, concerned in the German relations with Austria, having been the first member of the Imperial Government in Berlin to become acquainted with the terms of the Austrian ultimatum of 18 October 1913 to Serbia, the first indication of the crisis of July 1914.[2] And yet Sir Martin Gilbert wrote "War seemed unlikely in the spring and summer of 1914".[3] The illusion of war debate began with aims of colonial annexation and supremacy in Africa. Negotiated neutrality for other states to effectively invade France. Asserted attempts to compete with royal naval seapower. On 13 July 1914 Frans Josef I was persuaded to accept the ultimatum after Serbia failed to accommodate the Austrian Note. During the July Crisis on 6 July 1914, Jagow was confident that an Austro-Serbian war would be localized, and that Russia was not yet prepared for a continental war. This belief was incorrect: the Chancellor was more sceptical, which indirectly led to the outbreak of World War I.[5] But by 29 July he was "very depressed" that Austria's Note policy of duality had hastened war.[6] After the war, Jagow attributed deeper reasons for the outbreak of war to "this damned system of alliances." He had tried before war's outbreak to persuade the Chancellor to allow a debate the Reichstag on war aims in 1916, but a veto was imposed, and a ban on all criticism of the government. Long conferences with the Chancellor and Kaiser did nothing to change his mood. He wrongly believed Britain would respect Germany's access to Rotterdam, part of the catalogue of grievances that caused the war.[7] Consequently, he was perceived as "weak" link in a weak government before being replaced.[8] But he had always been aware of the French alliance with Britain. Furthermore, he made no secret of the racial Slavic nationalism threatened from Russia; as soon as her railways were complete she would invade.[9] Jagow also indulged in taunting ally Austria as "nervous" while at the same time ignoring Serbia's pleadings for peace.[10] He attempted to lull Britain into a false sense of security, while "cut the lines" of diplomatic communication after it was too late. In fact the fortnight's delayed response for Austria's commencement of hostilities gave Jagow the opportunity to blame Russia for starting the war. On 24 July the British thought he "quite ready to fall in with suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St Petersburg"[11] But he was already ill and exhausted from his exertions, acknowledging that Serbia was the victim of bullying.[12] He was a member of the Foreign ministry team that denied a British offer of a Five Power Conference, they already had agreed Moltke's plan two days before Austria's declaration against Serbia on 28 July 1914. The following day Lichnowsky's cable telegram was ignored for hours, which Jagow argued was responsible for Bethmann-Hollweg's "misstep."[13]

What were some long-term causes of the February Revolution a.ka.. March Revolution?

Despite its occurrence at the height of World War I, the roots of the February Revolution date further back. Chief among these was Imperial Russia's failure, throughout the 19th and early 20th century, to modernise its archaic social, economic and political structures while maintaining the stability of ubiquitous devotion to an autocratic monarch. As historian Richard Pipes writes, "the incompatibility of capitalism and autocracy struck all who gave thought to the matter".[9] The first major event of the Russian Revolution was the February Revolution, which was a chaotic affair, caused by the culmination of over a century of civil and military unrest. There were many causes of this unrest of the common people towards the Tsar and aristocratic landowners. The causes can be summarized as the ongoing cruel treatment of peasants by the bourgeoisie, poor working conditions of industrial workers and the spreading of western democratic ideas by political activists. All of these causes led to a growing political and social awareness in the lower classes of Russia. Dissatisfaction of proletarians was compounded by food shortages and military failures. In 1905, Russia experienced humiliating losses in its war with Japan, then Bloody Sunday and the Revolution of 1905, in which Tsarist troops fired upon a peaceful, unarmed crowd. These events further divided Nicholas II from his people. Widespread strikes, riots and the famous mutiny on the Battleship Potemkin ensued. These conditions caused much agitation among the small working and professional classes. This tension erupted into general revolt with the 1905 Revolution, and again under the strain of war in 1917, this time with lasting consequences.

Franz Joseph I or Francis Joseph I (Franz Joseph Karl; 18 August 1830 - 21 November 1916)

Emperor of Austria along with his wife: Empress Elizabeth of Austria, Queen of Hungary. He was also King of Hungary, King of Bohemia, and monarch of many other states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, from 2 December 1848 to his death.[1] From 1 May 1850 to 24 August 1866 he was also President of the German Confederation. He was the longest-reigning Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, as well as the third-longest-reigning monarch of any country in European history, after Louis XIV of France and Johann II of Liechtenstein.[2] In December 1848, Emperor Ferdinand abdicated the throne at Olomouc, as part of Minister President Felix zu Schwarzenberg's plan to end the Revolutions of 1848 in Hungary. This allowed Ferdinand's nephew Franz Joseph to accede to the throne. Largely considered to be a reactionary, Franz Joseph spent his early reign resisting constitutionalism in his domains. The Austrian Empire was forced to cede its influence over Tuscany and most of its claim to Lombardy-Venetia to the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, following the Second Italian War of Independence in 1859 and the Third Italian War of Independence in 1866. Although Franz Joseph ceded no territory to the Kingdom of Prussia after the Austrian defeat in the Austro-Prussian War, the Peace of Prague (23 August 1866) settled the German Question in favour of Prussia, which prevented the Unification of Germany from occurring under the House of Habsburg.[3] Franz Joseph was troubled by nationalism during his entire reign. He concluded the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which granted greater autonomy to Hungaryand transformed the Austrian Empire into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. He ruled peacefully for the next 45 years, but personally suffered the tragedies of the execution of his brother, the Emperor Maximilian of Mexico in 1867, the suicide of his only son and heir, Crown Prince Rudolf, in 1889, and the assassination of his wife, Empress Elisabeth, in 1898. After the Austro-Prussian War, Austria-Hungary turned its attention to the Balkans, which was a hotspot of international tension because of conflicting interests with the Russian Empire. The Bosnian Crisis was a result of Franz Joseph's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, which had been occupied by his troops since the Congress of Berlin (1878). On 28 June 1914, the assassination of his nephew, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, in Sarajevo resulted in Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against the Kingdom of Serbia, which was Russia's ally. That activated a system of alliances which resulted in World War I. Franz Joseph died on 21 November 1916, after ruling his domains for almost 68 years as one of the longest-reigning monarchs in modern history. He was succeeded by his grandnephew Charles.

What are the estimates of Cheka executions?

Estimates on Cheka executions vary widely. The lowest figures (disputed below) are provided by Dzerzhinsky's lieutenant Martyn Latsis, limited to RSFSR over the period 1918-1920: For the period 1918 - July 1919, covering only twenty provinces of central Russia: In 1918: 6,300; in 1919 (up to July): 2,089; Total: 8,389 For the whole period 1918-19: In 1918: 6,185; in 1919: 3,456; Total: 9,641 For the whole period 1918-20: In January-June 1918: 22; in July-December 1918: more than 6,000; in 1918-20: 12,733. Experts generally agree these semi-official figures are vastly understated.[25]Pioneering historian of the Red Terror Sergei Melgunov claims that this was done deliberately in an attempt to demonstrate the government's humanity. For example, he refutes the claim made by Latsis that only 22 executions were carried out in the first six months of the Cheka's existence by providing evidence that the true number was 884 executions.[26] W. H. Chamberlin claims, "It is simply impossible to believe that the Cheka only put to death 12,733 people in all of Russia up to the end of the civil war."[27]Donald Rayfield concurs, noting that, "Plausible evidence reveals that the actual numbers . . . vastly exceeded the official figures."[28] Chamberlin provides the "reasonable and probably moderate" estimate of 50,000,[27] while others provide estimates ranging up to 500,000.[29][30] Several scholars put the number of executions at about 250,000.[31][32] Some believe it is possible more people were murdered by the Cheka than died in battle.[33] Historian James Ryan gives a modest estimate of 28,000 executions per year from December 1917 to February 1922.[34] Lenin himself seemed unfazed by the killings. On 12 January 1920, while addressing trade union leaders, he said: "We did not hesitate to shoot thousands of people, and we shall not hesitate, and we shall save the country."[35]. On 14 May 1921, the Politburo, chaired by Lenin, passed a motion "broadening the rights of the [Cheka] in relation to the use of the [death penalty]."[36]

How did the Reevaluation of the hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic in the 1920s?

Eventually, some debts were reinstated to compensate creditors partially for the catastrophic reduction in the value of debts that had been quoted in paper marks before the hyperinflation. A decree of 1925 reinstated some mortgages at 25% of face value in the new currency, effectively 25,000,000,000 times their value in the old paper marks, if they had been held for at least five years. Similarly, some government bonds were reinstated at 2.5% of face value, to be paid after reparations were paid.[23] Mortgage debt was reinstated at much higher rates than government bonds were. The reinstatement of some debts and a resumption of effective taxation in a still-devastated economy triggered a wave of corporate bankruptcies. One of the important issues of the stabilization of a hyperinflation is the revaluation. The term normally refers to the raising of the exchange rate of one national currency against other currencies. As well, it can mean revalorization, the restoration of the value of a currency depreciated by inflation. The German government had the choice of a revaluation law to finish the hyperinflation quickly or of allowing sprawling and the political and violent disturbances on the streets. The government argued in detail that the interests of creditors and debtors had to be fair and balanced. Neither the living standard price index nor the share price index was judged as relevant. The calculation of the conversion relation was considerably judged to the dollar index as well as to the wholesale price index. In principle, the German government followed the line of market-oriented reasoning that the dollar index and the wholesale price index would roughly indicate the true price level in general over the period of high inflation and hyperinflation. In addition, the revaluation was bound on the exchange rate mark and United States dollar to obtain the value of the Goldmark.[24] Finally, the Law on the Revaluation of Mortgages and other Claims of 16 July 1925 (Gesetz über die Aufwertung von Hypotheken und anderen Ansprüchen or Aufwertungsgesetze) included only the ratio of the paper mark to the gold mark for the period from January 1, 1918, to November 30, 1923, and the following days.[25] The galloping inflation thus caused the end of a principle, "a mark is worth a mark", which had been recognized, the nominal value principle.[26] The law was challenged in the Supreme Court of the German Reich (Reichsgericht), but its 5th Senate ruled, on November 4, 1925, that the law was constitutional, even according to the Bill of Rights and Duties of Germans (Articles 109, 134, 152 and 153 of the Constitution).[27][28][29] The case set a precedent for judicial review in German jurisprudence.[30]

July 1932 German election

Federal elections were held in Germany (Weimar Republic) on 31 July 1932, following the premature dissolution of the Reichstag. They saw great gains by the Nazi Party, which for the first time became the largest party in parliament but without winning a majority. Since 1929, Germany had been suffering from the Great Depression as unemployment rose from 8.5% to nearly 30% between 1929 and 1932,[1] while industrial production inside Germany dropped roughly 42%.[1] In 1930, the governing grand coalition of the pro-republican parties (the Social Democrats, Centre Party and the two liberal parties) had broken apart. Hindenburg had then appointed a minority government headed by the Centre Party's Heinrich Brüning that could govern only via Hindenburg's emergency powers. Shortly afterwards, in the 1930 elections, the democratic parties lost their majority in the Reichstag, making any parliamentary government impossible. The elections also saw Hitler's Nazi Party rise to national prominence.[1] Brüning's policies, implemented via presidential decree and tolerated by parliament, failed to solve the economic crisis while weakening the parliamentary system. In March 1932, presidential elections pitted the incumbent Hindenburg, supported by pro-democratic parties, against Hitler and communist Ernst Thälmann. Hitler gained roughly a third of the vote and was thus defeated in the second round in April by Hindenburg, who gained a narrow majority.[1] However, Hindenburg at the end of May 1932 was persuaded to dismiss Brüning as chancellor, replacing him with Franz von Papen, a renegade of the Centre Party, and a non-partisan "Cabinet of Barons". Papen's cabinet had almost no support in parliament and only three days after his appointment, when faced with the opposition, had Hindenburg dissolve the Reichstag and called for new elections, for 31 July, so that the Reichstag could not dismiss him immediately.[2] The election campaign took place under violent circumstances, as Papen lifted the token ban on the SA, the Nazi paramilitary, which Brüning had put in place during the last days of his administration. That inevitably led to clashes with the communist paramilitants. The elections resulted in great gains by the Nazi Party; with 230 seats, it was the first time that the largest party in parliament did not go on to form a government. Neither the Nazi Party nor Hindenburg had a governing majority, and the other parties refused co-operation. Neither side had a majority on its own, and no coalition could be formed to create a governing majority.[2] Thus, Papen's minority government continued, leading to another election in November.

According to Lanthier, how did the dictatorship of Hitler actually work?

First, Germany between 1933-1945 was not an over-centralized dictatorship. The dictator did have the final say. Hitler waited for people to ask him what he wanted, and then Hitler made suggestions, a vague answer. Then, Hitler would watch as his underlings scrambled to do what he wanted. What is most important here is that as the underlings scrambled, they did NOT coordinate with each other against Hitler. This means that the system was very messy and inefficient, with various bodies and organizations competing against each other, unwittingly duplicating or disrupting each other efforts. However, this system worked to Hitler's advantage. Like many dictators during the 1920s and 1930s, Hitler was never sure he could trust anyone. By having his underlings distracted and off-balance, they couldn't work against Hitler.

Why did so many Germans acquiesce to the Holocaust?

First, one can't assume that ordinary German people were more or less free and able to stop Hitler to stop persecuting jews. Nevertheless, there was some gray area. Most did not complain or resist the anti-Semitic policies of the Nazis. The reality was the Nazi's carried it out in a way that did not affect ordinary Germans. As such, it was all very abstract for a lot of Germans. As it was not affecting them directly, the population was fairly tolerant.

What were some of the issues that contributed to the Ottoman Empire's collapse?

First, the Ottoman Empire was lagging behind technologically, and was constantly playing catch up. Also, the Ottoman Empire had a very open free trade policy, and foreign competition quashed the Ottoman economic development.

WHat were some ways that the Western powers were able to pay for World War I?

First, they raised taxes. Then, they sold war bonds to their citizens. Finally, they borrowed a lot of money from the Americans.

What did Walter Rathenau do with Germany's war economy?

He held senior posts in the Raw Materials Department of the War Ministry and became chairman of AEG upon his father's death in 1915. Rathenau played a key role in convincing the War Ministry to set up the War Raw Materials Department (KRA), of which he was put in charge from August 1914 to March 1915 and established the fundamental policies and procedures. His senior staff were on loan from industry. KRA focused on raw materials threatened by the British blockade, as well as supplies from occupied Belgium and France. It set prices and regulated the distribution to vital war industries. It began the development of Ersatzkaisertum raw materials, developing supply chains to bring peace and for regime change within Germany. KRA suffered many inefficiencies caused by the complexity and selfishness encountered from commerce, industry, and the government itself.

What are some of the criticisms of Franz Fischer's thesis?

Fischer's allegations caused a deep controversy throughout the academic world, particularly in West Germany. His arguments caused so much anger that his publisher's office in Hamburg was firebombed. His works inspired other historians, such as Gerhard Ritter, to write books and articles against his war-aims thesis. Many critics claim that Fischer placed Germany outside the proper historical context. They argue that Germany was not uniquely aggressive amongst European nations of the early 20th century, a time when Social Darwinist views of struggle were popular in Europe's ruling classes. Critics also contend that in the centuries following Columbus's voyages to America, the Western European countries including Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, etc. had already acquired vast overseas colonial possessions and spheres of influence long before German unification in 1871, so it is difficult to single out Germany alone as "grasping for world power" when this was a centuries-old European tradition. It was not until after World War II that many European colonial subjects finally won their independence. Even after the conclusion on the Second World War, France refused to relinquish control over Indochina. Moreover, Fischer's timetable has also been criticized as inaccurate. Hollweg's Septemberprogramm, outlining German war aims, was not produced until after the war had begun and was still going well for Germany. At the same time, other powers had been harboring similarly grandiose plans for post-war territorial gains.[14][15][16][17][18] Since its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870), France was committed to a path of revenge against Germany and the reacquisition of Alsace and Lorraine. Russia, too, had long-standing, explicit war aims.[19]

According to Professor Lanthier, what were some severe logistical challenges that were faced by the belligerents in WWI?

Food. Water. Fuel. Communication. Fresh clothes. Medicine is big. Horses to carry things around, which is a big logistic drain in and of itself, but also these horses were also being used for agriculture. Manpower is also a big problem, as every man sent to the front means one less man working to make food or arms or other vital supplies.

According to Lanthier, what was the problem that many men had with women doing technical jobs, like creating useful ammunition?

For many people, brought up in Victorian social mores, women were associated with life and nurturing, who were to be kept away from death and war, which was the domain of men. The idea of women getting involved in killing and violence was disturbing.

In terms of political structure, what made France unique among EUropean countries?

France was a Republic, with powers located primarily in the Legislative.

Hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic

From August 1921, Germany began to buy foreign currency with marks at any price, but that only increased the speed of breakdown in the value of the mark.[15] As the mark sank in international markets, more and more marks were required to buy the foreign currency that was demanded by the Reparations Commission.[12] In the first half of 1922, the mark stabilized at about 320 marks per dollar.[5] International reparations conferences were being held. One, in June 1922, was organized by US investment banker J. P. Morgan, Jr.[16] The meetings produced no workable solution, and inflation erupted into hyperinflation, the mark falling to 7,400 marks per US dollar by December 1922.[5] The cost-of-living index was 41 in June 1922 and 685 in December, a 15-fold increase. By fall 1922, Germany found itself unable to make reparations payments.[17] The mark was by now practically worthless, making it impossible for Germany to buy foreign exchange or gold using paper marks. Instead, reparations were to be paid in goods such as coal. In January 1923, French and Belgian troops occupied the industrial region of Germany in the Ruhr valley to ensure reparations payments. Inflation was exacerbated when workers in the Ruhr went on a general strike and the German government printed more money to continue paying for their passive resistance.[18] By November 1923, the US dollar was worth 4,210,500,000,000 German marks.[19]

According to Professor Lanthier, what was the attitude of people toward their lifestyle when the war broke out?

IN August 1914, most people thought that the war would be short. As such, there was a clear desire to keep everyday life the same as it was before the war. For example, in Britain, David Lloyd George is quoted as saying that the goal was to keep trade the same.

The 1932 German presidential elections

Held on 13 March (first round) and 10 April (second round run-off).[1] They were the second and final direct elections to the office of President of the Reich (Reichspräsident), Germany's head of stateunder the Weimar Republic. The incumbent President, Paul von Hindenburg, first elected in 1925, was re-elected to a second seven-year term of office. His major opponent in the election was Adolf Hitler of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP). Under the Weimar system, the presidency was a powerful office. Hindenburg, who deeply distrusted and personally detested Hitler, had been motivated to run for a second term primarily by a desire to stop Hitler from winning the presidency.[citation needed] Nevertheless, following his re-election, Hindenburg failed to prevent the NSDAP from assuming power. Two successive federal elections left the NSDAP as the largest party in the Reichstag and anti-Weimar parties in control of a majority of its seats. Under this political climate, Hindenburg reluctantly appointed Hitler as Chancellor of Germany in January 1933. Under the electoral law, a candidate who received an absolute majority of votes (i.e. more than half) in the first round was elected. If no candidate received a majority, then a second round would be held. In the second round, the candidate receiving a plurality of votes would be elected. A party was permitted to nominate an alternative candidate in the second round, but in 1932 this did not occur (unlike 1925). In the first round on March 13 no candidate obtained an absolute majority of the votes cast, though Hindenburg with 49.6% failed only by a narrow margin. He scored higher election results in traditional Social Democratic and Centre strongholds such as the Prussian Rhine Province or Saxony. Hitler's results were a great disappointment to him, nevertheless the NSDAP recorded further gains compared with the 1930 Reichstag election. The expectations of the Communists presenting "the only left candidate" were not fulfilled, nevertheless they continued their fight against the policies of the Social Democrats and nominated Thälmann for the second round on April 10. Hindenburg, Hitler, and Thälmann competed in the second round, after Dusterberg had resigned. DNVP and Stahlhelmabstained from making any recommendations, while the Agricultural League and the industrialist Fritz Thyssen declared themselves in favour of Hitler. Hindenburg was elected president by an outcome of 53%, while Hitler significantly increased his result by more than two million votes compared to the first round, largely benefiting from Duesterberg's withdrawal.

What was the Hindenburg Programme?

Hindenburg and Ludendorff demanded domestic changes to complement their changes of strategy. German workers were to be subjected to a Gesetz über den vaterländischen Hilfsdienst (Hilfsdienstgesetz Auxiliary Services Law) which from November 1916, made all Germans from 16-50 years old subject to compulsory service.[7] The new programme was intended to create a trebling of artillery and machine-gun output and a doubling of munitions and trench mortar production. Expansion of the German Army and output of war materials caused increased competition for manpower by the army and industry. In early 1916, the German Army had 900,000 men in recruit depots and another 300,000 due in March, when the 1897 class of conscripts was called up. The army was so flush with men that plans were made to demobilise older Landwehr classes and in the summer, Falkenhayn ordered the raising of another 18 divisions, for an army of 175 divisions. The costly battles at Verdun and the Somme had been much more demanding on German divisions and they had to be relieved after only a few days in the front line, lasting about 14 days on the Somme. A larger number of divisions might reduce the strain on the Westheer and realise a surplus for offensives on other fronts. Hindenburg and Ludendorff ordered the creation of another 22 divisions, to reach 179 divisions by early 1917.[8]

According to Lanthier, why was Hindenburg so hostile to Hitler?

Hitler admired Hindenburg, as the hero who had done so much for germany. However, Hindenburg could not stand Hitler. Hitler was an upstart. Hindenburg was a Prussian aristocrat. For Hindenburg, Hitler was an Austrian corporal, a sleazy opportunist who peddled in crude anti-semitism. These two men come from different political worlds. Both men are fundamentally hostile to democracy, However, Hindenburg was a Prussian junker of the 19th-century, who wants to return to the days of the Empire. Hindenburg, and men like him, wanted to restore the German Empire, a return to traditional ways, a return to societies where junkers are respected and in control. The members of the center-right political parties of the Weimar Republic are like Hindenburg, old aristocrats. In contrast, Hitler is a newcomer, who wanted something entirely new, a break from the empire and the republic.

When Hitler tried to annex Austria in 1934, Mussolini blocked him, as Austria served as a buffer between Germany and Italy. What does this suggest?

Hitler and Mussolini not initially fast friends. German Nazism was very similar to Italian fascism, but Hitler and Mussolini didn't see each other as partners. Mussolini was jealous of Hitler/Germany and its resources. Hitler referred to Mussollini as a dangerous fool. Nevertheless, Mussolini, in contrast to the democracies of Britain and France, was willing to stand up to Germany, and that Nazi Germany backed off. This showed that it was possible to stand up to the Nazi's. Also, it showed that Hitler was cautious, and willing to back off when faced with real opposition.

Based on the events in the 1930s, was Hitler was master strategist?

Hitler did have key things he wanted to accomplish, but he was rather flexible with order of things and how things would be accomplished. Hitler was aware that he was playing a dangerous game/was breaking international law, and he always knew that there was a risk that western allies would stand up to him. However, every time Hitler took an aggressive stance, he seemed to get away with little consequence. This encouraged him to continue his aggression. This became a vicious cycle.

Why did so many statesman take such a non-aggressive stance on Hitler in the 1930s?

Hitler did not really seem to represent an existential threat in relation to other great threats of Europe were concerned. Political leaders/diplomats throughout europe had a tendency to see Hitler as somebody more or less reasonable. He was not seen as a radical international revolutionary trying to completely uphand the Versailles, or as a power hungry tyrant. Many were hoping in 1933 that Hitler was a leader/Politian like any other. They knew that hitler had a colourful past, that he had written book in which he announced that he would do everything in his power to crush Britain and France (for revenge of Versailles settlement) but they hoped that this was just youthful nonsense. After all, there were other dictatorships in Europe at the time. Already there was a fascist dictatorship in Italy that had been there for 10 years. This kind of context made it seem that Hitler was not as alarming/concerning, and why people were so willing to treat Hitler like any other statesman.

What is a key problem of Germany's industrialization that affected war effort?

However, Germany had issues with food production and with feeding its population By 1916, Germany had to create a War Food Office. However, the War Food Office was not the supreme agency to coordinate food in Germany. As such, the War FOod Office constantly fought with other bureaucracies. The price off food started to inflate.

According to Professor Lanthier, what is unique among the popular reactions to the outbreak of war in 1914?

In 1914, in all countries, political rivals were quite willing to set aside whatever animus they had, and work together in the name of dealing with a national emergency. In many European countries, any working class people, drawing upon socialism, had acquired great political influence. This is particularly notable in Germany, a country which had the largest socialist political party, the Social Democratic Party, had acquired a sizeable representation in the Reichstag, which was quite alarming to the more traditional aristocratic and middle-class. In addition, the various socialist movements, generally speaking, were operating as an ideology that encouraged people to see themselves as belonging to the same class, while the nation-state was seen as a bourgeois trick to divide the working class. However, when war was declared, the socialist workers were quite willing to cooperate with the middle-class.

What are 2 things that slowed down Italian industrialization in 1900?

In Italy, the south of Italy was rural and very poor compared to the north. This was so poor was that millions of Italians had left southern Italy and emigrated to the United States. This economic situation mirrored the cultural attitudes among the northern Italians, who viewed the southerners as slow and having poor genes. Similarly, the southerners viewed the northerners as stuck-up rich snobs and tyrants.

Gleichschaltung (German pronunciation: [ˈɡlaɪçʃaltʊŋ]), or in English co-ordination

In Nazi terminology the process of Nazification by which Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Partysuccessively established a system of totalitarian control and coordination over all aspects of German society, "from the economy and trade associations to the media, culture and education".[1] The apex of the Nazification of Germany was in the resolutions approved during the Nuremberg Rally of 1935, when the symbols of the Nazi Party and the State were fused (see Flag of Germany) and German Jews were deprived of their citizenship (see Nuremberg Laws).

According to Lanthier, what was similar between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia?

In both countries, there was a goal of creating a "New Man." Both countries have great ideological goals, and believed, at least initially, that there was a complete change in the way people saw events. Of course, there were differences. In Nazi germany, there was NOT any widespread acceptance of Nazi ideology. However, among the youth, this was becoming widespread. Hitler, like many revolutionaries, did initially believe that it was possible to convert people very quickly. However, this does not work particularly well. What really happened was that, in 1930s, most people thought Hitler was, more or less, okay with the government. However, after a while, the Nazi's realized that the message wasn't sinking in, and dialed back the messages, and got a bit more subtle. Nazi's eventually shifted to more popular broadcasts. In the USSR, the Communist were a lot slower to realize this. The Bolshevik's were trying to create a new kind of human being, a "new man." An example of this was the Stakhanovite movement. There were propaganda figures in almost every profession, positive role models, and villains to be despised. However, these methods did not work very well. Most poeple did the bare minimum, largely because they didn't pay well, and because most people didn't really love the communists all that well.

What is new imperialism?

In historical contexts, New Imperialism characterizes a period of colonial expansion by European powers, the United States, and Japan during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[1] The period featured an unprecedented pursuit of overseas territorial acquisitions. At the time, states focused on building their empires with new technological advances and developments, expanding their territory through conquest, and exploiting the resources of the subjugated countries. During the era of New Imperialism, the Western powers (and Japan) individually conquered almost all of Africa and parts of Asia. The new wave of imperialism reflected ongoing rivalries among the great powers, the economic desire for new resources and markets, and a "civilizing mission" ethos. Many of the colonies established during this era gained independence during the era of decolonization that followed World War II. The qualifier "new" is used to differentiate modern imperialism from earlier imperial activity, such as the so-called first wave of European colonization between the 15th and early-19th centuries.[1][2] In the First wave of colonization, European powers conquered and colonized the Americas and Siberia; they then later established more outposts in Africa and Asia.

According to Lanthier, how did the average German view the end of WWI?

In reality, Germany was exhausted and defeated by the end of World War I? However, the average German doesn't know that. The breakdown of the Kaiser government, the new government taking control, and threat of communist revolution, made many Germans confused and ignorant of how the war was going. By the end of the war, many thought that the war was in fact a draw, so they are very confused by the wars end.

In short, what was the idea of the Schlieffen Plan?

In the advent of a two-front war against France and Germany, Germany was to knock-out France quickly. Since Russia would be slower to mobilize, Germany could then move it's forces to face Russia. Speed was paramount, so the Germans had to move through Belgium.

According to Professor Lanthier, what was the general routine that European peace conferences ealt with?

In the time of the Napoleonic Era, the goal of the post-war agreements, but to give everyone a little something, so that nobody was left feeling aggrieved and very upset. However, WWI was a very different war. A lot of the countries were representative democracies, and they had to worry about what their electorates wanted. They couldn't just do what was necessary for the general peace of Europe. In addition, eastern Europe was in chaos. The German Empire ceased to exist, and it wasn't clear that the new German Republic had the authority to negotiate peace. The Russians were in a civil war. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had collapsed, and was replaced with various new countries making their own claims. The Ottoman Empire was also on the verge of collapse. This was going to be a huge undertaking. Realistic people knew that this was going to be a messy affair. What else was new was the presence of the American president, Woodrow Wilson. A complex individual, he was had a very ideological perspective on foreign policy. He, like many Americans, viewed the Europeans as decadent and old-fashioned whose outdated views were responsible for the outbreak of the war. He wanted to bring about an idealistic vision to make the world safe for democracy. In addition, throughout all his treatment in Europe, Wilson was viewed by many Europeans as a savior. A lot of people, ignorant of the reality of American politics and taken with the idealistic version of America, were quick and desperate to see him as a savior who could build a better world. Compared to Europe, America seemed like a peaceful place.

Overall, during WWI, who was in charge?

In theory, it was the Kaiser, Wilhelm II, who would be in charge. The generals would be in charge of military affairs. However, the reality was the Kaiser was rarely taking a direct hand in government. As the war went on, it was generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff (mainly Ludendorff) began taking control of more and more of domestic politics. This is not an outright dictatorship, as they did not try to overthrow any civilian politicians. However, these two generals did began to influence the overall war aims. Hindenburg and Luddendorf adopted the war aim of conquering as much territory as possible against the East. Also, they wanted to have unrestricted submarine warfare against the Allies, and anyone who supported the Allies, which risked bringing in the United States. Also, they wanted a more aggressive war aims, including the establishment of German hegemony in Europe.

Describe the cult of personality that arose around Lenin?

Infinitely busy and business-like to the core, Lenin, probably, was really quite indifferent to the Byzantine incense, if only because he did not have the leisure to enjoy it. The desire to glorify Lenin, to give him some supernatural qualities, was already apparent during his life and was caused by many factors of an objective and subjective order. Among them were the cult syndrome of the 300-year reign of the Romanov dynasty, the low political culture of the society, and the absence of strong democratic traditions in the country. Love for Lenin sometimes took forms close to the deification of his image. The facts also indicate that Lenin sharply opposed this practice. The realization that he was dealing not with isolated facts but with a social phenomenon came to Lenin already in the beginning of the autumn of 1918. Thus, in September 1918, in a conversation with a number of leading workers, he declared: "With great displeasure, I notice that my personality begins to exalt. It's vexing and harmful. We all know that it is not a matter of personality. I myself would be inconvenient to forbid this kind of phenomenon ... But you should gradually apply the brake on the whole story". However, the process of exaltation of the personality of Lenin continued beyond his will, which was reflected in the press. Numerous materials devoted to him, addresses, greetings, etc. were published in newspapers and magazines, etc. Remaining true to himself, Lenin tried to deal with these facts. " what do they write in the newspapers? .. It's embarrassing to read. They write about me that I'm so, so, everyone exaggerates, they call me a genius, some kind of special person, but here is some kind of mysticism ... " Attempts to elevate Lenin to the pedestal of the cult were also observed among intellectuals. It suffices to recall the article by A.M.Gorky entitled "Vladimir Ilyich Lenin," published in 1920 in the journal Kommunist Internatsional. In this article Gorky compared Lenin with Peter the Great, called him "the legendary person," ... "the man who stands in the center and above all else," believed that "in the epoch of predominance of religious sentiments, Lenin would be considered a saint," emphasized that Vladimir Ilyich "possesses the gift of foresight, the ingenious intuition of the thinker-experimenter," etc. The spread of the cult moods was also facilitated by the rapidly growing Soviet bureaucracy, for which, like for any other bureaucracy, the deification of authority is its way of thinking. The desire to exalt Lenin could also be observed among the leaders of the Party and the Soviet state. In these conditions, the danger of the cult of Lenin's personality was quite real. The only one who uncompromisingly and consistently struggled with it was Vladimir Ilyich himself. And while he was alive, he still managed to restrain the universal campaign of raising and praising his personality. However, after his death, this barrier was lifted, which was used by Stalin. While exalting Lenin, he sought to exalt himself by introducing into the mass consciousness of people the false notion that he, Stalin, was the only faithful disciple of Lenin and the continuer of his work. It is noteworthy that, perhaps, one of the first to understand the development of cult phenomena understood NK Krupskaya. On the mourning days of 1924 she addressed the working people with the following words: "I have a big request to you: do not let your sorrow over Ilyich go to the external veneration of his personality. Do not arrange him with monuments, palaces of his name, magnificent celebrations in his memory, etc., he attached so little importance to his life, so much was burdened by all this. Remember how much more poverty, turmoil in our country. Do you want to honor the name of Vladimir Ilyich - arrange nurseries, kindergartens, homes, schools, libraries, outpatient clinics, hospitals, homes for disabled people, etc., and most importantly, let's carry out his covenants in everything." But in practice much was done just the opposite. It would seem that after Lenin's death there was absolutely no need to fan his cult, especially since Stalin, who thanks to Lenin's paralysis and death only stayed at the position of the General Secretary of the Central Committee, felt nothing but his usual poisonous hatred for the deceased. And yet, it was after Lenin's death that the cult of his personality began to blossom. Stalin immediately acted as the chief interpreter of Leninism, which he defined as "the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions." Later, when the powerful chorus of flattering voices bawled about the "great Stalin", he modestly commemorated Lenin and even once proclaimed an original toast: "For the health of Lenin and Leninism!" On Lenin's death day, January 22 of each year, the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow hosted a solemn mourning meeting, where the report was made under the stereotyped name "(for so many years) without Lenin under the leadership of Stalin along the Leninist path." Favorably overlooked by censorship, the newspapers printed a myth that, before resolving difficult questions, Comrade Stalin at night descends alone in the Mausoleum "to consult with Ilyich." After Comrade Stalin descended to the Mausoleum for a longer period, the cult of Lenin sharply increased. This was not prevented by the reasoning of the Malenkov period "about the role of the individual in history", nor the "exposure of the personality cult" of Stalin that followed Khrushchev. This is primarily a recognition of the real role of Lenin and the desire to raise the one next to which they turned from the leaders of a small illegal party into people who had enormous power, wide popularity and popularity. Glorifying Lenin, they thereby exalted themselves, because they were considered his companions and disciples. So the cult of Lenin flourished especially after Khrushchev. Decisions and speeches, books, pamphlets, articles, lectures, movies, radio and television programs, meetings and conferences, memorial plaques and complexes, posters, portraits and busts of Lenin - all these products of the propaganda machine of the nomenclature quickly passed a narrow line separating, according to Napoleon, great from the funny. It seems that, really, if Lenin could hear shameless panegyrics in the Soviet press in his honor, he would feel a sharp disgust. This feeling has engulfed the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. The people expressed this feeling, as usual, with anecdotes. Even under Stalin, there were jokes about his cult. The anecdote about the contest for the best monument to Pushkin: the third prize is the monument "Lenin reads Pushkin", the second one - "Pushkin reads Lenin", the first one - "Lenin". But no matter how the people mock the Leninist cult, this cult was diligently supported by the nomenclatura. Gorbachev paid his tribute. The goal is to inculcate the people and constantly support the cult of the leader in it. The head of the party, especially if he is also the head of the government, occupies the same posts that were occupied by Lenin in his time. If Lenin could become after the death of Marx and Engels a kind of living god of Marxism, it was only natural that after Lenin's death someone should occupy this place. In his book about Stalin, Henri Barbousse found a successful formula for this phenomenon: "Stalin is Lenin today." In such an ideal case, the cult of the living leader overshadowed the cult of the one resting in the Mausoleum, and vice versa, the further the living leader was from the apex of deification, the more actively the cult of Lenin was propagated.

By 1916, what was the picture of German politics?

It is an exaggeration that the Generals just take control of the German government. However, it is true that the military starts to take control over more and more of the government decisions. The civilians took a back seat. For example, the Reichstag was almost completely quiet. Most government policy was left to the Bundesrat, and the executive council.

What happened to the old Victorian-Edwardian mindset and the faith in the Industrial Revolution in the wake of WWI.

It shattered the faith in the old traditional value systems, such as faith in Progress, and the old constitutional monarchies, etc.

What was the Italian Unification?

Italian unification (Italian: Unità d'Italia [uniˈta ddiˈtaːlja]), also known as the Risorgimento ([risordʒiˈmento], meaning "the Resurgence"), was the political and social movement that consolidated different states of the Italian peninsula into the single state of the Kingdom of Italy in the 19th century. The process began in 1815 with the Congress of Viennaand was completed in 1871 when Rome became the capital of the Kingdom of Italy.[1][2] The term, which also designates the cultural, political and social movement that promoted unification, recalls the romantic, nationalist and patriotic ideals of an Italian renaissance through the conquest of a unified political identity that, by sinking its ancient roots during the Roman period, "suffered an abrupt halt [or loss] of its political unity in 476 AD after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire".[3] However, some of the terre irredente did not join the Kingdom of Italy until 1918 after Italy defeated Austria-Hungary in World War I. For this reason, sometimes the period is extended to include the late 19th-century and the First World War (1915-1918), until the 4 November 1918 Armistice of Villa Giusti, which is considered the completion of unification. This view is followed, for example, at the Central Museum of Risorgimento at the Vittoriano.[4][5]

Why did the Italians fight on the side of Entente, and not the Allies?

Italy had been allied with the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires since 1882 as part of the Triple Alliance. However, the nation had its own designs on Austrian territory in Trentino, the Austrian Littoral, Fiume (Rijeka) and Dalmatia. Rome had a secret 1902 pact with France, effectively nullifying its part in the Triple Alliance;[141] Italy secretly agreed with France to remain neutral if the latter was attacked by Germany.[14] At the start of hostilities, Italy refused to commit troops, arguing that the Triple Alliance was defensive and that Austria-Hungary was an aggressor. The Austro-Hungarian government began negotiations to secure Italian neutrality, offering the French colony of Tunisia in return. The Allies made a counter-offer in which Italy would receive the Southern Tyrol, Austrian Littoral and territory on the Dalmatian coast after the defeat of Austria-Hungary. This was formalised by the Treaty of London. Further encouraged by the Allied invasion of Turkey in April 1915, Italy joined the Triple Entente and declared war on Austria-Hungary on 23 May. Fifteen months later, Italy declared war on Germany.[142]

What were some of the military and political motivations of New Imperialism?

Leading European nations also felt that colonies were crucial to military power, national security, and nationalism. Military leaders claimed that a strong navy was necessary in order to become a great power. Thus, naval vessels needed military bases around the world to take on coal and supplies. Islands or harbors were seized to satisfy these needs. Colonies guaranteed the growing European navies safe harbors and coaling stations, which they needed in time of war. National security was an important reason for Great Britain's decision to occupy Egypt. Protecting the Suez Canal was vital for the British Empire. The Suez Canal, which formally opened in 1869, shortened the sea route from Europe to South Africa and East Asia. To Britain, the canal was a lifeline to India, the jewel of its empire. Many people were also convinced that the possession of colonies was an indication of a nation's greatness; colonies were status symbols. According to nineteenth-century German historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, all great nations should want to conquer barbarian nations.

What was the fallout of the Hindenburg Programme?

Ludwig von Mises called the Hindenburg Programme a command economy.[16] Enterprises "not important to the war economy" were closed to supply more workers.[17] In 2014, Alexander Watson wrote that the Auxiliary Service Law was drastically revised in the Reichstag by Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), Zentrumspartei (Zentrum) and the Fortschrittliche Volkspartei (FVP) deputies, to confound the attempt by the OHL to create a "command economy" at the expense of the working class. Extensive concessions to the working class were included in the law, with the establishment of a committee to supervise its implementation. Hindenburg later denounced the concessions as insufficient and "positively harmful"; industrialists, looking forward to a captive workforce to exploit, were aghast at being compelled to work with workers' committees and conciliation organisations. The main aim of the law, to deny workers' mobility was thwarted and with it went the possibility of centralised organisation of manpower. The super-profits anticipated by employers were limited by the prospect of improved pay and conditions being recognised as a valid reason to change jobs. The attempt by the third OHL to reorganise the war economy through compulsion was a failure but the law was effective in substituting workers of lesser physical fitness for those capable of military service. Concessions to organised labour were valuable in retaining the co-operation of the unions during the unrest of 1917.[18] The German army had reached its peak of manpower in 1916 and the Hindenburg Programme had been intended to reduce the burden on the remaining manpower by substituting machines. In 1917, the Westheer had managed to withstand the attacks of the French and the British, while offensive operations had been conducted on the eastern and southern fronts. The coalition against Germany increased its output of war materiel even more than the increase of the Hindenburg Programme, an industrial competition that Germany could not win; the programme worsened the labour shortage in Germany. The theoretical changes in German defensive tactics had greater effect than the increase in the size of the army and the output of weapons. British attacks in 1917 were much more competent than those of 1916 but German defensive methods were adapted to negate the effect of the maturing of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). The Battle of the Somme (1 July - 18 November 1916) had caused about 500,000 German casualties and the Second Battle of the Aisne (16 April - 9 May 1917), the main part of the Nivelle Offensivecost 163,000 men. The Third Battle of Ypres (31 July - 10 November) caused 217,000 German casualties.[19] Casualties in the Third Battle of Ypres led to the average number of men in an infantry battalion falling from 750 to 640 men and in October, congestion on the railway lines behind the 4th Army led to more shortages. The 4th Army had a ration strength of 800,000 men and 200,000 horses, which needed 52 trains of 35 wagons each just for daily maintenance but the change to a defence based on firepower, using the extra weapons and munitions produced by the Hindenburg Programme, needed more trains to carry ammunition to the front. On 28 July, the 4th Army fired 19 munitions trains' worth of ammunition, exceeding the record 16 trains' on the Somme. On 9 October, the 4th Army was firing 27 trains' worth per day, 18 million shells being fired during the battle. The trains had to compete for space on the railways with food supplies and troop transports, which created severe difficulties for Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht.[20] Men, horses and fuel were taken from agricultural production for the army and munitions, which caused food shortages and food price inflation, leading to Germany coming to the verge of starvation at the close of 1918.[17]

What were some of the ideological and cultural motivations of New Imperialism?

Many Westerners believed that Europe should civilize their little brothers beyond the seas. According to this view, non-whites would received the blessings of Western civilization, including medicine, law, and Christianity. Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) in his famous poem, "The White Man's Burden" expressed this mission in the 1890s when he prodded Europeans to take up "their moral obligation" to civilize the uncivilized. He encouraged them to "Send forth the best ye breed to serve your captives' need." Missionaries supported colonization, believing that European control would help them spread Christianity, the true religion, in Asia and Africa. Also, there was Social Darwinism. In 1859, Charles Darwin (1809-1882) published On the Origin of Species. Darwin claimed that all life had evolved into the present state over millions of years. To explain the long slow process of evolution, Darwin put forth the theory of natural selection. Natural forces selected those with physical traits best adapted to their environment. Darwin never promoted any social ideas. The process of natural selection came to be known as survival of the fittest. The Englishman Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was the first to apply "survival of the fittest" to human societies and nations. Social Darwinism fostered imperialistic expansion by proposing that some people were more fit (advanced) than others. The Europeans believed that they, as the white race, were dominant and that it was only natural for them to conquer the "inferior" people as nature's way of improving mankind. Thus, the conquest of inferior people was just, and the destruction of the weaker races was nature's natural law.

Why did so many of the new countries created in Eastern Europe become representative democracies?

Many of the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian countries became representative democracies because in part because it was in vogue, and because it this suited the great powers. Woodrow Wilson, the U.S. President, in particular viewed this as the advent of a golden age.

Macro-scale Factors leading to war in 1914?

Nationalism in Eastern Europe. The creation of a rival system of alliances. The requirements of a modern, industrialized military. The "will to war" among leaders & citizens.

Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia (r. 1894-1917).

Nicholas II or Nikolai II (Russian: Никола́й II Алекса́ндрович, tr. Nikolai II Aleksandrovich; 18 May [O.S. 6 May] 1868 - 17 July 1918), known as Saint Nicholas the Passion-Bearer in the Russian Orthodox Church, was the last Emperor of Russia, ruling from 1 November 1894 until his forced abdication on 15 March 1917.[1]His reign saw the fall of the Russian Empire from one of the foremost great powers of the world to economic and military collapse. He was given the nickname Nicholas the Bloody or Vile Nicholas by his political adversaries due to the Khodynka Tragedy, anti-Semitic pogroms, Bloody Sunday, the violent suppression of the 1905 Russian Revolution, the execution of political opponents, and his perceived responsibility for the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).[2][3] Soviet historians portrayed Nicholas as a weak and incompetent leader whose decisions led to military defeats and the deaths of millions of his subjects.[4] Russia was defeated in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, which saw the annihilation of the Russian Baltic Fleet at the Battle of Tsushima, the loss of Russian influence over Manchuria and Korea, and the Japanese annexation to the north of South Sakhalin Island. The Anglo-Russian Entente was designed to counter the German Empire's attempts to gain influence in the Middle East, but it also ended the Great Game of confrontation between Russia and Britain. When all diplomatic efforts to prevent the First World War failed, Nicholas approved the mobilization of the Russian Army on 30 July 1914, which gave Germany formal grounds to declare war on Russia on 1 August 1914.[5] An estimated 3.3 million Russians were killed in World War I.[6] The Imperial Army's severe losses, the High Command's incompetent management of the war effort, and lack of food and supplies on the home front were all leading causes of the fall of the House of Romanov. Following the February Revolution of 1917, Nicholas abdicated on behalf of himself and his son and heir, Alexei. He and his family were imprisoned and transferred to Tobolsk in late summer 1917.[7] On 30 April 1918, Nicholas, Alexandra, and their daughter Maria were handed over to the local Ural Soviet council in Ekaterinburg; the rest of the captives followed on 23 May.[8] Nicholas and his family were executed by their Bolshevik guards on the night of 16/17 July 1918.[9] The remains of the imperial family were later found, exhumed, identified and re-interred with an elaborate state and church ceremony in St. Petersburg on 17 July 1998. In 1981, Nicholas, his wife, and their children were recognized as martyrs by the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia in New York City.[10] On 15 August 2000,[11] they were canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church as passion bearers, commemorating believers who face death in a Christ-like manner.[12]

According to Professor Lanthier, was the Weimar Republic universally loved? Was the mood of universally optimistic.

No, many Germans longed for the days of the German Empire. Many Germans, particularly in the rural regions and the middle-class, felt that Germany had degenerated and felt that they had lost their way. This mood was shared by the rest of Europe. Many elites felt that their economies were stagnating. For example, in Britain, many British political elites feared that the economy was stagnating, which was based on truth.

According to Lanthier, is the Great Depression the sole cause for the rise of Dictatorships and the outbreak of WWII? Which groups actually benefited grom the Great Depression?

No. The Great Depression was a major factor in the rise of the dictatorships and the outbreak of WWII. BUT, the Great Depression didn't make life terrible for EVERYONE. Remember, the Great Depression was NOT the same as the hyperinflation crisis. The rich people in Europe were, for the most part, are still very very rich. Some manage to benefit from the crisis, buying up assets cheaply. The Soviet Union aws also, for the most part, insulated from the global economy, and from the Great Depression. The USSR was focused on autarchy, and fueling economic growth. Thanks to Stalin's Five-Year Plans, and the deaths and suffering from millions of people, the USSR was able to make massive economic growth. In addition, to a lot of people, the Great Depression makes capitalism look very very bad. Suddenly, many more people are willing to question the capitalist economic system. These skeptics grow more and more in number as the effects of the Great Depression lingers on into the late 1930s. This disillusionment extended from the economic system of capitalism to the political system of democracy. Many anti-capitalist, anti-democratic movements, which seemed to provide an alternative to a failing system, saw their movements swell in numbers. This includes groups like the Nazi's in Germany.

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and Franz Ferdinand's wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg.

Occurred on 28 June 1914 in Sarajevowhen they were mortally wounded by Gavrilo Princip. Princip was one of a group of six assassins (five Serbs and one Bosniak) coordinated by Danilo Ilić, a Bosnian Serb and a member of the Black Hand secret society. The political objective of the assassination was to break off Austria-Hungary's South Slav provinces so they could be combined into a Yugoslavia. The assassins' motives were consistent with the movement that later became known as the Young Bosnia. The assassination led directly to World War I when Austria-Hungary subsequently issued an ultimatum to the Kingdom of Serbia, which was partially rejected. Austria-Hungary then declared war on Serbia, triggering actions leading to war between most European states. In charge of these Serbian military conspirators was Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence Dragutin Dimitrijević, his right-hand man Major Vojislav Tankosić, and the spy Rade Malobabić. Tankosić armed the assassins with bombs and pistols and trained them. The assassins were given access to the same clandestine network of safe-houses and agents that Malobabić used for the infiltration of weapons and operatives into Austria-Hungary. The assassins, the key members of the clandestine network, and the key Serbian military conspirators who were still alive were arrested, tried, convicted and punished. Those who were arrested in Bosnia were tried in Sarajevo in October 1914. The other conspirators were arrested and tried before a Serbian court on the French-controlled Salonika Front in 1916-1917 on unrelated false charges; Serbia executed three of the top military conspirators. Much of what is known about the assassinations comes from these two trials and related records.

Provisional Committee of the State Duma?

Provisional Committee of the State Duma (Russian: Временный Комитет Государственной Думы) was a special government body established on March 12, 1917 (27 February O.S.) by the Fourth State Duma deputies at the outbreak of the Russian February Revolution. The Committee declared itself the governing body of Russian Empire, but de facto competed for power with the Petrograd Soviet, which was created on the same day. The Government of Golitzine as the Council of Ministers of Russian Empire retreated to the Admiralty building. The Committee of the State Duma appointed 24 commissars to head various state ministries replacing the Imperial Government. According to Milyukov Chkheidze never participated in the work of the Committee. On March 15 (March 2 O.S.) the Committee and the Petrograd Soviet agreed to create the Provisional Government. Many members of the Committee went on to serve in the Provisional Government, while the Committee continued to play an insignificant role until the Fourth Duma was dissolved on September 19 (September 6 O.S.).

According to Lanthier, what was workforce like in Europe pre-WWI?

Remember, most people at this time were involved in agriculture. People worked on the farms where they lived. As such, women were working in the fields and on the farm regularly. Of course, there were different responsibilities for men then there were for women.

What were some of the weaknesses of the League of Nations in terms of Global representation?

Representation at the League was often a problem. Though it was intended to encompass all nations, many never joined, or their period of membership was short. The most conspicuous absentee was the United States. President Woodrow Wilson had been a driving force behind the League's formation and strongly influenced the form it took, but the US Senate voted not to join on 19 November 1919.[196] Ruth Henig has suggested that, had the United States become a member, it would have also provided support to France and Britain, possibly making France feel more secure, and so encouraging France and Britain to co-operate more fully regarding Germany, thus making the rise to power of the Nazi Party less likely.[197] Conversely, Henig acknowledges that if the US had been a member, its reluctance to engage in war with European states or to enact economic sanctions might have hampered the ability of the League to deal with international incidents.[197] The structure of the US federal government might also have made its membership problematic, as its representatives at the League could not have made decisions on behalf of the executive branch without having the prior approval of the legislative branch.[198] In January 1920, when the League was born, Germany was not permitted to join because it was seen as having been the aggressor in the First World War. Soviet Russia was also initially excluded because Communist regimes were not welcomed and membership would have been initially dubious due to the Russian Civil War in which both sides claimed to be the legitimate government of the country. The League was further weakened when major powers left in the 1930s. Japan began as a permanent member of the Council since the country was an Allied Power in the First World War, but withdrew in 1933 after the League voiced opposition to its occupation of Manchuria.[199] Italy began as a permanent member of the Council, but withdrew in 1937 after roughly a year following the end of the Second Italo-Ethiopian War. Spain also began as a permanent member of the Council, but withdrew in 1939 after the Spanish Civil War ended in a victory for the Nationalists. The League had accepted Germany, also as a permanent member of the Council, in 1926, deeming it a "peace-loving country", but Adolf Hitler pulled Germany out when he came to power in 1933.[200]

What was Bismark's policy toward Russia?

Russia After Russia's victory over the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, Bismarck helped negotiate a settlement at the Congress of Berlin. The Treaty of Berlin revised the earlier Treaty of San Stefano, reducing the size of newly independent Bulgaria (a pro-Russian state at that time). Bismarck and other European leaders opposed the growth of Russian influence and tried to protect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire (see Eastern Question). As a result, Russo-German relations further deteriorated, with the Russian chancellor Gorchakov denouncing Bismarck for compromising his nation's victory. The relationship was additionally strained due to Germany's protectionist trade policies. Some in the German military clamored for a preemptive war with Russia; Bismarck refused, stating: "Preemptive war is like committing suicide for fear of death."[78] Bismarck realized that both Russia and Britain considered control of central Asia a high priority, dubbed the "Great Game". Germany had no direct stakes, however its dominance of Europe was enhanced when Russian troops were based as far away from Germany as possible. Over two decades, 1871-1890, he maneuvered to help the British, hoping to force the Russians to commit more soldiers to Asia.[79] Triple Alliance The League of the Three Emperors having fallen apart, Bismarck negotiated the Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary, in which each guaranteed the other against Russian attack. He also negotiated the Triple Alliance in 1882 with Austria-Hungary and Italy, and Italy and Austria-Hungary soon reached the "Mediterranean Agreement" with Britain. Attempts to reconcile Germany and Russia did not have a lasting effect: the Three Emperors' League was re-established in 1881 but quickly fell apart, ending Russian-Austrian-Prussian solidarity, which had existed in various forms since 1813. Bismarck therefore negotiated the secret Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 with Russia, in order to prevent Franco-Russian encirclement of Germany. Both powers promised to remain neutral towards one another unless Russia attacked Austria-Hungary. However, after Bismarck's departure from office in 1890, the Treaty was not renewed, thus creating a critical problem for Germany in the event of a war.

According to Professor Lanthier, was Russia a nation-state, or an empire?

Russia was a multi-ethnic empire, made up of various groups divided by language, culture, and religion. The dominant ethnic group were the Russians. The other ethnic groups, who had been conquered and faced attempts at assimilation, had attempted to break away unsuccessfully. This means that there is a complex Empire. Russia, was therefore not really a nation-state, but still an empire.

What was Russia's major problem in terms of industrialized warfare circa 1914?

Russia's huge size, combined with its lagging railway network compared to the other Great Powers, meant that Russian military forces struggled to rapidly mobilize, and faced being caught off guard.

According to Professor Lanthier, what kind of labour restrictions were implemented?

Strikes became legal, and governments were willing to step in to act as neutral arbitrators between workers and their employers. This was done out of pragmatism. Governments just want to get the workers back to work. This means that, more often than not, governments were willing to side with workers. Of course, this stops happening when WWI ends, but it is a foreshadowing of what is to come.

What were some of the technological motivations of New Imperialism?

Superior technology and improved medical knowledge helped to foster imperialism. Quinine enabled Europeans to survive tropical diseases and venture into the mosquito-infested interiors of Africa and Asia. The combination of the steamboat and the telegraph enabled the Western powers to increase their mobility and to quickly respond to any situations that threatened their dominance. The rapid-fire machine gun also gave them a military advantage and was helpful in convincing Africans and Asians to accept Western control.

According to Professor Lanthier, how did the belligerent states pay for the war.

Taxes increased significantly. For example, France had a long aversion to direct taxation, but by 1917 there were a lot of people paying 20% of their income to the government, which at the time was shocking. The British went a little further, while the average income tax was 6% on average before the war, during the war it shot up to 30%. This sort of direct taxation was text ended to everyone, including the working class, which prior to the war were able to get off scot-free from direct taxation. Taxes were also introduced on a variety of goods, like tea and chocolate. Germany was reluctant to raise taxes, and preferred taking out loans, a policy that was followed by all the Great Powers. By 1916-1917, everyone is heavily in debt. UK and France were able to borrow fromt he U.S., which, due to historic ties, was quite willing to deal with America.

How did the geostrategic position help the Bolsheviks win the Russian Civil War (1918-20)?

The Bolsheviks controlled the most heavily-populated parts of Russia. In 1918-19, Bolshevik-held territory contained some 70 million people, compared with approximately 20 million in the White-controlled areas. The Bolsheviks therefore had a bigger reservoir of manpower upon which the draw than the Whites. One consequence of this was that in major battles, the Red Army invariably had a huge numerical advantage over its opponents.

The successor states to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918?

The Czechoslovak Republic was proclaimed on 28 October 1918, the Kingdom of Hungary on 31 October, the Republic of Poland on 10/11 November, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 1 December. After a short time as a soviet republic, Hungary became a kingdom without a king under Miklós Horthy. Romania, which had signed a treaty of alliance with the Entente in 1916, benefited through the Treaty of Trianon and received not only all the territories with a majority Romanian population but also territories inhabited mainly by Hungarians.

As the war dragged on, and as Tsar Nicholas II's popularity declined, what organization emergd in the Russian government to challenge the tsar?

The Duma.

What were some preparations and negotiations for the passing of the Enabling Act?

The Enabling Act allowed the cabinet to enact legislation, including laws deviating from or altering the constitution, without the consent of the Reichstag . Because this law allowed for departures from the constitution, it was itself considered a constitutional amendment. Thus, its passage required the support of two-thirds of those deputies who were present and voting. A quorum of two-thirds of the entire Reichstagwas required to be present in order to call up the bill. The Social Democrats (SPD) and the Communists (KPD) were expected to vote against the Act. The government had already arrested all Communist and some Social Democrat deputies under the Reichstag Fire Decree. The Nazis expected the parties representing the middle class, the Junkers and business interests to vote for the measure, as they had grown weary of the instability of the Weimar Republic and would not dare to resist. Hitler believed that with the Centre Party members' votes, he would get the necessary two-thirds majority. Hitler negotiated with the Centre Party's chairman, Ludwig Kaas, a Catholic priest, finalising an agreement by 22 March. Kaas agreed to support the Act in exchange for assurances of the Centre Party's continued existence, the protection of Catholics' civil and religious liberties, religious schools and the retention of civil servants affiliated with the Centre Party. It has also been suggested that some members of the SPD were intimidated by the presence of the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA) throughout the proceedings.[8] Some historians, such as Klaus Scholder, have maintained that Hitler also promised to negotiate a Reichskonkordat with the Holy See, a treaty that formalised the position of the Catholic Church in Germany on a national level. Kaas was a close associate of Cardinal Pacelli, then Vatican Secretary of State (and later Pope Pius XII). Pacelli had been pursuing a German concordat as a key policy for some years, but the instability of Weimar governments as well as the enmity of some parties to such a treaty had blocked the project.[9] The day after the Enabling Act vote, Kaas went to Rome in order to, in his own words, "investigate the possibilities for a comprehensive understanding between church and state".[10] However, so far no evidence for a link between the Enabling Act and the Reichskonkordat signed on 20 July 1933 has surfaced.

According to Lanthier, what was particular about the Enabling Bill?

The Enabling Act has to be renewed over time. Remember, the Reichstag is still technically in power. Like many dictatorships, Nazi Germany maintained the illusion that the people's representatives were approving of the nazi Party in power.

What contributed to Germany's food shortages and flagging support among the population?

The Entente naval blockade prevented Germany from importing any goods.

BRIEFLY, outline World War I?

The German advance into France was halted at the Battle of the Marne and by the end of 1914, the Western Front settled into a battle of attrition, marked by a long series of trench lines that changed little until 1917 (the Eastern Front, by contrast, was marked by much greater exchanges of territory). In 1915, Italy joined the Allied Powers and opened a front in the Alps. Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in 1915 and Greece joined the Allies in 1917, expanding the war in the Balkans. The United States initially remained neutral, though even while neutral it became an important supplier of war material to the Allies. Eventually, after the sinking of American merchant ships by German submarines, and the revelation that the Germans were trying to incite Mexico to make war on the United States, the U.S. declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917. Trained American forces would not begin arriving at the front in large numbers until mid-1918, but ultimately the American Expeditionary Force would reach some two million troops.[22] Though Serbia was defeated in 1915, and Romania joined the Allied Powers in 1916 only to be defeated in 1917, none of the great powers were knocked out of the war until 1918. The 1917 February Revolution in Russia replaced the Tsarist autocracy with the Provisional Government, but continuing discontent at the cost of the war led to the October Revolution, the creation of the Soviet Socialist Republic, and the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by the new government in March 1918, ending Russia's involvement in the war. This allowed the transfer of large numbers of German troops from the East to the Western Front, resulting in the German March 1918 Offensive. This offensive was initially successful, but failed to score a decisive victory and exhausted the last of the German reserves. The Allies rallied and drove the Germans back in their Hundred Days Offensive, a continual series of attacks to which the Germans had no reply.[23] Bulgaria was the first Central Power to sign an armistice—the Armistice of Salonicaon 29 September 1918. On 30 October, the Ottoman Empire capitulated, signing the Armistice of Mudros.[24] On 4 November, the Austro-Hungarian empire agreed to the Armistice of Villa Giusti. With its allies defeated, revolution at home, and the military no longer willing to fight, Kaiser Wilhelm abdicated on 9 November and Germany signed an armistice on 11 November 1918, effectively ending the war.

The State Duma or Imperial Duma

The Lower House, part of the legislative assembly in the late Russian Empire, which held its meetings in the Taurida Palace in St. Petersburg. It convened four times between 27 April 1906 and the collapse of the Empire in February 1917. The First and the Second Dumas were more democratic and represented a greater number of national types than their successors.[1] The Third Duma was dominated by gentry, landowners and businessmen. The Fourth Duma held five sessions; it existed until 2 March 1917, and was formally dissolved on 6 October 1917.

According to Lanthier, what was Gleichschaltung?

The Nazi Party was spreading like a virus, to the point where it was very very difficult toi distinguish the nazi Party from the State apparatus. By 1935-1936, it is impossible to tell the difference between the Nazi party and the government apparatus. In addition, teh Nazi party has spread everywhere, in schools, factories, workshops etc.

According to Lanthier, what was the first real sign that extremism was on the rise in Germany?

The Reichstag elections in 1930. The 1930 elections changed the German political landscape by weakening the traditional nationalist parties, the DNVP and the DVP, leaving the Nazis as the chief alternative to the discredited Social Democrats and the Zentrum, whose leader, Heinrich Brüning, headed a weak minority government. The inability of the democratic parties to form a united front, the self-imposed isolation of the Communists and the continued decline of the economy, all played into Hitler's hands. The Communists win 13% of the popular vote. The Nazi's win 18% of the popular vote.

What was Russian culture as ACTUALLY encountered by the Bolsheviks after the Russian Civil War?

The Russian peasants were the predominant group in Russia. They were traditional, conservative, and quite often alcoholic. They were not enthusiastic about communism. In addition, the Russian working class was NOT enthusiastic about communism either. The population of the cities had shrunk considerably as people fled the cities for the rural communities. All the Russians wanted was land and peace. They were not interested in communism.

According to Lanthier, what factors changed the perception of women in WWI?

The average pre-war woman was a mother and homemaker, who stayed home to take care of the children while the husband went off to work. This was the PERCEPTION, not the reality. Of course, the reality was that women did work in Europe in large numbers, primarily in agriculture. The average European was thinking about the city, where there appeared to be some sort of gender segregation, primarily in the middle-class and the upper-class. This was an ideal that people aspired to, and is seen as desirable. People do this as soon as they can. Men take pride in being able to support their non-working wives, while women take pride being provided for by their husbands.

Logistics

The detailed organization and implementation of a complex operation. In military science, logistics is concerned with maintaining army supply lines while disrupting those of the enemy, since an armed force without resources and transportation is defenseless. Military logistics was already practiced in the ancient world and as modern military have a significant need for logistics solutions, advanced implementations have been developed. In military logistics, logistics officers manage how and when to move resources to the places they are needed.

Military logistics

The discipline of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of military forces. In its most comprehensive sense, it is those aspects or military operations that deal with:[1] -Design, development, acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel. -Transport of personnel. -Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities. -Acquisition or furnishing of services. -Medical and health service support.

War communism or military communism (Russian: Военный коммунизм, Voyennyy kommunizm)

The economic and political system that existed in Soviet Russia during the Russian Civil War from 1918 to 1921. According to Soviet historiography, the ruling Bolshevik administration adopted this policy with the goal of keeping towns (the proletarian power-base) and the Red Armystocked with food and weapons. Circumstances dictated extreme measures as the ongoing Civil War disrupted normal economic mechanisms and relations. War communism began in June 1918, enforced by the Supreme Economic Council (Russian: Высший Совет Народного Хозяйства), known as the Vesenkha. It ended on 21 March 1921 with the beginning of the New Economic Policy, which lasted until 1928.

The February Revolution (Russian: Февра́льская револю́ция, IPA: [fʲɪvˈralʲskəjə rʲɪvɐˈlʲutsɨjə], tr. Fevrálʹskaya revolyútsiya), known in Soviet historiography as the February Bourgeois Democratic Revolution[2] and sometimes as the March Revolution

The first of two revolutions which took place in Russia in 1917. The main events of the revolution took place in and near Petrograd (present-day St. Petersburg), the then-capital of Russia, where long-standing discontent with the monarchy erupted into mass protests against food rationing on 23 February Old Style (8 March New Style).[4]Revolutionary activity lasted about eight days, involving mass demonstrations and violent armed clashes with police and gendarmes, the last loyal forces of the Russian monarchy. On 27 February O.S. (12 March N.S.) mutinous Russian Army forces sided with the revolutionaries. Three days later Tsar Nicholas II abdicated, ending Romanov dynastic rule and the Russian Empire. A Russian Provisional Government under Prince Georgy Lvov replaced the Council of Ministers of Russia. The revolution appeared to break out without any real leadership or formal planning.[5] Russia had been suffering from a number of economic and social problems, which compounded after the start of World War I in 1914. Disaffected soldiers from the city's garrison joined bread rioters, primarily women in bread lines, and industrial strikers on the streets. As more and more troops deserted, and with loyal troops away at the Front, the city fell into chaos, leading to the overthrow of the Tsar. In all, over 1,300 people were killed during the protests of February 1917.[6]

What was the strategy used by Commanders and Generals to deal with Trench Warfare?

The fundamental strategy of trench warfare in World War I was to defend one's own position strongly while trying to achieve a breakthrough into the enemy's rear. The effect was to end up in attrition; the process of progressively grinding down the opposition's resources until, ultimately, they are no longer able to wage war. This did not prevent the ambitious commander from pursuing the strategy of annihilation—the ideal of an offensive battle which produces victory in one decisive engagement. The Commander in Chief of the British forces during most of World War I, General Douglas Haig, was constantly seeking a "breakthrough" which could then be exploited with cavalry divisions. His major trench offensives—the Somme in 1916 and Flanders in 1917—were conceived as breakthrough battles but both degenerated into costly attrition. The Germans actively pursued a strategy of attrition in the Battle of Verdun, the sole purpose of which was to "bleed the French Army white". At the same time the Allies needed to mount offensives in order to draw attention away from other hard-pressed areas of the line.

What was the homefront like in Britain during WWI?

The government was very upfront about the fact that civilians were going to have to face limitations and deprivations in order to win the war. However, the British were able to handle the shortages and limitations One factor may be that the British, being a functional democracy, was already better able to get people to cooperate with each other. However, much more significant was the technical mistakes made by the mistakes and the institutions. German administration made some key mistakes, while the British got lucky.

How did the will to war contribute to World War I?

The governments of the Great Powers in Europe did choose to go to war. They made choices. However, several actors on all the governments were against the war, while others were more hawkish. Therefore, there wasn't a big push among the governments to will war.

How did the Machine gun affect WWI?

The heavy machine gun was a specialist weapon, and in a static trench system was employed in a scientific manner, with carefully calculated fields of fire, so that at a moment's notice an accurate burst could be fired at the enemy's parapet or a break in the wire. Equally it could be used as light artillery in bombarding distant trenches. Heavy machine guns required teams of up to eight men to move them, maintain them, and keep them supplied with ammunition. This made them impractical for offensive manoeuvres, contributing to the stalemate on the Western Front. One machine gun nest was theoretically able to mow down hundreds of enemies charging in the open through no man's land. However, while WWI machine guns were able to shoot hundreds of rounds per minute in theory, they were still prone to overheating and jamming, which often necessitated firing in short bursts. Nevertheless, their potential was increased significantly when emplaced behind multiple lines of barbed wire to slow any advancing enemy.

How did the hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic in the 1920s resolve itself?

The hyperinflation crisis led prominent economists and politicians to seek a means to stabilize German currency. In August 1923, an economist, Karl Helfferich, proposed a plan to issue a new currency, the "Roggenmark" ("rye mark"), to be backed by mortgage bonds indexed to the market price of rye grain. The plan was rejected because of the greatly fluctuating price of rye in paper marks. Agriculture Minister Hans Luther proposed a plan that substituted gold for rye and led to the issuance of the Rentenmark("mortgage mark"), backed by bonds indexed to the market price of gold.[20] The gold bonds were indexed at the rate of 2790 gold marks per kilogram of gold, the same as the pre-war gold marks. Rentenmarks were not redeemable in gold but only indexed to the gold bonds. The plan was adopted in monetary reform decrees, on October 13-15, 1923. A new bank, the Rentenbank, was set up and controlled by new German Finance Minister Hans Luther. After November 12, 1923, when Hjalmar Schacht became currency commissioner, Germany's central bank (the Reichsbank) was not allowed to discount any further government Treasury bills, which meant the corresponding issue of paper marks also ceased.[21] The discounting of commercial trade bills was allowed and the amount of Rentenmarks expanded, but the issue was strictly controlled to conform to current commercial and government transactions. The Rentenbank refused credit to the government and to speculators who were not able to borrow Rentenmarks, because Rentenmarks were not legal tender.[22] On November 16, 1923, the new Rentenmark was introduced to replace the worthless paper marks issued by the Reichsbank. Twelve zeros were cut from prices, and the prices quoted in the new currency remained stable. When the president of the Reichsbank, Rudolf Havenstein, died on November 20, 1923, Schacht was appointed to replace him. By November 30, 1923, there were 500,000,000 Rentenmarks in circulation, which increased to 1,000,000,000 by January 1, 1924 and to 1,800,000,000 Rentenmarks by July 1924. Meanwhile, the old paper Marks continued in circulation. The total paper marks increased to 1.2 sextillion (1,200,000,000,000,000,000,000) in July 1924 and continued to fall in value to a third of their conversion value in Rentenmarks.[22] On August 30, 1924, a monetary law permitted the exchange of a 1-trillion paper mark note to a new Reichsmark, worth the same as a Rentenmark. By 1924 one dollar was equivalent to 4.2 Rentenmark.

What is the issue with the Republic's efforts to quash workers?

The issue was that the German army was kept small due to the terms of surrender in WWI. As such, the new Republic resorted to use paramilitary units, composed of largely veterans, to crack down on the communists. So, what we have is the SDP-dominated Republic government using right-wing paramilitary officers to quash communist and socialist uprisings.

What was the economy of Germany like in 1900? What was the opinion among many Europeans about Germany's economy in 1900?

The largest economy in Europe by 1900, Germany had established a primary position in several key sectors, like the Chemical industry and steel production. What is interesting is that this was a relatively recent development, as Germany was relatively late in terms of industrialization. German industries had been very good job of getting involved in the Second Industrial Revolution of electricity, and they dominated steel and chemical production. Many European powers were startled and alarmed by Germany's rapid industrial growth. Great Powers like Great Britain were concerned about Germany's economic might.

Wilhelm II (German: Friedrich Wilhelm Viktor Albert; 27 January 1859 - 4 June 1941)

The last German Emperor (Kaiser) and King of Prussia, reigning from 15 June 1888 until his abdication on 9 November 1918 shortly before Germany's defeat in World War I. He was the eldest grandchild of Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom and related to many monarchs and princes of Europe, most notably his first cousin King George V of the United Kingdom and Emperor Nicholas II of Russia, whose wife, Alexandra, was Wilhelm and George's first cousin. Assuming the throne in 1888, he dismissed the country's longtime chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, in 1890 before launching Germany on a bellicose "New Course" to cement its status as a respected world power. However, due to his impetuous personality, he frequently undermined this aim by making tactless, alarming public statements without consulting his ministers beforehand. He also did much to alienate other Great Powers from Germany by initiating a massive build-up of the German Navy, challenging French control over Morocco, and backing the Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908. Wilhelm II's turbulent reign culminated in his guarantee of military support to Austria-Hungary during the crisis of July 1914, which resulted in the outbreak of World War I. A lax wartime leader, he left virtually all decision-making regarding military strategy and organisation of the war effort in the hands of the German General Staff. This broad delegation of authority gave rise to a de facto military dictatorship whose authorisation of unrestricted submarine warfare and the Zimmerman Telegram led to the United States' entry into the conflict in April 1917. After Germany's defeat in 1918, Wilhelm lost the support of the German army, abdicated on 9 November 1918, and fled to exile in the Netherlands, where he died in 1941.

The Paris Peace Conference, also known as Versailles Peace Conference

The meeting of the victorious Allied Powers following the end of World War I to set the peace terms for the defeated Central Powers. Involving diplomats from 32 countries and nationalities, the major or main decisions were the creation of the League of Nations, as well as the five peace treaties with the defeated states; the awarding of German and Ottoman overseas possessions as "mandates", chiefly to Britain and France; reparations imposed on Germany; and the drawing of new national boundaries (sometimes with plebiscites) to better reflect ethnic boundaries. The main result was the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, which in section 231 laid the guilt for the war on "the aggression of Germany and her allies". This provision proved humiliating for Germany and set the stage for the expensive reparations Germany was intended to pay (it paid only a small portion before reparations ended in 1931). The five major powers (France, Britain, Italy, Japan and the United States) controlled the Conference. The "Big Four" were French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, US President Woodrow Wilson, and Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. They met together informally 145 times and made all the major decisions, which in turn were ratified by the others.[1] The conference began on 18 January 1919, and with respect to its end date Professor Michael Neiberg has noted: Although the senior statesmen stopped working personally on the conference in June 1919, the formal peace process did not really end until July 1923, when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed".[2]

The Treaty of Versailles (French: Traité de Versailles)

The most important of the peace treaties that brouwhat ght World War I to an end. The Treaty ended the state of war between Germany and the Allied Powers. It was signed on 28 June 1919 in Versailles, exactly five years after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which had directly led to the war. The other Central Powers on the German side signed separate treaties.[6] Although the armistice, signed on 11 November 1918, ended the actual fighting, it took six months of Allied negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference to conclude the peace treaty. The treaty was registered by the Secretariat of the League of Nations on 21 October 1919. Of the many provisions in the treaty, one of the most important and controversial required "Germany [to] accept the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage" during the war (the other members of the Central Powers signed treaties containing similar articles). This article, Article 231, later became known as the War Guilt clause. The treaty required Germany to disarm, make ample territorial concessions, and pay reparations to certain countries that had formed the Entente powers. In 1921 the total cost of these reparations was assessed at 132 billion marks (then $31.4 billion or £6.6 billion, roughly equivalent to US$442 billion or UK£284 billion in 2019). At the time economists, notably John Maynard Keynes (a British delegate to the Paris Peace Conference), predicted that the treaty was too harsh—a "Carthaginian peace"—and said the reparations figure was excessive and counter-productive, views that, since then, have been the subject of ongoing debate by historians and economists. On the other hand, prominent figures on the Allied side, such as French Marshal Ferdinand Foch, criticized the treaty for treating Germany too leniently. The result of these competing and sometimes conflicting goals among the victors was a compromise that left no one satisfied, and, in particular, Germany was neither pacified nor conciliated, nor was it permanently weakened. The problems that arose from the treaty would lead to the Locarno Treaties, which improved relations between Germany and the other European powers, and the re-negotiation of the reparation system resulting in the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, and the indefinite postponement of reparations at the Lausanne Conference of 1932. Although it is often referred to as the "Versailles Conference", only the actual signing of the treaty took place at the historic palace. Most of the negotiations were in Paris, with the "Big Four" meetings taking place generally at the Quai d'Orsay.

Article 231, often known as the War Guilt Clause

The opening article of the reparations section of the Treaty of Versailles, which ended the First World War between the German Empire and the Allied and Associated Powers. The article did not use the word "guilt" but it served as a legal basis to compel Germany to pay reparations for the war. Article 231 was one of the most controversial points of the treaty. It specified: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." Germans viewed this clause as a national humiliation, forcing Germany to accept full responsibility for causing the war. German politicians were vocal in their opposition to the article in an attempt to generate international sympathy, while German historians worked to undermine the article with the objective of subverting the entire treaty. The Allied leaders were surprised at the German reaction; they saw the article only as a necessary legal basis to extract compensation from Germany. The article, with the signatory's name changed, was also included in the treaties signed by Germany's allies who did not view the clause with the same disdain as the Germans did. American diplomat John Foster Dulles—one of the two authors of the article—later regretted the wording used, believing it further aggravated the German people. The historical consensus is that responsibility or guilt for the war was not attached to the article. Rather, the clause was a prerequisite to allow a legal basis to be laid out for the reparation payments that were to be made. Historians have also highlighted the unintended damage created by the clause, which caused anger and resentment amongst the German population.

What were the people that came to power in Vichy France?

The people that came to power were opportunists, who had always been dissatisfied with a democratic, secular, third republic in France

In what does NOT appear in chapter 4 of Howard Morley Sachar's 2014 book entitled Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History, in 1922, why were the most powerful members of the Politburo, Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, so interested in stopping Trotsky from succeeding Lenin?

They feared Trotsky would become a sort of "bonapartist." The term was used more generally for a political movement that advocated a dictatorship or authoritarian centralized state, with a strongman charismatic leader based on anti-elitist rhetoric, army support, and conservatism. Marxism and Leninism developed a vocabulary of political terms that included Bonapartism, derived from their analysis of the career of Napoleon Bonaparte. Karl Marx was a student of Jacobinism and the French Revolution, and was a contemporary critic of the Second Republic and Second Empire. He used "Bonapartism" to refer to a situation in which counter-revolutionary military officers seize power from revolutionaries, and use selective reforms to co-opt the radicalism of the popular classes. Marx argued that in the process, Bonapartists preserve and mask the power of a narrower ruling class. More generally, "Bonapartism" may be used to describe the replacement of civilian leadership by military leadership within revolutionary movements or governments. Leon Trotsky was accused of using his position as commander of the Red Army to gain top-level power after Lenin's death.

What were some historical assessments of the Paris Peace Conference?

The remaking of the world map at these conferences gave birth to a number of critical conflict-prone international contradictions, which would become one of the causes of World War II.[68] The British historian Eric Hobsbawm claimed: [N]o equally systematic attempt has been made before or since, in Europe or anywhere else, to redraw the political map on national lines. [...] The logical implication of trying to create a continent neatly divided into coherent territorial states each inhabited by separate ethnically and linguistically homogeneous population, was the mass expulsion or extermination of minorities. Such was and is the reductio ad absurdum of nationalism in its territorial version, although this was not fully demonstrated until the 1940s.[69] Historians on the left have argued that Wilson's Fourteen Points, in particular, the principle of national self-determination, were primarily anti-Left measures, designed to tame the revolutionary fever sweeping across Europe in the wake of the October Revolution and the end of the war by playing the nationalist card.[70] British Historian Antony Lentin evaluates Lloyd George's role in Paris as a major success: Unrivaled as a negotiator, he had powerful combative instincts and indomitable determinism, and succeeded through charm, insight, resourcefulness, and simple pugnacity. Although sympathetic to France's desires to keep Germany under control, he did much to prevent the French from gaining power, attempted to extract Britain from the Anglo-French entente, inserted the war-guilt clause, and maintained a liberal and realist view of the postwar world. By doing so, he managed to consolidate power over the House [of Commons], secured his power base, expanded the empire, and sought a European balance of power.[71]

The Free City of Danzig (German: Freie Stadt Danzig; Polish: Wolne Miasto Gdańsk)

The rural areas around Danzig were overwhelmingly Polish and the representatives of the Polish farmers around Danzig complained about being included in the Free City of Danzig, stating they wanted to join Poland.[11][need quotation to verify] For their part, the representatives of the German population of Danzig complained about being severed from Germany, and constantly demanded that the Free City of Danzig be reincorporated into the Reich.[16] The Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan wrote that a sense of Danzig national identity never emerged during the Free City's existence, and the German population of Danzig always regarded themselves as Germans who had been unjustly taken out of Germany.[16] The loss of Danzig did indeed deeply hurt German national pride and in the interwar period, German nationalists spoke of the "open wound in the east" that was the Free City of Danzig.[17] However, until the building of Gdynia, almost all of Poland's exports went through Danzig, and Polish public opinion was opposed to Germany having a "choke-hold" on the Polish economy.[18]

What happened to the grassroots "Soviets" after the Russian Civil War?

The soviets formed as a grassroots effort to practice direct democracy. Russian Marxists made them a medium for organizing against the state, and in 1917, between the February and October Revolutions, the Petrograd Soviet became a powerful force. The Bolsheviks used the slogan "All power to the soviets!" (Vsya vlast sovyetam!; Вся власть советам! [ˈfsʲə ˈvlɐstʲ sɐˈvʲetɐm]) to oppose the Provisional Government led by Kerensky. Based on the Bolshevik view of the state, the word soviet extended its meaning to any overarching body that obtained the authority of a group of soviets. In this sense, individual soviets became part of a federal structure - Communist government bodies at local level and republic level[note 1] were called "soviets", and at the top of the hierarchy, the Congress of Soviets became the nominal core of the Union government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), officially formed in December 1922. Successive Soviet Constitutions recognised the leading role of the Communist Party in politics,[citation needed] - the 1936 Constitution deemed it the "leading nucleus of all organisations of workers, whether public or state".[5] The soviets were structured[by whom?] as the instruments through which the Party governed the country. Thus the organs of the Communist Party (the highest being the Central Committee) made decisions on state policy, while the soviets acted as a system for public approval of implementing the Party's programme. Later,[when?] in the USSR, local-government bodies were named "soviet" (sovet: "council") with an adjective indicating the administrative level, customarily abbreviated: gorsovet (gorodskoy sovet: city council), raysovet/raisovet (rayonny sovet: raion council), selsovet (sel'sky sovet: rural council), possovet (poselkovy sovet: settlement council). In practice deputies in a soviet often worked in standing committees and carried out functions with the help of unpaid volunteers (the aktiv - Russian: актив).[6]

The French Third Republic (French: La Troisième République, sometimes written as La IIIe République)

The system of government adopted in France from 1870, when the Second French Empire collapsed during the Franco-Prussian War, until 10 July 1940 after France's defeat by Nazi Germany in World War II led to the formation of the Vichy government in France. The early days of the Third Republic were dominated by political disruptions caused by the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, which the Republic continued to wage after the fall of Emperor Napoleon III in 1870. Harsh reparations exacted by the Prussians after the war resulted in the loss of the French regions of Alsace (keeping the Territoire de Belfort) and Lorraine (the northeastern part, i.e. present-day department of Moselle), social upheaval, and the establishment of the Paris Commune. The early governments of the Third Republic considered re-establishing the monarchy, but confusion as to the nature of that monarchy and who should be awarded the throne caused those talks to stall. Thus, the Third Republic, which was originally intended as a provisional government, instead became the permanent government of France. The French Constitutional Laws of 1875 defined the composition of the Third Republic. It consisted of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate to form the legislative branch of government and a president to serve as head of state. Issues over the re-establishment of the monarchy dominated the tenures of the first two presidents, Adolphe Thiers and Patrice de MacMahon, but the growing support for the republican form of government in the French population and a series of republican presidents during the 1880s quashed all plans for a monarchical restoration. The Third Republic established many French colonial possessions, including French Indochina, French Madagascar, French Polynesia, and large territories in West Africaduring the Scramble for Africa, all of them acquired during the last two decades of the 19th century. The early years of the 20th century were dominated by the Democratic Republican Alliance, which was originally conceived as a centre-left political alliance, but over time became the main centre-right party. The period from the start of World War I to the late 1930s featured sharply polarized politics, between the Democratic Republican Alliance and the more Radicals. The government fell during the early years of World War II as the Germans occupied France and was replaced by the rival governments of Charles de Gaulle's Free France (La France libre) and Philippe Pétain's Vichy France (L'État français). Adolphe Thiers called republicanism in the 1870s "the form of government that divides France least"; however, politics under the Third Republic were sharply polarized. On the left stood Reformist France, heir to the French Revolution. On the right stood conservative France, rooted in the peasantry, the Roman Catholic Church and the army.[1] In spite of France's sharply divided electorate and persistent attempts to overthrow it, the Third Republic endured for seventy years, which as of 2018 makes it the longest lasting system of government in France since the collapse of the Ancien Régime in 1789.

What was teh general Nazi opinion of Jews?

They were a parasitical race that infiltrated other ethnic groups and destroyed them from the inside

What was significant about the term "soviet" in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics?

The word "Soviet" is derived from a Russian word сове́т (sovét) meaning council, assembly, advice, harmony, concord[note 1] and all ultimately deriving from the proto-Slavic verbal stem of vět-iti ("to inform"), related to Slavic věst ("news"), English "wise", the root in "ad-vis-or" (which came to English through French), or the Dutch weten ("to know"; cf. wetenschapmeaning "science"). The word sovietnik means "councillor".[20] A number of organizations in Russian history were called "council" (Russian: сове́т). For example, in the Russian Empire the State Council, which functioned from 1810 to 1917, was referred to as a Council of Ministers after the revolt of 1905.[20] During the Georgian Affair, Vladimir Lenin envisioned an expression of Great Russian ethnic chauvinism by Joseph Stalin and his supporters, calling for these nation-states to join Russia as semi-independent parts of a greater union, which he initially named as the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia (Russian: Сою́з Сове́тских Респу́блик Евро́пы и А́зии, tr. Soyúz Sovétskikh Respúblik Evrópy i Ázii).[21] Stalin initially resisted the proposal, but ultimately accepted it, although with Lenin's agreement changed the name of the newly proposed state to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, albeit all the republics began as "Socialist Soviet" and did not change to the other order until 1936. In addition, in the national languages of several republics the word "Council/Conciliar" in the respective language was only quite late changed to an adaptation of the Russian "Soviet" and never in others, e.g. Ukraine In some cases, due to the length of its name the state was referred to as the Soviet Union or the USSR, especially when used in the Western media. It was also informally called Russia (and its citizens Russians),[22] though that was technically incorrect since Russia was only one of the republics.[23]

According to Professor Lanthier, how popular was war among the nations where there were some democratic institutions?

There is significant evidence that there was support was the war. However, photographic evidence suggests that pro-war attitudes were among the urban upper and middle-classes, primarily men. These were shopkeepers and small business owners, artisans, factory clerks, management, tailors, generally producers of goods. There were also the rising bureaucrats and pencil-pushers, and civil service. Basically, the professions group. These were men who were acculturated in the classics, and in ideals of nationhood and heroic masculinity, where war was seen as noble, and fighting and dying for one's country was a heroic endeavour. However, these middle-class men were engaged in jobs that were quiet boring. War was seen as an opportunity to live out the glories and virtues with which they could be raised. Middle- and upper-class people tended to be more nationalistic, in part because they read nationalistic newspapers, and felt a sense of attachment to their nation-state. Also, middle-class men were acculturated in the classics, and in ideals of nationhood and heroic masculinity, where war was seen as noble, and fighting and dying for one's country was a heroic endeavour. The idea of upholding classical virtues. This was paritcularly attractive to the professions, which were not particularly demanding or were in many cases tedious. Then there was the rise of women's rights. As women campaigned for the right to vote, many men felt that their role as men was being diminished. Finally, many among the middle-class felt a sort of malaise. As the traditional world faded away, many men felt insecure. War was seen as a way of reaffirming the traditional masculine values.

According to Lanthier, what is Lanthier's interpretation of the dictatorship of Hitler actually work?

There is the possibility, that historians have brought up, that Hitler was a weak dictator. There is a great debate in the literature. Was Hitler a fearless and authoritarian ruler, or was he was scared and constantly in in fear. Lanthier seems to prefer the latter interpretation. Hitler was very cautious about his movements, and very careful about seizing power. Hitler was very willing to target outsiders, and minorities. However, when it came to the bulk of ethnic Germans, Hitler was very sensitive and careful. He realized that, pre-WWII, the bulk of the German population would tacitly accept the persecution of minorities, as long as it stayed out of sight. This raises the morbid possibility that, if the Germans were willing, they could have risen up and, either curtailed Hitler, or thrown him out. This also raises the question just how powerless the German people were in the first place. Just after WWII, many German people said that the Nazi's were an oppressive dictatorship which forced obedience. However, in the 1950s-1060s, many historians said that Hitler was a weak dictator, and that the German people wre in some sense complicit. Lanthier says that, in the current literature, the Nazi regime was a brutal dictatorship, and that protest and resistance was a dangerous. However, there were areas that were free of surveillance, which provided some means of some low-level resistance. Any clear question is very hard to determine.

Why were the Balkans in 1914 the "powder-keg of Europe"?

There were a number of very young, small countries competing against each other, and with the Ottoman Empire from which they gained their independence, for territory. This competition was exacerbated by the ethno-nationalism that had arisen. These small Balkan states were primarily ethno-states, but many of these states had great ethnic mixtures, with ethnic minorities living and mixing with the ethnic majorities. For example, there were a large number of ethnic Serbs living outside of the kingdom of Serbia. The leaders of Serbia were dreaming of a greater Serbia. This situation was of great concern to Austria-Hungary, which was filled with its own ethnic minorities which, motivated by ethno-nationalism, threatened to tear the Austria-Hungarian Empire apart. As such, Austria-Hungary was very sensitive to any situations in the Balkans. In addition, Russia, always seeking access to warm-water ports, were getting involved in the Balkans, under the guise of the ethno-nationalist justification of protecting the Slavic people.

According to Lanthier, what were some benefits provided to the Russian people as a result of the Communist Rule

There were improvements in Education. The U.S.S.R. went to great lengths to provide education to all its citizens. Thanks to this education, there was a social ladder. Starting in the 1930s, people who had benefited from the system were able to climb and achieve the social mobility. The standard of living by the 1930s did improve for many Russians. As such, even in a dark state like Communist Russia, it's never as simple as saying that everything was bad.

What was the government of the Austria-Hungarian Empire?

There were three parts to the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire:[38] the common foreign, military and a joint financial policy (only for diplomatic, military and naval expenditures) under the monarch the "Austrian" or Cisleithanian government the Hungarian government Hungary and Austria maintained separate parliaments each with its own prime minister. Linking/co-ordinating the two parliaments fell to a government under the monarch. In this sense Austria-Hungary remained under an authoritarian government, as the Emperor-King appointed both Austrian and Hungarian Prime ministers along with their respective cabinets. This made both Governments responsible to the Emperor-King, as neither half could have a government with a program contrary to the views of the Monarch. The Emperor-King could appoint non-parliamentary governments, for example, or maintain in power a government which does not have a majority in Parliament to block the formation of another which he does not approve. The Monarch had other prerogatives such as the right of Royal Assent before any kind of Bill would be presented to the National Assembly (the common name for the Hungarian Diet), the right to Veto all legislation passed by the National Assembly, and the power to prorogue or dissolve the Assembly and call to new elections (he had the same prerogatives considering the Croatian-Slavonian Diet or Croatian Parliament, the common name for the Croatian-Slavonian Diet). In the Austrian half, however, the Monarchs's power was even greater, as the Emperor had the power to both appoint and dismiss its Prime minister and cabinet members. The monarch's common government, in which its ministers were appointed by the Monarch and responsible to him, had the responsibility for the army, for the navy, for foreign policy, and for the customs union.[35] Due to the lack of common law between Austria and Hungary, to conclude identical texts, each parliament elected 60 of its members to form a delegation that discussed motions of the Imperial and Royal ministries separately and worked towards a compromise.[36] A common Ministerial Council ruled the common government: it comprised the three ministers for the joint responsibilities (joint finance, military, and foreign policy), the two prime ministers, some Archdukes and the monarch.[39] Two delegations of representatives (60-60 members), one each from the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments, met separately and voted on the expenditures of the Common Ministerial Council giving the two governments influence in the common administration. However, the ministers ultimately answered only to the monarch who had the final decision on matters of foreign and military policy. Overlapping responsibilities between the joint ministries and the ministries of the two halves caused friction and inefficiencies.[36] The armed forces suffered particularly from overlap. Although the unified government determined the overall military direction, the Austrian and Hungarian governments each remained in charge of recruiting, supplies and training. Each government could have a strong influence over common governmental responsibilities. Each half of the Dual Monarchy proved quite prepared to disrupt common operations to advance its own interests.[39] Relations during the half-century after 1867 between the two parts of the dual monarchy featured repeated disputes over shared external tariff arrangements and over the financial contribution of each government to the common treasury. Under the terms of the "Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867", an agreement renegotiated every ten years, determined these matters. There was political turmoil during the build-up to each renewal of the agreement. The disputes culminated in the early 1900s in a prolonged constitutional crisis. It was triggered by disagreement over which language to use for command in Hungarian army units, and deepened by the advent to power in Budapest in April 1906 of a Hungarian nationalist coalition. Provisional renewals of the common arrangements occurred in October 1907 and in November 1917 on the basis of the status quo.[36]

What happened in November 1918 for the German nobility?

Throughout the month of November 1918, all 22 monarchs within the German Empire were either forced to abdicate, or stepped down of their own accord. Duke Ernest Augustus of Brunswick was the first to do so on 8 November. The next day, the Emperor and King of Prussia Wilhelm II, went into exile in the Netherlands, and his abdication (which he would not officially confirm until 28 November, see below) was announced by his Chancellor and Prussian Minister President Maximilian of Baden. MSDP co-chairman Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed the new "German Republic" from the Reichstag building to gathered crowds, while two hours thereafter Spartacist leader Karl Liebknecht proclaimed the "Free Socialist Republic of Germany" at Berlin Palace. Neither proclamation of the republic was constitutional, and the political situation remained chaotic for several more months, with a short civil war between radical leftist revolutionaries and the more moderate post-imperial social democrat government that would emerge victorious and form the Weimar Republic. Nevertheless, the proclamations and Wilhelm II's abdication triggered a powerful domino effect: the same day a number of other princes stepped down, and within a week most monarchs in Germany had followed suit. The last to abdicate was King William II of Württemberg on 30 November 1918.

The 1917 French Army mutinies

Took place amongst French Army troops on the Western Front in Northern France during World War I. They started just after the unsuccessful and costly Second Battle of the Aisne, the main action in the Nivelle Offensive in April 1917. General Robert Nivelle had promised a decisive war-ending victory over the Germans in 48 hours; the men were euphoric on entering the battle. The shock of failure soured their mood overnight. The mutinies and associated disruptions involved, to various degrees, nearly half of the French infantry divisions stationed on the Western Front. The term "mutiny" does not accurately describe events: soldiers remained in trenches and were willing to defend but rejected attack orders. The new commander, General Philippe Pétain, restored morale by talking to the men, promising no more suicidal attacks, providing rest for exhausted units, home leave, and moderate discipline. He held 3,400 courts martial; 554 mutineers were sentenced to death but only 26 were actually executed.[1] While the immediate cause was the extreme optimism and subsequent disappointment at the Nivelle Offensive in the spring of 1917, other causes were pacifism (stimulated by the Russian Revolution and the trade-union movement) and disappointment at the non-arrival of American troops, whom French soldiers on the front had unrealistically been expecting to arrive within days of the U.S. declaration of war.[2] The mutinies were kept secret from the Germans and their full extent was not revealed until decades later. The Germans' inability to detect the mutinies has been described as one of the most serious and most consequential intelligence failures of the war.

What were the demands that total war placed on the World War I belligerents?

Total war demanded total mobilization of all the nation's resources for a common goal. Manpower had to be channeled into the front lines (all the powers except the United States and Britain had large trained reserves designed just for that). Behind the lines labor power had to be redirected away from less necessary activities that were luxuries during total war. In particular, vast munitions industries had to be built up to provide shells, guns, warships, uniforms, airplanes, and a hundred other weapons both old and new. Agriculture had to provide food for both civilians and for soldiers (some of whom had been farmers and needed to be replaced by women, children and the elderly who now did the work without animal assistance) and for horses to move supplies. Transportation, in general, was a challenge, especially when Britain and Germany each tried to intercept merchant ships headed for the enemy. Finance was a special challenge. Germany financed the Central Powers. Britain financed the Allies until 1916 when it ran out of money and had to borrow from the United States. The U.S. took over the financing of the Allies in 1917 with loans that it insisted be repaid after the war. The victorious Allies looked to defeated Germany in 1919 to pay reparations that would cover some of their costs. Above all, it was essential to conduct the mobilization in such a way that the short term confidence of the people was maintained, the long-term power of the political establishment was upheld, and the long-term economic health of the nation was preserved.

What were the three members of the OHL (Oberste Heeresleitung) Supreme Command of the German Army during the WWI?

Walther Rathenau, chairman of the Prussian War office and War Materials Section (KRA) Paul von Hindenburg, Chief of the General Staff (1916-1919) Erich Ludendorff, Quartermaster General of the German Army (1916-1918)

What were the policies of War Communism?

War communism included the following policies: 1 Nationalization of all industries and the introduction of strict centralized management 2 State control of foreign trade 3 Strict discipline for workers, with strikes forbidden 4 Obligatory labor duty by non-working classes 5 Prodrazvyorstka - requisition of agricultural surplus (in excess of an absolute minimum) from peasants for centralized distribution among the remaining population 6 Rationing of food and most commodities, with centralized distribution in urban centers 7 Private enterprise banned 8 Military-style control of the railways Because the Bolshevik government implemented all these measures in a time of civil war, they were far less coherent and coordinated in practice than they might appear on paper. Large areas of Russia remained outside Bolshevik control, and poor communications meant that even those regions loyal to the Bolshevik government often had to act on their own, lacking orders or coordination from Moscow. It has long been debated[by whom?] whether "war communism" represented an actual economic policy in the proper sense of the phrase, or merely a set of measures intended to win the civil war.[1]

According to Lanthier, why did the Social Democrats support and vote for Hindenburg? What did Hindenburg do in response?

While the Social Democrats did not like HIndenburg, and the feeling was mutual, the Social Democrats saw Hindenburg as the only way to stop Hitler. In response, Hindenburg dismissed Brüning. Brüning was already a very unpopular. Hindenburg decided to look to the right-wing parties for help.

According to Professor Lanthier, how did WWI change the view of the role of the government?

World War I saw the government's power increase exponentially. Many people at the time saw this as a temporary response to an emergency, and after the war, state's reverted to their less interventionist role. Nevertheless, this set a precedent that would not be forgotten.

In "the Reaction", p. 82-161, to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, when did the Prime Minister of Serbia Pašić learn about the assassination?

[p. 84] ¶5 Prime Pašić was on board a train bound for Kosovo to celebrate the anniversary of the battle on the evening of the 28th when news of the killings reached him. Although shocked, he continued his journey and attended the celebration. He was in the midst of an election campaign in which he and his party were challenged by opponents demanding a more- [p. 84] ¶1-aggressive foreign policy. Pašić could not afford to be seen as less patriotic than the opposition. But he had been working to improve relations with Austria-Hungary, believing that Serbia needed a long period of peace t consolidate the gains made in the Balkan wars. Those wars had cost 370 million dinars: three times the entire budget for 1912. The army was in a desperate state, and the minister of war estimated that it would take ten years to rebuild it. Pašić wanted to avoid a confrontation with Austria." (Martel 2014, 83-84).

Gavrilo Princip (Serbian Cyrillic: Гаврило Принцип, pronounced [ɡǎʋrilo prǐntsip]; 25 July 1894[1] - 28 April 1918)

a Bosnian Serb member of Young Bosnia, a Yugoslavist organization seeking an end to Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the age of 19 years old he assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife, Sophie, in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, initiating a chain of events that would lead to the outbreak of World War I.[2] Princip and his accomplices were arrested and implicated the Serbian nationalist secret society known as the Black Hand, leading Austria-Hungary to issue a démarche to Serbia known as the July Ultimatum.[3] Princip said the archduke was targeted because "as future Sovereign he would have prevented our union by carrying through certain reforms", an allusion to the archduke's reputed support for structural reforms of the monarchy that would assign more autonomy to the Slavic lands.[4] This was a threat to the Serbian irredentist project. Princip was a Yugoslav nationalist associated with the movement Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia) which predominantly consisted of Serbs, but also Bosniaks and Croats.[5] During his trial he stated: "I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be freed from Austria."[6] Princip died on April 28, 1918, from tuberculosis caused by poor prison conditions that had cost him a limb earlier.

The Bundesrat ("Federal Council") of the German Empire

in theory, the highest authority of the Empire. It existed from 1871 to 1918 and succeeded the same body of the North German Confederation. Until the 1902 spelling reform, its name was spelled Bundesrath. The Bundesrat comprised representatives of the 25 member states (Bundesstaaten). The numbers of votes of each state were specified in the imperial constitution. The representatives of the states voted as directed by their governments. The chairmanship of the Bundesrat was held by the Imperial Chancellor. All laws passed in Germany had to have the support of the Bundesrat. In addition, certain official procedures carried out by the Kaiser had to be voted on, for example, the dissolution of the Reichstag and declarations of war. The Bundesrat ruled on Reichsexekutions; in addition it had numerous administrative functions and the power to adjudicate disputes between the states and, in certain cases, to resolve constitutional disputes within a state. An Imperial Supreme Court, unlike that of the Constitution of St. Paul's Church, was not envisaged in the Imperial Constitution as an independent body, rather jurisdiction lay with the German Emperor and King of Prussia. The Bundesrat was, in practice, dominated by Prussia. It had a plurality of 17 votes in the chamber; no other state had more than six votes. It could control the proceedings by forming alliances with the other states. Additionally, Bismarck served as both prime minister and foreign minister of Prussia for almost his entire tenure. In the latter capacity, he had the right to instruct the Prussian deputies to the Bundesrat. The political reality was that the Bundesrat, in spite of its authority, was pushed into the background by the Kaiser and the Reich Chancellor due to the simple fact that the Prussian minister-president often held the office of Reich chancellor simultaneously and was thus chairman of the Bundesrat. For changes to the constitution a proposal had to go through the normal legislative process. That said, it only needed 14 votes in the Bundesrat to vote down a proposal. That meant that Prussia, with its 17 votes, effectively had a right of veto over constitutional changes.

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", how militarized were the Great Powers of Europe by 1914?

¶2 "... By 1914, millions of men, already serving or reservists, were ready or being made ready to fight. At full mobilization, Russia's army comprised 3.5 million men, Germany's 2.1 million, France's 1.8 million, and Austria-Hungary's 1.3 million. Great Britain was the only great power without a mass reserve conscript army. Its volunteer army of aroune 100,000 men, trained largely for colonial warfare, was puny compared with the size of the armies of the other great powers. But Britain had the Royal Navy, which allowed it to dominate the world's sea lanes and was the military basis of its imperial domination. It also had the potential to call upon huge numbers of recruits from its world empire." (Kershaw 2015, 28).

In the prologue to Gordon Martel's 2014 book entitled The Month That Changed the World, just how much influence did Kaiser Wilhelm II's style of 'personal rule' have over the policies of the German Empire?

¶2 "Debate has raged over the thesis that the kaiser's personal rule' dominated policies of the empire.33[33.] It is true that his interventions were spasmodic, his opinions vacillating, his reactions unpredictable. This meant that he was never responsible for constructing long-term plans and even less so for the day-to-day administration of policy. He did succeed in making life difficult for those who were responsible for planning and administering. 'Far from being the moving cog at the centre of the German governmental machine, Wilhelm II was usually a spanner in the works.'34[34.] But at the same time, everyone around the kaiser recognized that he would insist on having the final word on any issue of importance, and that it would be fruitless to undertake anything of significance without being certain of his support. On any critical decision--especially one that would determine war or peace--his would be the opinion that mattered." (Martel 2014, 25).

In Chapter 1 of Ian Kershaw's 2015 book entitled "To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949", what does the author say ultimately caused World War 1?

¶2 "The high-risk strategy of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia -- the willingness to escalate rather than to calm an essentially local conflict even if it meant a full-scale European war to serve their respective aims of power-politics -- ultimately caused the catastrophe of 1914. Nd of these three powers, as noted, Germany bears especial responsibility. Without the 'blank cheque', in which Germany guaranteed its support, Austria-Hungary would not have been emboldened to issue Serbia with such an uncompromising ultimatum. And without Austrian aggressive intransigence, Russia would not have committed its support to Serbia, with all the consequences that entailed. The 'blank cheque' was the trigger that meant a general European war became more, not less, likely." (Kershaw 2015, 25).