HIST 484(201) Final Exam Preparation.

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"... China's military experience from 1850 to 1911 is, indeed, replete with failure. Qing China badly lost the Arrow War (1856-1860) and the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).- (p. 154) -During the Boxer Uprising in 1900 an allied foreign army again swept away Chinese resistance as it marched to Beijing. The military was so weak that from 1897 onward Qing diplomats could not resist foreign demands for economic concessions and military bases, and in 1904 the Chinese could only watch as the Russo-Japanese War was fought primarily on Chinese soil." (Yu 2012, 153-154)

In "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution" by Richard S. Horowitz in the 2012 anthology "Beyond the Marble Boat: The Transformation of the Chinese Military, 1850-1911" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 153-174, how did the military transformation done after the Sino-Japanese War affect the late Qing state?

"... First, there were shifts in the relationship of the central government in Beijing and the provincial leaders. Second, as local elites became more involved in organizing local militia and other military activities, they became deeply involved in the political realm. Finally, the New Armies were crucial to the overthrow of the Qing regime." (Yu 2012, 169)

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, what was the outcome of the Battle of Muye? What kind of idea did the Zhou tradition propulgate as the outcome of the Battle of Muye?

"... For its impact on both history and memory, the encounter at Muye must rank as one of the most decisive battles ever fought in China. The story put out by the Zhou victors, reflected and elaborated in the writings of their descendants many centuries later, is that the battle of Muye was a dramatic confrontation between virtue and vice.1[1.] The last Shang king appears as a monstrous caricature of lust and cruelty, the inventor of fiendish new tortures who presided over orgies amid forests of meat and pools of wine and cut open the body of one of his advisers to find out whether the heart of a sage had seven apertures.2[2.] The Zhou founders, in contrast, are presented as paragons of virtue and champions of righteousness. In some version of the Muye story, the battle was one-sided and virtually bloodless as the Shang fighting men turned their weapons against their own leaders. The Zhou tradition held that the outcome was due not simply to a revolt of the oppressed against their oppressors, but to divine intervention bestowing military success and political legitimacy--the "Mandate of Heaven" (tian ming)--upon men of virtue.3[3.]" (Graff 2016, 195)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the rationale for linking sacrifice and warfare/hunting?

"... There is evidence to suggest at least two links between sacrifice and warfare in the constitution of authority. First, they were both modes of taking life, and taking life is a vivid expression of power. Second and more important, these activities were recognized as the primary means of serving the ancestors and the gods of locality, a service which consisted of both the physical feeding of these spirits and the "feeding' of their honor. I shall discuss each of these links below." (Lewis 1990, 20)

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, what does this chapter consider?

"... [This chapter] first considers the range of justifications for going to war (jus ad bellum) that were offered in ancient China, placing the concept of righteous war in this larger context and then highlighting the areas where advocates of righteous war disagreed with one another. After examining key weaknesses in the righteous war doctrine, especially its susceptibility to political- (p. 197) ¶1 "-manipulation, we will go on to consider the various ideas that were put forward in ancient China regarding the appropriate conduct of war (jus in bello). Since most early Chinese texts reflect the work of many hands, the majority of them anonymous, and because the longstanding assumption that early Chinese thought can be conveniently sorted into discrete "schools" (Legalist, Confucian etc.) has recently fallen into disrepute,6[6.] this chapter will take texts--rather than theorists or schools of thought--as its objects of analysis" (Graff 2016, 196-197)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, when did the Great all begin to be built, and why?

"Building of what we now know as the Great Wall began in the middle of the fifteenth century in response to Mongol raiding, though earlier dynasties had constructed similar fortifications from time to time.4 Sections of wall were initially constructed as local responses to that raiding, and only gradually linked into a continuous defense line. This was not a xenophobic response to non-Chinese, or an attempt to divide what was China from the steppe, but rather an ad hoc measure to mitigate a particular military problem. It took some time for the imperial court to sanction wall building as a policy, and to provide extra funds to support it. These long walls had an ancient pedigree in Chinese history, but they were not the walls of the first emperor of China, as they are so often described. Indeed, their construction was not so much a policy, as the failure of policy. Unable to decide either to advance or to withdraw the Ming army to more defensible positions, the court chose to adopt a temporary measure that effectively became permanent." (Lorge 2017, 75)

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, what was the philosophy of war reflected by the Mozi and the Mohists?

"By far the strongest assertion of the legitimacy of defensive war, however, comes from the book of Mozi, a work reflecting the ideas of the late fifth-century BCE thinker Mo Di that was given shape by his followers--the Mohists--over some two centuries. More than any of the other philosophical tendencies and intellectual lineages of the Warring States period, the Mohists were truly a school of thought, a militant, tightly-organized sect with a clearly defined body of doctrine. Their philosophy, often characterized by modern scholars as a sort of utilitarianism, aimed at the attainment of three fundamental goals: material sufficiency, population growth, and the maintenance of social order. The wars of conquest waged by the rulers of the Warring States were highly detrimental on all three counts, and the Mozi contains several powerful denunciations of the loss of human life and waste of scarce resources resulting from aggressive war.26[26.] Except for their much larger scale, offensive wars were logically no different from the crimes of robbery and murder that the same rulers punished severely when they occurred within their own states. In order to deter offensive wars (or stymie their perpetrators, should deterrence fail), Mo Di and his followers were strong advocates of defensive preparations and armed resistance. Thus, the book of Mozi tells us, "preparation is what a country should emphasize. SUpply is the treasure of a country, armament its claws, and the city walls are the stronghold of its self-defence. And these three items are the essentials to the existence of a state."27[27.] The Mohists practiced what they preached, becoming experts in the technical aspects of defending a city under siege. The Mozi includes a story of how Mo Di employed a sort of kriegspiel to dissuade the state of Chu from attacking the capital of its smaller neighbor Song, using his belt to represent the city wall and small sticks for weapons.28[28.] Many members of the Mohist sect gave their lives defending besieged cities." (Graff 2016, 199)

"Facing a momentous peasant rebellion inspired by prototypical Christian ideals, the ruling Qing dynasty would have collapsed in the mid-nineteenth century had it not been for the military genius of a prominent Confucian scholar, Zeng Guofan (1811-1872). Zeng and his military thought occupy a unique place in Chinese military history. It is true that there have been many military strategists and theorists throughout the annals of Chinese statecraft, and Zeng Guofan himself may not have been the most brilliant or original, but he was exceptional in the sense that he was one of the very few who were both theorists and practitioners of military doctrines. Few influential strategists have had the opportunity of creating, training, and commanding a huge and powerful army based upon self-taught or self-synthesized principles of war." (Yu 2012, 144)

How does Lei Haizong, author of " Chinese Culture and Chinese Soldiers" describe what happened between civilian-military relations during the period of the Han and the Tang?

"In terms of their social origins, the soldiers did not come directly from the midst of the people, so naturally they had no emotional link with normal folk. It was hard to say how much loyalty they had to the state, but since the emperor supported them, they were prepared to sell their lives for him. The bulk of the common people, living as they were in the midst of a reasonably settled empire, gradually lost any knowledge of things military. Since these docile people were unwilling to defend the nation and were incapable of defending themselves, it was difficult for them to avoid being looked down on by the collection of social outcasts who formed the army, and from disdain to bullying was but one short, natural step. At the same time, since the soldiers were riff-raff, they were despised by good citizens. Since this type of disdain was not backed up by any force, the people were unable to bully soldiers directly, and could only defame them with words. The origins of the saying "good iron is not used for nails, and good men do not become soldiers" are unknown, but this mentality of despising soldiers certainly started to appear as early as the Han." Lei Haizong, author of " Chinese Culture and Chinese Soldiers".

In "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution" by Maochun Yu in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 135-151, what were some of the reforms that Zeng worked out in the 1850s and 1860s to deal with the Taiping Rebellion, specifically in term of civilian command over the military?

"Second, Zeng Guofan steadfastly stressed the importance of civilian command over the military. This reflects the ideal of "excellence in both literary and martial skills" (wen wu shuang quan). Zeng himself is revered as the quintessential scholar-general: a physically unimpressive scholar applying his brilliant intellect to the command of an awesome and ferocious fighting force. Zeng used many fellow literati as his top generals and officers of senior grade. In his Hunan Army, over half of the officers had previously been literary candidates for the imperial examinations; the top 10 percent of the army's officer corps were literati who had already passed an examination. In fact, only at the bottom of the officer ranks did the military candidates outnumber the literary candidates.9 All the prominent leaders of the Hunan Army and other forces created later on the same pattern were without exception members of the literati class. The Hunan Army was in fact an army of peasants led by literati, as if the U.S. Army were being run by Ph.D.s in the humanities." (Yu 2012, 147)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, what was the Battle of Pyongyang on February 8, 1593?

"The Battle of Pyongyang on February 8, 1593 saw a head-to-head clash between the Ming-Korean army and the Japanese defenders of the city. The city was captured in a brutal assault backed by cannons, fire-arrows, and smoke bombs. Fierce hand-to-hand street fighting dislodged the Japanese, who lost 6,000-7,000 men in the city, another 6,000 who drowned while fleeing, and several hundred more to planned ambushes. Ming dead numbered about 800. The Japanese army had never before faced the sort of firepower brought to bear on them in Pyongyang.11[11.] This was in many ways the decisive battle of the war, and all subsequent campaigns. The Japanese saw that they could not face Ming cannon, and that as long as the Ming supported the Koreans, they could not conquer Korea. After the Battle of Pyongyang they avoided direct clashes with Ming forces armed with cannon, preferring ambushes and hit-andrun tactics. The Japanese were also required to defend a number of fortified positions." (Lorge 2017, 84)

In "State Making and State Breaking" by David A. Graff, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, how did ambitious leaders who wanted to claim the Mandate of Heaven go about trying to establish a new imperial regime?

"Some of the regional leaders were essentially separatists whose principalconcern was to preserve their independence for as long as possible. Others harbored the ambition of overcoming their rivals to reunify "all under Heaven" and establish a new imperial regime. These ambitious, expansionist leaders signalled their intentions and sought to gather support by taking imperial titles and assuming other trappings of legitimacy, instituting proper court ritual and appointing men to high offices. They competed with one another in several ways. One was the manipulation of symbolic propaganda, which in some periods might involve the discovery of numinous stones, purple clouds, and other auspicious portents. Another was to send envoys to persuade uncommitted local leaders to submit to their authority. The most important and effective means of competition, however, involved military force. The major contenders raised large armies and sought to conquer their opponents' territories. Campaigns usually centered around the capture of walled cities, administrative centers whose control ensured domination of the surrounding countryside, and battles in the open field were often precipitated by efforts to relieve besieged cities. Victory in a major battle could produce a decisive shift in the balance of power. The great Tang victory at Hulao near Luoyang in 621 eliminated both Wang Shichong and Dou Jiande and delivered the eastern plains to Li Yuan, just as Zhu Yuanzhang's victory in the Boyang Lake campaign of 1363 led to the annexation of the Han state on the middle Yangzi and a vast increase in Ming power. Chinese civil wars often exhibited a "bandwagoning" pattern, with -subordinate elements of the defeated coalition and uncommitted local leaders rushing to align themselves with the winning side after a major battle. Participants seemed to expect the restoration of imperial unity, and local leaders without imperial ambitions of their own were more interested in ending up in the good graces of the eventual winner than in defending their independence to the last ditch." (Graff 2012, 48)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what does Mark Edward Lewis about the Eastern Zhou states?

"The Eastern Zhou states were dominated by an aristocracy that defined itself through performance of the "great services," which consisted of offering sacrifice at the altars of the ancestral temple and the state,a nd winning booty and glory through ceremonial hunts and equally ceremonial combats. All these activities culminated in presentations at the altars, and the distribution and consumption of the meat from these ceremonies served both to define the elite and link it together in networks of exchange. This aristocracy was in turn divided into a hierarchy of lineages through the principles of "lineage law," but the lower-level lineages were simply reduced replicas of the royal house and the feudal lords, each with its own capital, ancestral temple, "she" altar, dependent population, and military forces. Because this segmentary pattern of authority- (p. 51) -gave each lineage a base of power independent of its titular lord, and all nobles were ascriptive kin, the lower levels of the Zhou nobility were able to enjoy a proximity of status and a casual sociability with their rulers which was radically different from that of courtiers in imperial China. They were also able to compete with their putative superiors and their fellows in a general struggle for supremacy. The battles which constituted one element of the "great services" were primarily means of gaining glory for the lineage and the self, so the nobles of the Spring and Autumn period lived a life devoted to the winning of prestige through heroism and martial prowess. This was true not only in wars between states but also in the struggles between lineages for supremacy within the state, and in the constant vendettas and acts of bloody vengeance provoked by the obsessive concern with honor and prowess. The pursuit of honor for the lineage and the individual noble led the Zhou aristocracy into a deepening spiral of civil warn and mutual annihilation that ended in the destruction of much of the nobility and the creation of the new political and social forms that characterized the Warring States period. One innovation that appeared in the Spring and Autumn period itself as a new means of reconstituting the political order was the blood covenant. First used by the most powerful of the feudal states to forge leagues and impose their own authority as the "master of the covenant" or hegemon, these sacrificial oaths were gradually applied to any situation in which men sought to forge new coalitions and impose binding ties on their fellows. In this way these instruments of interstate diplomacy came to provide the means for organizing conspiracy, insurrection, and civil war. They were also employed to draw new social elements, most notably the members of the capital populace, into active service in the political struggles of the day. As civil wars and the increasingly frequent destruction of states and lineages tore apart the old order of feudalism and lineage law, the blood covenant came to play an ever more important role as the sole means of binding men together for collective action. The culmination of this process is vividly demonstrated in the large number of covenants unearthed at Houma. In the Introduction I suggested that the patterns of sanctioned violence could cast light on the nature and distribution of authority, on the fundamental divisions of a society, on what its people held to be of deepest significance, and perhaps on how men understood their own civilization and its relation to the natural world. For the Eastern Zhou state we have found that authority was explicitly identified with the performance of the ritually guided violence of sacrifice and warfare, that this authority was distributed throughout the aristocracy on the basis of ascriptive kin ties, that the matter of highest significance was honor, that- (p. 52) -the fundamental unit of elite society was the lineage, and that ritual violence granted authority and structured society through its culmination in the service of the spirits, both ancestral and local. Sanctioned violence and the authority which it defined were both ultimately expressions of the cultic service which linked men to the world of ancestors and gods. When the social order defined through differential relations to common ancestors and the ritual service of the altars began to crumble together with the monarchy, new political ties were constituted through the presumptive power of blood sacrifice to substantiate words and thus make oaths sacred and binding. With the accelerating distingretation of that order in the incessant wars and vendettas of the late Spring and Autumn period, the use of blood sacrifice to sanction pledges became the dominant form of binding men together in a political order and imposing obedience to the dictates of the new rulers. In this development we see the beginnings of the new patterns of sanctioned violence and authority that characterized the Warring States period." (Lewis 1990, 50-52)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, by what terms should the great Wall be judged?

"The Great Wall should not be seen in terms of the repair or revival of a simple and ineffective ancient barrier against the steppe threat. It was neither ancient nor simple nor ineffective. Rather, the Ming dynasty's Great Wall must be seen in the context of warfare increasingly marked by cannon and handgun. Earlier dynasties also built long walls for defense against steppe, and even other Chinese, armies with mixed results. The Ming Great Wall was created not so much because similar fortifications had been built in the past, but because guns and walls together made for a potent combination. Chinese infantrymen had become comfortable using guns from fortifications or ships; walls allowed them to use these slow-firing weapons against steppe raiders. Initially the walls merely redirected steppe raiders, but as the line of walls was completed, it was necessary actually to defend them." (Lorge 2017, 76)

In "State Making and State Breaking" by David A. Graff, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what was the usual pattern regarding China's dynastic transitions?

"The civil wars that surrounded China's dynastic transitions rarely lasted more than fifteen years from the breakdown of the old imperial regime to the consolidation of its successor. (Unsuccessful rebellions, such as that of the Taipings in the nineteenth century, also tended to run their course within the same time frame.) The usual pattern saw one of the major contenders defeat his rivals one by one and add to the resources at his disposal until his ultimate victory was all but inevitable. On those relatively rare occasions when several of the weaker regional powers were able to cooperate effectively to check the expansion of their strongest competitor, however, military stalemate and political division could last for a very long time. In the last years of Eastern Han, Cao Cao succeeded in eliminating all of his rivals in north China, but his attempt to conquer the Yangzi valley and the far south was stymied when his two remaining opponents, Sun Quan and Liu Bei, joined forces to defeat him in the famous Battle of Red Cliff in 208 C.E. This battle ushered in the three-way balance of power between Cao's Wei state in the north, Liu's Shu-Han in Sichuan, and Sun's Wu state based on the lower Yangzi that dragged on until 263. The peasant rebellions against the waning Tang dynasty in the late ninth century also gave rise to a prolonged period of disunity, as the conflict between the Liang regime based on the Henan plains and the Shatuo Turk state in Shanxi (and later the incursions of the nomadic Kitan people from the northern steppe) permitted several autonomous regional regimes to cement their control over the south. Imperial unity was not re- stored until the second half of the tenth century, under the Song dynasty." (Graff 2012, 51)

In Paul van Els 2013 article "Righteous, Furious, or Arrogant? On Classifications of Warfare in Early Chinese Texts", in the anthology "Early Chinese Texts Debating War in Chinese History"", edited by Howard M. Hensel, what much is Master Wen in support of using war?

"The unearthed Master Wen fragments exhibit a quietist philosophy that centers on union with the Way through, among other things, the practice of being non-active. Warfare may well be the most extreme form of active conduct and certainly something the text would argue against. ..." (Van Els 2013, 30)

According to Clausewitz, what is the Trinity of War?

"War (is) a paradoxical trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability ...; and ... as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone." Carl von Clausewitz THE TRINITARIAN ANALYSIS AND THE NATURE OF WAR Irrational i.e. the Realm of Emotion and Passion = THE PEOPLE, associated w/ "Primordial Violence", "Passions, Hate". Rational i.e. the Realm of Reason = THE GOVERNMENT/STATE, associated w/ "Political aims", "reasons" "Calculations" "element of subordination" "Instrument of Policy". Chance/Unknowable i.e. the Realm of Genius = THE COMMANDER AND HIS ARMY associated w/ "The play of chance, probability, and the creative spirit," "Fog of War", "Friction", "Genius".

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, by what were Ming expeditions launched 1405-1433 about?

"While the Ming army was pulling back from the steppe and establishing the Great Wall as its northern border, the Yongle emperor was dispatching a series of naval expeditions to the south and west. Under the command of the Muslim eunuch Admiral Zheng He, these events were practically insignificant at the time and only received much attention in the twentieth century, after the European voyages of discovery had become a symbol of Western technological prowess and outward expansion. Strictly speaking, Zheng's fleet was not exploring, in the sense of going where no one had gone before; they followed the paths of preexisting trade routes. His seven voyages between 1405 and 1433 projected Ming power to South and Southeast Asia. They were military and diplomatic expeditions, well armed and provided with soldiers, and intended by the Ming court to make its power known.5[5.]" (Lorge 2017, 76)

In Chapter 1 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what triggered the Eight Trigram Sect (1813)?

#1 "... In 1812, the Eight Trigram's leaders, Lin QIng and Li Wencheng, announced that Li was a "true lord of the Ming," and declared 1813 as the year for rebellion. After winning support from several powerful eunuchs who worked in the Forbidden City. They might have been successful in overthrowing the Qing, except that Prince Mianning--the future Daoguang Emperor--used his forbidden musket to oppose the invaders.36 ... #3 Lin Qing and Li Wencheng seemed to have been inspired to overthrow the Qing by the appearance in 1811 of a bright comet. Although Beijing claimed that this comet showed great glory for the Dynasty, Lin and Li apparently saw this as an "auspicious blessing for their enterprise" to overthrow the Dynasty. ..." (Ellemen 2007, 10)

In Chapter 1 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what triggered the White Lotus Rebellion?

#2 The members of the White Lotus Society (Bailian jiao) were not ethnically different from Han Chinese, but belonged to a popular religious organization that was based on a mixture of Taoism, Buddhism, and Manicheaism. One of the core beliefs was that the dual deities--Buddha and the Manichean "Prince of Light"--would come to earth to establish an earthly paradise. Although there had been WHite Lotus outbreak before (for example, in 1622 in Shandong Province) the 1796 rebellion was centered in Hubei, Sichuan, and Shaanxi Provinces.30 It was indirectly sparked by the Miao Revolt, since White Lotus congregations formed their own protective militias, which then rose in open revolt against the Qing Dynasty during February 1796.31" (Ellemen 2007, 9)

In Chapter 1 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what was, in the eyes of Chinese rulers, the ultimate goal of the state, and how did that affect the Chinese way of warfare?

#3 "Since ancient times, Chinese rulers have proclaimed that "unity" of the Empire was the ultimate goal of the state, because unity meant "domestic peace, the prerequisite for prosperity and civilized life." To a large degree, the army's role was to sustain the unity of the Empire and, when necessary, to fight to reinstate it. However, in the Confucian world, the military was subservient to the Mandarin bureaucrat, which considered military means as just one element of state control. This was particularly the case whenever so-called barbarian dynasties ruled China--such as under the Manchus' Qing Dynasty--when the "Confucian scholars" kept the "conquering barbarian military in their properly subordinate place ... by helping the barbarian rulers hold power through all the civilian, more-than-military means that the task required."18 #4 Frank Kierman and John Fairbank's "Chinese Ways in Warfare" was one of the first western books to study CHinese military philosophy. They identified three important characteristics of Chinese warfare: (1) the close interconnection between the military and bureaucracy; (2) a desire to avoid violence- (p. 7) #1-whenever possible, and (3) a tendency to rely on defensive, rather than offensive, warfare. Although extermination of an enemy is acceptable, and is on occasion preferable, it is usually "less costly" simply to exhaust and pacify the enemy. THerefore, in the tradition of Sunzi, author of "Art of War", the best war is the one that never has to be fought.19 #2 When war was unavoidable, however, the Chinese military generals would draw no quarter.20 Unlike Europe, where warfare gradually became intertwined with questions of morality, ethics, and international law,21 in the Chinese way of thinking there wa sno universal law governing war, since the highest possible military and political goal was to achieve unity. As a result, the slaughter of innocent civilians and non-combatants was commonplace, and the estimates for the numbers of poeple killed while quelling CHina's internal rebellion during the nineteenth century are in the tens of millions. One estimate of the number of Chinese killed during her twentieth-century wars and political mass movements has topped 115 million.22" (Ellemen 2007, 6-7)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what were the major battles of the Opium War (1839-42)?

#5 During the course of the Opium War (1839-42) there were only three notable confrontations--the September 1839 "Battle of Kowloon," the November 1839 "Battle of Chuanbi," and the August 1840 "Battle of the Barrier"--that even earned the title of battle. Most of the other noteworthy Sino-British- (p. 15) #1-engagements--with the so-called Suanyuanli Incident being a notable exception--were British-sponsored actions designed to take strategically placed cities and level China's defensive fortresses. ..." (Ellemen 2007, 14-15)

In chapter 6 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was Scobell's analysis of CHina's road to the war, speicifically with regard to any passiveness or aggressiveness among the PLA?

(p. 141) §2 A Passive/Aggressive PLA - Opposition by military figures was also likely linked to ambiguity over the precise military objectives of the operation. Such ambiguity is inherent in the practice of coercive diplomacy, and the civil-military distinction is often exacerbated when a state resorts to such behavior.107 As Alexander George explains: In contrast to . . . traditional military strategy . . . coercive strategy focuses on affecting the enemy's will rather than upon negating his capabilities. It does not rely on ample or quick use of force to achieve political objectives. Rather, if threats alone do not suffice and force is actually used, it is employed in a more limited, selective way. . . .108 §3 The reason for this tension is that soldiers and diplomats see coercive diplomacy from very different perspectives. While both invariably prefer a solution short of war, statesmen favor subtle signals and gradual increases in the pressure applied to an opponent in order to deter or compel them. Soldiers, by contrast, prefer to send a strong, direct, and unambiguous message promptly - a rapid, massive show of force to bring an opponent swiftly to his senses. (p. 141) §1 While the political objectives were more or less straightforward, the military goals of the attack were never fully spelled out. The general political goal was to force Vietnam to respect China's resolve, and more specifically to put an end to the persistent border provocations as well as force Vietnam to divert military resources away from Cambodia. All these aims were mentioned either in Beijing's formal policy statements or remarks by top leaders. By contrast, China was unlikely to reveal the military goals prior to or even during the actual war because this would provide valuable intelligence to the enemy. And these precise goals were not revealed afterward so that China could claim victory no matter how unsuccessful the outcome. Indeed, the closest China came to giving a military objective was the formally stated goal of ending Vietnam's harassment along the nations' common frontier and improving border security generally. Deng also gave this as the primary aim of the action in a discussion with U.S. Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal during the latter's visit to China in late February 1979.109 Still it was never explained precisely how these objectives would be achieved. §2 Available evidence suggests that military objectives were never properly specified.110 Deng was extremely vague on this subject during a meeting with Indian journalists on February 14, three days before China's attack. When asked what he meant by "teaching Vietnam a lesson," Deng replied, "Well, you see it depends on how the situation develops."111 Certainly Deng was in part being deliberately cagey in order to deceive Vietnam (as noted previously). But the vagueness also probably reflected the imprecise military goals of the operation. At a February 26 meeting in the midst of the conflict, Deng was asked by the president of the Kyodo News Agency what precise lesson the Chinese had in mind for the Vietnamese. Deng responded: "We would not mind military achievements. Our objective is a limited one, that is to teach them they could not run about as much as they desired."112 Such vagueness likely contributed to opposition by some military figures to the operation. Without a clear idea of what was to be accomplished, many PLA men were reluctant to support such a risky attack. In this regard, Chinese soldiers tend, like soldiers in some other countries, to be conservative, pessimistic, and more reluctant than their civilian counterparts to resort to force.113 §3 The soldiers who did seem very eager to "teach Vietnam a lesson" were those with a strong anti-Vietnam sentiment. Most such soldiers were involved in assisting the Vietnamese communists in their wars against the French and Americans. China provided a considerable amount of arms to Vietnam between 1957 and 1974. In the 1960s, Beijing provided an estimated U.S. $60 million in weaponry to Hanoi, which constituted almost two-thirds of China's entire foreign military assistance during this decade.114" (Scobell 2003, 141-142).

Summary of Imperialist Encroachment on the Qing

1842 - Qing loses Hong Kong island to Britain 1860 - Qing loses Kowloon peninsula to Britain, 400,000 square miles in Manchuria to Russia 1879 - Japan annexes the Liu-Qiu (Ryukyu) Islands, formerly a Qing vassal state 1884-85, Sino-French War. Qing forced to recognize French protectorate over former vassal Vietnam 1881 Ili Crisis - The Qing narrowly avoids losing most of the Xinjiang region to Russia 1894-95 - First Sino-Japanese War, former vassal Korea becomes a Japanese protectorate, Taiwan ceded to Japan. The Scramble for Concessions begins! 1896-99 - Russia, Germany, France, and Britain all get leases on various pieces of Qing territory. Partition seems inevitable.

People's war, also called protracted people's war

A Marxist military strategy first developed by the Chinese communist revolutionary leader Mao Zedong (1893-1976). The basic concept behind People's War is to maintain the support of the population and draw the enemy deep into the countryside (stretching their supply lines) where the population will bleed them dry through a mix of mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. It was used by the Communists against the Imperial Japanese Army in World War II and by the Chinese Soviet Republic in the Chinese Civil War. The term is used by Maoists for their strategy of long-term armed revolutionary struggle. After the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, Deng Xiaoping abandoned People's War for "People's War under Modern Conditions", which moved away from reliance on troops over technology. With the adoption of "socialism with Chinese characteristics", economic reforms fueled military and technological investment. Troop numbers were also reduced and professionalisation encouraged. The strategy of people's war was used heavily by the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War. However protracted war should not be confused with the "foco" theory employed by Che Guevara and Fidel Castro in the Cuban Revolution of 1959.

War Trash

A novel by the Chinese author Ha Jin, who has long lived in the United States and who writes in English. It takes the form of a memoir written by the fictional character Yu Yuan, a man who eventually becomes a soldier in the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and who is sent to Korea to fight on the Communist side in the Korean War. The majority of the "memoir" is devoted to describing this experience, especially after Yu Yuan is captured by United Nations forces and imprisoned as a POW. The novel captured the PEN/Faulkner Award and was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize.

What happens in the Set Up under Guan Zhong and Lord Shang?

After concentration of power in the ruler's hands the king had direct access to ALL material and human resources. All other intervening nobility is replaced by a powerful bureaucracy, appointed directly by the ruler, and thus entirely dependent upon the good will of the ruler.

What does one early Chinese source say about warfare among the legendary sage kings?

As one early Chinese source notes, "Shen Nong attacked the Pu-Sui, the Yellow Emperor fought at Zhoulu and seized Chi Yu, Yao attacked Huan Dou, Shun attacked the Three Miao, Yu fought Gong Gong, Tang [founder of the Shang] went against the Xia ... Indeed, who has not gone to war?"

What is the danger of both Offensive realism and Defensive realism?

Both Offensive and Defensive Realist responses can run into the so-called " Security Dilemma " - the harder you try to achieve security, the greater the likelihood that your actions will elicit responses from other states that actually reduce your security. For example, your efforts could start an arms race or prompt the formation of alliances aimed against you.

According to Professor Green, what was China like in the Warring States Era?

China in the warring state era is a textbook example of an anarchic interstate environment. This is similar to Hobbes' idea of a "Homo homini lupus". Living in a world of unlimited wants but limited needs, man is in constant struggle. The only way to ensure peace was to have one central authority. Independent people would sacrifice some of their power to this authority in exchange for security.

According to Clausewitz, how important are "the people" in warfare?

Clausewitz also noted that the "people" played an important part in wars and their morale had to be included in all relative strength calculations.

What are some examples of a total collapse of morale?

Communist leader Vladimir Lenin commented, "They voted with their feet," regarding Russian soldiers deserting the army of the Tsar.

How did the CCP respond to Chiang Kai-shek's 5th campaign?

Faced with imminent destruction, in the fall of 1934 the CCP abandoned the Jiangxi Soviet and embarked on the Long March to Yan'an in the Shanxi Soviet. Starting with 80,000 men, they covered 6000 miles in 368 days. Less than 10,000 survived.

When was the mandate of heaven first formulated, and why?

First used to support the rule of the kings of the Zhou dynasty (1046-256 BCE), and legitimize their overthrow of the earlier Shang dynasty (1600-1069 BCE).

So what did the Trace Italienne do?

First, it made defensive works incredibly expensive. For hundreds of years European leaders had freeloaded on the work of their ancestors. Aside from maintaining the medieval castles they inherited, defensive works required little outlay. With old medieval castles now obsolete, entire cities had to be re-fortified at great expense. In addition, it was no longer possible to simply have one main fortress. For a nation like France it was essential that the entire border be protected by a chain of Trace Italienne forts. These would be both defensive bastions AND bases for launching offensive operations. Obviously the increase in the size and number of forts meant more garrison troops, so armies had to grow.

What were the influences that had a major impact on Confucius's thought?

For Confucius, the Zhou represented an ideal age in Chinese history, when sage kings ruled over societies in perfect harmony. This view is understandable given his situation. By the end of the Spring and Autumn era, the Zhou existed only in name, and its vassals had declared themselves to be kings in their own right. The old order was on its deathbed, and only Confucius mourned its passing. If order was to be restored and harmony established, obviously the ways of Zhou would have to be re-established. For Confucius, the ancient Zhou were ruled by sage kings who brought about the Way, the Dao, of Heaven on Earth. Heaven wants: Harmony, peace, and prosperity. Heaven sought one man to bring about this vision, the one man who could bring it about. This was a sage-king.

How was Sun Zi's advocation of spies and other so-called "black ops"? What was Sun Zi's response.

His advocacy of such underhanded methods led to later condemnation by Confucian moralists. Echoing Mencius' condemnation of warfare, they singled out Sun Zi because his realistic approach seemed immoral (we would say "Machiavellian"), and his work was effectively blacklisted. But Sun Zi was simply being realistic. Like Clausewitz, he believed that good intelligence could help minimize the uncertainty that contributed to friction and the "fog of war": "If I know our troops can attack, but do not know the enemy cannot be attacked, it is only halfway to victory. If I know the enemy can be attacked, but do not realize our troops cannot attack, it is only halfway to victory. Knowing that the enemy can be attacked, and knowing that our army can effect the attack, but not knowing the terrain is not suitable for combat, is only halfway to victory. Thus one who truly knows the army will never be deluded when he moves, never be impoverished when initiating an action. Thus it is said if you know them and you know yourself, your victory will not be imperiled. If you know Heaven and you know Earth, your victory can be complete!"

From where does China's understanding of the role of war, the nature of the enemy, and the efficacy of force come from? What are the implications of these ideas?

However, China's understanding of the role of war, the nature of the enemy, and the efficacy of force is actually rooted in historical formative ideational legacies" that date back to the Warring States era. These legacies created both an Idealized Strategic Culture (Confucian) and an operational Strategic Culture (Parabellum). The former is part of habitual discourse (which explains why it keeps showing up), but the latter informs and explains actual behaviour. Moreover, the two frequently merge due to the Chinese tendency to justify the use of force in moral terms lifted directly from Confucianism's Just War Doctrine.

What happened to the Zhou in 771 BCE?

In 771 BCE, the Zhou court was forced to abandon its capital and flee eastwards. A new capital was created at Chenzhou, marking the start of the Eastern Zhou and the SPRING AND AUTUMN period.

In practical terms, what was the outcome of the official PLA doctrine of People's War?

In practical terms, this meant that the PLA doctrine downplayed the importance of conventional tactics and conventional hardware (planes, tanks, artillery). While China did have these weapons, the organizational culture within the military was highly politicized, and ideological orthodoxy stressed men over weapons.

What is stage one of the people's war?

In stage one, the revolutionary force conducting people's war starts in a remote area with mountainous or forested terrain in which its enemy is weak. It attempts to establish a local stronghold known as a revolutionary base area.

What was the social changes brought on by the era of the Warring States Era?

In the Warring States era the more frequent wars, longer campaigns, bloodier battles, and larger fortifications placed heavy demands on rulers. Where would the resources come from? Traditional feudal methods of extracting revenue and mobilizing manpower could not meet the demands of Total War. The existing feudal structure is an impediment. The solution? Centralization of power and creation of a bureaucracy to extract resources and mobilize manpower. The lower aristocrats is replaced by a bureaucrats who answer to the kings.

According to Sun Zi, what was the purpose of war?

Like Clausewitz, Sun Zi saw war as "a continuation of politics by other means." Accordingly, force must be used in pursuit of rational goals - wars must be waged FOR SOMETHNG, not AGAINST SOMEONE. As Sun Zi stated, "If it is not advantageous, do not take action. If objectives cannot be attained, do not use the army. Unless endangered, do not resort to warfare. A ruler cannot mobilize the army in a fit of anger. A general cannot seek battle out of frustration. When it is to your advantage, move. When it is not advantageous, stop. Anger can revert to happiness, annoyance can revert to joy, but a vanquished state cannot be restored, and the dead cannot be brought back to life. Therefore when it comes to war, the enlightened ruler should exercise caution and the good general should be ever alert. This is the way to bring security to the state and preserve the army intact."

Who was Liang Qichao, and what was his attitude toward Chinese nationalism and militarism?

Liang Qichao (1873-1929) is representative of the literati who took up the cause of militarism, and his writings incorporate many of the themes found in the works of other Chinese intellectuals who struggled to come to terms with the Darwinian world around them - fear of racial/cultural degeneration or even extinction, as well as fear of China succumbing to imperialism and becoming a "lost country" (亡國). Liang harshly criticized his compatriots for being too soft, and he ridiculed the idea that only barbarians should esteem strength, noting that Rome's advanced civilization had not saved it from the Goths. Liang attributed Western power to superior martialspirit, but he did not think that this martial spirit [shang wu jingshen 尚武精神] was somehow limited to the West, for he pointedly reminded his readers that even China's tiny neighbor Japan had successfully instilled such a spirit in her people. Unfortunately, the Chinese people displayed no such spirit; on the contrary, while the Europeans and Japanese emphasized sports and other physical activities to ensure that their children developed into healthy citizen-soldiers, the Chinese had become a weak and enfeebled race, addicted to opium and soft living. How could such a people ever stand up to the fierce martial races? Liang blamed China's history, admitting that "The strong do not become powerful overnight, nor do theweak become feeble in a day." As Liang noted, the Chinese people "did not copy Confucius' firmness, but rather his softness. They did not copy his yang, but rather his yin." Their submissiveness had caused the Chinese people to endure "shame and humiliation that even slaves would not have tolerated, and to endure hardships that even oxen and horses would not have endured. Not once had they fought back with bared arms and fire in their eyes." Liang feared that in his own time the degeneration of the Chinese people had reached the point where not even the sages of old could transform these "soft, spineless, spiritless people into an indomitable race." However, while Liang recognized that soft living had led to the physical degeneration of the Chinese people, he saw China's weakness as primarily psychological in nature. Liang believed a spiritual renaissance based on "muscular Confucianism" and resurgent wu was required to remedy the debilitating effects of the preceding two thousand years. Liang was all for training troops and buying weapons, but unless these reforms were accompanied by the development of a national martial spirit, it would be akin to "covering a sheep with a tiger's skin." If the Chinese people could develop a true military spirit, Liang hoped that his compatriots would be able to "raise their heroic spirits and muster their courage, and stop destroying their self-confidence through over-caution and self-doubt." Liang was far from alone in espousing these views. Patriotic and politically engaged Chinese across the socio-economic spectrum shared these beliefs. For example, the future general Cai E (Cai Songpo 1882-1916) was clearly disgusted with the anti-military attitudes of his fellow Chinese, and he ridiculed them not only for their lack of martial enthusiasm, but also for their feebleness, noting that their poor physique and bad habits left the nation vulnerable to foreign aggression: "We have four hundred million people, but of these, fifty percent are women who are not suited for soldiering. Ten to twenty percent of the people are addicted to opium, while another ten percent have immersed themselves in studying to the extent that they resemble senile old men. The handicapped, deaf, blind, mute, chronically sick, young and old together constitute another ten to twenty percent. All told, the so-called fit population only amounts to ten percent. Of this ten percent, it is hard to guarantee that they will all be suitable for military service. When looked at this way, even if the great powers abandoned fighting with bullets in favor of boxing, we would still all be killed on the spot!"

Was the Zhou kings reliance on their military, economic, and mythic power enough to maintain control over their vast new holdings?

No, it was not enough to tie the new territories permanently to the Zhou center. By 200 BCE there were almost 200 lords ruling over domains of various sizes in the Zhou "empire". These independent centers of political-economic-military power soon threatened the king's authority. FRAGMENTED SOVEREIGNTY weakened the Zhou authority and created an inherently unstable system. The Zhou rulers understood this, but increasingly lacked the means to enforce more than symbolic authority over these domains.

Did the military revolution drive state-building in Europe?

Some historians argue that it was the military revolution that drove state-building in Europe. In their view, the changes in warfare propelled Europe out of Feudalism and into the Early Modern Era. The autocracy of the 18th century was forged in the crucible of ever-intensifying war during the 17th century. This might be a bit of an exaggeration. It is difficult to tell what came first (the "chicken and the egg" argument): did stronger central power enable monarchs to build bigger armies and more expensive forts (proactive change), or did the need to do these things compel rulers to consolidate their power, the better to be able to squeeze their subjects for funds and manpower (reactive change)? Roberts and his supporters certainly believe that changes in warfare drove state-building.

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the Guiding Principle of Internal Security "Chaos Phobia"?

§2 Chaos Probia. Chinese strategic culture places great emphasis on internal security and in particular on the survival of the regime in power.127 There is a deep-seated cultural fear of chaos and turmoil. Since ancient times, Chinese leaders have attached great importance to domestic stability. Western concepts of security, by contrast, have focused on external threats, according to Chinese researchers.128 §3 Domestically, the stress has tended to be on nonlethal force to maintain stability. Under Mao, and to a lesser extent under Deng, a powerful system of controls was in place that operated through an individual's work unit (danwei). The factory, office, school, or commune held an inordinate amount of power over members of the danwei even in the most basic decision in life, such as whom one could marry and where one could live.129 Therefore, there has been little need for a modern centralized police force in the PRC. Members of the Public Security Bureau are normally not armed, and it was only in the early 1980s with the decline of controls -- including the power of the work unit -- that a new national constabulary was established. Decommissioned PLA units, who merely swapped uniforms, staffed the People's Armed Police. In communist China, only two types of people are armed: soldiers and criminals. Possession of firearms was a key defining feature of the PLA.130 §3 When officials determine that China has lapsed into chaos or is on the verge of chaos, resorting to deadly force is a natural step. This is particularly true when ordinary instruments of control break down or weaken, as they did during the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Not surprisingly, Chinese leaders have a near obsession with maintaining stability at all costs. Deng argued in early 1980; "... it is clear that without stability and unity we ahve nothing [meiyou anding tuanjie, jiu meiyou yiqie]. ... [We] cannot afford further chaos [that is another Cultural Revolution] and [we] will not permit it to recur."131 (Scobell 2003, 36).

In chapter 5 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the revisionist view of Lin Biao?

§3 "Lin, defense minister of the PRC since 1959, tends to be reviled by scholars mirroring official Chinese accounts, where he is identified as one of the chief villains of the Cultural Revolution - status confirmed by his alleged aborted coup attempt against Mao in 1971.16 However, in light of recent evidence and scholarship, it seems that Lin has been overly maligned and, along with Jiang Qing and the other members of the Gang of Four, was set up to take the blame for the machinations and failures of Mao himself. In the revisionist interpretation of Lin, he comes across as reclusive, shy, and eccentric, with a host of ailments both real and imagined.17 Lin appears not to have sought out power and privilege but to have had it unwillingly thrust upon him by Mao. However, once promoted by Mao, he strove to secure his position with the support and encouragement of his family and supporters. Seen in this light, Lin is more a tragic figure, manipulated by Mao, goaded by his family, and appalled by the destructive impact of the Cultural Revolution on his beloved PLA.18" (Scobell 2003, 97)

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, what was the concept of "competent authority" and it's relationship with the Chinese idea of Righteous War?

¶2 "Another criterion used to differentiate the righteous war from other types of conflict was what would become known as "competent authority" in the Western just war tradition. The Rites of Zhou takes it as axiomatic that the agents of punishment will be officers of the legitimate Zhou king, the "Son of Heaven." This notion is also found in the writings of Mencius, who sought to distinguish between legitimate punitive expeditions and other, less legitimate, uses of military power. "A punitive expedition is a war waged by one in authority against his subordinates. It is not for peers to punish one another by war."59[59.] The example, par excellence, of teh justified use of force had the Son of Heaven sending his armies into a subordinate principality whose ruler had violated the etiquette of the Zhou "feudal" order. The wars waged by the state rulers of the Spring and Autumn period were, in contrast, illegitimate exercises of arbitrary violence. The Son of Heaven, according to Mencius, "punishes but does not attack, while a feudal lord attacks but does not punish."60[60.] ..." (Graff 2016, 204)

In Chapter Two of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the view of Han officials regarding systematic revenge?

¶2 "Even though systematic revenge was so common that some men feared it was becoming a "private" law in opposition to the "public" law of the empire, records from the Han indicate that many, perhaps most, officials approved of vengeance and regularly condoned it in practice. The most obvious expression of this approval was the frequent refusal of local officials to arrest those guilty of murder for the sake of revenge. In other cases officials released avengers who had already been arrested, and although some of these officials had to go into hiding for failing to execute the law, many of them continued in office, a fact that suggests the tremendous leeway for independent action still possessed by local officials under the Han.142[142.]" (Lewis 1990, 90).

Briefly, what was Sun Zi's view of warfare?

Sun Zi recognized that warfare was a dangerous activity devoid of set rules. Losers faced complete destruction, and even winners had to be on guard against pyrrhic victory. This is why "Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way to survival or extinction!" Given the stakes, warfare was no place for amateurs. Professionals were required, men who understood the complex interplay of factors on both the strategic and tactical levels. (he was of course referring to himself).

How does Sun Zi's commander deploy his troops?

Sun Zi's commander deploys his troops in two ways for two different purposes. To elicit a desired response from the enemy, some troops can be deployed to be seen. However, the troops that will actually defeat the enemy must remain hidden. In the defensive, "One who excels at moving the enemy deploys in a configuration to which the enemy must respond. He offers something that the enemy must seize. With profit he moves them, with the foundation he awaits them." On the offensive, "The location where we will engage the enemy must not become known to them. If it is not known, then the positions that they must prepare to defend will be numerous. If the positions the enemy prepares to defend are numerous, then the forces we engage will be few." "If I determine the enemy's disposition while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate my forces while the enemy is fragmented. If we are concentrated into a single force while he is fragmented into ten, then we can attack him with ten times his strength. Thus we are many and the enemy is few. If we attack his few with our many, those whom we engage in battle will be severely constrained." This simple statement would become the guiding principle for guerrilla warfare in the 20th century in places like China, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.

What happened to the Macartney mission?

The British tried to negotiate better trade access as early as 1793 An embassy was dispatched under the command of Lord Macartney, an experienced diplomat. He was instructed to push for diplomatic relations, trade liberalization, and an offshore base for the British. He had an audience with the Qianlong Emperor, but negotiations went nowhere. The British and Chinese worldviews were too far apart to allow for any compromise.

How did the Chinese initially deal with the European traders encountered in the 16th century?

The Chinese initially saw these European traders as an ocean-going variant of their old Inner Asian nemesis, the nomadic hordes. They assumed that all these barbarians wanted was access to the wealth of China, and that if they could not get it through trade they would resort to violence. The Portuguese, Dutch and English did little to counter this image, for they all resorted to piracy when denied permission to trade - in Chinese eyes this was classic "trade-or-raid" behavior. Accordingly, local Chinese authorities in Canton adopted an "Accommodationist" strategy designed to satisfy European craving for Chinese goods while minimizing contact. This was the origin of the Canton Trade System

Why did the Qing military not technologically advance, or update itself, to face the West?

The Qing military never saw combat against Western forces until 1839. Before then, they had only been used against enemies who possessed no advanced technology and fought in traditional ways. Given the stability of their security environment, there were no incentives for the Manchus to pursue either reactive or proactive innovation in technology, organization, or doctrine. The existing military establishment seemed to be capable of handling all potential rivals. The Qing military ended up trapped in a time warp -while the Western world experienced rapid changes in both the technology and techniques of warfare, the Manchus clung fast to the ways that had served themwell in the 17th and 18th centuries.

What was the connection of the Shang political structure and the Longshan era?

The Shang political structure should be seen as an extension of the earlier multi-village political units of the late Longshan era. The Shang kings had absolute control over their own lineage territories, but their authority over vassal states was directly proportional to their capacity to coerce or entice.

What kind of weapon did Shang-era aristocracy use?

The Shang-era aristocracy used chariots for both hunting and war. The two pursuits were closely connected, and hunting was seen as a rehearsal for war.

What is the key feature of the Spring and Autumn Era?

The Spring and Autumn Era witnessed the slow but inexorable collapse of the fragile unity imposed by the Zhou dynasty. It is the disintegration of the kinship feudalism established by King Wu, who either convinced Shang dynasty nobles to join him, or replaced resistance with his own kin. However, by 771, the Zhou, forced to flee eastward, had little physical power. The domains ruled by relatives of the Zhou royal house had gradually lost any sense of loyalty to the dynasty, and the territories they supposedly ruled on behalf of the Zhou ended up as independent states. Moreover, within these states, powerful families conspired to seize power for themselves. In the absence of muscle and money, the myth of the Weniad was not enough to bind the noble houses to the Zhou dynasty. The Zuo Zhuan identifies some 148 states within the Zhou territory. During the Spring and Autumn Era most of these would be swallowed up by their larger neighbors.

Why did the 100 Schools Thought flourish at this time?

The flourishing of the 100 Schools of thought really indicates just how fluid the situation was in the late Spring and Autumn and subsequent Warring States eras. In the Darwinian world of the time (survival of the fittest, 弱肉強食 The weak are meat upon which the strong shall feed), there was a new interest in radical ideas, and thus a new willingness to test out bold solutions to the problems associated with increasing state power. In the end, it was the Qin rulers who were able to put these new ideas into action, with devastating results for the other states.

What was the last straw that triggered full scale rebellion?

The last straw was when Shang Zhou had an official [his uncle!] cut open so he could exam his still beating heart for signs of exceptional virtue. As the Shi Ji noted with great understatement, "The hundred surnames looked toward him with hatred, and some of the feudal lords revolted."

What was the original point of the Whampoa Academy?

The original point of the Whampoa Academy was to create a Party Army that would act as the subordinate arm of the KMT - militarily efficient, but also politically reliable. But Chiang had other plans ...

What happened to Zheng He's expeditions after 1433? Why?

These voyages were abruptly halted in 1433 and never repeated Some argue conservative and isolationist officials stopped the voyages on principle. Others say the court's financial woes following a failed campaign in Vietnam forced the cancellation. One popular explanation holds that resurgent Mongol power may have diverted the court's attention back to Inner Asia. Regardless, the Ming willfully pulled back at a time when China enjoyed unchallenged supremacy on the seas. Who knows what would have happened if China had exploited its naval supremacy to expand its influence into the Atlantic - perhaps the European maritime expansion could have been contained, and Western imperialism prevented! Or perhaps we might all be speaking Chinese today!

What are the two works of Daoism? that have survived?

Two works have survived that capture the essence of this escapist philosophy - the Dao De Jing (Classic of the Way and Virtue 道德經) and the Zhuang Zi (莊子 The Book of Master Zhuang). The Dao De Jing is, of course, able to be interpreted hundreds of different ways. The Zhuang Zi is a lot easier to access.

What does the scholar Wang argue against President Hu Jintao?

Wang argues that claims like President Hu Jintao's are disingenuous, and that China's exercise of power and strategic preferences are characteristic of Structural Realism, not some mythical Strategic Culture. How else can one explain China's seemingly un-Confucian use of force in the past?

What is the mandate of heaven?

_____ holds that the creator who creates all under heaven seeks one man based on ethical qualifications. That person is blessed with perfect virtue. This person is chosen to run all under heaven to carry out heaven's will. What heaven wishes for its creation of us is: harmony, prosperity, happiness. Heaven gives the perfect man "Tian Ming", mandate of heaven, to bring harmony, prosperity, and happiness to all his people. However, unlike Japan, the ruler of China is a human, so he is subject to flaws: he can be lustful, or become a despot who makes his people suffer. As such, heaven's appointment is never absolute, it is conditional on the Ruler's ability to give his people harmony, prosperity, and happiness. If a king does not do these three, then he will be executed, and overthrown by someone who can.

What is the strategic concept: strategic configuration of power?

STRATEGIC CONFIGURATION OF POWER 勢 Shi, or strategic configuration of power, is a key concept in the Art of War . It also appears in many of the Legalist texts, although in a different context. For the Legalists, shi was the term used to describe the power the ruler wielded due to his position - positional authority. In the military texts, shi has a related meaning, but of course it is used in the context of warfare rather than politics. As a military concept, shi has been translated a variety of ways - circumstantial power, latent energy, momentum, positional advantage, force of circumstances, potential energy. Judging from these terms, most interpreters have assumed that the concept of shi entails the idea of advantage resulting from superior position. This understanding is derived from Sun Zi's own example: "One who employs strategic power [shi] commands men in battle as if he were rolling logs and stones The nature of wood and stone is to be quiet when stable but to move when on precipitous ground. If they are square they stop, if round they tend to move. Thus the strategic power of one who excels at employing men in warfare is comparable to rolling round boulders down a thousand-fathom mountain. Such is the strategic configuration of power." But it is not simply a case of positional advantage - there is also the idea of strength. Sun Zi was primarily concerned with striking power, and that was a function not only of advantage derived from position, but also the nature of the objects that collide. According to the concepts of modern physics, the momentum that can be developed, and thus the amount of force that can be applied when an object collides with an obstacle in its path [the enemy], depends upon the original height, the final speed at the moment of impact, and the inherent qualities of the object. Clearly a small stone will transfer less energy at the moment of impact than a much larger boulder, and a rubber ball will inflict less damage than a bullet. So shi really involves two factors: 1) the strategic advantage conveyed by superior position, and 2) the strength of the force involved [this incorporates numbers, weapons, morale, discipline, leadership, physical condition]. When properly employed shi imbues the army with a form of potential energy - like a cocked crossbow, ready to be fired at the enemy. But of course even a cocked crossbow will be useless in unskilled hands. In addition to strength and positional advantage, Sun Zi also stresses the idea of precision timing. Like a cocked crossbow, a strong army in an advantageous position will prove useless if set in motion at the wrong time or unleashed at the wrong target. But if released at the right moment, the stored [potential] power of the army is released with devastating results: "When the speed of rushing water reaches the point where it can move boulders, this Is the force of shi. When the timing of a hawk is such that it can strike and kill, this is precision. So it is with skillful warriors - their force is swift and their precision is close. Their strategic configuration of power is like a fully drawn crossbow, their precisi on is like pulling the trigger [at the right moment]."

According to Professor Leary, which militaries are at the forefront in military development?

The U.S. The Israel. The Soviet Union. The China.

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", how did honor impact the conduct of warfare?

"The centrality to warfare of questions of honor is also revealed in the conduct of campaigns. In addition to the numerous rituals which linked their every step to the service of the states' altars, campaigns were also guided by a set of strictures that guaranteed the honourable character of the battle and hence assured the glory of the victors. As we have seen above, an encounter with an enemy in the field obliged an army to fight or suffer dishonour, and in at least one case a commander was executed for withdrawing in the face of an enemy army.96[96.] Some speakers even went so far as to argue that honor demanded that one attack the enemy army at its strongest point.97[97.] As combat was a ceremonial trial of strength, states of often greeted an invading army with offerings of meat which, as we saw above, established bonds between them as fellow nobles and linked the bloodshed of combat to the sacrificial cults.98[98.] The day and field of the battle were then formally agreed upon by the two parties, and different terms were applied to distinguish true combats from those which had not been properly arranged.99[99.] Encounters in the field obliged an army to fight, and every fight had to be properly arranged to allow a genuine test of strength. Since combat ideally matched the prowess of two prepared foes, the dictates of honor prohibited taking advantage of an adversary's difficulties. Thus if the lord of a state had died, an invading army was supposed to withdraw on the principle that one should not "increase mourning." This principle was so routinely observed that in one case a state successfully secured the departure of an invader by staging a mock funeral.100[100.] Invaders would also usually leave if a state offered no- (p. 39) -resistance.101[101.] These ideas were extended onto the field of battle, as in the famous case of Lord Xiang of Song, who would not attack Chu's army until it had reformed its ranks after crossing a river. In justification, he argued that of old those who commanded an army would not make use of an enemy's difficulties to attack him. Although an adviser criticized his action, with the apparent approval of the "author," elsewhere in the text men state explicitly that to take advantage of a foe's difficulties is cowardly, and his idea accords with the practices of arranging battles, not attacking foes who did not offer resistance, and not beginning a battle until both sides had drummed the signal to advance.102[102.] The last and perhaps most striking demonstration of the primary concern for honor on the field of battle was the bouts of formalized provocation (zhi shi) that preceded the opening of general hostilities. These were feats of bravado in which one or several chariots would ride out from the host, come dangerously close to the opposing lines, attack some members of the enemy army, and then dash back to their own troops, usually pursued by a substantial force.103[103.] The textual accounts refer to seeking permission to make a provocation, so these displays appear to have been part of the "formal" preparation for battle. However, since one man who was refused permission proceeded to act on his own accord, they were also personal displays of valor. Both as collective ceremony and personal display they centered attention on the demonstration of courage and prowess, and in this way they epitomized the nature of warfare in this period." (Lewis 1990, 38-39)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what was the leading cause of the Opium War?

#3 Before turning to the battle itself, it is important to review some of the political events that led to conflict. It was during September 1836 when the Qing Emperor, Daoguang, ordered the governor-general in Guangzhou to eliminate all opium imports. Although China initially prohibited the smoking of opium in 1729, and further outlawed its growth and importation in 1796, these laws were never really enforced. As a result, there was a lively opium trade in China, including both domestic and imported varieties. #4 While the Qing Court overlooked the opium trade as long as China retained a foreign trade surplus, it became increasingly concerned during the mid-1830s when the opium trade led to a serious trade imbalance. Millions of dollars in silver began to be shipped out of China every year, primarily by British traders. Changes in the international silver market exacerbated this problem. This silver depletion led to inflation, and threatened to injure China's domestic trade. Recent research has suggested, however, that the real underlying cause of the silver depletion was not just foreign trade, but also the vast sums being spent by the Manchus to put down Muslim rebellion in Xinjiang.49 (p. 16) #1 Therefore, the leading cause of the Opium War was not opium per se, but the supposedly injurious effects of foreign trade. In 1852, the former governor and commander-in-chief of the colony of Hong Kong, Sir John Francis Davis, even wrote that "at no time was the [opium] traffic deserving of the full load of infamy with which many were disposed to heap it, for at the most it only supplied the poison which the Chinese were not obliged to take." In fact, Davis wrote, the "worst effect" of the opium trade was the "piracy it engendered" and: "Of the war it [the piracy] certainly was mainly the cause."50 #2 Disruption of domestic trade was highly dangerous to any foreign usurper of the Chinese throne, and the Manchus were particularly concerned that change of any kind might lead to claims that the Manchus had lost its "Mandate of Heaven." A public realization that the Manchus had lost this mandate would certainly result in new domestic rebellions attempting to return a Han Dynasty to the throne. Therefore, although the Qing government toyed with the proposal to legalize opium imports and impose a tariff similar to other foreign medicines, in the end, fear of change--no doubt coupled with concern of an ever-strengthening Han merchant class in South China--persuaded the Daoguant Emperor to insist instead on harsher opium controls." (Ellemen 2007, 15-16)

Guan Zhong (Chinese: 管仲; Wade-Giles: Kuan Chung; c. 720-645 BC)

A chancellor and reformer of the State of Qi during the Spring and Autumn period of Chinese history.[1] His given name was Yiwu (Chinese: 夷吾; pinyin: Yíwú). Zhong was his courtesy name. He is mainly remembered for his reforms as chancellor under Duke Huan of Qi, as well as his friendship with his colleague Bao Shuya, though his reputation remained controversial among the Confucians of his time.[2][clarification needed] Through Guan Zhong's reforms and skilful diplomacy Qi became the most powerful of the feudal states and Duke Huan became the first of the Five Hegemons. Though knowledge of his reforms is limited, in particular he instituted a famous fiscal policy known as "balancing the light and the heavy", associated with salt and iron monopolies.[3] Though otherwise a diverse work, the Guanzi compilation making use of his name makes similar such recommendations.[4] Philosophy and appraisal[edit] Guan Zhong was disparagingly identified with the Legalist school as a result of his administrative reforms.[5] Though actually legalistic philosophy did not develop until hundreds of years later, R. Eno of Indiana University does consider that "If one were to trace the origins of Legalism as far back as possible, it might be appropriate to date its beginnings to the prime ministership of Guan Zhong, chief aide to the first of the hegemonic lords of the Spring Autumn period, Duke Huan of Qi (r. 685-643)."[6] He is said to have indulged in a luxurious lifestyle.[7] Guan Zhong was also a pragmatist who did not equate a ruler's moral purity with his ability to govern. Duke Huan, who loved hunting and women, asked Guan if these indulgences would harm his hegemony, to which Guan replied that the ruler's love for luxury would not harm his hegemony. It would only be harmed through inappropriate staffing and misuse of talent.[8] One passage "recounts" Confucius as considering him "mediocre" for his lack of frugality and knowledge of ritual.[9] Despite all this, he might be considered, "at least in most respects" an "ideal Confucian minister".[10] Guan Zhong is reported to have advised Duke Huan: 'Summon the wavering with courtesy and cherish the remote with virtuous conduct. So long as your virtuous conduct and courtesy never falter, there will be no one who does not cherish you.'" When Duke Huan was approached to dethrone the ruling clans of his state, Guan Zhong advised him that he had won their adherence through politeness (li) and trustworthiness (xin). When Confucius's students criticized Guan Zhong as lacking propriety, crediting his ambition and achievement Confucius said of him that "It was due to Guan Zhong that Duke Huan was able to assemble the feudal lords on numerous occasions without resorting to the use of his war chariots. Such was his goodness! ... Through having Guan Zhong as his minister Duke Huan became protector over the feudal lords. He brought unity and order to the entire realm so that even today people enjoy his gifts to them ... I am afraid that without Guan Zhong we would be folding our lapels right-over-left (traditional Chinese clothing customarily is folded left-over-right)."[11] Achievements[edit] Guan Zhong started multiple reforms in the State of Qi. Politically, he centralized power and divided the state into different villages, each carrying out a specific trade. Instead of relying on the traditional aristocracy for manpower, he applied levies to the village units directly. He also developed a better method for choosing talent to be governors. Under Guan Zhong, Qi shifted administrative responsibility from hereditary aristocrats to professional bureaucrats. He is also credited for creating the first official government sponsored brothel known as "女市" which funded the government treasury. During his term of office, the State of Qi became much stronger. The Zuo Zhuan records that in 660 BC, Guan Zhong urged Duke Huan of Qi to attack the small neighboring State of Xing which was under attack from Quan Rong nomads, a non-Chinese Rong tribes[12]. Later, in 652 BC he advised the duke not to ally with a vassal ruler's son who wished to depose his father. Duke Huan often listened to Guan Zhong's sound advice such that his status amongst other Zhou vassal states rose. As a result, the duke came to be recognized as the first Hegemon or leader of the vassal alliance.[1] In recognition of Guan Zhong's service, Duke Huan gave him the honorary title of "Godfather" (仲父). Same title was later given to Lü Buwei by Prince Zheng, the future Qin Shi Huang. State Monopoly on Salt and Iron[edit] Main articles: Discourses on Salt and Iron and zh:盐业专卖 Under Guan's guidance several important economic reforms were introduced. He created a uniform tax code and also used state power to encourage the production of salt and iron. He believed that monopolizing the nature resources was helpful on improving the government income, with fewer complaints from the public than raising taxes. The strategy was described by himself to the Duke of Huan as "managing the mountain and the sea（官山海）", which mainly refers to iron mine from the mountain and salt from the sea. Under his policy, private business who produce salt by boiling seawater and iron by mining must sell all outputs to the government, and the government resell refined salt and iron products, with huge price gap, to all household in State of Qi. Historians usually credit Guan Zhong for introducing state monopolies controlling salt and iron. Qi-Hengshan War[edit] Main article: zh:衡山之谋 In the record of Guanzi Chapter 84, Duke of Huan wanted to restrain the threat from State of Hengshan（衡山国）and asked Guan for solution. State of Hengshan was famous for its weapon production. Guan then ordered officials to buy arms from State of Hengshan in large quantities. After ten months, worrying that the price will continuously grow up, State of Yan, State of Dai and later State of Qin followed up the buying. The price then jumped sharply and, as a result, almost all household in State of Hengshan switched to make weapons instead of farming. One year later, Guan ordered officials to buy rice from State of Zhao, at a price more than three times higher than normal. By seeing the potential huge profit, State of Hengshan sold its rice inventory to officials from State of Qi. Afterwards, Guan suddenly ordered State of Qi's army to invade State of Hengshan. With selling out of weapon and rice, State of Hengshan soon surrendered. Some historians marked Qi-Hengshan War the early form of Economic Warfare[13]. Publications[edit] He is listed as the author of the Guanzi encyclopedia, actually a much later (of the late Warring States period) compilation of works from the scholars of the Jixia Academy.

Wu wei (无为)

A concept literally meaning "without exertion." Wu wei emerged in the Spring and Autumn period, and Confucianism, to become an important concept in Chinese statecraft and Taoism, and was most commonly used to refer to an ideal form of government including the behavior of the emperor. Describing a state of unconflicting personal harmony, free-flowing spontaneity and savoir faire, it generally also more properly denotes a state of spirit or mind, and in Confucianism accords with conventional morality. Sinologist Jean François Billeter describes it as a "state of perfect knowledge of the reality of the situation, perfect efficaciousness and the realization of a perfect economy of energy", which in practice Edward Slingerland qualifies as a "set of ("transformed") dispositions (including physical bearing)... conforming with the normative order." Definition[edit] Sinologist Herrlee Creel considers Wu wei, as found in the Tao Te Ching and Zhuangzi, to denote two different things. An "attitude of genuine non-action, motivated by a lack of desire to participate in human affairs" and A "technique by means which the one who practices it may gain enhanced control of human affairs." The first is quite in line with the contemplative Taoism of the Zhuangzi. Described as a source of serenity in Taoist thought, only rarely do Taoist texts suggest that ordinary people could gain political power through Wu wei. The Zhuangzi does not seem to indicate a definitive philosophical idea, simply that the sage "does not occupy himself with the affairs of the world." The second sense appears to have been imported from the earlier governmental thought of "Legalist" Shen Buhai (400 BC - c. 337 BC) as Taoists became more interested in the exercise of power by the ruler.[4] Called "rule by non-activity" and strongly advocated by Han Fei, during the Han dynasty, up until the reign of Han Wudi rulers confined their activity "chiefly to the appointment and dismissal of his high officials", a plainly "Legalist" practice inherited from the Qin dynasty.[5] This "conception of the ruler's role as a supreme arbiter, who keeps the essential power firmly in his grasp" while leaving details to ministers, has a "deep influence on the theory and practice of Chinese monarchy",[6] and played a "crucial role in the promotion of the autocratic tradition of the Chinese polity", ensuring the ruler's power and the stability of the polity.[7] Only appearing three times in the first (more contemplative) half of the Zhuangzi, early Taoists may have avoided the term for its association with "Legalism" before ultimately co-opting its governmental sense as well, as attempted in the Zhuangzi's latter half. Thought by modern scholarship to have been written after the Zhuangzi, Wu wei becomes a major "guiding principle for social and political pursuit"[8] in the more "purposive" Taoism of the Tao Te Ching, in which the Taoist "seeks to use his power to control and govern the world (Creel)."[9]

In Chapter Two of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what exactly were the reforms of Lord Shang? What were their outcomes?

(p. 61) ... ¶3 "The process of enlarging the state structure through the progressive incorporation of the rural population culminated in the reforms of Shang Yang carried out in the state of Qin in the years following 359 B.C. Because of their significance in Chinese history these reforms have generated a massive secondary literature, but no description of them to pre-Qin literary sources has survived, and the Han accounts amount to only a handful of sentences.31[31.] The discovery of over 1,000 Qin dynasty bamboo strips at Shuihundi in 1975 produced an abundance of new materials, but these have not changed the basic outlines of our understanding of Shang Yang's reforms nor, as of now, resolved many of the scholarly disputes that have developed over the years on the details of the various institutions.32[32.] Consequently, only the broad outlines of the reforms will be discussed here. ¶4 The basic account is that in the Shi ji. He commanded that the people be divided into tens and fives and that they supervise each other and be mutually liable. Anyone who failed to report criminal activity would be chopped in two at the waist, while those who reported it would receive the same reward as tha for obtaining the head of an enemy. Anyone who actively hid a criminal would be treated the same as one who surrendered to an enemy [executed and all property confiscated]. Any family that had more than two adult males who did not divide the household would pay a double military tax. Those who had achievements in the army would in proportion receive an increase in rank [in the twenty rank hierarchy in- (p. 62) -which the entire populace was rated]. Those who engaged in private quarrels would be punished with a severity in accord with the gravity of their quarrel. Those who devoted themselves to the fundamental enterprises and through their farming and weaving contributed much grain and cloth would be remitted [from tax and corvee], while those who worked for peripheral profits [in trade and crafts] and those who were ideal would be confiscated as slaves. Those in the royal family who had no military merit would not be listed in the registers of [royal] relatives. He made clear the exalted and lowly through the orders of titles and ranks. Each according to his degree would receive fields and dwellings, and [the number of] male and female slaves and [type of] clothing would accord with the rank of the family. Those who achieved merit would be exalted, while those without merit, even if rich, would receive no distinction. ... And he commanded that among the people fathers, sons, and siblings should not rest together in the same house. He collected the small xiang towns together into large xian and established officials for them. There was a total of thirty-one xian. For the fields he opened up the qian and mo and set up boundaries. He equalized the military levies and land tax and standardized the measures of capacity, weight, and length " ¶2 The basic features of these reforms follow the pattern set by the institutions discussed earlier. A uniform administration was established for the entire population, which was organized into units of five for the purposes of mutual surveillance and military recruitment.34[34.] The people were responsible for enforcing the laws within their units and were also held mutually liable for the performance of their units in battle.35[35.] Through these units the Qin government achieved the total identity of civil administration and military organization towards which earlier reforms had tended and which had become the ideal of legalist administrative theory. ¶3 This identification of the social order with the army was strengthened through the institution of ranks of military merit. Such ranks were employed in other states, but nowhere so systematically as in Qin.3636.] Anyone who gained merit in battle by slaying enemies or commanding victorious units was rewarded with promotion in a twenty-rank hierarchy. Depending on their standing, they would receive stipulated amounts of land, numbers of dwellings, and quotas of slaves. Moreover, these ranks could be used to remit penalties for violations of the law or to redeem relatives form penal bondage. Ranks were no hereditary,- (p. 63) ¶1-but if a man died heroically in battle his descendants received the number of ranks he would have gained.37[37.] The hierarchy of military merit fixed by these ranks was intended to be the only measure of honor and distinction in Qin society, so that all social rank and status would directly reflect military performance. ¶2 In addition to organizing the whole population into units of military service which served as the primary means of civil control, and then ranking all subjects according to military performance, Qin also made xian, which were units of military administration, the basis of local government as well. The word xian had originally referred to the area outside of a walled city inhabited by dependent populations who provided service to nobles, but in the late Spring and Autumn period they became the primary locus of military recruitment, and lineages or states established them in areas of strategic importance.38[38.] It was through their role as units of military recruitment and administration that the xian and the jun ..., originally a sub-unit of the xian became the basic units of local, civil government. ¶3 The final major reform associated with the extension of military service throughout the state of Qin was the construction of qian and mo. As the cumulative research of modern scholars has shown, these were a network of paths built under Shang Yang as part of his reform sin Qin, and they formed a rectangular grid over the agricultural fields. Because they were evenly spaced, they divided the countryside into equal-sized blocks of land.39[39.] ¶4 This reshaping of the countryside was an integral part of the extension of military service and the attempt to identity the social order with the army. Shang Yang argued that agriculture was the basis of society and the root of all wealth, and his ideal state was a land of small-scale farmers guided by a severe, detailed code of laws. By dividing the land into equal blocks, he was able to allocate to each family sufficient land to be worked by a single adult male. In this way the state could obtain the maximum amount of land in cultivation and the highest possible number of adult males liable for military service and taxes.41[41.] Moreover, since those who earned high rank received additional land and servants, the- (p. 64) ¶1-systematic partition of the land provided a fixed unit for standardized rewards. It thus serviced to facilitate the control and mobilization of the population, and to stabilize the units of rewards and punishment that fixed the hierarchy based on ranks of military merit. ¶2 The reforms of Shang Yang marked the culmination of the process of breaking down the social and institutional barriers between city and hinterland through the extension of military service. The entire countryside was divided into a rectangular grid, the entire population into military units, the administration into military districts, and then the individual households of the population were "mapped" onto the grid in accord with merits earned in battle or through agriculture. ¶3 The completion of these reforms marked the end not only of the Zhou nobility but also of the armed lineages which had been the fundamental unit of aristocratic society. These politicized kin groups had been based in the old semi-independent city-states, where they used their military and cutic power to extract sustenance from the rural villages under their control. With the absorption of the cities into the territorial states, the dispersal of military service throughout the countryside, the division of land among the peasantry in exchange for taxes paid directly to the state, and the disappearance of the ancestral cult centered on the Zhou royal house, the noble lineages had lost the bases of their power and indeed the very preconditions of their existence. Along with the noble lineage, the peasant village as a unit in the fiscal organization of the state had also vanished in the new patterns of land distribution and the extraction of service from individual households. All disposition of military power and claims to service and tribute were now concentrated in the hands of the rulers of the territorial states, while the only significant unit for the definition of kin ties or the offering of service and taxation was the household. Whereas previously political organization and elite kin structures had been identical, they were now separated into a state order (guo ...) under a single, absolute prince and a kin realm composed of individual households (jia ...), each rules by its own unchallenged paterfamilias.42[42.] (Lewis 1990, 61-64).

What are the opening lines of Sun Tzu's The Art of War.

1: Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. # 2: It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.

After the withdrawal of the KMT to Taiwan, what was the PLA planning to do with Taiwan, what what kind of strategies was the PLA prepared to do?

After the withdrawal of the KMT to Taiwan, the PLA was preparing for the invasion of the "renegade province" and the final destruction of Chiang's forces. Mao seemingly had no intention of reverting back to the old guerrilla strategies - China had stood up, and the PLA now had the capacity to defend China's sovereignty by conventional means. And then came the Korean War...

How does Clausewitz define war?

First of all, war is never an end in itself. "War is the continuation of politics by other means." No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his right mind ought to do so - without first being clear what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.

How reliable does Professor Green consider the Chun Qiu and the Zuo Commentary?

He considers them to be sketchy. Believe it, or don't believe it. The important thing is that for 2,000 years, Chinese scholars, intellectuals, and decision-makers, believed it, and based their decisions upon it.

What really defeated the Japanese?

However, in the end the Japanese were not defeated by Mao's Protracted War, but by the U.S. atomic bombs. But that did not matter, for Mao's real enemy had always been Chiang Kai-shek.

In Mao's strategy for dealing with the Red Army, what was the three of three stages to defeat the Japanese?

In Stage Three of Protracted War, the regular units of the Red Army have grown strong enough to go on the strategic offensive by launching attacks to reclaim the land occupied by the Japanese. Guerrilla warfare supplements the regular units by harassing the enemy and cutting his supply/communication lines, but the heavy fighting is done by the regular units. This may well involve large scale conventional battles against the weakened foe.

Since Yu gave his son the throne, how did ancient sources describe that son?

Since his son succeeded him, Yu is described in some ancient sources as the founder of the "Xia" dynasty (2205-1766 BCE) that allegedly preceded the Shang.

According to structural realism, what are the two responses to an anarchic environment?

Structural Realists argue that states are compelled to adopt one of two responses to the anarchic security environment (states can switch between the two): Defensive Realism and Offensive Realism.

How did the PLA forces fair against the primarily-American-UN forces?

The Chinese initially enjoyed great success, pushing the US forces back to the 38th parallel. In the process they taught the US that the Chinese soldier could withstand tremendous hardship and fight tenaciously, even in the face of superior firepower. However, US firepower eventually slowed the Chinese and the war became a standoff along the 38th parallel, but not before Chinese casualties approached 800,000. The PLA lacked the armor, artillery, and airpower to force a breakthrough.

What are the 3 things peasants must deliver in exchange for their plot of land, according to Guan Zhong?

Tribute, labour service, and military service

Should we call the Zhou rulers an "empire"?

We should not call the Zhou polity an "empire", since that word is connected to the far more centralized imperial state of later dynasties. Nor was there a "China" in this era - zhong guo was plural, no singular!

In chapter 6 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was the context to the lead up to the Sino-Vietnamese War in general?

§2 "THE CONTEXT - In the late 1970s, Beijing felt extremely vulnerable. The Soviet Union loomed menacingly along China's long northern border. Newly unified Vietnam, a budding Soviet client state, was flexing its considerable military muscle in the south and seeking to dominate Indochina. This sense of vulnerability was exacerbated by the sequence of events that occurred on China's periphery in 1978, which led many in Beijing to feel at once surrounded by foes and bereft of friends. Concerns over the Soviet connection and Vietnamese expansionism, especially Hanoi's designs on the Khmer Rouge regime in Phnom Penh, were compounded by Vietnam's treatment of its ethnic Chinese residents, border incidents, and Vietnam's increasingly vocal claims to territory that China considered its own. §3 But the decision to attack Vietnam was made not only within the context of the geopolitical environment, it was influenced also by the sense of outrage at what Beijing felt was Hanoi's deceitful betrayal of a steadfast friend. The Chinese viewed the Vietnamese as ingrates who reciprocated decades of Chinese aid and sacrifice with backstabbing. Vietnam had received more economic and military assistance from China than any other country, with the possible exception of North Korea. Certainly in terms of sustained military aid provided during more than two decades of war in Indochina, Beijing's support to Hanoi is without parallel for the PRC. The CCP actively assisted Viet Minh forces in their struggle to win independence from France virtually from the start. Then, during the struggle to unify Vietnam waged against South Vietnam and its main ally, the United States, China provided additional aid. During the 1960s, hundreds of thousands of troops served in Vietnam and Laos in engineering and anti-aircraft artillery divisions. Inevitably Chinese soldiers were killed in Indochina in American air attacks.5" (Scobell 2003, 120)

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, what is the overall theme and thesis of works like "The Stratagems of the Warring States (Zhanguoce)" and "Book of Lord Shang (Shang jun shue)"?

¶2 It is worth nothing that the outset that the authors of some of the ancient Chinese writings addressing matters of statecraft apparently saw no need to provide any sort of moral justification for the resort to arms. The Stratagems of the Warring States (Zhanguoce) consists of several stories relating the diplomatic and military schemes and counter-schemes of the competing kingdoms, together with a number of highly rhetorical speeches or persuasions mostly aimed at the making (or breaking) of alliances. Through these extensive materials probably dating from the late Warring States period, the arguments and decisions revolve around calculations of advantage (li); states choose to use armed force because they are convinced that it is in their interest to do so, either to secure some advantage for themselves (such as a territorial acquisition) or to prevent a rival from gaining an advantage at their expense.7[7.] When righteousness is mentioned at all, it is either denounced as ineffective in securing the desired result or deployed cynically as a smokescreen to conceal one's true agenda.8[8.] As one freelance diplomatist is supposed to have advised the king of Qi, "fight only the opportune battle, and make it sem righteous ..."9[9.] Success in international relations is ultimately a matter of strength and cunning, and morality is irrelevant to the outcome: "... the man capable of great undertaking first weighs the size of his state, next measures the power of his enemies' troops and then can count on achievement and the establishment of his name."10[10.] ¶3 "... The goal of Lord Shang, the writers who appropriated his name, and later kindred spirits was the enhancement of state power against both domestic elites and foreign rivals. The people's efforts in agriculture and warfare, the two activities that provided the foundation for a strong state, were to be promoted by a legal code backed by rewards and punishments to elicit the desired behaviors while at the same time discouraging frivolous or antisocial pursuits. Wars were to be waged for more than just defensive purposes; aggression leading to territorial aggrandizement and the enhancement of state power was a positive good, and any stron gstate that failed to failed to wage aggressive war upon its neighbors could hardly avoid decadence and dismemberment.12[12.] The BOOK OF LORD SHANG steers clear of moral (as opposed to pragmatic) justifications- (p. 199 ¶1-for war. Although at one point it puts forward the notion that aggressive war is necessary in order to bring about the political unity that will put an end to war, the idea is not pursued and has the ring of rationalization.13[13.] In an amoral, dog-eat-dog world of perpetual armed conflict, the fact that one's neighbors and rivals were plotting aggression of their own was usually sufficient reason for aggression against them.14[14.]" (Graff 2016, 198-199)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", during the Opium War, how did the British improve on their technology, compared to the Chinese?

¶2 One of the most noteworthy aspects of the Opium War was that it allowed the British to introduce and field-test in China new improvements in shipbuilding, weapons, and organizations. These changes may appear insignificant when viewed singly, but together they had an enormous effect on the outcome of the war. By contrast, the Chinese war junks, muskets, and military organization, which were not too far from "state of the art" at the beginning of the Opium War, looked woefully outdated by the end of the conflict. China's inability either to develop its own new weaponry, or to adopt quickly those improvements devised by the West, provided to be a major cause for her failure." (Ellemen 2007, 25)

¶3 "Master Wu is a short military-strategic text in six chapters, each more or less on a different topic (such as assessing the enemy and managing troops). Perhaps more than other texts in the same genre, Master Wu advocates a balance between civil virtue and martial vigor as two complementary tools of statecraft. ..." (Van Els 2013, 16)

Mencius (/ˈmɛnʃiəs/ MEN-shee-əs)[1] or Mengzi (372-289 BC or 385-303 or 302 BC)

A Chinese philosopher who has often been described as the "second Sage", that is after only Confucius himself.[2][3] Main concepts Human nature[edit] While Confucius himself did not explicitly focus on the subject of human nature, Mencius asserted the innate goodness of the individual, believing that it was society's influence - its lack of a positive cultivating influence - that caused bad moral character. "He who exerts his mind to the utmost knows his nature"[26] and "the way of learning is none other than finding the lost mind."[27] The four beginnings (or sprouts)[edit] To show innate goodness, Mencius used the example of a child falling down a well. Witnesses of this event immediately feel "alarm and distress, not to gain friendship with the child's parents, nor to seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor because they dislike the reputation [of lack of humanity if they did not rescue the child]... The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanity; the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness; the feeling of deference and compliance is the beginning of propriety; and the feeling of right or wrong is the beginning of wisdom. Men have these Four Beginnings just as they have their four limbs. Having these Four Beginnings, but saying that they cannot develop them is to destroy themselves.[28]" Human nature has an innate tendency towards goodness, but moral rightness cannot be instructed down to the last detail. This is why merely external controls always fail in improving society. True improvement results from educational cultivation in favorable environments. Likewise, bad environments tend to corrupt the human will. This, however, is not proof of innate evil because a clear thinking person would avoid causing harm to others. This position of Mencius puts him between Confucians such as Xunzi who thought people were innately bad, and Taoists who believed humans did not need cultivation, they just needed to accept their innate, natural, and effortless goodness. The four beginnings/sprouts could grow and develop, or they could fail. In this way Mencius synthesized integral parts of Taoism into Confucianism. Individual effort was needed to cultivate oneself, but one's natural tendencies were good to begin with. The object of education is the cultivation of benevolence, otherwise known as Ren. Education[edit] According to Mencius, education must awaken the innate abilities of the human mind. He denounced memorization and advocated active interrogation of the text, saying, "One who believes all of a book would be better off without books" (盡信書，則不如無書, from 孟子.盡心下). One should check for internal consistency by comparing sections and debate the probability of factual accounts by comparing them with experience.[citation needed] Destiny[edit] Mencius also believed in the power of Destiny in shaping the roles of human beings in society. What is destined cannot be contrived by the human intellect or foreseen. Destiny is shown when a path arises that is both unforeseen and constructive. Destiny should not be confused with Fate. Mencius denied that Heaven would protect a person regardless of his actions, saying, "One who understands Destiny will not stand beneath a tottering wall". The proper path is one which is natural and unforced. This path must also be maintained because, "Unused pathways are covered with weeds." One who follows Destiny will live a long and successful life. One who rebels against Destiny will die before his time. Views on politics and economics[edit] Mencius emphasized the significance of the common citizens in the state. While Confucianism generally regards rulers highly, he argued that it is acceptable for the subjects to overthrow or even kill a ruler who ignores the people's needs and rules harshly. This is because a ruler who does not rule justly is no longer a true ruler. Speaking of the overthrow of the wicked King Zhou of Shang, Mencius said, "I have merely heard of killing a villain Zhou, but I have not heard of murdering [him as] the ruler."[29] This saying should not be taken as an instigation to violence against authorities but as an application of Confucian philosophy to society. Confucianism requires a clarification of what may be reasonably expected in any given relationship. All relationships should be beneficial, but each has its own principle or inner logic. A Ruler must justify his position by acting benevolently before he can expect reciprocation from the people. In this view, a King is like a steward. Although Confucius admired Kings of great accomplishment, Mencius is clarifying the proper hierarchy of human society. Although a King has presumably higher status than a commoner, he is actually subordinate to the masses of people and the resources of society. Otherwise, there would be an implied disregard of the potential of human society heading into the future. One is significant only for what one gives, not for what one takes. Mencius distinguished between superior men who recognize and follow the virtues of righteousness and benevolence and inferior men who do not. He suggested that superior men considered only righteousness, not benefits. That assumes "permanent property" to uphold common morality. [30] To secure benefits for the disadvantaged and the aged, he advocated free trade, low tax rates, and a more equal sharing of the tax burden.[31] Comparisons to contemporaries[edit] His alleged years make him contemporary with Xun Zi, Zhuangzi, Gaozi, and Plato. Xun Zi[edit] Xun Zi was a Confucian who believed that human nature is centered on self-interest and greed, and the purpose of moral cultivation is to develop our nature into goodness. This put him at odds with Mencius. Later, the thinker Zhu Xi declared the views of Xun Zi to be unorthodox, instead supporting the position of Mencius. Plato[edit] Mencius's argument that unjust rulers may be overthrown is reminiscent of Socrates's argument in Book I of Plato's Republic. Influence[edit] Mencius's interpretation of Confucianism has generally been considered the orthodox version by subsequent Chinese philosophers, especially by the Neo-Confucians of the Song dynasty. Mencius's disciples included a large number of feudal lords, and he is said to have been more influential than Confucius had been.[32] The Mencius (also spelled Mengzi or Meng-tzu), a book of his conversations with kings of the time, is one of the Four Books that Zhu Xi grouped as the core of orthodox Neo-Confucian thought. In contrast to the sayings of Confucius, which are short and self-contained, the Mencius consists of long dialogues, including arguments, with extensive prose. It was generally neglected by the Jesuit missionaries who first translated the Confucian canon into Latin and other European languages, as they felt that the Neo-Confucian school largely consisted of Buddhist and Taoist contamination of Confucianism. Matteo Ricci also particularly disliked Mencius's strong condemnation of celibacy as unfilial. François Noël, who felt that Zhu's ideas represented a natural and native development of Confucius's thought, was the first to publish a full edition of the Mencius at Prague in 1711;[33][d] as the Chinese rites controversy had been recently decided against the Jesuits, however, his edition attained little influence outside central and eastern Europe. In 1978 book purporting to estimate the hundred most influential persons in history to that point, Mencius is ranked at 92.[35]

Mo Zi

Mozi (/ˈmoʊˈtsiː/;[1] Chinese: 墨子; pinyin: Mòzǐ; Wade-Giles: Mo Tzu/ˈmoʊˈtsuː/;[2] Latinized as Micius[3] /ˈmɪsiəs/; c. 470 - c. 391 BC),[4]original name Mo Di (墨翟) A Chinese philosopher during the Hundred Schools of Thought period (early Warring States period). A book named after him, the Mozi, contains material ascribed to him and his followers. Born in what is now Tengzhou, Shandong Province, he founded the school of Mohism that argued strongly against Confucianism and Taoism. His philosophy emphasized self-restraint, self-reflection and authenticity rather than obedience to ritual. During the Warring States period, Mohism was actively developed and practiced in many states but fell out of favour when the legalist Qin dynasty came to power. During that period, many Mohist classics are by many believed to have been ruined when the emperor Qin Shi Huang supposedly carried out the burning of books and burying of scholars. The importance of Mohism further declined when Confucianism became the dominant school of thought during the Han Dynasty, until mostly disappearing by the middle of the Western Han dynasty.[5] Mozi is known by children throughout Chinese culture by way of the Thousand Character Classic, which records that he was saddened when he saw dyeing of pure white silk, which embodied his conception of austerity (simplicity, chastity). For the modern juvenile audience of Chinese speakers, the image of his school and its founder were popularized by the animated TV series The Legend of Qin. The concept of Ai (愛) was developed by the Chinese philosopher Mozi in the 4th century BC in reaction to Confucianism's benevolent love. Mozi tried to replace what he considered to be the long-entrenched Chinese over-attachment to family and clan structures with the concept of "universal love" (jiān'ài, 兼愛). In this, he argued directly against Confucians who believed that it was natural and correct for people to care about different people in different degrees. Mozi, by contrast, believed people in principle should care for all people equally. Mohism stressed that rather than adopting different attitudes towards different people, love should be unconditional and offered to everyone without regard to reciprocation, not just to friends, family and other Confucian relations. Later in Chinese Buddhism, the term Ai (愛) was adopted to refer to a passionate caring love and was considered a fundamental desire. In Buddhism, Ai was seen as capable of being either selfish or selfless, the latter being a key element towards enlightenment. Life Most historians believe that Mozi was a member of the lower artisan class who managed to climb his way to an official post. It is known, however, that his parents were not affectionate towards him and showed him very little love. Mozi was a native of the State of Lu (today's Tengzhou, Shandong Province), although for a time he served as a minister in the State of Song.[6] Like Confucius, Mozi was known to have maintained a school for those who desired to become officials serving in the different ruling courts of the Warring States.[7] Mozi was a carpenter and was extremely skilled in creating devices (see Lu Ban). Though he did not hold a high official position, Mozi was sought out by various rulers as an expert on fortification. He was schooled in Confucianism in his early years, but he viewed Confucianism as being too fatalistic and emphasizing too much on elaborate celebrations and funerals which he felt were detrimental to the livelihood and productivity of common people. He managed to attract a large following during his lifetime which rivaled that of Confucius. His followers—mostly technicians and craftspeople—were organized in a disciplined order that studied both Mozi's philosophical and technical writings. According to some accounts of the popular understanding of Mozi at the time, he had been hailed by many as the greatest hero to come from Henan. His passion was said to be for the good of the people, without concern for personal gain or even for his own life or death. His tireless contribution to society was praised by many, including Confucius' disciple Mencius. Mencius wrote in Jinxin (Chinese: 孟子盡心; pinyin: Mengzi Jinxin) that Mozi believed in love for all mankind. As long as something benefits mankind, Mozi will pursue it even if it means hurting his head or his feet. Zhang Tai Yan said that in terms of moral virtue, even Confucius and Laozi cannot compare to Mozi. Mozi travelled from one crisis zone to another throughout the ravaged landscape of the Warring States, trying to dissuade rulers from their plans of conquest. According to the chapter "Gongshu" in Mozi, he once walked for ten days to the State of Chu in order to forestall an attack on the State of Song. At the Chu court, Mozi engaged in nine simulated war games with Gongshu Ban, the chief military strategist of Chu, and overturned each one of his stratagems. When Gongshu Ban threatened him with death, Mozi informed the king that his disciples had already trained the soldiers of Song in his fortification methods, so it would be useless to kill him. The Chu king was forced to call off the war. On the way back, however, the soldiers of Song, not recognizing him, would not allow Mozi to enter their city, and he had to spend a night freezing in the rain. After this episode, he also stopped the State of Qi from attacking the State of Lu. He taught that defense of a city does not depend only on fortification, weaponry and food supply; it is also important to keep talented people close by and to put trust in them. Philosophy See also: Mozi (book) Mozi's moral teachings emphasized self-reflection and authenticity rather than obedience to ritual. He observed that we often learn about the world through adversity ("Embracing Scholars" in Mozi). By reflecting on one's own successes and failures, one attains true self-knowledge rather than mere conformity to ritual ("Refining Self" in Mozi). Mozi exhorted people to lead a life of asceticism and self-restraint, renouncing both material and spiritual extravagance. Like Confucius, Mozi idealized the Xia Dynasty and the ancients of Chinese mythology, but he criticized the Confucian belief that modern life should be patterned on the ways of the ancients. After all, he pointed out, what we think of as "ancient" was actually innovative in its time, and thus should not be used to hinder present-day innovation ("Against Confucianism, Part 3" in the Mozi). Though Mozi did not believe that history necessarily progresses, as did Han Fei Zi, he shared the latter's critique of fate (命, mìng). Mozi believed that people were capable of changing their circumstances and directing their own lives. They could do this by applying their senses to observing the world, judging objects and events by their causes, their functions, and their historical bases. ("Against Fate, Part 3") This was the "three-prong method" Mozi recommended for testing the truth or falsehood of statements. His students later expanded on this to form the School of Names. Mozi tried to replace what he considered to be the long-entrenched Chinese ideal of strong attachments to family and clanstructures with the concept of "impartial caring" or "universal love" (兼愛, jiān ài). He argued directly against Confucians, who had philosophized that it was natural and correct for people to care about different people in different degrees. Mozi, in contrast, argued that people in principle should care for all people equally, a notion that philosophers in other schools found absurd, as they interpreted this notion as implying no special amount of care or duty towards one's parents and family. Overlooked by those critics, however, is a passage in the chapter on "Self-Cultivation" which states, "When people near-by are not befriended, there is no use endeavoring to attract those at a distance." This point is also precisely articulated by a Mohist in a debate with Mencius (in the Mencius), where the Mohist argues in relation to carrying out universal love, that "We begin with what is near." Also, in the first chapter of the writings of Mozi on universal love, Mozi argues that the best way of being filial to one's parents is to be filial to the parents of others. The foundational principle is that benevolence, as well as malevolence, is requited, and that one will be treated by others as one treats others. Mozi quotes a popular passage from the Book of Odes to bring home this point: "When one throws to me a peach, I return to him a plum." One's parents will be treated by others as one treats the parents of others. In pursuing this line of argument, Mozi was directly appealing to the idea of enlightened self-interest in social relations. Also of note is the fact that Mozi differentiated between "intention" and "actuality", thereby placing a central importance on the will to love, even though in practice it may very well be impossible to bring benefit to everyone. In addition, Mozi argued that benevolence comes to human beings "as naturally as fire turns upward or water turns downward", provided that persons in positions of authority illustrate benevolence in their own lives. In differentiating between the ideas of "universal" (jian) and "differential" (bie), Mozi said that "universal" comes from righteousness while "differential" entails human effort. Furthermore, Mozi's basic argument concerning universal love asserts that universal love is supremely practical, and this argument was directed against those who objected that such love could not be put into practice. Mozi also held a belief in the power of ghosts and spirits, although he is often thought to have only worshipped them pragmatically. In fact, in his discussion on ghosts and spirits, he remarks that even if they did not exist, communal gatherings for the sake of making sacrificial offering would play a role in strengthening social bonds. Furthermore, for Mozi the will of Heaven (天, tiān) was that people should love one another, and that mutual love by all would bring benefit to all. Therefore, it was in everyone's interest that they love others "as they love themselves". Heaven should be respected because failing to do so would subject one to punishment. For Mozi, Heaven was not the "amoral", mystical nature of the Taoists. Rather, it was a benevolent, moral force that rewarded good and punished evil. Similar in some ways to the Abrahamic religions, Mozi believed that all living things live in a realm ruled by Heaven, and Heaven has a will which is independent from and higher than the will of man. Thus he writes that "Universal love is the Way of Heaven", since "Heaven nourishes and sustains all life without regard to status." ("Laws and Customs" in Mozi) Mozi's ideal of government, which advocated a meritocracy based on talent rather than background, also followed his idea of Heaven. Anti-fatalism(非命)- Mozi opposed to Confucian "Destiny"[8] thought, class differences and other ideas. Mozi put forward to promote people's victory, things in the subjective attitude to life, encourage people to work hard to change their fate and inequality in the world. In Confucius's opinion, a person's life and death, wealth and poverty are completely related to destiny and personal power can not be changed. Ethics[edit] Main article: Mohist consequentialism What is the purpose of houses? It is to protect us from the wind and cold of winter, the heat and rain of summer, and to keep out robbers and thieves. Once these ends have been secured, that is all. Whatever does not contribute to these ends should be eliminated.[9] — Mozi, Mozi (5th century BC) Ch 20 Mohist ethics are considered a form of consequentialism, sometimes called state consequentialism.[10] Mohist ethics evaluates the moral worth of an action based on how it contributes to the stability of a state,[10] through social order, material wealth, and population growth. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Mohist consequentialism, dating back to the 5th century BC, is the "world's earliest form of consequentialism, a remarkably sophisticated version based on a plurality of intrinsic goods taken as constitutive of human welfare".[11] Unlike utilitarianism, which views pleasure as a moral good, "the basic goods in Mohist consequentialist thinking are ... order, material wealth, and increase in population".[12] During Mozi's era, war and famines were common, and population growth was seen as a moral necessity for a harmonious society. Mozi opposed wars because they wasted life and resources while interfering with the fair distribution of wealth, yet he recognized the need for strong urban defenses so he could maintain the harmonious society he desired.[13] The "material wealth" of Mohist consequentialism refers to basic needs like shelter and clothing, and the "order" of Mohist consequentialism refers to Mozi's stance against warfare and violence, which he viewed as pointless and a threat to social stability.[9] Stanford sinologist David Shepherd Nivison, in The Cambridge History of Ancient China, writes that the moral goods of Mohism "are interrelated: more basic wealth, then more reproduction; more people, then more production and wealth ... if people have plenty, they would be good, filial, kind, and so on unproblematically".[12] In contrast to Jeremy Bentham, Mozi did not believe that individual happiness was important; the consequences of the state outweigh the consequences of individual actions.[12] Mozi tended to evaluate actions based on whether they provide benefit to the people, which he measured in terms of an enlarged population (states were sparsely populated in his day), a prosperous economy, and social order. Like other consequentialist theories, Mozi thought that actions should be measured by the way they contribute to the "greatest societal good for what we have agreed to in a social contract". With this criterion Mozi denounced things as diverse as offensive warfare, expensive funerals, and even music and dance, which he saw as serving no useful purpose. Mozi did not object to music in principle—"It's not that I don't like the sound of the drum" ("Against Music")—but only because of the heavy tax burden such activities placed on commoners and also due to the fact that officials tended to indulge in them at the expense of their duties. Works and influence[edit] Main article: Mozi (book) "Mozi" is also the name of the philosophical text compiled by Mohists from Mozi's thought. This text originally consisted of 71 chapters. During the Han dynasty Confucianism dominated China. As Mohism is against Confucianism, the text "Mozi"was neglected. During the Song dynasty, only 61 chapters were left. Today, we have only 53 chapters through which we attempt to understand this school of thought, as compiled by Sun Yirang. Because Mohism disappeared as a living tradition from China, its texts were not well maintained, and many chapters are missing or in a corrupted state. For example, of the three chapters "Against Confucianism", only one remains. The collection of texts from "Mozi" is a rich source of insight into early Chinese dynastic history and culture. Much of Mozi's arguments are supported by the historical claims of even earlier records. His conversations with other renowned philosophers of that era are also recorded. From them, we can distinguish Mohismfrom other schools of thought more clearly. Mohism was suppressed under the Qin and died out completely under the Han, which made Confucianism the official doctrine. However, many of its ideas were dissolved into the mainstream of Chinese thought, since both Confucians such as Xunzi and Taoists such as Zhuangziexpressed sympathy with Mozi's concerns. The influence of Mozi is still visible in many Han works written hundreds of years later. In modern times, Mohism was given a fresh analysis. Sun Yat-Sen used "universal love" as one of the foundations for his idea of Chinese democracy. More recently, Chinese scholars under Communism have tried to rehabilitate Mozi as a "philosopher of the people", highlighting his rational-empirical approach to the world as well as his "proletarian" background. Some views claim that Mozi's philosophy was at once more advanced and less so than that of Confucius. His concept of "universal love" embraced a broader idea of human community than that of the Confucians, but he was less tolerant than Confucius in his condemnation of all that is not directly "useful", neglecting the humanizing functions of art and music. Zhuangzi, who criticized both the Confucians and the Mohists, had this in mind in his parables on the "usefulness of the useless". Of course, this insistence on usefulness comes from a time when war and famine were widespread and could well have made all the royal pageantry look frivolous. However, others would say the above view is not entirely accurate, and that in fact "universal love" (博愛), as well as "the world as a commonwealth shared by all" (天下為公) advocated by Sun Yat-Sen are Confucian ideas.[14] "Universal love" (博愛, Boai) in Confucianism is a little different from Mozi's "universal love" (兼愛, Jian'ai): in Confucianism it tends to emphasize it as naturally befitting human relations, while in Mozi's ideas it tends to be community oriented and non-differentiated according to individual. Some modern-day supporters for Mozi (as well as Communism) make the claim that Mohism and modern Communism share a lot in terms of ideals for community life. Others would claim that Mohism shares more with the central ideas of Christianity, especially in terms of the idea of "universal love" (in Greek, "agape"), the "Golden Rule", and the relation of humanity to the supernatural realm. Mohism and science[edit] According to Joseph Needham, Mozi (collected writings of those in the tradition of Mozi, some of which might have been by Mozi himself) contains the following sentence: 'The cessation of motion is due to the opposing force... If there is no opposing force... the motion will never stop. This is as true as that an ox is not a horse.' which, he claims, is a precursor to Newton's first law of motion.[15] Mozi also contains speculations in optics and mechanics that are similarly strikingly original, although their ideas were not taken up by later Chinese philosophers. The Mohist tradition is also highly unusual in Chinese thought in that it devoted time to developing principles of logic.[16] Contemporary use in technology[edit] In 2016, a joint Austrian-Chinese initiative between the experimental physics groups of Anton Zeilinger and former graduate student Jian-Wei Pan known as Quantum Experiments at Space Scale launched a quantum communications satellite nicknamed "Micius" or "Mozi" in homage to the philosopher's writings on optics.[17][18][19]

What are 2 of the main problems of the medieval era?

1. The Inner Asian Threat: Strangers at the Gates! 2. Problems of Military Control: How to keep the soldiers on tap but not on top!

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

A book by the American scholar John Mearsheimer on the subject of international relations theory published by W.W. Norton & Company in 2001. Mearsheimer explains and argues for his theory of "offensive realism" by stating its key assumptions, evolution from early realist theory, and its predictive capability. He readily acknowledges the inherent pessimism of offensive realism and its predictions because his world is one in which conflict between great powers will never see an end. An article adapted from the book had previously been published by Foreign Affairs.[2] Anarchy and the struggle for power Mearsheimer posits that states are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals. He argues that states pursue power because of the anarchic system in which they operate. In international politics, there is no hierarchy, no "night watchman" to turn to when one state attacks another so states are forced to rely only on themselves for security. Thus, states seek to expand their power both militarily, geographically and economically in order to increase their security. Primacy of land power A state's power in international politics, Mearsheimer argues, derives from the strength of its military for two reasons: because land force is the dominant military power in the modern era, and because large bodies of water limit the power projection capabilities of land armies. The stopping power of water Mearsheimer argues that the presence of oceans in the world prevents any state from reaching world hegemony. He posits that large bodies of water limit the power projection abilities of militaries and thus naturally divide up powers in the globe. He uses the example of the isolation provided to Britain by the English Channel, which allowed it to act as an offshore balancer on mainland Europe. Britain, he argues, never had ambitions to control or dominate continental Europe. Instead it aimed only to maintain the balance of power and ensure that no state could become so powerful as to achieve regional hegemony on the continent. For much of the 19th century, Britain had an industrial capacity that would have allowed it to easily invade and dominate much of Europe. However, Britain chose not to attempt domination of the continent, in part because it calculated that its aims of achieving security could be more cheaply achieved if the European powers could be played off against each other. By doing so, it would be occupied on the European continent and unable to challenge Britain across the English Channel or interfere with Britain's economic interests in Asia and Africa. Therefore, the central aim of American foreign policy is to be the hegemon in the Western Hemisphere only, and to prevent the rise of a similar hegemon in the Eastern Hemisphere. In turn, the proper role for the United States is as an offshore balancer, balancing against the rise of a Eurasian hegemon and going to war only as a last resort to thwart it. State strategies for survival Objective 1 - Regional hegemony In addition to their principal goal, which is survival, great powers seek to achieve three main objectives. Their highest aim is to achieve regional hegemony. Mearsheimer argues although achieving global hegemony would provide maximum security to a state, it is not feasible because the world has too many oceans which inhibit the projection of military power. Thus, the difficulty of projecting military power across large bodies of water makes it impossible for great powers to dominate the world. Regional hegemons try strongly to prevent other states from achieving regional hegemony. Instead, they try to maintain an even balance among of power in regions and act to ensure the existence of multiple powers so as to keep those multiple powers occupied among themselves rather than being able to challenge the regional hegemon's interests, which they would be free to do if they were not occupied by their neighboring competitors. Mearsheimer uses the example of the United States, which achieved regional hegemony in the late 1800s and then sought to intervene wherever it looked as though another state might achieve hegemony in a region: Imperial Germany during World War I Nazi Germany during World War II Imperial Japan during World War II Soviet Union during the Cold War Objective 2 - Maximum wealth Great powers seek to maximize their share of the world's wealth because economic strength is the foundation of military strength. Great powers seek to prevent rival powers from dominating wealth-producing regions of the world. The United States, for example, sought to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Western Europe and the Middle East. Had the Soviets gained control of these areas, the balance of power would have been altered significantly against the United States. Objective 3 - Nuclear superiority Mearsheimer asserts that great powers seek nuclear superiority over their rivals. Great powers exist in a world of multiple nuclear powers with the assured capacity to destroy their enemies called mutually assured destruction (MAD). Mearsheimer disagrees with the assertions that states are content to live in a MAD world and that they would avoid developing defenses against nuclear weapons. Instead, he argues that great powers would not be content to live in a MAD world and would try to search for ways to gain superiority over their nuclear rivals. Rise of American power; 1800-1900 The United States was a strongly expansionist power in the Americas. Mearsheimer points to the comment made by Henry Cabot Lodge that the United States had a "record of conquest, colonization and territorial expansion unequaled by any people in the 19th century." In the 1840s, Europeans began speaking about the need to preserve a balance of power in America and contain further American expansion. By 1900, however, the United States had achieved regional hegemony and in 1895 its Secretary of State Richard Olney told Britain's Lord Salisbury that "today the U.S. is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects within its interposition...its infinite resources and isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable against all other powers." Future of American power On the penultimate page of Tragedy, Mearsheimer warns: Neither Wilhelmine Germany, nor imperial Japan, nor Nazi Germany, nor the Soviet Union had nearly as much latent power as the United States had during their confrontations ... But if China were to become a giant Hong Kong, it would probably have somewhere on the order of four times as much latent power as the United States does, allowing China to gain a decisive military advantage over the United States. SOURCES: 1. "Amazon.com: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition) (9780393349276): John J. Mearsheimer: Books". Archived from the original on 2016-03-10. Retrieved 2017-09-16. 2. John, J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of the American Pacifier," Foreign Affairs, 80/5, (2001): p 46-61.

The high-level equilibrium trap

A concept developed by environmental historian Mark Elvin to explain why China never underwent an indigenous Industrial Revolution despite its wealth, stability, and high level of scientific achievement. Essentially, he claims that the Chinese pre-industrial economy had reached an equilibrium point where supply and demand were well-balanced. Late imperial production methods and trade networks were so efficient and labor was so cheap that investment in capital to improve efficiency would not be profitable. At the same time, an intellectual paradigm shift from Taoism to Confucianism among the intelligentsia moved the focus of academic inquiry from natural science and mathematics, which were conceived of under Taoism as investigations into the mystical nature of the universe, to studies of social philosophy and morality under Confucianism. According to Elvin, this produced an intellectual climate that was not conducive to technical innovation. By comparison, the economy of Great Britain at the time of the Industrial Revolution was vastly smaller and less efficient than the late imperial Chinese economy. Labor was comparatively more expensive, and internal trade far less efficient than in China. This produced large imbalances in the forces of supply and demand, leading to economic problems which provided a large financial incentive for the creation of scientific and engineering advances designed to address them. At the same time, the Enlightenment had shifted the focus of academic inquiry towards natural sciences, providing the basis for many technical innovations. Background According to Elvin, Chinese knowledge of science, mathematics, and engineering in the 14th century was far more advanced than anywhere else in the world. He presents the case study of the spinning wheel, a device used to assist in the production of yarn from plant fibers which increased the efficiency of a worker by orders of magnitude. An automatic, water-powered spinning wheel for hemp fiber was described in Chinese scientific manuals by the early 14th century; comparable devices would not be invented in Europe until the 18th century. Despite providing an enormous gain in worker productivity, the Chinese spinning wheel fell into disuse over the subsequent centuries and was completely unknown by the 17th century, whereas the mechanical automation of spinning in Europe in the 18th century (from manual spinning wheel precursors of the 13th century ultimately sourced from Asia Minor) led directly to a process of technical refinement and engineering improvements that resulted in the Industrial Revolution and widespread mechanization of production of goods beyond yarn. Decline of the mechanical spinning wheel in China Elvin says that cotton began replacing hemp as the main fiber crop shortly after the mechanical spinning wheel was invented. Cotton produced far higher fiber yields per unit of land than hemp, and was thus far more profitable, so it largely replaced hemp. As hemp fibers are much longer than cotton fibers, existing mechanical spinning wheels designed for hemp could not be used to spin cotton fibers without substantial mechanical modifications to the apparatus. Apparently, no such modifications were ever made. All spinning in China reverted to far less efficient hand-spinning, and the automatic spinning wheel was forgotten. Elvin proposes several factors whose confluence prevented any further technical development of the automatic spinning wheel. Cheap labor Elvin says that substantially all extant arable land in China was already under cultivation by the 17th century. Prior to that, food production was expanded by simply cultivating new areas rather than through technical improvements in production methods, which was possible only because of China's vast size. Once all arable land was under cultivation, the lack of technical progress meant that crop yields were relatively flat, whereas the population continued to grow. This led to a large labor surplus, which drove down wages substantially. He suggests that this abundance of cheap labor rendered the capital investment required for ongoing engineering research and improvements simply not cost-effective compared to hiring laborers to do the work by hand. Further, the wealthy merchants who financed cotton production wielded effective political control over government officials. They had the trade laws written broadly in their favor in such a way as to prevent any significant accumulation of wealth by the independent peasant contractors who were actually doing the spinning, rendering it less likely that one of the spinners would be in a position to develop efficiency-improving technology. Well-developed trade network By the cotton period, Elvin says that China's trade network had reached an advanced and highly efficient state. As the Chinese economy was enormous, local shortages and crop failures were no longer a major problem as local shortages were quickly alleviated through internal trade with some other part of the vast economy. This removed much of the local economic pressure to increase production efficiency. Shift from Taoism to Confucianism Elvin says that the Chinese intelligentsia gradually abandoned Taoism in favor of Confucianism around the 14th century. Whereas the Taoist philosophical paradigm had promoted scientific and mathematical investigation as a kind of mystical exploration of the workings of the universe, the Confucian paradigm focused far more on social philosophy and morality, which prompted a general lack of further research in mathematics and natural sciences. Decline of serfdom During the period when hemp was the dominant fiber crop, many Chinese peasants still lived as serfs and worked under the direct control and supervision of an aristocratic manor lord. Elvin says that this direct supervision of their work by well-educated lords who had broad knowledge of the latest scientific and engineering principles may have contributed to the invention of the automatic spinning wheel as a means of improving their work efficiency. In the cotton-dominant period, however, the practice of serfdom had died out and much spinning was organized as a cottage industry; peasant spinners typically worked at home as independent contractors with no direct supervision. He suggests that their lack of access to education may have helped to prevent the development of technical improvements in the spinning process. The high-level equilibrium trap Elvin says that these factors in combination produced what he calls a "high-level equilibrium trap." He says that widespread technical progress results from some large disequilibrium between supply and demand in the economy, which prompts people to find creative new ways to address the difficulties produced by the change. The late imperial Chinese economy had reached an equilibrium point. It had become stable, efficient, and well organized. The rapidly growing population but slowly growing amount of agricultural land largely prevented any significant capital surplus from developing, as almost all production was required for basic sustenance. The growing population also provided a ready pool of cheap labor. The Chinese economy was enormous and well integrated. The dense and well-developed water trade networks yielded a relatively large amount of profit to the upper classes and alleviated local supply shortages. Thus, there was no incentive for further technical refinement, and technical progress stagnated. Contrast with Britain By contrast, the British economy at the time of the Industrial Revolution was much smaller and less efficient than China's. Local shortages could not be readily alleviated by internal trade; besides being far smaller than China, Britain lacked an efficient internal water-based trade network, which prompted the development of the steam engine and railroads. The early paucity of arable farmland in Britain encouraged technical refinements to improve crop yields at an early date, whereas the vast size of China permitted production to be increased simply by cultivating more land until late in the imperial period. Although overseas colonies provided cheap labor during the Industrial Revolution, local labor in Britain itself was more expensive than in China, providing the capitalist class an incentive to improve worker efficiency.

What was the political intrigue like in the Spring and Autumn period?

Alliances were commonplace, as was treachery, and warfare gradually became more frequent and more costly. The fighting got so bad at one point that some of the states attempted to sponsor a disarmament conference in 579 BCE, but it did little to suppress the ambitions of the powerful lords.

In the consensus regarding Confucian strategic culture, when is the use of violence justified?

As noted in the Confucian consensus, the use of violence is justified under certain specific conditions: 1. Initiated by proper/legitimate authority. In the Chinese case this usually meant the Son of Heaven, unless his misconduct had resulted in the loss of the Mandate, in which case he could be forcibly overthrown with Heaven's approval. 2. Used to punish/chastise/rectify/correct the incorrigibly wicked, violent, and unruly. In other words, the target of your action must bring about his/their own chastisement through their willful misconduct. Then the blame for being "crooked" is on them!

According to Professor Green, what is the significance of the oracle bones for the Shang dynasty?

They reveal how preoccupied the Shang rulers were with military affairs

According to Sun Zi, what should a state do to pursue it's political aims INSTEAD of war?

Whenever possible, the state's political ends should be achieved through diplomatic maneuvers, thwarting the enemy's plans and alliances, and frustrating his strategy. The state should use military force only if the enemy threatens the state with military action or refuses to bend to one's will without being brutally forced into submission.

In chapter 9 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the role of soldiers and the use of force

(p. 195) §1 SOLDIERS AND THE USE OF FORCE: MILITARY CULTURE - The five case studies in this volume reveal that Chinese soldiers and statesmen hold different perceptions about how and when to use military force. Organizational culture seems influential in determining the perspective of individual figures vis-`a-vis the use of force. Belying their bellicose reputation, Chinese soldiers tend to be no more hawkish than Chinese statesmen are. Indeed, frequently military leaders tend to be significantly less hawkish than their civilian counterparts. Whatever their disposition, Chinese soldiers rarely seem to be the decisive element in decisions to use force. In any event, the caution of soldiers tends to go unheeded. §2 In only one of the cases examined - the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait Crisis - did the thinking of PLA leaders have a significant impact on whether force was used. In this case, they were consistently more hawkish than statesmen. The term hawkish is used deliberately instead of bellicose or belligerent (see Chapter 8). The latter two words imply a predisposition or eagerness to resort to violence and are inaccurate in my view. §3 With the exception of the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait Crisis, it was the paramount leader who was the primary impetus in decisions to deploy the military both at home and abroad. Mao was the driving force behind the decisions to intervene in Korea and to send the PLA into the streets, factories, communes, and schools in the late 1960s. Deng was the prime mover in the attack launched against (p. 196) §1-Vietnam in 1979 and in the unleashing of the PLA to crush the Beijing Spring protest movement of 1989. §2 Generally, soldiers are more cautious and conservative than statesmen on domestic and foreign employments; however, this is less true on issues of emotional nationalism. The sentiments of Chinese soldiers in the Korea and Vietnam interventions were both influenced by a history of a close association between the PLA and the armed forces of these respective communist movements. In 1950, this history tended to reinforce sentiment to enter the war in Korea and assist old comrades-in-arms. In 1979, this history tended to reinforce sentiment among some soldiers to attack Vietnam and punish a traitorous erstwhile ally that had turned against China - a sentiment that also affected Chinese civilians. In the cases of Vietnam and Taiwan, there seems to have been a broad consensus among soldiers and statesmen that some kind of military action was required. Perhaps this was also because each case involved a "domestic" issue. In the case of Vietnam, the issue was the treatment of ethnic Chinese and territorial disputes. As for Taiwan, the issue of national unification raises the emotions of both soldiers and civilians. §3 The analysis here is consistent with research by other scholars about the perspectives of elite Chinese figures regarding the employment of force: Soldiers seem to be no more hawkish than their civilian counterparts. In at least three instances other than the five cases examined here - the Taiwan Strait (1958), India (1962), and Vietnam (1964-5) - it seems that at least some top soldiers opposed the use of force.6 During the Mao and Deng eras, the opinion of China's top civilian leader appears to have carried the day, while the military view never seemed to be the determining factor in decisions to initiate actual hostilities. The 1995-6 Taiwan case study suggests this could change in the absence of a dual role paramount leader. While China's generals may remain reluctant to press for war, they can be hawkish. That is, they may engage in saber-rattling and brinkmanship, particularly on matters, such as Taiwan, that they believe threaten core issues of national sovereignty and vital strategic interests. The April 2001 collision between a Chinese F-8 fighter and a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft in international airspace near Hainan Island may also be viewed in this context. It appears that Chinese pilots were regularly engaged in risky flying maneuvers designed to intimidate U.S. aircrews flying routine missions near Chinese airspace. Very likely this behavior was sanctioned by the military chain of command but without the knowledge of top civilian leaders.7 Any of such "shows of force" could escalate into a full-blown conflict. The findings of this study suggest that the attitudes of Chinese soldiers and statesmen conform roughly to the pattern found by Richard Betts in his study of the attitudes of American leaders during the Cold War.8 Betts found that military- (p. 197) §1-figures tended to be no more hawkish than civilian leaders and, in fact, often were more dovish. However, once a country has embarked on the path of war, soldiers, especially commanders in the theater of operations, become eager to undertake their mission. Nevertheless, on the eve of combat, officers in the field exhibit considerable caution and conservatism on strategy and tactics and on employment of maximum force. My research supports the contention by Paul H. B. Godwin that on issues of national security and foreign policy, Chinese soldiers and statesmen hold basic dispositions generally consistent with the findings of Betts.9 This indicates the existence of a "Chinese military mind" - comparable to that identified in the United States - distinct from the thinking of Chinese civilian leaders. §2 Interestingly, Betts' study of U.S. crisis behavior found air force and naval commanders to be somewhat more willing to use force than army officers.10 If we can generalize from these findings, they hold significant implications for China. The overwhelming predominance of the PLA's land component, relative to its air and naval arms, suggests that in the past the Chinese military may have been significantly less hawkish than the armed forces of other states possessing more substantial air and naval capabilities.11 This too may be changing as China's naval and air services undergo significant modernization and enhancement of their capabilities.12 The increasing influence of the PLA Navy is significant here. The PLA Navy seems to have a particularly strong sense of mission and appears to be a driving force behind Chinese exploration of and expansion into the South China Sea.13 §3 The attitudes of soldiers and statesmen do tend to differ fundamentally on the issue of coercive diplomacy. This point is very much evident in four of the five case studies in this book. There were tensions between how civilian and military leaders viewed the way in which force should be applied. These tensions were relatively easily reconciled in all but one of the five case studies because soldiers deferred to the wishes of the paramount civilian leader. Only in the fifth and final case, Taiwan, did the generals get out in front of the civilian leadership on the necessity for using force. Nevertheless, there was widespread civil-military consensus among both political and military leaders on the appropriate action to take." (Scobell 2003, 195-197)

What is: The Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP)?

A global political commitment which was endorsed by all member states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit in order to address its four key concerns to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The principle of the Responsibility to Protect is based upon the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations.The principle is based on a respect for the norms and principles of international law, especially the underlying principles of law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict. The Responsibility to Protect provides a framework for employing measures that already exist (i.e., mediation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers) to prevent atrocity crimes and to protect civilians from their occurrence. The authority to employ the use of force under the framework of the Responsibility to Protect rests solely with United Nations Security Council and is considered a measure of last resort.The United Nations Secretary-General has published annual reports on the Responsibility to Protect since 2009 that expand on the measures available to governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society, as well as the private sector, to prevent atrocity crimes. Definition The Responsibility to Protect has been the subject of considerable debate, particularly regarding the implementation of the principle by various actors in the context of country-specific situations, such as Libya, Syria, Sudan and Kenya, for example. The Responsibility to Protect is a political commitment unanimously adopted by all members of the United Nations General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit and articulated in paragraphs 138-139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document: 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 140. We fully support the mission of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. The above paragraphs in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document serve as the basis for the inter-governmental agreement to the Responsibility to Protect. The General Assembly adopted the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document in its resolution 60/1 of 2005. The body subsequently committed to continue consideration of the Responsibility to Protect with its Resolution A/Res/63/308 of October 2009. The UN Security Council first reaffirmed the Responsibility to Protect in Resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, recalling in particular paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Scope and limitations of the Responsibility to Protect The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which first articulated the Responsibility to Protect in its December 2001 Report, envisioned a wide scope of application in its articulation of the principle, which included "overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened." Heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit refined the scope of the Responsibility to Protect to the four crimes mentioned in paragraphs 138 and 139, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, which are commonly referred to as 'atrocity crimes' or 'mass atrocity crimes'. As per the Secretary-General's 2009 Report on the Responsibility to Protect, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, "The responsibility to protect applies, until Member States decide otherwise, only to the four specified crimes and violations: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity...To try to extend it to cover other calamities, such as HIV/AIDS, climate change or the response to natural disasters, would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility." The focused scope is part of what the UN Secretary-General has termed a "narrow but deep approach" to the Responsibility to Protect: A narrow application to four crimes, but a deep approach to response, employing the wide array of prevention and protection instruments available to Member States, the United Nations system, regional and subregional organizations and civil society. Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect The Responsibility to Protect consists of three important and mutually-reinforcing pillars, as articulated in the 2009 Report of the Secretary-General on the issue, and which build off of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and the intergovernmental agreement to the principle: Pillar I: The protection responsibilities of the state; Pillar II: International assistance and capacity-building; Pillar III: Timely and decisive response. As seen in the 2005 World Outcome Document the UN Member States unanimously agreed to uphold their Responsibility to Protect. Pillar I being the protection responsibilities of the state, paragraph 138 (see definition) states "Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity". Under Pillar I many countries are able to uphold these principles of preventing mass atrocity crimes. As Pillar II leads on to international assistance and capacity-building. The international community is sent to help populations in need before further crises break out. States who may be willing but are either incapable or too weak to uphold their responsibility now may receive international support as a result of R2P. Pillar III is to deliver a timely and decisive response. This movement is a prevention method for mass atrocity crimes when a state fails to protect its populations. In reference to paragraph 139 "The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the [UN] Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity". According to the UN Secretary-General's 2012 report, the three pillars of the Responsibility to Protect are not sequential and are of equal importance. "Without all three, the concept would be incomplete. All three pillars must be implemented in a manner fully consistent with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter." The pillared approach is intended to reinforce, not undermine state sovereignty. As per the 2009 report of the Secretary-General, "By helping States to meet their core protection responsibilities, the responsibility to protect seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it. It seeks to help States to succeed, not just to react when they fail." The Responsibility to Protect and 'Humanitarian Intervention' The Responsibility to Protect differs from humanitarian intervention in four important ways. First, humanitarian intervention only refers to the use of military force, whereas R2P is first and foremost a preventive principle that emphasizes a range of measures to stem the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity before the crimes are threatened or occur. The use of force may only be carried out as a measure of last resort, when all other non-coercive measures have failed, and only when it is authorized by the UN Security Council. This is in contrast to the principle of 'humanitarian intervention', which allows for the use of force as a humanitarian imperative without the authorization of such bodies like the Security Council. The second point relates to the first. As a principle, the Responsibility to Protect is rooted firmly in existing international law, especially the law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict. Third, while humanitarian interventions have in the past been justified in the context of varying situations, R2P focuses only on the four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The first three crimes are clearly defined in international law and codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the treaty which established the International Criminal Court. Ethnic cleansing is not a crime defined under international law, but has been defined by the UN as "a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas". Finally, while humanitarian intervention assumes a "right to intervene", the R2P is based on a "responsibility to protect". Humanitarian intervention and the R2P both agree on the fact that sovereignty is not absolute. However, the R2P doctrine shifts away from state-centered motivations to the interests of victims by focusing not on the right of states to intervene but on a responsibility to protect populations at risk. In addition, it introduces a new way of looking at the essence of sovereignty, moving away from issues of "control" and emphasising "responsibility" to one's own citizens and the wider international community.

For Sunzi, how does one acquire knowledge of the enemy, and hte ground?

Intelligence/reconnaissance work is essential in the planning process. Sun Zi dedicates an entire chapter to the use of spies.

How do the CCP view the Chinese tributary system?

The CCP sees the Chinese tributary system as a golden age of China.

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what is the military expression of Ancient China?

"Ancient China during the Shang dynasty (ca. 1500-1045 B.C.E.), the Western Zhou (ca. 1045-770 B.C.E.), and the Spring and Autumn era was a Bronze Age society whose military expression was the war chariot with two spoked wheels. Commanded by an aristocratic archer, the chariot's crew included a driver and sometimes a third person armed with a spear." (Dreyer 2012, 20)

"... The issue of central-provincial relations is a complicated one. The writings ofLuo Ergang in China in the 1930s and Franz Michael in subsequent years in the United States articulated what is known as the "regionalism thesis": In the effort to suppress the Taiping and other mid-century rebellions, officials like Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang became, in effect, regional satraps, with essentially "personal" armies and autonomous sources of revenue from the lijin commercial transit tax. The Qing state, it was argued, was never able truly to reassert central control, and so the rise of these provincial leaders was a direct antecedent to the complete collapse of central control during the 1910s and 1920s. 10 While initially plausible (and still widely reproduced in textbooks), the regionalism thesis has been under constant and devastating attack for years. Kwang-ching Liu demonstrated that Li Hongzhang remained highly dependent on the central government for funds and remained a loyal central government agent, and that his more or less permanent position as Zhili governor-general was an exception. Other scholars have shown that the customs revenues remained under firm central control. While a few governors-general undoubtedly became exceptionally powerful as a result of the suppression of the rebellion, it did not represent a fundamental structural shift in the Qing state.11 The real shift in central-provincial relations began during the Boxer Uprising. When the central government began to support the Boxers' antiforeign activities and the siege of the foreign legations, prominent provincial officials saw this as at best futile and at worst suicidal. While in many cases they simply ignored central government edicts and- (p. 170) -waited for the storm to pass, in the crucial Yangzi valley the prominent governors-general Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi, responding to intense pressure from local elites, signed the Yangzi Compact, an agreement with the British that no military action would be undertaken in the Yangzi valley-and an open rejection of an imperial edict. In the aftermath of the disaster, as the Empress Dowager Cixi initiated the New Policy reforms, the disobedience was conveniently forgotten, but the unwillingness of even loyal senior officials and local elites to listen to Beijing indicated a real break from the traditions of Qing government. The building of new armies was primarily a provincial activity, and only slowly did the central state try to take control of the process. This centralization effort had not achieved much success by the end of the first decade. Efforts to assert control by shifting Zhang Zhidong and Yuan Shikai from their positions of power, and to nationalize the railways that local elites had vigorously sought to purchase from foreign control, provided fuel for open rebellion. From 1908 onward, as reformers became disillusioned with the central government, this lack of effective control would become a fatal problem." (Yu 2012, 169-170)

What are some of the connections between Maoist guerrilla warfare and the theories of Sun Zi in terms of the guerrillas and the people?

2. The people are the sea and the guerrillas are fish - the fish cannot exist in a hostile sea! This is related to the first principle. As Xun Zi noted, the people are like the sea and the ruler is like a boat - the sea can support the boat, but it can also overturn the boat. Winning the hearts and minds of the people is essential for the success of guerrilla operations. Not only are the guerrillas dependent upon the people for intelligence, they are also dependent on the people's willingness to supply them and shield them from hostile forces. To win the hearts and minds of the people, guerrillas must seek to understand their concerns. Stubborn adherence to policies that alienate the people is suicidal for guerrillas. One must pay attention to the local social ecology of revolution!

According to Confucian Strategic Culture, what is 3) the efficacy of war and violence?

3) The efficacy of war and violence: This is related to the Chinese understanding of the role of war in human affairs. In keeping with the Confucian consensus, the Chinese supposedly have a strategic culture that emphasizes the efficacy of virtue while downplaying the role of force. This is reflected in a number of popular sayings: "Emphasize civility, de-emphasize martiality; stress virtue and downplay physical strength." (重文輕武重德不重力). "If one has virtue, one cannot be matched." (有德不可有敵) "Display virtue and do not flaunt the military. " (觀德不耀兵) Violence is simply not as effective as virtue in eliciting "right" behavior, so the Chinese supposedly downplayed the "hard power" use of force and emphasized ming ming de (明明德) - the "soft power" of virtue.

What are some of the connections between Maoist guerrilla warfare and the theories of Sun Zi in terms of how specifically guerrillas fight a conventional army?

6. Draw the enemy in with the orthodox and destroy him with the unorthodox - tempt him with profit, avoid positional warfare except as bait in a trap! The guerrilla must lay his traps carefully, always taking into consideration both the political and military ramifications of any operation. Guerrilla warfare is often intensely frustrating for conventional armies, and that frustration makes them vulnerable to provocation: "Thus one who excels at moving the enemy deploys in a configuration to which the enemy must respond. He offers something which the enemy must seize. With profit he moves them, with the foundation he awaits them!" In a type of war that offers few prizes, many commanders cannot resist the promise of an easy victory against an inferior foe - and therein lies their undoing! As Sun Zi noted, "All warfare is based on deception. Thus although you are capable, display incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When your objective is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates prepare against him; where he is strong avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under a strain and wear him down. When he is united, divide him. Attack where he is unprepared; emerge where he does not expect you!" "Thus the army is established by deceit, moves for advantage, and changes through segmenting and reuniting." Wise words for any guerrilla force! Mao echoed this: "In general, the shifting of forces should be done secretly and swiftly. Ingenious devices such as making a noise in the east while attacking in the west, appearing now in the south and now in the north, hit-and-run and night action should be constantly employed to mislead, entice, and confuse the enemy. Flexibility in dispersion , in concentration, and in shifting is the concrete manifestation of the initiative in guerrilla warfare!" Mao understood flexibility was the key: "Attack may be changed into defense and defense into attack; advance may be turned into retreat and retreat into advance; containing forces may be turned into assault forces, and assault forces into containing forces." The similarity with Sun Zi's concept of the orthodox-unorthodox is clear! It must be noted that Guerrilla warfare (youji zhan游擊戰 "roving attack war") was NOT a Chinese invention. It has been used in other places at other times (eg., American War of Independence, Spain and Russia during the Napoleonic Wars, etc), but Mao was one of the first to integrate this strategy into a revolutionary war, uniting patriotism, politics, and guerrilla warfare into one formidable doctrine - one that would inspire revolutionary copycats around the world.

Xun Kuang (/ˈʃʊn ˈkwɑːŋ/; Chinese: 荀況; pinyin: Xún Kuàng [ɕy̌n kʰwâŋ]; c. 310 - c. 235 BC, alt. c. 314 - c. 217 BC),[1] also widely known as Xunzi(/ˈʃʊnˈdziː/; Chinese: 荀子; pinyin: Xúnzǐ; Wade-Giles: Hsün-tzu, "Master Xun")

A Chinese Confucian philosopher who lived during the Warring States period and contributed to the Hundred Schools of Thought. A book known as the Xunzi is traditionally attributed to him. His works survive in an excellent condition, and were a major influence in forming the official state doctrines of the Han dynasty,[2] but his influence waned during the Tang dynasty relative to that of Mencius.[3] Xunzi discusses figures ranging from Confucius, Mencius, and Zhuangzi, to Linguists Mozi, Hui Shi and Gongsun Long and "Legalists" Shen Buhai and Shen Dao.[4] He mentions Laozi as a figure for the first time in early Chinese history,[5] and makes use of Taoist terminology, though rejecting their doctrine.[6] Life[edit] Xunzi was born Xun Kuang. Some texts recorded his surname as Sun (孫) instead of Xun, either because the two surnames were homophones in antiquity or because Xun was a naming taboo during the reign of Emperor Xuan of Han (73-48 BC), whose given name was Xun. Herbert Giles and John Knoblock both consider the naming taboo theory more likely.[7][8] Nothing is known of his lineage, and the early years of Xunzi's life are enshrouded in mystery. Accounts of when he lived conflict; he is said to have met a King Kuai of Yan during the time of Mencius, while Liu Xiangstates that he lived more than a hundred years after Mencius. The Sima Qian records that he was born in Zhao, and Anze County has erected a large memorial hall at his supposed birthplace. He is recounted at the age of fifty as going to the state of Qi to study and teach at the Jixia Academy. The Shi Ji states that he became a member of the academy during the time of King Xiang of Qi, discounting the story of his being a teacher of Han Fei, but it's chronology would give him a lifetime of 137 years. After Qi Xunzi is said to have visited the state of Qin, possibly from 260 to 265 BC,[9] and praised its governance, and debated military affairs with Lord Linwu (臨武君) in the court of King Xiaocheng of Zhao. Later, Xunzi was slandered in the Qi court, and he retreated south to the state of Chu. In 240 Lord Chunshen, the prime minister, invited him to take a position as Magistrate of Lanling (蘭陵令), which he initially refused, but Lord Chunshen was assassinated In 238 BC by a court rival and Xunzi subsequently lost his position. He retired, remained in Lanling, a region in what is today's southern Shandong province, for the rest of his life and was buried there. The year of his death is unknown,[10][11] though if he lived to see the ministership of supposed student Li Si, as recounted, he would have lived into his nineties, dying shortly after 219 BC.[12] Philosophy[edit] Xunzi witnessed the chaos surrounding the fall of the Zhou dynasty and rise of the Qin state - which upheld "doctrines focusing on state control, by means of law and penalties ("Chinese Legalism").[3] Like Shang Yang, Xunzi believed that humanity's inborn tendencies were evil and that ethical norms had been invented to rectify people. His variety of Confucianism therefore has a "darker", more pragmatic flavour than the optimistic Confucianism of Mencius, who tended to view humans as innately good, though like most Confucians he believed that people could be refined through education and ritual.[13][14] However, he believed that only an elite could accomplish this.[15] Adapting Confucianism to the ideas of the Mohists and "Legalists",[16] unlike other Confucians, Xunzi therefore allowed that penal law could play a legitimate, though secondary, role in the state.[17] He rejects the Book of Lord Shang and Zhuangzi's claims that the way changes with the times, saying the way had been invented by the sages.[13] To this end he seems to have taken up the Mohists' argumentive strategies and conception of models (Fa) (which the "Legalists" had also taken up), saying "the Ru model themselves after the former kings".[13] Unlike the "Legalists", he places little emphasis on general rules, advocating the use of particular examples as models.[15] Ultimately, he refused to admit theories of state and administration apart from ritual and self-cultivation, arguing for the gentleman, rather than the measurements promoted by the "Legalists", as the wellspring of objective criterion.[16] His ideal, gentleman (junzi) king and government, aided by a class of erudites (Ru), are "very close to that of Mencius", but without the tolerance of feudalism.[18]

The security dilemma

Also referred to as the spiral model, is a term used in international relations and refers to a situation in which, under anarchy, actions by a state intended to heighten its security, such as increasing its military strength, committing to use weapons or making alliances, can lead other states to respond with similar measures, producing increased tensions that create conflict, even when no side really desires it.

What are 3 assumptions made about the war, based on their experiences with the nomads?

Based on their experience with the nomads, the Chinese made three assumptions about the world: The 3 Assumptions of the Chinese Worldview: 1. The Chinese are superior. This was not just ego - the Chinese had never met any barbarians who possessed a civilization as advanced as that of China. Chinese civilization will eventually dominate the world. 2. The Chinese need nothing from the outside world. China is blessed with an abundance of everything anyone could ever need or want. But the downside of this is that everyone else wants what China has. 3. The barbarians will come. Whether drawn by China's advanced civilization or attracted by her material wealth, these covetous neighbors are going to show up, either looking for a handout or looking to take what they want by force.

What are some of the problems when being a soldier?

Being a soldier can be REALLY boring. Commanders try to keep their soldiers occupied vai training, and through physical sports. Nevertheless, it is hard to keep morale high. So, soldiers often turn to drinking, drugs, and gambling to pass the time.

What would states do when seeking an auspicious time to start battle?

Both sides would practice divination to seek an auspicious time to start battle. In fact, some inquirers would try to game the system, despite the warnings not to do that. Warfare does involve the taking of human life and shedding of human blood. Such sacred matters required sacred approval from the divine.

According to Confucius, how would these Superior Men transform others?

By the power of positive moral example! "The virtue of the Superior Man is like the wind, while that of the Petty Man is like the grass. When the wind blows, the grass must bend!" It was the duty of Superior Men [including the ruler] to lead these Petty Men back to the Way by means of their own exemplary conduct: "Lead the people by means of government policies and regulate them through punishments, and they will be evasive and have no sense of shame. Lead them by means of virtue and regulate them through rituals [social norms] and they will have a sense of shame and moreover have standards!" Confucians place great hope in good moral example.

What are the 2 competing forces in Chinese political philosophy?

Centrifugal forces & Centripetal forces.

The Chinese statesman Shen Buhai (Chinese: 申不害; c. 400 BC - c. 337 BC)

Chancellor of the Han state under Marquis Zhao of Han for fifteen years, from 354 BC to 337 BC.[2] A contemporary of syncretist Shi Jiao and Legalist Shang Yang, he was born in the State of Zheng, and was likely a minor official there. After Han conquered Zheng in 375 BC, he rose up in the ranks of the Han officialdom, dividing up its territories and successfully reforming it. Though not dealing in penal law himself, his administrative innovations would be taken into "Chinese Legalist" statecraft by Han Fei, his most famous successor, and Shen Buhai's book most resembles the Han Feizi (though more conciliatory). He died of natural causes while in office. Though Chinese administration cannot be traced to any one individual, emphasizing a merit system figures like 4th century BC reformer Shen Buhai may have had more influence than any other, and might be considered its founder, if not valuable as a rare pre-modern example of abstract theory of administration. Sinologist Herrlee G. Creel sees in Shen Buhai the "seeds of the civil service examination", and, if one wished to exaggerate, the first political scientist,[3]while the correlation between Shen's conception of the inactive (Wu-wei) ruler and the handling of claims and titles likely informed the Taoist conception of the formless Tao (name that cannot be named) that "gives rise to the ten thousand things."[4] He is famous for the dictum "The Sage ruler relies on standards and does not rely on wisdom; he relies on technique, not on persuasions."[5] The Huainanzi says that when Shen Buhai lived the officials of the state of Han were at cross-purposes and did not know what practices to follow.[7] Though not unifying the laws as Shang Yang did, what Shen appears to have realized is that the "methods for the control of a bureaucracy" could not be mixed with the survivals of feudal government, or staffed merely by "getting together a group of 'good men'", but rather must be men qualified in their jobs. Unlike Shang Yang, Shen therefore emphasizes the importance of selecting able officials as much as Confucius did, but insists on "constant vigilance over their performance", never mentioning virtue. In comparison with Han Fei on the other hand his system required a strong ruler at the center, emphasizing that he trust no one minister. Ideally, Shen Buhai's ruler had the widest possible sovereignty, was intelligent (if not a sage), had to make all crucial decisions himself, and had unlimited control of the bureaucracy - over which, in contrast to Shang Yang, he is simply the head. Championing Fa (法 "method"), Shen believed that the greatest threat to a ruler's power came from within, and unlike Han Fei, never preaches to his ministers about duty or loyalty. He insisted that the ruler must be fully informed on the state of his realm, but couldn't afford to get caught up in details and was advised to listen to no one - and does not, as Sinologist Herrlee G. Creel says, have the time to do so. The way to see and hear independently is by grouping particulars into categories through mechanical or operational decision making (Fa or "method").[8] Shen's doctrines, posthumously referred to by Han Fei as Shu or Techniques (a term Shen does not appear to have used), are described as concerned almost exclusively with the "ruler's role and the methods by which he may control a bureaucracy", that is, its management and personnel control: the selection of capable ministers, their performance, the monopolization of power,[9] and the control of and power relations between ruler and minister which he characterized as Wu Wei.[10] They can therefore easily be considered the most crucial element in controlling a bureaucracy.[11] More specifically, Shen Buhai's methods (Fa) focused on "scrutinizing achievement and on that ground alone to give rewards, and to bestow office solely on the basis of ability".[12] Liu Xiang wrote that Shen Buhai advised the ruler of men use technique (shu) rather than punishment, relying on persuasion to supervise and hold responsible, though very strictly.[13] Liu considered Shen's "principle tenant" to be (Xing-Ming 刑名).[14]Representing equally applied checks against the power of officials, Xing-Ming seeks the right person for the job through the examination of skill, achievement and (more rarely) seniority. Personnel selection[edit] Further information: rectification of names Shen Buhai's personnel control, or rectification of names (such as titles) worked through "strict performance control"(Hansen), correlating performance and posts (Xing or Shih and Ming).[10] It would become a central tenant of both "Legalist" statecraft[17] and its Taoistic derivatives. The correlation between Wu-wei and Xing-ming may have informed the Taoist conception of the formless Tao that "gives rise to the ten thousand things."[18] In the Han Dynasty secretaries of government who had charge of the records of decisions in criminal matters were called Xing-Ming, a term used by Han Fei, which Sima Qian (145 or 135 - 86 BC) and Liu Xiang (77 BC - 6 BC) attributed to the doctrine of Shen Buhai(400 BC - c. 337 BC).[19][20] Liu Xiang goes as far as to define Shen Buhai's doctrine as Xing-Ming.[21] Shen actually used an older, more philosophically common equivalent, ming-shih, linking the "Legalist doctrine of names" with the name and reality (ming shih) debates of the school of names.[22] Such discussions are also prominent in the Han Feizi.[23] Sima Qian and Liu Xiang define Xing-Ming as "holding actual outcome accountable to Ming".[24][25] Ming sometimes has the sense of speech--so as to compare the statements of an aspiring officer with the reality of his actions--or reputation, again compared with real conduct (xing "form" or shih "reality").[26] Rather than having to look for "good" men, Xing-Ming (or ming-shih) can seek the right man for a particular post, though doing so implies a total organizational knowledge of the regime.[27] More simply though, it can allow ministers to come forward with proposals of specific cost and time frame, leaving their definition to competing ministers--the doctrine favored by Han Fei. Preferring exactness, it combats the tendency to promise too much;[28] the correct articulation of Ming is considered crucial to the realization of projects.[29] The logician Deng Xi (died 501 BCE) is cited by Liu Xiang for the origin of the principle of Xing-Ming. Serving as a minor official in the state of Zheng, he is reported to have drawn up a code of penal laws. Associated with litigation, he is said to have argued for the permissibility of contradictory propositions, likely engaging in hair-splitting debates on the interpretation of laws, legal principles and definitions.[30] Shen Buhai solves this through Wu wei, or not getting involved, making an official's words his own responsibility.[19] Shen Buhai says, "The ruler controls the policy, the ministers manage affairs. To speak ten times and ten times be right, to act a hundred times and a hundred times succeed - this is the business of one who serves another as minister; it is the not the way to rule."[31] Noting all the details of a claim and then attempting to objectively compare them with his achievements through passive mindfulness (the "method of yin"), Shen Buhai's ruler neither adds to nor detracts from anything, giving names (titles/offices) on the basis of claim.[19] Shen supported reward for visible results,[32] using ming-shih for investigation and appointment, but the legal system of Han was apparently confused, prohibiting uniform reward and punishment. We have no basis to suppose that Shen advocated the doctrine of rewards and punishment (of Shang Yang, as Han Fei did), and Han Fei criticizes him for not unifying the laws.[33] Wu wei[edit] (People) go along with whatever has the backing of the authorities and adjust their words and actions according to whichever way the wind is blowing. They think that they will thus avoid mistakes. Deng Xiaoping[34] Further information: Wu wei Earlier modern scholars suggested that Shen's statecraft blended with Taoism. Rather, since the bulk of the Tao Te Ching appears to have been composed later, it might therefore be assumed that Shen influenced the Tao Te Ching. Lacking any metaphysical connotation, Shen used the term Wu wei to mean that the ruler, though vigilant, should not interfere with the duties of his ministers.[35] Following Shen, Han Feistrongly advocated Wu wei. During the Han dynasty up until the reign of Han Wudi, rulers confined their activity "chiefly to the appointment and dismissal of his high officials", a plainly "Legalist" practice inherited from the Qin dynasty.[36] This "conception of the ruler's role as a supreme arbiter, who keeps the essential power firmly in his grasp" while leaving details to ministers, has a "deep influence on the theory and practice of Chinese monarchy." Shen Buhai argued that if the government were organized and supervised relying on proper method (Fa), the ruler need do little--and must do little.[37] Unlike "Legalists" Shang Yang and Han Fei, Shen did not consider the relationship between ruler and minister antagonistic necessarily.[38] Apparently paraphrasing the Analects, Shen Buhai's statement that those near him will feel affection, while the far will yearn for him,[39] stands in contrast to Han Fei, who considered the relationship between the ruler and ministers irreconcilable.[40] However, Shen still believed that the ruler's most able ministers are his greatest danger,[41] and is convinced that it is impossible to make them loyal without techniques.[42] Sinologist Herrlee G. Creelexplains: "The ruler's subjects are so numerous, and so on alert to discover his weaknesses and get the better of him, that it is hopeless for him alone as one man to try to learn their characteristics and control them by his knowledge... the ruler must refrain from taking the initiative, and from making himself conspicuous--and therefore vulnerable--by taking any overt action."[43] Emphasizing the use of administrative methods (Fa) in secrecy, Shen Buhai portrays the ruler as putting up a front to hide his weaknesses and dependence on his advisers.[44] Shen therefore advises the ruler to keep his own counsel, hide his motivations, and conceal his tracks in inaction, availing himself of an appearance of stupidity and insufficiency. Shen says:[45] If the ruler's intelligence is displayed, men will prepare against it; if his lack of intelligence is displayed, they will delude him. If his wisdom is displayed, men will gloss over (their faults); if his lack of wisdom is displayed, they will hide from him. If his lack of desires is displayed, men will spy out his true desires; if his desires are displayed, they will tempt him. Therefore (the intelligent ruler) says 'I cannot know them; it is only by means of non-action that I control them.'[46] Acting through administrative method (Fa), the ruler conceals his intentions, likes and dislikes, skills and opinions. Not acting himself, he can avoid being manipulated.[47] The ruler plays no active role in governmental functions. He should not use his talent even if he has it. Not using his own skills, he is better able to secure the services of capable functionaries. Creel argues that not getting involved in details allowed Shen's ruler to "truly rule", because it leaves him free to supervise the government without interfering, maintaining his perspective.[48] Seeing and hearing independently, the ruler is able to make decisions independently, and is, Shen says, able to rule the world thereby.[49] The ruler is like a mirror, reflecting light, doing nothing, and yet, beauty and ugliness present themselves; (or like) a scale establishing equilibrium, doing nothing, and yet causing lightness and heaviness to discover themselves. (Administrative) method (Fa) is complete acquiescence. (Merging his) personal (concerns) with the public (weal), he does not act. He does not act, and yet the world itself is complete. — Shen Buhai[50] This Wu wei (or nonaction) might be said to end up the political theory of the "Legalists" , if not becoming their general term for political strategy, playing a "crucial role in the promotion of the autocratic tradition of the Chinese polity." The (qualified) non-action of the ruler ensures his power and the stability of the polity.[51] Legacy[edit] The Shiji records Li Si as repeatedly recommending "supervising and holding responsible", which he attributed to Shen Buhai. A stele set up by Qin Shi Huang memorializes him as a sage that, taking charge of the government, established Xing-Ming - Shen Buhai and Han Fei's doctrine of personnel selection. The Shiji states that Emperor Wen of Han was "basically fond of Xing-Ming." The scholar Jia Yi advised Wen to teach his heir to use Shen Buhai's method, so as to be able to "supervise the functions of the many officials and understand the usages of government." Two advisors to Wen's heir, Emperor Jing of Han were students of Xing-Ming, one passing the highest grade of examination, and admonished Jing for not using it on the feudal lords. By the time of the civil service examination was put into place, Confucian influence saw outright discussion of Shen Buhai banned. However, the Emperor under which it was founded, Emperor Wu of Han, was both familiar with and favorable to Legalist ideas, and the civil service examination did not come into existence until its support by Gongsun Hong, who wrote a book on Xing-Ming.[52] The Emperor Xuan of Han was still said by Liu Xiang to have been fond of reading Shen Buhai, using Xing-Ming to control his subordinates and devoting much time to legal cases.[53] Zhuge Liang attached great importance to the works of Shen Buhai and Han Fei. Emperor Wen of Sui is recorded as having withdrawn his favour from the Confucians, giving it to "the group advocating Xing-Ming and authoritarian government".[54] Regarded as being in opposition to Confucians, as early as the Eastern Han its full and original meaning would be forgotten.[55] Yet the writings of "Tung-Cung-shu" discuss personnel testing and control in a manner sometimes hardly distinguishable from the Han Feizi. Like Shen Buhai, he dissuades against reliance upon punishments. As Confucianism ascended the term disappeared,[56] though it appears in later dynasties.

What did Confucius and Mencius think about human deep down?

Confucius suggests that, deep down, humans are good, i.e. prosocial. What Confucius hints at, Mencius states outright. As such, humans simply need a good moral example, a virtuous ruler, to awaken their conscience and inspire them to virtue.

According to Professor Green, what is Daoism all about?

Daoism advocates individualism, quietism, and spontaneity in harmony with nature. It rejects the constraints of artificially contrived social relations in favor of seeking individual harmony with the all-encompassing (but formless and purposeless) cosmos. The Confucians look at the chaos and see it as the collapse of the once perfect social order, the Western Zhao. the Confucians want to reverse this pattern of decline, and restore the Western Zhao. The Mohists have a more utopian view, of universal love, but again, the idea is to actively work to get people to get there. In contrast, the Daoists believe that the ideal way is the way of nature. They see civilization as an artificial construct, a man-made creation. This is an imposition upon nature, that is disruptive toward nature. The harder man tries to impose on nature, the harder nature will push back, and civilization will push back. In contrast to the Confucians and the Mohists, the Daoists believe that the best way is to return to nature. The Daoists thus say, "Let nature take its course! Be yourself! Relax and enjoy life!" Only through "Wu wei" (無為 inaction or non-striving) can one achieve oneness with the Way (go with the flow).

What was the struggle that Chiang faced when it came to militarizing Chinese society?

During this period Chiang also struggled with how to militarize Chinese society. Given the challenges China faced, he believed the nation could only survive if the people were prepared to set aside their personal interests and sacrifice for the greater good. For Chiang, the soldier ought to serve as the model for the citizen. Indeed, throughout the Nanjing Decade Chiang struggled to militarize Chinese society, not only in order to break it to the bit of Nationalist rule, but also because he genuinely believed that the creation of a disciplined citizenry was critical to China's nation-building efforts. But his efforts were not always appreciated by the people.

What did the Confucians and Mohists have in common?

For all their differences, Confucians and Mohists, were earnest reformers, concerned with improving society. Their ideas were an understandable reaction to the chaos of the late Zhou era.

Who invented Gunpowder, when, and why?

Gunpowder was invented in 7th-century China and spread throughout most parts of Eurasia by the end of the 13th century. Originally developed by the Taoists for medicinal purposes, gunpowder was first used for warfare about 1000 AD. Although it is not known precisely by whom gunpowder was discovered, most historians agree that gunpowder's origins were in China due to the amount of archaeological evidence and historical documents that exist predating others by centuries. The very earliest possible reference to gunpowder appeared in 142 AD during the Eastern Han dynasty when the alchemist Wei Boyang wrote about a substance with the properties of gunpowder. He described a mixture of three powders that would "fly and dance" violently in his Cantong qi, otherwise known as the Book of the Kinship of Three, a Taoist text on the subject of alchemy. Although it is impossible to know if he was actually referring to gunpowder, no other explosive known to scientists is composed of three powders. While it was almost certainly not their intention to create a weapon of war, Taoist alchemists continued to play a major role in gunpowder development due to their experiments with sulfur and saltpeter involved in searching for eternal life and ways to transmute one material into another. Historian Peter Lorge notes that despite the early association of gunpowder with Taoism, this may be a quirk of historiography and a result of the better preservation of texts associated with Taoism, rather than being a subject limited to only Taoists. The Taoist quest for the elixir of life attracted many powerful patrons, one of whom was Emperor Wu of Han. One of the resulting alchemical experiments involved heating 10% sulfur and 75% saltpeter to transform them. The next reference to gunpowder occurred in the year 300 during the Jin dynasty (265-420). A Taoist philosopher by the name of Ge Hong wrote down the ingredients of gunpowder in his surviving works, collectively known as the Baopuzi ("The Master Who Embraces Simplicity"). The "Inner Chapters" on Taoism contains records of his experiments with heated saltpeter, pine resin, and charcoal among other carbon materials, resulting in explosion, which most historians acknowledge as an early form of gunpowder. In 492, Taoist alchemists noted that saltpeter, one of the most important ingredients in gunpowder, burns with a purple flame, allowing for practical efforts at purifying the substance. The first confirmed reference to what can be considered gunpowder in China occurred more than three hundred years later during the Tang dynasty, first in a formula contained in the Taishang Shengzu Jindan Mijue (太上聖祖金丹秘訣) in 808, and then about 50 years later in a Taoist text known as the Zhenyuan miaodao yaolüe (真元妙道要略). The first formula was a combination of six parts sulfur to six parts saltpeter to one part birthwort herb. The Taoist text warned against an assortment of dangerous formulas, one of which corresponds with gunpowder: "Some have heated together sulfur, realgar (arsenic disulphide), and saltpeter with honey; smoke [and flames] result, so that their hands and faces have been burnt, and even the whole house burned down." Alchemists called this discovery fire medicine ("huoyao" 火藥), and the term has continued to refer to gunpowder in China into the present day, a reminder of its heritage as a side result in the search for longevity increasing drugs. The earliest surviving chemical formula of gunpowder dates to 1044 in the form of the military manual Wujing Zongyao, also known in English as the Complete Essentials for the Military Classics, which contains a collection of factoids on Chinese weaponry. The Wujing Zongyao served as a repository of antiquated or fanciful weaponry, and this applied to gunpowder as well, suggesting that it had already been weaponized long before the invention of what would today be considered conventional firearms. These types of gunpowder weapons styles an assortment of odd names such as "flying incendiary club for subjugating demons," "caltrop fire ball," "ten-thousand fire flying sand magic bomb," "big bees nest," "burning heaven fierce fire unstoppable bomb," "fire bricks" which released "flying swallows," "flying rats," "fire birds," and "fire oxen". Eventually they gave way and coalesced into a smaller number of dominant weapon types, notably gunpowder arrows, bombs, and guns. This was most likely because some weapons were deemed too onerous or ineffective to deploy.

What is a "Military Revolutions"?

Historians generally see technological, organizational, and doctrinal innovation as key components of MILITARY REVOLUTIONS. The term "military revolution" is used to describe sweeping changes that radically alter the way in which wars are conducted. The changes can be so sweeping that they affect not only the way wars are fought, but also the way states and societies are structured. As we will see, the demands imposed by new ways of war can compel massive changes far beyond the confines of the military.

What are some examples of centripetal forces in Chinese history?

Imperial system = all-powerful central government that binds central government together. Standardized written language = a standardized written text. The Chinese written language is not dependent on a written pronunciation. It is independent of an oral language. You can adopt the symbols, and then pronounce it in your own language. This leads to... Cultural homogenization = the creation of a Chinese culture, brought about thanks to a powerful imperial system, and a unified written language. All of these a product of human will.

So what impact did all these changes of gunpowder and other weapons in the 16th-17th century have in the West? Was it a "revolution"?

In 1955 a historian by the name of Michael Roberts argued that changes in the nature of European warfare in the 16th and early 17th Centuries constituted a military revolution. He claimed that the wider use of gunpowder weapons (portable cannons and hand-held firearms) changed the face of warfare on several levels - tactics, strategy, scale, and finally the larger impact on state and society. Not everyone accepts this argument, but most historians agree that warfare in the West changed dramatically in this period, and that these changes set the stage for European global domination.

When did the CHinese test their first nuclear warhead?

In 1964 the Chinese tested their first warhead, joining the exclusive club of nuclear powers. This was a moment of immense pride for the Chinese people -possession of nuclear weapons marked China's entry into the ranks of the great powers. China would never again be bullied!

How would the maintenance of the People's War doctrine affect China in the post-Mao era?

In 1979 China broke with its former friend and invaded Vietnam. This was supposed to be a "chastisement" aimed at punishing Vietnam for its provocative behavior along the Sino-Vietnamese border and its aggression against the Beijing-backed Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia. This was the first major PLA operation since the limited border clash with India in 1962. What was supposed to be a simple exercise in muscle flexing turned into a major embarrassment when the Vietnamese proved more capable than the Chinese. Coming out of that debacle, the new paramount leader Deng Xiaoping pledged to modernize the PLA, using the slogan of People's War under Modern Conditions

In the Rites of Zhou, what kind of force can a regime used to respond to the "trigger"?

In response to any of these "triggers", the virtuous ruler is justified in using force to impose any of these punishments: 1. cutting off a portion of the offender's land 2. attacking and suppressing him 3. sending him into exile 4. exterminating him 5. invading his state to compel submission 6. isolating him from other states Through their unrighteous conduct, the "crooked" bring chastisement or destruction upon themselves. The virtuous ruler is justified, indeed compelled, to use force "to set things right". In other words, offensive use of force was morally acceptable as long as the blame could be attached to the enemy.

Throughout the War of Resistance (1937 - 1945), how did Mao refine his strategic thought?

In the course of the long war against Japan Mao had a chance to further develop his thoughts on strategy. The result was a number of very influential pieces, most notably "On Protracted War" [1938]. This long piece contains an insightful analysis of the problems faced by the CCP and lays out Mao's strategy for victory. Mao realized that the Red Army was clearly outgunned by Japan. However, the CCP had the home field advantage - the Japanese were a hated invader, while the CCP represented the patriotic resistance. Mao's solution to the strategic imbalance was to wage a "Protracted War" based on Chinese strengths and Japanese weaknesses. This involved a three stage struggle leading to victory.

In the late 1950s, what did the Soviet Union do to help China in terms of atomic weaponry?

In the late 1950s Soviet technicians started to assist the Chinese in the development of atomic weapons. From the beginning it was assumed these would only be for deterrent purposes. The Soviets provided key technical information and critical supplies. It is likely that Moscow assumed Chinese nuclear weapons would be controlled by the Soviets - if true, this was an incredibly naïve assumption.

For Sunzi, how essential is knowledge of one's own capabilities and those of the enemy?

Knowledge of one's own capabilities and those of the enemy are essential: "One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement!"

What do we know about Confucius?

Most of what we know about his thought comes to us from works he did not write himself. Foremost among these is the ANALECTS [Lun Yu], which purports to record Confucius' conversations with his disciples.

What were some objections to the idea of sinicization?

Other historians argue that the degree of sinicization was exaggerated, and that the whole notion of " winning the culture war" was nothing more than an excuse used by the Chinese to comfort themselves every time they were humiliated by yet another wave of nomadic conquerors. And of course the whole idea of sinicization is based on the assumption that barbarians WANT to become Chinese. What would happen when the Chinese encountered outsiders who were equally confident in their own cultural superiority? [ie., the Europeans]

Generally speaking, what is the appearance of the geo-political situation today?

Pundits argue the 21st century world will be a multi-polar one dominated by new players. Although India and Brazil are considered to be rising powers, Western political, economic, and military strategists seem to be obsessed with China - will China be a responsible and cooperative global citizen or a strategic rival and an aspiring hegemon?

What is the significance for the Mandate of Heaven to those who are thinking about challenging the establishment of a new dynasty?

The answer is that he is sitting on the dragon throne, heaven supported him in every step of the way. He could not succeed without the support of heaven. This is incredibly important political tool, no matter how nasty the dynastic changes, the new dynastic ruler will be able to claim legitimacy and rule over all people.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, what was China's doctrine?

The doctrine of People's War (backed up by the odd Nuke), remained in place throughout the Mao era. Chinese military equipment and warfighting doctrine remained fixated on the idea of men over weapons. In truth, the PLA was in poor condition. The lack of modern equipment, poor training, and the hyper-politicization of the military that accompanied the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) left it in no condition to wage a major war. Moreover, the doctrine of People's War was really only defensive in nature. China's strategic scenarios all revolved around first the US (1960s) and then the USSR (late 1960s - 1970s) invading China. This would come back to haunt China after Mao's death in 1976.

What is the threat of a centralized bureaucracy?

The king is entirely dependent upon this central bureaucracy. They are his eyes and ears. The king thus depends upon the bureaucrats TELLING THE TRUTH. However, bureaucrats quickly realize what their rulers likes and doesn't like, and manipulates the flow of information to apply leverage the ruler, and thus apply indirect power over the king.

What kind of measures does Shen Buhai advocate?

The ruler should be inscrutable, to avoid being manipulated by the bureaucracy.

The Eastern Zhou

The second half of the Zhou dynasty of ancient China. It is divided into two periods: the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States.

How did the Chinese interpret the standoff that was the result of the Korean War?

The standoff in Korea was interpreted as a Chinese victory. For the first time, China had fought the most powerful imperialist power to a standstill. The fact that the US was not interested in an all-out war was ignored - China had not lost, so by default it had won!

What happened to the title of "king" (wang, 王) during the Warring States Era?

The title of "king" (wang, 王) was held by figurehead rulers of the Zhou dynasty, while the rulers of most states held the title of "duke" (gong, 公) or "marquess" (hou, 侯). A major exception was Chu, whose rulers were called kings since King Wu of Chu started using the title c. 703 BC. In 344 BC the rulers of Qi and Wei mutually recognized each other as "kings": King Wei of Qi and King Hui of Wei, in effect declaring their independence from the Zhou court. This marked a major turning point: unlike those in the Spring and Autumn period, the new generation of rulers ascending the thrones in the Warring States period would not entertain even the pretence of being vassals of the Zhou dynasty, instead proclaiming themselves fully independent kingdoms.

How did Chiang Kai-shek respond to Mao and the Red Army's strategies? When did he launch his 4th campaign?

These strategies worked very well for Mao and the Red Army in the early campaigns against the Jiangxi Soviet. But Chiang eventually realized that he was going to have to use greater resources to deal with Mao. His next assaults coincided with political infighting in the CCP. In summer 1932 he launched the 4th and biggest campaign to date. It eventually stalled, but Mao lost his leadership position in the Party and army due to political infighting with pro-Moscow rivals. They did not like Mao's guerrilla strategy of yielding territory and waging mobile warfare. Instead they advocated a determined defense of the Soviet base area.

How did the Chinese and the Manchus interpret the end of the First Opium War (4 September 1839 - 29 August 1842)?

Unfortunately for the Chinese and the Manchus, they were slow to acknowledge their military inferiority. Instead, they saw the defeats in 1839-1842 as an aberration - a one-off event that could be blamed on the incompetence of a handful of commanders. The Court bought into this interpretation, and soon started to resist British efforts to exercise their rights under the Treaty of Nanjing. Chinese obstinacy ran head on into British belligerence, and the result was yet more fighting between 1856 and 1860.

How sturdy were Neolithic villages of China?

Villages were temporary, as the soil usually could not sustain crops for more than a few years. When the soil was worn out, the villagers would move on, clearing new fields through slash-and-burn methods.

What were the first kings roles in their dominant lineages? What was the relation of the first kings and the clan ancestral cult?

We believe that the first kings were the heads of dominant lineages who also acted as the head of their clan ancestral cult. Most scholars accept that the early kings blended in their persons both religious and secular authority, and that military power was from the beginning intimately connected with religious authority. In fact, in those days, there was little distinction.

Who followed Zhuanxu? What was noteworthy about Shun?

Zhuanxu was followed by Ku,Yao, and Shun. The latter two are famous for their wisdom, but Shun is also noteworthy because he was supposedly NOT a blood descendant of the Yellow Emperor. He was given the throne by Yao, who disapproved of his own sons' dissipated lifestyle. Yao's other sons were considered unworthy, but Shun displayed humility and ritual reluctance. Thus began the ritual of "ritual humility"

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what are the Guiding Principles of Internal Secuirty IN GENERAL?

§1 Guiding Principles for Internal Security - The two guiding principles that tend to predispose the Chinese state to resort to force internally are a fear of turmoil, and an emphasis on the community over the individual. (Scobell 2003, 35).

In chapter 7 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", why did the PLA feel justified in using violence to shut down the student protests?

§2 "By the evening of Saturday, June 3, when people berated troops: ". . . the sympathy [for the demonstrators] that had characterized the troops last week had gone; the soldiers seemed to have a certain resolve." When members of the crowd blocking the soldiers' advance asked the troops whether they would shoot if they were so ordered, the soldiers gave "weak assurances" that they would not. One soldier replied, "We have to obey orders because we are soldiers." An officer told the crowd what the army feared most was its weapons falling into the wrong hands: "We just fear that our guns will be taken and then we will have chaos."44 §3 Therefore, in the minds of many in the officer corps, the ongoing protests, the indignities and injuries suffered by their troops, and the standoff in the streets disposed them to favor prompt decisive action to end the deadlock. Even though many officers and men obviously sympathized with the protesters, a consensus developed among the soldiers that China was drifting toward chaos and this had to be checked at all costs. Even the May 21 statements of retired marshals Nie and Xu, while suggesting that the military should not be used against the students, also urged the students to end their protests for the good of the country. Their comments as reported in the Chinese media clearly indicate that these men, while sympathizing with the students, also felt that their actions constituted a threat to stability and social order. As time went on, the intensity of the latter feelings grew. According to Yang Shangkun's secret speech of May 24, these two distinguished old soldiers supported the decision to impose martial law.45 Indeed, a week after the June 3-4 weekend, both reportedly wrote letters expressing "sympathy and solicitude" (weiwen) to martial law troops. In a letter dated June 11, Marshal Nie commended their performance and "saluted" them. Marshal Xu, in a separate letter dated June 13, offered his condolences for the losses suffered during the operation and expressed "lofty tribute to all the officers and men of the Martial Law Command."46 §4 According to Yang Shangkun, Deng also consulted top military leaders, including Minister of National Defense Qin and CMC members Liu and Hong, (p. 155) §1-before concluding martial law was necessary.47 Although it is thought Qin and Hong had reservations about the move - the two reportedly signed a letter, made public shortly after the imposition of martial law, that was written by serving officers opposing the use of force - they appear to have backed the crackdown during the June 3-4 operation and its aftermath. On June 9, Qin, Hong, and Liu all visited PLA soldiers and PAP troops in Beijing area hospitals recovering from injuries received during the weekend.48 PLA Chief of General Staff Chi, who reportedly had been one of the one hundred officers who signed a letter of dissent, apparently changed his mind. In an interview given months after the crackdown, he explained: The People's Liberation Army intervention was a matter of necessity. It is understandable that some students were resentful of party corruption, official profiteering and inflation. But a small minority of people with evil ambitions instigated the turmoil and spread rumors to provoke the masses.49 §5 While the PLA is by no means of one mind on many matters, ". . . on the most basic issue of supporting domestic political order," the army is united.50" (Scobbell 155-156)

In chapter 8 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the actual crisis of the Taiwan Strait crisis (1995-1996)?

§2 THE CRISIS - The granting of a visa to President Lee of Taiwan in May 1995 to visit the United States the following month further enraged the PLA. Still the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was restrained. The PLA focused its anger on the MFA and Foreign Minister Qian. Finally, in the wake of Lee's bombastic speech at Cornell University, military figures acted. In mid-June 1995, after Lee's triumphal return from the United States, an emergency session of Beijing's top policy-making body on Taiwan, the TALSG, was called.24 The two civilian leaders of the TALSG, Chairman Jiang and Vice Chair (and Foreign Minister) Qian, were confronted by three irate military men insisting it was time for harsher action. Normally the body has only one military representative, Deputy Chief of General Staff Xiong Guangkai (who sits along side half a dozen civilians, including Jiang, Qian, Wang Daohan [head of Beijing's quasi-official Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait], and Wang Zhaoguo [director of the CCP United Front Work Department]). Also present this time were the two most senior figures in the PLA, generals Liu Huaqing and Zhang, both vice chairs of the CMC. Liu at the time was also the only PLA leader on the Standing Committee of the Politburo. These military men definitely charged the atmosphere and ensured a swift change of policy.25 §3 Between July 1995 and March 1996, China conducted a series of military exercises and missile tests in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait. On July 18, 1995, Beijing announced that missile tests would be conducted targeting an area some 90 miles off the coast of northern Taiwan. Then on three consecutive days, July 21, 22, and 23, a total of six DF-15 missiles were launched from sites on the mainland (two per day). The following month, after a five-day advance warning, PLA naval vessels and aircraft conducted live-fire tests off the coast of Fujian for ten days. Further military exercises were conducted in mid-November to the south of the Strait including joint cooperation involving air, land, and sea arms of the PLA. On March 5, 1996, Beijing announced it would soon begin another round of missile tests. This time they were to be targeted at seas less than fifty miles from Taiwan's busiest ports. On March 8, three DF-15 missiles were fired from their bases on the mainland. Five days later another DF-15 missile was launched. Finally, also after advanced warning, live-fire tests and war games were conducted off the coast of Fujian to the north- (p. 176) §1-of the Strait and to the south of the Strait between March 12 and March 25. The maneuvers included amphibious landing exercises and aerial bombing. Some 40 naval vessels, 260 aircraft, and an estimated 150,000 troops participated. §2 The military exercises of the summer of 1995 were meant to signal China's displeasure at the visit of Taiwanese President Lee to the United States that June. The maneuvers and tests of March 1996 were meant to intimidate Taiwan in the lead-up to a presidential election and chasten the incumbent, President Lee, who seemed certain to be reelected (he was). The more general aim of the full show of force was to deter Taiwan from pursuing independence from China. In both instances, China was also addressing another important audience: the United States. The message for Washington was that Beijing was deadly serious about Taipei and was prepared to use force if necessary to unite Taiwan with China with or without American intervention. This message was intended to deter the United States from promoting Taiwan independence.

In Chapter Two of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the third aspect of bonds that distinguished them from the earlier covenants?

¶2 "The third aspect of bonds that distinguished them from the earlier covenants was their ties to certain ceremonial and magic practices related to mating. Through these associations they were linked with the general reconstitution of the political realm through the personal, absolute submission of servants to a master, ties that were consciously identified with those binding a wife to her husband. ¶3 The character yue has not yet been identified in the oracle bone and bronze inscriptions, and it rarely occurs in early Zhou literature. In the Shi jing it appears three times, and it means simply "to tie together" (boards) or "to wrap" (the wheel-naves of chariots).79[79.] The Shuo wen jie zi glosses it as "to tie up a bundle" (chan shu ...).80[80.] Although it is possible that a verb meaning "to tie together" was applied by metaphor to the "tying" together of men, there is evidence of a practice that directly links the tying of bundles to the formation of human bonds and sheds light on the political use of the word "bond." ¶4 More than a dozen lyrics in the Shi jing link the breaking off, gathering, and binding together of certain plants with the joining together, either illictly or in marriage, of men and women.81[81.] The Han commentator Zheng Xuan noted this linkage and explained it as a metaphor. The manner in which men and women rely on ritual to be united is like the manner in which firewood and fodder rely on human labor before they become bundles.82[82.] In the early decades of the nineteenth century, Hu Chenggong (1776-1832 A.D.) noted the frequency of this linkage and suggested that some presentation of firewood, fodder, or bundled shrubs had originally been part of the rituals of betrothal or marriage.83[83.] In our own century, apparently independently, the French sinologist Marcel Granet also noted the frequent link of tying bundles to courtship, and his work was extended by Matsumoto Masaaki.84[84.] Itō Seiji founded references in early imperial and medieval Chinese literature, as well as evidence from the- (p. 73) ¶1-customs of minority peoples in modern China, to show that collecting and binding firewood or certain types of reeds was sometimes part of marriage ritual and sometimes part of a sexula magic used to secure illicit liaisons.85[85.] Moreover, the Lie xian zhuan and the "Demonography" discovered amongst the 'bamboo strips at Shuihudi also record examples of picking and manipulating8.] plants to work sexual magic.86[86.] This same "Demonography", moreover, reveals how the notion of "binding" (jie ..., a character closely related to yue) oneself to another through written documents was linked to both legal practice in Qin times and the use of oaths and spells to magically obligate ("spell-bind") demons and men.87[87.] Finally, at least two quotations regarding the political "bonds" show that they were still associated with physical bundles in the minds of Warring States Chinese thinkers.88[88.] This evidence all suggests that the term "bonds" had originated in certain ceremonial or magical acts thought to have the power to control or obligate the spirits and men, that these rites were linked to the commanding power of written language embodied in legal codes, and that they played a particularly important role in the sexual binding together of men and women." (Lewis 1990, 72-73).

In Chapter Two of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the significance of the equation of wives and concubines, with officials?

¶5 "This equation of officials with wives and concubines appeared not only in poetry, commentary, homiy, and story, but even in political theory. It was a commonplace of early Chinese political thought that the household was a microcosm of and a training ground for the political realm. The emperor was the father of his peopole, and the father was the emperor of his household. This suggests that the rule of the paterfamilias over his wives and children was the prototype of all political power. Xun Shuang (128-190 A.D.) presented this idea thus: ¶6 I have heard that only after there are husbands and wives are there fathers and sons; only after there are fathers and sons are there- (p. 75) ¶1 -rulers and ministers; only after there are rulers and ministers are there superiors and subordinates; only after there are superiors and subordinates are there ritual and decorum. ... Husbands and wives are the beginning of human relations, the origin of the king's transformation [of his subjects].96[96.] The political realm derives from the household, so all political relations originate in the family, and the family begins with the husband and wife. Consequently the relation of husband and wife is the source of and model for all political authority. ¶2 These equations of ministers or retainers with wives or concubines and the tales of their jealous struggles for the favors of the ruler often strike Western readers as merely bizarre, if not demented.97[97.] However, this identification of political ties with sexual ones both highlights one of the fundamental tensions of the Chinese empire and reveals a basic feature of its formation. ¶3 The fundamental tension to which I refer is the one between the inner and outer courts. The inner courts of the Han, the boy emperors controlled by their mothers in the Northern Wei, and the eunuch domination of the late Han, Tang, and Ming are all cases in which the court women or their adjuncts supplanted the "men of honor" of the official court. Hence these strange stories of the jealousy and mutual exclusion of concubines and ministers could be regarded as "charter myths" of the imperial Chinese court. ¶4 The basic feature of the formation of the Chinese empire reveal by the equation of political servants with wives was the crucial role played by personal ties between servant and master based on the exchange of loyalty and devotion in return for recognition. These ties involved the total subservience and the complete devotion of the official to the ruler, and it was to express these new ideals that the image of the official as wife or concubine was invoked. In contrast with the nobility of Zhou China, those who filled the courts of the Warring States and the early empires were total dependents who obtained office and status as acts of grace from their ruler, and they were expected to repay this grace with an unswerving devotion unto death. The bonds, as legally binding oath, general model of the formation of personal ties, and emotive markers of complete submission and devotion, were the explicit forms of these ties. ..." (Lewis 1990, 74-75).

In chapter 6 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what does Scobell contend sparked the assault on Vietnam by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) on February 17, 1979?

(p. 119) §3 "I contend that Beijing practiced "half-hearted coercive diplomacy" toward Vietnam in the six months leading up to China's largest military conflict of the post-Mao era. The Chinese action was not only a response to changes in the international environment but also reflected a civil-military culture in the throes of radical change in terms of leadership, doctrine, and identity. This- (p. 120) §1-chapter examines the roles of senior PLA and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders in order to determine the attitudes of various individuals toward the use of military force. First the background and circumstances leading up to China's decision to attack Vietnam are reviewed, and then the positions of different leaders toward an attack are analyzed." (Scobell 2003, 119-120)

In chapter 4 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", in mid-September 1950, when the UNC troops under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur continued northward beyond the Thirty-Eighth Parallel toward the Yalu River, how did China's foremost diplomat, PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai respond?

(p. 82) §3 The Diplomat. China's foremost diplomat, PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou, firmly supported intervention.23 Judging by his statements to India's ambassador in China, K. M. Panikkar, and his speeches about Korea, Zhou consistently took a hawkish view.24 While it is debatable whether these words actually reflect Zhou's own thinking, it is very likely that these views were his own.25 According to CCP Central Committee member Bo Yibo, as early as August 1950 Zhou strongly favored intervention in Korea.26 A military attache ́ named Chai Chengwen reports briefing Zhou in Beijing on September 1, 1950, upon the former's return from Korea. According to Chai, he gave the premier a sober and ominous assessment of the military situation. After listening attentively, Zhou asked him pointedly, "In case the situation suddenly worsened - if we had to dispatch troops to intervene in Korea - what difficulties do you envision?" Chai took this to mean that Zhou was favoring intervention and would enter China in the conflict if the military situation deteriorated.27 (p. 83) §1 Another account, citing an unnamed high-level communist source, notes that Zhou firmly supported intervention in the face of serious opposition from others.28 Still, one can discern even in Zhou hints of reservations about the prudence of dispatching Chinese forces to Korea. The foreign minister seemed to harbor some degree of doubt about the prospect of a Korean adventure.29 It was Zhou who reportedly insisted on issuing a final warning to the UNC via Ambassador Panikkar in the early morning hours of October 3.30 Certainly, this was in part a propaganda ploy, but it also held out the last-minute possibility of averting Chinese military action if the UNC heeded the warning. (Scobell 2003, 82-83)

Examples of unsolicited technology

Examples of unsolicited technology - gunpowder, the machine gun, the steam engine, the internal combustion engine, the airplane. These were all developed outside of the military establishment, but came to play a huge role in warfare.

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, in ancient China, how was the concept of jus in bellow actualy used by military practitioners?

(p. 209) ¶2 "Yet this idea, like the concept of jus in bello in the hands of the military authors, was susceptible to uses that would have been disquieting to moralists such as Mencius. Rather than remaining an end in itself which, incidentally, might also confer invincibility upon its possessors, virtue cae to be widely regarded as a tool, just one more card in the hand of the canny and capable ruler seeking to expand at the expense of his neighbors. ..." (Graff 2016, 209).

In chapter 4 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", in 1950, what is the purpose of chapter 3?

(p. 79) §3 "... The purpose of this chapter is to assess the views of individual- (p. 80) §1-Chinese soldiers and statesmen regarding the use of force - most of the recent English-language literature on the Korean War does not consider this - rather than focus exclusively on Mao or study the decision-making process.4 The fundamental goal is to determine whether a pattern of attitudes among political and military elites is discernable." (Scobell 2013, 79-80)

Briefly, what happened during the Warlord Era?

Between 1917 and 1928 various warlord cliques fought a series of wars that effectively destroyed the Republic and almost destroyed China. The fighting was endemic: "On the battlefield, soldiers fought each other constantly. Leaving aside the innumerable small-scale clashes in which soldiers were involved, there was an average of eight full-scale wars per annum between 1912 and 1930. Only two years, 1914 and 1915, were free of conflict. In the worst single year, 1928, there were sixteen separate wars. Each year, an average of seven provinces was hit by war. These wars caused major turbulence and disruption on their own, but the violence did not end there. Men with guns were just as likely to use them against civilians as they were against other soldiers. Chinese civilians were subjected to a capricious, arbitrary, chronic terrorism, at the hands of the 'defenders of the nation'." China Divided - The tragic irony of the Warlord Era was that for the first time China had millions of soldiers armed with the latest Western weapons, but instead of defending China they preyed upon their own people. The partition of China was done by the Chinese themselves!

According to Clausewitz, is all war rational? Why not?

But Clausewitz observed that REAL WAR is not entirely RATIONAL. If the abstract nature of war (the tendency towards absolute violence) is restrained by rationality, then war should be almost scientific in its precision and predictability. But it is not: Why? Because of chance, "friction", the "fog of war", passion and hate, and other human foibles such as myopia.

What do the Daoists say about governing a state?

But the Dao De Jing does not ignore governing and warfare. It actually has much to say on both.

When the Chinese thought to use an Offensive strategy, did they justify it by resorting to a Confucian strategic culture, or to a Parabellum strategic culture?

But when the Chinese felt confident that an Offensive strategy would likely produce meaningful results (the permanent elimination of a particular nomadic threat), then they seemed to have few moral/philosophical qualms about going on the attack. Policy debates could invoke assumptions from both the Confucian and Parabellum Strategic cultures, but in the end decisions frequently depended less on historical arguments from the Classics and more on a careful calculation of available resources, the odds of success, and above all the recommendations of men with intimate knowledge of the enemy (Sun Zi would approve - " Know yourself and know your enemy ...."). This explains the persistent "realpolitik" behavior of the Chinese in dealing with the nomads (and why Wang Yuan-kang dismisses the relevance of Culture).

What did Chiang Kai-shek do in the early 1930s to try and destroy the CCP base in the Jiangxi soviet?

Chiang Kai-shek launched 3 encirclement campaigns (called "Bandit Extermination" campaigns) in the early 1930s using former warlord troops. Chiang did not want to leave the CCP base areas alone even though they posed no immediate threat to his power. He saw them as a disease of the heart, and believed that if left unsuppressed they would spread. Extermination was the only solution.

What was the Japanese's reaction to Chiang kai-shek's attempt to militarize China?

Chiang wanted to build a modern army capable of taking on Japan, but the Japanese were determined not to give him what he desperately needed -time! Both the Japanese and Chiang's domestic critics seemed intent on forcing Chiang into a premature confrontation. The clock was ticking ....

What evidence for warfare is there in Neolithic China?

Evidence of warfare in this period is limited - it appears that population density was very low, and competition over land and resources limited.

What are some of the connections between Maoist guerrilla warfare and the theories of Sun Zi in terms of the dimensions of war?

There is a close connection between Maoist guerrilla warfare and the theories of Sun Zi, and each of the key principles of guerrilla warfare correspond with ideas from The Art of War.

In chapter 4 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", in mid-September 1950, when the UNC troops under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur continued northward beyond the Thirty-Eighth Parallel toward the Yalu River, how did many of the CCP leadership supported intervention, and how many did not?

§2 "Doubts in the Party. There is evidence of considerable opposition within the CCP leadership about the wisdom of sending Chinese troops to Korea. The PRC had barely celebrated its first anniversary on October 1, 1950. Five months earlier, the CCP Central Committee ordered the demobilization of 2.4 million soldiers to be accomplished in two phases.31 Many Chinese looked forward to a period of peace at last, in which the country could focus on economic development after decades of protracted armed struggle. §3 There appears to have been nothing short of a "high-level policy debate" on the merits of intervention.32 According to one account, "some comrades" feared that China was completely unprepared for war with the most powerful country in the world and would probably be defeated. At a Politburo meeting on October 4, these individuals argued that it would be best to postpone intervention for a few years so that China could properly prepare itself.33 When the meeting resumed the next day, these opponents of intervention remained but seem to have been won over by the shrewd arguments of Peng and Mao.34 The prospect of a relatively unsophisticated peasant army with little armor or artillery and no air force or navy to speak of against the most technically advanced armed forces in the world possessing nuclear weapons was extremely daunting. Accordingly, for China's top leaders, ". . . the policy decision to dispatch troops to resist America and aid Korea was one of the most difficult . . . of their lives."35 §4 One bloc of opposition identified by many scholars is the economic bureaucracy.36 Chen Yun, an economic planner and Politburo member, seems to have opposed a war. The tone and content of a November 15, 1950, report about the country's finances, made to a national economic conference on the impact of China's involvement in Korea, supports the notion that Chen opposed the war. Chen's mood is noticeably unenthusiastic and matter-of-fact.37 Still, economists appear to have been convinced eventually by Mao, Zhou, and others that China must intervene.38 §5 "Most of the old Communists," including senior CCP leader Dong Biwu, reportedly opposed China's entry into the war until the PRC was more firmly- (p. 84) §1-established.39 Liu Shaoqi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and Rao Shushi, the leader of China's eastern region, were also reportedly against intervention.40 There was allegedly opposition from some other civilian leaders - including Gao. It appears that Gao initially opposed sending troops to Korea but eventually decided to support the move.41" (Scobell 2003, 83-84)

In chapter 5 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was the view among China's political leadership about the Cultural Revolution by late August 1967?

§3 "CIVILIAN ELITE - As the level of violence continued to escalate across the country, a consensus emerged in late August among most of China's top political leaders that the situation had deteriorated substantially, and it was necessary to utilize the PLA to restore order. The level of concern among China's top political leadership can be gauged by the flurry of official notices (tongzhi) and decisions (jueding) aimed at curbing the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, and ensuring continued production and the reestablishment of basic order issued by various top bodies between January and August of 1967.67" (Scobell 2003, 106)

In chapter 4 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", in mid-September 1950, when the UNC troops under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur continued northward beyond the Thirty-Eighth Parallel toward the Yalu River, how did Nie Rongzhen, the acting Chief of General Staff Nie in 1950, feel about intervening in Korea?

§3 ... While Nie does not specifically say in his memoirs that he opposed the idea of intervention, neither does he say he vocally endorsed it from the start. Implicit in his discussion of the deliberations is his own ambivalence. Nie wrote vaguely of the doubts of unnamed "comrades" and alludes to his own doubts: "Whether to fight that war was a question on which no one could easily make up his mind."54 By the end of September, he was convinced if U.S. forces kept advancing toward the Yalu, China would have no alternative but to intervene. On September 25, during a dinner in Beijing with K. M. Panikkar, Nie told the Indian diplomat, "in a quiet and unexcited manner that the Chinese did not intend to sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come up to their border." He continued soberly, "We know what we are in for, but at all costs American aggression has to be stopped."55" (Scobell 2003, 54-55)

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the Guiding Principle of Internal Security "Community over Individual"?

§5 Community over individual. In China, as in many cultures, the interests of the community are considered paramount, and the interests of the individual take a back seat. This focus on the collective over the individual means that authorities in china are likely to turn swiftly and harshly against persons and groups perceived as threatening social order and stability. Mao reportedly considered- 9p. 37) §1-the most important purpose of the legal system was to obtain the "greatest benefit for the greatest number of people." Hence, according to one legal scholar, "The people's benefit is our highest law." Significantly this discussion of China's "highest law" occurred in a paper on the subject of China's use of the death penalty.132 §2 Fear of chaos and a belief in the primacy of the collective majority -- "the People" -- contributed to the communist party-state taking particularly repressive and violent actions against those identified as "enemies of the people." Despite the emphasis on nonlethal force and on the educative and rehabilitative role of punishment, the system seemed paradoxically to mete out brutal treatment to those suspected of being enemies of the state.133 Communist China has consistently experienced extreme and terrifying episodes of lethal violence. During the campaign against landlords in the early 1950s, Mao claimed that more than eight hundred thousand people were killed. It is conservatively estimated that during the Cultural Revolution half a million people were killed. More recently, during the reform era, I estimate that China leads the world in the number of judicial executions carried out: at least tens of thousands of prisoners have been executed in China during the past twenty years.134 §3 Extremely harsh punishments are rationalized as being necessary to educate the offender and/or society -- a major goal of China's criminal justice system -- but at the same time are tempered by mercy. The communist authorities, like their Confucian predecessors, emphasize correct thinking and the power of education to inculcate proper attitudes and beliefs, hence the institutions of reform through labor and reeducation through labor. Employing the concept of general education and making an example of serious criminals can serve as a deterrent to the rest of society. Petty crimes involving "nonantagonistic contradictions" among the people can be dealt with fairly simply and with mild penalties. More serious crimes that involve antagonist contradictions represent more critical challenges to order. According to Deng: We should distinguish between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. We should educate the overwhelming majority of persons who disrupt public order, all those who can be educated, and take stern legal steps against those who are beyond education or who prove incorrigible. ... We must continue to strike resolutely at various kinds of criminals, so as to ensure and consolidate a sound, secure public order. We must learn to wield the weapon of law effectively.135 Deng continued: "By dealing sternly with these criminals now, we will be giving some kind of education not only to the overwhelming majority of offenders, but to the whole party and people."136 (p. 38) §1 Even, for capital punishment a prime rationale has been its educative role -- in terms of a lesson for the individual and/or society. The category of punishment called "death penalty, suspended for two years," is especially noteworthy. According to several Chinese officials, the measure reflects the strong humanitarian current in their country's criminal justice system.137 The suspended death sentence is roughly equivalent to life without parole and appears to have been widely used in China since the early 1980s. The measure seems to have deep roots in Chinese tradition. §2 In the final analysis, however, the extensive use i the reform era of anti-crime campaigns characterized by the vigorous use of harsh penalties, such as capital punishment, underscores the depth of fear of social disorder and the paramouncy of collective interests over those of the individual." (Scobell 2003, 36-38)

In Chapter 3 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", during the Opium War (4 September 1839 - 29 August 1842), what was the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64)?

¶1 The Taiping "Rebellion" (1851-64), or "Revolution," was a religious-based domestic uprising with ethnic--Han versus Manchu--overtones. Fought mainly with traditional Chinese weapons and tactics, it corresponded and overlapped with the Arrow War (1856-60), or second Opium War, which was China's second anti-foreign trade war. The Manchus lost the Arrow War, but in the interim created China's first modernized armies--the "Ever-Victorious Army" and the Xiang Army--in order to defeat the Taipings." (Ellemen 2007, 32)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", describe the outcome of the "Battle of Kowloon" for China?

¶5 This Sino-British military encounter was called the "battle of Kowloon." The next day, a British eyewitness to the battle provided the following written account of the first naval conflict between European and Asian powers: "the Junks then triced up their Boarding nettings, and came into action with us at half pistol shot; our guns were well served with Grape and round shot; the first shot we gave them they opened a tremendous and well directed fire upon us, from all thier Guns (each Junk had 10 Guns, and they brought all these over on the side which we engaged them on.) ... The Junks' fire, Thank God! was not enough depressed, or if otherwise, none would have lived to tell the Story.--19 of their Guns we received in the mainsail."55 At 3:45 P.M. the Chinese shore batteries opened fire in support of the Junks, and by 4:30 P.M. the Louisa had fired 104 rounds. (p. 18) ¶1 Running low on ammunition, the British retreated. When the Junks pursued them, however, the Louisa and the Pearl turned and resumed battle. According to an eyewitness report: "The junks immediately made sail after the Louisa and at 4:45 they came up with the ENglish vessels. We hove the vessel in stays on their starboard Beam, and the "Pearl" on the Jarboard Bow of the van Junk, and gave them three such Broadsides that it made every Rope in the vessel grin again.--We loaded with Grape the fourth time, and gave them Gun for Gun.--The shrieking on board was dreadful.56 After resorting to grape-shot, the Louisa and the Pearl were joined by several smaller British boats, including a barge from the Cambridge commanded by an America, Captain J.A. Douglas. This late-arriving ship soon absorbed the bulk of the casualties, as Douglas received a flesh wound in his arm and two of his sailors received more serious injuries." (Ellemen 2007, 17-18)

"By the mid-1870s the initial stage of self-strengthening had come to an end. Increasingly, financial restraints limited the creation of large new facilities. And while the Taiwan crisis in 1874 (when a Japanese military- (p. 158) -expedition landed on the coast of Taiwan, ostensibly to punish aborigines who had murdered and otherwise mistreated both Japanese and Ryukyuan sailors) renewed concerns about the need to further improve the military, large new commitments offunds were not forthcoming. ..." (Yu 2012, 157-158)

"Even when placed in global perspective, China's Taiping Rebellion, which resulted in the death of at least 25 million people, is the most destructive civil war in history. When compared with the other bloody civil war that was unfolding almost at the same time in the United States, where a little over 600,000 lives were lost, the Taiping Rebellion is staggeringly immense in its devastation. This chapter attempts to elucidate only the main strands of the military side of the Taiping Rebellion." (Yu 2012, 135)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what kind of army did the two Han dynasties, and the Six Dyansties?

"HAN. The two Han dynasties continued to employ the cadre-conscript army developed by the state of Qin during the Warring States, just as they continued the bureaucratic system and other Qin institutions. Similarly, the military systems of the Three Kingdoms, the ephemeral Western Jin (265-316), and the later south China regimes collectively called the Six Dynasties evolved from the Later Han state of affairs in which rival warlords controlled armies of dependent soldiers (buqu)." (Dreyer 2012, 29)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what roles did hunting play with regard to ancestor worship?

"Hunting played at least three roles in the service of the ancestors: 1) it provided animals that were offered up in the temples; 2) hunts were an element of ceremony in several major sacrifices; 3) hunts were identified with combat, which was itself a form of service to the ancestors. Evidence of the third role was provided above, so I will here deal only with the first two." (Lewis 1990, 21)

In "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution" by Richard S. Horowitz in the 2012 anthology "Beyond the Marble Boat: The Transformation of the Chinese Military, 1850-1911" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 153-174, what happened to any of the gains made by the self-strengthening movement in 1894-1895?

"In 1894-1895 all ofthis unravelled. In a lightning campaign, the armies of Meiji Japan crushed Li Hongzhang's best forces in Korea and then proceeded into China. The Japanese navy smashed the northern Chinese fleet at the Battle of the Yellow Sea, and Li Hongzhang's army lost a series of battles in Korea and north China. The settlement was humiliating. China ceded Taiwan to Japan, allowed the Japanese a free hand in Korea, and agreed to pay a massive indemnity, effectively covering Japan's costs for the war. Only the self-interested intervention of Germany, France, and Russia prevented the cession of the strategically important tip of the Liaodong Peninsula and the naval base at Port Arthur. But this came at the cost of a still larger indemnity." (Yu 2012, 159)

"In 1911 and 1912 revolution finally felled the Qing dynasty, and the New Armies were a central part of it. The rebellion was sparked when it was discovered that soldiers in the Wuchang garrison were associated with revolutionary groups. The panicked soldiers rebelled, forcing a reluctant brigade commander, Li Yuanhong, to join the rebellion. With astonishing speed the insurrection spread among local elites and new military men. The government, facing the crisis, discovered that its New Armies were not as loyal as it had imagined; suppressing the rapidly growing rebellion was hard going. Yuan Shikai was recalled, and by early 1912 he decided that with the Beiyang Army's support for the Qing regime lukewarm at best, his most promising alternative was to negotiate the abdication of the Qing emperor. Using his unparalled influence as the creator of the Beiyang Army, he also established himself as president of the new regime." (Yu 2012, 166)

In "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution" by Richard S. Horowitz in the 2012 anthology "Beyond the Marble Boat: The Transformation of the Chinese Military, 1850-1911" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 153-174, what were the reasons for the Qing officials selective response to Western military methods?

(p. 161) ... There were both ideological and institutional reasons for the selective response to Western military methods before 1895. At the level of perceptions, to Qing officials the modern West was not a seamless whole: Diplomats, merchants, missionaries, and adventurers who came to China had their own motives, and their products and ideas needed to be considered in that light. The modern West could not or should not simply be imitated. At the same time, the Chinese political milieu shaped the way that Western ideas and technology were received and utilized. Orthodox Neo-Confucian political theory (which had undergone a revival in the 1840s and 1850s) emphasized that leaders needed proper ethical orientations rather than specific technical skills. Therefore, efforts by self-strengthening advocates to provide official positions for specialists in Western technology were subject to intense opposition by conservatives. Specialists in foreign methods were regarded as small-minded technicians and therefore morally suspect. To conservatives, the self-strengtheners' emphasis on technology was misplaced; a moral renaissance among officials was what was needed. As one conservative critic declared in 1871, "Ever since the [foreign trouble] began in Guangdong, we have been on an unfortunate slope, and we must hope to get loyal, righteous, and heroic men, who can act for the country in managing its difficulties."3 Good men, not gadgets, would restore the dynasty to power. Even reformers, moreover, worried about the motives of foreign advisors. During the 1860s the Zongli Yamen and Li Hongzhang, the most prominent advocates of Western technology at the time, questioned whether foreigners would be willing to sell their key technologies to China, and even more whether foreign officers serving in the Chinese military would be willing to take orders from their Chinese superiors. Early returns were not good. An attempt to purchase a flotilla of river gunboats failed in 1863 when the British commander refused to be subordinated to Zeng Guofan, and in the final days of the Taiping campaign Gordon very nearly resigned in a huff over Zeng's management of the operation. Similarly, in the late 1870s the U.S. government reneged on earlier commitments to allow Chinese boys who had been educated in the United States to study at West Point and Annapolis. Taken together, these concerns created a quandary. On the one hand, foreigners could not be trusted in positions of authority. One the other hand, Chinese who had moved outside of the traditional education system to develop Western technical expertise were seen as morally suspect. (p. 162) -Qing efforts at Westernizing military reforms were also limited by institutional problems. In the financial realm, the Qing government simply did not adequately support military reform efforts. During the 1850s and 1860s new revenues flowed in from taxes on commerce, especially the internal transit tax known as the lijin and the maritime customs system administered by Sir Robert Hart and staffed with foreigners (but which reported to the Zongli Yamen). Foreign loans guaranteed with customs revenues were also used extensively to fund military campaigns. Gradually the new tax revenues were committed to various civil and military projects, and the discretionary funds that had made the reforms of the 1860s possible disappeared. Foreign loans were generally only used for emergencies, and further financial reforms were not pursued. Consequently, after 1875 financial constraints limited reform. 4 The structure of Qing political institutions also impeded reform, for administrative authority over both civil and military affairs was spread out among numerous provincial and metropolitan officials. This system was intended to avoid dangerous concentrations of power and maximize the choices available to the emperor, but it made the management of policies extending across provincial jurisdictions quite difficult. Only decisive involvement by the throne (i.e., the emperor or the regents ruling in his name) could produce effective policies on the national level. And yet from 1861 until 1898 the throne simply did not act to establish strong and consistent defense policies. While reforms went ahead, support was half-hearted and self-strengthening advocates were subjected to ferocious criticism from conservative officials. This opposition eroded the enthusiasm of the reformers and almost certainly deterred others from joining their ranks. Finally, in many respects the nature of foreign imperial involvement served as a deterrent to broader economic development, particularly in areas such as railways that could be seen as strategically important. The institution of extraterritoriality, by which foreigners were not subject to the jurisdiction of Qing law courts, severely limited the willingness of Qing officials to allow foreign investment. The earliest Western residents in China's interior, Christian missionaries, were felt to be abusing extraterritoriality to protect their converts and subvert the authority of local government. Foreigners with extraterritoriality, Qing officials felt, could not be controlled. The 1876 Wusong Railroad incident, in which a railway illegally constructed by British merchants from Shanghai to Wusong was purchased and removed by the Qing government, is often taken as an example of resistance to modernization. But to Qing officials the railway- (p. 163) -constituted a serious infringement on Qing sovereignty, and allowing it to continue would simply sanction lawlessness. In this situation, the dangers of foreign investment were perceived as far outweighing its economic and military benefits. Before 1895 new projects proceeded only when the government was convinced of strategic benefits and was willing to invest its own resources and/or attract private Chinese investors." (Yu 2012, 161-163)

(p. 167) "... Leadership was also a problem. The military background of commanders was often limited to experience from the Taiping, Nian, and Muslim rebellions, with little formal military training. The problems among junior officers were even worse: Foreigners often noted the reluctance of- (p. 168) -junior officers to participate in training, and stated that they were unwilling to lead troops in battle. 7 Li Hongzhang agreed with the substance of these criticisms. In 1885 he created a new military academy to train officers for his Anhui Army (and made similar efforts to professionalize the Northern Navy). But these efforts to improve the professionalism of the Anhui Army were insufficient, and the superior discipline, mobility, and training of the Japanese armies proved decisive in 1894-1895." (Yu 2012, 167-168)

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what does the founding myth of China reveal about China's differing views on war?

(p. 23) §4 The various strands of thinking on war and violence are evident from the central myths about the origins of Chinese civilization that emerged during the Warring States period. The myth of China's founding involves the powerful figure of the Yellow Emperor (Huang Di) -- revered as the progenitor of the Chinese race. The legend of the emperor's gargantuan struggle to vanquish his two main foes is crucial to delineating the role of sanctioned violence in subsequent Chinese culture. The Yellow Emperor's first adversary was the Divine Husbandman (Shen Nong), an avowed pacifist farmer, while his second- (p. 22) §1-adversary was the Fierary Emperor (Chi Yan), who was the bellicose inventor fo weapons of war. §2 The symbolism of the three main protagonists in the epic is strong. The Divine Husbandman represents the narrow utopian dream of a world where evil, violence, and even scholarly pursuits have o place. The Fiery Emperor by contrast represents the harsh reality of man's brutish animal nature, which, if unchecked, leads to constant violence and mayhem. The Yellow Emperor represents the middle way between the unrealistic and very dangerous extreme of complete pacifism and the all-too-real and terrifying extreme of unrestrained violence. Thus, violence that is focused, disciplined, and limited can be a force for good: "The historical Chinese culture and polity began with the 'invention' or cultural innovation made by the Yellow Emperor, and that innovation was the use of correct violence to establish political authority."42 §3 The Yellow and Fiery Emperors also provided the justification for a government to rule by laws. The laws were administered by Heaven's earthly representative -- the Emperor. And law, as Lewis notes, was synonymous with punishment. Punishments were invariably harsh, originally entailing either physical disfigurement or death. Enforcement of the law was "the precondition of good government and social order."43" (Scobell 2003, 21-22).

In Chapter Two of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the outcome of the constant wars of the Zhou noble lineages?

(p. 53) ¶1 The constant wars of the Zhou noble lineages gradually led to the creation of ever larger territorial units through the conquest of alien states and the extension of central government control into the countryside. These were called "warring states" because they devoted themselves to warfare, they were created through the progressive extension of military service, and the registration and mobilization of their populations for battle remained fundamental to their existence as states.1[1.] They kept every form of violence that had defined the political order of the Zhou nobility--warfare, sacrifice, blood oaths, and vengeance--but these were reorganized and reinterpreted as constitutive elements of ritually sanctioned violence had been the hallmark of authority, in the Warring States all men engaged in licit violence, while authority was associated with its manipulation and control. Instead of being a means of defending honor, sanctioned violence served to establish or reinforce the authoritarian, hierarchic bonds that constituted the new social structure. In place of the lineage as the primary unit of both politics and elite kinship, the state secured control of military force, while the kin groups were reduced to the individual households that provided both taxes and labor service. These kin units were in turn defined through patterns of sacrifice, vengeance, and collective punishments. The ultimate sanction of segmentary, aristocratic rule in the ancestral cults was replaced by forms of sanctioned violence and authority that were justified through the imitation of the "patterns of Heaven" by a single, cosmically potent ruler. Finally, this new organization and interpretation of violence- (p. 54) ¶1-allowed the Warring States Chinese to develop a new understanding of the structure of human society and of the natural world. The remainder of this book will deal with each element of this transformation." (Lewis 1990, 53-54).

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, what did Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea (1592-1598) reveal about guns?

(p. 66) "Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea brought about a direct clash between three different gun-armed forces, the Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans. Japanese forces were armed with muskets and trained in volley fire; Chinese forces relied upon cannon; and Korean forces used cannon on armored warships to interdict Japanese maritime supply lines. On the strategic level, the Japanese were completely defeated, achieving none of their political or military goals at a tremendous loss of life. Tactically, the results were more mixed. Chinese armies succeeded when they brought their cannon up to the battlefield, and lost when they did not. The Korean navy defeated the Japanese navy using cannon to oppose their boarding tactics, but was ineffective when poorly commanded. Overall, the conflict demonstrated that guns, whether muskets or cannon, were now critical in East Asian warfare." (Lorge 2017, 66).

In Chapter Two of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the effect of the de-centering of the sacrifice in blood oaths?

(p. 67) ... "¶5 The de-centering of the sacrifice in blood oaths also began in the Spring and Autumn period with a new characterization of the role of the hegemon. This "master of the covenant" had originally been a warlord and collector of tribute, but over time many Chinese assigned him a normative and regulating function among the states. According to those- (p. 68) ¶1-men the hegemon had to use his power to maintain the political status quo, to suppress expansionist states, and to preserve or restore states menaced by hostile neighbors.49[49.] These correlate activities of crushing the strong and rebellious while preserving the weak and obedient reflect the notion of "virtuous potency" (de ...) that was evolving in this period, and indeed several speakers describe such actions as expressions of the hegemon's "potency."50[50.] Not only did this belief in the hegemon as a ielder of potency cast him in the role of a monarch, but two speakers argued that the hegemon's potency and not the blood covenant secured the mutual trust that guaranteed adherence to the league.51[51.]" (Lewis 1990, 61-64).

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, why did the central governments of China and Japan distrust, and work so hard to control, the "Wokou"?

(p. 78) "...Land powers like the various governments, local and central, of China or Japan, expected their subject populations to remain in fairly fixed locations where they could be taxed and controlled. The maritime population moved when it wanted to, and often lived in places inaccessible to- (p. 79) -land powers, like islands. It was therefore very difficult to control the actions of these people. The Japanese central government was sometimes unable and sometimes unwilling to control the "wokou", something that complicated relations between China and Japan." (Lorge 2017, 78-79)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, what caused the court in China to ban all foreign trade in southern China?

(p. 79) "The 1523 incident persuaded the court to ban all foreign trade in southern China. This prevented foreign merchants from collecting debts owed them by Chinese merchants, and stimulated raiding and smuggling. As long as the ban was not too strenuously enforced, raiding was light and smuggling made up for much of the legal trade. Unfortunately, this made criminals out of traders, and brought more hardened criminals into the process of trading. The court was then caught between strict enforcement, which alienated locals, including some powerful families, but which did not stop "wokou" raids, and lax enforcement, which allowed raiding and smuggling to increase. What the court did not understand was that there was an explosion of international trade during the sixteenth century, in part because of the arrival of European traders (the Portuguese first arrived in Chinese waters in 1516), which was fueling enormous demand for goods in the maritime world." (Lorge 2017, 79)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, what was s the greatest problem underlying the government's difficulties in combating the "wokou"?

(p. 80) "Perhaps the greatest problem underlying the government's difficulties in combating the "wokou" was the dilapidated state of the military establishment in the area. On paper, there appeared to be sufficient patrol boats and soldiers to keep order, but the reality was very different. Less than half the stated number of soldiers was actually available, and they had been paid only intermittently; there were very few horses; often less than a fifth of the indicated ships even existed, of which most were in disrepair. Once the government began to address these problems by placing competent military and civilian leaders in charge, the "wokou" problem diminished markedly. It was mostly over by the 1560s." (Lorge 2017, 80)

What is Defensive Realism?

1. DEFENSIVE REALISM - when a state is satisfied with its position within the status quo it seeks the capacity to protect that position. If a threat to the status quo manifests, the state will take action to protect itself through Internal and external balancing (building up its own military capacity and creating Balancing alliances). Such states tend to be defenders of the existing global order and are not expansionist, but the inability to distinguish between defensive and offensive capabilities can prompt arms races or even preemptive strikes. The offensive use of force in defense of the status quo is still a possibility.

The Terracotta Army

A collection of terracotta sculptures depicting the armies of Qin Shi Huang, the first Emperor of China. It is a form of funerary art buried with the emperor in 210-209 BCE with the purpose of protecting the emperor in his afterlife. The figures, dating from approximately the late third century BCE,[1] were discovered in 1974 by local farmers in Lintong District, Xi'an, People's Republic of China, Shaanxi province. The figures vary in height according to their roles, with the tallest being the generals. The figures include warriors, chariots and horses. Estimates from 2007 were that the three pits containing the Terracotta Army held more than 8,000 soldiers, 130 chariots with 520 horses, and 150 cavalry horses, the majority of which remained buried in the pits near Qin Shi Huang's mausoleum.[2]Other terracotta non-military figures were found in other pits, including officials, acrobats, strongmen, and musicians.

Shun (Chinese: 舜; pinyin: Shùn), also known as Emperor Shun (Chinese: 帝舜; pinyin: Dìshùn) and Chonghua (Chinese: 重華; pinyin: Chónghuá)

A legendary leader of ancient China, regarded by some sources as one of the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors being the last of the Five Emperors. Oral tradition holds that he lived sometime between 2294 and 2184 BC. According to traditional sources, Shun received the mantle of leadership from Emperor Yao at the age of 53, and then died at the age of 100 years. Before his death Shun is recorded as relinquishing his seat of power to Yu (禹), the founder of the Xia Dynasty. Shun's capital was located in Puban (蒲阪), presently located in Shanxi). Under Emperor Yao, Shun was appointed successively Minister of Instruction, General Regulator and chief of the Four Peaks, and put all affairs in proper order within three years.[3] Yao was so impressed that he appointed Shun as his successor to the throne. Shun wished to decline in favour of someone more virtuous, but eventually assumed Yao's duties.[3] It was said that "those who had to try a lawsuit did not go to Danzhu, but to Shun." Danzhu was the son of Yao.[4] After ascending to the throne, Shun offered sacrifices to the god Shang Di (上帝), as well as to the hills, rivers, and the host of spirits (神).[5] Then he toured the eastern, the southern, the western, and the northern parts of the country; in each place he offered burnt-offering to Heaven at each of the four peaks (Mount Tai, Mount Huang, Mount Hua and Mount Heng), sacrificed to the hills and rivers, set in accord the seasons, months, and days, established uniform measurements of length and capacities, and reinforced ceremonial laws.[6] Shun divided the land into twelve provinces, raising altars upon twelve hills, and deepening the rivers.[7] Shun dealt with four criminals: banishing the Minister of Works to You island, confining Huan-dou on Mount Chong; driving San-Miao into San-Wei, and holding Gun a prisoner till his death on Mount Yu (羽).[8] Yu (禹) was subsequently appointed Minister of Works to govern the water and the land.[9]Later, Shun appointed Yu to be General Regulator (Prime Minister).[9] Yu wished to decline in favour of the Minister of Agriculture, or Xie, or Gao Yao, but finally accepted upon Shun's insistence.[9] Shun then appointed Chui as the new Minister of Works.[10] Shun also appointed Yi as Minister of Animal Husbandry to govern the beasts and trees of the land,[11] Bo-yi as Priest of the Ancestral Temple to perform religious ceremonies,[12] Hui as Director of Music,[13] Long as Minister of Communications to counter deceptions and false reports.[14] According to the Canon of Shun, Shun began to reign at the age of 30, reigned with Yao for 30 years, and reigned 50 more years after Yao's abdication, then Shun died.[15] The Bamboo Annals state that Yao chose Shun as his heir three years before abdicating the throne to him. Both sources agree that after abdicating, Yao lived for another 28 years in retirement during Shun's reign. In later centuries, Yao and Shun were glorified for their virtue by Confucian philosophers. Shun was particularly renowned for his modesty and filial piety (xiao 孝). The name of Shun's mother was Wodeng (握登), and his birthplace was Yaoxu (姚墟). SOURCES 3 Canon of Shun, v 2. 4 Heiner Roetz (1993). Confucian ethics of the axial age: a reconstruction under the aspect of the breakthrough toward postconventional thinking. SUNY Press. p. 37. ISBN 0-7914-1649-6. Retrieved 4-1-2012. Check date values in: |accessdate= (help) 5 Canon of Shun, v 3. 6 Canon of Shun, v 4. 7 Canon of Shun, v 5. 8 Canon of Shun, v 6. 9 Canon of Shun, v 9. 10 Canon of Shun, v 13. 11 Canon of Shun, v 14. 12 Canon of Shun, v 15. 13 Canon of Shun, v 16. 14 Canon of Shun, v 17. 15 Canon of Shun, v 20.

Does the concept of "strategic culture" threaten structural realism?

Alastair Johnston recognizes that the very idea of "Strategic Culture" threatens the core assumptions of Structural Realism: "The notion of strategic culture, in principal at least, poses a significant challenge to structural realist claims about the sources and characteristics of state behaviour by rooting strategic choice in deeply historical, formative ideational legacies."

According to Sun Zi, how should a general make himself unconquerable?

As Sun Zi notes, the general must first make himself unconquerable. For Sun Zi, that meant taking defensive measures designed to thwart the possibility of an enemy attack. However, he notes that one's ability to conquer depends on the enemy. Does this mean one must sit passively and wait for the enemy to make a mistake? Hardly! Sun Zi's commander will use ruse de guerre and other measures to get the enemy to place themselves in a position where they can be conquered - then he strikes! In sum: "The victorious army first realizes the conditions for victory, and then seeks to engage in battle. The vanquished army fights first, then seeks victory!" Those who rushed headlong into battle without proper planning would endanger themselves and their state.

According to Professor Green, why did intraclass warfare affect the rise of a type of chivalry among the aristocracy?

Basically, the idea was that noble lineages were precious and important. Exterminating all of them would have weakened all the noble class. Members of the same class share the same values and beliefs, and so create rules to limit the damage that these battles would do. Hence, the rise of a type of chivalry in Spring and Autumn period. This is not surprising for similar situations prevailed in other cultures. For example, the European idea of Chivalry required aristocratic knights to treat each other with respect and courtesy on the battlefield. This is characteristic of intraspecific [or intraclass] warfare.

According to Professor Leary, what made the Qing dynasty unable to keep up technologically with the West?

China had reached a high-level equilibrium trap.

According to Clausewitz, how ought the goals of the war, and amount of force be used in war, be determined?

Clausewitz assumed that political goals should be rational, and that the amount of force will be determined not by the maximum amount a state can muster, but rather by prudent caution, cost-benefit analysis, and estimates of the force required to accomplish specific goals. This process of calculation imposes constraints on the practice of war by using rationality to rein in its tendency towards absolute violence. As a continuation of politics, war ought to be every bit as rational as the political goals it is intended to achieve!

According to Professor Green, what drove people to consolidate their villages into what would become "proto-states"?

Fear of attack from other villages and clans. Fear for their lives encouraged individual clans and villages to migrate and band together. Smaller villages were tied together around a larger central village. These larger villages would often have palaces. As a result, the Longshan era is sometimes described as the time of "wan guo" [萬國], or ten-thousand states, a phrase that describes the rivalry between competing nodes of power. Warfare was endemic, hence the need for villagers to live in larger settlements with real walls for protection from two-legged predators.

What about China's actions makes China's neighbors very nervous?

In an era of waning US influence and capacities, Beijing's new assertiveness makes its neighbors very nervous. Chinese efforts to build up and militarize disputed reefs in the South China Sea continue to create tensions in the region. Despite UNCLOS rules and arbitration judgements, Beijing continues to claim these reefs and small islands as Chinese territory. And there is the matter of China's frantic efforts to develop an armada of aircraft carriers - these are classic instruments for force projection, and it is very difficult to put a defensive spin on them. Of course they can be used (as the US carriers are) to police the existing order in the global commons - but is this really what China is aiming at? Or does Beijing aspire to enforce a new Pax Sinica? The Liaoning - China's first operational carrier. A second is undergoing seat trials, with a third under construction.

What effect did the Korean War have on Mao's planned invasion of Taiwan?

In late June 1950, North Korea attacked the south in an attempt to forcibly reunify the peninsula. Mao had been planning the invasion of Taiwan but this had to be postponed when war broke out in Korea. Mao had not known about the attack in advance and he was caught off guard by the North Korean invasion.

What is Confucian Strategic Culture?

Many scholars have long argued that the Chinese have a unique Strategic Culture, the origins of which date back to the Warring States period and even as far back as the Zhou. This Strategic Culture is allegedly pacifist in orientation, and deeply rooted in Confucian concepts about the use of force. This tradition is frequently cited in making unflattering comparisons with the allegedly belligerent nature of the West. Where the West follows the "Hard Power" Way of the Hegemon ( Ba Dao 霸道), China follows the "Soft Power" Way of the Sage-King (Wang Dao 王道). Many contemporary Chinese leaders make repeated references to this unique Strategic Culture in their efforts to reassure nervous neighbors (and the West) about China's growing military and economic power.

What did Mao Zedong and his military strategist Zhu De and his deal with Chiang's military superiority?

Mao Zedong and his military strategist Zhu De - they also realized that they would have to adopt an unconventional strategy and special tactics to deal with Chiang's military superiority. The approach they pioneered in the Jiangxi Soviet was the basis of the Guerrilla Warfare used against both the KMT and the Japanese. It would also inspire revolutionaries and nationalists in SE Asia, India, the Middle East, Central and South America, and Africa.

Fire arrows

One of the earliest forms of weaponized gunpowder, being used from the 9th century onward. Not to be confused with earlier incendiary arrow projectiles, the fire arrow was a gunpowder weapon which receives its name from the translated Chinese term huǒjiàn (火箭), which literally means fire arrow. In China a 'fire arrow' referred to a gunpowder projectile consisting of a bag of incendiary gunpowder attached to the shaft of an arrow . Fire arrows are the predecessors of fire lances, the first firearm. Fire arrows were first reported to have been used by the Southern Wu in 904 during the siege of Yuzhang. In 969 gunpowder propelled rocket arrows were invented by Yue Yifang and Feng Jisheng. In 975, the state of Wuyue sent to the Song dynasty a unit of soldiers skilled in the handling of fire arrows. In the same year, the Song used fire arrows to destroy the fleet of Southern Tang. In 994, the Liao dynasty attacked the Song and laid siege to Zitong with 100,000 troops. They were repelled with the aid of fire arrows. Published in 1044, the Wujing Zongyao, or Complete Compendium of Military Classics, states that in 994 A.D. the city of Zitong was attacked by an army of 100,000 men who were driven back by regular war machines and fire arrows. In 1083 Song records state that the court produced 350,000 fire arrows and sent them to two garrisons. On March 1, 1126, the Song general Li Gang used a fire arrow machine known as the Thunderbolt Thrower during the Jingkang Incident. By 1127 the Jin were also using fire arrows produced by captured Song artisans. In 1159 fire arrows were used by the Song navy in sinking a Jin fleet. In 1161 the general Yu Yunwen used fire arrows at the Battle of Caishi, near present-day Ma'anshan, during a Jin maritime incursion. The Mongols also made use of the fire arrow during their campaigns in Japan. Probably as a result of the Mongolian military campaigns the fire arrow later spread into the Middle East, where they were mentioned by Hasan al-Rammah in the late 13th century. In 1374 the kingdom of Joseon also started producing gunpowder and by 1377 were producing fire arrows and cannons, which they used against wokou pirates. Korean fire arrows were used against the Japanese during the invasion of Korea (1592). In 1380 an order of "wasp nest" arrow rocket launchers were ordered by the Ming army and in 1400 rocket launchers were recorded to have been used by Li Jinglong. In 1451 a type of mobile arrow rocket launcher known as the "Munjong Hwacha" was invented in Joseon. The Japanese version of the fire arrow was known as bo-hiya. Japanese pirates (wokou also, kaizoku or wako) in the 16th century were reported to have used bo hiya which had the appearance of a large arrow. A burning element made from incendiary waterproof rope was wrapped around the shaft and when lit the bo-hiya was fired from a wide bore tanegashima (Japanese matchlock) or a mortar-like weapon (hiya taihou). During one sea battle it was said the bo-hiya were "falling like rain".

King Wuling of Zhao (Traditional Chinese: 趙武靈王, Simplified Chinese: 赵武灵王) (died 295 BCE, reigned 325 BCE - 299 BCE)

Reigned in the State of Zhao during the Warring States period of Chinese history. His reign was famous for one important event: the reforms consisting of "Wearing the Hu (styled) Attire and Shooting from Horseback (in battle)" (Simplified Chinese: 胡服骑射, Traditional Chinese: 胡服騎射) He was credited for the implementation of protective outfit during military events and proceedings. Probably the son of Zhao Suhou (Marquess Su of Zhao, Simplified Chinese: 赵肃侯), King Wuling of Zhao ascended to the throne at 325 BCE, about halfway into the Warring States Period. His reign coincided with the appearance of several other notable figures in the Warring States. He was also the first ruler of Zhao to style himself "king" (王), but later reversed the decision. He would later receive the title as part of his posthumous name.

According to Sun Zi, how should an enemy commander's flaws be exploited?

Sun Zi sees personal shortcomings in commanders as flaws to be exploited. Generals who are quick to anger can be provoked. Generals who lack decisiveness can be paralyzed. Generals who lack benevolence can be separated from their men. Generals who crave fame can be tempted into a trap by the promise of easy victory. Generals who cannot penetrate deceptions are easily tricked. Generals who lack imagination are predictable.

What are the forms that technological change usually take?

Technological change usually takes one of two forms: 1) unsolicited and 2) solicited.

How did the Japanese interpret the outcome of the First Sino-Japanese War (25 July 1894 - 17 April 1895)?

The Chinese were mocked in Japanese art, driving home the point that Japan was now on top. Defeat by their former vassal Japan in 1894-95 shocked the Chinese in a way that the Opium Wars never had - they realized their limited self-strengthening efforts had failed and that the Qing was in real danger of partition at the hands of the imperialist powers. Whittling China down to size

What was one of the most important developments in the Longshan era?

The emergence of proto-states was one of the most important developments in the Longshan era - the most powerful lineages extended protection to weaker lineages/villages in exchange for submission and tribute. The dominant lineage home base became a "palace" city. This was the beginning of a feudal system based on military power.

What are some of the criticisms of Confucius relationships? What are some of the relationships?

The five relationships (3 Bonds are CAPITALIZED): •RULER-SUBJECT •PARENT-CHILD •HUSBAND-WIFE •Older Brother-Younger Brother •Friend-Friend Are hierarchical, with the left above the right. The response is that these relationships are recriprocal. The Subject owes the Ruler: Obedience, tribute, submission. The Ruer owes the Subject: Protection, Justice, and good Government. Similarly, a child owes a Parent: Filial Piety (honour and obey your parents while alive; Give them a proper funeral when they pass and maintain the rites of ancestor worship; get out and breed new descendants and carry on the family name). A Parent owes a Child: The mother owes her children: love and nurture; the father educates, protects, and disciplines their children. (This is why Chinese literature often refer to the emperor and the government as the mother and the father of the people). An Younger Brother honors and obeys their Older Brother. The Older Brother protects and guides the Younger Brother.

From where did the Shang derive the spoked-wheel chariot?

The lack of precursor technology for the chariot, like solid wheels, suggests that the Chinese did to invent the wheel. However, places like Egypt and mesopotamia already had the chariot circa 3rd century BC. This suggests that China imported the technology from Central Asia, who got it from the Middle East.

What dictates the locations of macroregions?

The locations of these macroregions were dictated by the absence of natural lines of communication within China. Macroregions are often difficult, but not impossible, to traverse. However, the difficulty was high enough for each macroregion tends to prefer insularity and inward-looking economics, and deter outward cross-regional transportation and economics.

What happened to the nature of warfare during teh late Spring and Autumn Era?

The nature of warfare gradually changed during the late Spring and Autumn Era. Under both the late Shang and the Western Zhou, warfare was based on chariots backed by foot soldiers. Due to both the expense of chariots and the long hours of practice necessary to master their handling, only members of the aristocracy could use them. Peassants did not have the economic means, nor the time, to raise peasant armies. Nobles did not have the money or the inclination to train peasant armies at this time. Due to the cost, wars were primarily fought with aristocratic lineages vs aristocratic lineages within feudal states. Various ranks of nobles would fight each other.

In the 17th century, what methods did the early 17th century military innovators come up with to maximize the effectiveness of use weapons?

The problem with firearms was that they were unreliable, expensive, cumbersome, and wildly inaccurate. It took several minutes to load the early 16th Century arquebus, and it was only moderately accurate out to 100 yards (as compared to the 10 arrows per minute of the Longbow, with its 200 yard range). But technology would improve, and the weapons became cheaper and lighter. But how to use them to maximum effect? By the early 17th century military innovators had came up with methods to maximize the effectiveness of these new weapons. Dense formations were abandoned in favor of thin lines of troops - this maximized the number of muskets firing to the front. Troops were also required to fire in unison rather than as individuals - this added psychological shock to the actual physical damage caused by the lead shot. But the complex drills required to march, load and discharge firearms in unison required standardized training and improved organization. Troops had to be drilled constantly to develop blind obedience to orders. "Drill and Discipline" would make European armies almost unbeatable in their encounters with non-Western armies.

Emperor Wu of Han (30 July 157 BC - 29 March 87 BC), born Liu Che, courtesy name Tong

The seventh emperor of the Han dynasty of China, ruling from 141-87 BC. His reign lasted 54 years — a record not broken until the reign of the Kangxi Emperor more than 1,800 years later. His reign resulted in a vast territorial expansion and the development of a strong and centralized state resulting from his governmental reorganization, including his promotion of Confucian doctrines. In the field of historical social and cultural studies, Emperor Wu is known for his religious innovations and patronage of the poetic and musical arts, including development of the Imperial Music Bureau into a prestigious entity. It was also during his reign that cultural contact with western Eurasia was greatly increased, directly and indirectly. As a military campaigner, Emperor Wu led Han China through its greatest expansion. At its height, the Empire's borders spanned from modern Kyrgyzstan in the west, to Korea in the east, and to northern Vietnam in the south. Emperor Wu successfully repelled the nomadic Xiongnufrom systematically raiding northern China, and dispatched his envoy Zhang Qian in 139 BC to seek an alliance with the Yuezhi of Kangju (Sogdia, modern Uzbekistan). This resulted in further missions to Central Asia. Although historical records do not describe him as being aware of Buddhism, emphasizing rather his interest in shamanism, the cultural exchanges that occurred as a consequence of these embassies suggest that he received Buddhist statues from Central Asia, as depicted in the murals found in the Mogao Caves. Emperor Wu is considered one of the greatest emperors in Chinese history, due to his effective governance which made the Han dynasty one of the most powerful nations in the world. Michael Loewe called the reign of Emperor Wu the "high point" of "Modernist" (classically justified Legalist) policies, looking back to "adapt ideas from the pre-Han period." His policies and most trusted advisers were Legalist, favouring adherents of Shang Yang. However, despite establishing an autocratic and centralised state, Emperor Wu adopted the principles of Confucianism as the state philosophy and code of ethics for his empire and started a school to teach future administrators the Confucian classics. These reforms had an enduring effect throughout the existence of imperial China and an enormous influence on neighbouring civilizations.

Who were the original groups of nomadic peoples living on the edge of the Qin?

There were originally 3 groups of nomadic peoples living on the edge of the Qin - The Eastern Hu in the area of southern Manchuria, the Xiongnu in the Ordos region, and the Yuezhi to their west.

Over the period of the Han and the Tang, what happened between civilian-military relations?

What we see developing over the period from the Han to the Tang is a growing rift between the Chinese and their soldiers. In the Qin and early Han, Chinese soldiers were conscripts drawn from the general population. They could not stand apart from society because they were a part of society. But this changes with the shift towards professional forces. Drawn from déclasse elements (criminals, refugees, non-Chinese), these forces stood apart from society. The poor social standing of these soldiers made them a target for derision, but they repaid that contempt by treating the Chinese people brutally whenever they had the chance. This is the beginning of China's " culture without soldiers" (無兵之文化)

What did Confucius believe that the superior man had to master?

While Confucius believed in the transformative power of virtue, he nonetheless encouraged his disciples to master the ways of wu as well as those of Wen. Some of his disciples actually went on to fight for one or another of the feudal states. He believed that the superior man had to be a master of both the civil and the military arts ( 文武合一), a reflection of his admiration for the early Zhou era, when there was no functional differentiation between those who practiced wu and those who practiced wen.

In chapter 4 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", in mid-September 1950, when the UNC troops under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur continued northward beyond the Thirty-Eighth Parallel toward the Yalu River, how did the military leadership feel about intervening in Korea?

§2 ... Military men proved extremely reluctant to commit troops to the peninsula and were ultimately convinced as to the wisdom of the move only after the sustained and forceful arguments of Mao and later by CPV Commander Peng." (Scobell 2003, 84)

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what are the Guiding Principles of External Security IN GENERAL?

§2 Guiding Principles for External Security - Counteracting these three core elements are two key strategic constants that justify the external use of military force. The concepts of "just or righteous war" and "active defense" in practice negate the pacifying effects of the preceding core philosophical elements." (Scobell 2013, 34).

In chapter 6 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was the context to the lead up to the Sino-Vietnamese War in the Overseas Chinese Factor?

(p. 121) §3 The Overseas Chinese Factor. Hanoi had long considered the Hoa - the ethnic Chinese inhabitants of Vietnam - a latent security concern. The Chinese of Vietnam, as in so many other countries in Southeast Asia, were disproportionately concentrated in the commercial and financial sectors. As such, many were some of the most prominent and wealthy members of Vietnamese society. Because of their high visibility, there tended to be considerable resentment among the indigenous Vietnamese toward the great success and material well-being that some in the Chinese community enjoyed. Thus the CPV began a crackdown on private enterprise in the recently liberated south. This crackdown slipped into high gear in March 1978 and quickly became a witch hunt directed at Chinese businesses. In response to the crackdown, Chinese merchants and financiers lay low, hoarded their goods, and/or operated on the black market. As a result, Vietnam's economy went into a tailspin. Both the authorities and many ordinary Vietnamese tended to blame the Hoa for the economic crisis. In this extreme political climate, attacks on and discrimination against Vietnamese- (p. 122) §1-residents of Chinese descent became more severe, particularly from March 1978 onward.10 §2 Nevertheless, the initial exodus of Hoa that also began in March 1978 seems to have been unrelated to the crackdown on the one million strong Hoa community in southern Vietnam. The first wave of departees, numbering some two hundred thousand, arrived in southern China from northern Vietnam.11 Their departure seemed to have been triggered by rumors of impending war between China and Vietnam and the circulation of pamphlets of mysterious origin urging ethnic Chinese to return to the motherland and contribute to economic modernization. These moves are not likely to have been the result of any coordinated policy by Hanoi. Indeed, Hanoi would seem to have had little to gain from the exodus of these northern residents, many of whom were vital workers in critical industries. Thus the blame for the initial outflow of ethnic Chinese residents cannot be placed solely on Hanoi, although Vietnam's policy toward the Hoa contributed to the outflow. And after the emigration began, the exodus took on a logic and momentum all of its own.12 §3 Later on, the Hanoi regime seems to have made an explicit policy decision to encourage the departure of Hoa from the south. Local authorities on the coast were instructed to build and/or make available boats of various descriptions and permit ethnic Chinese to exit the country in exchange for fees and taxes. Many of these refugees were forced to pay high prices for boats of dubious seaworthiness and sizeable bribes to Vietnamese officials to look the other way. While this outflow of humanity - dubbed "Boat People" - caused tremendous consternation in the international community, it enraged Beijing's leaders who saw it as a direct affront to China.13 In April 1978 the PRC official with primary responsibility for overseas Chinese affairs, Liao Chengzhi, expressed concern at the plight of the Hoa and stated that Beijing opposed any foreign government that forced overseas Chinese to take up a foreign nationality. The temperature rose considerably the following month. In mid-May China announced the suspension of twenty-one Chinese aid projects in Vietnam and stated that the funds allocated for these projects would be redirected to assist ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam. Then, on May 24, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office formally condemned Vietnam's persecution and expulsion of ethnic Chinese residents in strong terms. The statement made it clear that Beijing would hold Hanoi responsible for any mistreatment of the Hoa.14 On May 26 China escalated the war of words by announcing it would send two ships to rescue "persecuted Chinese." Four days later, China canceled more aid projects.15"

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", during the Opium War (4 September 1839 - 29 August 1842), was the Treaty of Nanjing, signed on 29 August 1842, unfair?

¶4 Although many Chinese and foreign commentator shave referred to the Treaty of Naniing as "unfair" or "unequal," it is important to place it within the context of the Manchu domination fo Han China. As Wakeman has conceded, "There was no question that the citizens of Guangzhou and the English did indeed share certain interests," and Commissioner Lin even accused the Guangzhou merchants--whom he called jinshang or "treacherous merchants"--of being a worse enemy than the British.84 ¶5 Therefore, the Manchu thought of the southern Chinese as being as much, or more, of an enemy than they did the British. Strange as it may appear, many of these "unequal" points in the Treaty of Nanjing--such as forcing open five port cities in South China for trade--actually benefited Han Chinese, especially those engaged in foreign trade and commerce. In addition, the elimination of smuggling and the orderly collection of tarrifs meant that taxes- (p. 32) ¶1-from this trade suddenly became available directly to the provincial governments, instead of to corrupt Manchu officials who had formerly accumulated great wealth by allowing the smuggling to continue unopposed. ¶2 By means of the Sino-British treaty, Han Chinese--especially in southern China--regained rights that they had lost following the Qing conquest of China. When seen in this light, the British military victory was also an economic victory for the Han Chinese. Increased Han Chinese nationalism was a natural result. This, in turn, caused pre-existing north-south tensions to women. Not surprisingly, it would be these southern regions that soon erupted in the failed Taiping Rebellion and that were destined to lead the successful revolution seventy years later that finally overthrew the Manchu." (Ellemen 2007, 31-32)

Why were military expeditions so short during the Shang dynasty?

Most of the soldiers were not professionals, but conscripted peasants. If these peasants are on war, then they are not farming grain which can be paid for the tribute to the king.

An Lushan (c. 703 - 29 January 757)

A general in the Tang dynasty and is primarily known for instigating the An Lushan Rebellion. An Lushan was of Sogdian and Göktürk origin, at least by adoption. He rose to military prominence by defending the northeastern Tang frontier from the Khitans and other threats. He was summoned to Chang'an, the Tang capital, several times and managed to gain favor with Chancellor Li Linfu and Emperor Xuanzong of Tang. This allowed An Lushan to amass significant military power in northeast China. After the death of Li Linfu, his rivalry with General Geshu Han and Chancellor Yang Guozhong created military tensions within the empire. In 755, An Lushan, following 8 or 9 years of preparation, instigated the An Lushan Rebellion, proclaiming himself the ruler of a new dynasty, Yan. REBELLION Initial stage In the spring of 755, matters were beginning to come to a head. When An Lushan submitted a petition to have 32 non-Han generals under him replace Han generals, this was accepted by Emperor Xuanzong, despite opposition from Yang Guozhong and his fellow chancellor Wei Jiansu who took An's use of non-Han generals as a sign of impending rebellion. Yang and Wei then suggested that An be promoted to be chancellor, and that his three commands be divided between his three deputies. Emperor Xuanzong initially agreed, but after the edict was drafted, Xuanzong tabled it and instead sent the eunuch Fu Qiulin (輔璆琳) to send fresh fruits to An and to observe him—upon which An was alleged to bribe Fu into submitting a favorable report. Yang, however, persisted in his reports against An. Yang then attacked some of An's staff and associates, including having the mayor of Jingzhao arrest An's friend Li Chao (李超) and others, and executing them secretly. An Qingzong, who was then at Chang'an, reported Yang's attack to An Lushan, causing considerable concern to An Lushan, who, thereafter, refused to attend the funeral of an imperial prince in summer 755, and did not offer to send a large number of horses to Chang'an that autumn, which aroused the suspicions of Emperor Xuanzong. Allegations of An's bribes to Fu also reached the Emperor, who then had Fu executed, and sent another eunuch, Feng Shenwei (馮神威) to Fanyang to again summon An Lushan, who ignored the summons. In winter 755, An launched his rebellion on 16 December, claiming he had received a secret edict from Emperor Xuanzong to advance on Chang'an to remove Yang. The imperial officials were all apprehensive, because An had the strongest troops of the realm at the time, except for Yang, who believed that An could be suppressed easily. Emperor Xuanzong commissioned the general Feng Changqing as military governor of Fanyang and Pinglu, intending to have him replace An after An's rebellion was defeated. The Emperor also sent Feng to the eastern capital, Luoyang, to build up the defense there; another general, Gao Xianzhi, was ordered to command a secondary defense at Shan Commandery (陝郡, roughly modern Sanmenxia, Henan). He executed An Qingzong and An's first wife Lady Kang, and forced An Qingzong's present wife, Lady Rongyi, to take her own life. On 8 January 756, An Lushan crossed the Yellow River, quickly capturing Chenliu (陳留, roughly modern Kaifeng, Henan) and Yingyang (滎陽, roughly modern Zhengzhou, Henan) Commanderies. He approached Luoyang, where he encountered an ill-prepared army commanded by Feng, defeating Feng quickly and forcing Feng to flee and concede Luoyang to him. Feng joined forces with Gao and urged a retreat to Tong Pass; Gao agreed, and they took up defensive positions there, and An did not proceed quickly, but remained at Luoyang, planning to declare himself emperor there. (Soon, due to accusations of the eunuch Bian Lingcheng (邊令誠), Emperor Xuanzong executed Feng and Gao, and replaced Gao with Geshu Han.) Some Tang officials north of the Yellow River resisted An Lushan under the leadership of Yan Zhenqing, the governor of Pingyuan Commandery (平原, roughly modern Dezhou, Shandong). As emperor of Yan On Lunar New Year's day, 756 (5 February), An Lushan declared himself Emperor at Luoyang, establishing a new state of Yan, making Zhang Tongru and the surrendered Tang official Daxi Xun (達奚珣) his chancellors. He created An Qingxu the Prince of Jin and another son, An Qinghe (安慶和), the Prince of Zheng. Meanwhile, Yan Zhenqing's cousin Yan Gaoqing (顏杲卿), who initially submitted to An, rose against An at Changshan Commandery (常山, roughly modern Baoding, Hebei) but was quickly defeated and delivered to An in Luoyang; An executed him and sent An Qingxu to make an initial attack against Tong Pass, and Geshu Han repelled the attack. By this time, the Tang generals Guo Ziyi and Li Guangbi had fought their way into Emperor An's territory north of the Yellow River, cutting off the communication between Luoyang and Fanyang, causing much fear in An's troops. An considered withdrawing north of the Yellow River to secure the territory, but meanwhile, suspicions had begun to rise between Yang Guozhong and Geshu, each believing that the other had designs on himself. Yang therefore persuaded Emperor Xuanzong to order Geshu to attack the Yan general Cui Qianyou, who was then stationed at Shan Commandery. (This order was against the advice of Geshu, Guo, and Li Guangbi that the proper strategy was to secure Tong Pass and let Guo and Li Guangbi capture the Yan territory to the north.) Geshu, with Emperor Xuanzong repeatedly ordering him to attack, was forced to do so, and was defeated by Cui. Geshu's subordinate Huoba Guiren (火拔歸仁) seized him and surrendered to Yan forces. Subsequently, An induced Geshu to write letters to several Tang generals, urging them to surrender, but they all refused. When Yan forces captured Tong Pass, Emperor Xuanzong and Yang, in panic, abandoned Chang'an and fled toward Shu Commandery (蜀郡, roughly modern Chengdu, Sichuan). On the way, at a small village, Mawei Station, prompted by general Chen Xuanli who believed that Yang Guozhong had provoked this rebellion, the imperial guards assassinated Yang Guozhong, and demanded the death of Yang Guifei, to which the Emperor reluctantly consented. An, caught by surprise of the Emperor's retreat, had Cui advance slowly into Chang'an, even though the Tang mayor of Chang'an, Cui Guangyuan (崔光遠), offered to surrender. Also surrendering to Yan forces were the former chancellor Chen Xilie and the key officials Zhang Jun (張均) and Zhang Ji (張垍), and An made Chen and Zhang Ji chancellors as well. Meanwhile, An had Emperor Xuanzong's sister, Princess of Huo, as well as a number of other imperial relatives, executed, and sacrificed their organs to An Qingzong. At this point, a new person became the Tang Emperor, Li Heng, or Emperor Suzong. Due to the slowness of the Yan advance, the Yan forces were unable to capture either Emperor Xuanzong, who eventually reached Shu Commandery, or Li Heng, who fled to Lingwu and took imperial title there (as Emperor Suzong). (Xuanzong recognized Li Heng's actions and subsequently took the title Taishang Huang (retired emperor).) Hearing news of Chang'an's fall, Guo and Li Guangbi withdrew to Lingwu, allowing Shi to again pacify the region north of the Yellow River and east of the Taihang Mountains with exception of pockets held by Yan Zhenqing and other Tang officials under his command. Death An Lushan's chronic eye problems led to blindness, and he suffered from ulcers. As a result, he became ill-tempered, and would whip, cane or even sometimes execute his servants, if they had caused him any displeasure. Yan Zhuang and a favorite eunuch of An, Li Zhu'er (李豬兒), were also said to be hit frequently. Once he declared imperial title, he spent most of his time inside the Luoyang palace, and his generals rarely saw him, with most important matters going through Yan Zhuang. An favored his son An Qing'en (安慶恩), the son of his second wife, Lady Duan (who might have carried the title of empress by this point). An considered letting An Qing'en be his crown prince, instead of An Qingxu, who was otherwise considered in order to receive that honor. An Qingxu often feared that An Lushan would put him to death; this fear drove him to assassinate An Lushan. He, Yan, and Li Zhu'er therefore plotted the assassination. On the night of 29 January 757, with Yan and An Qingxu watching outside, Li Zhu'er took a sword into the palace and attacked An Lushan; An Lushan tried to fight back, but could not locate a sword that he put under his bed, and Li Zhu'er killed him. The next morning, Yan first announced to the Yan officials that An Lushan was seriously ill and was creating An Qingxu crown prince, and then An Qingxu took the throne, before announcing An Lushan's death. After Shi Siming killed An Qingxu in 759 and took imperial title himself, he buried An Lushan with ceremony due an imperial prince, not an emperor, and gave him the rather unflattering posthumous name of La (剌, meaning "unthinking").

"... the three texts jointly disapprove of accumulated anger as a motive for war. Resentment among heads of state, they suggest, should be dealt with thorugh diplomacy, not war." (Van Els 2013, 32)

(p. 34) ¶2 There is, however, a more fundamental reason for seeing Master Wu's classification of warfare as the source of the other two. This has to do with the popularity of enumerated lists in military-strategic circles. Master Wu often captures its teachings under a heading, such as "the four vital points of warfare" (which are morale, terrain, affairs, and strength) or "the four disharmonies" (disharmony in the state, in the army, in formations, and in battle). In addition, Master Wu also elaborates on "the three things on which the ruler depends," "the four principles of lightness, two principles of heaviness, and one principle of belief," "the five affairs to which a general must pay careful attention," "the six circumstances in which, without performing divination, one should avoid conflict," and "the eight conditions under which one engages in battle without performing divination. Such enumerated descriptions occur throughout the text, but they are not limited to Master Wu alone. Other early Chinese military-strategic writings, such as The Art of Warfare or The Six Secret Teachings, likewise speak of "the three treasures," "the five ways to know victory," "the six thieves," "the seven harms," and so on and so forth. This kind of enumeration obviously flourished in military-strategic circles, where it had an important function. To students of military thought, enumerative lists served as mnemonic devices and allowed them to keep the essentials of warfare in mind. Faced with a situation on the actual battlefield, they could easily go over the memorized lists and take the appropriate action. At the end of the Warring States era, such lists also became popular outside the military-strategic context.44[44.] It therefore seems plausible that this specific list, the classification of various types of warfare, originated in a military-strategic context, perhaps even specifically in Master Wu, and later spread to a broader politico-philosophical context, to which The Four Canons and Master Wen belong. We know from contemporary sources that writings ascribed to the distinguished general Wu Qi were popular until well into the Han dynasty, and it is not unlikely that contemporary authors took inspiration from that text. If the classification of warfare already formed part of Master Wu in those days, it may have inspired the similar classifica- (p. 35) ¶1-tions in the other two texts, a liberal interpretation in The Four Canons and a more literal interpretation in Master Wen." (Van Els 2013, 35)

In Chapter Two of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was brought about the emergence of social ties between individuals, free from familial or village ties?

(p. 75) ¶5 ... Beginning with a schematized model of Zhou society in which ascriptive kin ties had defined the relations of the Zhou elite, and village custom had controlled the common people's statuses and- (p. 76) ¶1-roles, Masubuchi traced the gradual emergence of elective, "artificial" ties of service or comradeship between individuals. This process began when certain individuals lost their fixed positions in the old social order and hence became eligible for recruitment to the service of others on an individual basis. Defeated rebels, younger sons of rulers and their followers who fled a state to avoid death at the hands of the heir, members of destroyed lineages or states, younger offspring of cadet lineages who had no place in the kin hierarchy, ambitious elements of the capital populace, and even brigands formed a pool of warriors and political agents whose recruitment could strengthen lineages against their rivals. ... ¶3 the first record of competition to recruit "free" members of the nobility dates from the struggle for the succession to Lord Huan of Qi (d. 643 B.C.). ... The recruitment of these "free" warriors played an increasingly important role in the intensifying interlineage battles that led to the partition of Jin and the usurpation of the Tian clan in Qi.104[104.] ... (p. 77) ¶1 In the Warring States period this struggle to recruit followers became a general social trend. Leading political figures, such as the famous "Four Princes," competed in recruiting small armies of followers, who, in exchange for rank and sustenance, devoted themselves to their masters. Men of letters and would-be reformers traveled from state to state, seeking a prince who would employ them and implement thier policies. Many of these wandering scholars or warriors joined together to form schools or bands, or, in the case of the Mohists, philosophical schools that also functioned as military units. This pattern of exchanging service and devotion for office and payment laid the basis for the so-called "bureaucratic" government that developed in the period, and the life-giving "potency" of the ruler or hegemon, previously identified with his sparing those who submitted, now referred to the rewards and salaries he distributed to his followers.105[105.]. ¶2 This constitution of the political realm through the exchange of service for recognition, office, and material rewards led to the development of a new elite ethic in which men were celebrated for their devotion unto death to whoever "recognized them" (zhi ji ...). The new form of loyalty was summed up, in the statement of Yu Rang. "A noble man dies for the one who recognizes him, just as a beautiful woman adorns herself for the one who pleases her. Zhi Bo recognized me, and if I must die in order to avenge Zhi Bo then my upper and lower souls will have nothing of which to be ashamed." Later in the same chapter, Yu Rang, who had no bothered to avenge two lineages he had previously served, justified the need to avenge Zhi Bo thus: "When I served the Fan and Zhonghang lineages they treated me as one of the mass, so I repaid them as befitted one of the mass. But Zhi Bo treated me as a noble man of the state, so I repaid him as befits a noble man of the state.106[106.] This reply states explicitly that the loyalty and reciprocity enjoined on a retainer were proportional to teh recognition and honor received. It articulates the exchange of the servant's devotion for the honor bestowed by the lord that typified the new political relations, and it marks the extent of that devotion by insisting on the need to seek vengeance at the expense of one's own life. ¶3 Yu Rang's statement became a familiar homily in China, and the Shi ji contains a chapter devoted entirely to men who sacrificed their lives trying to avenge the death or disgrace of a lord who had honored- (p. 78) ¶1-them. In cases where no vengeance was possible, then followers could express their devotion by mass suicide.107[107.] Other people, although criticized for their actions, demonstrated this loyalty by sacrificing their sons, or even feeding a son to a ruler.108[108.] It was these new personal bonds between ruler and subordinate, consciously created and imposing absolute obligations, that received explicit, legal form in the bonds.109[109.] Hence bonds were the ritual basis of the ruler's authority over his officials, just as they underlay the army regulations and legal codes through which the ruler commanded the common people. The entire political edifice of the warring state was cerated through these modified blood covenants." (Lewis 1990, 75-78).

As the Spring and Autumn Era went on, and the fighting intensified, which states suffered the most? Which states had greater room to expand?

As states competed, those in the core suffered the most. They simply had nowhere to go, and were squeezed on all sides. Those states on the outer edge of the Zhou world were luckier, for they could expand outwards. Qin, Jin, Qi, and Chu expanded considerably, sometimes by enlisting the aid of non-Chinese peoples like the Rong, Man, Yi, and Di. This gave them access to more land and people.

What kind of strategy did Mao Tse-tong and Zhu De form in the Jiangxi Soviet in 1930-1931?

Based on their experience in the remote countryside, Mao and Zhu De came up with a strategy that called for 1) a strong party at the head of a party army 2) a rural territorial base, rooted in peasant support. Mao experimented with various mobilization tactics, and gradually won over the suspicious peasantry. Other groups copied Mao, and by 1931 at least a half dozen major Soviets had appeared In Dec. 1931 representatives from these Soviets met in Jiangxi and elected Mao Chairman of the new Chinese Soviet Republic. But Chiang was closing in rapidly. He was determined to exterminate the CCP.

How did China attempt to catch-up with the technological advances of the West and the USSR?

Chinese military planners hoped to be able to leapfrog ahead by purchasing and reverse-engineering foreign technology. The West and the USSR were so far ahead Chinese planners initially feared that China would never be able to catch up through domestic R&D alone (research and development).

What made the Battle of Muye so historically significant?

In 1045 BCE, the Shang and Zhou forces met in the Battle of Muye. Although he allegedly had 45,000 troops and 300 chariots, King Wu was still vastly outnumbered ...but it did not matter: Heaven was on his side! This is what made the Zhou victory so historically significant. It was the first time dynastic change was explicitly justified by the "Mandate of Heaven" [tian ming 天命]

According to Sun Zi, if force is used, then what key principle should govern the use of force?

Even when force is used, its application must accord with the key principle of "preservation": "Preserving the enemy's state capital is best, destroying their state capital second-best. Preserving their army is best, destroying their army is second-best. Preserving their battalions is best, destroying their battalions is second-best. ... For this reason attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is NOT the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence!"

What was Confucius legacy?

unwillingness to compromise likely alienated his superiors, but he remains the most influential Chinese philosopher of all time. Unfortunately, his realistic approach to the role of war and military force was ignored by those who claimed to be his followers. In later years they chose to ignore his words of warning: "Those who engage in civil (wen) affairs must also make military preparations, while those who are engaged in military (wu) affairs must also make civil preparations!"

Sun Zi's Analysis of Leadership

STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES WISDOM UNENLIGHTENED CREDIBILITY UNTRUSTWORTHY STRICTNESS LAXITY BENEVOLENCE LOVES THE PEOPLE TOO MUCH COURAGE LOVES LIFE, COWARDLY SKILLFUL ANALYST CANNOT FATHOM THE EMEMY NO INTEREST IN FAME CRAVES FAME UNDETERRED BY THREAT OF PUNISHMENT FEARS RESPONSIBILITY PLACES THE ARMY FIRST SELFISH TRANQUIL EASILY ANGERED, HASTY OBSCURE TALKATIVE, EASY TO READ UPRIGHT ARROGANT SELF-DISCIPLINED WEAK CLEVER/INVENTIVE PREDICTABLE

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what is the major problem of studying China from the seventh era to the fourth era?

"The major problem for studying this era is that apart from some of the poems in the "Shi jing" and a few of the later chapter of the "Shang shu", which cannot be dated with any precision, we have no literary- (p. 16) -sources written during the period in question. A detailed narrative of the years from 722 to 464 B.C., however, appears in the "Zuo zhuan", a work generally dated to the mid-fourth B.C. This work is a compilation of historical anecdotes appended to a year-by-year chronicle of events written from the perspective of the state of Lu. It is obviously a multilayered work drawing on many sources and having passed through many hands, but it was compiled in its final form by men working in the Confucian tradition, and it later became one of the "classics" of that school. The judgements and attitudes of the final redactors are consistent with those expressed in the "Lun yu", and when the stories have a clear "moral," these are in harmony with the positions of the Confucian school. However, the actions and speeches attributed to the historical actors frequently depict a world of institutions and values totally at odds with those of the Warring States Confucians and the other philosophical schools. In many cases these speeches and actions are the objects of criticism, but even the words and deeds of seemingly "positive" characters often suggest a world far removed from that of the Warring States authors, and these traces of an "alien" world offer an intelligible, internally consistent vision of society. Moreover, in contrast to the philosophical texts of the period, in which historical incidents are cited as adjuncts to an argument, or with the more closely related "Guo yu", which is "philosophy and rhetoric in a historical setting," the "Zuo zhuan" contains many stories that have no clear moral message, as well as extensive chronicles that offer no more than dated events.1[1.] The preservation of large amounts of material that serve no moral argument and of speeches and actions that depict a world alien or hostile to Warring States Confucianism suggests that despite heavy reworking, the "Zuo zhuan" is our only detailed repository of information on a social order that was already vanishing by the time that philosophical and historical texts appeared in the late Spring and Autumn period. Because much of the evidence is preserved simply as a target for ciriticsm, and the chronological arrangement of speeches and anecdotes is not necessarily reliable, the text does not allow a detailed study of the process of change in the Zhou socio-political order. Instead, one can at best achieve a schematic contrast of "before" and "after," where the extant text already represents "after," and "before" must be deduced from otherwise unexplainable values and practices appearing in the anecdotes. This reconstruction can also be supplemented by evidence preserved in Warring States philosophical works, the writings of Sima Qian, and many archeological finds."

In Chapter 1 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what did the Miao, White Lotus, and Eight Trigram uprisings do to the Qing Dynasty?

#6 While the Manchus succeeded in putting down the Miao, White Lotus, and Eight Trigram uprisings, the combined effect of the rebellions weakened the- (p. 12) #1-Qing Dynasty. ..." (Ellemen 2007, 11-12)

(p. 14) ¶2 Given the overwhelming attention paid to strategy and tactics by Master Sun and other military thinkers, and the ardent promotion of non-violent solutions to socio-political problems by Confucius and others, it is tempting to see these views as antithetical: the one being pro-war and the other pro-peace. However, such a conclusion would be inaccurate because these views are not complete opposites. For instance, Master Sun may recommend strategies and tactics for winning battles, but he also emphasizes that the best general is one who is able to "bend the enemy to his will without fighting."7[7. The Art of Warfare, 3. Yang Bing'an, ed., Shiyi jia zhu Sunzi jiaoli (Beijing: Zhongua shuju, 1999), p. 45; Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., the Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 161.] Confucius, despite his aversion to war, states that the common people may be sent to war on the condition that "an upright man has trained them for seven years",8[8. The Analects, 13.29. Yang, Lunyu yizhi, p. 144; The Analects, p.123] It.- (p. 15) ¶1-appears that these views mainly differ in the degree to which they propagate "civil virtue" and "martial vigor", the proverbial brush and the sword, as a cure for the socio-political chaos. As Rand explains, there are those who advocated "the predominant use of martiality" to exercise conflicts and those who "insisted on the primacy of civility" to prevent and mitigate the ongoing chaos.9[9. Christopher C Rand, "Chinese Military Thought and Philosophical Taoism," monumenta Serica 34 (1979-1980): 173.] A preference for civil virtue does not necessarily mean the exclusion of martial vigor, and vice versa. That being said, teh precise position of these thinkers and texts on the wide specrum between civility and martiality is often not immediately clear." (Van Els 2013, 14-15)

In chapter 8 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the Context of the Taiwan Strait crisis (1995-1996)?

(p. 174) §1 THE CONTEXT - The origins of the crisis can be traced back to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the KMT in the Civil War in the late 1940s. The defeated remnants of the KMT led by Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan. §2 The United States has been intimately involved in the China-Taiwan standoff since 1950. After the CCP had taken control of most of the mainland and captured Hainan Island in April 1950, the PLA began to concentrate on the invasion of Taiwan. These preparations were aborted by the outbreak of the Korean War. In June 1950, when President Harry S. Truman decided to intervene on the Korean Peninsula, he also ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. Beijing attached great significance to the insertion of U.S. naval forces into the Strait - Mao in particular viewed this as a major event.14 Chinese forces preparing for the invasion of Taiwan were shifted from Fujian Province, adjacent to the Strait, to Manchuria, near the border with Korea, to counter the threat posed by U.S. troops on the peninsula. Then in 1955, after the first Strait crisis, the United States and Taiwan signed a bilateral defense treaty. §3 While Mao and Chiang were alive, a qualitative improvement in crossstrait relations proved impossible. Only after Chiang died in 1975 and Mao passed away the following year did change become possible. When Deng had established himself as Mao's successor in late 1978, he demonstrated renewed energy and determination to recover Taiwan combined with a healthy dose of pragmatism. Whereas Mao had focused on "liberation" by military force, Deng stressed peaceful unification. Commencing on January 1, 1979, coinciding with the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing, the PLA ceased its symbolic bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu. A new peace offensive was launched in 1981 by Marshal Ye Jianying, who had old KMT comrades-in-arms dating back from his days in the mid-1920s at a CCP- KMT cooperative endeavor: the Whampoa Military Academy in Guangdong Province. The core of Ye's nine-point proposal was what soon became known as the "one country, two systems" formula, whereby Taiwan could unify with the mainland while remaining autonomous and retaining its existing economic and social systems. While initially this proposal failed to elicit any tangible response from Taipei, the formula did provide the framework for a 1984 agreement between Beijing and London setting the return of Hong Kong. §4 Despite a legacy of rancor, China-Taiwan relations improved dramatically during the 1980s and early 1990s. Burgeoning economic interaction and crossstrait travel by individuals and groups during the 1980s evolved into direct quasiofficial negotiations between Beijing and Taipei by 1993.15 From Beijing's perspective, following the summit between the heads of the two- (p. 175) §1-quasigovernmental organs on neutral ground in Singapore, prospects for unification seemed the brightest in four decades. Unease at voices on the island calling for independence and initiatives abroad to raise Taiwan's international profile seemed relatively insignificant in the face of apparent continued progress toward unification. §2 Still some groups in China harbored a profound distrust of KMT leader and Taiwan President Lee and were very suspicions about U.S. motives. These sentiments appeared to be particularly strong within the military. The rhetoric of former or current U.S. officials seems to confirm suspicions. In July 1991, for example, only one month after stepping down as U.S. ambassador to Beijing, James R. Lilley spoke in support of a Taiwan separate of China during a visit to the island. Other U.S. officials, including leading congressional members of the U.S. foreign policy community, spoke in similar terms.16 President Yang Shangkun, speaking in October 1991, was adamant that "foreign forces [were] instigating Taiwan independence." He warned, "whoever plays with fire will perish with fire."17 At the time Yang was the leader of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG) and a vice chair of the CMC. A career soldier, Yang spoke words that indicate a high level of outrage over Taiwan. Almost identical warnings were given by Chinese leaders some four decades earlier, prior to China's entry into Korea, and some three decades earlier, preceding China's war with India.18 §3 In late 1992, PLA leaders were enraged by the announcement by President George Bush to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan.19 The soldiers pressed for a strong Chinese response in reports, memoranda, and high-level meetings, including CMC, Politburo, and National People's Congress (NPC) sessions, but Deng vetoed this. In May 1994, the National Defense University (NDU) and Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) cohosted a conference on Taiwan policy. Conference leaders drafted a letter to the Central Committee and the State Council urging that Foreign Minister Qian Qichen be dismissed. The president of the NDU and the director of the AMS reportedly blocked the letter.20 §4 Further military anger was directed at U.S. pressure over the Yinhe incident in 1994.21 In addition, U.S. adjustments in its dealings with Taiwan were perceived by PLA leaders as marking a significant change of policy. In all these matters, Deng reined in PLA leaders and their conservative civilian allies. He played a key balancing role on Taiwan policy and foreign policy more generally. But by 1995, Deng was ailing and no longer actively involved.22 PRC President Jiang's January 1995 "Eight Point Proposal" was widely deemed synonymous with the phrase "Chinese should not fight Chinese" and promptly labeled conciliatory. The overall alarmist tone of Jiang's address was overlooked, however. Jiang warned of forces on the island plotting independence (p. 176) §1-as well as "Certain foreign forces [that] have further meddled in the issue of Taiwan, interfering in China's internal affairs." Jiang intoned that Beijing had not renounced the use of force but that this was not aimed at Taiwan as such but "against the schemes of foreign forces to interfere in China's unification."23

In Chapter 3 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what is the man who started the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64)?

(p. 36) ... ¶4 The founder of the Taiping movement was Hong Xiuquan, a Hakka Chinese born and raised in Guangdon Province.88 Growing up just forty miles north of Guangzhou, Hong aspired to become a government official. Like all other candidates for this position. Hong read and memorized the Chinese classics to prepare for the government examination. He took the Imperial Examination for the first time at age 16 and failed. Later, when he was 24 he fried again, and then once more at age 25, failing both times.89 ¶5 Hong appears to have blamed himself for failing to pass the Imperial Examinations in 1828 and 1836, but in 1837, after his third failure, he fell ill. Later, Hong's Taiping followers claimed: "He died and came to life again after seven days."90 Other versions say that, for forty days, Hong was in a trance and had visions of God coming to him and appointing him supreme ruler of the world.91 During the next six years, Hong worked dutifully as a teacher. He continued his studied, but failed the Imperial Examinations for the fourth and- (p. 37) ¶1-final time in 1843, soon after Qing's defeat in the Opium War called their "mandate" into question by proving the Manchus' "military and political decadence."92 ¶2 After failing for the fourth time, Hong agrily vowed the devote his life to destroying evil. Coincidentally, this included overthrowing the Manchus. Hong converted to Christianity in June 1843, and was self-baptized. Since Hong was unable to read English, his main source of information on Christianity seems to have been a series of nine Chinese-language pamphlets by Minister Liang Fa. ALthough these pamphlets presented a somewhat simplified view of Christianity, Hong was convinced that they had been sent to him from heaven to reaffirm his earlier religious visions. ¶3 Following his convention, Hong immediately began to preach his views, and quickly converted two of his cousins--Feng Yunshan and Hong Ren'gan--both of whom had also failed the Imperial Examinations and, like Hong, sought a new path to social mobility by overthrowing the mancus. Feng Yunshun actually founded the religious organization that would develop into the Taipings, and he became their military leader.93 Hong Ren'gan stayed in Guangdong until the late 1850s, but when he arrived in Nanjing in 1859 he quickly became prominent as the political leader of the Taipings. ¶4 Hong Xiuquan's understanding of the Christian doctrine and organization was rudimentary. During 1847, he spent several months in a Baptist church in Guangzhou studying Christianity with the American missionary, I. J. Roberts. At this time HOng ws able to observe the workings of a Christian church firsthand. Hong and Roberts soon quarreled and parted company before HOng could be baptized. Meanwhile, in 1846, Feng Yunshan had undertaken to organize a group known as the Society of God-Worshipers (Bai SHangdi Hui). In August 1847, Hong took charge of this society.94 Basing their movement at Mt. Thistle, in Guangxi Province, during the summer of 1849, the Society of God-Worshipers evolved into a militant revolutionary movemnet. By 1851, this group had grown considerably. On 11 January 1851, Hong Xiuquan became Heavenly King, and he proclaimed the beginning of an anti-Manchu revolution. ¶5 ALthough Hong and the Taipings worshipped the Christian God, claimed to recognize Christ as the Savior, followed the Ten Commandments, and performed Baptism, they rejected the Trinity. Instead, the Taipings placed God at the top of a Confucian hierarchical system, with Jesus Christ second, and Hong third, since Hong proclaimed himself to be the younger brother of Jesus Christ. Later, after Hong's son was born, in traditional Chinese fashion he was made the adopted son of the childless Jesus, and he referred to Jesus as his "Heavenly Father" and to Hong simply as "Father." ¶6 The Taipings often cited the Bible, but Hong believed that he alone had the authority to direct religious affairs on Earth.95 His Christian ethics also incorporated many Confucian traits, such as supporting correct relations "between ruler and official, ruler and subject, father and son, brother and brother, husband and wife, etc." Because of their many unorthodox beliefs,- (p. 38) ¶1-the Taiping were early on described by one Catholic observer as a "militant Protestant offshoot burdened with unorthodox elements."96" (Ellemen 2007, 36-38)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, how prolific were guns in China during the fourteenth century?

(p. 66) "... Although guns were widely available in the struggle for supremacy in China during the mid-fourteenth century, they became a cornerstone of the Ming army only after the Ming conquest of China. Before the end of the fourteenth century, almost 10 percent of the army's 1.2-1.8 million soldiers were armed with guns. The capital's arsenals produced 3,000 cannon and 3,000 handguns annually from 1380 to 1488. These weapons were widely deployed and initially gave Ming armies an advantage over neighboring states that were not so armed. ..." (Lorge 2017, 66).

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, what was the turning point for Zhu Yuangzhang's campaign to found the Ming dynasty?

(p. 73) "... The turning point in Ming fortunes was Zhu Yuanzhang's decisive victory over Chen Youliang at Lake Poyang in 1363. Chen's newly rebuilt fleet sailed downstream, entered Lake Poyang, and laid siege to the city of Nanchang. His fleet was centered around massive three-decker ships with armored castles, each holding 2,000 to 3,000 men. These vessels were clearly designed to function as moving fortifications capable of dominating any other ship. His entire force was reportedly 300,000 men; while this was likely an exaggeration, even including the men on the smaller ships, it probably numbered more than 200,000 men. Even this enormous force could not rapidly overwhelm Nanchang, and with both sides making great use of firearms the siege ground on and on. After eighty-five days, Chen had already suffered a strategic defeat, and was anxious for a way out of the situation. He had presumably begun the campaign planning to capture Nanchang and, by so doing, lure Zhu Yuanzhang into a- (p. 74) -direct confrontation with his superior fleet. If Zhu showed up before the city fell, Chen might still have expected to defeat Zhu's fleet, and thus force the city to capitulate. Unfortunately for Chen, the city held out, and Zhu was preoccupied with internal matters. So, when the defenders offered a truce with a set surrender date, Chen accepted, even though he suspected that it was a play for time. Zhu finally arrived at the lake on August 28 with a reported 1,000 ships and 100,000 men. Once he had placed forts at the mouth of the lake to contain Chen's fleet, he sailed into a four-day naval battle that commenced the following day. With handguns, bows, and crossbows, the two fleets fired away at each other to little effect on the first day. The second day Zhu took advantage of a favorable wind and used gunpowderpacked fire ships to burn a proportion of Chen's close-packed ships. Several hundred warships were destroyed and 60,000 casualties inflicted, but Chen's fleet was still not broken. Meanwhile, a land force Zhu had dispatched earlier relieved the siege of Nanchang. Zhu could still not make much of an inroad against Chen's fleet, and he fell back to blockading positions on September 2. Had Chen immediately broken out of the lake, he might have recovered the initiative and at least dealt Zhu a serious naval defeat. As it was, it took Chen until October 3 before he broke out. Zhu managed to get upstream from Chen and send down fire ships before the two fleets closed and clumped into ship-to-ship combat. While this inconclusive fight continued, Chen was struck and killed by an arrow, handing Zhu an unexpectedly decisive victory. Chen's bad luck still did not prevent some of his fleet from returning home, and it took Zhu Yuanzhang until 1365, after a great deal of campaigning, to take control of Chen's former territories. It was finally Zhang Shicheng's turn in late December of 1366. Although the city of Hangzhou fell quickly before Zhu's 200,000-strong army, Zhang's capital at Suzhou would prove a different matter. Despite relatively weak fortifications, Suzhou held out for ten months. Zhu's army completely enclosed the city in a circumvallation, and pounded it with artillery. Ten months of firing resulted in that rare occurrence in Chinese city fortifications, a wall breach. Zhang was soon captured and the city, and the regime, fell." (Lorge 2017, 73-74)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, who was the general most closely associated with the successful suppression of the 'wokou'?

(p. 81) "Qi Jiguang is the general most closely associated with the successful suppression of the 'wokou', though several other men were equally important. Qi recorded his training and deployment system, making it clear how much Western handguns and cannon had become central to southern Chinese military methods. ..." (Lorge 2017, 81)

In chapter 4 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", in mid-September 1950, when the UNC troops under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur continued northward beyond the Thirty-Eighth Parallel toward the Yalu River, how did some soldiers, like Lin Biao, feel about China intervening in the Korean War?

(p. 87) §2 ... Some soldiers openly opposed China's involvement in a war on the Korean Peninsula. One such general was Lin Biao. §3 Lin Biao. Until very recently, Lin was in official disgrace. Many scholars agree that Lin was a shrewd and clever - if not brilliant - tactician who appeared to suffer from self-doubt and a "strong streak of pessimism."58 Although claims that he opposed Mao on Korea suggest character assassination, this stand is consistent both with what we know about Lin's character as well as circumstantial evidence, and is corroborated by many different sources.59 While one account speculates that Lin was "an enthusiastic proponent" of intervention in Korea, this view was based on fragmentary and faulty evidence and the erroneous assumption that Lin had served as the first commander of the CPV before being replaced by Peng in 1951.60 §4 The evidence suggests that Mao first asked Lin to command the CPV.61 An important question is why Mao waited so long before deciding to select Peng (on October 2), and waited several more days before actually asking him (on October 5). This delay is understandable if Mao had assumed that Lin would take the job but at the last minute begged off on grounds of ill health. Lin declined Mao's request to lead the CPV but left open the possibility of stepping in later if he recuperated quickly.62 Only in late September did Mao learn that Lin would not be available and spent two "days and nights" before selecting Peng. Mao apparently also considered selecting General Su Yu, who had been charged with masterminding the invasion of Taiwan, to lead the CPV.63 Chai, a military attache posted to the hastily activated Chinese embassy in Pyongyang, gives an account of a conversation with Lin in early September. §5 Chai had just returned with an ominous sounding report on the military situation in Korea indicating that while on the surface things appeared to favor the KPA, North Korean forces were overextended and would be particularly vulnerable to a sudden American counteroffensive. According to Chai, Lin asked him "bluntly": "If we don't dispatch troops and tell them [North Korea's leaders] to head for the mountains and wage guerilla warfare, would that be okay?"64 Mao reportedly told the October 2 Politburo meeting that, in a conversation several days earlier, Lin had raised serious doubts about the wisdom of (p. 88) §1-intervention. Indeed, Mao said, Lin insisted that involving the country in Korea would only hurt China.65 Foremost among Lin's concerns was the possibility that the United States would use nuclear weapons.66 Another account states that Lin opposed dispatching troops both at the Central Committee meeting chaired by Mao on October 4 and also at a meeting of the Central Military Commission chaired by Zhou two days later. At this second meeting, Lin reportedly declared: "The United States is highly modernized. Furthermore, it possesses the atomic bomb. There is no guarantee of achieving victory [against the United States]. The central leaders should consider this issue with great care."67 Zhou criticized Lin's attitude, saying the matter had already been decided. Zhou and Lin were eventually selected to go to the Soviet Union to facilitate arms transfers - the latter since Lin was already scheduled to travel there to receive medical treatment.68 §2 Lin's reaction to Mao's request that he command the Chinese forces in Korea contrasts dramatically with Peng's response. Lin, pleading illness, declined his superior's request. Many accounts report Lin "said he was ill" (shuo bing), or used sickness as "an excuse" (jiekou, jiegu, or tuoci). 69 It is likely that he was feigning illness to shirk duty in Korea, although it is also possible that he really was sick.70 The refusal to obey, which could have been considered insubordination, was necessarily couched in terms of poor health since this offered an honorable out, short of flat refusal. Despite Mao's polite phrasing, his "request" was actually an order. §3 Where the likelihood of character assassination comes into play is over the scornful tone of many accounts suggesting that Lin was using sickness as an excuse to avoid a difficult mission that he personally opposed. There is the clear inference in several accounts that Lin acted out of cowardice.71 Far from qualifying as shameful behavior, however, this was accepted face-saving etiquette for a senior official (military or civilian) strongly opposed to a major policy. From Mao's words and actions, he seemed to have believed Lin was really ill. Mao was deeply concerned and went so far as to order personally a top physician to treat Lin.72 Mao told the October 2 meeting of a conversation in which Lin insisted he was ill and suffered from insomnia. Lin was "afraid of wind, light, and noise, aiya!" Mao exclaimed. He continued: "he [Lin] has the three afraids - how could he possibly command troops!" Mao later recounted this story to Peng.73 §4 Indeed Lin, like several other military figures including PLA Chief of General Staff Xu, had a record of chronic ill health, and others, including Nie, suffered serious bouts of illness at different times, probably brought on by overwork.74 In the final analysis, Lin's affliction is best viewed as a "political illness" (zhengzhi bing), and this is the way many senior Chinese leaders (p. 89) §1-perceived it.75 Thus Lin's response was a convenient and time-honored excuse to avoid an escalation of intra-elite conflict over policy." (Scobell 2003, 87-89).

In chapter 4 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", in mid-September 1950, when the UNC troops under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur continued northward beyond the Thirty-Eighth Parallel toward the Yalu River, how did some field commanders feel about China intervening in the Korean War?

(p. 90) §3 ... many troop commanders in the prospective field of operations were deeply concerned about the nuts and bolts of the actual intervention. Their concerns reveal a large measure of doubt as to the wisdom of prompt intervention. At a meeting of commanders at and above the corps level in Shenyang on October 9, Peng and Gao explained Beijing's order to dispatch them to Korea. After the briefing, there was a chorus of concerns: ". . . various officers raised questions, they were most worried that troops were being sent abroad to fight without air support."85 General Liu Zhen, commander of the infant air arm of the CPV, stated candidly that after being appointed commander, he surveyed the years of his military career and acknowledged that while he had commanded infantry, artillery, and armored units, he had never commanded air units. Liu admitted air warfare and organization were a "mystery." He continued: "Neither I nor any of the other cadres had any experience organizing or commanding air combat operations and there was no shortage of problems." Liu Zhen also noted the obvious: ". . . in our levels of tactics and technology we were way, way below those of our enemy."86 Considering the enemy that China was facing and the paltry resources available, building an air force was a daunting task. Liu Zhen could only draw strength from the fact that the PLA had long struggled successfully against overwhelming odds learning military strategy, tactics, and combat through trial and error in battle. Liu Zhen recalled: "I nevertheless had a resolute thought running through my mind over and over again. The cause of- (p. 91) §1-the revolution had all along developed out of nothing, gone from small to big, developed as a brutal, difficult, death-defying struggle."87" (Scobell 2003, 90-91)

Yuan Shikai (Chinese: 袁世凱; pinyin: Yuán Shìkǎi; 16 September 1859 - 6 June 1916)

A Chinese military and government official who rose to power during the late Qing dynasty, and tried to save the dynasty with a number of modernization projects including bureaucratic, fiscal, judicial, educational, and other reforms. He established the first modern army and a more efficient provincial government in North China in the last years of the Qing dynasty before the abdication of the Xuantong Emperor, the last monarch of the Qing dynasty, in 1912. Through negotiation, he became the first official president of the Republic of China in 1912.[2] This army and bureaucratic control were the foundation of his autocratic rule as the first formal President of the Republic of China. He was frustrated in a short-lived attempt to restore monarchy in China, with himself as the Hongxian Emperor (Chinese: 洪憲皇帝). Evaluation and legacy Historians in China have considered Yuan's rule mostly negatively. He introduced far-ranging modernizations in law and social areas, and trained and organized one of China's first modern armies. But the loyalty Yuan had fostered in the armed forces dissolved after his death, undermining the authority of the central government. Yuan financed his regime through large foreign loans, and is criticized for weakening Chinese morale and international prestige, and for allowing the Japanese to gain broad concessions over China.[29] Jonathan Spence, however, notes in his influential survey that Yuan was "ambitious, both for his country and for himself", and that "even as he subverted the constitution, paradoxically he sought to build on late-Qing attempts at reforms and to develop institutions that would bring strong and stable government to China." To gain foreign confidence and end the hated system of extraterritoriality, Yuan strengthened the court system and invited foreign advisers to reform the penal system.[30] After Yuan's death, there was an effort by Li Yuanhong to revive the Republic by recalling the legislators who had been ejected in 1913, but this effort was confused and ineffective in asserting central control. Li lacked any support from the military. There was a short-lived effort in 1917 to revive the Qing dynasty led by the loyalist general Zhang Xun, but his forces were defeated by rival warlords later that year. After the collapse of Zhang's movement, all pretense of strength from the central government collapsed, and China descended into a period of warlordism. Over the next several decades, the offices of both the president and Parliament became the tools of militarists, and the politicians in Peking became dependent on regional governors for their support and political survival.[31] For this reason, Yuan is sometimes called "the Father of the Warlords". However, it is not accurate to attribute China's subsequent age of warlordism as a personal preference, since in his career as a military reformer he had attempted to forge a modern army based on the Japanese model. Throughout his lifetime, he demonstrated an understanding of staffing, military education, and regular transfers of officer personnel, combining these skills to create China's first modern military organisation. After his return to power in 1911, however, he seemed willing to sacrifice his legacy of military reform for imperial ambitions, and instead ruled by a combination of violence and bribery that destroyed the idealism of the early Republican movement. In the CCTV Production Towards the Republic, Yuan is portrayed through most of his early years as an able administrator, although a very skilled manipulator of political situations. His self-proclamation as Emperor is largely depicted as being influenced by external forces, especially that of his son, prince Yuan Keding. A bixi (stone tortoise) with a stele in honor of Yuan Shikai, which was installed in Anyang's Huanyuan Park soon after his death, was (partly) restored in 1993.[32]

Zheng Chenggong, Prince of Yanping (27 August 1624 - 23 June 1662), better known internationally by his Hokkien honorific Koxinga or Coxinga (Chinese: 國姓爺; pinyin: Guóxìngyé; Pe̍h-ōe-jī: Kok-sèng-iâ)

A Chinese Ming loyalist who resisted the Qing conquest of China in the 17th century, fighting them on China's southeastern coast. In 1661, Koxinga defeated the Dutch outposts on Formosa,and established a dynasty, the House of Koxinga, which ruled the island as the Kingdom of Tungning from 1661 to 1683.

The Battle of Muye or Mu (c. 1046 BC)

A battle fought in ancient China between the Zhou and Shang. The Zhou victory led to the Shang being replaced and subsequently justified the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. The victory of the Zhou led to the fall of the Shang. Background By the 12th century BC, Shang influence extended west to the Wei Rivervalley, a region that was occupied by clans known as the Zhou. King Wen of Zhou, the ruler of the Zhou, who was a Shang vassal, was given the title "Count of the West" by the King Di Xin of Shang (King Zhòu). Di Xin used King Wen to guard his rear while he was involved in a south-eastern campaign. Eventually Di Xin, fearing King Wen's growing power, imprisoned him. Although Wen was later released, the tension between Shang and Zhou grew. Wen prepared his army, and conquered a few smaller states which were loyal to Shang, slowly weakening Shang's allies. However, King Wen died in 1050 BC before Zhou's actual offensive against Shang. Di Xin paid very little attention to these, as he viewed himself as the rightful ruler of China, a position appointed by the heavens, or perhaps because he was becoming engrossed with his personal life with his beautiful consort Daji, to the exclusion of all else. King Wen's son King Wu of Zhou led the Zhou in a revolt a few years later. The reason for this delay was because King Wu believed that the "heavenly order" to conquer Shang had not been given and plus with the advice of Jiang Ziya to wait for the right opportunity. Chinese civilians greatly supported King Wu's rebellion. In legend, Di Xin, initially, had been a good ruler. But after he married Daji, he became a ruthless ruler. Many called for the end of the Shang dynasty. Battle With Jiang Ziya as the strategist, King Wu of Zhou led an army of about 50,000. Di Xin's army was at war in the east, but he still had about 530,000 men to defend the capital city of Yin. But to further secure his victory, he gave weapons to about 170,000 slaves to protect the capital. These slaves did not want to fight for the corrupt Shang dynasty, and defected to the Zhou army instead. This event greatly lowered the morale of the Shang troops. When engaged, many Shang soldiers did not fight and held their spears upside down, as a sign that they no longer wanted to fight for the corrupt Shang. Some Shang soldiers joined the Zhou outright. Still, many loyal Shang troops fought on, and a very bloody battle followed, which is described in the Shijing (poem #236), as translated by James Legge: The troops of Yin-shang, Were collected like a forest, And marshalled in the wilderness of Mu. ... 'God is with you, ' [said Shang-fu to the king], 'Have no doubts in your heart. ' The wilderness of Mu spread out extensive ; Bright shone the chariots of sandal ; The teams of bays, black-maned and white-bellied, galloped along ; The grand-master Shang-fu, Was like an eagle on the wing, Assisting king Wu, Who at one onset smote the great Shang. That morning's encounter was followed by a clear bright [day]. The Zhou troops were much better trained, and their morale was high. In one of the chariot charges, King Wu broke through the Shang's defense line. Di Xin was forced to flee to his palace, and the remaining Shang troops fell into further chaos. The Zhou were victorious and showed little mercy to the defeated Shang, shedding enough blood "to float a log". Aftermath After the battle Di Xin adorned himself with many valuable jewels then lit a fire and burned himself to death in his palace on the Deer Terrace Pavilion. King Wu killed Daji after he found her with the order to execute him given by Jiang Ziya. Shang officials were released without charge with some later working as Zhou officials. The imperial rice store was opened immediately after the battle to feed the starving population. The battle marked the end of the Shang dynasty and the beginning of the Zhou dynasty. Notes Although the day and month on which the Battle of Muye was fought are certain, there is doubt about the year.[2] For more, see the article on the Xia-Shang-Zhou chronology project. References Citations ^ Cambridge History of Ancient China, p. 233. ^ Wu, note 40, 319 and note 41, 320 Bibliography Wu, K. C. (1982). The Chinese Heritage. New York: Crown Publishers. ISBN 0-517-54475-X.

According to the Han dynasty historian Sima Qian, why did the last Shang King invite so much rebellion?

According to the Han dynasty historian Sima Qian, the last Shang king [Di Xin or Shang Zhou 商紂 - not the 周 of Zhou dynasty] was a terrible despot, draining his empire to satiate his appetite for wine and women. He roasted some critics alive and turned others into mincemeat.

What was the origin of the Canton Trade System?

Accordingly, local Chinese authorities in Canton adopted an "Accommodationist" strategy designed to satisfy European craving for Chinese goods while minimizing contact. This was the origin of the Canton Trade System Almost all maritime trade approached China from the south, so as early as the 12th century Canton emerged as a major port It was also far from the capital, allowing the Qing to keep the importunate barbarians at arm's length It was also thought to be easily defensible, in case the seafaring nomads resorted to raiding once again. In the mid-18thcentury the Qing decided to restrict all European trade to Canton.

What brought the First Opium War to an end(4 September 1839 - 29 August 1842)?

After 2 years of intermittent fighting, the British fleet sailed up the Yangzi and threatened the old imperial capital at Nanjing, forcing the Qing to sue for peace. Signed in 1842, the Treaty of Nanjing was the first of the Unequal Treaties to be imposed on China by a foreign power. Many more would follow ...

How did Qin Shi Huangdi deal with barbarians, both north and south of his position?

After the final battles of the Warring States era and the founding of the Qin dynasty in 221 BCE, Qin Shi Huangdi launched his armies southwards, conquering large territories in south China and northern Vietnam inhabited by southern "barbarians". But he also sent armies northwards to do battle with the steppe peoples who were starting to press on the northern settlements. The famous general Meng Tian was successful in driving the nomads back, and he oversaw construction of the first 1400 mile long Great Wall to keep them at bay. But this was only the beginning, for the steppe peo

What does Alastair Johnston argue influences China's current strategic decision-making?

Alastair Johnston argues that China's current strategic decision-making is indeed influenced by historical/cultural experience, but he warns that this "Strategic Culture" is not the Confucian one claimed by Chinese leaders. Instead, it is a Parabellum culture that was shaped by China's own historical experience with anarchic interstate competition. Johnston relegates the Confucian culture to the realm of discourse, labeling it an "idealized" strategic culture that does not have much bearing on actual decisions.

What was the Shang kings basis of power?

Although cloaked in religious authority, the Shang kings' power was ultimately based on military strength.

Henry Alfred Kissinger (/ˈkɪsɪndʒər/;[1] German: [ˈkɪsɪŋɐ]; born Heinz Alfred Kissinger; May 27, 1923)

An American elder statesman, political scientist, diplomat, and geopolitical consultant who served as United States Secretary of State and National Security Advisor under the presidential administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. A Jewish refugee who fled Nazi Germany with his family in 1938, he became National Security Advisor in 1969 and U.S. Secretary of State in 1973. For his actions negotiating a ceasefire in Vietnam, ___________ received the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize under controversial circumstances, with two members of the committee resigning in protest.[2] ___________ later sought, unsuccessfully, to return the prize after the ceasefire failed.[3][4] A practitioner of Realpolitik, __________ played a prominent role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, orchestrated the opening of relations with the People's Republic of China, engaged in what became known as shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East to end the Yom Kippur War, and negotiated the Paris Peace Accords, ending American involvement in the Vietnam War. _________ has also been associated with such controversial policies as U.S. involvement in a military coup in Chile, a "green light" to Argentina's military junta for their Dirty War, and U.S. support for Pakistan during the Bangladesh War despite the genocide being perpetrated by his allies.[5] After leaving government, he formed Kissinger Associates, an international geopolitical consulting firm. ___________ has been a prolific author of books on diplomatic history and international relations with over one dozen books authored. He remains a controversial figure in American history. Some journalists, political activists and human rights lawyers have condemned __________ as a war criminal.[6][7][8] According to a 2014 survey by Foreign Policy magazine 32.21% of "America's top International Relations scholars" considered __________ the most effective U.S. Secretary of State since 1965. SOURCE: 2. Feldman, Burton (2001). The Nobel Prize: A History Of Genius, Controversy, and Prestige. Arcade Publishing. p. 16. ISBN 978-1-55970-537-0. 3. Dommen, Arthur (2002). The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Indiana University Press. p. 878. ISBN 9780253109255. 4. Takeyh, Ray (June 13, 2016). "The Perils of Secret Diplomacy". The Weekly Standard. Retrieved June 28, 2016. 5. Bass, Gary (September 21, 2013). "Blood Meridian". The Economist. Retrieved February 13, 2016. 6. Rohter, Larry (March 28, 2002). "As Door Opens for Legal Actions in Chilean Coup, Kissinger Is Numbered Among the Hunted". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved December 14, 2015. 7. "Protesters Heckle Kissinger, Denounce Him for 'War Crimes'". The Times of Israel. January 30, 2015. Retrieved December 14, 2015.

Why are armies so conservative?

Armies have traditionally been seen as "temples of ancestor worship" and are frequently criticized for "training to fight the last war instead of the next one." These observations reflect the tendency for armies And navies to cling to tradition and tested technology even when circumstances favor change. Given the high stakes involved in war this conservatism is perhaps understandable - the businessman gambles with his fortune, but the soldier gambles with his life. Armies can evolve, embracing new forms of organization, new technology, and new ways of fighting [doctrine] - but it is never a smooth process.

What was Guan Zhong's view on the connection between wealth and power?

Guan Zhong was one of the earliest Chinese statesmen to realize the connection between wealth and power. He made this connection explicit: "Being complete in preparations is the source of victory. ... By being sure to calculate your wealth, you will be victorious. By being sure of the direction of your expenditures, you will be victorious. ... Exchange materials in accordance with the areas where they are produced, then weapons will be well prepared." In other words, pay attention to your revenue stream. You need a strong economy to sustain a powerful military, AND a powerful military to protect a strong economy.

For Sunzi, what governs the planning prior to battle?

In planning, caution is the order of the day: "In antiquity those who excelled in warfare first made themselves unconquerable in order to await the moment when the enemy could be conquered. Being unconquerable lies within yourself; being conquerable lies with the enemy. Thus one who excels in warfare is able to make himself unconquerable, but cannot necessarily cause the enemy to be conquerable."

What was the attitude toward the Canton Trade System and the Chinese that was growing among Westerners?

Macartney knew what the Chinese refused to admit: isolation was no longer an option! As the industrial revolution took off, European traders were becoming more aggressive. A growing sense of nationalism coupled with an awareness of their technological superiority led foreigners to show less patience in dealing with the Chinese and their irritating regulations. In particular, Westerners were frustrated by the unwillingness of the Chinese to lift restrictions on trade and establish diplomatic relations (the two demands were seen as related - how could they negotiate free trade when they could not even talk to the Chinese on the basis of parity?)

Who were the most vocally anti-military, and why?

Of all the Chinese, the most vocally anti-military were the scholar officials. These men of letters looked on the military commanders with both jealousy and fear. They feared the military men because of their power, and they were jealous of their influence at court. In almost every dynasty, scholar-officials went out of their way to marginalize military officials. They were mocked for their crude ways and lack of literary skills, and accused of incompetence at every turn. But the reality was that these attitudes reflected deep-seated fear of praetorianism, warlordism, and the dangers associated with aggressive military policies. Since it was the scholar-officials who wrote the history of China, this anti-military bias was reflected in the official histories. Victories and defeats were duly noted, but the dynastic histories cannot be described as "celebrations" of military prowess!

What factor that drove European military innovation was missing in China?

On the other hand, European military innovation was driven by the almost relentless warfare in the period between 1500 and 1815. With the exception of brief interregnum wars, China's only rivalry during this same period was with technologically primitive nomads, bandits, pirates, and rebels. In the absence of technologically sophisticated rivals who could necessitate REACTIVE or PROACTIVE innovation, we should not be surprised that China was woefully unprepared for the Western onslaught in the 19th century.

According to Clausewitz, how important are "the concept" of "Will" and Means"?

SIDE A: Means x Will VS. SIDE B: Means x Will Acknowledging the importance of morale in war - both military and civilian - Clausewitz argues that WILL must be added to MEANS in calculating the probability of victory. This was one of the lessons of the Napoleonic era - an aroused citizenry can be a force multiplier, while a despondent or demoralized populace can erode one's strength. Moreover, national/ethnic hatred can sustain an irrational war beyond its logical lifespan.

What do the 3 answers to the 3 questions proposed by Johnston make up?

The 3 answers that together allegedly make up a Confucian Strategic Paradigm all contribute to the Confucian idea of JUST or RIGHTEOUS WAR (yibing or yizhan -義兵 or 義戰-jus ad bellum).

How did many key PLA military figures feel the Korean Intervention? How did Mao respond?

The Korean Intervention was not supported by many key military figures. Some felt it was a distraction from the planned campaign against Taiwan, while others felt it was too dangerous to confront the US military. Mao overruled all objections and insisted on the intervention. But some of the military objections were based on real concerns about the readiness of PLA forces to engage in a winter campaign against US forces outside of China. The PLA would not be able to use guerrilla warfare against the US - this would be a conventional struggle, and the US was no Chiang Kai-shek! But Mao was adamant, and the intervention went ahead. Mao was seemingly undeterred by the prospect of a direct clash with the US, and he pushed the reluctant generals to take action.

How did the PLA's operational doctrine fair during the Great Leap Forward?

The PLA's operational doctrine also fell victim to factional politics. In the aftermath of Mao's failed policies in the Great Leap Forward General Peng Dehuai dared to criticize him - this led to Peng being purged and replaced as commander of the PLA by Lin Biao. Many others who supported Soviet-style modernization were also purged with Peng.

What did the Zhou army consist of? Where did they get their numbers?

The Zhou army consisted of chariots and foot soldiers provided by other disaffected Shang vassals and Zhou allies. The Shang had become increasingly oppressive, demanding higher tribute from its vassals and allies, which drove many of them over to the Zhou.

King Wen of Zhou (Chinese: 周文王; pinyin: Zhōu Wén Wáng; 1112 - 1050 BC, the Civilizing King)

The count of Zhou during the late Shang dynasty in ancient China. Although it was his son Wu who conquered the Shang following the Battle of Muye, Count Wen was posthumously honored as the founder of the Zhou dynasty and titled King. A large number of the hymns of the Classic of Poetry are praises to the legacy of King Wen. Some consider him the first epic hero of Chinese history.[1][2] Born Ji Chang (姬昌), Wen was the son of Tairen and Ji Jili, the count of a small state along the Wei River in present-day Shaanxi. Jili was betrayed and executed by the Shang king Wen Ding in the late 12th century BC, leaving the young Chang as the count of Zhou. Wen married Taisi and fathered ten sons and one daughter by her, plus at least another eight sons with concubines. At one point, King Zhou of Shang, fearing Wen's growing power, imprisoned him in Youli (present-day Tangyin in Henan) after he was slandered by the Marquis of Chong.[3] His eldest son, Bo Yikao, went to King Zhou to plead for his freedom, but was executed in a rage by lingchi and made into meat cakes which were fed to his father in Youli. However, many officials - namely and notably San Yisheng and Hong Yao - respected Wen for his honorable governance and gave King Zhou so many gifts - including gold, horses, and women - that he released Wen, and also bestowed him his personal weapons and invested him with the special rank of Count of the West. In retribution, Wen offered a piece of his land in Western Luo to King Zhou, who in turn allowed Wen to make one last request. He requested that the Burning Pillar punishment be abolished, and so it was. Subsequently, upon returning home Wen secretly began to plot to overthrow King Zhou. In his first year as Count of the West, he settled a land dispute between the states of Yu and Rui, earning greater recognition among the nobles. It is by this point that some nobles began calling him "king". The following year, Wen found Jiang Ziyafishing in the Pan River and hired him as a military counsellor. He also repelled an invasion of the Quanrong barbarians and occupied a portion of their land. The following year, he campaigned against Mixu, a state whose chief had been harassing the smaller states of Ruan and Gong, thus annexing the three of them. The following year, he attacked Li, a puppet of Shang, and the year latter he attacked E, a rebel state opposed to Shang, conquering both. The following year he attacked Chong, home of Hu, Marquis of Chong, his arch-enemy, and defeated it, gaining access to the Ford of Meng through which he could cross his army to attack Shang. By then he had obtained about two thirds of the whole kingdom either as direct possessions or sworn allies. That same year he moved his capital city one hundred kilometers east from Mount Qi to Feng, placing the Shang under imminent threat. The following year, however, the Count of the West died before he could cross the Ford to accomplish his end. Four years from this, his second son, known as King Wu, followed his footsteps and crushed the Shang at Muye, founding the Zhou dynasty.[4] The name "Wen" means "the Cultured" or "the Civilizing" and was made into an official royal name by King Wu in honor of his father.

What is a centrifugal force?

The force that takes things from center and spins them away (tears things apart).

Where did the name "Shang Zhou" come from?

The name "Zhou" comes from the latter part of the horse saddle that stopped the saddle from sliding across the horse's spine, and which would be covered in feces.

How effective were Mao Zedong's tactics?

There remains some question as to who was the real architect of the guerrilla strategy - Mao or Zhu De - but its effectiveness cannot be denied, for it allowed the Communists to defeat the first three encirclement campaigns launched by Chiang. 410

Just how pervasive is the Confucian notion of just war?

This idea is still very pervasive. When China invaded Vietnam, they used the language of Confucius to justify this.

The Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors

Two groups of mythological rulers or deities in ancient northern China who in later history have been assigned dates in a period from circa 2852 BC to 2070 BC. Today they may be considered culture heroes.[1] The dates of these mythological figures may be fictitious, but according to some accounts and reconstructions, they preceded the Xia Dynasty (which itself is prehistoric, without writing, and which is likewise also documented only in much later written sources). Description The Three Sovereigns, sometimes known as the Three August Ones, were said to be god-kings, demigods or god emperors[3] who used their abilities to improve the lives of their people and impart to them essential skills and knowledge. The Five Emperors are portrayed as exemplary sages who possessed great moral character and lived to a great age and ruled over a period of great peace. The Three Sovereigns are ascribed various identities in different Chinese historical texts. These kings are said to have helped introduce the use of fire, taught people how to build houses and invented farming. The Yellow Emperor's wife is credited with the invention of silk culture. The discovery of medicine, the invention of the calendar and Chinese script are also credited to the kings. After their era, Yu the Great founded the Xia Dynasty.[2] According to a modern theory with roots in the late 19th century, the Yellow Emperor is supposedly the ancestor of the Huaxia people.[4] The Mausoleum of the Yellow Emperorwas established in Shaanxi Province to commemorate the ancestry legend.[4] The Chinese word for emperor, huángdì (皇帝), derives from this, as the first user of this title Qin Shi Huang considered his reunion of all of the lands of the former Kingdom of Zhou to be greater than even the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors. SOURCES: 1 Hucker, Charles (1995). China's Imperial Past: An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture. Stanford University Press. p. 22. ISBN 9780804723534. 2 Morton, W. Scott; Lewis, Charlton M. (2005). China: its history and culture. McGraw-Hill. p. 14. ISBN 978-0-07-141279-7. 3 Eliade, Mircea; Adams, Charles J., eds. (1987). The Encyclopedia of religion. 9, Liu-Mith. Macmillan. p. 133. 4 王恆偉 (2005). Zhongguo li shi jiang tang #1 Yuan gu zhi Chun Qiu 中國歷史講堂 #1 遠古至春秋 [Chinese History Lectures #1: Ancient times to Spring and Autumn period]. 中華書局. p. 13. ISBN 962-8885-24-3.

What is unsolicitated technological change?

Unsolicited technological change: new technology NOT developed specifically to address a particular military need. Often the product of research conducted by people outside of the military establishment, this type of technology poses a creative problem for soldiers, who are often slow to appreciate the military implications of the new technology.

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the Guiding Principles of External Security of "Active Defense"?

§4 Active Defense. The idea of "active defense" (jiji fangyu) is a more recent concept in chinese strategic thought. This concept crops up frequently in spoken and written material by Chinese strategic thinkers -- it is mentioned in the 1995 interview with Liu quoted previously, for example. While Johnson dismisses active defense as mere propaganda,118 the strategy appears to have real significance. In fact, active defense was a key guiding principle in Mao's day, in Deng's time, and remains important at the dawn of the twenty-first century.119 Indeed, it figures prominently in China's 1998, 2000, and 2002 Defense White Papers. §5 In 1957, then Defense Minister Peng Dehuai explained China's attachment to active defense: ... in military matters our country has had a guiding principle of strategic defense, not a guiding principle of launching strategic offensives. This kind of defense, however, ought not be passive defense; instead, it should- (p. 35) §1-be guided by the strategic principle of active defense. ... Our country's nature, mission, and foreign policy all very clearly show our strategic guiding principle should be defensive.120 According to Deng "... active defenses is not merely defense per se, but includes defensive offensives. Active defense includes our going out, so that if we are attacked we will certainly counter attack."121 §2 Senior Colonel Wang Naiming explains: [active defense] ... emphasizes that the nature of our military strategy is defensive, but also active in requirements. It requires the organic integration of offense and defense, and achieving the strategic goal of defense by active offense; when the conditions are ripe, the strategic defense should be led [sic] to counterattack and offense.122 §3 This "organic integration" between offense and defense is very much consistent with the idea of "absolute flexibility" (quanbian) highlighted by Johnston.123 In a real sense, then, the line between offense and defense is blurred. In the final analysis, "Active defense strategy does not acknowledge the difference ... between defense and offense."124 In fact, according to a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences, active defense does not rule out a first strike: "Our strategic principle of 'striking only after the enemy has struck' certainly does not exclude sudden 'first strikes' in campaign battles or counterattacks in self-defense into enemy territory."125 Peng articulated the logic of such a move in the late 1950s: Launching a war first offensively against another country is in violation of our country's nature, mission, and our foreign policy fundamentals. ... Under the strategic guiding principle of active defense, are we permitted to gain the initiative by striking first? That is to say, when we are to expecting an imminent large-scale offensive attack by the enemy against our country, are we permitted to act first and launch an offensive strike against enemy territory or not? We may consider this unacceptable. Yet, in such a situation, the chief criminal culprit is the enemy who originally schemed to launch the war. The peace loving people of the entire world can only be suddenly threatened if the enemy is allowed to instigate war. However, if we don't wait for the enemy to move first, then we can strike first offensively into enemy territory. In this case our war in defense of the motherland would be completely just. ... Peng cited China's intervention in Korea against the United States as an example.126" (Scobell 2003, 34-35).

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what was the Confucian doctrine regarding war?

"Confucian doctrine saw war as a necessary evil. Military force had to be used to resist invasion, suppress rebellion, and reunify China after periods of division. Confucian officials were not reluctant to use military power on such occasions; indeed, one recent study argues that force was the preferred option when circumstances were right. 1 The military skills of chariotry and archery were two of the six skills of a Confucian gentleman. Yet when Duke Ling ofWei asked Confucius about military tactics, Confucius denied any knowledge of the subject, and he left the next day (Analects 15.1). The ideal was the monarch who had received the Mandate of Heaven because of his virtue and who ruled through ritual and moral example. War was necessary because barbarians and "petty people" (xiaoren) among the Chinese could not be ruled through such ideal- (p. 23) -means. Understandably, the Confucian tradition had no place for the ideas of conquest, expansion, and imperial rule over subject peoples that were driving forces in, for example, Roman and Ottoman Turkish history. Emperors who seemed to enjoy war and conquest too much were usually opposed by their officials and/or condemned by history (examples include Qin Shi Huangdi, Han Wudi, Sui Yangdi, Tang Taizong, and Ming Yongle), while emperors who decisively moved from war to peace, and from military (wu) to civil (wen) values (such as Han Gaozu and Song Taizu) were correspondingly praised. Nor, as the aftermath of the early Ming naval expeditions demonstrates, was there ever any prospect of commerce-driven overseas colonial expansion, even though Ming China had both the economic development and the nautical technology to be a major player in the creation of colonial empires through seapower had Confucian values permitted such activity." (Dreyer 2012, 22-23).

"The rebellion was led by a small group of visionary peasant rebels, the chief of whom was a man named Hong Xiuquan. Hong belonged to the Hakka minority of south China, a people who had migrated from north China centuries before. Although ethnically Han Chinese, the Hakkas spoke a dialect distinct from those of the native southerners. Often meeting with hostility and discrimination, they maintained a strong sense of identity and tended to dwell in their own separate communities. Hong followed the traditional career path in his youth by diligently preparing for the imperial examinations. Four times he traveled from his home village in Guangdong province to the southern metropolis of Canton (Guangzhou) to take the exam, and four times he failed. Amid enormous anguish and frustration, Hong encountered Protestant missionaries in Guangzhou; their proselytizing literature would provide him with a powerful Christian vision as the ideological basis of the Taiping Rebellion. With his hopes of pursuing a position as a scholar-official dashed, Hong started to organize rebellious forces in neighboring Guangxi province, where years of arduous preaching and secret recruiting among the Hakka communities resulted in a major eruption in 1850, the year that marked the beginning of the momentous Taiping Rebellion. The armed revolt against the Qing government began on Hong Xiuquan's thirty-seventh birthday, January 11, 1850. At a gigantic birthday feast in Jintian village, Guangxi, Hong virtually declared war against the Qing dynasty in front of tens of thousands of his followers. Immediately Hong and his Taiping rebels started to seize nearby county governments, mobilizing new recruits along the way, and rapidly became a nightmare for the ruling regime." (Yu 2012, 135)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the role of human sacrifice in the Shang dynasty?

"Under the Shang dynasty human sacrifice had been a regular institution closely linked to military activities. Excavations have revealed the mass execution of slaves or prisoners to "accompany" the deceased Shang rulers, and the oracle records contain many divinations regarding the sacrifice of members of non-Shang states or tribes. The hundreds of bodies discovered in some royal tombs were probably prisoners taken in- (p. 27) -warfare, and it is even possible that some campaigns were fought solely for the purpose of obtaining these sacrificial victims. Combat was tied to the service of the cult of the dead, and military success was clearly manifested in the scale of human sacrifice." (Lewis 1990, 26-27)

What is the Weniad?

"Weniad" is the name sometimes given to the epic tale of how the Zhou overthrew the Shang. This is a archetypal saga of how good triumphs over evil in order to restore harmony to all under heaven. It is also an example of the role played by military power in bringing about dynastic change.

In Chapter Two of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the second, and thus wider, new meaning of the term "bond"

(p. 70) ... ¶3 The second new aspects of bonds was their role in general theoires of the constitution of human society through ties consciously created by rulers. If the bond was originally the text of an oath, then it was the same as a shi, which likewise signified the words of a covenant. Indeed, the Shuo wen jie zi states, " 'Oath' (shi) means a 'bond' (yue shu ...)," and the two characters were frequently joined in a synonym compound.72[72.] So the two characters could act as synonyms meaning "the words or text of an oath." ¶4 However, the term "bond" also developed a much wider meaning. As the institution of bonds became the primary mode of establishing political ties and obligations, ritualists and philosophers increasingly used the word as a verb to signify any deliberate creation of links between men or objects. This usage extended the blood oath from its defined social functions to a model or prototype of all social ties. In this more general, verbal sense it often appeared in the compound yue xin- (p. 71) ¶1 ... "to bind trust," i.e., to establish relations of good faith and mutual trust between men. Thus the standard formulation of the distinction between oath and covenant states: "When they bind trust [yue xin] it is called an "oath," and in the presence of a sacrifice it is called a "covenant."73[73.]" Yue in this general sense also appears several times in the Lun yu as the defining function or characteristic of ritual.74[74.] Since in Confucius's thought "ritual" referred to teh rules and principles that ideally guided all human action and made possible a human existence, the definition of the role as ritual as "yue" suggests that the institutions of bonds was becoming synonymous with the possibility of a human community. In this role they were often identified with the power of the ruler to hold men together. ¶2 The encompassing sense of yue as the general term for all consciously created human ties also figures in several appeals to the previous existence or possibility of a "natural" society in which men assumed the good faith of their fellows without institutionalized pledges. Thus a passage in the Lü Shi chun qiu says: "In ancient times worthy masters employed any means in seeking as servants men who had the Way, and men who had the Way and desired to serve would do anything to seek out a worthy master. Only when they found one another were they happy. Without planning they were like relatives, and without bonds they trusted one another.75[75.] Warring States Confucians often linked bonds, perhaps because of their association with legal codes, to the rule of force and guile characteristic of the hegemons, and they contrasted this negatively with the moral rule of the true king.76[76.] The Zhuangzi argued that bonds were like glue or ropes used to hold an object together, but the true sage did not divide things and thus had no need to bind them back together.77[77.] In all these passages yue has the sense of any bonds consciously formed between men. ¶3 In his discussion of the "rectification of names" Xun Kuang identified bonds as the basis of all social ties and linked this with their linguistic nature. He argued that the pinnacle of government could be attained only through holding the "bonds of names" and later elaborated: Names have no fixed suitability, so you must bind them by command. When the bonds are fixed and customs established,- (p. 72) -then we call them suitable, and that which differs from the bonds is called unsuitable. Names have no fixed content, so you must bind then by command. When the bonds are fixed and customs established, then we may call them "[content-]full names".78[78.] Language, the basis of the very possibility of human sociability, became feasible only when words had fixed, common meanings, and these were established by the bonds imposed by the ruler to hold men together in a community of shared definitions." (Lewis 1990, 70-72).

Siemens AG

A German conglomerate company headquartered in Berlin and Munich and the largest industrial manufacturing company in Europe with branch offices abroad.

How did the Japanese work in Manchuria from 1931-1935?

After taking Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese formed puppet regimes in the northwest in 1933, and forced the Chinese to demilitarize the northern provinces in 1935. Japanese aggression distracted Chiang from his anti-CCP campaigns. The public could not understand why he was intent on killing other Chinese when the Japanese were the real problem.

How did Chiang Kai-shek emerge from the War of Resistance (1937 - 1945)?

Chiang's army had been seriously weakened by the war, and the government had lost control of the northern half of China. The CCP had taken advantage of the war to build up its strength in the north, and was now in a position to expand into the areas vacated by the departing Japanese. Mao simply switched his sights to Chiang, and prepared to resume the CCP-KMT civil war. His strategy against Chiang was a logical continuation of his Protracted War against Japan.

So what does the fact that China failed to maintain its technological edge all mean?

As Lorge argues, the real puzzle is why China failed to maintain its technological edge. As we have seen, the answer lies in the forces that drive military innovation. While the Chinese possessed the institutional structures necessary to use gunpowder weapons on a large scale, they lacked rivals with similar capacities. The period of greatest development was the Song, a time when China was under serious threat from sophisticated enemies like the Sinicized Jurchen-Jin and the Mongols, both of whom used gunpowder. But from the Ming onwards there was little incentive to modernize, so change was glacial or nonexistent. This left China unprepared for the new threat from the other side of the globe.

How did Chiang kai-shek differ from his warlord enemies?

Chiang was a little more like his warlord enemies than he thought. Once Sun died in 1925, he quickly used his control over the Party army to seize control of the KMT itself, and by 1926 he was the Generalissimo -the supreme commander of the Nationalist Revolutionary movement.

What happened to Chinese naval technology after the 15th century?

Chinese naval technology never evolved in any significant way after the 15th century. Warships (or "junks") were primarily used for coastal patrols, and operated as troopships with limited firepower. Shipboard firearms were mainly antipersonnel, not anti-ship. Tactics were focused on closing with the enemy, sweeping their deck with shot, and then boarding them for a hand-to-hand battle. They were not prepared for the European way of fighting, where ships stood off and engaged in broadsides aimed at crippling or sinking the enemy.

How does Clausewitz start his description of war?

Clausewitz started by describing the abstract nature of war as absolute violence. Since war was "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will", it "follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigor in the application of force". In other words, "The essence of war is violence. Moderation in war is imbecility. Hit first! Hit hard! And hit anywhere!"

How did Confucius explain the chaos and disorder in society? What was the way to deal with this situation?

Confucius also realized that humans were fallible creatures, and he saw most people as being driven by greed and self-interest. But these "petty men" (Xiao Ren 小人) could be led back to the proper "path" (the Dao 道). Men of superior virtue would have to take the lead in transforming society. These "superior men" (Jun Zi 君子), possessed all of the following Confucian virtues: •Ren - humanity 仁 Xiao - filial piety 孝 • Yi - righteousness 義 Zhong - loyalty 忠 • Xin - trustworthiness 信 Jing- respectfulness 敬 • Lian - integrity 廉 Shu - reciprocity 恕 In sum, "The Superior Man thinks of righteousness, the Petty Man of profit!" In any situation, the Superior Man acts in accordance with propriety and righteousness.

How did Confucius' view of his "superior man" influence what he taught his disciples?

Confucius modelled his "superior man" on the Zhou nobility, who were in a time before the separation of wen (civil power) and wu (martial power). As such, Confucius believed that a "superior man" should be a master of administration AND warfare. His disciples studied archery and charioteering in order to prepare themselves for any eventuality, for he believed that the Superior Man had to be ready to use force when confronted by evil. Moreover, if compelled to use force, he had no doubt about the outcome: "If fight, then I will prevail! ["我戰則克" Book of Rites]

According to Professor Green, what are some of the key facts of Confucius overall lifespan?

Confucius was born in the state of Lu around 551 BCE and died around 479, so he lived during the final years of the Spring and Autumn era. We either know a great deal about him, or nothing at all, depending on how credible the early Chinese sources are. It is thought he was a member of the minor nobility (the shi士), and that his father had served in the military. At the very least, his level of education indicates that he came from a family of means. Given his high education and aristocratic background, it is perhaps not surprising that Confucius (Kong Qiu 孔丘 or Kong Fu Zi 孔夫子) aspired to high office.

What kind of radical reforms did Guan Zhong, and other like-minded reformers, advocate?

Guan Zhong was only the first of many Chinese statesmen who pushed through radical reforms aimed at strengthening the power of the state and the ruler. Their efforts were a logical outcome of the drift towards Total War. To survive in this dog-eat-dog world, rulers had to be able to reach down and mobilize ALL of the manpower and material resources in their state. Under the old feudal order the ruler's ability to do this was constrained by the hereditary privileges of the nobility, but such fragmented sovereignty was a fatal weakness in the Warring States era. In Guan Zhong's reforms we can see the beginnings of Legalism, the political philosophy of Chinese Authoritarianism (some would go even further and argue Guan laid the foundation for Totalitarianism.)

What does Strategic Culture consist of?

Harvard Political Scientist Alastair Johnston argues that Strategic Culture consists of two basic elements: A. A central paradigm that supplies answers to three basic, related questions about 1) the nature of conflict in human affairs, 2) the nature of the enemy, and 3) the efficacy of violence. B. A ranked set of strategic preferences logically derived from this central paradigm.

What are some examples of centrifugal forces in Chinese history?

In Chinese history, centrifugal forces include geography (China is big and varied, with no natural lines of communication in China, like mountain passes or navigable rivers, which tends to departmentalize the region), and climate. Many Chinese assume that if China is left to itself, it is assumed that the pieces tend to fall apart.

How did the Chinese policy of keeping their ethnic Han-based regional armies under the command of trusted Chinese officials work against the Western powers and Japan?

In wars with France in 1884-85 and Japan in 1894-95, the lack of coordination and cooperation among these regional forces cost the Qing dearly. Regional officials saw these forces as part of their own power base and were therefore reluctant to see them sacrificed to defend some other official's area of responsibility. In 1884, despite orders from Beijing to sail south, the bulk of the Qing navy stayed in port while the French destroyed the southern fleet. In 1894 the southern fleet repaid the favor by staying out of the fighting between Japan and Li Hongzhang's northern fleet. Li ended up having to fight Japan with only his own regional forces while the rest of the Qing military sat on the sidelines.

What are "hangtu" walls?

Longshan villages were protected by "hangtu" - walls made out of tamped earth. A wooden frame was erected, successive layers of earth were tamped down and allowed to dry, and then the frame was removed leaving an extremely durable wall. No one would go to this trouble just to keep animals at bay - these walls were designed to keep humans out!

What were the ways an ambitious talented man could achieve fame and fortune?

Men of talent could seek their fame and fortune in two ways. The first was through the military. The non-aristocratic mass armies of the time offered the chance of rapid promotion. There were no social barriers in the way of commoners who had the ability to command. Results spoke louder than breeding in an age of Total War. The stakes were too high to be fussy about a soldier's pedigree!

Summarize Military Revolutions

Military Revolutions involve radical changes in the way wars are fought. They are usually triggered by changes in technology, organization and/or doctrine. Military Revolutions can have a significant impact in non-military areas such as society, the economy, and the structure of the state. But it is important to remember that the initial impetus for change (technological, organizational, doctrinal) arises out of RIVALRY - without rivalry there is no real impetus for change. Rivalry works in two ways: 1) changes adopted by your rivals force you to change (REACTIVE) and 2) your desire to defeat/deter your rival prompts you to take the initiative in adopting changes (PROACTIVE).

Where does most of the information on warfare during the Spring and Autumn period come from? What is the issue with these sources?

Most of the information we have on warfare in this period comes from the Commentary of Zuo (Zuo Zhuan 左傳) which was likely compiled in the more violent Warring States era, so there may be a degree of nostalgia in these accounts. As such, the idea that there was a form of "righteous war", with codes of chivalry, may have been just nostalgic longings for an earlier time. Even if these accounts are true, warfare gradually started to change as battles became a matter not of sport and honor, but of state survival. The Zuo Zhuan identifies over 500 interstate battles, as well as more than 100 civil wars, all in the 250 years covered by the commentary.

What other weapons besides cannons were adopted by Europeans?

Of course cannons were not the only gunpowder weapons adopted by the Europeans. Primitive handheld firearms were introduced as early as the 15th century, but they were initially too heavy, inaccurate, and unreliable for everyday use. As metallurgy improved, smaller versions of these early prototypes became common on the battlefields, but only as a supplement to the main weapons - the cutting/stabbing weapons like the pike, halberd, saber, and lance would maintain their dominance well into the 17th century. Even the venerable longbow and crossbow would hang on until the late 16th century.

Who is Guan Zhong, and what is he credited for doing?

One of the most important figures in this drive towards the centralization of power was Guan Zhong [管仲 725-645 BCE], a minister to Duke Huan of Qi (齊桓公, r. 685-643 BCE). Duke Huan became the first Hegemon of the Eastern Zhou largely as a result of the reforms carried out by Guan Zhong. Guan Zhong is credited with dividing the population of Qi into geographic units directly controlled by the state (rather than feudal subdomains controlled by nobles), instituting a uniform tax system based on direct taxation of households, reorganizing the military on the basis of compulsory service (as opposed to relying on aristocrats and their feudal levies), implementing a state economic policy based on state monopolies of iron and salt, and controlling prices and currency to ensure market stability.

According to Professor Green, how accurate is Xunxi's description of how Chinese emperors conquered other people: "Therefore, where the soldiers of the benevolent man encamp they command a god-like respect; and where they pass, they transform the people. They are like the seasonal rain whose coming is welcomed by all men. Thus Yao attacked Huan Dou, Shun attacked the rulers of the Miao, Yu attacked Gonggong, Tang attacked the ruler of Xia, King Wen attacked Chong, and King Wu attacked Shang Zhou. These four emperors and two kings all marched through the world with their soldiers of benevolence and righteousness. Those nearby were won over by their goodness, and those far off were filled with longing by their virtue. They did not stain their swords with blood, and yet near and far alike submitted; their virtue flourished in the center and spread to the four corners!"

Professor Green calls crap. He sees this as whitewashing.

According to Professor Green, what is the most important source for The Spring and Autumn Era

The Chun Qiu is not the key source for this period, for it is very brief. Instead, we rely on the Zuo Commentary (Zuo Zhuan 左傳), an addition to the Chun Qiu that fills in many of the details. This commentary covers the period 722-468 BCE and was likely written in the early 4th century BCE.

What happens in the feudal setup?

The King only had direct control over his own land and peasants - for additional resources he needed the nobility. If he didn't have the co-operation of the nobility, then the king didn't have that problem.

How did China acquire foreign military technology through the 1980s and 1990s?

Throughout the 1980s China sought out foreign military technology, and this process accelerated after 1990, when the cash-starved former Soviet Union began selling cutting edge technology to China. For the first time PLA strategists began to believe they might soon have the capacity to challenge American hegemony in the western Pacific.

Total war

Warfare that includes any and all civilian-associated resources and infrastructure as legitimate military targets, mobilizes all of the resources of society to fight the war, and gives priority to warfare over non-combatant needs. The American-English Dictionary defines total war as "war that is unrestricted in terms of the weapons used, the territory or combatants involved, or the objectives pursued, especially one in which the laws of war are disregarded."

In chapter 5 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", how has the intervention of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1967, during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (CR) (1966-9)

§1 "The intervention of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1967 has received considerable attention by scholars.1 The use of PLA units during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (CR) (1966-9) has been viewed as a negative step that proved detrimental to both Chinese politics and the PLA itself.2" (Scobell 2003, 94)

What is the relationship between centrifugal and centrepetal forces in China?

In China, there is a fragile balance between centrifugal forces & centripidal forces. While, geography is generally seen as a centrifugal force in Chinese history, promoting regionalism and fragmentation, such centrifugal forces could be balanced by man-made centripetal forces such as culture, the imperial institution, and military force. But military power could also be a centrifugal force!

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", why did the king and feudal lords carry out their own personal sacrifices?

"Not only was sacrifice seen as a form of killing, but the link between taking life and authority was emphasized by the fact that the king- (p. 21) -and the feudal lords acted as their own sacrificers; they personally performed the sacrifices in their own states.21[21.] This practice was based on the idea that ancestral spirits would accept sacrifice only from the eldest male descendant of their line, so the heads of the cadet lineages must also have served as the sacrificial victims offered to the ancestors marked paramount authority in the state and in the subordinate lineages." (Lewis 1990, 20-21)

Liang Qichao (Chinese: 梁啟超; Cantonese: Lèuhng Kái-chīu; 23 February 1873 - 19 January 1929) courtesy nameZhuoru, art name Rengong

A Chinese scholar, journalist, philosopher, and reformist who lived during the late Qing dynasty and the early Republic of China. He inspired Chinese scholars with his writings and reform movements.

What is the political structure of the Western Zhou?

A feudal structure. The Western Zhou emperor only has total command over his own feifdom. If he wants something from his vassal nobles, then he has to have a contract. They give him something in the form of tribute or military service, then that is in exchange for protection and support.

Zhuanxu (Chinese: trad. 顓頊, simp. 颛顼, pinyin Zhuānxū) also known as Gao Yang(t 高陽, s 高阳, p Gāoyáng)

A mythological emperor of ancient China. In the traditional account recorded by Sima Qian, Zhuanxu was a grandson of the Yellow Emperor who led the Shi clan in an eastward migration to present-day Shandong, where intermarriages with the Dongyi clan enlarged and augmented their tribal influences. At age twenty, he became their sovereign, going on to rule for seventy-eight years until his death.

What did the Zhou ruler, King Wen of Zhou, decide to do after choosing to rebel?

After deciding to rebel, the Zhou ruler led expeditions into the territory between his own lands and the Shang. It is unclear if his intention was to topple the Shang at that time, but he actively rallied disaffected Shang vassals to his cause. He died suddenly in the 50th year of his reign and was replaced by his son, King Wu, or the Martial King [武王], who decided to continue his father's mission.

For the imperial Western Powers during the Age of Discovery and the establishment of Empires, who was turned to for recruitment into the Navy?

Fisherman. Almost all coast towns have fisherman who had naval experience, and could adapt quickly to life on the sea.

What is solicitated technological change?

Solicited technological change: new technology created specifically to address military needs. The impetus for the creation of this technology comes from the military itself, which recognizes a need for a specific capacity and sponsors development of the necessary supporting technology.

Historically, did Sun Zi and the Bingjia accept the standard prioritization of Confucian Strategic Culture?

There is certainly plenty of textual support for the claim that the Chinese accepted this prioritization. Even the various Bingjia texts seem to indicate a preference for non-violent or Accommodationist strategies. But is this really the case? Although some of the military texts display a very Confucian respect for the role of virtue, benevolent rule, and righteousness, if one reads them closely it becomes apparent that they do in fact seem to embrace a very different set of assumptions about war. Alastair Johnston argues the Bingjia see: 1. War as part of the human condition - inevitable, or at least extremely frequent. The world is a dangerous place. 2. War as driven by the enemy's predisposition to challenge one's interests in pursuit of their own. 3. That the threat can often best be eliminated [As opposed to managed] through the application of force.

What happened to siegecraft during the Warring States Era?

To counter the rise of fortifications, Chinese developed sophisticated siegecraft technology.

For the Confucian, what is the connection between music and warfare?

To the COnfucian, music is a metaphor for a properly ordered society, the difference between cacophany and harmony is that in harmony, every note is in its proper place. Music is widely used in rituals. Similarly, in a harmonious society, every person is in its place. Likewise in warfare?

Who was the last of the legendary kings? What did he do?

Yu, the last of the legendary kings, is famous for creating an irrigation and flood control system. He organized the construction of massive dikes to contain the Yellow River, preventing the flooding of the North China plain. He was so successful the people insisted his son succeed him.

The Clash of Civilizations

a hypothesis that people's cultural and religiousidentities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. The American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington argued that future wars would be fought not between countries, but between cultures, and that Islamic extremismwould become the biggest threat to world peace. It was proposed in a 1992 lecture[1] at the American Enterprise Institute, which was then developed in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article titled "The Clash of Civilizations?",[2] in response to his former student Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man. Huntington later expanded his thesis in a 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. The phrase itself was earlier used by Albert Camus in 1946,[3] by Girilal Jain in his analysis of the Ayodhya dispute in 1988,[4] by Bernard Lewis in an article in the September 1990 issue of The Atlantic Monthly titled "The Roots of Muslim Rage"[5]and by Mahdi El Mandjra in his book "La première guerre civilisationnelle" published in 1992.[6][7] Even earlier, the phrase appears in a 1926 book regarding the Middle East by Basil Mathews: Young Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilizations(p. 196). This expression derives from "clash of cultures", already used during the colonial period and the Belle Époque.[8] Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse theories about the nature of global politics in the post-Cold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that human rights, liberal democracy, and the capitalist free market economy had become the only remaining ideological alternative for nations in the post-Cold War world. Specifically, Francis Fukuyama argued that the world had reached the 'end of history' in a Hegelian sense. Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had only reverted to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that the primary axis of conflict in the future will be along cultural lines.[9] As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict. At the end of his 1993 Foreign Affairs article, "The Clash of Civilizations?", Huntington writes, "This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations. It is to set forth descriptive hypothesis as to what the future may be like."[2] In addition, the clash of civilizations, for Huntington, represents a development of history. In the past, world history was mainly about the struggles between monarchs, nations and ideologies, such as seen within Western civilization. But after the end of the Cold War, world politics moved into a new phase, in which non-Western civilizations are no longer the exploited recipients of Western civilization but have become additional important actors joining the West to shape and move world history.[10] SOURCES: 1. "U.S. Trade Policy - Economics". AEI. 2007-02-15. Archived from the original on 2013-06-29. 2. Official copy (free preview): The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993 3. le problème russo-américain, et là nous revenons à l'Algérie, va être dépassé lui-même avant très peu, cela ne sera pas un choc d'empires nous assistons au choc de civilisations et nous voyons dans le monde entier les civilisations colonisées surgir peu à peu et se dresser contre les civilisations colonisatrices. http://www.ina.fr/audio/PHD85011203 4. Elst K., Some recollections from my acquaintance with Sita Ram Goel in Elst, K. (2005). India's only communalist: In commemoration of Sita Ram Goel. [1] Also: Elst, K. India's Only Communalist: an Introduction to the Work of Sita Ram Goel, in Sharma, A. (2001). Hinduism and secularism: After Ayodhya. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 5. Bernard Lewis: The Roots of Muslim Rage The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990 6. Elmandjra, Mahdi (1992). Première guerre civilisationnelle (in French). Toubkal. 7. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (1996), p. 246: " 'La premiere guerre civilisationnelle' the distinguished Moroccan scholar Mahdi Elmandjra called the Gulf War as it was being fought." 8 Louis Massignon, La psychologie musulmane (1931), in Idem, Ecrits mémorables, t. I, Paris, Robert Laffont, 2009, p. 629: "Après la venue de Bonaparte au Caire, le clash of cultures entre l'ancienne Chrétienté et l'Islam prit un nouvel aspect, par invasion (sans échange) de l'échelle de valeurs occidentales dans la mentalité collective musulmane." 9. mehbaliyev (30 October 2010). "Civilizations, their nature and clash possibilities (c) Rashad Mehbal...". 10. Murden S. Cultures in world affairs. In: Baylis J, Smith S, Owens P, editors. The Globalization of World Politics. 5th ed. New York: Oxford University Press; 2011. p. 416-426.

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, in ancient China, what does Graff say about the idea that the rise of the Zhou dynasty was due to the righteousness of that dynasty?

¶3 "Pace Mencius, there is good reason to believe that the rise of the Zhou dynasty was no more righteous than any of the later regime changes in Chinese history. It involved the permanent armed occupation (rather than simple rectification followed by evacuation) of conquered territories, an occupation that did not accord with the wishes of the inhabitants of those territories, if the massive uprising that broke out soon after the initial Zhou conquest can be taken as any indication of their sentiments. According to the account found in the "Great Capture" chapter of the Yi Zhou shu, which has the ring of an authentic record from early Western Zhou, even the initial conquest was bloody and apparently quite unrestrained, with a body count of 177,779 verified by the presentation of ears cut from the bodies of the slain.91[91.] Once the idea of the righteousness of the Zhou conquest had been put forward and accepted, however, its effect was to confine mainstream Chinese thinking about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of resort to arms to the same channel for more than two millennia thereafter. For all those who respected the ancient sage kings and accepted them as a model (a list that would include not only Confucius, Mencius, Xun Kuang and all of their acolytes, but also Mo Di, the authors of eclectic works such as the Guanzi, the Annals of Lü Buwei, and the Huainanzi, most of the military authors, and even, up to a point, Han Feizi), uncompromising pacifism was not an option; whatever their distaste for force and violence, an exception always had to be made for righteous war. During the Warring States period, Chinese political thought was already the prisoner of Chinese history." (Graff 2016, 210).

In "State Making and State Breaking" by David A. Graff, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what typically preceded peasant uprisings?

"Peasant uprisings in imperial China were typically preceded by natural disasters, but not every flood or drought led to rebellion. Agriculture in north China was heavily dependent on moisture-laden monsoon winds from the Pacific encountering cooler air currents from the heart of Asia at the right place and time to produce the needed amount of rainfalL If the currents failed to meet, there would be drought; if they met for too long, on the other hand, the result was likely to be excessive rainfall and flooding. These were fairly frequent occurrences, with China's dynastic histories noting 1,621 floods and 1,393 droughts over the space of 2,117 years.3 Given the ubiquity of such events, government policy must also have been an important factor determining whether adverse weather conditions would give rise to large-scale rebellion. When the imperial government was vigorous, distribution of relief grain and the prompt and effective use of military force could prevent serious outbreaks. When the effectiveness of government declined, however, relief grain was often unavailable and local officials were unable or unwilling to excuse peasants from their tax and corvee obligations. In the last years of the Ming dynasty, unpaid imperial troops helped to drive many peasants into revolt by requisitioning their crops. The most terrible episodes of flooding, moreover, can be blamed on a less- (p. 43-44) -effective government as much as on natural conditions, since they resulted from the failure of officially supervised water conservancy efforts on the Yellow River. Once the disaster had taken place, repair efforts could become an additonal irritant. The Yuan government's call-up of corvee labor to restore the Grand Canal and the Yellow River dikes in 1351, for example, drove many hard-pressed peasants to take refuge with rebel groups." (Graff 2012, 43-44)

"The early self-strengthening period brought significant achievements. The use of Western weapons gave the Qing forces major advantages over domestic opponents. By the early 1870s the rebellions in China proper had been defeated, and by 1878 Qing armies had reasserted control of even the outlying frontiers of Xinjiang. In the meantime, the improved military situation had led to a stabilization of the international situation of the Qing state. During the 1874 Taiwan crisis, Shen Baozhen's quick mobilization of military resources put pressure on the Japanese to seek a diplomatic solution, and Qing authority in Taiwan was firmly reasserted (and as Edwin Leung has shown, contrary to the textbook explanation, the settlement did not sacrifice Qing claims in the Ryukyus).1 In 1881 Zeng Jize's brilliant diplomacy, backed by Zuo Zongtang's military mobilization along the northwestern border, led to the Russian withdrawal from the strategically important IIi valley in Xinjiang, which Russian troops had occupied for a decade. In 1884-1885 the war with France, pri- (p. 159) -marily over French demands in northern Vietnam, saw some serious defeats for Qing forces, particularly at sea. But in Taiwan, Qing troops under Liu Mingquan performed reasonably well, preventing the French from capturing the town of Danshui, and along the Vietnam-China border, after initial French advances, Qing troops defeated the French at Lang Son and were advancing toward Hanoi when the armistice was signed. The war was settled without the Qing making any new concessions or paying substantial indemnities. While hardly a victory, the contrast to the Opium and Arrow Wars was striking." (Yu 2012, 158-159)

In Chapter 1 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what did the Miao, White Lotus, and Eight Trigram uprisings reveal about Chinese military?

#2 The generally ineffective response of the QIng government and military to these rebellions highlights how CHina had begun to lag behind Europe--which was even then embroiled in the Napoleonic Wars--both in terms of modern weaponry and political organization. Just a few years before, during the reign of the Qianlong Emperor, the Manchus increased the chinese Empire to its largest extent. However, after almost twenty years of constant domestic turmoil and warfare, China suffered from widespread destruction and economic dislocation. What is more important, these rebellions called the Qing Dynasty's right to rule--the "Mandate of Heaven"--into question. Therefore, according to Immanuel Hus, China "was plagued with serious administrative, military, and moral problems which were unmistakable indices of the falling dynastic fortune."41" (Ellemen 2007, 12)

In chapter 5 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what did the Wuhan Incident show about the PLA's involvement in the Cultural Revolution?

(p. 102) §3 "The Wuhan Incident - The situation in the central Chinese city of Wuhan was typical in many ways of the chaos that was enveloping most of the country's urban centers in the summer of 1967. Wuhan Military Region Commander Chen Zaidao and First Political Commissar Zhong Hanhua sided with local party leaders and a conservative mass organization called the Million Heroes, composed largely of workers and- (p. 103) §1-local party officials. Violence simmered and escalated across China during the months of June and July, with the regional military forces blatantly favoring the Million Heroes. The most glaring indication of this was the Wuhan Affair or "7-20 Incident" in mid-July of 1967. These events highlight the complex interplay between competing elite factions at the national level and mass organizations at the local level. §2 The Wuhan Incident of mid-July 1967 highlighted the growing sense of exasperation felt by the regional PLA, which was given the job of restoring order but at the same time was hampered and obstructed by the meddling of central party and military leaders. ..." (Scobell 2003, 102-103)

What is Offensive Realism?

2. OFFENSIVE REALISM - the stronger you are, the safer you are. These states seek to maximize their power in order to maximize their security, and often pursue hegemony in order to protect their interests. New powers often embrace offensive realism because they are not content with their place in the existing order. Such powers frequently end up challenging the status quo, and they are often joined by opportunistic states who seek to benefit from a new global order (bandwagoning alliances).

What did Chiang kai-shek do in 1936?

By 1936, Chiang was making real progress in building up his army of German-trained and equipped divisions. Once complete, China would have a first-class fighting force - and Japan would have a serious problem realizing its imperial ambitions in China!

How did the King Wu justify the establishment of the Zhou dynasty?

He proclaimed that his victory was proof that he was backed by heaven. In reality, this was an exercise in self - justification. Having overthrown the tyrannical but legitimate Shang, the Zhou had to somehow legitimize this act of rebellion. They simply appealed to a "higher" authority for approval. And since they won, they must have had Heaven's approval! Victory was prima facie evidence that the new ruler enjoyed Heaven's blessing, which of course granted automatic legitimacy to new dynasties created by violent acts of usurpation and rebellion. What mortal could question Heaven's will?

What kind of change is most important to a "Military Revolution"?

Historians generally agree that technological change is usually more important than organizational and doctrinal change. There have been instances where organizational change on its own has radically changed the nature of warfare. For example, the introduction of conscription (the Levée en masse) in the French Revolution led to an increased tendency on the part of the French to seek out decisive battle regardless of casualties. There have also been instances where doctrinal change on its own has radically changed the nature of warfare. For example, the emergence of guerrilla warfare and low-level insurgencies caused conventional armies to rethink the way they fought wars. But technological change usually drives organizational and doctrinal change, not the other way around.

What was the only way that Chinese leaders could see to stop the violence?

How could China escape the scourge of warlordism? Civilian politicians seemed powerless. The militarization of politics meant that only those who wielded military power could be political players. It seemed China could only be rescued from chaos by a "man on horseback"- a man who could beat the warlords at their own game! As in the past, a new dynasty (republic?) would have to be born on the battlefield. But once in power would the new leader heed the lessons of the Chinese past? (That which is gained through martial means can only be preserved by civil means! One can conquer All Under Heaven on horseback, but one cannot rule from there!)

In contrast to Confucius' graded love, what was Mo Zi's view of love?

In contrast to Confucius' graded love, Mo Zi argued for loving everyone equally. He believed that the root of all disorder was partiality, or bias in favor of one's own family or state. If everyone regarded others as they would their own parents or children, social competition and conflict would disappear. Even wars between states would end!

In the second decade of the 21st century, what kind of approach does the Chinese military advocate and pursue?

In the second decade of the 21st century China continues to pursue both approaches - building up conventional capabilities in Air, Sea, and Land power, while simultaneously investing heavily in Asymmetrical Systems. But it is the latter which really worries the United States.

What is a useful way of understanding the Clausewitzian trinity/triad?

It helps to think of Clausewitz's Trinity as consisting of three magnets competing to attract/capture a metal pendulum. One magnet represents the "irrational" side of warfare - primordial passions, violence, and hatred. The second magnet represents the "rational" side of warfare - political aims, war as instrument of policy, cost-benefit analysis etc. The third magnet represents Chance and Probability - or the "non-rational", unknowable, and unpredictable side of war. All three influence the course of any conflict, first pulling it one way, then another. The result is that all conflicts have the potential to proceed in an unpredictable and occasionally irrational manner. Political leaders and military commanders MUST be ready for this!

According to Johnston, what are the practical implications of China's Parabellum strategic culture?

Johnston is arguing that China has acted and will continue to act in a manner that seems to accord with the assumptions of Structural Realism.

What does Confucius mean by Li?

Lǐ (禮/礼) is a system of ritual norms and propriety that determines how a person should properly act in everyday life in harmony with the law of Heaven. If every member of society acted in accordance with the specific behavioral norms associated with each role - what Confucius called Li [rites 禮] - and fulfilled their specific obligations, then society would be in a state of perfect harmony.

Where did the Zhou come from?

Many smaller states existed outside the Shang domains. To the west were the Qiang, a fierce people who supplied the bulk of the Shang sacrificial victims. Between the Qiang and the Shang was the frontier buffer state of Zhou.

According to Professor Green, what was the legacy of Mencius?

Mencius is really responsible for the pro-wen, anti-wu bias of the later Chinese literati. His ardent condemnation of war drowned out his grudging recognition of the need for military force in punishing the incorrigibly wicked, violent, or unruly. For the next 2000 years, the literati of imperial China largely stuck to their one-sided interpretation of Mencius. According to Professor Green, those who follow Mencius emphasize the Wen, the civil, peaceful teachings, and de-emphasized the Wu, or martial military force.

How does one Italian witness describe the impact of the arrival of gunpowder on the battlefield?

One Italian witness noted that "Before the year 1494, wars were protracted, battles bloodless, the methods followed in besieging towns slow and uncertain; and although artillery was already in use, it was managed with such lack of skill that it caused little hurt. Hence it came about that the ruler of a state could hardly be dispossessed. But the French, in their invasion of Italy, infused so much liveliness into our wars that whenever the open country was lost, the state was lost with it." The guns made the difference: "They were planted against the walls of towns with such speed, the space between the shots was so little, and the balls flew so quick and were impelled with such force, that as much execution was done in a few hours as formerly had been done in the like number of days in Italy!" Niccolo Machiavelli summed it up well: "No wall exists , however thick, that artillery cannot destroy in a few days!"

One of the issues with veterans?

One of the major issues with veterans is what to do with disgruntled veterans. When veterans return to the civilian, there is the threat that those veterans will use the skills in violence that they have learned on the civilian population. Very often, veterans will turn to crime, like banditry or piracy. This is a big problem for veterans of the ENEMY. For example, in the Korean war, many Chinese troops were former Guomingdang soldiers.

What made Western ships superior to Chinese ships?

One of the major things that made ships superior to their Chinese counterparts was their superior rigging. This gave the ships superior maneuverability, and being able to sale "close to the wind".

What factors in a security environment motivate armies to change in a PROACTIVE fashion?

Sometimes a country or a military seeks to change its security environment unilaterally by embracing new ways of fighting or new technology. These PROACTIVE changes can translate into an advantage against one's rivals, providing they are slow to adapt.

How and when did Chiang Kai-shek launch his 5th campaign?

The 5th campaign in late 1933 was based on blockading the Soviet and slowly squeezing it. The CCP strategy was now based on positional warfare, and the Red Army was almost destroyed as a result.

What strategy did the British use during the First Opium War (4 September 1839 - 29 August 1842)?

The British used a strategy that played to their strength at sea. British fleets roamed up and down the Chinese coast at will, blockading ports and destroying any Chinese forces that opposed them. The contest was completely one-sided. 1839-1841

Instead of technological reform, what kind of reform did the Chinese military focus on?

The Chinese focused more on organizational and doctrinal reform, and in this regard rivalry played a more active role. The large conscript armies of the Warring States period were useless both for offensive operations against the nomads and for garrisoning the northern frontiers, so successive dynasties relied on professional soldiers and Inner Asian auxiliaries. This gave the Chinese both defensive and offensive capabilities.

What was the difference between the Confucians and Mohists, and the Daoists?

The Daoist response was also predictable. In the face of all the bloodshed and disorder, perhaps it made sense to simply give up the hopeless battle and withdraw into seclusion. Escapism seemed an attractive alternative. Confucius and Mencius both encountered self- proclaimed recluses who refused to seek office or engage with the problems of their day simply because their efforts could make little difference and might very well make things worse.

What are the names of the first modern war between China and Japan (25 July 1894 - 17 April 1895)?

The First Sino-Japanese War The war is commonly known in China as the War of Jiawu (Chinese: 甲午戰爭; pinyin: Jiǎwǔ Zhànzhēng), referring to the year (1894) as named under the traditional sexagenary system of years. In Japan, it is called the Japan-Qing War(Japanese: 日清戦争 Hepburn: Nisshin sensō). In Korea, where much of the war took place, it is called the Qing-Japan War (Korean: 청일전쟁; Hanja: 淸日戰爭).

Since the Chinese couldn't go on the offensive to wipe out the northern barbarians directly, what could they do to try to neutralize them?

The Inner Asians spent their entire lives on horseback, and mounted warfare was second nature to them. Conscript soldiers simply could not compete. The Chinese understood this, so they decided to recruit soldiers from among the semi-sinicized nomads living on the fringes of the empire. These auxiliaries were drawn from the "dependant states" ( shu guo 屬國), tribes that had become vassals of the empire in exchange for land and trade goods. In keeping with the idea of "using barbarians to control barbarians", the Chinese recruited entire tribes to serve as mounted auxiliaries in their campaigns against the Xiongnu and other hostile groups. Over time these semi-sinicized barbarians interming led with the Chinese, giving birth to a new frontier elite. These people became the backbone of China's military..The Chinese state under the Han continued to use conscription in order to guard the capital and man The frontier defenses, but the offensive power of the empire was in the hands of these mounted auxiliaries.

What was the relation between the wars in Vietnam and Mao's strategy?

The Vietnam Wars are classic examples of Mao's strategy in action. Although first France and then the United States had absolute military superiority backed by larger populations and stronger economies, the Vietnamese nationalists led by Ho Chi Minh were able to prevail after a long struggle. Waging both a political and a military struggle, the Vietnamese Communists were able to utilize their strengths and exploit French and American weaknesses. What they lacked in material strength they made up for in willpower, and they eventually wore the French and American publics down. Vietnam was reunified in 1975.

What is the main reason for the Western Zhou's claim to fame?

The main reason for the Western Zhou's fame is that Confucius and his disciples saw it as a golden age. The Western Zhou was, to Confucius, a sort of hierophany, an image of a perfect society. Their own works popularized the Western Zhou as a paradigm of perfect governance.

According to Johnston, who during the Warring States period demonstrated the Parabellum Strategic Culture, and Realist Behavior in Chinese history/

The classic example of this Realist behavior in the Warring States era comes from the so-called " School of Diplomacy" (縱横家 Zong Heng Jia), sometimes associated with the esoteric book " The Master of Demon Valley " (鬼谷子 Gui Gu Zi). The name "School of Diplomacy" refers to a group of statesmen who advocated either "vertical alliances" of the weaker states against the rising power of Qin, or opportunistic "horizontal alliances" with Qin. In modern terms, the "vertical" represented Defensive Realist balancing alliances in defense of the status quo, while the "horizontal" represented Offensive Realist bandwagoning alliances aimed at the creation of a new order. Clearly the anarchic interstate system of the Warring States era generated classic Realist responses!

How SIGNIFICANT are the earliest records of the immortal sage kings to Chinese culture?

The earliest records, although of questionable reliability in their portrayal of events in the distant past, uniformly justify the exercise of military power by claiming religious/divine sanction. When these early rulers went to war, the kings always consulted the spirits for support from the spirits. This might be an effort to retrospectively whitewash a bloody era in Chinese history, or it might be an accurate reflection of how these early inhabitants of the Yellow River region associated the taking of human life with the blood sacrifices that were part of their religious beliefs.

What triggered the First Opium War?

The first major clash with the West came in 1839. Increasing dependence on opium smuggling to balance the tea-trade deficit set the British on a collision course with Chinese authorities. Chinese efforts to crack down on the trade inadvertently precipitated a military clash, giving the British the opportunity to use force to achieve their larger trade goals.

King Zhou (/dʒoʊ/;[1] Chinese: 紂王; pinyin: Zhòu Wáng)

The pejorative posthumous name given to Di Xin (Chinese: 帝辛; pinyin: Dì Xīn), the last king of the Shang dynasty of ancient China.[2] He is also called Zhou Xin (紂辛; Zhòu Xīn). He may also be referred to by adding "Shang" (商 Shāng) in front of any of his names. In Chinese, his name Zhòu (紂) also refers to a horse crupper,[3] the part of a saddle or harness that is most likely to be soiled by the horse. It is not to be confused with the name of the succeeding dynasty which has a different character and pronunciation. Early reign In the Records of the Grand Historian, Sima Qian wrote that Di Xin, in the early part of his reign, had abilities which surpassed those of the ordinary man, and was quick-witted and quick-tempered. According to legend, he was intelligent enough to win all of his arguments, and he was strong enough to hunt wild beasts with his bare hands.[4] He was the younger brother of Zi Qi (子启) and Zi Yan (子衍) (later rulers of Zhou's vassal state Song)[5] and father of Wu Geng. His father Di Yi had two brothers, Ji Zi and Bi Gan. Di Xin added to the territory of Shang by battling the tribes surrounding it, including the Dongyi to the east. Late reign In his later years, Di Xin gave himself over to drinking, women and abandoned morals, preferring these to the proper governance of the country, and ignored almost all affairs of state. According to Sima Qian, he even hosted festive orgies where many people engaged in immoral things at the same time with his concubines and created songs with crude (erotic) lyrics and poor rhythm. In legends, he is depicted as having come under the influence of his wicked wife Daji, and committing all manner of evil and cruel deeds with her. In fictionalizations, including the novel Fengshen Yanyi, she was said to be possessed by a malevolent fox spirit. One of the most famous forms of entertainment Zhou enjoyed was the "Alcohol Pool and Meat Forest" (酒池肉林). A large pool, big enough for several canoes, was constructed on the Palace grounds, with inner linings of polished oval shaped stones from the seashores. This allowed for the entire pool to be filled with alcohol. A small island was constructed in the middle of the pool, where trees were planted, which had branches made of roasted meat skewers hanging over the pool. This allowed Zhou and his friends and concubines to drift on canoes in the pool. When they thirsted, they reached down into the pool with their hands and drank the wine. When they hungered, they reached up with their hands to eat the roasted meat. This was considered one of the most famous examples of decadence and corruption of a ruler in Chinese history. In order to please Daji, he created the "Cannon Burning Punishment" (炮烙之刑). One large hollow bronze cylinder was stuffed with burning charcoal and allowed to burn until red-hot, then prisoners were made to literally hug the cylinder, which resulted in a painful and unsightly death. Zhou and Daji were known to get highly aroused after watching such torture. Victims ranged from ordinary people and prisoners to high government officials, such as Mei Bo.[6] In order to fund Zhou's heavy daily expenses, extremely heavy taxes were implemented. The people suffered greatly, and lost all hope for the Shang dynasty. Zhou's brother Wei Zi tried to persuade him to change, but was rebuked. His uncle Bi Gan similarly remonstrated with him, but Di Xin had his heart ripped out so he could see what the heart of a sage looked like. When his other uncle Ji Zi heard this, he went to remonstrate with the kingly nephew and, feigning madness, was imprisoned. Fall When Zhou dynasty's army, led by the famous Jiang Ziya, defeated the Shang dynasty at the Battle of Muye in 1046 BC, Di Xin gathered all his treasures around himself in the Palace, and then set fire to his palace and committed suicide. The name "Zhou" actually appeared after the death of King Zhou, a posthumous name (although perhaps used furtively by his contemporaries). This name was a representation of his actions, both dishonorable and cold-hearted. King Zhou would go down in history as one of the worst examples of a corrupted king in China. Mentions in literature and legend Zhou is mentioned in the Confucian Analects (19 "子張");[7] and also in the Three Character Classic.[8] Zhou is also one of the main subjects of Fengshen Yanyi and its various derivations in popular media. Thus, Di Xin, also known as Zhou, has served as a (negative) exemplar of Confucian principles (presented as the wicked ruler who justifies regime change according to the Mandate of Heaven), as well as becoming an icon of popular culture. This makes for a biographically interesting figure, but one challenging a clear distinction between history, legend, and philosophical point-making. In Fengshen Yanyi, Zhou visited the Goddess Nüwa's temple and offended the Goddess with his lustful comments towards her beauty. In response, Nüwa decided that the Shang dynasty should end and sent her three subordinates to become three beautiful women (including Daji) to bewitch Zhou. Under the influence of these women, Zhou becomes a ruthless king, losing the support of people and triggering his downfall. Until now, nobody knows most of his lifestyle from the reduced amount of artifacts found regarding to him. God of marriage According to the Investiture of the Gods, Jiang Ziya recognized that King Zhou was a well-versed and well-trained individual that became an incapable ruler only because of having fallen victim to seduction. After his death, Jiang Ziya deified King Zhou as the Tianxi Xing (天喜星 "Star of Heavenly Happiness"). As the Tianxi Xing, he had the responsibility of managing the marriage affairs of humans.

Duke Huan of Qi (Chinese: 齊桓公; pinyin: Qí Huán Gōng; died 643 BC), personal name Xiǎobái (小白)

The ruler of the State of Qi from 685 to 643 BC. Living during the chaotic Spring and Autumn period, as the Zhou dynasty's former vassal states fought each other for supremacy, Duke Huan and his long-time advisor Guan Zhong managed to transform Qi into China's most powerful polity. Duke Huan was eventually recognized by most of the Zhou states as well as the Zhou royal family as Hegemon of China. In this position, he fought off invasions of China by non-Zhou peoples and attempted to restore order throughout the lands. Toward the end of his more than forty-year-long reign, however, Duke Huan's power began to decline as he grew ill and Qi came to be embroiled in factional strife. Following his death in 643 BC, Qi completely lost its predominance.

What is the most dangerous thing about soldiers?

The soldiers can rebel against their commanders. Maintaining an army is a logistical nightmare, requiring vast amounts of clothing, water, food, shelter, equipment, and money.

Were these "mythic" rulers mere cultural progenitors?

These "mythic" rulers were not just the cultural progenitors who created Chinese civilization - they were also fighters who expanded the Sinic zone through conquest and the displacement/assimilation of the non-sedentary peoples who lived on the edge of the Chinese world. They may have been champions of wen [文 the civil, or cultural], but they were also masters of wu [武 the martial].

What is the meaning of this symbol: 王 (Wang = "King")

This ancient character has great symbolic value. The three horizontal lines stand for Heaven, Earth, and Man. Only the vertical line - the ruler - can unite all three in perfect harmony. This represents the religious origins of Chinese kingship in the pre-Shang era, when shamans (or those who controlled them) used spiritual authority to legitimize secular political power. All subsequent Chinese rulers were expected to carry out both political and religious functions. Moreover, only they could legitimize warfare through the soliciting of divine approval for the taking of human life. The king is therefore the linchip that holds it all together.

What is the appropriate response?

This is THE question - Will China's determination to simultaneously pursue economic growth and military power (fu guo qiang bing!) prompt other countries to engage in the following behavior? 1. Internal balancing - build up their own militaries in response to China, leading to an arms race 2. External balancing - seek alliances to offset Chinese power, including geo-economic containment strategies aimed at slowing the economic growth that funds China's military buildup 3. Hedging - talk softly but keep a big stick handy. Engage China economically, but take steps to protect yourself if China becomes aggressive

Did Emperor Wu continue the policy of appeasement started by the Han dynasty?

This policy of appeasement lasted for roughly a half century, but was abandoned under Emperor Wu (the "martial" emperor) who ruled from 141-87 BCE. The internal situation in China was far more stable than it had been under the founder, and the empire was far richer. Emperor Wu decided that he could afford to he take a tougher stance toward the Xiongnu and duly dispatched several expeditions deep into Xiongnu territory. This is a classic example of a Parabellum approach to solving the nomadic threat. He did not succeed in destroying the nomadic forces (they simply avoided his huge but slow-moving armies), but he did drive them back. He protected this cleared territory by moving in hundreds of thousands of Chinese settlers and fortifying the new borders.

What kind of war did the CCP promote in the 1950s and 1960s?

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the CCP promoted People's War as the correct revolutionary strategy to be followed in the global struggle against imperialism. This influenced movements in Peru, Nepal, India, Rhodesia, South Africa, Cambodia, and Laos. The Chinese also threatened to wage a People's War should the United States attack. To this end, the PLA downplayed the role of modern military technology in favor of guerrilla warfare: "The atom bomb is a paper tiger ... All reactionaries are paper tigers... Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters, the US reactionaries, are paper tigers. History will finally prove that our millet plus rifles are more powerful than Chiang Kai-shek's aeroplanes plus tanks. The day will come when these reactionaries are defeated and we are victorious!"

How significant was the threat of the Xiongnu to the development of Chinese strategic thought?

Throughout the Han Dynasty and beyond, the Xiongnu and other inner Asian tribes would constitute the greatest security challenge to the Chinese empire. Just as the internecine warfare experiences of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States eras shaped the bingjia understanding of war and diplomacy, the problems posed by these persistently importunate neighbors shaped imperial China's approach to war and diplomacy. Interaction with the inner Asian nomads shaped the Chinese understanding of the outside (ie., non- Chinese) world in important ways.

What is "kinship feudalism"? How was this used by King Wu?

Uncooperative lords were replaced with Zhou relatives or loyal appointees in order to tie the new territories more closely to the Zhou. This was "kinship feudalism".

How significant was the issue of fragmented sovereignty during the Warring States Era?

Under the old feudal order the ruler's ability to do this was constrained by the hereditary privileges of the nobility, but such fragmented sovereignty was a fatal weakness in the Warring States era. To survive in this dog-eat-dog world, rulers had to be able to reach down and mobilize ALL of the manpower and material resources in their state.

"First of all, the Taipings placed civic virtue and puritanical discipline at the top of their military indoctrination. The "Taiping Rules and Regulations" (Taiping tiao gui), the military training manual of the movement, specifically stipulated that all Taiping soldiers were expected to "obey the heavenly regulations" and "cultivate good morals"; they were not to smoke tobacco or drink wine. l The same manual assigned men and women to separate military units and strictly prohibited sexual relations. Looting was not permitted, which made the Taipings popular in territories beyond their original home base in Guangxi. Strict regulations required harsh punishments for violators; the most common punishment was beheading. What did this extreme, puritanical austerity mean for the military effectiveness of the Taipings? Of all the important ramifications, nothing stands out so much as the extreme flexibility and agility of the Taipings' troop movements. As a Taiping company commander explained to a French officer at the time, "The days of distress followed the days of opulence and we found it all quite natural. It was just that which made us superior to the imperial troops. When they camp, they need big installations. They have to have fortifications, tents, and so on. We went straight on. If there were houses we stayed there, if not, we slept under the stars."2" (p. 143) The second unique feature of the Taiping military organization was its utilization of women soldiers in combat units. Since all men and women were regarded as brothers and sisters under God, no one was supposed to face discrimination because of their sex. A woman under the Taiping regime thus had the same privilege or obligation to serve in the army that a man did, as well as the same right to own her own land. To Hong Xiuquan and his associates, the employment of women combat soldiers also provided a powerful ideological weapon against what they regarded as the chief spiritual evil: Confucianism. In the orthodox Confucian order, women were expected to stay indoors and were not supposed to engage in outside social activities, let alone serve in the military. In fact, the prevailing practice of footbinding essentially rendered women useless in any type of military service because they were unable to run. The use of women in Taiping combat units was in direct defiance of the Confucian order, and it was possible because the women of the Hakka minority did not practice footbinding. In the key battles at Guilin and Changsha, Taiping women soldiers performed with valor and were highly praised. A third unique feature of the Taiping military was that its main organizational principle was the soldier-peasant model. All citizens in the regime were required to serve as soldiers. And conversely, all layers of society were structured according to the military command hierarchy. Although soldiers were paid slightly better than farmers, the ethos and tempo of a farmer's life became the same as for a soldier. Farmers as well as soldiers were subjected to a rigid military command structure. In the Taiping system, "A corporal commands four men. A sergeant commands five corporals.... A colonel commands five captains.... A corps general commands five colonels; altogether he commands 13,125 men."3 (Yu 2012, 142-143)

How was the SHang military organized?

Shang military forces consisted of the Shang royal guard (a few thousand men) and feudal levies led by nobles (who eventually commanded and fought from chariots). Essentially, this was a feudal levée, with the king as a prima inter pares of his peers. But these forces could not campaign for long - a few months at most.

How exactly does Sun Zi describe the thorough analysis and planning is essential before initiating hostilities?

Sun Zi describes this process in detail in his fourth chapter "Formations": "The rules of the military are five: measurement [of ground], estimation [of forces needed], calculation [of actual numbers], weighing [of relative strengths], and victory. The ground gives rise to measurements, measurements give rise to estimation, estimation gives rise to calculations, calculations give rise to weighing, weighing gives rise to victories."

What does the Art of War present in terms of strategic concepts?

The Art of War presents several important strategic concepts in its 13 chapters. Many of these themes are repeated in the other military classics and came to represent essential elements of the Chinese way of warfare. Many of these concepts are still the subject of debate. The language used in the Art of War and the other military classics is vague, and to make matters even more complicated, the same character is used in different ways in the texts, and sometimes even within a single work one finds very different applications.

According to Professor Green, how did the geography of the Qin help that state win out in the end?

The Qin were located on the Western fringe of the Chinese sphere. While their easter border faced the other Chinese states, their western, northern, and southern border faced "barbarian" tribes, which they could expand and absorb those barbarian lands and peoples, turning the Qin into a successful war machine.

"The year 1856 marks a watershed in the military development of the Taiping Rebellion. A major implosion took place within the Taiping regime. Hong Xiuquan, the Heavenly King of the Taiping Tianguo (Heavenly Kingdom of the Grand Harmony), was believed to be the real younger brother of Jesus Christ. That grand stature gave him enormous power over his followers. But he was not the only prophet in the Taiping camp. Back in 1850, when Hong was temporarily absent from the Taiping base in Guangxi, the Taiping followers began to lose faith in the cause, and trouble started to brew. In a desperate effort to save the situation, Yang Xiuqing, Hong's second-in-command, announced to the world that he could speak on behalf of "God the Father" (tian fu). Yang's stunning announcement secured the unity of the Taiping followers in Hong's temporary absence, but it also created a practical problem. Hong Xiuquan himself was only the younger brother of Jesus Christ, but Yang had made people believe that he himself could now enunciate the will of the father of Jesus Christ. Thus, Yang's words would in theory be more powerful and command more respect than than those of Hong. Yet since Hong's presence as the brother of Jesus was daily and constant, while Yang could only receive "edicts" and instructions from God during temporary trances, Hong acquiesced in the arrangement. The bizarre result was that Yang announced frequently that he was receiving instructions from God so as to restrain Hong and punish him for not having given Yang himself more prestige in the Taiping hierarchy. Hong had to publicly confess his "crimes." This, of course, became terribly humiliating to Hong, and in 1856 he carried out a bloody coup. Wei Changhui, one of Hong's five kings and Yang Xiuqing's rival, received the order from Hong to carry out the murderous coup in which Yang, his entire family, and several thousands of his security forces were mercilessly liquidated. Wei's hideous killings of the Taiping comrades naturally evoked disgust among the rank and file. Facing pressure from below, Hong Xiuquan eventually pointed the finger at Wei and had him executed. By the end of the year, of the half dozen veteran Taiping leaders, only Hong and an ambitiously independent king named Shi Dakai remained alive. But the implosion had so disturbed Shi that in 1857 he led tens of thousands of the Taiping troops to flee Hong and Nanjing, moving westward to the mountainous area of Sichuan. There he was captured and executed by government forces in June 1863." (Yu 2012, 137)

In "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution" by Maochun Yu in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 135-151, what are some of the major issues that Zeng Guofan discovered in the Qing imperial army that allowed the Taiping Rebellion to succeed?

(p. 144) ... Hereditary Bureaucratic Military Force The strategic core of the Qing dynasty's military consisted of two basic forces, the Manchu banners and the Chinese Green Standard Army. The troops served for life or even on a hereditary basis, with no channel for bringing in new blood from outside. As a result, these once-powerful fighting forces had deteriorated into a decadent cohort of unfit soldiers and officers by the time of the Taiping Rebellion. As a Western observer of Zeng's time noted, "The men were as heterogeneous as their clothes. Old and young, strong and decrepit, half-blind or whole deaf, none seemed too miserable objects for service."4 (p. 145) Failure to Con'le to the Support of Comrades in Trouble This piqued Zeng's strongest sentiment against the imperial army. "When I daily ponder over our current military forces," Zeng wrote, "the most shameful and hateful of all aspects is what is expressed by the four characters bai bu xiang jiu [the defeated cannot expect rescue] ."5 The reason for this fateful shortcoming, Zeng argued, was the way the court assembled military units in time of war. Fearful of entrenched, personally bonding loyalty between a superior commander and his soldiers, the Qing court constantly broke up solid troop units and regrouped the men into new ones. Thus, the newly formed units were made up of strangers who felt no obligation to help one another. When a battle occurred, units under the same commander failed to cooperate: "One unit of soldiers is defeated, bleeding like a river, yet the other unit nearby, watchfully smiling, stays put, with no intention of offering help and rescue."6 Jealousy This went far beyond the normal realm of interservice and interunit rivalry. Instead, it had become a deadly disease of the Qing army. In Zeng's analysis, low military pay and insufficient training were responsible for this problem. Lack of Discipline and No Concern for "the People" One historian has noted that "the people of north China feared the Imperial troops more than they feared the rebels."7 The danger of indiscipline lay not just in the ineffectiveness of the troops, but in the alienation of the people from the government, preparing the way for the dynasty's demise. Lack of Civilian Control The banners and the Green Standard Army consisted of professional military men who had grown arrogant and shortsighted. During a crisis such as the Taiping Rebellion, they had proved themselves worthless. Yet it was difficult to impose civilian guidance to counteract the ignorance and incompetence of the imperial army." (Yu 2012, 144-145)

In chapter 7 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what did the Tiannamen Square incident reveal about the supposed new generation of leadership in the China late 1980s?

(p. 144) §3 "Civil-Military Culture in Flux - In 1989, China's civil-military culture was in a state of transition, particularly civil-military format. Specifically, critical to understanding the outcome of the crisis are the role of a small but enormously influential group of elderly communists and the relationship between the military and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). §4 First, although China's aging paramount leader Deng Xiaoping insisted that the reins of power had been successfully handed over to a new, younger generation of leaders, the events of 1989 proved this had not yet occurred.2 By the end of 1988, the PRC's political elders, all veteran communists of the Long March era, were ostensibly either retired or on the verge of retirement. A new younger core of leaders had supposedly stepped to the fore - at least they occupied the most visible positions of authority in the formal hierarchy of the- (p. 145) §1-power structure. In fact, this generation administered the day-to-day affairs of the state, but major policy decisions were still made by the elders. A small circle of influential octogenarians still held unparalleled prestige by virtue of their association with the communist movement since its earliest days. The most important of these men numbered some half a dozen. Most easily recognizable was Deng (b. 1904). Though he was the dominant figure, as the events of 1989 clearly show, Deng was far from being the unchallenged ruler of China. Also extremely powerful were two former generals: State President Yang Shangkun (b. 1907), and Vice President Wang Zhen (b. 1908). Other elders included conservative economist Chen Yun (b. 1905), retired National People's Congress (NPC) Chair Peng Zhen (b. 1902), Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Chair and former general Li Xiannian (b. 1909), Central Advisory Commission Deputy Chair Bo Yibo (b. 1909), and the sole woman - the widow of Zhou Enlai - Deng Yingchao (b. 1904). Chinese often referred to this group as the Gang of Elders. Here they are referred to as "the Elders."3 §2 These elders were dual role elites, a reminder that CCP and the PLA hierarchies, especially at the higher echelons of leadership, remained inextricably intertwined. Over time it has become easier to distinguish between the civilian and military hierarchies and the leaders - especially at the lower levels of the PLA - but the distinction between the two remained blurred at the highest level of political power. Military figures who traced their careers and networks as far back as the 1920s still existed. Old soldiers, such as PRC President Yang, retained strong followings within the PLA and held top-level posts in both party and state bodies with direct responsibility for the PLA. Like Yang, Deng also retained tremendous support and prestige among China's soldiers. Thus, although they held top posts in the party and state apparatus, both could be logically classified as "military men." During the critical months of April, May, and June, Deng and Yang were chair and vice chair, respectively, of both the party Central Military Commission (CMC) and the state CMC." (Scobell 2003, 144-145)

A bastion fort or trace italienne

A fortification in a style that evolved during the early modern period of gunpowder when the cannon came to dominate the battlefield. It was first seen in the mid-15th century in Italy. Some types, especially when combined with ravelins and other outworks, resembled the related star fort of the same era. The design of the fort is normally a pentagon or hexagon with bastions at the corners of the walls. These outcroppings eliminated protected blind spots, called "dead zones", and allowed fire along the curtain from positions protected from direct fire. Many bastion forts also feature cavaliers, which are raised secondary structures based entirely inside the primary structure.

The Battle of Tai'erzhuang (Chinese: 台兒莊會戰; pinyin: Tái'érzhūang Huìzhàn)

A battle of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1938, between the armies of the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan. The battle was the first major Chinese victory of the war. It humiliated the Japanese military and its reputation as an invincible force, while for the Chinese it represented a tremendous morale boost. Tai'erzhuang is located on the eastern bank of the Grand Canal of China and was a frontier garrison northeast of Xuzhou. It was also the terminus of a local branch railway from Lincheng. Xuzhou itself was the junction of the Jinpu railway (Tianjin-Pukou) and the Longhai railway (Lanzhou-Lianyungang) and the headquarters of the KMT's 5th War Zone. Impact of the Battle The defeat was a significant blow to the Japanese military. Being the first major Japanese defeat since the beginning of the war, the battle broke the myth of Imperial Japanese military invincibility, and resulted in an incalculable benefit to Chinese morale. Amid the celebrations of the victory in Hankou and other Chinese cities, Japan initially denied their defeat and ridiculed the reports of the battle for days. It was reported in the foreign newspapers, however. The battle also resulted in significant casualties and losses for the Japanese. The Japanese claim they suffered a total 11, 918 casualties,[4] while the Chinese claim to have annihilated 24,000 Japanese troops[4] in addition to knocking out some 30 tanks. The Chinese also took 719 Japanese troops as POW, and captured large quantities of military supplies, including 31 artillery pieces, 11 armored cars, 8 armored fighting vehicles, 1,000 machine guns and 10,000 rifles.[5][6] Furthermore, the battle became an important symbol of Chinese unity, since the various Chinese units that participated in the campaign were all from a myriad of different cliques, which had been at war with each other merely seven years ago. In particular, the North-western Army, which had played a significant role in fighting Chiang Kai-shek's loyalist forces as part of the anti-Chiang coalition, played a pivotal role in this campaign. Furthermore, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, whom Chiang Kai-shek had previously labelled as rogues and expelled from the KMT for life, took a leading role in commanding the battle.[4] Thirdly, the successful defence bought the Chinese time to withdraw government staff, refugees, factories, and resources in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River westwards from the war areas via Hankou, thus playing a pivotal role in supporting the overall Chinese resistance strategy.[4]

According to advocates of the Confucian Strategic Culture, whta are the priorities of that strategic culture?

According to the Chinese themselves, the Confucian Paradigm ostensibly led to a preference for non-violent solutions to issues of state security. While force is an option, it is never supposed to be the preferred option. Instead, the Chinese supposedly prioritized their strategic preferences as follows: 1. Accommodationist: This strategy relies on diplomacy, political trading, economic incentives, balancing alliance behavior, cultural influence, and other non-coercive policies. This strategy implies that Chinese goals exclude the political and/or physical elimination of the enemy and the annexation of their territory. Accommodationist strategy assumes no conflict is zero-sum (only ending with the total destruction of one party), so negotiation, compromise, and non-violent means can work. 2. Defensive: This grand strategy is more coercive in the sense that it involves the use or threat of force. However, it relies primarily on static defense along an external boundary. When force is used, the goal is not to annex territory or destroy the enemy's political leadership and/or the enemy state itself. Defensive strategy is based on deterrence through denial or limited punishment. 3. Offensive/Expansionist: This strategy is highly coercive, relying primarily on the offensive, preventive, preemptive, or punitive uses of military force beyond one's borders. The strategic goal is total victory and the political destruction of the adversary, including the possible annexation of at least some territory. But it is not necessarily imperialist in nature - the ultimate goal can still be a return to the political or territorial status quo.

At the beginning of the 19th century, what were the Qing Bannerman?

At the beginning of the 19th century the Qing court still relied on the hereditary Manchu Banners for its military forces. These numbered more than 250,000 men, organized in garrisons located in the capital region and all the major centers in China. The bulk of the Manchu forces were concentrated near the capital - as one might expect given the foreign nature of the regime. There were strong garrisons in the north-west, a traditional source of trouble, but the garrisons within China were located in important political, economic, and communication centers. The deployment of Banner garrisons within China indicates that the Manchus' primary concern was deterring or suppressing Han Chinese rebellions. The 19th century organization of the Banner forces remained the same as it had been in the pre-conquest period. Membership was hereditary, and in theory all Manchu men were enrolled in a Banner. When the Court needed to mount a military operation it would call upon the various garrisons to provide companies of Bannermen (niru), and these would be cobbled together into an ad hoc army for the duration of the campaign. When not engaged in active service, the Bannermen were supposed to be training in the traditional military arts. To protect their martial ethos from the enervating effects of sinicization, they were banned from marrying Chinese or engaging in trade. The so-called "Tartar cities"were ethnic Manchu enclaves surrounded by larger Chinese populations. These Banner forces were originally very effective, and allowed the Manchus to not only conquer China, but subjugate Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet as well. But they were only as good as they had to be.

Based on the 3 assumptions of Chinese culture, what strategy did the Chinese devise to deal with the nomads?

Based on these assumptions, the Chinese devised a strategy that appears to be derived directly from Confucian Strategic Culture: "To control barbarians the sage ruler punished and resisted them when they came [to invade China], and prepared and guarded against them when they left. If, attracted by China's civilization, they came to offer tribute, they would be treated with courtesy, and kept under loose rein without severing the relationship, so that the blame of being crooked would always be on them." The first part is of course a Defensive strategy, while the second is an Accommodationist strategy. But where is the Offensive/Expansionist strategy. Scholar who believe that the Chinese did/do possess a Confucian Strategic Culture argue that this is a deliberate omission. However, there are very practical reasons for rejecting Offensive Strategies.

What was warfare like in Mencius' time? What did Mencius say about warriors, warlike rulers, and those who serve such rulers?

By Mencius' time, warfare had become both endemic and more brutal. The horrible impact of the unrelenting warfare is reflected in his words: There are men who say, 'I am skillful at marshalling troops, I am skillful at conducting a battle!' These are great criminals!" "When a ruler failed to practice humane government, all those ministers who enriched him were rejected by Confucius. How much more would he have rejected those who are vehement to fight for their rulers? When they fight for territory, they slaughter so many people that the fields are full of them. When they fight for a city, they slaughter so many people that the city is full of them. This is what is called leading on the land to devour human flesh. Death is not enough for such a crime! Therefore those who are skillful in fighting should suffer the heaviest punishment." In other words, warlords, generals, and those who lead armies, are murderers. These excerpts still stand as the most scathing Confucian indictment of both war and warriors! In fact, this passage was used to show that Confucius was fundamentally opposed to the use of force in human affairs by many Confucians.

What is Strategic Culture?

Definition: "Strategic Culture refers to the idea that there are consistent and persistent historical patterns in the way particular states (or state elites) think about the use of force for political ends. That is, different states have different predominant sets of strategic preferences that are rooted in the 'early' or 'formative' military experiences of the state or its predecessor, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and state elites as these develop through time. Ahistorical or 'objective' variables such as technology, capabilities, levels of threat, and organizational structures are all of secondary importance: it is the interpretive lens of strategic culture that gives meaning to these variables."

What are the two types of overall commanders that emerged during teh time of the Spring and Autumn Era, and the Warring States Era?

FIRST, there was the battlefield commanders, who would lead armies directly in the battlefield. THEN, there were the strategic theorists, who specialized in military strategy, grand strategy, politics, and philosophy of war.

What is the PRC's nuclear weapons program like now?

The PRC now has a small but potent nuclear deterrent based on ICBMs,L/MRBMs, SLBMs, and Cruise Missiles. China has "sort of" renounced the first use of nuclear weapons, but the variety of systems coupled with sophisticated deception and concealment efforts ensures that it has a second strike capacity for deterrent purposes.

¶2 "... The outcome of the campaign is bound to be unsuccessful if the underlying motive does not conform to the principle of righteousness. Any other motive would fail to gain the support of the population, which is of principal concern in Master Wu. ..." (Van Els 2013, 20)

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, throughout the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period, under what circumstances could the resort to arms be considered justified and fully legitimate?

¶2 "The answer most put forward during the Warring States period, and which had acquired hegemonic status by early imperial times, was fully consistent with the story of the battle of Muye. The legitimate war was a righteous war that found its justification in the moral differential between the two combatants, and above all in the difference in moral character between their leaders.4[4.] As on the field of Muye, it was virtue pitted against vice, the cruel, the impious tyrant challenged by the benevolent ruler determined to relieve the suffering of the "black-headed people." In such a confrontation the triumph of righteousness was often thought to be preordained, the inevitable consequence of either divine sanction or natural law--which was not clearly distinguished from moral principles." (Graff 2016, 196)

In Chapter 1 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what happened to the advancement of CHinese weaponry compared to the advancement of European weaponry?

#3 "During the seventeenth century, European and Asian weaponry continued to advance on a par, but this situation changed rapidly by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century with rifled guns and the bayonet, which allowed for the more efficient use of each solider and promoted new tactics.4 With rifles, the effective field of fire for infantry increased from 100-200 yards to 600-800 yards, which gave troops added protection from cavalry charges. With an attached bayonet, often called the "queen of arms," there was also a "revolution in warfare" in infantry combat, since a foot soldier could be equipped to both shoot and fight hand-to-hand. The bayonet was soon the- (p. 4) #1-"sole weapon fit for desperate close combat."5 Finally, in line with rapid advances in military technology, tactics and strategy were also forced to change dramatically. Geoffrey Parker has identified three elements that resulted from this change: "a new use of firepower, a new type of fortification, and an increase in army size."6 Napoleon Bonaparte was perhaps the most famous of the new strategists, and soon pioneered the principles of "concentration of forces," "maneuver," and "combined action."7 #2 It was in these quickly evolving areas of modern weapons, tactics, and strategy that CHina lagged behind. According to William McNeill, this was no accident but was government policy: "Only the Far East remained apart, owing to Chinese and Japanese governmental policy which deliberately restricted European trade."8 These modernizing changes took place just as China's Manchu-led Qing Dynasty was reaching its highest peak under the Qianlong Emperor (1736-95). During his sixty years on the throne, QIanlong oversaw the destruction of the Central Asian Olod Khan and the subjugation of the Zunghars.9 As a result of his military victories, the Chinese Empire permanently absorbed Xinjiang in 1768. Other military endeavors included the suppression of rebellions within China and on Taiwan, and large-scale campaigns to attempt to subjugate Burma and Vietnam. Although not always successful, during Qianlong's reign the Chinese Empire increased to its largest extent. #3 Immediately after the Qianlong Emperor retired in 1795, however, the Empire faced a series of domestic rebellions by ethnic minorities, secret societies, and sects under the Jiaqing Emperor (1796-1820) and his successor Daoguang (1820-50). This was not atypical, and David Ralston stated that "the system of rule which the Manchus had instituted had begun to deteriorate by the early nineteenth century ... a process experienced by every preceding dynasty."10 The first of these was the Miao Revolt (1795-1806), the second was the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1805), and the third was by the Eight Trigram Sect (1813). Although the Qing succeeded in putting down all three uprisings, in addition to quelling Muslim uprisings in Xinjiang during the 1820s,11 this era of rebellion led to incredible destruction and to massive economic dislocation. They also called the dynasty's "Mandate of Heaven" into question. #4 To reassure the primarily Han Chinese populace of the validity of the Manchu rule and to -re-establish order within China, the Qing Court became even more traditional in its governing and thinking. Unfortunately for China, this era of Qing conservatism occurred just as military reform in Europe was speeding up; the Industrial Revolution in England, in particulr, was to usher in dramatic changes. It was in the immediate aftermath of these rebellions that China was to experience its first military defeat in its encounters with the West, as the British traversed half the globe to subdue China in the Opium War." (Ellleman 2007, 3-4).

When did humans first start to settle in villages in the area now known as the Yellow River Valley?

Approximately 10,000 years ago, humans first started to settle in villages with a lifestyle based on simple agriculture and the domestication of livestock. Archeologists have discovered evidence of variety of different culture groups living in the north China plain.

What were the practical reasons for the Chinese to reject Offensive strategies when dealing with the nomads?

First, as Liu Bang, founder of the Han, discovered, the hordes of inner Asian horsemen are very hard to pin down. Even the great Martial emperor Han Wu Di only succeeded in driving them away from China's frontiers. The problem was the very different styles of fighting. The Chinese fielded huge but cumbersome infantry armies made up of peasant conscripts. Brave and effective when defending fortified positions, these troops were out of their depth in the steppes. Once on nomad turf, the Chinese were sitting ducks. Aside from the difficulties inherent in using infantry to fight cavalry, the Chinese also suffered from logistical difficulties. The further their armies moved into the steppes, the more difficult it became to supply them. Long, cumbersome supply trains made a perfect target for fast-moving horsemen, and if they succeeded in cutting off a Chinese army from its supplies, disas ter loomed. The Chinese learned at great cost that offensive operations into the steppes were: 1)very expensive, 2)very risky, and 3)not necessarily very effective. The problem was that few nomads were stupid enough to get in the way of a Chinese army. Instead, they harassed, pillaged if the opportunity presented its elf, and then disappeared into the steppes. In the end, after great expense in blood and treasure, the expeditions at best secured a temporary peace that would last only until the nomads regrouped. The costs might be justifiable if the operations added valuable new territories to the empire, but the lands outside of China were not deemed worthy of annexation. So the lack of Offensive strategies is really just An indication of what Sun Zi would call common sense. Why persist with offensives into the steppes if they simply did not deliver rewards commensurate with the risks and costs?

What was the Shang dynasty political structure?

The Shang empire was built around a feudal structure, with the Shang king acting as overlord. He was the most powerful of the lords, but when he waged war - either against rebellious lineages or non-Chinese tribes - he had to call on his vassals to provide him with additional chariots and foot soldiers.

"According to historiographical sources, Wu Qi, a native of Wei, was educated in the school tradition of Confucius. He espoused Confucian Principles such as "humaneness" and "righteousness", but also understood that social and political stability depend both on sound government and on military vigilance. Hence he immersed himself in military-strategic thought. In the career that followed, Wu Qi served several states as a general and an official, until aversion to his policies and envy over his growing influence eventually led to his death.10[10.]" (Van Els 2013, 16)

What are some of the connections between Maoist guerrilla warfare and the theories of Sun Zi in terms of the dimensions of war?

1. All war involves both a military and a political dimension - to forget either one is to court defeat! As Sun Zi noted: "The Dao causes the people to be fully in accord with the ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger." A regime that enjoys the support of the people will be much stronger than one that does not. Guerrillas must actively seek to undermine the credibility of the enemy while increasing their own popularity. The political dimension is often more important than the military dimension. Sun Zi stressed the principle of preservation, noting that "Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence." Given that many guerrilla wars were in fact civil wars, the guerrillas had a vested interest in minimizing the bloodshed and destruction. One way of subjugating the enemy is to wage a political campaign designed to demoralize the troops and drive a wedge between the government and the people. If properly executed, the political campaign alone might alleviate the need for a military struggle. Mencius claimed that "If the ruler of a state loves benevolence, he will have no enemy in the kingdom!" The reverse is equally true!

Just how important did Guan Zi consider military power?

• The Guan Zi (管子 Book of Master Guan) was written long after Guan Zhong's death, but it incorporates much of his thought. In particular, it notes the importance Guan Zhong attached to military power in a dangerous age: "Nothing is more important than the armed forces in determining whether a prince is despised or respected or whether his state is safe or endangered. The reason for this is that when punishing an aggressor state, it is necessary to use armed forces. When restraining perverse people, it is necessary to apply punishments. Thus the armed forces are used externally to punish aggression and internally to restrain wickedness. Therefore armed forces are the primary factor in ensuring respect for the ruler and the safety of the state. They are indispensable!" Moreover, the ruler had to keep military affairs in mind at all times: "If the ruler wishes to put war making aside, the ministers and advisors will not venture to speak of weapons. Thus internally he will not know whether the state is in order or in confusion, and externally he will not know whether the feudal lords are strong or weak. Accordingly, fortress walls will collapse and no one will repair them, armor will deteriorate and weapons will decay, and no one will maintain them. Hence, defense preparations will disintegrate."

(p. 81) ... §3 The Paramount Leader. The opinion of China's top civilian leader, Mao, was critical in Beijing's decision to dispatch troops to Korea. Evidence of the extent- (p. 82) §1-of the chairman's preoccupation with the situation in Korea and his considerable involvement in the most minor details of Beijing's response is overwhelming.15 The decision was a difficult one for Mao, who, although having reached a decision in August that in principle China would probably have to intervene in Korea,16 wavered on the actual decision until virtually the last minute. According to acting Chief of General Staff Nie Rongzhen, Mao "pondered deeply for a long time and from many different angles before he finally made up his mind."17 According to many accounts, the chairman had all but made up his mind on October 1 after receiving an urgent telegram from North Korean leaders Kim and Pak Hon Yong requesting that Chinese troops intervene. At an enlarged Politburo Standing Committee meeting the following day, Mao stated that China should intervene but left undecided the timing of the operation and the appointment of a military commander.18 §2 But it was another week before Mao finally issued the formal order (on October 8) after convincing himself and other top officials, following days of deliberation and discussion with Chinese civilian and military leaders, that China had no choice but to intervene. It was also on this date that Mao informed Kim of China's decision to assist Korea.19 Nevertheless, after receiving an October 10 telegram from Zhou Enlai in Moscow reporting that Joseph Stalin had decided against providing air support for the intervention, on October 12 Mao instructed Commander Peng Dehuai of the CPV to postpone the intervention. Mao directed Peng and Gao Gang, the CCP boss of Manchuria, to hurry to Beijing for urgent consultations.20 During the period October 11-13, Mao did not sleep, pondering "a most difficult decision." 21 Finally, on October 13, Mao reaffirmed his decision.22" (Scobell 2003, 81-82)

The Shang dynasty (Chinese: 商朝; pinyin: Shāngcháo) or Yin dynasty (殷代; Yīndài)

According to traditional historiography, ruled in the Yellow River valley in the second millennium BC, succeeding the Xia dynasty and followed by the Zhou dynasty. The classic account of the Shang comes from texts such as the Book of Documents, Bamboo Annals and Records of the Grand Historian. According to the traditional chronology based on calculations made approximately 2,000 years ago by Liu Xin, the Shang ruled from 1766 to 1122 BC, but according to the chronology based upon the "current text" of Bamboo Annals, they ruled from 1556 to 1046 BC. The Xia-Shang-Zhou Chronology Project dated them from c. 1600 to 1046 BC. The Shang dynasty is the earliest dynasty of traditional Chinese history supported by archaeological evidence. Excavation at the Ruins of Yin (near modern-day Anyang), which has been identified as the last Shang capital, uncovered eleven major royal tombs and the foundations of palaces and ritual sites, containing weapons of war and remains from both animal and human sacrifices. Tens of thousands of bronze, jade, stone, bone, and ceramic artifacts have been found. The Anyang site has yielded the earliest known body of Chinese writing, mostly divinations inscribed on oracle bones - turtle shells, ox scapulae, or other bones. More than 20,000 were discovered in the initial scientific excavations during the 1920s and 1930s, and over four times as many have been found since. The inscriptions provide critical insight into many topics from the politics, economy, and religious practices to the art and medicine of this early stage of Chinese civilization.[2] SOURCES 2 Keightley, David N. (2000), The Ancestral Landscape: Time, Space, and Community in Late Shang China (ca. 1200-1045 B.C.), China Research Monograph, 53, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, ISBN 978-1-55729-070-0.

In general, what was the system of leadership among the nomads?

Any man could claim the leadership, but he would have to demonstrate his ability to guide the tribe through the dangerous world of the steppe. If he was a good raider and had a knack for finding food and water for the herds, then his hold on power was likely secure- for a while. But anyone could challenge him at any time, and if the majority supported the challenger, that was it. While this guaranteed that only the most talented rose to the position of leader, it made tribal politics inherently unstable. This effectively prevented tribes from collaborating in groups large enough to pose a serious threat to China. But this could change when a charismatic leader emerged, and if this coincided with a period of Chinese weakness (internal rebellions, dynastic change, etc), then a large scale invasion was a real possibility.

What "external" factors in a security environment motivate armies to change in a REACTIVE fashion?

Armies are by nature "rival institutions" - simply put, this means armies are designed to cope with "rivals", and the nature of one's "rivals' plays a large part in determining how an army is organized and equipped, and how it fights. Changes in a country's security environment can precipitate corresponding REACTIVE responses in military technology, organization, and operational doctrine. Sometimes these responses occur in a timely fashion before they are needed, but all too often the changes come about only after painful and bloody lessons on the battlefield. Of course, if there are no changes in a country's security environment, then there is little incentive to embrace changes in organization, weapons or doctrine.

Aside from specializing the art of war, what was another way for a man of talent to get ahead during the Warring States Era? What was the legacy of these men?

Aside from service as a soldier or strategist, there was another way for an ambitious man to get ahead in this turbulent age. Given the demands of Total War, rulers also sought out men of learning who offered new insights into the art of governing. It became common practice for self-proclaimed philosophers to travel from court to court in searcH of patrons. These men peddled their ideas in the hope that some ruler could be persuaded to appoint them to high office, or any other job, where they would be able to put these ideas into action The work of the most influential thinkers in this period eventually formed the basis of the major ways of thought in ancient and imperial China. The first of these great thinkers was Confucius. He was followed by others, such as Mencius, Mo Zi, Xun Zi, Lao Zi, and Han Fei Zi, all of whom left a lasting mark on Chinese social, political, and philosophical thought. Along the way they also influenced military thought in surprising ways.

What kinds of rules governed warfare during teh Spring and Autumn Era?

Based on writings like Zuo Commentary, in the early Spring and Autumn Era, the chariot remained dominant. The ancestral cult meant that a key part of propitiating the ancestors was to burn incense, and set out trays of fruit and chicken, every ten days to the ancestors. To add to this sacrifice meant bringing a victory home to the ancestors. War was very much an affair between gentlemen, with a ritual aspect to it, and strict codes of conduct governed battle. There were rules in place designed to minimize the costs that battle would take upon the aristocratic lineages. For example, killing a wounded foe was taboo. Also, chasing down and killing a fleeing enemy was also forbidden.

Briefly, what is the Confucian Consensus on Warfare?

Between Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi, a "Confucian Consensus" on warfare can be seen: 1. The universe and mankind are governed by an impersonal but willful Heaven (tian) 2. Heaven wills that men be happy and orderly in accord with cosmic harmony (the "Way" or Dao) 3. Rulers have a responsibility to manifest illustrious virtue [明明德] in order to promote harmony. For Xunxi, the best way to promote harmony is educate people and provide them with positive examples. For the Confucians in general, the best way to secure one's throne is to rule in a virtuous and benevolent fashion. 4. But there will always be evildoers - the incorrigibly wicked, violent, and unruly. They are largely immune to virtue and will only respond to force. 5. But force is legitimate only when authorized by the Son of Heaven, and it must serve to promote the greater good and set things right - this is China's "Just War" doctrine.

According to Johnston, what strategic culture explains China's un-Confucian behavior?

For Johnston, the perplexing conflict between China's Confucian Strategic Culture and its actual behavior can be explained without rejecting Strategic Culture. Johnston asserts that the other Strategic Culture- the Parabellum Strategic Culture - accounts for China's un-Confucian behavior. Moreover, the political/strategic environment that gave rise to the Bingjia and their theories bears a striking resemblance to the anarchic interstate system at the heart of the Structural Realist model. As a result, the Bingjia understanding of the role of war, the nature of the enemy, and the efficacy of force closely corresponds with the assumptions of Structural Realism. They therefore behave as Structural Realists! This similarity is what prompted Johnston to coin the term "Cultural Realism" - this captures the idea that China's operational (as opposed to idealized) Strategic Culture was shaped in an anarchic interstate environment that generated Realist responses.

Did Mao agree with the PLA generals assessment of the outcome of the Korean War?

For Mao, Korea was a one-off case - he did not envision needing to wage war outside of China. Mao feared imperialist aggression. In keeping with his theory of Protracted War/People's War, Mao believed that China's best defense was to lure any attacker in deep, where they would become bogged down in endless battles and a hostile human sea!

For Mencius, what is the importance of Kings Wen and Wu?

For Mencius, Kings Wen and Wu are important for two reasons. First, they set the standard for rule by virtue. Second, they demonstrate that the power of virtue is superior to military power: "When King Wu punished Yin [another name for the Shang], he had only 300 chariots of war and 3000 soldiers. The King said 'Do not fear. Let me give you repose. I am no enemy of the people!' Upon hearing this the people of Yin bowed their heads to the earth, like the horns of animals falling off." Note the use of the word "punish". This is not a rebellion, but a punishment. Mencius also cites the example of the sage-king Tang who founded the Shang: "When he was executing his work of correction in the south, the primitive tribes of the north murmured. When he was executing it in the east, the primitive tribes of the west murmured. Their cry was, 'Why does he make us last?'" [note he calls Tang's campaign of conquest " work of correction"!] Similarly, here, military force is NOT seen as a conquest, but a work of correction and discipline. The point of this quote is to show that the people, attracted by sage-king Tangs virtue, WANTED to be annexed by the virtous ruler.

How does a good general manipulate the morale, or the "spirit" or "qi" of hsi soldiers?

Like the Legalists, the good general uses rewards And punishments to manipulate qi. With rewards the general must emphasize credibility, and with punishments he must emphasize certainty. When rewards are trusted and punishments inevitable, the commander will be respected and obeyed. Moreover, in issuing rewards, the general focuses on the small, while in imposing punishments he focuses on the great. If even the lower ranks are rewarded, all will strive to earn the favor of their commander. If even the highest officers are punished for mistakes, the entire army will tremble and obey. But the general must also be able to "read" the qi of his men and react accordingly. If his men are cold, hungry, and thirsty, the general cannot enjoy luxuries - instead, he must share their hardships to set an example. But his concern for his troops is utilitarian - the general must not become so attached to his troops he hesitates to put them in harm's way. He nurtures their qi to make them more effective!

What was the goal, or objective, of the 3-stage war?

Mao called this 3-stage war a "Protracted War" for obvious reasons. He was under no illusion the Japanese could be worn down quickly, and he envisioned this process taking at least several years. But his forces would only grow stronger over time while the Japanese forces (and morale) would only get weaker! Time was on his side, and he knew it. The objective was to wage war on two fronts - one military, the other political. Militarily, Mao sought to torment his foes through constant harassment without giving them the satisfaction of a decisive engagement. Politically, Mao sought to mobilize the people for the struggle and woo them away from the enemy while simultaneously eroding enemy morale. Ultimately, Mao aimed to " surround the cities from the countryside". Politically isolated and harassed militarily, the enemy would be forced to retreat to the cities. The guerrillas would control the countryside, building their strength for the final showdown. Mao was under no illusion that guerrillas alone could finish the enemy off. Instead, he argued that by the time the enemy was demoralized and holed up in the cities, the Communist forces would be powerful enough to engage in conventional warfare.

What was Mencius's attitude towards what to do what non-virtuous, tyrannous rulers? What connection does this have with the Mandate of Heaven?

Mencius warned that if a ruler did not practice benevolent government, his people would desert him in droves, weakening his state. Ultimately, Heaven would destroy those rulers who did not cherish the people, for "Heaven sees as the people see, and Heaven hears as the people hear." If the people suffered from misrule, the ruler would suffer Heaven's wrath. When it came to evil rulers who do not take as their first priority the people's welfare, Mencius seems to advocate Regicide, or more accurately, Tyrannicide: The King asked, "Is it all right for a minister to murder his king?" Mencius said, "He who injures humanity is a bandit. He who injures righteousness is a destructive person. Such a person is a mere fellow. I have heard of killing a mere fellow Zhou [Di Xin, the last Shang despot], but I have not heard of murdering the ruler." Mencius accepted the Mandate of Heaven, and believed that popular uprisings against tyrants were manifestations of Heaven's displeasure. ...

What is one of the most glaring weaknesses of the Qing military establishment?

One of the most glaring weaknesses of the Qing military establishment was coastal defense. The Green Standard Army had a naval branch, but it was mostly a river force, with some ships for pirate suppression along the coast. The mighty fleets of Zheng He were a distant memory, and Chinese naval technology had not changed substantially since the 15thcentury. The last major sea-borne threat had come from the "Dwarf" pirates in the 16th century and the Ming-loyalist Koxinga in the 17thcentury. Since then, the coast had not figured in Qing security concerns. This would prove to be a terrible mistake. The Chinese navy would prove to be completely incapable of defending China's coasts. Armed with antiquated fixed guns firing stone shot propelled by poor quality gunpowder, these ships were no match for even the oldest British ships.

What has been Beijing's goal since the early 1980s?

Starting in the early 1980s Beijing has actively sought to accomplish the following: 1. Remedial modernization of the Chinese military through selective purchase of foreign weapons/technology. 2. Build up domestic military-industrial capacity with goal of achieving military self-sufficiency. 3. Build up domestic research and development capabilities so that China will be able to pursue the independent development of new generations of weapons and other military technology. 4. Prepare for warfare under "informationized" conditions.

Briefly, what autobiographical details do we know about Sun ZI?

Sun Zi allegedly lived near the end of the Spring and Autumn era, and was active at the end of the 6th century BCE. He either came from the state of Wu (this is based on a misreading of his given name "Wu" - 武 vs. 吳), or he came from the state of Qi (of Tai Gong and Sima Rangju fame). According to the Shi Ji, he was involved in the 3-way struggle between Wu, Chu, and Yue. He was recruited to serve Wu by Wu Zixu (伍子胥), an adviser to King Helu of Wu. After his successful if bloody audition, Sun Zi served King Helu, but what he actually accomplished is unknown. He is sometimes associated with the Wu campaigns against Chu, but there is little evidence of this, In fact, the absence of any reference to Sun Zi outside his brief bio in the Shi Ji and Wu Yue Qunchiu (Annals of Wu and Yue) led some scholars to speculate that he was not even a real person.

Briefly, what is the history of translating Sun Zi's The Art of War

Sun Zi's Art of War has been known in the west for almost 200 years. It was first translated by a French missionary, was allegedly studied by Napoleon, and supposedly served as Mao Zedong's inspiration. The first serious English translation was published at the beginning of the 20th century. It has since been translated many times (and in many different ways - the curse of classical Chinese is that it is very cryptic and amenable to widely different interpretations.) The text itself is thought to be the oldest military manual (if one accepts the Warring States origin of the Tai Gong and Sima Fa texts).

What conditions are most conducive to technological change?

Technological change, and the advantage that it brings, work best when Army X, who has the advantage, is facing an opponent army with the same type of army. However, when the army is fighting an opponent with a completely different style of fighting, in a different terrain, than that technological advantage may be nullified. For example, the Chinese used fire arrows against the Mongols, but since the Mongols fought primarily using cavalry, and were able to outmaneuver the fire arrows easily, the Chinese technological advantage was nullified.

When does technological change work best?

Why did the Macartney mission fail?

The Chinese authorities persisted in viewing the British as vassals, and dismissed their requests out of hand - China set the rules, and Qianlong would not be swayed by British pleas. His empire needed nothing from the outside world, and the barbarians should be grateful for the privileges he already allowed them. Macartney could not but wonder over the condescension shown by the Chinese, for he knew full well their power was no match for European militarytechnology. He had ample opportunity to study the Qing military establishment and he was not impressed. He admired their ostentatious uniforms, but noted the lack of modern firearms and drill. He was especially contemptuous of Chinese naval power. Macartney knew what the Chinese refused to admit: isolation was no longer an option!

How did the the Mandate of Heaven influence China's view of the lifestyle's of dynasties?

The Mandate of Heaven also came to be seen as central to the idea of the "Dynastic Cycle. The Chinese came to believe that dynasties had lifecycles, just like humans. They would grow and prosper, but eventually they would weaken, at which point they would lose the Mandate of Heaven. The Mandate would be passed on to a new dynasty, thus starting the cycle over again. It was a clever theory, for by definition any successful dynastic challenger would have proved his right to the Mandate - nothing succeeds like success! All military challengers could claim to have the Mandate on their side, thereby legitimizing what would otherwise be treason and regicide.

What triggered China to cross the Yalu River and intervene in the Korean War?

The PRC warned the US (via the Indians) that US forces should not approach the Yalu River (the border with Manchuria), but General MacArthur ignored both the Chinese warnings and President Truman's orders to stop short of the border. When it became obvious that MacArthur would not stop, Mao and his generalsfelt compelled to respond. PLA forces - known as the Chinese People's Volunteers - started to mass on the Manchurian side of the border. US intelligence sources badly underestimated both the size and skill of the Chinese forces, as well as Mao's determination to drive the Americans away from the Yalu. Starting in October 1950, Chinese and American forces clashed, leading to a hurried US/UN retreat out of North Korea.

What is the significance of naming the first rulers of Zhou dynasty Wen and Wu (文 and 武)?

The posthumous names of those who overthrew the last Shang despot have great symbolic value in China, and in the hands of later Confucian scholars this story established key paradigms for dynastic succession and the legitimate use of military force. King Wen, manifesting the power of de [德 virtue], attracted all those who suffered under the Shang. The conduct of the last Shang ruler cost him the Mandate, which was transferred to the Zhou. How do we know they received it? They won, so they must have had it. But King Wen's virtuous power was not enough to do the job - that required King Wu's martial [ wu 武] prowess. But immediately after vanquishing Shang, King Wu had to return to the ways of his father. This idea would become a political axiom for the Chinese, and would resurface frequently in sayings like "That which is won by war can only be retained by civil means." [taken from a phrase in the Spring and Autumn Annals 武王以武得之, 以文持之].

What were some of the dangers of the shift to a professional army?

The shift to a professional army, especially one that involved large numbers of non-Chinese, was inherently risky. The various dynasties attempted to ensure these armies would not become any one commander's personal power base by rotating officers and ensuring that no commander had both military and administrative authority over a region. But this system did not last - gradually commanders asserted more and more independence. They remained in command of their forces for longer periods of time and openly resisted attempts to move them. In both the Later Han and the Tang this process culminated in the creation of " personal armies" ( jia jun 家軍) that belonged to the general rather than the state (bing wei jiang you 兵為將有). These personal armies were a real threat to the central government, but as long as the Court held the purse strings they could still control them. However, in periods of dynastic weakness (late Han, late Tang), commanders could easily usurp administrative control over their commandaries - this gave them control over taxes, which they could divert to cover their own expenses. This would usually culminate in either local Warlordism (where commanders acted as de-facto kings in the areas they controlled) or Praetorianism (where commanders used their military power to threaten the central government). This problem resulted in the fragmentation of the empire following the collapse of the Han dynasty. Powerful military commanders like Cao Cao usurped the power of the last Han ruler and attempted to create their own dynasties. In the era of the Northern and Southern Dynasties (roughly 300-589 CE), military men dominated politics in the north. Both the Sui and the Tang were founded by military men, and the Tang was almost destroyed by the AnLushan rebellion in the mid-8Th Century. An Lushan was a semi-sinicized Inner Asian who acted as a military governor for the Tang, and his revolt was only suppressed with the assistance of other powerful warlords and nomadic tribes, who demanded autonomy and subsidies as the price of their support. In the interregnum between the Tang and the Song (907-960 CE), the 5 dynasties in the north all succumbed to praetorianism. 263

During the Warring States period, what was the consequence of technological developments?

There were also technological developments that propelled changes in the way wars were fought. Two big developments were iron and the crossbow. The introduction of iron around the 4th century BCE made the mass production of cheap but effective weapons possible - a prerequisite for mass armies. The invention of the crossbow also provided conscripts with a deadly but easy to use projectile weapon. Now a peasant could use powerful crossbows, with iron arrows, to take down charioteers.

What is the Thucydides Trap?

This is known as the "Thucydides Trap" - this concept comes from Thucycides' book "The Peleponnesian Wars", a chronicle of the 5th century BCE rivalrybetween Athens and Sparta. This theory holds that if a rising power finds the existing distribution of power unsatisfactory (ie, it has additional aspirations/interests that the status quo powers are unwilling to accommodate) it will become a "revisionist" power that seeks to alter the existing distribution of power. If the status quo powers resist, war is likely or even inevitable. The two classic examples of rising revisionist powers are Germany in the early 20th century, Imperial Japan in the 1920s/1930s - the result was WW1 and WW2 in the Pacific. Will China's rise result in WW3?

What was the origin of Deng Xiaoping's slogan "People's War under Modern Conditions"?

This was not a new slogan - it had first been used in the 1950s by PLA generals who supported Soviet-style modernization. They attempted to get around Mao's stubborn faith in People's War by claiming that the adoption of modern weapons did not change the fundamental strategy. The slogan was revived by Deng, who won the support of the military for his economic reforms by pledging to update their equipment and doctrine - the fact that they had been badly humiliated in Vietnam added urgency to this process. But this was not going to be an easy process - China was in fact decades behind the US and the USSR. Chinese defense industries were handicapped by obsolete technology and poor funding.

In general, what kinds of strategies did the Chinese use, and why?

Until fairly recently both Chinese and Western historians accepted that the Chinese largely stuck to Accommodationist and Defensive strategies, with the odd (and presumably out-of-character) Offensive policy. The assumption was that the Chinese had a cultural preference for the former two over the latter. Recent research has indicated that while the preference might occasionally have been justified in terms of The assumptions inherent in Confucian Strategic Culture ,the real reasons were far more mundane. Offensive strategies were usually risky, expensive, and ineffective, while Accommodationist and Defensive strategies were usually effective in managing the threat under most conditions.

When waging war, what did the Shang kings do to try to get the blessings of the gods?

When waging war, the Shang kings sought the blessing of the highest god Di and the assistance of their ancestors in elaborate religious ceremonies before taking the field against their foes. The role of divination in war would outlast the Shang.

Overall, what does the archaeology of the late Neolithic era, and the accounts of the legendary sage kings, say about contemporary claims that China is inherently pacific?

• Despite claims that Chinese civilization expanded peacefully through the power of cultural attraction - a claim frequently made in later Chinese accounts of their origins - the development of larger political units in the late Neolithic era involved organized violence on an ever-increasing scale. • These larger multi-village/multi-lineage political units - proto-states - were either forged through conquest or founded for mutual protection against the threat of conquest.

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, how are guns manufactured in China during the fourteenth century?

"... As we have seen, weapons in China were usually manufactured in government arsenals under bureaucratic supervision. ..." (Lorge 2017, 69).

"... the core message of both texts is the same: the ruler should not try to actively control his realm, but allow the realm to follow its natural course. ..." (Van Els 2013, 27)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what was the long-term trend of the Northern Song's central army?

"...The long-term trend in the Northern Song was for the central army to become larger and more expensive, while its soldiers became poorer and less capable militarily and its civilian administrators more intrusive and abusive. The relative ease with which the Jurchen Jin conquered Kaifeng and the rest of north China illustrated the decay to the (p. 34) Song military system. ..." (Dreyer 2012, 33-34)

"A second level on which military change shaped the Qing state was in the formation of local militias in the mid-nineteenth century. Philip Kuhn argued that militarization of local elites during the rebellion led them into increasingly powerful political roles and toward growing efforts to influence state activities. 12 The activism of local elites in everything ranging from paramilitary and police functions to tax collection and philanthropy was one of the most important developments in the post-Taiping period, eventually leading to local assemblies and other openly political activities. While local elites had always played significant roles in local politics, the scope and organization of these developments reached new levels, and at least in some areas, such as tax collection, there was a growing reliance on coercion in implementing these roles." (Yu 2012, 170)

In "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution" by Richard S. Horowitz in the 2012 anthology "Beyond the Marble Boat: The Transformation of the Chinese Military, 1850-1911" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 153-174, what iwas the military situation like for the Qing dynasty by the end of the 1850s?

"But by the end of the 1850s the multiple challenges to Qing sovereign authority had pressed the empire's military capacities to their limits and beyond. The regular military forces proved pitifully incompetent in the face of both internal and external military threats. Against the domesic rebels, as the banner and Green Standard armies failed to perform as expected, Qing leaders increasingly turned to large, ramified armies of recruits, which gradually formed several new permanent (or semipermanent) forces, notably the Hunan Army created by Zeng Guofan and the Anhui Army created by Zeng's protege Li Hongzhang. These new armies gradually began to gain the upper hand against the Taipings. Qing forces had even more difficulty against the British and French. Only one engagement in the Opium and Arrow wars, the 1859 ambush of British and French flotillas at Dagu in north China, could be regarded as a Qing victory. It resulted in a still more humiliating foreign invasion of north China that forced the emperor to flee Beijing. These military travails against both domestic and foreign opponents led officials such as Wenxiang, Zeng Guofan, and Li Hongzhang to implement the first efforts to adopt Western patterns of military technology and organization." (Yu 2012, 156)

So why did Mao intervene in the Korean War?

"Historical facts teach us that a crisis in Korea has much to do with the security of China. With the lips gone, the teeth would be exposed to the cold; with the door broken, the house itself would be in danger. For the people of China to aid the people of Korea in their struggle against the US is not merely a moral responsibility but also a matter closely related to the vital interests of our own people, a decision necessitated by a need for self-defense. Saving our neighbors at once means saving ourselves. To protect our own country, we must help the people of Korea." Mao Zedong In other words, China's offensive use of force beyond its borders was defensive and intended to "set things right"!

In "State Making and State Breaking" by David A. Graff, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, who were most often the leaders of present uprisings?

"Even among the predatory forces, leadership was seldom in the hands of ordinary peasants. The typical leader of a large, semipermanent bandit gang in the nineteenth or early twentieth century was what one authority has called the "village aspirant," a young man from a relatively well-to-do farm family with perhaps some literacy and ambitions of rising in the world. The ninth-century anti-Tang rebel leader Huang Chao, an unsuccessful candidate in the imperial civil service examination, fits this pattern remarkably well, as does the nineteenth-century Taiping leader Hong Xiuquan. There are also examples from various periods of leadership provided by men who had been local subofficials, military subalterns, or professional criminals such as salt smugglers. Liu Bang, one of the early rebel leaders against the Qin dynasty and the eventual founder of the Han, had been the leader of a unit of one thousand households. Two other early anti-Qin rebels were men of substance in their communities who had been placed in command of a unit of conscripts before they launched their rebellion. Among the leaders of the anti-Yuan rebels in the mid-fourteenth century were cloth merchants, salt smugglers, and Buddhist monks. Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong, the two most important anti-Ming leaders in the 1630s and 1640s, were at least marginally literate and had probably seen some military service. Many of Li's followers were not peasants, but transport workers from the empire's network of post stations who had been let go by the cash-strapped Ming government. In some periods, spiritual leaders and religious beliefs played an important role in mobilizing rebel forces. Although the anti-Qin rebels and the Red Eyebrows do not seem to have been animated by religious visions, the great Yellow Turban revolt against Han rule which erupted in 184 was led by the Daoist master Zhang Jue and his two brothers, who practiced faith (p. 46) -healing and called for confession of sins. The religious element was less prominent in Sui and Tang, but reemerged several centuries later in Buddhist guise. The anti-Yuan rebellions in the 1350s were largely the work of White Lotus sectarians, who believed in the imminent arrival of Maitreya, the Buddha ofthe future. The White Lotus ideology would reappear in several unsuccessful revolts against the Qing dynasty in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Regardless of whether the framework and terminology was Buddhist or Daoist, these ideologies of rebellion shared a common millenarian outlook: The world was seen to be approaching a cosmic turning point when violence would sweep away the iniquitous old order and usher in a new golden age of peace and prosperity for the followers of the rebel movement. The mutant Christian ideology of the nineteenth-century Taiping rebels may be understood as a new variation on a very old theme." (Graff 2012, 45-46)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, how did Hideyoshi's embassies to Korea from 1586 to 1591 pan out?

"In 1586, Hideyoshi sent envoys to the Korea court to ask them to help him in his plan to conquer Ming China. The Koreans rejected this idea, and Japanese envoys continued to attempt to persuade the Korean king for the next few years, without success. The king and his court were concerned about a Japanese invasion, but they were uncertain whether Hideyoshi was really intending to invade or just posturing. On several occasions, Japanese envoys presented the Koreans with Portuguese-style arquebuses, perhaps to demonstrate the sort of high tech weapons they possessed. A Korean embassy to Japan, in turn, presented the Japanese with Portuguese cannons. Neither side was entirely clear on the other's intentions. The Korean court was divided by factions with vastly different assessments of the likelihood of invasion, and both main factions corresponded with the Japanese. The Koreans also understood that Hideyoshi's plan to conquer China was impossible. Hideyoshi, for his part, could not accept the Koreans' unwillingness to assist him, or to recognize his greatness. He was confident that the Chinese would simply flee at the sight of his army. By 1591, Hideyoshi resolved to punish the Koreans on his way to conquering the Ming." (Lorge 2017, 82)

"In the final decades of the dynasty, these two trends-local activism and increasing provincial power-came together. The New Policy reforms eliminated the traditional Confucian-based examination system, which had long attracted ambitious young men to pursue government service and inculcated in them politically safe ethical orientations toward service and loyalty. Now, with no alternative method of becoming involved in the government, many of these young men began to enter the New Armies and were far more literate and far more inclined than earlier Chinese soldiers to be politically active. By 1911 there were significant numbers of men in the New Armies who were increasingly committed to the revolutionary cause." (Yu 2012, 170)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what was the fubing military system?

"In 493 Tuoba Hong, the Northern Wei emperor posthumously titled Xiaowendi, played a trick on his Xianbi clan leaders. Pretending to lead them in an invasion of south China, he instead made them stop at the still impressive ruins of Luoyang, the capital of the Later Han and Western Jin, which he made his own capital. North China had been overrun early in the fourth century by various Inner Asian peoples who diplayed an uncharacteristic hostility to Chinese civilization. After the disorders of this period, the brief stabilization of the Northern Wei in the fifth century as the first of the important "dynasties of conquest" begins the second period of military evolution. The Northern Wei created early forms of the equal field (juntian) land system and the fubing military system that became major institutions under the Sui and Tang dynasties. Most important, the Northern Wei attempted to create a society in which the military skills of the Xianbi would be complemented by bureaucratic and literary skills of the Chinese educated elite. Later dynasties of conquest made the same attempt, and in military matters- (p. 32) Inner Asian influence was important even in dynasties (Sui, Tang, Ming) usually considered Chinese. "After the breakup of the Northern Wei, Yuwen Tai (505-556) and his descendants ruled the northwest first through puppet emperors of Western Wei and then as emperors of the Northern Zhou, and there both the soldier-farmer (fubing) military system and the mixed Chinese and Inner Asian Guanzhong aristocracy that commanded it evolved to provide military means and leaderhip for the Sui and Tang empires. The Yuwen rulers were not of Chinese origin, while the Sui founder and the father of the Tang founder were married to sisters from the Xiongnu Dugu clan. By the end of the sixth century, surnames within the Guanzhong aristocracy did not indicate purely Chinese or Inner Asian ancestry because of intermarriage, and similarly the fubing soldiers included elements capable of fighting on foot or on horseback. Under the fubing system each headquarters (fu) commanded about one thousand farmer-soldiers who could be mobilized for war. In peacetime they were self-sustaining on their land allotments, and were obliged to do tours of active duty in the capital. These tours were usually one month long (two months for the most distant units), and their frequency depended on the distance of each unit from the capital. The fubing soldiers permitted the Sui and Tang founders to conquer China, but attempts at foreign conquest were less consistently successful. Obsessive efforts to subdue the Korean kingdom of Koguryo ultimately cost the second Sui emperor his throne and his life. Tang Taizong (r. 626-649) fought both Turks and Tibetans to peace on favorable terms, but failed to overcome Koguryo. That goal was accomplished by his son Gaozong (r. 649-683), though the final winner was not Tang China but its ally, the southern Korean kingdom of Silla, which succeeded in unifying the entire peninsula under its own rule. Japan, which had supported Paekche, the third Korean kingdom, was alarmed by these developments and responded by imitating the fubing and other Tang institutions in the Taika reforms. Most of the fubing units were located in the northwest, and the system was best suited for the annual campaigning cycle of an expanding empire. Under Empress Wu (r. 684-705) the fubing system declined, and under Xuanzong (r. 712-756) a standing army stationed on the northern frontier evolved in its place. This army reached a strength of half a million men and eighty thousand horses by the 740s. Its Chinese personnel included many men displaced by economic changes since the founding of the Tang, and its non-Chinese personnel included Koreans, Kitan, Turks, and Sogdians. The new standing army thus preserved the Chinese-Inner (p. 33) Asian mixture characteristic of the early Tang, but the old Guanzhong aristocracy ceased to have much involvement with it and its higher ranks came to be filled from within. Having accepted the decline to uselessness of the fubing system, the Tang court had no central army to resist the An Lushan rebellion, and could only counter it by appealing to other frontier commanders whose social background was similar to An Lushan's and who could move swiftly from loyalty to rebellion when their autonomy was challenged. Despite impressive successes by the court, the pattern of regional warlordism continued until the fall of Tang. While the replacement of the fubing system with the standing army was a major discontinuity in China's military development, this discontinuity occurred in a period of peace as a result of a deliberate policy decision of the Tang government. While it led to disorder, it was not caused by defeat." (Dreyer 2012, 32-33)

In "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution" by Maochun Yu in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 135-151, what about the command structure of the Taipings that made them so successful?

"Key to the swift success of the Taiping armed rebellion was the command structure at its highest level. On top of the military echelon was of course Hong Xiuquan himself, who was called the "Heavenly King" (tian wang). Second in command was the "Eastern King," Yang Xiuqing, a for- (p. 137) -mer coal miner and the most brilliant military commander of the Taiping forces. Following Hong and Yang were four other "kings," with equal command power. The stunning cohesiveness of this supreme command is without a doubt the most important factor contributing to the impressive military victories of the Taipings in the early stages of their revolt. As time went by, the tragic erosion of this cohesiveness and the internecine power struggle among the six supreme commanders laid the foundation for the ultimate demise of the Taiping uprising." (Yu 2012, 136-137)

"Master Wen asked: How many ways of being a true king are there? The Old Master answered: "Only one." Master Wen asked: "In the past soome reigned on the basis of the Way and others on the basis of warfare. How can there be only one?" The Old Master answered: "Those who reigned on the basis of the Way were virtuous and those who reigned on the basis of warfare were also virtuous. There are five ways of using the army: there is righteous warfare, reactive warfare, furious warfare, greedy warfare, and arrogant warfare. To punish an oppressor and rescue the weak is called 'righteous.' To have no choice but to rise in arms when the enemy has invaded is called 'reactive.' Not being able to hold back when quarrelling over trivial matters is called 'furious.' To profit from other people's land and desire other people's goods is called 'greedy.' To rely on the sheer size of one's realm and take pride in the sheer number of one's people, while desiring to appear more worthy than one's enemies, is called 'arrogant.' Righteous warfare leads to kingship, reactive warfare to victory, furious warfare to defeat, greedy warfare to death and arrogant warfare to annihilation. Such is the Way of Heaven." (Van Els 2013, 29)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, what was warfare like during the collapse of the Yuan dynasty?

"Once again, warfare in China demonstrated all of the aspects of early modern warfare in Europe. Heavily fortified cities were almost impossible to capture without long sieges, though these sorts of operations were difficult to carry out while fending off the other armies of one's opponent. The various regimes could field armies of a hundred thousand men without exhausting all of their troops. Multiple forces maneuvered over extensive territory fighting pitched battles that often achieved very little territorial gain. The regimes themselves were resilient, possessing enough resources in men and material, and enough political and institutional strength, to withstand serious setbacks. This was important because casualties could be appallingly high, as when Zhu Yuanzhang ambushed Chen Youliang's army near Nanjing in 1360, killing 20,000 men, and capturing a hundred large warships, and several hundred smaller ships along with their crews. Yet Chen returned to the struggle the following year, and even after another naval defeat, was able to rebuild his fleet in 1362." (Lorge 2017, 73)

In "State Making and State Breaking" by David A. Graff, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, how was the Chinese imperial state structured?

"The Chinese imperial state was structured to prevent the emergence of regional power centers that might successfully challenge the authority of the central government. Institutional details varied from dynasty to dynasty, but imperial statesmen were usually well aware ofthe danger posed by a "tail too big to be wagged." During the heyday ofthe Tang dynasty in the early eighth century, for example, there was no regularly established level of administration between the approximately 350 prefectures and the center. The prefectures were grouped into ten province-size "circuits;' but these were provided with itinerant surveillance commissioners rather than real provincial governors. Commanders of local military units who mobilized troops without receiving permission from the capital might face the death penalty. Very similar arrangements for circuits of inspection and the control of troops had prevailed under the Han dynasty more than five hundred years earlier. Even after the emergence of the province as a regular unit of administration under the Ming and Qing dynasties, authority was quite deliberately fragmented. The Qing Green Standard and banner troops belonged to entirely separate structures, and within each province some units reported to the civil governor while others were under the authority of an independent military chain of command. Thanks to measures of this sort, Chinese dynasties were seldom threatened by powerful regional leaders emerging from their own administrative system, unless the exigencies of dealing with a major peasant rebellion had already necessitated a significant devolution of authority to provincial governors and regional military commanders."(Graff 2012, 42)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, how successful was the Great Wall?

"The Great Wall was not a total failure in as much as it did make raiding more difficult for small bands of steppe cavalry. This is hard to quantify, since we are only informed when a raid succeeded in getting through, but the Great Wall considerably raised the stakes for a would-be steppe raider. A force not only had to get through the wall on the way in, it also had to get back through it on the way out, possibly while laden with booty and being pursued. Larger armies were more able to break through, though this was still time consuming, and the wall may have tended to increase the difficulty of raiding so much that only a very serious enemy was willing to make the attempt. The invading Manchu army in the seventeenth century was able to penetrate the Great Wall line seemingly at will, for example, but large armies like those of the Manchus preferred to use the main roads that had strong fortifications blocking strategic passes. Well-garrisoned positions were still extremely difficult to overcome." (Lorge 2017, 75)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, what did the invasions of Korea in 1592-1598 reveal about cannon, handguns, and bombs?

"The clash between differently armed gunpowder armies in Korea makes it clear how critical cannon, handguns, and bombs were in East Asian warfare in the late sixteenth century. Guns became more important over the course of the conflict, though each side tended to emphasize its manner of gun use, rather than adopt the methods of its opponents. This was not necessarily the paralyzing effect of a given group's military culture; all sides could point to victories won using their particular methods. Neither side felt compelled to revise its technology, only its tactics. Here again, the results of the battlefield reinforced preconceived notions of warfare. People learned the lessons they were inclined to learn, and even those were strongly affected by their political implications." (Lorge 2017, 86)

In "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution" by Richard S. Horowitz in the 2012 anthology "Beyond the Marble Boat: The Transformation of the Chinese Military, 1850-1911" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 153-174, what effect did defeat in the SIno-Japanese War do to the Qing dynasty's military policy?

"The crushing defeat in the Sino-Japanese War initiated radical changes in military policy. In the aftermath of the war, with its best armed forces destroyed and its prestige in tatters, the Qing government found itself in a position of profound weakness. Long unwilling to give railway and mining concessions to foreign companies, the Qing government now found it could do little to resist foreign demands. From 1897 to 1899 a dramatic scramble for concessions saw the empire carved into putative spheres of economic influence for foreign powers. Within these spheres foreigners demanded and received rail and mining concessions, naval bases, and other benefits. In this context increasingly ambitious efforts were made to restore China's military strength, this time by building new armies from scratch The first of the new armies were sponsored by two officials, Yuan Shikai in north China and Zhang Zhidong in Hubei. In 1895 Zhang had established a new "Self-Strengthening Army" consisting of thirteen battalions of carefully selected men who were organized along European patterns and trained by a team of thirty-five German officers and noncommissioned- (p. 164) -officers. This force included cavalry, infantry, artillery, and engineering units, and also had medical and support personnel. Zhang also created a new military academy in Nanjing in 1896 to provide trained officers for his new army. When he was transferred back to his former position of governor-general of Hunan and Hubei, Zhang created another military academy in Wuchang and began to reform the troops in these two provinces. Meanwhile, at the behest of the increasingly influential Manchu grand councilor Ronglu, in 1895 Yuan Shikai, a former protege of Li Hongzhang, began to establish a new army to prop up the weakened defenses of north China. This "newly created army" was to total some 7,000 men, trained by German instructors." (Yu 2012, 163-164)

In "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution" by Maochun Yu in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 135-151, what was the fundamental difference between the Taiping rebels and most other peasant uprisings?

"The fundamental difference between the Taiping rebels and most other peasant uprisings in Chinese history lies in the unique vision of their leaders. The Taipings were by and large inspired by prototypical Christian ideas, dedicated to eradicating "demons" and "Confucianists." Theirs was an ecumenical vision with a long-range strategy that aimed to create a brand-new "world order" for "the new times." It was just such a vision that propelled the rebels to launch a widespread, large-scale assault on the government forces over a vast region of China. They were seldom concerned only with local campaigns. To them, every military campaign served the cosmic purpose of creating a new world order. Within a couple of years, the Taipings moved triumphantly from the back country of Guangxi province to central China, taking Quanzhou, Daozhou, Yuezhou, Hanyang, Hankou, and Wuchang. By the end of 1852, the Taipings had developed an army of over 200,000 troops. In April 1852, the Taiping high command met in Daozhou to map out a grand strategy. It was decided that instead of going straight to Beijing, the Taipings would aim to capture Nanjing toward the mouth of the Yangzi River." (Yu 2012, 137)

In "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution" by Richard S. Horowitz in the 2012 anthology "Beyond the Marble Boat: The Transformation of the Chinese Military, 1850-1911" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 153-174, what effect did defeat in the SIno-Japanese War do to the Qing dynasty's military policy?

"The military reforms were only strengthened by the disaster [of the Boxer Rebellion]. Prominent provincial officials such as Zhang Zhidong, Liu Kunyi, and Yuan Shikai had refused to support the Boxers and stood aside as the foreign invasion proceeded. In early 1901, after the treaty was settled, the Empress Dowager began to initiate thoroughgoing reforms in government, education, and the military, known as the New Policy reforms. The military aspects- (p. 165) -of these reforms specifically built on the earlier efforts of Zhang Zhidong and Yuan Shikai. Yuan's army was rapidly expanded to form the Beiyang (or "northern") Army, which soon established itself as the preeminent military force in China. Provincial governments were ordered to establish armies along Western lines and to set up military academies to produce professionally trained officers. Separate standing armies, reserves, and gendarmerie divisions were to be created. The traditional military examination system was suspended and discussion of either dissolving or reforming the traditional Green Standard and banner armies began; in the end these were often redesignated as reserve units. Response to the New Army reforms varied from province to province. Progress was greatest where strong, reform-minded governors-general were in place, as, for example, in Zhili under Yuan Shikai and Hunan and Hubei under Zhang Zhidong. Elsewhere the process was less dramatic: Existing units were reorganized and officers trained in nascent military academies. Foreign (often Japanese) advisors were hired to train Chinese officers, and occasionally to drill Chinese troops." (Yu 2012, 164-165)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what did the principle of hierarchy underlying the graded lists of ritual attributes suggest about the aristocracy?

"The principle of hierarchy underlying the graded lists of ritual attributes awarded to the different levels of the aristocracy also suggests a notion of a common "nobility" to which honors or titles were subsequently added. Each higher level was granted more musicians, tripods, coffin layers, or sacrifices, but the lowest level "shi" had some number or form of every attribute. The king was at the top of the nobility and the "shi" at the bottom, but the language and ritual procedures of the period insisted that the two shared a common noble nature, that they were divided in degree and not in kind." (Lewis 1990, 32)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, when the first invasion of Korea ended, how did the diplomacy in the aftermath resolve the situation?

"The years of farcical diplomacy that followed need not concern us here, but it seems clear from most accounts that not only did the negotiators repeatedly deceive their own masters, but Hideyoshi also did not really understand the military situation in Korea. The Japanese leader seems not to have grasped that his armies had been, in fact, badly beaten on several occasions, and that his grand design was entirely in ruins. Hideyoshi ordered a second invasion of Korea, this time to punish the Koreans, who he felt had slighted him, and to vent his fury at the Ming's unwillingness to acknowledge his greatness. It was a pointless and tragic military adventure, even more filled with Japanese atrocities against the Koreans." (Lorge 2017, 85)

In "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution" by Maochun Yu in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 135-151, what were some of the reforms that Zeng worked out in the 1850s and 1860s to deal with the Taiping Rebellion, the cultivation of moral character in all military personnel and motivating troops?

"Third, and perhaps the most significant element in Zeng's military thought and practice, was the cultivation of moral character in all military personnel. This was strictly along the lines of Confucian virtues and mores. For the general, benevolence toward both his soldiers and the people was crucial. He had to be upright, generous, diligent, and caring, both a righteous ruler and a gentleman of good personal attributes. Among the various strands of Confucian virtues, the most important to Zeng was the value of family. A superior officer was expected to act like a father to his soldiers. Zeng often communicated with his officers in such a fashion. The establishment of a strong relationship between a benevolent superior officer and his subordinates was deemed essential in accomplishing military goals. This hierarchical structure of human relationships rooted in Confucian ethics poses a sharp contrast with the ultraegalitarian rigidity of the Taiping military order. Instead of being motivated by an abstract ideology like that of the Taipings, a soldier in the Hunan Army was taught to fight not necessarily for the court, nor for his province, nor even for Zeng Guofan, but for his family, his parents, his brothers and sisters. To strengthen the connection between a soldier on the move and his family back home, superior officers were given the power to send a significant portion of a soldier's stipend directly to his family. Misconduct and disgraceful behavior such as desertion or cowardice in battle was interpreted as bringing shame on the family- (p. 148) -and the clan. io The cultivation of a morally sound fighting man was the essence of Zeng's military reform." (Yu 2012, 147-148)

In Chapter Two of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what is this chapter about?

"This chapter will focus specifically on the means by which the political order was recreated through the changing patterns of military service, and how modified forms of the old, aristocratic patterns of violence were used to establish fixed hierarchies and secure social control in the emerging territorial states. With the rise of universal military service, warfare and the army became a mechanism for hierarchically organizing and controlling the entire population. Blood oaths gradually became emotive "bonds" that formed the basis of legal codes and established the absolute supremacy of rulers overruled. Sacrifice became a "theatrical" performance in which men defined their social roles by acting them out in choreographed ceremonies. Vengeance, which had been the root of feud and civil war among the aristocracy, was celebrated as a "debt of blood" that defined and hallowed ties of kinship and service. In this way, patterns of approved killing and collective violence created or reinforced each of the social relationships that made up the new order." (Lewis 1990, 54).

In Chapter 1 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what was, briefly, the Miao Revolt (1795-1806)?

"Throughout much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Qing had to cope with Miao rebellions. The Miao were aboriginal tribes scattered throughout central and western China. They were especially concentrated in Guizhou Province, where about 40-60 percent of the population was composed of minority groups. The main point of friction between the Miao and the Manchus were Qing attempts to bring the Miao leaders within the regular government bureaucracy. Not only did this process interfere with the autonomy of the Miao tribes, but Han settlers and merchants usually followed close behind, which merely created greater ethnic friction. As a result, in 1795 an enormous Miao revolt broke out along the Hunan-Guizhou border. After eleven years, the Qing military finally subdued this revolt in 1806." (Ellemen 2007, 7)

"Yet the days of the Taiping were numbered, despite the many impressive military victories they had scored against government forces by the end of 1859. What the Taipings had thus far fought against were mainly the imperial armies of the Eight Banners and the Green Standards, which were notorious for their incompetence and corruption. After the Northern Front and the Southern Front were beaten by the Taipings, the Qing court was forced to place the fate of the empire into the hands of newly formed militia armies led by examination degree-holders and local elites (gentry). The most important of these forces was the Hunan Army led by the scholar-general Zeng Guofan. Zeng was appointed military governor of the Jiangsu and Jiangxi area in the wake of the demolition of the Southern Front in 1859. The Taipings were no match for Zeng, who combined brilliant military strategy with unique methods of training and leadership. Due to increasing friction between the Taipings and the Western powers in the coastal areas, Zeng was able to enlist the help of foreigners in Shanghai and other treaty ports to harass the rebels. The first important victory came to Zeng when he outmaneuvered the Taipings and captured the key city of Anqing in September 1861, which left the vast upstream flank of Nanjing extremely vulnerable to attack. In February 1862, Zeng Guofan launched his final campaign against Nanjing. It lasted over two years, with many bloody battles and troop movements on an epic scale. As the noose tightened around Nanjing, Hong Xiuquan died suddenly of illness on June 1, 1864, leaving his sixteen-year-old son as the new head of the Taiping regime. Fifty days later, on July 19, 1864, Zeng Guofan's artillery barrage finally destroyed a major section of the city wall. The government forces flooded into the city and, amid scenes of slaughter, all of the major Taiping leaders were captured and executed. The fifteen-year ordeal of the Qing dynasty was finally over." (Yu 2012, 141)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", how is the Opium war characterized?

#1 "The Opium War is best characterized as a trade war, during which the Chinese tried and failed to use traditional military methods to counter Britain's modern weaponry, strategy, and tactics. ..." (Ellemen 2007, 13)

In Chapter 1 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what was the primary responsibility of the Chinese army?

#2 "... ALthough the Qing frequently used their armies for foreign conquest among China's tributaries and to quell border uprisings, the day-to-day responsibility of the military was to oppose domestic and ethnic uprisings. This fact remained constant during the almost 200-year period from 1795 to 1989, from the Miao Revolt to the Tiananmen Incident.12 ..." (Ellleman 2007, 5).

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", describe the outcome of the "Battle of Kowloon" for China?

#2 The Chinese naval commander, however, quickly reported victory to Commissioner Lin, even though damage to the British ships was slight. According to Arthur Waley, this report claimed that the Chinese sank a two-masted English ship and inflicted "at least forty or fifty" casualties.57 In his official memorial to Beijing, dated 18 September 1839, Lin repeated the claim that the Chinese forces had sunk one British ship, and he furthermore stated that at least seventeen British had been killed.58 Most importantly, Lin reported to his Manchu overlords how the CHinese had "obtained a victory over superior forces."59 #3 Lin's report, and other later memorials that reported Chinese defeats as victories, helped lull China's Manchu leaders into a sense of complacency, as they falsely assumed that the Han officials were successfully repelling the British. The resulting "myth of victory," as James Polachek has called it, helped insure that China did not take much-needed military precautions to insure against defeat at the hands of the British.60 To a large degree, it was this Chinese-sponsored myth of invincibility that helped make the later battles of the Opium War appear so one-sided to many western epics." (Ellemen 2007, 18)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", how is the Opium war characterized?

#2 The Sino-British "Opium War" was significant for three reasons. One, it was arguably the first direct military conflict between a western European nation and China. Two, it was one of the first military conflicts in history to take advantage fo the rapid technological changes that had gone hand-in-hand with British industrialization--such as compartmentalized metal ships and percussion rifles--thus setting a new standard for military conflicts. Three, the war ended when China agreed to sign an international treaty.42 This treaty was arguably the first that China ever signed in which the Chinese government accorded equal treatment to foreign participants--traditoinally thought of as mere "barbarians."43" (Ellemen 2007, 13)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", describe the actual Battle of Chuanbi?

#4 "The battle itself was comparatively short and one-sided, however, as the two men-of-war, the Volage and the recently arrived Hyacinth, faced sixteen war junks and thirteen fireboats under the command of Admiral Guan Tianpei. To protect the British merchant fleet anchored just outside the Bogue, the Volage and the Hyacinth could either retreat or they could try to force back the Chinese. Perhaps fearful that a British retreat would be misconstrued as yet another Chinese victory, Elliot gave the order to attack. #5 Around noon on 3 November, Captain Henry Smith, commander of the British naval forces, ordered the first barrage against the twenty-nine Chinese ships. Taking advantage of teh wind, the more maneuverable British ships ran along the Chinese line and fired starboard broadsides against the slower Chinese ships. This tactic immediately resulted int he sinking of a Chinese fireboat. Soon afterward, a Chinese war junk was also struck in its ammunition- (p. 20) #1-magazine and blew up; the Volage was slightly damaged by burning debris, but continued the battle unchecked. #2 Completing their run, the Volage and the Hyacinth turned and repeated the maneuver using their port broadsides. The Chinese ships fell into confusion, and the Hyacinth took advantage and moved in for short-range firing. Faced with superior fire power, one junk was blown up, three were sunk, and several others were damaged. During the conflict, the Han Chinese crews of several ships deserted, while the majority tried to retreat. Only Admiral Guan's flagship, which carried twelve cannon, remained in palace and was holed repeatedly before Captain Smith gave the signal to halt." (Ellemen 2007, 19-20)

In Chapter 1 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what kind of methods were used to put down the Miao rebellion?

#4 The Qing army used traditional military methods to defeat the Miao Revolt.28 Most of the fighting took place in western Hunan, although Miao groups in eastern Guizhou also participated sporadically. Accordingly, the measures taken by the Qing troops were "Draconian," and included "forced assimilation, larger garrisons of both regular troops and military-agricultural colonists, and the construction of a long wall with manned watchtowers to insure that Miao and Han remained segregated."29" (Ellemen 2007, 8)

In Chapter 1 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what was the size of the Manchu Bannerman compared to the Army of the Green Standard troops?

#5 Estimates of the number of Manchu Bannermen total only 250,000 men. Meanwhile, by 1764 the Green Standard troops had grown to 630,000. Although this number dropped to 590,000 in 1785, it once again rose dramatically to approximately 660,000 in 1812. According to Ralph Powell, the main reason for this sharp increase was that it was the Green Standard that "had pacification duties among the border tribes and internal aborigines." Accordingly, the "decline noted by 785 came after the end of the major campaigns of the Qianlong. Emperor and the increase by 1812 is attributable to the revolts of the Miao tribes and the White Lotus Society."15" (Ellemen 2007, 5)

In Chapter 1 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", how did the Qing manage to fight the White Lotus?

#5 The Qing commanders sent to repress the rebellion had a difficult time putting down the White Lotus. The White Lotus bands mainly used guerilla tactics, and once they disbanded were virtually indistinguishable from the local population. As one Qing official complained: The rebels are all our own subjects. They are not like some external tribe ... that came be demarcated by a territorial boundary and identified by its distinctive clothing and language. ... When they congregate and oppose the government, they are rebels; when they disperse and depart, they are civilians once more.34 Without any clear enemy to fight, brutality against civilians became more common. Because of the brutality of the Qing troops, the troops were soon nicknamed the "Red Lotus" Society, and the White Lotus Rebellion got worse, not better. #6 The Qing forces were under the command of Fukangan, a Manchu related by marriage to the Qianlong Emperor, and Helin, the brother of the most powerful and corrupt eunuch in Beijing, Beshen. After both died in battle in- (p. 10) #1-1796, Beijing sent new officials, but none were successful. Only after 1800 did Beijing adopt new tactics. Most importantly, the government began to organize village militias (tuan) to help surround and destroy the White Lotus, but "despite their contribution, after the campaign ended the militia units were ordered disbanded," perhaps for fear that they might become the Manchu's next opponent.38 #2 The WHite Lotus were finally put down in 1805 by a combination of military and social policies. Approximately 7,000 Banner troops brought in from Manchuria, in league with dependable Green Standard battalions brought in from Guizhou and Yunnan, and buttressed by tens of thousands of local mercenaries (xiangyong), drove the White Lotus from their strongholds. Meanwhile, the local militias made sure that new uprisings would not occur. After almost ten years of fighting, the Qing troops finally succeeded in rounding up and destroying over 100,000 followers of the White Lotus. To achieve this victory, Beijing spent an estimated 120 million taels, which not only eliminated the budget surplus gathered under the Qianlong Emperor, but also drained the Imperial treasury in the process. The White Lotus rebels continued to be active, however, and perhaps influenced the next major domestic rebellion in 1813, the Eight Trigram Sect." (Ellemen 2007, 9-10)

In chapter 6 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was the context to the lead up to the Sino-Vietnamese War with regard to "The Strategic Dimension"?

(p. 120) §4 The Strategic Dimension. However, during the 1970s Hanoi became gradually more estranged from Beijing and drew closer to Moscow. The culmination of these trends was the formal establishment on November 3, 1978, of an alliance between Vietnam and the Soviet Union - a twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The Soviets established a naval base in Camh Ranh Bay in the south, and by the late 1970s provided Vietnam with considerable economic and- (p. 121) §1 military aid. Moreover, Hanoi appeared to harbor ambitions to become the hegemon of Indochina. Battle-hardened from decades of combat and well equipped with American, Soviet, and Chinese hardware, the Vietnamese People's Army had become one of the world's most effective and largest military machines. Hanoi sought to expand its influence in Vientiane and Phnom Penh. And its aggressive moves toward Cambodia particularly alarmed China. Commencing in July 1978, official pronouncements emanating from Beijing began to refer to Vietnam scornfully as the "Cuba of the Orient" - a not-so-subtle reference to the significant role that Cuban troops played in Africa as Soviet proxies.6 §2 With the downward spiral of Sino-Vietnamese relations seemingly beyond repair - and the complete failure of Hanoi's efforts to speedily establish full diplomatic relations with Washington - Vietnam decided to go full speed ahead with closer ties with the Soviet Union.7 As early as February 1978, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) seems to have decided that an attack on Cambodia would probably be necessary and that some kind of military response from China would be forthcoming.8 In June Vietnam formally joined COMECON, and General Vo Nguyen Giap traveled to Moscow to begin negotiations on a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The Soviets promptly began sending weaponry to Vietnam in August, although the treaty was not formally signed until some three months later.9 In addition, on December 25, 1978, China was confronted with a full-blown Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. And then some two weeks later, on January 6, 1979, China's embassy in Phnom Penh was evacuated hurriedly as Vietnamese troops approached the Khmer Rouge capital. In Chinese eyes, these developments merited a swift and forceful response." (Socbbell 2003, 120-121)

(p. 122) §4 "Territorial Disputes. Vietnam had paid little attention to territorial claims until the mid-1970s. Until 1975 its priority had been reunification with the south.- (p. 123) §1-Vietnam's common land border with China, almost eight hundred miles of very rugged mountainous terrain, like so many national borders in Asia, had never been properly demarcated to everyone's satisfaction. The wording of an 1887 Sino-Vietnamese treaty was extremely vague, water courses referred to in the treaty had altered over the decades, and the location of the stone markers that delimited the border became a matter of dispute, further complicating the situation. Moreover, Vietnam and China also put forward competing claims to maritime locations: coastal waters in the Gulf of Tonkin as well as archipelagos in the South China Sea, notably the Paracel and Spratly islands.16" (Scobell 2003, 122-123).

(p. 13) "In some texts, warfare is promoted as a solution to socio-political chaos. For instance, military-strategic treatises, such as The Art of Warfare "generally accepted warfare as inevitable and devoted little effort to justifying it."2]2 Mark E. Lewis,"The Ethics of War in Asian Civilizations—A Comparative Perspective, edited by Torkel Brekke (London & New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 186.] Rather, they maintain that thorough knowledge of strategies and tactics, and the will to put this knowledge into practice if a situation so requires, are essential for obtaining and sustaining peace. ..." (Van Els 2013, 13)

In chapter 7 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what does chapter 7 cover?

(p. 144) §2 "This chapter charts the rise of the protest movement and the response of CCP leaders. The decision to impose martial law and orders to the PLA to intervene are examined. Next the genesis of the orders to use deadly force and the military response are examined. Finally, the factors leading to this violent outcome are assessed." (Scobell 2003, 144).

In chapter 7 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was the context of the Tiannamen Square Incident?

(p. 145) §3 THE CONTEXT - The reform program of paramount leader Deng that had proceeded relatively smoothly and successfully for almost a decade began to produce unwanted and unpopular results. By early 1989, urban Chinese were growing increasingly disgruntled with inflation, flagrant official corruption, and glaring inequities in the distribution of the fruits of the economic reform program. As 1988 drew to a close, China's leaders vacillated on difficult economic decisions,- (p. 146) §1-and reformers were unable to offer quick or easy solutions. The elders blamed CCP Secretary Zhao Ziyang for the deteriorating economy, and Zhao's patron, Deng, considered the party chief a mounting political liability. By March 1989, a concerted effort spearheaded by Chen and Bo was under way to topple Zhao from power. Old soldiers Li and Wang also opposed him, and Zhao's sole backer within the group was Deng.4 Senior PLA officers such as Chief of Staff Chi Haotian, although far from being staunch supporters, respected Zhao for his efforts as vice chair of the CMC to help modernize the PLA.5 §2 It was beneath this protracted round of elite conflict that the student protest movement developed. Sparked by the death of former CCP Secretary Hu Yaobang on April 15, the spontaneous student demonstrations rapidly gained momentum. Unrest also spread to other parts of China: Protests were held in many other cities, and rioting erupted in Changsha and Xian on April 22. After students began a boycott of classes on April 24, Deng issued a stern warning: a strongly worded editorial in the People's Daily of April 26 condemning the demonstrations.6 The editorial, through its use of vocabulary, drew implicit parallels with the Cultural Revolution. The intention of the document was, combined with other moves, to compel the students to end their protests.7 Rather than intimidating the students, however, the editorial served only to invigorate the movement. The following day saw the largest crowd since the beginning of the crisis: More than 150,000 students forced their way past police cordons into Tiananmen Square, cheered on by a crowd of some half a million onlookers.8 Other steps were taken to underline the seriousness of the warning: dispatching party cadres to the streets of the capital to urge an end to the demonstrations and increasing the number of soldiers around the square. Other more conciliatory steps were taken to balance the "stick" with a "carrot" dimension.9 §3 The intensity of the movement and the breadth of support it attracted caught the leadership of the CCP and the PLA off guard and divided. One of the main splits was along generational lines. Many younger midlevel officers were very critical of elderly senior officers or recent retirees who abused their powers and insisted on being coddled in luxury. Some publicly voiced their complaints. Chen Xianhua, the commander of the 42nd Group Army, openly disdained the "empty politics" and outdated management of his superiors.10 Another group of officers indicated their discontent in an open letter to the CMC several days prior to the imposition of martial law. The authors, who remained anonymous, urged support for CMC Vice Chair Zhao's calls for moderation in dealing with the demonstrations. The letter also called for the defense budget to be lowered, military organizations to be "streamlined," and senior officers to give up luxuries- (p. 147) §1-such as "imported cars." The funds saved from these cuts would be put toward education.11 §2 The situation was complicated by two high-profile international events scheduled for May. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) convened its first-ever meeting in Beijing, and the city hosted the first Sino-Soviet summit in thirty years. World attention focused on the Chinese capital, yet both events were overshadowed by the mass demonstrations. The protests disrupted scheduled activities. The official welcoming ceremonies for Mikhail S. Gorbachev on May 15, for example, were held at the airport instead of Tiananmen Square, which was awash in a sea of demonstrators.12 §3 As the weeks went by, the demonstrations did not subside, although the number of participants and spectators fluctuated considerably over time. Token displays of strength by public security officers and units of the People's Armed Police (PAP), aimed at intimidating the students, seemed only to revitalize the protests. Meanwhile, a consensus began to emerge among the Elders: In their eyes, negotiation and restraint had failed. Student demands were growing progressively more radical and rebellious. As the protests continued, the party elders grew increasingly frustrated and restless. Their anger was directed not just at the student demonstrators but at the younger leaders of the party and government who, in the Elders' opinion, were proving incapable of rapidly resolving the crisis. §4 The Elders seem to have been willing to use military force to crush the protests from the early days of the demonstrations. Deng reportedly remarked on April 25 that the shedding of blood - even tens of thousands of lives - was an acceptable price to pay to avert chaos. Deng said defiantly, "I am not afraid because I have millions of troops."13 Then, on June 9, four days after the massacre, Deng spoke in all seriousness, of a full-blown "rebellion" confronting martial law enforcement troops.14 What constituted a rebellion in his eyes? Anything that conflicted with the Four Cardinal Principles declared by Deng in 1979 and enshrined in the 1982 PRC Constitution - namely, adherence to the socialist road, leadership of the CCP, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, and the people's democratic dictatorship. Indeed he was right: During the final days of the protests, at least some activists did call for the overthrow of the CCP. However, there is no evidence of a well-organized plot, and very few dissidents explicitly advocated the violent overthrow of the CCP.15 §5 The student demonstrations confronted a leadership divided over economic policy and embroiled in a power struggle in which Zhao was fighting for political survival. Further, hordes of foreign journalists were in Beijing to cover the ADB meeting and Sino-Soviet summit. Deng and other top leaders were furious about the prolonged student occupation of Tiananmen Square - which demarcates- (p. 148) §1-both the city center and the symbolic heart of China - but were unwilling to evict them forcefully while the international media recorded the event." (Scobell 2003, 145-148)

(p. 146) First, Zeng Guofan completely overhauled the concept of "braves" (yang), and made these troops into a first-rate force. There had been three layers in the Qing military system: "soldiers" (bing), "braves" (yang), and "militiamen" (ding). The soldiers were professional, full-time military men such as the banner and Green Standard troops. They were fully supported by the court, with stable financial backing and regular military structures. They were designed to be the strategic core of the Qing army. The braves were recruited by the court, mostly during times of prolonged rebellion or civil disturbance on a grand scale, as part-time servicemen fully financed by the government. But the braves were much less privileged than the regular troops and their stipends varied a great deal. The militiamen were even less formally organized. They were local by nature. Recruited and trained by local luminaries and gentry heavyweights, militiamen acted as a local security force for the neighborhood or village. Their military usefulness during a time like the Taiping Rebellion was inconsequential, but they could help maintain the Confucian moral order and keep local toughs under control. When the Taipings marched north through his home province of Hunan in 1852, Zeng was at home fulfilling the filial duty of mourning his mother's death. Burdened with the task of protecting his birthplace from the rebels' ravages, Zeng concluded that the regular soldiers were good for nothing and the militiamen undependable. He opted instead for the braves. It was this choice of yang recruits that enabled Zeng Guofan to create the greatest army of late imperial China: the Hunan Army. The Hunan Army was an army of recruits. By strengthening this element, Zeng aimed to break with the hereditary character of the Qing standing army. Zeng recruited peasants from the mountain areas of Hunan. His recruiting standards became famous. Recruits were to be «skillful, young and strong; the simple, plain and peasant-like are the best. (p. 147) Never recruit those who are slick, who are urban Philistines, and who are officious and pretentious."8 All these bad qualities, in Zeng's view, were prevalent among the regulars." (Yu 2012, 146-147)

(p. 148) ... Following the salient tradition of classical Chinese military doctrine, Zeng Guofan placed supreme importance on the quality and power of commanding generals. Zeng had a reputation for selecting the best people for such posts. Perhaps the most unique aspect of the Hunan Army was the unparalleled control a commander had over his subordinates. It started with recruitment. Zeng Guofan recruited his proteges as army commanders, these army commanders then went on to recruit their own proteges or friends to be division commanders, who also recruited their own people. Commanders at each level had absolute authority over the level immediately below them, but the authority of higher commanding officers could not jump over intervening levels. This reform is of great significance because for the first time in several hundred years, a system of "state-owned" military was beginning to give way to a "general-owned" military. Indeed, Zeng and his many proteges could easily have made themselves independent warlords had they so desired." (Yu 2012, 148)

(p. 148) ... Fourth, a sweeping reform of military finance was indispensable to Zeng's efforts. Ever fearful of concentrating too much power in the hands of a military commander, the Qing court had devised a system of checks and balances in military finance. The banners and the Green Standard Army were all paid for by the court, but there were independent stipend commissioners to decide the scale and distribution of soldiers' pay, so that commanding officers had little to do with the financial well-being of their subordinates. The Hunan Army was partly funded with government money at the outset, but gradually developed complete financial independence through such means as imposing taxes (lijin) on goods in transit. With this change, a general could decide the pay of his own subordinates. And Zeng chose to pay his troops extremely well. At a time when a farm hand earned five taels of silver per year, an infantry soldier of the lowest grade in the Hunan Army was paid fifty-one taels of silver each year. A battalion commander made more than ten times what an infantry soldier did. ii Even though moral indoctrination played the greatest role in Zeng Guofan's system, such high financial reward greatly enhanced the morale of the troops. But most important, high pay also had a strong moral utility: A well-paid soldier was less likely to loot, gamble, or commit other crimes or unethical deeds." (Yu 2012, 148)

(p. 148) ... Since the Taipings were mostly interested in a war of movement, Zeng's strategic approach tended to favor positional warfare. The key concepts that Zeng emphasized were calmness (wen) and being the- (p. 149) -"host" (zhu). Calmness meant the time-honored strategic quality of being cautious, planning well, and being rooted in one place. "In a battle," Zeng ruminated, "one should be calm and steady, which is the first thing one should be; only then should one seek for changes."12 The strategy of calmness was closely linked to the concept of the host, because Zeng believed that to fight in someone else's territory as a "guest" (ke) has many disadvantages that can easily lead to defeat. To grasp the position of the host requires utilizing to the fullest extent the local support of people from your village, county, or province. It also involves creating situations on the battlefield to which the enemy is forced to respond. The host is always the side that determines the terms of the fight. Zeng's wen and zhu methods would become a prominent feature in twentieth-century Chinese counterinsurgency campaigns, including the Nationalists' efforts to wipe out the Communist forces in the Jiangxi Soviet. Zeng Guofan had a specific military mission: to defeat the Taiping Rebellion and save the Qing dynasty. In this he succeeded with extraordinary gallantry and efficiency. While the well-trained, well-organized Taipings carried out their social and military campaigns with puritanical rigidity, ideological fanaticism, and utopian collectivism, Zeng trained and commanded his armies with a strong emphasis on family ties, individual responsibility, flexible yet responsible discipline, enhanced military pay, respect for intellectuals serving the army, and a strong bond between officers and soldiers. In the final analysis, Zeng Guofan won and the Taipings lost precisely because the Taipings did not understand the power of human relations as Zeng did. A deep appreciation of the Chinese way of human relations is the core of Confucianism. In this sense, the defeat of the Taipings may be viewed not just as the rout of utopian radicalism, but also as the triumph of Chinese tradition." (Yu 2012, 148-149)

(p. 15) ¶4 "This chapter studies classifications of warfare in Master Wu, The Four Canons, and Master Wen. In sections one through three, I analyze the classifications in their original contexts. How do they relate to the texts in which they appear? In what way does each classification feed into the overall philosophy of the text? In section four, I compare the three classifications. What are their similarities and differences? In section five, I discuss the possibility of a relationship between the three classifications.- (p. 16) ¶1 "Are any perhaps directly and demonstrably influenced by another? I hypothesize that the classification of warfare in Master Wu may have served as a source for those in The Four Canons and Master Wen. In section six, I explore the development of classifications of warfare in writings from the Warring States period to the early Han dynasty. How did the classifications evolve from military-strategic writings to texts of politico-philosophical nature? Finally, in section seven, I survey the impact of classifications on the wider political debate on warfare in those days. Did classifications influence the debate? If so, to what effect? My chapter engages all the other chapters in this volume on a fundamental philosophical level, but it is in section seven that the concrete connections are clearest. Most obviously, Shu-hui Wu's chapter takes up the debates that immediately follow those I discuss in section seven." (Van Els 2013, 15-16)

(p. 154) ... In 1861, responding to embarrassing defeat in the Arrow War (also known as the Second Opium War) and to continuing internal rebellion, leading officials of the Qing dynasty began to call for "self-strengthening." They initiated a range of efforts to repair the weaknesses ofthe Qing state, often involving the use of foreign technology and foreign methods. Military measures were at the center of this effort. Over the course of three decades troops began to use Western-style infantry firearms and artillery, and at times Western patterns of military training. New naval forces were created using armored, steam-.powered ships. To provide weapons for these forces, new arsenals and shipyards were created, establishing the (p. 155) -foundation of a modern armaments industry. The self-strengthening movement, as historians later dubbed it, was led by a rather small group of officials. Provincial leaders such as Zeng Guofan and his former subordinates Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang, all of whom rose to prominence fighting the Taiping Rebellion, oversaw many of the most important projects and typically receive most of the credit. In Beijing, a new bureau of foreign affairs known as the Zongli Yamen, led by the imperial Prince Gong and masterminded by Wenxiang, a prominent Manchu grand councilor, sought to coordinate and finance many of these efforts through the 1860s and 1870s." (Yu 2012, 154-155)

(p. 155) "The self-strengthening effort began as a response to the multiple military problems faced by the Qing dynasty. Rapid population growth, systemic problems in Qing local government, currency instability, and in many cases ethnic conflict produced vast internal rebellions. The most significant were the quasi-Christian Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) in the Yangzi valley, the Nian Rebellion (1851-1868) on the North China Plain, the Muslim Panthay Rebellion (1855-1873) in Yunnan and Guizhou, and the massive Northwestern Muslim Rebellions (1862-1877), which began in Shaanxi and Gansu provinces and later engulfed the vast territory of Xinjiang in the far northwest. There were external threats as well. Along the northern reaches of the empire, Russia was extending its control in the direction of the Pacific Ocean and seeking territorial and trade concessions. And, of course, "the West"-the British, French, Americans, and later Germans-wanted trade, railway, and mining concessions and a semicolonial realm of treaty ports, missionaries, and extraterritorial justice. The Opium War (1839-1842) and the Arrow War demonstrated that the British and French were willing to use arms in pursuit of these goals." (Yu 2012, 155)

In chapter 7 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was the PLA response to the Tiannamen Square protests in terms of Operational Response?

(p. 158) §2 The Operational Response - Once units of the PLA began the serious business of crushing the protest movement, the sudden and uncontrolled release of passions by both civilians and soldiers took its toll. After weeks of remarkable civilian self-control and military discipline, pent-up feelings of anger and frustration finally broke to the surface. Speaking at the enlarged Politburo Standing Committee meeting of June 3, Zhou Yibing remarked that despite being "publicly humiliated," his soldiers had been "swallowing their anger [and were] . . .struggling to restrain themselves."67 The military's outburst was exacerbated by the inadequate training and inappropriate equipment of the military units involved in the operation. §3 Many accounts of the military crackdown on June 3-4 vilify a particular unit, targeting one Group Army as the force that caused the majority of the bloodshed. It stands to reason that one Group Army did the bulk of the damage. One thoughtful, balanced analysis written by a participant in the student movement two years after the events explained: "If all the troops and armed police entering the capital had shot and killed people, how could anyone have dared to burn vehicles or attack the army of the people?"68 The great majority of civilian casualties occurred in a few specific localities, lending further weight to the view that few units actually participated in the massacre. Indeed if all units had fired without hesitation, less damage might have been done to military vehicles and there might have been fewer military casualties. §4 The Twenty-Seventh Group Army stationed in Hubei Province is said to have carried out the bulk of the massacre.69 Conventional wisdom has it that the bloody weekend and its aftermath marked the growing power and influence of PRC President Yang Shangkun and his clan. While there is some merit to this view (see the analysis at the end of this chapter), it has been the basis of some questionable assertions about June 4. The report that the commander of the Twenty-Seventh Group Army was Yang Shangkun's nephew, for example, was false.70 Nor is it clear that the Twenty-Seventh Army played a leading role in the massacre. Indeed, the Thirty-Eighth Army is now emerging as the real villain. Most early accounts tended to cast the soldiers of the Thirty-Eighth as the good guys. The Thirty-Eighth was the army stationed near the capital and was generally considered to have the closest ties to Beijing inhabitants. Officers of the Thirty-Eighth had supervised military training for Beijing University students during the summer of 1988 and had continued to nurture friendships with students through the 1988-9 academic year.71 Lending further credence- (p. 159) §1-to the Thirty-Eighth's positive image was the refusal of its commander, Xu Qinxian, to order his troops against the students and his subsequent court martial, already noted. According to a careful analysis written two years after the crackdown by a leading civilian participant, Gao Xin, however, it was actually soldiers of the Thirty-Eighth Group Army who fired the first shots and who did most of the killing.72 This is supported by The Tiananmen Papers and corroborated by Harlan Jencks; he notes that the units involved in the bloody fighting were equipped with modern Type-69 tanks and armored cars that the Twenty-Seventh Group Army does not possess but that the Thirty-Eighth Army does.73 §2 According to Gao, the Thirty-Eighth Army moved in from the west along Chang'an Avenue and first opened fire at demonstrators at Muxidi at about 11:00 .. on June 3.74 According to a Ministry of State Security intelligence report of the incident, troops fired only after riot control units had been repulsed and civilians continued to hurl bricks at soldiers. Finally, troops rushed forward, chanting, "If no one attacks us, we will not attack them, but if someone attacks us, we will definitely attack them."75 Additional bloody clashes took place at Xidan, Nanchizhi, and Zhushikou.76 The soldiers who actually first entered Tiananmen Square and surrounded Gao and the other remaining protesters on the early morning of June 4 arrived from the east. These forces did not encounter as much resistance as units in the west that had advanced at a much slower pace. Significantly they had not encountered stiff resistance from civilians and had not opened fire yet. Gao suggests that this is why troops did not fire on the several thousand demonstrators in the square that morning and permitted them to exit peacefully.77 §3 The officers and troops of the PLA had been under constant and unrelenting pressure for weeks. They were not used to being opposed by fellow Chinese, nor were they accustomed to being unable to follow orders. Even for the few who had experienced the Cultural Revolution in uniform, 1989 was rather different. Unlike in the tumultuous earlier era, the crowds in the spring of 1989 formed spontaneously and were generally well behaved and united.78 The soldiers were first confused, then frustrated, and finally humiliated. They could not understand the greater forces at work in the Chinese capital, nor could they comprehend the exhilaration and self-confidence of the students and ordinary Chinese citizens who confronted them. PLA troops in the 1980s had no interest in politics, a low level of education, and a high degree of dissatisfaction with army life. Their predominant interest was in making money.79 The firm but usually amiable way that the people intervened to stop the troops from following orders confounded them. As time went on, this bewilderment turned to frustration, as military units were unable to carry out even the simplest orders. (p. 159) §1 The soldiers also were confronted by increasingly ugly crowds. Troops saw their comrades injured and physically exhausted by a combination of crowd violence, freak accidents, and hot weather. Although these incidents were isolated, they tended to darken the mood both of the PLA and the public.80 There were angry and violent confrontations between PLA and civilians well before June 3-4. The first violent scuffle took place on April 18 outside the Xinhua Gate, the main entrance to the Zhongnanhai complex that houses China's top leaders. Soldiers as well as PAP members cleared an unruly crowd outside the gate.81 Several other serious clashes between soldiers and demonstrators occurred in mid-May. Two separate violent confrontations occurred on May 22. One took place in a village southwest of Beijing as a convoy of trucks filled with soldiers heading toward the capital was blocked by angry peasants. When soldiers broke through, fist fights erupted. Students sought unsuccessfully to halt the violence. A student at the scene said, "the citizens didn't have a good reason to hurt the soldiers."82 PLA troops were also injured in another violent clash with civilians in Fengtai District that same day.83 Another serious incident occurred in a southwest suburb of Beijing early on May 23. Troops and PAP personnel armed with rifles and truncheons forced their way through a crowd to enable a large convoy of trucks and tanks immobilized on the road for days to proceed to a nearby military base. Soon after the convoy had entered the installation, rock-throwing crowds stormed the camp gate. Troops armed with rocks and bottles counterattacked and dozens of injuries were reported on both sides.84 §2 At least one soldier was killed in the line of duty well before June 3-4: A PLA officer apparently died in an accident in the western suburbs of Beijing on May 23. He either fell off a moving truck or was accidentally knocked under the wheels of an oncoming vehicle while engaged in crowd control. News of the officer's death spread to other military units, and he was quickly canonized as a "revolutionary hero."85 During the latter part of May, dozens of soldiers and PAP members were also injured severely enough to be hospitalized.86 Many were suffering from dehydration, heat stroke, or exhaustion. In the summer heat, many troops marched or jogged for miles in heavy military gear and lacked adequate water and food.87Gifts of food and drink from students amid bystanders likely compounded their sense of frustration and confusion over their predicament.88 §3 The PLA's self-restraint and patience were wearing thin after weeks of the standoff. The crowds, although generally sympathetic and well behaved, sometimes humiliated the soldiers. People lectured, berated, and even cursed PLA troops.89 Even during the earliest days of martial law, the level of military frustration was high. According to one colonel, his troops were deeply disturbed by the verbal abuse directed at them by some civilians on the second day of (p. 161) §1-martial law. One man shouted, "You soldiers, you're all sons of bitches, devoid of any humanity!" Another man yelled, "Your sisters are being gang raped, but alas you're stuck here - quick, go home." on May 22 that his men could endure being deprived of water, food, and sleep, but "we cannot stand the indignities." 91 In the early morning of June 3, irate citizens rushed out onto the streets and pelted advancing troops with shoes and other objects. Crowds tore knapsacks off soldiers' backs and taunted them until troops broke up into small groups. Fearful and ashamed, some reduced to tears, the soldiers finally retreated.92 A colonel and a major general commented sarcastically: "Later, some people said those people surrounding military vehicles were relatively 'friendly.' Their symbols of 'friendship' were bricks, stones, and liquor bottles, and even other things that couldn't be thrown."93 Possibly the final straw came when fresh troops waiting on the outskirts of Beijing saw tired, dejected, and distraught comrades returning from unsuccessful attempts to enter the city center. §2 In a growing number of incidents, the crowds became less friendly, more suspicious, and even angry. The mood of the people changed because the PLA had not joined them, and they were uneasy about rumors of military and police violence against crowds. The crowds began to sense that although the military might be sympathetic to their cause, it would not abandon the authorities and join the demonstrators en masse. Many concluded that instead of being an ally, the army had become the enemy. The sense of suspicion and foreboding was heightened by a traffic accident on the evening of June 2. A speeding PAP jeep careened into a crowd, killing three persons and injuring another. Although the driver appears simply to have lost control of the vehicle, rumors swept through Beijing that the incident was a deliberately staged provocation.94 Tension mounted in the capital, and the number of demonstrators that had dwindled during the week began to rise again. The expectations of further troop movement seemed well founded when in the early morning of Saturday, largely unarmed troops on the outskirts of Beijing attempted to enter the city center. The force was repulsed only after a violent scuffle with angry crowds. Crowds also discovered caches of weapons with out-of-uniform officers on buses attempting to enter central Beijing.95 §3 Television and radio broadcasts on Saturday afternoon and evening warned residents to stay indoors. The announcement marked an escalation of the government's efforts to suppress the demonstrations, but based on the military response to date, many citizens did not believe they were in mortal danger. The people's army would never fire on the people.96 The events of the past weeks had lulled the demonstrators into a false sense of security; the government seemed powerless against the crowds, and the army was unwilling to move against them. (p. 162) §1 Most civilians also were angry at their top leaders, who had not acknowledged officially the validity of the protesters' demands, and at the army that had not sided with them. When troops first began shooting late in the day on June 3, civilians could not believe the troops were using live ammunition. This realization provoked outrage among some who suddenly released weeks of frustration and anger and set on troops with frightening ferocity. §2 Many of the troops used in the Beijing crackdown were very young, eighteen and nineteen years old.97 Some of the troops used to clear the streets of the capital displayed little discipline, were poorly trained, and badly led.98 Certainly some of their actions were more characteristic of rampaging rebels than a disciplined infantry. There were numerous reports of troops firing wildly and randomly without provocation. Soldiers fired on medical personnel and ambulances - clearly marked as such - that were trying to aid wounded civilians.99 Troops fired at bicyclists and pedestrians, and even into diplomatic compounds and ordinary apartment buildings, terrifying foreigners and Chinese, many of whom were not violating martial law orders but simply looking with curiosity out of the windows of their apartments.100 Some of this behavior can be explained by the anger and frustration unleashed that fateful weekend. Soldiers had heard of comrades being injured or killed by civilians or witnessed the brutality of frenzied civilians against soldiers firsthand. Untrained in the intricacies of riot control or urban warfare, some troops panicked. Desertions may account for many of the four hundred soldiers reported missing.101 This inexperience and lack of training in urban warfare likely contributed to the casualty rate; many of the injuries and deaths among the troops appear to have been inflicted by fellow soldiers in the chaos of battle.102 Eyewitnesses reported that an armored car traveling at high speed eastward along Chang'an Boulevard away from Tiananmen Square early on June 4 smashed into a truck full of soldiers, knocking it over, killing at least one soldier and injuring many others. That same evening, armored cars speeding toward the city center were tailing each other so closely that they were unable to brake without crashing into each other when the lead vehicle stopped suddenly. Many soldiers almost certainly sustained injuries from accidents like this chain collision. Troops in these and other incidents simply set ablaze and abandoned their wrecked vehicles, apparently in their haste to reach Tiananmen Square.103 The sheer volume of burned out military vehicles - numbering in the hundreds - is astounding.104 Some of these metal skeletons were the handiwork of civilians, but many were actually destroyed by the soldiers themselves. Some were abandoned or destroyed by their military occupants without any apparent reason. Others were apparently abandoned by troops who deserted. But a significant number may also have been discarded as part of a scheme to wreak- (p. 163) §1-damage that could be blamed on the demonstrators. The CMC reportedly instructed troops to drive their vehicles to prearranged locations, set them ablaze, and withdraw. Some old armored vehicles were allegedly removed from their displays in the military museum near Muxidi, parked on the roadway outside, and set ablaze.105 §2 Senior civilian and military leaders as well as PLA officers involved in the operation all insist that troops were well disciplined and obeyed orders. Many of these participants say units fired only when attacked, and only when ordered to do so. Troops first fired into the air and only when this failed to dissuade rioters did the troops fire on crowds.106 Further, according to an internal PLA report published in 1991, troops opened fire only after being ordered to by the operational commander at 10:30 .. on June 3. The officer, who is not identified by name in the report, was directing operations from a helicopter hovering above the city.107 Thus the resultant bloodshed is best viewed primarily as the outcome of a series of calculated decisions by both high-level political leaders and military officers in the field and was exacerbated by the actions of ill-disciplined troops seething with anger." (Scobell 2003, -163)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what triggered the Battle of Kowloon?

(p. 16) #3 In late 1838, the Daoguang Emperor made Lin Zexu, a loyal Han Chinese official, the high commissioner of Guangzhou.51 The Emperor gave Lin full command over the Guangdong Navy so as to stamp out the opium trade at Guangzhou, although this order was disguised in the official edict under the phrase" to investigate port affairs."52 Lin apparently realized the superiority of the foreign ships, and so avoided any direct naval conflict. Instead, Lin sought to manage the foreign traders through timely suspension and restoration of trade priveleges. #4 Tensions increased dramatically following the 26 February 1839 execution, carried out in front of the foreign-run factories in Guangzhou, of a Chinese opium smuggler. In mid-March, Lin ordered the foreign merchants to hand over all of their opium stocks as well as sign a pledge never to trade in opium again. When the merchants delayed, Lin ordered the blockade of the foreign factories on 24 March. Lin also ordered the Chinese workers to stay away, and barricaded all entrances to the foreign area. #5 On 27 March 1839, Charles Elliot, the British chief superintendent, ordered that all foreign-owned opium chests be handed over to him, after which he would turn them over to Lin. His rationale for this unusual move was that the merchants were not to blame for the heightening tensions, but that Commissioner Lin had directly threatened the British government, since for "the first time, in our intercourse with this Empire, its government has taken the unprovoked initiative in aggressive measures against British life, liberty, and property, and against the dignity of the Crown."53 #6 By resorting to the stratagem of handing over all the opium himself, Elliot rendered the chests British property. This in turn made the Chinese government directly liable to the British Crown for all losses. Authors like Maurice- (p. 17) #1-Collis have argued that the British merchants were happy to unload their unsold opium, and expected its destruction merely to "send up the price for th enew crop."54 Although this argument may be partially true, as soon as the opium became British property it also became the responsibility of the British government to obtain proper compensation for its loss from China. On 18 October 1839, Lord Palmerston wrote to Elliot that he would send an expeditionary force to deal with China. #2 Woefully uninformed about European diplomatic practices, the Manchu officials mistakenly interpreted Elliot's decision to hand over the opium as proof that Britain had surrendered, and so proclaimed victory. Under Lin's supervision, the Chinese confiscated and destroyed over 20,000 cases of opium. Blockaded, the British merchants had little choice but to retreat from Guangzhou. By July 1839, there were approximately fifty British ships anchored in a protected bay near the island of Hong Kong. #3 The situation remained tense through early July, when British sailors on shore leave killed Lin Weixi, a local islander. Following the murder on 7 July, Commissioner Lin demanded that the guilty culprits be turned over immediately to the Chinese authorities for punishment. Elliot refused, citing the common practice in China of torturing prisoners to force a confession. Until the guilty party was handed over, Lin ordered that Chinese merchants should no longer sell supplies to the British. He further ordered that all local springs near Hong Kong be poisoned so as to deprive the British of potable water. #4 On 25 August 1839, Elliot protested to Lin the Chinese decision to deny the British provisions. On 4 September he led a small fleet of ships to Kowloon to demand supplies. Elliot's three ships--the cutters Louisa and Pearl, supported by the pinnace from the Volage--faced three Chinese war junks. When the Chinese ignored Elliot's ultimatum that supplies be provided within half an hour, he gave the order to fire." (Ellemen 2007, 16-17)

In chapter 7 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", how did the Tiannamen Square create an identity crisis for the PLA?

(p. 165) §2 The People's Army or the Party's Army? - In terms of civil-military culture, the PLA felt an identity crisis. Was it the people's army or the party's army? Unlike in the countries of Eastern Europe in 1989 or the Soviet Union in 1991, in China the army proved to be loyal to the party. As a result, the sacred bond between the PLA and the Chinese people may have been irreparably damaged.119 Since June 1989, the Liberation Army Daily has openly acknowledged that the public reputation of the PLA has been seriously harmed.120 The army had long enjoyed high prestige and reverence among virtually all Chinese. Although the PLA image had been somewhat tarnished since the Cultural Revolution, it managed to retain a mystique associated with its heroic exploits against successive enemies - the Japanese, the Kuomintang, and the United States. This aura was perpetuated by "Learn from the PLA" campaigns and the army's restoration of order during the Cultural Revolution. §3 In the immediate aftermath of June 1989, there was a noticeable decline in the prestige of the PLA among the Chinese people and a rise in feelings of anger amid revenge directed at the army. Snipers continued to fire on troops in Beijing for days after June 3-4, and in the three-month period following the bloody crackdown there were more than 160 civilian attacks against troops stationed in Beijing, reportedly causing at least twenty-one PLA deaths.121 Less dramatic, but equally telling, was the significant fall off in the sales of army-style hats for children that had been very popular.122" (Scobell 2003, 165)

In "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution" by Richard S. Horowitz in the 2012 anthology "Beyond the Marble Boat: The Transformation of the Chinese Military, 1850-1911" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 153-174, what did the first Sino-Japanese War (25 July 1894 - 17 April 1895) do to the Qing military?

(p. 168) "In terms of organization, the Sino-Japanese War was a turning point in the history of the Qing military. The destruction of the Anhui Army's best units by Japanese forces had a double effect: It eliminated the existing Anhui Army as an effective fighting force, and it clearly demonstrated the limitations of the recruited armies. The new-model armies of the post-1895 period, exemplified by Yuan Shikai's Beiyang Army and Zhang Zhidong's Self-Strengthening Army, were deliberately built on Western lines. The heavy emphasis on personal ties was replaced with bureaucratic organization, academy education, and an emphasis on discipline, training, and overall efficiency. In theory, merit was to guide recruitment and promotion. Indeed, a central aspect of the New Army reforms was education to form a disciplined and technically proficient officer corps through the creation of military academies, such as Yuan Shikai's at Baoding. Solid performance in the ranks could also provide a way up the ladder: In the Beiyang Army at least, literate recruits were able quickly to advance to become noncommissioned officers and eventually commissioned officers. ... (p. 169) The Chinese had embraced Western models of military organization both in form and in substance. Nevertheless, even the New Armies were lacking important elements of contemporary European military organization. In particular, the lack of centralized organization and a general staff system suggests that even these new armies had a long way to go to match their potential European and Japanese adversaries." (Yu 2012, 168-169)

(p. 17) ... ¶3 The opening chapter of Mater Wu discusses the fundamentals of statecraft and the military's role therein. One passage in the chapter outlines five motives for raising the troops: (p. 18) ¶1 Master Wu: "There are five motives for raising troops: a struggle for fame; a struggle for profit; an accumulation of resentment; chaos within the realm; and a response to famine. Each of these five has its own name: 'righteous warfare,' 'strong warfare,' 'hard warfare,' 'oppressive warfare,' and 'contrary warfare.' Putting an end to oppression and rescuing people from chaos is termed 'righteous.' Relying on the masses to launch an offensive is termed 'strong.' Mobilizing the army in an outburst of anger is termed 'hard.' Abandoning propriety while greedily seeking profit is termed 'oppressive.' Embarking on military campaigns and mobilizing the masses when the state is in chaos and the people are exhausted, is termed 'contrary.' Each of these five also has an appropriate countermeasure. The righteous can only be overcome with propriety. The strong can only be overcome by modesty. The har can only be overcome by retreat. The oppressive can only be overcome by deceit. The contrary can only be overcome by a tactical balance of power."14[14.]" ... (p. 19) ... ¶1 Here is, in my understanding, what the passage intends to say: righteous warfare is meant to end disorder in a state. The righteous ruler of one state mobilizes his army in order to oust the oppressive ruler of a neighboring state and bring that state back to order. Strong warfare is supposed to bring fame to the ruler who attacks smaller states simply because the size of his population enables him to do so. Hard warfare is a violent outburst of accumulated anger, where the infuriated ruler is blind to diplomacy and other non-violent means of ending a dispute. Oppressive warfare is meant to quench the ruler's quest for possession with cartloads of booty. Contrary warfare is undertaken by an incompetent ruler against an external enemy in an attempt to lead attention away from the famine and chaos in his own realm. Judging by Wu Wi's descriptions of these types of warfare, only righteousness is a permissible motive; the other four are unacceptable. Wu Qi also describes countermeasures for each type of warfare. For example, an army launched in search of profit can be countered by deceit, and an army mobilized out of anger by retreat. In the exceptional case of righteousness, the only justified motive in Wu Qi's eyes, the unrighteous ruler under attack can only achieve victory if he turns to propriety." (Van Els 2013, 17-19)

In chapter 8 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the difficulty of using coercive diplomacy?

(p. 179) §3 Civil-Military Relations and Coercive Diplomacy - Coercive diplomacy is difficult enough for statesmen to practice without factoring in civil-military relations. In coercive diplomacy, "force is used in an exemplary, demonstrative manner, in discrete and controlled increments to induce the opponent to revise his calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict."34 For statesmen to optimize its chances of success, coercive diplomacy requires attention to both "carrot" and "stick" - that is, to demonstrate a credible threat but at the same time to offer some incentive for the other party to comply. Moreover, great care must be made to make the signals as clear as possible - to ensure that the threat of force is recognized as such and not taken as preparations for imminent attack that might escalate to open conflict. A further complication is the fact that diplomats and soldiers see coercive diplomacy from very different perspectives.35 While both prefer a solution short of war, statesmen favor subtle signals and gradual increases in the pressure applied to an opponent in order to deter or compel them. Soldiers, in- (p. 180) §1-contrast, prefer to send a strong, direct, and unambiguous message promptly - a rapid, massive show of force to bring the opponent swiftly to his senses: . . . [C]oercive diplomacy [requires] . . . just enough force . . . to demonstrate . . . [one's resolve] to protect well defined interests and also to demonstrate the credibility of one's determination to use more force if necessary. . . . [I]f threats alone do not suffice and force is actually used, it is employed in a more limited, selective way. . . .36

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, what does Sunzi's the Art of War say about righteous war?

(p. 202) ¶1 "... the most famous of the early military texts, Sunzi's Art of War (Sunzi bingfa), shows the least interest in righteous war. Although the author of the Art of war includes a moral victor ("Which ruler has the Way?") in his formula for calculating which side will win and therefore whether or not it is advisable to go to war, moral superiority is far from being an absolute prerequisite--otherwise, mention of the four other factors listed together with the Way, including weather and terrain, would not be necessary.45[45.] Even more than the other military treatises, the Art of War is coldly pragmatic, concentrating on the means to victory rather than the rights and wrongs of beginning the war." (Graff 2016, 202)

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, what caused the enduring popularity of the righteous war doctrine with emperors and others?

(p. 203) ¶2 The enduring popularity of the righteous war doctrine with emperors of others contemplating military action surely owed much to the fact that it was the only widely acceptable justification for aggression in a philosophical climate that had otherwise turned sharply against violent projects in general and offensive wars of territorial aggrandizement in particular. In the words of Arthur Waley, writing in 1939, righteous war "became merely a moral cloak under which to cover acts of aggression. It was in fact a mechanism, familiar enough today, for bridging the gap between the amoralism of those who actually handle the affairs of a State and the inconvenient idealism of the masses."54[54.] ..." (Graff 2016, 203)

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, what did the First Emperor of Qin invoke to justify his conquests?

(p. 204) ¶2 "... the Annals of Lü Buwei with its strong defense of righteous war was written at the behest of the prime minister of Qin, a state with a long history of territorial gains at the expense of its neighbors and a reputation for brutal tactics (the Han historian Sima Qian claimed that no fewer than 400,000 captured enemy soldiers were immolated after a Qin victory in 260 BCE).55[55.] It was Qin that eventually created a unified empire by conquering the other six major states, with the last of them, Qi in today's Shandong province, succumbing in 221 BCE. Although the amoral theories of Shang Yang and Han Feizi may have dominated the actual formation of his government's policies, the First Emperor of Qin invoked the concept of righteous war to justify his conquests in the stele inscriptions he left at various points in his newly acquired territories between 219 and 210 BCE. ..." (Graff 2016, 204)

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is Scobell's description of "The Cult of Defense"?

(p. 27) §3 The Cult of Defense - The Cult of Defense comprises three core philosophical elements and six guiding strategic principles. The core elements of this military tradition are that the Chinese: (1) are a peace-loving people; (2) are not aggressive or expansionist; and (3) only use force in self-defense. This set of beliefs seems quite consistent with the stereotype of a COnfucian pacifistic, defense-minded civilization- (p. 28) §1-averse to the use of force identified in this chapter. And yet China's high-minded ideals have not prevented its leaders from waging war against their neighbors or using lethal force against their own people. Nor did core American beliefs in the fundamental rights of man prevent the United States government from oppressing African Americans, through slavery and later segregation, and rolling westward to conquer native Americans. §2 While the leaders of most countries tend to believe they use military power in a strictly defensive manner,70[70.] this cluster of beliefs seems to be particularly inviolable among the Chinese. In the broad realm of security policy (both internal and external), two guiding principles counter the fundamental teets noted previously: (1) a strong reverence for national unification, and (2) a heightened sense of threat perception. In confronting foreign threats, the three fundamental tenets noted previously are countered by two guiding principles: that China (1) fights only "just wars," and (2) adheres faithfully to the strategic concept of "active defense." In addressing domestic threats, these three tenets are countered by two other principles: (1) a deep-seated fear of internal chaos, and (2) a heavy emphasis on the primacy of community over individual." (Scobell 2003, 27-28).

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the FIRST core element of "The Cult of Defense"?

(p. 28) §5 Peace is Precious. A deeply held belief in elite circles is that China possesses a pacifist strategic culture. Certainly a majority of people in most countries, including the United States, say they love peace -- indeed it seems a near universal humand esire. What is striking in the case of China, however, is the extreme degree to which this is stressed -- to the extent that Chinese civilization is viewed as being completely pacifistic, quite distinct from other strategic traditions in- (p. 29) §1-the world. ..." (Scobell 2003, 28-29).

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the THIRD core element of the "Cult of Defence"?

(p. 31) §3 IF Someone Doesn't Attack Us, We Won't Attack Them. The third central tenet of the Cult of Defense is that China possesses a purely defensive strategic culture. According to Li, "The Chinese are a defensive-minded people."93 The classic illustration of this tendency regularly cited by Chinese scholars is, not surprisingly, the Great Wall. According to Li, "China's Great Wall has always been a symbol of a defense, not the symbol of a national boundary."94 In the 1990s, some Chinese researchers have sought to validate this point by citing Western scholarship, notbaly the work of Fairbank and Mark Mancall.95[95.] They also seek to make their case by drawing a direct comparison between Western and Chinese strategic traditions. According to one military researcher, China's military tradition places "complete stress on a defensive stance" whereas, in contrast, Western military tradition "emphasizes offense."96 §4 Another example of the defensive nature of China's strategic posture is the "no first use" pledge regarding nuclear weapons.97 Chinese officials also point to the military reforms that China has undertaken over the past two decades as proof of China's purely defensive stance. Liu said in 1995: As is known to all, China possesses a strategy of active defense, and cut its troops by 1 million several years ago, something no other country has thus far achieved. Our present military strength is of a defensive nature and the Chinese Government strictly limits defensive expenditure to the minimum level necessary to ensure national security.98 Perhaps the most commonly touted evidence is Mao's admonition, "If someone doesn't attack us, we won't attack them; however if someone does attack us,- (p. 32) §1-we will definitely [counter] attack" (Ren bu fan wo, wo bu fan ren; ren fan wo, wo bi fan ren).99 This quote appears in China's 1998 Defense White Paper. The phrase also appeared in a key People's Daily editorial in December 1978. The editorial contained a stern warning to Vietnam that China would realitae if Hanoi did not end its aggressive behavior (see Chapter 6). Significantly, PLA soldiers widely used the slogan during the Cultural Revolution and in Beijing during the weekend of June 3-4, 1989.100." (Scobell 2003, 31-32)

(p. 32) ¶2 "The three texts offer differing evaluations of profit as a motive for war ... While Master Wu and Master Wen condemn it, The Four Canons does not. Master Wu associates profit with a surplus of greed and a lack of propriety. Master Wen likewise speaks disapprovingly of profiting from other people's land and desiring other people's goods. By contrast, The Four Canons discusses only the annexation of weak states that fail to subsist on their own, which it finds acceptable but of little use." (Van Els 2013, 32)

In Chapter 3 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what was the goal of the Taipings, during the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64), and what kind of military tactics did they employ to achieve that goal?

(p. 39) ... ¶3 "One of the primary goals of the Taipings was to create a Christian kingdom in China. Clearly, this was an ideology that originated from the West. Therefore, like the British, the Taipings had first to face and defeat the Manchu Dynasty. Unlike the British, the Taipings' goal was not treaty revision but was political nature--taking control of China. The military overthrow of the Manchus, and the establishment of a new Han Chinese Dynasty to take its place, soon became the single most important ideology uniting the Taipings. ¶4To carry out this goal, Hong Xiuquan and his cousin Feng Yushan soon realized the need for a strong military. In 1844, the two men traveled to Guangxi Province to look for a suitable base for the future Taiping Army. Feng is also given credit for devising a military system, supposedly based on the military administration of China's founding Qin Dynasty, in which fixed armies of 13,155 men were subdivided into divisions, brigades, companies, paltoons, and squads. In addition to the military command ,which had administrative and training responsibilities, there was a separate strategic "army inspector" who could issue orders to the army commander. When several armies were gathered, a commander-in-chief gave the orders and reported to his superiors, who in turn went up the chain of command to the Heavenly King, Hong Xiuquan. Discipline was strictly enforced by corporal punishment, public shaming, beating, or loss of rank, and the Taiping troops were regulated by a strict code composed of sixty-two rules, most of which emphasized loyalty to the movement and its leaders.98 ¶5 Even the Taipings' enemies, such as the Imperial commander Zeng Guofan, came to admire the Taipings' military structure and determination. According to Jen Yu=wen, the secret of the Taipings' military success was their common religious beliefs: (p. 40) ¶1 The whole army kept up the religious practices of their early days as God-Worshipers, assembling to worship God in the morning and evening, saying prayers before meals, gathering to listen to sermons on Sundays, kneeling in prayer before going to battle, etc. This was the real secret of their strength--a secret known to the Imperialists but dismissed as a king of witchcraft.99 In the beginning, the very weakness of the Taipings also forced them to be innovative, such as allowing Hakka women to fight with the men. They appealed to patriotic Han Chinese to join in overthrowing the Manchus, and the Taiping army quickly grew to 50,000. In battle, the Taipings also made use of a wide variety of military technology. For example, when they attacked Guilin, the Taipings used towering siege equipment, ladders, and rockets. When besieging Chuanzhou, they tunneled beneath the city wall and blew it up with gunpowder. ¶2 The Taipings employed diverse offensive strategies. For example, in taking the small town of Yung'an Zhou on 25 September 1851--the first walled town to the controlled by the Taipings--the Taiping commander, Lo Dagang, ordered his troops to light firecrackers and throw them over the city wall as if they were explosives. In the midst of the ensuing panic, the Taipings scaled the city wall and occupied the town virtually unopposed. Eighteen months later, while advancing down the Yangzi River on Nanjing, the Taipings filled empty ships with mud and rocks and sent them downstream past the Imperial garrisons. Only after the Imperial troops exhausted their ammunition on the decoys did the real Taiping ships appear. In traditional Chinese fashion, based on Sunzi's "Art of War", the Taipings also took care to use the terrain to their advantage. Once they were forced to evacuate, the Taipings ambushed the Imperial forces along narrow mountain paths, where their superior weapons and horses did them little good." (Ellemen 2007, 39-40)

In Chapter 3 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what triggered the Arrow War?

(p. 45) ... ¶2 In the midst of the domestic turmoil that accompanied the Taiping Rebellion, piracy increased dramatically; often, whether true or not, these pirates claimed political allegiance with the Taipings. In January 1856, the British instituted a scheduled north-south convoy system, sending a well-armed man-of-war with the British merchant ships. Chinese-owned ships registered in HOng Kong were also allowed to join the convoy and fly the British flag. By doing so, these Chinese-owned ships tacitly gained the same extraterritorial rights and protections from nanchu intervention as other British ships along the China coast. This decisions oon led to conflict with Manchu authorities, who insisted that all Chinese-owned ships remain under the administrative authority of China. ¶3 On 8 October 1856, Guangzhou police boarded a Chinese-owned, but HOng Kong-registered, ship called the Arrow. This ship had a British captain but a Chinese crew. Hauling down the British flag, the police arrested twelve crew members. Immediately, Harry Parkes, the British Consul, demanded that Ye Mingchen, the Imperial Commissioner in Guangzhou, apologize for this "insult" to the flag. Commissioner ye offered to release nine of the arrested sailors but refused to apologize, thereby disputing teh British practice of registering Chinese ships and allowing them to fly British flags. ¶4 This incident gave Governor of Hong Kong, John Bowring a long-sought-for opportunity to demand treaty revisions from China.109 After consulting with Admiral Michael Seymour, commander of the British fleet, it was decided to send Commodore George Elliot to Guangzhou with the Sybille, the Barracouta, and the Coromandel, and later the steam frigates Encounter with Sampson were added to this number. Under the threat of naval shelling, Commissioner Ye proved willing to return all twelve arrested sailors, but would not apologize for violating the British flag. The resulting British action has been described in detail by Gerald Graham: Admiral Seymour proceeded to assault the four barrier forts, some five miles below the city. Carrying Royal Marines and the boats' crews of the Calcutta, Winchester, and Bittern, the Sampson and the Barracouta, accompanied by the boats of the Sybille under Commodore Elliot, set out from Whampoa. Arriving at Blenheim Reach on 23 October, the two steam sloops, Sampson and Barracouta, ascended the Macao Passage in order to block the alternative backwater channel. Blenheim Fort capitulated quickly, as did Macao Fort, a well-sited- (p. 46) ¶1-bastion on an island in mid-river, mounting 86 guns. This later stronghold, Seymour prepared to hold and garrison.110 By 25 October 1856, more than 150 Chinese cannon had been taken and spiked, while marines took control of the foreign factories and defended them successfully against a Chinese attack. Casualties during this three-day engagement were extremely light, with the British avoiding even a single death and the Chinese reportedly suffering only five troops injured." (Ellemen 2007, 45-46)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, what did Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea (1592-1598) reveal about siege warfare, naval warfare, and guns?

(p. 68) "Hideyoshi's invasions, like the construction of the Great Wall, demonstrated once again the close connection between siege warfare, naval warfare, and guns. While troops in the field could maneuver to take advantage of their own strengths and avoid those of their opponents, sometimes to the extent of refusing battle entirely, siege and naval warfare quite often did not allow that possibility. Strong points had to be taken if territory was to be controlled, certain sailing routes had to be used at certain times if ships were to reach their destination. One of the greatest weaknesses of the Japanese war effort was the Japanese navy, a rather surprising circumstance given the competence of Japanese sea lords earlier in the sixteenth century, described by Peter Shapinsky in the previous chapter." (Lorge 2017, 68).

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, what is the earliest known specimen of a gun from China?

(p. 69) "The earliest known specimen of a gun was excavated in July of 1970 in Acheng county, Heilongjiang province.Made of bronze, it is 34 centimeters long, weighs 3.5 kilograms and has three distinct parts to its length: a barrel, powder chamber, and socket for a handle at the rear end. It has been dated no later than 1290. ..." (Lorge 2017, 69).

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, why did innovation in guns slow so dramatically after the thirteenth century?

(p. 70) "Chinese gun development matured in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as warfare incorporated the new capabilities of handguns and cannon. Guns were now understood, but no one conceived of a further broadening of their possibilities. Much of the combat that established the Ming dynasty was naval, frequently combined with siege operations. Peace, however, dramatically diminished the number of battles fought by the Ming army. Knowledge of gun and gunpowder making became more restricted outside of the military, and bureaucratic controls were placed on who within the government had access to that information. What further advances there were tended to come from active duty officers campaigning on the borders. This was a much smaller group of people than during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and fewer people meant less innovation. Guns became a fact of warfare and military life, leading to an acceptance of what they were and what they could do. This weapon was now so familiar that it seemed as though there was nowhere else for it to develop." (Lorge 2017, 70).

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, what happened around 1279 in China?

(p. 71) ... "By 1279, the very last remnants of the Song dynasty had been completely destroyed. The Mongols were now the unquestioned rulers of China under the rubric of the Yuan dynasty, a Chinese-style regime created by Khubilai Khan in 1272 in order to diminish Chinese resistance to foreign- (p. 72) -control. Khubilai exploited Chinese resources in his struggle with his brother in the steppe, as well as in his desultory adventure against the Japanese discussed in the previous chapter. When he died in 1294, the Yuan state was an odd patchwork of conflicting institutions and ideologies. Although nominally a Chinese imperial structure, in reality its resources were haphazardly distributed among the Mongol aristocracy and the imperial clan without regard for the subject population or the realities of finance. Khubilai's grandson and successor, Temür, succeeded in having himself declared Khaghan over all the Mongol khanates in Eurasia in 1304 as the result of a decisive victory in September of 1301. This was probably the highest point of Mongol unity, notional as it was, since the reign of Chinghis." (Lorge 2017, 71-72).

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, who founded the Ming dynasty and how?

(p. 72) "Zhu Yuanzhang (1328-98), the man who eventually emerged victorious from the enormous struggles for power in China and founded the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), began his life in abject poverty. While his background and personality were certainly unique among Chinese founding emperors, the fact that the dynasty he established began its path to conquest in southern China is even more peculiar. Unlike any other great dynasty in Chinese history, Ming power was forged in an extended series of naval battles and sieges up and down the Yangzi River. This was the logical return to the military environment of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and the struggles between the Jurchen Jin, Song, and Mongols. Khubilai had been forced to build a navy to defeat the Song, but it was a strange branch of the military for the Mongols, and it crumbled after he died." (Lorge 2017, 72)

In Chapter 3 of Peter Allan Lorge's 2017 book The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, what was the demographic make-up of the "wokou"?

(p. 78) "It is unclear what percentage of the "wokou" were actually Japanese, and it seems likely that the percentage changed over time, with a higher number in the earlier period and a lower number later on. The most damaging raids were conducted with a great deal of local Chinese assistance. We should not, of course, hold too closely to strict categories of modern nationality. "Wokou" raids increased in frequency when there was political turmoil in Japan and the central authorities could not control provincial lords. These Japanese raiders or merchants were connected to the East and Southeast Asian maritime world, which included a mobile population of sailors and their families. Sailors from one place might take up residence in another and marry locally. Their offspring might be considered transcultural, or multicultural, from the false perspective that each locality was part of a monolithic national culture that coincided with a unified polity. More realistically, the sailors and their families were part of a maritime culture that also had ties to various lands." (Lorge 2017, 78)

According to Confucian Strategic Culture, what is 1) the role in human affairs?

1) The role of war in human affairs: As the Dao De Jing notes, weapons are inauspicious instruments and should only be used in unavoidable circumstances (兵者凶器也不得已而用之). As we have seen in the Confucian consensus, war is only to be resorted to in dealing with the incorrigibly wicked, and is never to be regarded as a "good" thing. In fact, resort to wu 武 is almost an admission of the ruler's failure in manifesting wen 文. China prefers the "soft power" of Virtue, not the "hard power" of Force.

Scholars have offered several theories to explain why the nomads pestered the Chinese relentlessly for centuries:

1. Mongolian historian Sechin Jagchid argues the nomads needed 3 things the steppe could not provide: grain textiles, and metal. When the Chinese made these available through trade, hostilities declined. This is the "trade-or-raid" economic theory. 2. Anthropologist Thomas Barfield agrees that nomad demand for Chinese goods was at the heart of most conflicts, but he argues the demand was not for staple goods but for the luxury items needed to hold steppe confederacies together. This is the "political necessity" theory. 3. Anthropologist A.M. Khazanov agrees that nomadic dependency was the problem, but given the disparity in wealth he sees raiding as frequently more profitable than trading. This is the "expediency" theory.

What are the symptoms of Dynastic Decline?

1. Out of control, widespread bureaucratic corruption. This prevents rapid response and resolution of natural disasters, which ensures widespread social disorder. 2. Board governors start to accumulate feudal power over the regions they control, as well as armies that garrison them. If you have a man that controls armies and money, then he becomes powerful and could rebel. 3. The increasing power of the Eunuchs. Eunuchs can see the emperor 24 hours a day, which gives them ability to influence the emperor. While officials have to take the Civil Service Exams, eunuchs just ahve to have all the genitalia cut off. If they abuse their contact/closeness with the emperor to amass more power, they can destabilize the dynasty. 4. Out of control Dynastic factionalism. Often rulers would play ureaucrats against each other, or split power to ensure no one bureaucrat amassed enough power. However, if this gets out of control, then it paralyzes the court, resulting in the neglect of the administration of the empire

Following the end of the Northern Expedition in 1928, what challenges did Chiang was still face? How did Chiang kai-shek view these problems, and what was these problems?

1. The surviving Communists - the CCP had to be rooted out and exterminated. Those in the cities could be targeted for assassination, but the others who had established bases in the remote countryside would have to be located and crushed militarily (this included Mao Zedong) 2. Residual warlords - former allies who were now political rivals. They would either have to accept being declawed (armies disbanded) or be crushed militarily. 3. The Japanese - they were the single greatest threat to China, but a premature confrontation would be disastrous for Chiang. Patience was in order while Chiang crushed his rivals and modernized his army. 395 Chiang viewed these problems through the eyes of a soldier, and to his mind they were all amenable to solution by military means: regional rivals could be defeated, the Communists could be destroyed, and the central military forces could be modernized to defend against Japan. But since the clock was ticking towards the looming showdown with Japan, all these things had to be done almost simultaneously! Given the financial and political problems faced by the Nanjing government throughout the 1930s such ambitious goals were perhaps unrealistic, but Chiang believed that China's very survival depended on his efforts. He was therefore determined to extend Nanjing's authority, centralize and modernize the military, and, because he still retained his faith in militarism as the key to China's revival, he was also intent on militarizing Chinese society.

According to Confucian Strategic Culture, what is 2) the nature of the enemy?

2) The nature of the enemy: much of what we have examined is based on Chinese experience fighting other Chinese, but there are elements that apply to non-Chinese. When fighting Chinese, there is the assumption that one can "win the hearts and minds" of one's opponents through manifesting virtue and benevolence. But what about barbarians - ie., non- Chinese? Even in antiquity, the Chinese were convinced of their own cultural superiority, and they believed that eventually all those around them would become sinicized - absorbed into the Chinese world. The Chinese had no need to physically conquer their neighbors - they would be absorbed into the Central Cultural Florescence (zhonghua 中華) in time through enculturation/assimilation. Therefore, let the barbarians come - they will be transformed (lai hua 來化) through contact. "If the Yi and Di barbarians enter the central states [China], then sinify them!" (夷狄進入中國則中國之) This faith in the transformative "soft" power of Chinese culture meant that China could take a long-term approach in dealing with its neighbors - take a defensive stance and wait for the enculturation process to take effect on one's enemies. China did not view its relationship with its neighbors as a zero-sum winner-take-all game. Instead, it believed that negotiation could resolve most differences while giving enculturation time to work its magic. The enemy always has their "price", and the empire has deep pockets.

What are some of the connections between Maoist guerrilla warfare and the theories of Sun Zi in terms of the intelligence?

3. Intelligence - cultivate your own sources and deny the enemy any! As Sun Zi said, "one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements!" Moreover, "advance knowledge cannot be gained from ghosts and spirits, inferred from phenomena, of projected from the measures of Heaven, but must be gained from men for it is the knowledge of the enemy's true situation!" This is why Sun Zi dedicated an entire chapter to spies. Advance knowledge is the key to victory, and the survival of the guerrillas depends on their ability to see everything while keeping the enemy blind and confused. The Fog of War is the guerrillas' friend, but only if they can use the people as their eyes and ears!

What are some of the connections between Maoist guerrilla warfare and the theories of Sun Zi in terms of resource management?

4. Conservation of one's own resources, attrition of the enemy's - live off the enemy where possible! Sun Zi noted that preservation of one's resources was critical to victory: "Thus the wise general will concentrate on securing provisions from the enemy. One bushel of the enemy's foodstuffs is worth twenty of ours; one picul of fodder is worth twenty of ours!" Sun Zi also recommended making use of captured equipment and enemy soldiers: "Change their flags and pennants to ours; intermix and employ them with our own chariots. Treat the captured soldiers well in order to nurture them for our use. This is referred to as 'conquering the enemy and growing stronger!'" Feeding off the enemy reverses relative strengths over time, and treating prisoners well makes good propaganda. For guerrillas, this is a sacred principle!

What are some of the connections between Maoist guerrilla warfare and the theories of Sun Zi in terms of attacking the enemy?

5. Do not attack the enemy's fullness, only his emptiness - avoid attacking on equal terms, attack only where local superiority is assured! As Sun Zi notes, one must avoid a superior enemy: "If you are equal in strength to the enemy, you can engage him. If fewer, you can circumvent him. If outmatched, you can avoid him. A small enemy that acts inflexibly will become the captive of a large enemy!" Given the usual disparity in firepower, does this mean that when attacked guerrilla forces simply run away? Hardly! Even when avoiding direct combat guerrillas can harass the enemy : "If the enemy is rested you can tire him; if he is well fed you can make him hungry; if he is at rest you can move him. Go forth to positions to which he must race. Race forth where he does not expect it!" Confuse, exhaust, and demoralize him! When the moment is right, the guerrillas can strike - but only when success is certain. This requires thorough intelligence gathering to gain knowledge of the enemy's weak spots. Intelligence gathering is not always a passive activity (ie., watching and waiting). In addition to harassing the enemy, the guerrillas must "stimulate them to know the patterns of their movement and stopping. Determine their disposition of force to know the tenable and fatal terrain [around their positions]. Probe them to know where they have excess, where there is an insufficiency." The goal is to ascertain the enemy's fullness and emptiness. Fullness must be avoided while emptiness can be attacked - but it takes patience and skill to avoid the one while targeting the other. "If I can determine the enemy's disposition of forces while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate my forces while the enemy is fragmented. If we are concentrated into a single force while he is fragmented into ten, then we attack him with ten times his strength. Thus we are many and the enemy is few." In Sun Zi's language, the guerrillas must make themselves unbeatable (by avoiding the enemy's fullness, or his main forces) while setting the enemy up to expose his emptiness (by tricking him into dividing his forces). Once his emptiness is discerned, the guerrillas can attack. After all, "when someone excels in attacking, the enemy does not know where to defend; and when someone excels at defense, the enemy does not know where to attack!" Wise words for any guerrilla!

Sima Qian ([sɨ́mà tɕʰjɛ́n]; Chinese: 司馬遷)

A Chinese historian of the early Han dynasty (206 BC - AD 220). He is considered the father of Chinese historiography for his Records of the Grand Historian, a Jizhuanti-style (history presented in a series of biographies) general history of China, covering more than two thousand years from the Yellow Emperor to his time, during the reign of Emperor Wu of Han, a work that had much influence for centuries afterwards on history-writing not only in China, but in Korea, Japan and Vietnam as well.[2] Although he worked as the Court Astrologer (Tàishǐ Lìng 太史令), later generations refer to him as the Grand Historian (Tàishǐ Gōng 太史公) for his monumental work; a work which in later generations would often only be somewhat tacitly or glancingly acknowledged as an achievement only made possible by his acceptance and endurance of punitive actions against him, including imprisonment, castration, and subjection to servility. 2 Jay, Jennifer (1999). ""Sima Qian"". In Kelly Boyd. The Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing Volume 2. FitzRoy Dearborn. pp. 1093&ndash, 1094.

Junzi (Chinese: 君子; pinyin: Jūn Zǐ; literally: "Lording Master") and the xiaoren (小人, xiăorén, "small or petty person")

A Chinese philosophical term often translated as "gentleman" or "superior person"[1] and employed by both the Duke of Wen in the I-ching and Confucius in his works to describe the ideal man. In Confucianism, the ideal personality is the sheng, translated as sage. However, sagehood is hard to attain and so Confucius created the junzi, gentleman, which more individuals could achieve. Zhu Xi defined junzi as second only to the sage. "Junzi has many characteristics. Junzi can live with poverty; Junzi does more and speaks less. A junzi is loyal, obedient and knowledgeable. Junzi disciplines himself. Among these, ren is the core of becoming junzi.[2](in Chinese)" As the potential leader of a nation, the son of the ruler is raised to express superior ethical and moral positions while gaining inner peace through virtue. To Confucius, the junzi sustained the functions of government and social stratification through his ethical values. Despite its literal meaning, any righteous man willing to improve himself can become a junzi. By contrast the xiaoren (小人, xiăorén, "small or petty person") does not grasp the value of virtues and seeks only immediate gain. The petty person is egotistic and does not consider the consequences of his actions. Should the ruler be surrounded by xiaoren as opposed to junzi, his governance and his people will suffer due to their small-mindness. Examples of such xiaorenindividuals can range from those who continually indulge in sensual and emotional pleasures to the career politician who is interested merely in power and fame; neither sincerely aims for the long-term benefit of others. The junzi rules by acting virtuously himself. It is thought that his pure virtue would lead others to follow his example. The ultimate goal is that government behaves much like family. Thus at all levels filial piety promotes harmony and the junzi acts as a beacon for this piety.

Confucius (/kənˈfjuːʃəs/ kən-FEW-shəs;[1] 551-479 BC)[2][3]

A Chinese teacher, editor, politician, and philosopher of the Spring and Autumn period of Chinese history. The philosophy of Confucius, also known as Confucianism, emphasized personal and governmental morality, correctness of social relationships, justice and sincerity. His followers competed successfully with many other schools during the Hundred Schools of Thought era only to be suppressed in favor of the Legalists during the Qin dynasty. Following the victory of Hanover Chu after the collapse of Qin, Confucius's thoughts received official sanction and were further developed into a system known in the West as Neo-Confucianism, and later New Confucianism (Modern Neo-Confucianism). Confucius is traditionally credited with having authored or edited many of the Chinese classic texts including all of the Five Classics, but modern scholars are cautious of attributing specific assertions to Confucius himself. Aphorisms concerning his teachings were compiled in the Analects, but only many years after his death. Confucius's principles have commonality with Chinese tradition and belief. He championed strong family loyalty, ancestor veneration, and respect of elders by their children and of husbands by their wives, recommending family as a basis for ideal government. He espoused the well-known principle "Do not do unto others what you do not want done to yourself", the Golden Rule. He is also a traditional deity in Daoism. Confucius is widely considered as one of the most important and influential individuals in shaping human history. His teaching and philosophy greatly impacted people around the world and remains influential today.[4][5]

Si vis pacem, para bellum (Classical Latin: [siː wiːs ˈpaːkẽː ˈpara ˈbɛllũː])

A Latin adage translated as "If you want peace, prepare for war". It is adapted from a statement found in Book 3 of Latin author Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus's tract De Re Militari (4th or 5th century AD),[1] although the idea which it conveys also appears in earlier works such as Plato's Nomoi (Laws) and the Chinese Shi Ji.[2][3][4] The phrase is used above all to affirm that one of the most effective means to ensure peace for a people is always to be armed and ready to defend oneself.

Lin Biao (December 5, 1907 - September 13, 1971)

A Marshal of the People's Republic of China who was pivotal in the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, especially in Northeast China. Lin was the general who commanded the decisive Liaoshen and Pingjin Campaigns, in which he co-led the Manchurian Field Army to victory and led the People's Liberation Army into Beijing. He crossed the Yangtze River in 1949, decisively defeated the Kuomintang and took control of the coastal provinces in Southeast China. He ranked third among the Ten Marshals. Zhu De and Peng Dehuai were considered senior to Lin, and Lin ranked directly ahead of He Long and Liu Bocheng. Lin abstained from taking an active role in politics after the civil war ceased in 1949. He led a section of the government's civil bureaucracy as one of the co-serving Deputy Vice Premiers of the People's Republic of China from 1954 onwards, becoming First-ranked Vice Premier from 1964. Lin became more active in politics when named one of the co-serving Vice Chairmen of the Communist Party of China in 1958. He held the three responsibilities of Vice Premier, Vice Chairman and Minister of National Defense from 1959 onwards. Lin became instrumental in creating the foundations for Mao Zedong's cult of personality in the early 1960s, and was rewarded for his service in the Cultural Revolution by being named Mao's designated successor as the sole Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China, from 1966 until his death. Lin died on September 13, 1971, when a Hawker Siddeley Trident he was aboard crashed in Öndörkhaan in Mongolia. The exact events of this "Lin Biao incident" have been a source of speculation ever since. The Chinese government's official explanation is that Lin and his family attempted to flee following a botched coup against Mao. Others have argued that they fled out of fear they would be purged, as Lin's relationship with other Communist Party leaders had soured in the final few years of his life. Following Lin's death, he was officially condemned as a traitor by the Communist Party. Since the late 1970s Lin, and Mao's wife Jiang Qing (with her Gang of Four) have been labeled the two major "counter-revolutionary forces" of the Cultural Revolution, receiving official blame from the Chinese government.

How does Sun Zi differ from Western military strategists with regard to destroying the enemy on the battlefield?

A careful reading of Sun Zi reveals that he has a sophisticated understanding of warfare. Unlike many Western military strategists, Sun Zi is not obsessed with destroying the enemy's combat power in battle. In Western theory the destruction of the enemy's army often becomes the strategic goal, rather than simply a means to an end. Sun Zi stresses that warfare is just one of many means available, and often is not the most cost effective way of achieving one's ends. It is far better to use your forces not to destroy the enemy's army (for actual combat will inevitably cost your side in men and material), but rather to maneuver the enemy into an untenable position. The superior general wins without fighting! But do not assume Sun Zi's preference for avoiding head-on battles was grounded in any moral aversion to violence - he was just advocating rational cost-benefit analysis!

Wén 文 and wǔ 武

A conceptual pair in Chinese philosophy and political culture describing opposition and complementarity of civil ① and military ② realms of government. Differentiation between wen and wu was engaged in discussions on criminal punishment, administrative control, creation and reproduction of social order, education and moral transformation. The concept was formed during the Chunqiu and Warring States periods, and best articulated in the 3rd or 2nd century BCE. However, until recently it was not much discussed by the Western scholars because of ① their aberrated perception of the importance of Confucianism in the pre-imperial and early imperial era, and ② their understanding of Confucianism as pacifist in its nature. An example of the last is provided by John K. Fairbank: "Warfare was disesteemed in Confucianism... The resort to warfare (wu) was an admission of bankruptcy in the pursuit of wen [civility or culture]. Consequently, it should be a last resort... Herein lies the pacifist bias of the Chinese tradition... Expansion through wen... was natural and proper; whereas expansion by wu, brute force and conquest, was never to be condoned."

Kù (simplified Chinese: 喾; traditional Chinese: 嚳), usually[1] referred to as Dì Kù (simplified Chinese: 帝喾; traditional Chinese: 帝嚳), also known as Gaoxin or Gāoxīn Shì (Chinese: 高辛氏)

A descendant of Huangdi, the Yellow Emperor. he went by the name Gaoxin until receiving imperial authority, when he took the name Ku and the title Di, thus being known as Di Ku. He is considered the ancestor of the ruling families of certain subsequent dynasties. Some sources treat Ku as a semi-historical figure, while others make fantastic mythological or religious claims about him. Besides varying in their degree of historicizing Ku, the various sources also differ in what specific stories about him they focus on, so that putting together the various elements of what is known regarding Ku results in a multifaceted story. Di Ku was (according to many versions of the list) one of the Five Emperors of the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors of Chinese mythology. Ku, or Gaoxin, is also known as the "White Emperor".

What is a constitutional monarchy?

A form of monarchy in which the sovereign exercises authority in accordance with a written or unwritten constitution.

Imperial overstretch, also known as Imperial overreach

A hypothesis which suggests that an empire can extend itself beyond its ability to maintain or expand its military and economic commitments. Arguably, this was true of the Roman Empire, which was strong and effective in the first and early second centuries CE, despite a few setbacks (Germany in 9CE; Scotland in the 80s CE) but lost territories (e.g. Dacia and Mesopotamia) after that and could not keep the Saxons, Huns and other 'barbarians' out in the 4th and 5th centuries. Clearly, this was true of the Napoleonic Empire, which made rapid gains by conquest in the first decade after Napoleon became dictator of France, but became over-extended militarily when it attempted to conquer Russia in 1812. Likewise the German reich in 1942. The idea was popularised by Yale University historian Paul Kennedy in his 1987 book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.

Emperor Yao (simplified Chinese: 尧; traditional Chinese: 堯; pinyin: Yáo; traditionally c. 2356 - 2255 BC)[2]

A legendary Chinese ruler, according to various sources, one of the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors. Yao's ancestral name is Yi Qi (伊祁) or Qi (祁), clan name is Taotang (陶唐), given name is Fangxun (放勳), as the second son to Emperor Ku and Qingdu (慶都). He is also known as Tang Yao (唐堯).[3][4] Yao's mother has been worshipped as the goddess Yao-mu.[5] Often extolled as the morally perfect and intelligent sage-king, Yao's benevolence and diligence served as a model to future Chinese monarchs and emperors. Early Chinese often speak of Yao, Shun and Yu the Great as historical figures, and contemporary historians believed they may represent leader-chiefs of allied tribes who established a unified and hierarchical system of government in a transition period to the patriarchal feudal society. In the Classic of History, one of the Five Classics, the initial chapters deal with Yao, Shun and Yu. SOURCES 2 Ching, Julia; R. W. L. Guisso (1991). Sages and filial sons: mythology and archaeology in ancient China. The Chinese University Press. p. 140. ISBN 978-962-201-469-5. 3 Sarah Allan (1991). The shape of the turtle: myth, art, and cosmos in early China. SUNY Press. p. 59. ISBN 0-7914-0460-9. Retrieved 2012-04-01. 4 Asiapac Editorial (2006). Great Chinese emperors: tales of wise and benevolent rule (revised ed.). Asiapac Books Pte Ltd. p. 11. ISBN 981-229-451-1. Retrieved 2012-04-01. 5 C.K. Yang. Religion in Chinese Society : A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors(1967 [1961]). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 102.

What were some military trends that developed in the period between the late Han and the Tang dynasty (roughly 200 - 900 CE)?

A number of trends developed in the period between the late Han and the Tang dynasty (roughly 200 - 900 CE): 1. The conscription system was gradually replaced by the use of professional soldiers. It was simply too troublesome to send conscripts off to garrison the frontier - they would have to be rotated too often. 2. These professional soldiers would be permanently settled in the frontier regions in self-supporting garrisons of farmer-fighters. These garrisons could be combined to create larger offensive forces. 3. Semi-sinicized tribes would be recruited to provide the cavalry, and would be led by their own chiefs. 260

The Spring and Autumn period

A period in Chinese history from approximately 771 to 476 BC (or according to some authorities until 403 BC[a])[2] which corresponds roughly to the first half of the Eastern Zhou Period. The period's name derives from the Spring and Autumn Annals, a chronicle of the state of Lu between 722 and 479 BC, which tradition associates with Confucius(551-479 BC). During this period, the Zhou royal authority over the various feudal states started to decline, as more and more dukes and marquesses obtained de facto regional autonomy, defying the king's court in Luoyi, and waging wars amongst themselves. The gradual Partition of Jin, one of the most powerful states, marked the end of the Spring and Autumn period, and the beginning of the Warring States period.

What did Mao Tse-Tong and the CCP do after their failed urban uprisings in 1928-1930?

After a series of abortive urban uprisings in 1928-1930, Mao and another CCP member named Zhu De led their ragtag forces deep into rural Jiangxi province, cutting themselves off from the urban leadership that was still in hiding in Shanghai. Relatively free from outside meddling, Mao experimented with land reform and unconventional tactics, and succeeded in creating the Jiangxi Soviet-an independent zone ruled by the CCP Using remnants of his own forces, reformed bandits, warlord army deserters, and peasants, Mao and Zhu De also created their own Red Army. Never again would they be caught unarmed! As Mao had learned first hand, "Political power grows from the barrel of a gun!"

How concerned were early Chinese military thinkers about threates from the steppes?

All of the early Chinese military thinkers were focused on warfare between Chinese states, which is perfectly understandable given the political situation within China during the late Spring and Autumn and Warring States eras. But the non-Chinese threat was always lurking. The early texts make frequent references to engagements with "barbarians", presumably people whose culture was not yet sinicized to the point where they could be included in the general category of "Chinese". The outlying states like Qin and Yan had the most interaction, and some Chinese historians claim Qin'Sssuccess was due in part to the absorption of barbarian tribes.

What happened to architecture during the Warring States era?

Almost all nobles started developing fortifications and strongholds to resist invasion. The idea was that the defender would store up all the provisions, while stripping the countryside of any resources, would give the advantage to the defender, and force the attacker to retreat.

The Warring States period (Chinese: 戰國時代; pinyin: Zhànguó Shídài)

An era in ancient Chinese history characterized by warfare, as well as bureaucratic and military reforms and consolidation. It followed the Spring and Autumn period and concluded with the Qin wars of conquest that saw the annexation of all other contender states, which ultimately led to the Qin state's victory in 221 BC as the first unified Chinese empire, known as the Qin dynasty. Although different scholars point toward different dates ranging from 481 BC to 403 BC as the true beginning of the Warring States, Sima Qian's choice of 475 BC is the most often cited. The Warring States era also overlaps with the second half of the Eastern Zhou dynasty, though the Chinese sovereign, known as the king of Zhou, ruled merely as a figurehead and served as a backdrop against the machinations of the warring states. The "Warring States Period" derives its name from the Record of the Warring States, a work compiled early in the Han dynasty.

What does Andrew Scobell argue influences China's current strategic decision-making?

Andrew Scobell is not so sure - he believes that Confucian values still inform decision-making, although he acknowledges that Realpolitik considerations tend to dominate. But he does note that Realpolitik decisions are still consistently justified with reference to Confucian ideas. "China's strategic behavior is influenced not just by a Realpolitik strand but also by a Confucian one. The combined effect is what I have dubbed a Chinese Cult of Defense, in which realist behavior dominates but is justified as defensive on the basis of a pacifist self-perception." "The outcome of these two strategic cultures interacting is a China that assertively protects and aggressively promotes its own national interests, up to and including acts of war [Structural/Cultural Realism], but that rationalizes all military moves as purely self-defensive [Confucian]."

Suiren (Chinese: 燧人, pinyin: suì rén)

Appears in Chinese mythology and some works which draw upon it. Suiren (literally, "Fire Maker") is credited as a culture hero who introduce humans to the production of fire and its use for cooking (Wu 1982, 51, and Christie 1968, 84). He was included on some ancient lists of the legendary Three August Ones, who lived long before Emperor Yao, Emperor Shun, and the emperors of the earliest historical Chinese dynasty (Xia), and even before the Yellow Emperor & Yandi.

What is stage two of the people's war?

As it grows in power, it enters stage two, establishes other revolutionary base areas and spreads its influence through the surrounding countryside, where it may become the governing power and gain popular support through such programmes as land reform.

What was the impact of scholars bias against the military on Chinese strategic culture?

As noted in Lect 4, it is this literati bias against the military that gave credence to the notion of a Confucian Strategic Culture with a preference for Accommodationist and Defensive strategies. Based on these accounts, one Western observer even claimed that "The Chinese proudly call themselves pacifists and assert this title as proof of the superiority of their civilization. ...The early wars of China were practically all defensive, and passively defensive at that. ... Such wars required no great military skill, and developed none. Thus the Chinese have no military history worthy of scientific study." This opinion was echoed by many other Western scholars: " The Chinese are not militaristic ... The soldier in the long span of Chinese history until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1912, has been looked down upon with a disenchantment bordering on contempt."

What happened as the struggle for hegemony continued through the Warring States Period?

As the struggle for hegemony continued, the number of states in the Zhou territory was inevitably reduced. Larger states absorbed smaller ones, before succumbing in turn to even more powerful rivals. Slowly and bloodily, the number of states was reduced until only 7 remained of the more than 140 that had originally existed in the Spring and Autumn era. Those originally 140 states either surrendered, or either conquered.

After the late 14th century weapon design in China stagnated. Some minor changes were sparked by early contact with Europeans in the 16th century (the matchlock), but in general Chinese weapon designs did not improve during the late Ming and Qing dynasties. Why was this the case?

Bearing in mind that military innovation is driven by rivalry, we need to look first at the nature of China's rivals. The Inner Asian steppes dominated China's military thinking for more than two thousand years. This was the ONLY rivalry that mattered. Right up until the early 19th century none of China's other neighbors constituted a viable threat to the empire, so the Chinese took little notice of them. From the standpoint of technology, the Sino-Nomadic rivalry did not encourage the development of new weapons, especially firearms. The nomads continued to fight with traditional technology (bow and horse), and the Chinese responded using the traditional repertoire of weapons. The steppe nomads rarely stood their ground and fought, so even mobile field artillery was of little use. And of course the clumsy matchlocks in use at the time could not be used on horseback, nor could they match the steppe bow in range and rate of fire. The story of gunpowder in China is a classic example of how military innovation is shaped by rivalry. In the case of China, none of her neighbors possessed sophisticated gunpowder weapons, or any advanced military technology for that matter. Existing weapons were effective, so there was little impetus for the development and adoption of new technology such as mobile artillery and light hand-held firearms.

According to the new Professor, what is offensive realism, briefly described?

Briefly, it means to go out there, and hit your enemies before they grow strong.

Considering Mo Zi's condemnation of war, did Mo Zi refuse all kinds of war? What was Mo Zi's view on "just war"?

But Mo Zi had no time for those who took his condemnation of wars of aggression to mean he was against all offensive war: "Now those rulers who delight in offensive warfare attempt to put a pleasing facade upon their doctrines and criticize Mo Zi, saying "Do you claim that offensive warfare is an unrighteous and unprofitable thing? In ancient times Yu launched an expedition against the ruler of the Miao, Tang attacked Jie [last ruler of the Xia], and King Wu attacked Shang Zhou, and yet all three are regarded as sage kings. Why is this? Mo Zi said, "You have failed to examine the terminology which I employ and do not understand the reasoning behind it. What these men did was not to 'attack' but to 'punish'. Again we see the idea of "Just War" phrased in a similar manner to the Confucians. But Mo Zi recognized that in his day few rulers waged Just Wars: "The rulers and feudal lords of today are not like this. They all set about to examine the relative merits of their soldiers, who are their teeth and claws, arrange their boat and chariot forces, and then, clad in strong armor and bearing sharp weapons, they set off to attack some innocent state. As soon as they enter the borders of the state, they begin cutting down the grain crops, felling trees, razing walls and fortifications, filling up moats and ponds, slaughtering the sacrificial animals, firing the ancestral temples of the state, massacring its subjects, trampling down its aged and weak, and carrying off its vessels and treasures." What was listed above was a list of offenses that violated just conduct in war. Those who waged wars of aggression were thieves and ought to be punished as such. For Mo Zi and his disciples, it was their moral obligation to assist any "innocent state" attacked by aggressive neighbors.

How did PLA generals interpret the outcome of the Korean War?

But for PLA generals, the lessons were obvious -China needed to modernize its army. In the aftermath of the Korean War Chinese generals pushed for the introduction of more modern weapons.They realized Chinese forces had been at a disadvantage in Korea because they lacked modern weapons and doctrine - not every war was going to beat guerrilla war! The model for China's military modernization was the Soviet Red Army. Post-WW2 Soviet doctrine focused on armor, artillery, and airpower in large combinedarms operations. Taking advantage of Soviet equipment supplied during and after the Korean War,and Soviet military advisers, the PLA sought to update its organization and doctrine - but Mao was not so sure.

When should a ruler use force? If a ruler uses force, what does that say about the ruler, according to Confucius?

But no ruler should relish war! Given that virtue is more powerful than awesomeness, sage-rulers should not have to resort to war in order to maintain order. Those who are immune to the transformative power of virtue can be chastised or corrected (ie., punished) by force, but rulers must bear in mind that resort to arms not only reflects the incorrigible wickedness of the evildoers, it also represents a failure on the part of the ruler. After all, his virtue should have been sufficient to create harmony, so resort to arms is an admission of personal failure.

When faced with America's technological edge, what did some PLA strategists argue?

But the Americans remain determined to maintain their technological edge. This poses a serious challenge to the PLA strategists - will China ever catch up? Can it match US military spending levels? Some strategists argue that China does not have to catch up at all - at least not in the conventional sense. Some PLA theorists argue that China should focus on asymmetrical warfare rather than trying to match the US in those areas where it is strongest. Asymmetrical warfare is based on Sun Zi's concepts of orthodox-unorthodox and emptiness-fullness. It involves targeting the enemy's weaknesses rather than his strengths. Rather than challenge America's overwhelming technological superiority in air and sea power, the Chinese should focus on developing capacities that target America's Achilles Heel.

Did the Chinese ALWAYS use Accommodationist strategies when dealing with the nomads? What other strategies did they sue that led tot he fall of the Xiongnu?

But the Chinese never just sat back and adopted a passive approach to dealing with the nomads. Instead, they found other ways - ways that Sun Zi himself would have approved. The Chinese understood that nomadic confederacies were inherently unstable and could be undone through selective use of rewards. The Chinese developed a diplomatic strategy based on the idea of yi yi zhi yi (use a barbarian to control a barbarian 以夷制夷) - play one barbarian off against another. The Chinese would selectively offer favors to one clan or tribe in order to promote dissension. When taken to its extremes, this policy aimed at using some nomadic allies as proxies in fighting off China's other nomadic enemies. Why buy cavalry when you could rent it? This approach was ultimately responsible for the demise of the Xiongnu. The Chinese took advantage of a split in the Xiongnu confederacy and won over the "Southern Xiongnu" - these nomads settled on China's northern frontier and served as a buffer against the hostile "Northern Xiongnu". Eventually the Chinese took the offensive with the help of their allies and drove the hostile group deep into the steppes. But it was a temporary victory, as they were soon replaced by other nomadic groups.

How did the the Mandate of Heaven influence China's view of the lifestyle's of dynasties?

But the Mandate of Heaven also came to be seen as central to the idea of the "Dynastic Cycle. The Chinese came to believe that dynasties had lifecycles, just like humans. They would grow and prosper, but eventually they would weaken, at which point they would lose the Mandate of Heaven. The Mandate would be passed on to a new dynasty, thus starting the cycle over again. Just like the cycles of unity and disunity in China's history, the dynasties will go through cycles as well. It was a clever theory, for by definition any successful dynastic challenger would have proved his right to the Mandate - nothing succeeds like success! All military challengers could claim to have the Mandate on their side, thereby legitimizing what would otherwise be treason and regicide.

What did the cannon do to land warfare?

But the cannon did not just revolutionize land warfare - it also changed the face of naval warfare. By the 16Th century the Europeans were equipping their ocean- going vessels with ship-killing cannons, mounted on special gun decks. These purpose-built "Men o' War" could mount over 100 guns and were designed to destroy other ships through concentrated cannon fire. For the first time in history this gave European navies an unbeatable edge over their enemies. These ships provided the "muscle" during the Age of Exploration, allowing the European powers to assert their domination over the peoples of Africa, Central and South America, South and Southeast Asia, and of course China. It looks pretty low-tech, but the naval cannon and the gunport gave European ships an edge over their enemies, facIlitating the rise of the great oceanic empires (Britain, Spain, Holland)

In Sun ZI's the Art of war, how does a general erode the qi of his enemy?

But the great general must also seek to erode the qi of his enemy: "The qi of the Three Armies can be snatched away; the commanding general's mind can be seized. For this reason in the morning their qi is ardent; during the day their qi becomes indolent; at dusk their qi is exhausted. Thus one who excels at employing the army avoids their ardent qi and strikes when it is indolent or exhausted. This is the way to manipulate qi." How does one manipulate the enemy's qi? Through both physical and psychological means. Exhaust the enemy by forcing him to move fast over long distances to match your deployments. Intercept his supplies to cause hardship. Avoid him when he attacks, harass him when he rests, harry him when he withdraws. Use psychological warfare to sow discord and create pessimism. All of these measures will take their toll on the qi of the enemy commander and his army.

What happened to the Qing Dynasty as a result of their military reforms?

But the modern military would not prove to be China's salvation - at least not yet. The New Army was recruited from the most politicized - and therefore most anti-Manchu and revolutionary - segment of the Chinese population. Far from defending the Qing, it became a hotbed of anti-Manchu activism, and in late 1911 many units took part in the Republican Revolution against the Manchu dynasty. This is a classic case of the "military efficiency vs political reliability" dilemma. The Qing court was forced to reform its military to improve efficiency, but in the process the army became politically unreliable. Unfortunately China's great republican experiment also did not go as planned. General Yuan Shikai used his control over the Beiyang Army to make himself the first President of the Republic in 1912.

What the anti-military bias amongst the scholars absolute? Was the Wen-Wu gap absolute?

But this anti-military bias was never absolute, and among the scholar-officials there was never complete agreement. Some scholars criticized their peers for neglecting military affairs. For example, the Tang official and poet Du Fu condemned the artificial distinction between wen and wu: "Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the 'civil' and the 'military,' and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of action, or in what year of what dynasty it was first introduced, is more than I can say. But, at any rate, it has come about that the members of the governing class are quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a shamefaced manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set down as eccentric individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary instance of the way in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose sight of fundamentals." As Don Wyatt and Kathleen Ryor note in their articles [on web], many civil officials did in fact develop expertise in military affairs (due to the habit of appointing civil officials to oversee military campaigns), and many military officials took great pleasure in pursuits traditionally associated with The civil literati - calligraphy, poetry, painting, etc. The Wen-Wu gap was never absolute, but it did exist, and the power struggle for influence at court tended to exacerbate the problem. It did not help matters That many of the most powerful military men in the late Tang and Song were in fact men of mixed blood - part Inner Asian, and therefore suspect at a time when China was confronted by serious nomadic threats. This anti-military bias was persistent, a fact attested to by the lament written 800 years after the Tang by the Ming dynasty official Huang Zongxi: "To protect the nation and its sacred shrines in the business of gentlemen (junzi). To obey commands and exert themselves physically is the business of ordinary men. In the security of the nation and the preserving of its sacred shrines intact, what is more important than generalship? If ordinary men can be deemed worthy of it, what greater honor can we bestow on gentlemen? Today the most important matters are entrusted to the least of men. Is this treating the military as important or as unimportant?" As Huang noted, the sad fact was that China was dominated by a class of "effete scholars, with no understanding of warfare, and quite unwilling to serve as soldiers."

By 2000 BCE, what was China like?

By approximately 2000 BCE, the stage was set for the emergence of the first true Bronze Age culture in China. Villages were now much larger (even multi-lineage), with an established center of political-religious power (the "palace city") controlling a number of villages Society had become stratified, with an elite ruling over a much larger peasant population. Rulers combined political, military, and religious roles. A rudimentary writing system was emerging, and metallurgical skill was improving. It is at this point that the Chinese historical (ie., written) record allegedly begins. Texts written in the period 600-100 BCE claim to base their accounts on much earlier records left behind by the first Bronze Age civilizations.

What idea challenges the widespread belief that China currently operates under the influence of Confucian Strategic Culture?

Challenging the widespread belief that China currently operates under the influence of Confucian Strategic Culture, some scholars reject the idea of Strategic Culture entirely and argue that China actually acts in accordance with the assumptions of Structural Realism. According to Political Scientist Yuan-Kang Wang, Structural Realism "holds that anarchy, defined as the absence of central authority above states, pushes states to engage in power competition and use force when necessary; a state's culture does not have an independent effect on how it behaves in the world." He downplays the role of culture since the anarchic interstate system compels similar behaviour in all state actors. The advocates of Structural Realism therefore reject the influence of unique Strategic Cultures.

How did Mao respond to the tactics used by Mao?

Chiang attacked with traditional tactics - large columns of troops supported by artillery and aircraft. Mao responded by developing strategy and tactics based on practical experience and ideas taken from Sun Zi's Art of War and the Ming dynasty novel Outlaws of the Marsh(Shuihu Zhuan). These old texts found new relevance as the Communist underdogs waged war against Chiang and his forces. The Art of War's emphasis on deception, unorthodox tactics, and morale offered useful lessons to Mao and his guerrillas. Outlaws of the Marsh offered Mao concrete examples to illustrate Sun Zi's theories. This book was a collection of stories about legendary outlaws who lived a Robin Hood-like existence during the Song dynasty. The tales were known to all Chinese courtesy of itinerant storytellers, and made it easier to explain unorthodox strategies to illiterate peasants. Drawing on these traditional Chinese bandit strategies and the works of the ancient bingjia, Mao advocated using surprise, deception, dispersal, and mobility to seize the initiative from his numerically superior and heavily armed but relatively slow-moving foes. The strategy was to pit one man against ten, but the tactics were to pit ten men against one! There is strength in weakness and weakness in strength! How Daoist! Mao and Zhu De understood that their small Red Army stood no chance in any head-on clash with Chiang's forces, even if the latter were mostly warlord troops who had only recently defected to the KMT. Instead, Mao and Zhu designed a strategy that worked to THEIR strengths, not those of the enemy [asymmetrical warfare]. They knew the ground well, and could avail themselves of the eyes and ears of the peasants - that allowed them to keep track of Chiang's columns, while Chiang's troops searched in vain for the elusive Red Army. Mao and Zhu used deception and feints to cause the enemy to divide their forces, forcing them to spend all of their energy chasing phantoms. Meanwhile, the Red Army gathered its forces to achieve local superiority for surprise attacks on isolated portions of Chiang's forces. These tactics chewed up Chiang's forces. 409

What kind of threats did Chiang kai-shek prioritize?

Chiang believed he had to eliminate the internal threats first - China could not confront Japan while handicapped by disunity. He therefore embraced theunpopular "An nei, rang wai" [安内攘外] policy -this called for internal pacification before resisting external threats. Appease Japan to buy time while consolidating his power and building up his forces. In 1929 and 1930 he defeated his remaining major rivals [former warlord allies] in campaigns involving hundreds of thousands of troops. Once these threats were eliminated or contained, he turned on the Communists. In a series of 5 "extermination campaigns" in 1931-34 he destroyed Communist base areas in the countryside (Mao developed his guerrilla warfare tactics in response to these attacks).

What does China's military buildup suggest about Beijing's agenda?

China seeks to develop the following capacities: 1. Capacity to deter Taiwanese independence - DONE 2. Capacity to defeat and occupy Taiwan - DONE 3. Capacity to deter US/Japanese intervention in defense of Taiwan (anti-access/area denial) - SOON 4. Capacity to assert area dominance in Yellow Sea and South China Sea, and extend reach beyond the East China Sea/first island chain into the Pacific - IN PROGRESS 5. Capacity to project power necessary to protect Chinese national interests beyond East Asia - this includes creating a global network of allies/bases - IN PROGRESS (seems all very post-45 US like!!!)

How did the British win the Second Opium War (8 October 1856 - 24 October 1860)?

China was no better prepared the second time around, and the British (now joined by the French) had little difficulty defeating Qing forces. But it was worse this time around, as the British were determined to teach the Chinese a lesson they would not soon forget. In 1858-1860 the British defeated the Chinese coastal defenses just as easily as they had in 1840. But this time they would insist on forcing the Chinese to negotiate in Beijing rather than on the coast. The Dagu (Taku) forts were key to the British strategy. They controlled the approaches to Beijing, and were the only real obstacle between the European troops and the imperial capital. These were stormed in 1860, allowing an Anglo- French force to advance on Beijing. The Chinese weapons were out of date by hundreds of years, and the crews had little or no training. Courage alone could not compensate, and the European forces destroyed all who stood in their way. Once clear of the Dagu forts, there was little to stop the Anglo-French force from advancing on Beijing. Manchu cavalry were simply swept aside by British guns. Zhuge Nu 諸葛弩 - Chinese repeating crossbow. The design dates back to the Warring States era! Even the imperial capital was no longer safe. As the Anglo-French troops approached Beijing the Manchu court was forced to flee. How could a numerically inferior force operating at the end of a perilously long supply line possibly put such a large force to flight? Drill, discipline, and organization!

From where did Chiang Kai-shek arise?

China's "Man on Horseback": Chiang Kai-shek Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) came of age in the turbulent years of the late Qing, and was convinced that the Manchus had to go if China was to be saved. Chiang joined the ranks of young men who saw military service as a way of contributing to the nation, and in 1908 he was sent to Japan to attend a military school. He was impressed by what the Japanese had accomplished, and like Cai E he came to believe in Militarism as an ideology of national development. He was also surprised to learn that what the Japanese believed to be the secret behind their success -Bushidō- was in fact Chinese in origin. As he studied what the Japanese called seishin kyōiku [spiritual education], he quickly realized that Bushidō was nothing other than China's own Way of the Warrior [Wushidao 武士道 - even the characters were the same as the Japanese Bushidō!]. If the secret source of Japanese strength was in fact Chinese, then all the Chinese had to do was recover their own martial heritage - once they reclaimed their wu, China could easily cast off the yoke of foreign imperialism! Appointed by the anti-warlord revolutionary Sun Yat-sen to be the commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy in 1924, Chiang set out to rebuild the image of the soldier and reassert the military's place at the forefront of China's struggle to modernize. He believed his cadets would serve as missionaries of militant nationalism, and that they would be able to save both the revolution and the nation, even in the face of formidable odds. In Chiang's own words: "Prior to the founding of Whampoa, I had one desire - I hoped that at some point in my life I would be able to open a military school and train dedicated youths according to my own ideals in order to complete the task of building the army and the nation. Moreover, at the time I believed that if I could realize my desire, China's militaryeducation would definitely be successful, and that the officers produced by this education system would not only be able to complete the Northern Expedition and unite China, they would also establish a modern army and a modern nation."

What motivated Westerner's to finally start studying Sun Zi?

China's ancient military strategists were ignored by Western scholars for the hundreds of years, despite the numerous military clashes between China and the Western powers starting with the Opium War of 1839. Of course, China lost all of these encounters with the West, and its military weakness in the 19th and early 20th centuries hardly constituted a glowing endorsement of the ideas of Sun Zi et al. After all, what could the great powers possibly have to learn from the "sick man of Asia"! But this changed gradually during the mid-20th Century. Western military observers began to take note of Chinese military thought during the Anti-Japanese, Korean, and Vietnam Wars. What they found shocked them. Upon closer examination Western military men discovered that the ancient Chinese strategists possessed a surprisingly sophisticated understanding of warfare in all its dimensions - military, psychological, political, economic, social, moral. Moreover, they discovered that the Chinese strategists had somehow avoided the Western fixation on physically destroying the enemy's army as the primary objective in war. For Sun Zi, "preservation" was more important than "destruction"! The bingjia knew how to defeat an enemy with minimal bloodshed - something Western military thinkers could appreciate after the terrible bloodshed of the World Wars! More importantly, they knew the secrets of how the weak could overcome the strong - truly dangerous knowledge in the age of anti-colonialism, insurgencies, and guerrilla warfare!

How do the Chinese justify the use of force?

Chinese justifications for the use of force inevitably make reference to what we have identified as the Confucian concept of Just War (jus ad bellum). China's offensive use of force is always justified in moral language - it is intended to "set things right", to "rectify", to "chastise" wrongdoing and "punish" evildoers - it is never about profit. The intervention in Korea, the clash with India, the invasion of Vietnam, and the constant threats aimed at Taiwan - the decision to use military force in each case was based on perceptions of Chinese national interest, but in each case the decision was portrayed as driven by the need to "set things right", to "chastise" or deter wrongdoing.

What is the difference between how Clausewitz was received INITIALLY, and the later, more accurate understandings of his writing?

Clausewitz was largely ignored for most of the 19th century. When he was re-discovered, he was misinterpreted by many who saw him as an advocate for war a outrance (all out war). In reality, Clausewitz was a realist who recognized the utility of limited war in pursuit of realistic goals. But he also recognized that war was inherently risky and that the best laid plans could be derailed by chance or passion. He still left room for the Napoleons and Alexanders - only the genius of the commander and his coup d'oeil [strategic intuition] could make uncertainty and confusion allies instead of enemies. Clausewitz is heralded as the West's greatest military thinker, but if we look closely at the Art of War it becomes apparent that Sun Zi had reached many of the same conclusions 2000 years earlier!!!

What stopped the Qin, and many other Chinese dynasties, from adopting a primary Offensive strategy when dealing with teh nomads?

Coming out of the Warring States era, China had developed a sophisticated military establishment based on infantry armies made up of conscripted peasants. As Qin demonstrated, this army was formidable when used against other Chinese states. But what about when used against the Inner Asian nomads? The Qin achieved some success in driving the Xiongnu out of the Ordos region using conventional forces, but this was only a temporary solution. The construction of the Great Wall was intended to allow infantry garrisons to keep the mounted nomads at bay. Unfortunately, this defensive posture prevented the Chinese from launching punitive expeditions against the nomads. For such operations you needed cavalry, and that was something in short supply in China. Horses were always in short supply, but even more important was the lack of skilled riders. You could take a peasant and teach him how to use a crossbow or wave a sword, but you would never be able to make him an accomplished cavalryman. The Inner Asians spent their entire lives on horseback, and mounted warfare was second nature to them. Conscript soldiers simply could not compete. The Chinese understood this, so they decided to recruit soldiers from among the semi-sinicized nomads living on the fringes of the empire.

Did Confucius have a problem with using military force?

Confucius did not have a problem with using military force, providing it was used for LEGITIMATE PURPOSES BY THE PROPER AUTHORITY. Warfare is only permissible, "When good government prevails in the empire, ceremonies, music, and punitive military expeditions [征伐] proceed from the Son of Heaven. When bad government prevails in the empire, ceremonies, music, and punitive expeditions proceed from the princes. When these things proceed from the princes, as a rule, the cases will be few in which they do not lose their power in ten generations. If they proceed from the Great Officers of the princes, the cases will be few in which they do not lose their power in five generations. When the subsidiary ministers of the Great Officers hold in their grasp the orders of the state, the cases will be few in which they do not lose their power in three generations. When right principles prevail in the kingdom, government will not be in the hands of the great officers!"

What did Confucius think of introverts?

Confucius thought that they were kind of pathetic. Man is a social animal, and thrives in social relationships.

What was Confucius' primary goal and area of interest?

Confucius was not concerned with Heaven, or spirits, or the afterlife - he was concerned with this life, and what he saw around him in the late Spring and Autumn era was deeply disturbing. He believed that man was a social animal, and existed not so much as an individual, but as a point in a web of social relationships. It was this web of relationships that held society together, and each strand, or relationship, involved specific mutual obligations and specific behavioral norms.

How did Deng Xiaoping's modernize the PLA?

Deng included the military in his "Four Modernizations" plan [Agriculture, Industry, Science/Technology, Military]. For the PLA, this involved accelerated investment in domestic military production coupled with strategic purchases of foreign technology. Obsolete manufacturing technology was updated, a process that was made possible by Chinese access to Western technology in the early 1980s. Funding remained a critical problem, for Deng had to allocate scarce resources to all four areas of modernization. But the PLA was a priority - a powerful military was not only a guarantor of Chinese security and a deterrent to Taiwanese independence, it was also critical to regime security. The PLA was a Party Army, and Deng needed to ensure it was both militarily effective and politically reliable - giving the generals what they wanted ensured their support for his other reforms.

In contrast to the Confucian Strategic Culture, what other strategic consensus seems to be pointed at by the Bingjia?

Despite the hat-tipping to the Confucian Consensus, the underlying assumptions of the Bingjia bear a striking resemblance to what in the West is known as the Parabellum Paradigm. The Parabellum Paradigm is derived from the Latin phrase "si vis pacem parabellum" - if you want peace, prepare for war. This paradigm sees a threat of war due to the enemy's disposition and capability to use force. The enemy is only held at bay by one's own preparations for war, demonstrations of resolve, and bargaining strategies that are highly coercive, all aimed at demonstrating one's own capacity and willingness to use force to thwart the enemy's intentions. The stronger you are, the safer you are -but the only permanent solution is the total defeat of the enemy ! [but remember - total defeat is not the same as total destruction!]

What did Chiang kai-shek do in the years from 1929 to 1934?

During this period Chiang also set out to rebuild his army along modern lines. The old Revolutionary Army might have had ideological zeal, but that would not be enough in a showdown with Japan. Chiang arranged for German military advisers to come to China. In a complicated trade-for-weapons deal, he also arranged to buy German weapons for his forces. His ultimate goal was to both restore the military effectiveness of the Chinese military and return it to its place as the vanguard institution in China's struggle to modernize. The process was slow, as he faced funding difficulties - money was limited, and what was available had to also fund ongoing anti-Communist and anti-Warlord operations. But he made progress towards the goal of 80 modernized divisions (approx. 1,000,000 troops)

What is the strategic concept: emptiness and fullness?

EMPTINESS AND FULLNESS 虛實 Emptiness and Fullness (or vacuity and substance - xu 虛 and shi 實) refer to the dispositions of the enemy. Where the enemy has deployed in strength to attack or meet our assaults, this constitutes Fullness (substance). Where the enemy is thinly deployed because he feels secure or does not anticipate an attack, this is Emptiness (vacuity). The good general attacks the enemy's emptiness but not his fullness! What this really means is that the good general never attacks where he is expected to attack - to do so is To walk into the enemy's trap. Instead, the good general targets the enemy's Emptiness, so that "wherever the army attacks it is like a stone thrown against an egg!" There is an element of Daoist thought in the concept of Emptiness and Fullness. The Dao De Jing alludes to this in stanza 78: "There is nothing in the world more soft and weak than water, and yet for attacking things that are firm and strong there is nothing that can take precedence of it; there is nothing (so effectual) for which it can be changed. Everyone in the world knows that the soft overcomes the hard, and the weak the strong, but no one is able to carry it out in practice." Sun Zi clarifies: "Now the army's disposition of force is like water - the form of water is to avoid the high and go to the low, while the form of a military force is to avoid the full and attack the empty. The flow of water is determined by the earth, the victory of a military force is determined by the opponent. So a military force has no constant formation, and water has no constant shape. The ability to gain victory by changing and adapting according to the opponent is called genius! "

What did King Wu do after defeating the Shang, and how did it set a template for all subsequent dynastic founders?

Equally important is what King Wu did after defeating the Shang. The "Book of Odes" records that upon overthrowing the Shang, King Wu inaugurated an era of peace: Brilliant and illustrious is the house of Zhou. The positions of the princes have been regulated; The shields and spears have been recalled; The bows and arrows have been cased. I will seek true virtue, and display it throughout the great land, That as king I may indeed preserve our appointment. This set the pattern for ALL subsequent dynastic founders by establishing the proper relationship between wen [文 the civil] and wu [武 the martial].

What is stage three of the people's war?

Eventually in stage three, the movement has enough strength to encircle and capture small cities, then larger ones, until finally it seizes power in the entire country.

What initiated the Age of Cannons?

Evidence exists of the use of cannons in Europe in the first half of the 14th century. These early guns were primitive, clumsy, inaccurate, hard to move, and dangerous to use. They also had limited effect on stone walls. But that would change... As technology improved, it became possible to build cast iron and bronze cannons. These strong cannon fired iron shot that were effective against stone walls. The new weapons were also much lighter and therefore more mobile. The ability to bring cannons On campaign meant that for the first time generals had the means to defeat fortified towns. Before the development of mobile artillery, sieges were a huge problem. Attackers could surround the city and try to starve the defenders out, but that was risky (attackers could run out of food first, a relieving army could arrive, or the defenders could launch a sortie and defeat the besieging force). Or they could try storming the position, but unless a wall could be brought down by sapping (mining), such a move would be prohibitively costly.

Examples of solicited technology

Examples of solicited technology - poison gas, the heavy bomber, the tank, the submachine gun, the atomic bomb, ballistic missiles, the Taser. These were all developed to meet specific needs identified by military planners.

Praetorianism

Excessive or abusive political influence of the Armed Forces in a country. Daniel R. Headrick, professor of History and Social Sciences at Roosevelt University, describes praetorianism as a type of militarism oriented to the interior life of a nation, often related to minor countries, that does not aspire to fight or win international wars, but instead to maintain its influence in the domestic political system, controlling decisions that could affect the interests of the military as a corporation, or supporting some particular political faction or party.

What attracts people to join the army?

FIRST, it is a tradition, either a family or an ethnic. In China, whether a regiment, or in the Machu case, the banner, sons follow their fathers in the military. In China, many families were military families. For the Manchu, the Qing dynasty, being a Manchu mean you would join a banner. SECOND, career possibilities. If you come from a very poor area, and you are a peasant, the military is the only way out. With no education or personal connections, any ambitious person who wanted to climb the social ladder joined the army. In China, the traditionally poorest province, Shandou province, was also the largest source of recruits was the army. In particularly, there is the "anjiatei", which means "family money". Parents of children who join the army would get some money. This is particularly of younger sons. Note in China, every son gets an inheritance. This contrasts with primogeniture, where the firstborn gets everything. THIRD, volunteering out of patriotism. In Canada for WWII, many of the volunteers would be tough farmboys, and there were huge numbers of cropdusters. In China, however, due to a huge population, there is an u FOURTH, mercenaries. These professional soldiers, who are it in for the money. In China, this would mean bandits, frontier barbarians, and people with martial arts training. The problem of mercenaries is that they expect to be paid, and regular payment may be difficult to maintain, so mercenaries are unreliable. FIFTH, conscripts. Conscripts come up again and again in Chinese history, sometimes in wartime, sometimes in peace. This is always a major issue. By and large, they are used NOT to fight, but as porters, and as support workers. The term is "lafu", which essentially means being press-ganged. SIXTH, true believers. These guys fight out of a genuine belief of a cause.

How do you keep people in the army?

FIRST, they don't want to go home. Soldiers who are sent into the army by their parents are rarely welcomed back, unless you came back making a lot of money. SECOND, strong pressures to conform. The first thing a soldier receives is a uniform. Other techniques are meant to differentiate a soldier from a civilian. The second thing is drilling. Soldiers have to operate as groups, and just to pass the time. Soldiers in truth spend a fraction of their time actually engaged in operations, so they spend most of their time training and drilling. Third, there are rituals, designed to give a sense of identity and purpose, like how the Marines are often compared to a cult. THIRD, payment. Commanders often reward their soldiers by allowing victorious soldiers to loot and plunder. As a matter of course, civilians rarely like soldiers. Above all, loyalty comes at a price. As a matter of course, people do not fight simply out of loyalty to clan or country.

What is the strategic concept: the Flexibility?

FLEXIBILITY 權變 For Sun Zi, rigidity and inflexibility were weaknesses. To form a plan and then stick to it without regard to changes in the situation was tantamount to stubbornness. Sun Zi was a big fan of thorough intelligence gathering and detailed planning, but he also understood - like Clausewitz - that once hostilities started, a thousand different problems would conspire to thwart one's plans. This is what Clausewitz called "friction" and "the fog of war". For ordinary generals, these factors could cause paralysis, but for Sun Zi's "genius" constantly changing circumstances presented opportunities for exploitation. Therefore the truly great general had to be an expert in calculating subtle changes in the balance of power. In modern management studies, the phrase quanbian [權變] is used for contingency theory , which is really just a fancy term for flexibility in response to changes in the situation. For Sun Zi, the great general doesn't just cope with chaos, he embraces it, and uses it to his advantage. In fact, he actually exacerbates it by sowing confusion in the enemy ranks and confounding the enemy's plans. This is accomplished through false intelligence, deceptions, misleading deployments, and even feigned disorder on the part of one's own troops. Far from fearing chaos, the great general uses it to torment his foe: "Intermixed and turbulent, the fighting appears chaotic, but they [one's own forces] cannot be made disordered. In turmoil and confusion, their deployment is without head or tail, yet they cannot be defeated!" "[Simulated] chaos is born from control. [The illusion] of fear is born from courage. [Feigned] weakness is born from strength. Order and disorder are a question of numbers; courage and fear are a question of strategic configuration of power [shi]; strength and weakness are a question of deployment [of forces]. Thus one who excels at moving the enemy deploys in a configuration to which the enemy must respond. He offers something that the enemy must seize. With profit he moves them, with the foundation he awaits them!" The idea is to pull the enemy in a hundred directions at once, paralyzing the commander with indecision. "One who excels at employing the army may be compared to the Shuairan snake...if you strike its head the tail will respond. If you strike its tail the head will respo nd. If you strike the middle, both the head and tail react !"

How was Confucius' view of war?

For Confucius, moral suasion was the preferred means of dealing with those who had strayed from the Way. The ideal Son of Heaven cultivates his virtue, and "manifests illustrious virtue", which for Confucius acts as a affective force, awakening shame in the petty man and urging them to be good. But he recognized that war as a tool of chastisement could be wielded in the LAST RESORT when dealing with the incorrigibly wicked. Confucius viewed war in moral terms and as such it was justifiable only when initiated by the Son of Heaven to punish the wicked (xie邪), the violent (bao 暴), or the unruly (luan 亂). These people are immune to the transformative power of virtue, and thus these people must be contained, or killed if necessary.

According to Sun Zi, what is one of the major components of deception?

For Sun Zi, one of the major components of deception was concealing one's own plans from the enemy. Whenever the army deploys on the battlefield, its configuration, being apparent, will evoke a reaction from the enemy. Under normal circumstances, the disposition of forces quickly betrays the average commander's intentions and the enemy can react accordingly with countermeasures.

How successful was the Chinese strategy for dealing with the nomads?

For most of imperial Chinese history, Inner Asia has Been THE security problem for the Chinese. With the exception of internal rebellions, all serious threats developed on the Inner Asian frontier, so the Chinese state was understandably fixated on this region. But their track record was not very good. For long periods they did succeed in "managing " the threat through strong defenses, accommodationist strategies based on trade, subsidies, heqin (合親) policies, and diplomatic efforts, and occasionally offensive operations. But the threat was never permanently "eliminated". In fact, when dynasties were weak the threat actually increased, and for long periods of time China was actively bullied by its Inner Asian neighbors.

What was the cognitive impact of Inner Asian nomads conquering China?

For the Chinese this was a source of cognitive dissonance - how could they reconcile their faith in their own superiority with the reality of rule by "barbarians"? The way in which this contradiction was resolved in the mind of the Chinese contributed to this idea of a Confucian Strategic Culture. The Chinese admitted that these barbarians had beaten them on the battlefield (not once, but hundreds of times), but this was hardly reason for shame. Barbarians were naturally good at fighting - after all, the martial man was a crude man (wu ren shi cu ren 武人是粗人). But while the barbarians claimed victory in battle, they would lose the war that mattered - the culture war. By "conquering" the Chinese, these barbarians sealed their fate - they would be sinicized. Their superior wu Brought them victory on the battlefield, but China's superior wen would eventually prevail!

Confucius on war

Given his distress over the dog-eat-dog politics of his day and the social chaos that prevailed throughout The remnants of the Zhou realm, we should not be surprised that Confucius was not keen on war. He was a realist, however, and he acknowledged that war was a fact of life. But one had to be cautious: "The things in reference to which the Master exercised the greatest caution were fasting, war, and sickness." He noted that if a ruler intended to lead his people to war, he had to prepare them: "Let a good man teach the people seven years, and they may then be employed in war. To lead an uninstructed people to war is to throw them away!" This statement recognizes that rulers will lead their subjects to war, and that therefore the rulers have a responsibility to prepare their subjects.

What do the Daoists say about warfare?

Given its abhorrence of contention, it is not surprising that Daoism has a negative view of warfare and violence: "As for weapons, they are inauspicious instruments - they are hated by men. Therefore those who possess the Way turn away from them. The good ruler when at home honors the left, when at war he honors the right. Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When you have no choice but to use them, it is best to remain tranquil and calm. You should never look upon them as things of beauty. If you see them as beautiful things, this is to delight in the killing of men! And when you delight in the killing of men, you will not realize your ambitions in the empire. In happy events we honor the left, but in mourning we honor the right. Therefore the subordinate commanders stand on the left and the supreme commander stands on the right - which is to say they arrange themselves as they would at a funeral. When multitudes of people are killed, we stand before them in sorrow and grief. When we are victorious in battle, we treat the occasion like a funeral ceremony!" War was a deadly and disruptive business, and Lao Zi recognized it as the ultimate example of striving and contending [and therefore the opposite of wu wei 無為]. War had to be undertaken with great caution: "One who assists the ruler of men by means of the Way does not dominate the world by force. The use of force usually brings requital. Wherever armies are stationed, briers and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines. A good general achieves his purpose and stops, and dares not seek to dominate the world. He achieves his purpose but does not brag about it. He achieves his purpose but is not arrogant about it. He achieves his purpose, but only as an unavoidable step. He achieves his purpose but does not aim to dominate." For all their condemnation of war and caution over the use of force, the Daoists actually had a major influence on Chinese military thought. Their faith in the efficacy of wu wei or non-striving was picked up by military strategists who applied the concept to military operations.

According to Sun Zi, is the actual application of force the best means of achieving the state's goals?

Given the emphasis on rational ends in the Art of War, we should not be surprised that Sun Zi does not necessarily see the actual application of force as the best means for achieving the state's goals: "The highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities. Thus one who excels at employing the military subjugates other people's armies without engaging in battle, captures other people's fortified cities without attacking them, and destroys other people's states without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim of "preservation". Thus his weapons will not become dull, and the gains can be preserved. This is the strategy for planning offensives!"

How important is the role of the commander / general in Sun Zi's work?

Given the importance of the general in Sun Zi's work, it is easy to see why he urged rulers to pay close attention in selecting the men to command their armies. Generals also had to keep the proper qualities of the commander in mind when assessing their competition.

It is this growing gap between the Chinese people and their soldiers that led to the popularity of such anti-military sayings as:

Good iron is not used for nails, and good men do not become soldiers (hao tie bu da ding, hao ren bu dang bing好鐵不打釘好人不當兵) When a scholar sees a soldier, reason is of no avail (xiucai jianle bing, you li shou bu qing 秀才見了兵有理說不清) Soldiers and bandits are one and the same (bing fei bu fen 兵匪不分)

How were gunpowder weapons used in China?

Gunpowder weapons did play a significant role in siege warfare, but unlike in Europe they tended to favor the defender rather than the attacker. In interregnum civil wars or when defending against invading nomadic conquerors, sieges were common. Chinese cities were often protected by huge tamped earth walls faced with stone and brick, and since mobility was not an issue defenders could use a variety of clumsy gunpowder devices. Gunpowder was used by attackers, but usually only to mine walls. Gunpowder projectile weapons were rarely used against fortified cities, presumably because of cost, limited effectiveness against massive walls, and mobility issues. Even when nomadic invaders employed Chinese and Central Asian experts, gunpowder rarely played a major role in their siege victories.

What is the meaning of this word: 國 (Guo = "Kingdom")

Guo, the character for kingdom or state in Chinese. Its origins have much to do with the prevalence of warfare in the Longshan-Xia-Shang eras. The character itself is composed of four parts. The first is the hollow square 囗 that stands for a walled enclosure. The second is a smaller square 口 That stands for mouths, or people. The third, the abbreviated slash, is the 土 That stands for earth or territory. The fourth, is 戈 which is the character for an ancient weapon. Combined, they symbolize a walled territory defended by an army. The character guo captures the truth about the origins of the early kingdoms - they were created through conquest and preserved by military strength.

How aggressive was Han Wu Di?

Han Wu Di's insatiable appetite for conquest drove his armies far to the west, bringing Chinese civilization into contact with the edges of the Roman empire. He tried to consolidate his conquests by settling Chinese in the area, but since this was not always practical he often simply accepted the submission of the indigenous tribes and oasis kingdoms. Some claim Wu Di had an "Alexander" complex - a desire to conquer the world, but it can also be argued that this drive into inner Asia was ultimately a defensive precaution against resurgent nomadic power and an attempt to control the lucrative trade routes through inner Asia.

WHAT kind of relationships did Confucius advocate?

He believed that man was a social animal, and existed not so much as an individual, but as a point in a web of social relationships. It was this web of relationships that held society together, and each strand, or relationship, involved specific mutual obligations and specific behavioral norms. This concept of a web is embodied in the 3 Bonds and Five Relationships. Confucius saw these as being the glue that held society together: The Five Relationships (3 Bonds are CAPITALIZED): •RULER-SUBJECT •PARENT-CHILD •HUSBAND-WIFE •Older Brother-Younger Brother •Friend-Friend If every member of society acted in accordance with the specific behavioral norms associated with each role - what Confucius called Li [rites 禮] - and fulfilled their specific obligations, then society would be in a state of perfect harmony.

What is the major difference between Xunzi and Mencius when it came to human nature?

His major disagreement with Mencius concerned the latter's "naïve" belief that humans were by nature good. Xunzi argued that far from being naturally good, humans were inherently selfish. However, humans are endowed by their creator to recognize their flaws, and correct them. Early on, the sage-kings realized that humans are selfish people, and took measures to restrain such selfish, bad behavior, by creating social norms and conventions, social structures that embedded people within those bonds. Only through education and ritual could human nature be tamed: "When a son yields to his father, or a younger brother yields to his elder brother, or when a son takes on the work for his father or a younger brother for his elder brother, their actions go against their natures and Run counter to their feelings. And yet these are the way of the filial son and the principles of ritual and morality." This is a far darker view of human nature than can be found in either the Analects or the Mencius, and this negative view extended to society as well. Given man's tendency to be selfish, proper government was essential to prevent a rapid descent into chaos and brutality. Unlike both Confucius and Mencius, Xunzi had extensive experience as an official. It is likely this practical experience convinced him that governing a state took more than virtue. However, he still accepted the Mencian version of the Mandate of Heaven with its emphasis on serving the people, noting that "The ruler is the boat, the common people are the water. It is the water that bears up the boat but also the water that capsizes it!"

Describe China's naval power in the early fifteenth century

Historians have long been fascinated by China's failure to maintain or exploit its early technological lead. Gunpowder is a case in point, but there are others - most famously, China's early naval superiority. In the years 1405-1433, a eunuch Admiral named Zheng He led a series of huge naval expeditions as far as Africa. At a time when Europeans were still using galleys, these vast fleets dominated the oceans. Between 1403 and 1419 the shipyards near Nanjing alone built 2000 vessels, including 100 "treasure ships" 370-440 ft in length displacing approx. 3000 tons, with 4 - 9 masts up to 90 ft high, and carrying up to 500 men. The first large fleet in 1407 had 317 vessels (the great Spanish Armada of 1588 had only 132!) crewed by some 27,800 men. Moreover, the fleet was armed with cannon! The world had never seen such a projection of maritime power, and would not see its like again until World War Two. The fleets certainly dwarfed anything Europe had at the time. The Europeans were only starting to venture out of the Mediterranean, and their ships were tiny and unsophisticated in comparison to Zheng He's gigantic ships.

According to Sun Zi, how should a commander compel his enemy make a fatal error?

How does the commander compel his enemy to make a fatal error (and thereby make himself conquerable)? Deception! "Warfare is the Way of deception. Thus although you are capable, display incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When your objective is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby." "Thus the army is established by deceit, moves for advantage, and changes through segmenting and reuniting." Deceptions (false deployments, feigned movement, feints, psychological warfare) are all designed to deceive the enemy so that he will be confused or forced to respond in a predetermined way and thereby provide one's army with an exploitable advantage.

According to Professor Green, what about Confucius make him unable to achieve office? What motivated Confucius's unwillingness to compromise?

However, he was a man of principle and unwilling to compromise for the sake of office. He looked at the rapidly changing world around him and was not impressed. For him, change did not necessarily equal progress, and he thought the world was falling into chaos. This view is understandable given his situation. By the end of the Spring and Autumn era, the Zhou existed only in name, and its vassals had declared themselves to be kings in their own right. The old order was on its deathbed, and only Confucius mourned its passing. For Confucius, the Zhou represented an ideal age in Chinese history, when sage kings ruled over societies in perfect harmony. If order was to be restored and harmony established, obviously the ways of Zhou would have to be re-established.

What are some of the issues with China's use of "just war" to justify military operations and region ambitions?

However, the idea of "setting things right" is rather broad - who defines what is right? Does the reassertion of past Chinese territorial claims fall into this category? Does the righting of perceived historical "wrongs" qualify as "setting things right"? China certainly has regional ambitions, notably Taiwan and the island chains in the East and South China Sea. As the Chinese demand for resources grows, China will become more assertive in laying claim to these areas, but it justifies these claims based on history. China argues that its claims to Taiwan, the Spratly's and other regions are based on history. These areas were allegedly "taken" from China, so Beijing's aggressive moves to assert Chinese sovereignty fall into the category of "setting things right". The regime sees aggressive use of force to claim/retain these areas as morally justifiable and ultimately defensive in nature. And China increasingly has the means to enforce its claims.

Why was hunting so important to the Shang Dynasty?

Hunting provided the meat necessary for ancestral sacrifices?

In 2004, what did the President of the PRC say that drew upon the Confucian Strategic Culture?

In 2004 the President of the PRC Hu Jintao made just such a claim for China's peaceful development in an address aimed at both Asian and Western audiences: "A stable and prosperous China is in itself an important contribution to peace and stability in Asia. China since ancient times has had a fine tradition of sincerity, benevolence, kindness and trust towards its neighbors. The very purpose of China's foreign policy is to maintain world peace and promote common development. China always practices what it preaches. Persisting in building good-neighborly relationships and partnership with the neighboring countries, we pursue a policy of bringing harmony, security and prosperity to neighbors and dedicate ourselves to strengthening mutual trust and cooperation with the fellow Asian countries, easing up hot spot tensions, and striving to maintain peace and tranquility in Asia."

In Mao's strategy for dealing with the Red Army, what was the first of three stages to defeat the Japanese?

In Stage One, China is on the defensive and is expected to lose territory to the superior Japanese forces. This was a dangerous time, for initial losses would encourage defeatism. But all was not lost! While China traded space for time the CCP would concentrate on a) securing base areas, b) mobilizing the population against the Japanese, and c) organizing guerilla units to harass the Japanese. Positional warfare (zhendi zhan 陣地戰) would sometimes be necessary to slow the enemy down, but the Chinese should emphasize mobile warfare (yundong zhan 運動戰) to minimize the effects of Japan's superior firepower. Although in Stage One the balance of power clearly favors Japan, this will start to change as the war enters Stage Two. Japan might have gained territory, but the cost was high.

In Mao's strategy for dealing with the Red Army, what was the second of three stages to defeat the Japanese?

In Stage Two, the Japanese offensive grinds to a halt as they try to consolidate their hold. Chinese guerrilla units begin to infiltrate back into occupied areas, establishing base areas and harassing Japanese troops. The enemy must still be regarded as formidable, but the war is beginning to take its toll on the enemy, both materially and in terms of morale. The Chinese people, on the other hand, will be thoroughly mobilized to struggle with the invader. Chinese forces are not yet strong enough to go on the strategic offensive (attacks on a broad front designed to take and hold territory), but they can wear down the enemy's forces through tactical offensives (local attacks). In this stage the Chinese get stronger while the enemy gets progressively weaker. Base areas proliferate as the invader retreats to the cities and yields the countryside to the Chinese.

How was the concept of People's war used in China?

In its original formulation by Mao Zedong, people's war exploits the few advantages that a small revolutionary movement has—broad-based popular support can be one of them—against a state's power with a large, professional, well-equipped and well-funded army. People's war strategically avoids decisive battles, since a tiny force of a few dozen soldiers would easily be routed in an all-out confrontation with the state. Instead, it favours a three-stage strategy of protracted warfare, with carefully chosen battles that can realistically be won. In stage one, the revolutionary force conducting people's war starts in a remote area with mountainous or forested terrain in which its enemy is weak. It attempts to establish a local stronghold known as a revolutionary base area. As it grows in power, it enters stage two, establishes other revolutionary base areas and spreads its influence through the surrounding countryside, where it may become the governing power and gain popular support through such programmes as land reform. Eventually in stage three, the movement has enough strength to encircle and capture small cities, then larger ones, until finally it seizes power in the entire country.

What is this Confucian Strategic Culture? According to Johnston, what are the 3 key questions that need to be answered in any Strategic Culture?

In keeping with Johnston's definition, we first need to determine how the Chinese have traditionally answered 3 key questions: 1) the nature of conflict in human affairs, 2) the nature of the enemy, and 3) the efficacy of violence.

What doctrinal difficulty did the PLA face in the 1950s as a result of the disagreement between the PLA generals and Mao regarding PLA military doctrine?

In the 1950s the PLA suffered from a split personality - it was acquiring large numbers of tanks, artillery and aircraft, but at least officially its operational doctrine was still based on Mao's concept of People's War. Complicating matters was the outstanding issue of Taiwan. After Korea, Chiang's regime benefited from generous US support, and his army, navy, and air force were becoming a potential threat once again. PLA planners needed to take into account the possibility of Chiang actually acting on his threat to "liberate the mainland".

In Sun ZI's the Art of war, what is one example of how a general can manipulate the morale, or the "spirit" or "qi" of hsi soldiers?

In the Art of War there is a chilling example of how the general can manipulate qi by throwing his men into impossible situations: "Cast them into positions from which there is nowhere to go and they will die without retreating. If there is no escape from death, the officers and soldiers will fully exhaust their strength. When the soldiers and officers have penetrated deeply into enemy territory [so there can be no retreat], they will cling together. Where there is no alternative, they will fight." "Cast them into hopeless situations and they will be preserved; have them penetrate fatal terrain and they will live. Only after the masses have penetrated dangerous terrain will they be able to craft victory out of defeat." In other words, if manipulated carefully, the general can arouse his troops' qi and turn them into berserkers!

What do the Daoists say about governing a state?

In the Dao De Jing governing a state is compared to boiling a small fish - if you mess with it too much it will fall apart. Similarly, micromanaging a state will bring about a collapse. Far better to "Do nothing, and then there is nothing that will not be done!" As for the people, "Fill their bellies and empty their minds, strengthen their muscles and weaken their wills!" By minimizing institutions and laws, the Daoist sage-ruler would return society to a state of primitive simplicity in which the interplay of natural forces would be least hindered by human meddling. As such, Daoists were against any effort to actively change things. Rather Daoists say to let things collapse, and thus return man to nature.

What is the difference between the rise of the European nation-state, and the centralization of power in Warring States Era China?

In the Warring States era this state building process was even more drastic. As the feudal states descended into Total War battles became a matter of life and death, leaving rulers with no choice but mobilize all available resources, even if that meant trampling on the hereditary privileges of the aristocracy. In their efforts to increase their power these aspiring hegemons adopted policies that went well beyond what the Absolute Kings of Europe ever attempted.

How did the Qing Court try to modernize in the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion?

In the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion, the Qing Court finally seemed to take military reform seriously, and in 1905 plans were made to create a 36 division Western-style imperial army of approx. 450,000 men. This force - the New Army- was to be based on an earlier experimental force, now grown to some 70,000 men and known as the Beiyang Army(Northern Seas Army). Literate men were to be recruited from respectablefamilies in order to improve the quality of the soldiers. A nationwide network of military schools was also established with the intention of creating a truly professional - and truly national - officer corps for the New Army. Select men were also sent overseas for training in Japan and the West.

What ideology did the Chinese try to emulate from the first decade of the 20th century?

In the first decade of the 20th century, many Chinese wanted to emulate the experience of Germany and Japan, and they embraced Militarism as an ideology of national development. Militarism consists of four components: 1. Militocracy - domination of the state by the military, or at least granting precedence to military needs 2. Militancy - an aggressive foreign policy (expansionist or revanchist) 3. Militarization - the export of military modes of organization to the larger host society 4. Militolatry - social adulation of martial virtues The idea was to remake Chinese society in the image of the modern military - patriotic, disciplined, fit, and ready to defend China's sovereignty. This idea of the military as a Vanguard Institution changed public perceptions of the military. In 1910 the Times correspondent in China noted that "probably the greatest change observable in modern China is the honour shown now to the formerly despised military profession. ...Military rank may come to supersede civil rank in the aspirations of the ambitious. Soldiers are now proud of their uniforms, they keep their rifles clean, they are smart and respectful - always, of course, comparing them with the Chinese soldiers we knew a few years ago. Soldiers now demand that they be treated with consideration by their own authorities. Officers travel on the train first-class; the rank and file will not suffer themselves to be herded as before like cattle in open trucks; they now require covered carriages in which they can sit with comfort. It is a noticeable change."

What were some examples of the Inner Asian nomads successfully overcomming Chinese strategies and conquering China?

In the long period of disunity following the collapse of the Han in 220 CE, the Inner Asian tribes were drawn into north China. 13 of the 16 kingdoms that existed in north China between 300 and 581 CE were founded by non-Chinese, and it is thought that the ruling elites of the Sui (581-618 CE) and Tang (618-907 CE) were part Inner Asian (part of a hybrid frontier elite). The Tang dynasty had to maintain strong border defenses against the Inner Asian threat, and when that dynasty weakened, the nomads were once again drawn in to north China. The Khitan-Liao (916-1125), Jurchen-Jin (1126-1234), Mongol-Yuan (1279-1368), and Manchu-Qing (1644- 1912) dynasties were all conquest dynasties founded by Inner Asians, and they dominated all or part of China for a total of 730 years!

What did Chiang kai-shek do in the summer of 1926?

In the summer of 1926 he launched the Northern Expedition to defeat the warlords and reunite China. The odds were against him - he was outnumbered, and any success might well prompt a foreign intervention, but he was determined to try. The campaign was broken into two phases, and by 1928 Chiang and his allies were in control of most of China. The "man on horseback" seemed to have claimed the mandate. But China's troubles were far from over ...

What happened to social mobility during the late Spring and Autumn Era?

In the turbulent atmosphere of the late Spring and Autumn Era, rulers anxiously sought any advantage. They were always on the lookout for new talent, and this provided opportunities for many who had previously been shut out of government due to the aristocratic and hierarchical nature of Zhou society. Men of talent could seek their fame and fortune in two ways. The first was through the military. The non-aristocratic mass armies of the time offered the chance of rapid promotion. There were no social barriers in the way of commoners who had the ability to command. Results spoke louder than breeding in an age of Total War. The stakes were too high to be fussy about a soldier's pedigree! Many commoners and lower order aristocrats (the shi士) rose to command great armies. But some also became strategists, who offered rulers advice both tactical and strategic. The most famous of these was (and remains) Sun Zi/Sun Tzu. [孫子]

In the aristocratic code of honor, how are prisoners supposed to be treated?

Individual challenges could settle disputes between states. Aristocratic prisoners were treated as guests, and a strict code of honor initially condemned tricks and other ruse de guerre.

If China persists in pursuing BOTH wealth and power, then what sort of problem does China face?

It might well run into the so-called "security dilemma" This refers to the Catch-22 situation in which a nation's pursuit of security through a military buildup generates a reaction on the part of its neighbors (internal/external balancing) that actually leaves it less secure! This can lead to an arms race and possibly even war. There is a temptation to equate China's rise to the rise of Germany and Japan at the beginning of the 20th century. Those newly emergent powers felt restricted by the status quo so they sought to revise/challenge it - the result was not one but two cataclysmic wars. Will history repeat itself with China?

According to the new Professor, what are some of the weaknesses of the defensive realist position?

It was extremely expensive. Maintaining a professional army is tremendously expensive. It was also prone to corruption. If a local commander is provided money to supply 2,000 troops, he is never going to have them all together at one time. In truth, he has at any one time a thousand, while the rest are spread out or on leave. This means that the commander only has to pay for 1,000 troops. The rest can be used to bribe officials by giving them wonderful banquets, which is a form of bribing people. Commanders therefore can therefore buy their networks of support. In addition, this defensive posture prevented the Chinese from launching retaliatory strikes against the nomads. Such expeditions required cavalry, which the Chinese were in short supply. Even worse, the Chinese had a lack of skilled riders. A peasant can be taught to use a crossbow or a sword, but a peasant was never able to become an accomplished cavalryman.In contrast, the nomads spent their entire lives on horseback, and mounted warfare was ingrained in their culture. The Chinese simply could not compete. Also, logistics was very difficult. Supplying good and supplies to professional standing armies is very difficult. Creating a professional standing army creates a complete divide between the military and the civilians. In the traditionally Confucian worldview of the scholar-officials, and to many peasants, the soldier was despised by the ordinary people.

During the Warring States period, what was the consequence of the shift to infantry-centered tactics, and larger armies?

Larger armies were needed for these bloodier wars, and chariots were simply too expensive - they were also ineffective against fortified cities built for defense. Mass infantry was the wave of the future - cheap, flexible, and obedient. The shift to infantry-centered armies had unexpected consequences that proved favorable to rulers. The chariots had been the preserve of the aristocracy, so the decline of the chariot helped eliminate the aristocracy's hold on the military.

How much importance does Sun Zi place on thorough analysis and planning in war?

Like Clausewitz, Sun Zi recognized the unpredictable nature of warfare, and he too argued that thorough analysis and planning is essential before initiating hostilities. Only proper prior planning and thorough preparation can minimize the role of chance and uncertainty. Before commencing hostilities, the commander must first undertake an estimate of the situation: "Thus when making a comparative evaluation through estimations, seeking out true nature, ask: Which ruler has the Dao? Which general has greater ability? Who has the advantages of Heaven and Earth? Whose laws and orders are more thoroughly implemented? Whose forces are stronger? Whose officers and troops are better trained? Whose rewards and punishments are clearer? From these I will know victory and defeat!" 161

What beliefs did Mencius share with Confucius regarding a ruler's virtue (de 德)?

Like Confucius, Mencius believed that a ruler's virtue (de 德) was more important than his awesomeness (wei 威). If a ruler had the support and love of his people, he rule would be secure. After all, "If the ruler of a state loves benevolence, he will have no enemy in the kingdom!" Not only would his people obey his orders, they would willingly sacrifice their lives to defend him against external enemies. But Mencius confidently predicted that would not be necessary. What about the quest for hegemony? Rule by virtue would also attract the people of neighboring states, who would vote with their feet and flee the despotic rule of their own kings to live under a benevolent ruler. Eventually, the virtuous king would "hollow out" the other states and end up ruling over All under Heaven without having to resort to force! Moreover, being based on virtue, his rule would be far more secure: "When force is used to overcome people, they do not submit willingly but only because they have not sufficient strength to resist. But when virtue is used to overcome people, they are pleased in their hearts and sincerely submit, as the seventy disciples submitted to Confucius. As the Book of Odes says: From the west, from the east From the south, from the north None wanted to resist" Mencius warned that if a ruler did not practice benevolent government, his people would desert him in droves, weakening his state. Ultimately, Heaven would destroy those rulers who did not cherish the people, for "Heaven sees as the people see, and Heaven hears as the people hear." If the people suffered from misrule, the ruler would suffer Heaven's wrath.

How did Lin Biao affect the PLA's military doctrine?

Lin was one of the most talented PLA generals to emerge from the War of Resistance and the Civil War. However, he was also a very ambitious man. Lin was a bit of a sycophant and in his efforts to earn favor with Mao he became a champion of Mao's concept of People's War, arguing that men were more important than machines, and ideology more powerful than bombs. Based on his experience he believed China ought to abandon reliance on technology. Lin edited the Little Red Book as a study tool for the army. Who needs advanced weapons when you can wield the words of Chairman Mao! But this was really just a case of making a virtue out of necessity. Following the Sino-Soviet split in 1960 China found itself cut off from its source of advanced weaponry. With little in the way of domestic military industry and confronted by the technologically superior forces of the USSR and the USA, China had no choice but to fall back on People's War. Willpower mattered more than weapons - PLA troops seeking inspiration from Mao's Little Red Book. If the Soviet revisionists or American imperialists attacked, People's War would defeat them!

What does the historian Lorge argue about substantial changes to state and society in China?

Lorge argues that historians fail to note any substantial changes to state and society in China following the introduction of gunpowder weapons after the 11th century simply because the changes necessary to support the deployment of these weapons had already taken place - if anything, existing structures facilitated large scale standardized production and the rapid introduction of these weapons into the Chinese military! This leads Lorge to make a bold assertion (and one that continues to irritate Eurocentric historians): "The significance of the European military revolution was that European military practice, and possibly government institutions as well, became more Chinese before they could take full advantage of guns. Armies grew in size, fortresses became larger and harder to capture, and soldiers had to learn discipline and be supported by a bureaucratized logistics system." In sum, Lorge makes the case that there was a revolution in the way wars were fought in China due to the introduction of gunpowder weapons, but that this revolution in warfare did not have any noticeable spinoff effects on state and society because unlike The Europeans the Chinese already possessed the institutional structures necessary to exploit the new technology efficiently.

What is the strategic concept: Morale?

MORALE 氣 Qi is an integral part of Chinese thought, ranging from metaphysics to medicine. The character itself symbolizes the steam rising off cooked rice, and represents nourishment. In the philosophical sense, qi is the vital energy that pervades all living things. In the sense of morale, qi is the foundation and basis of courage, the vital spirit directed by will and intention. Without strong qi, an army cannot fight and will break easily, so the commander must concentrate on nourishing the Qi of his troops. This can be done through the exercise of careful leadership strategies. Astute observers in the West understood the importance of morale. In War and Peace Tolstoy made this very clear: In military affairs the strength of an army is the product of its mass and some unknown X. Military science, seeing in history innumerable instances of the fact that the size of any army does not coincide with its strength and that small detachments defeat larger ones, obscurely admits the existence of this unknown factor and tries to discover it - now in a geometric formation, now in the equipment employed, now, and most usually, in the genius of the commanders. But the assignment of these various meanings to the factor does not yield results which accord with the historic facts. ...That unknown quantity is the spirit of the army, that is to say, the greater or lesser readiness to fight and face danger felt by all the men composing an army, quite independently of whether they are, or are not, fighting under the command of a genius, in two- or three-line formation, with cudgels or with rifles that repeat thirty times a minute. ... The spirit of an army is the factor which multiplied by the mass gives the resulting force. To define and express the significance of this unknown factor - the spirit of an army - is a problem for science. Before even going to war, the morale of the people must be nurtured by benevolent government, both to ensure the people are strong and to draw them closer to the ruler so that they will stand by him through hardship. The general must carefully nurture the qi of his troops by seeing that they are well trained, rested, properly fed, clothed, and equipped. But he must also impose discipline, and in that respect he must be strict and unyielding. In a sense he must be both father [disciplinarian] and mother [nurturer]: "When the general regards his troops as young children, they will advance into the deepest valleys with him. When he regards the troops as his beloved children, they will be willing to die with him. However, if they are well treated but cannot be employed, if they are loved but cannot be commanded, or when in chaos they cannot be governed, they may be compared to arrogant children and cannot be used!"

What was Mao Tse-Tong's attitude toward the Atomic Bomb?

Mao frequently dismissed the significance of the Atomic Bomb, even once proclaiming that China could afford to lose half of its population and still survive. In 1955 he made this statement: "Today, the danger of a world war and the threats to China come mainly from the warmongers in the United States. They have occupied our Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and are contemplating an atomic war. We have two principles: first, we don't want war; second, we will strike back resolutely if anyone invades us. This is what we teach the members of the Communist Party and the whole nation. The Chinese people are not to be cowed by U.S. atomic blackmail. Our country has a population of 600 million and an area of 9,600,000 square kilometres. The United States cannot annihilate the Chinese nation with its small stack of atom bombs." But in reality Mao was deeply concerned by the potential for atomic blackmail. In the late 1950s Mao grew increasingly concerned by American threats to use nuclear weapons in support of Chiang Kai-shek's regime on Taiwan. The USSR refused to extend its nuclear shield to cover China(largely because Mao was too unpredictable), but Moscow was at least willing to help Mao develop a Chinese A-Bomb.

How did Mao Tse-Tong use the war against the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek to his advantage?

Mao never forgot that any struggle has both a military AND a political dimension. Even as the remnants of the Red Army recovered from their military defeat, Mao went on the political offensive. He called for another United Front to resist Japan. Of course, this would require a ceasefire between Chiang and the CCP, which was the entire point. By early 1937 public pressure had compelled Chiang to call off his attacks, and in July war with Japan broke out. Very quickly Chiang's forces were driven out of north China, and eventually out of the lower Yangzi as well. This almost destroyed Chiang's army. But for Mao and the CCP this was a welcome opportunity. It was during the War of Resistance (1937 - 1945) that Mao developed his theories on Protracted War

How Mao sum up his tactics?

Mao summed up his tactics in simple slogans such as: The enemy advances, we retreat. The enemy camps, we harass. The enemy tires, we attack. The enemy retreats, we pursue. Uproar in the east, attack in the west. The key was to wear the enemy down, deny him information while learning everything about him, lead him on wild goose chases while fragmenting his forces, draw him deeper into your territory while frustrating and demoralizing his troops, and then destroy him!

How did Mao's strategy of Protected War affect other anti-imperailist movements in the Third World?

Mao's strategy of Protracted War provided anti-imperialist movements in the Third World with a template for victory. As applied in the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle this strategy was known as "People's War". In keeping with the 3 stages, rebels would organize guerrilla units and seek to create a "base area" in a remote region. From there they would spread outwards, creating more guerrilla units and base areas. These efforts would be supported by aggressive propaganda designed to win over the people while eroding the enemy's will to fight. Once the popular movement has developed sufficient strength (and the enemy has been sufficiently demoralized and weakened), victory is inevitable.

According to Professor Green, what is the importance of Mencius?

Mencius (孟子~ 370-300 BCE) remains the most important interpreter of Confucius. He is credited with expanding on many of the core ideas of Confucianism and filling in many of the gaps in Confucius' own record. He came from the small state of Zou, located next to Confucius' home state of Lu. He was reported to have studied with Confucius' own grandson, and he too roamed from state to state seeking a ruler who would heed his advice.

According to Professor Green, does there appear to be a contradiction in the teachings of Confucius and Mencius?

Mencius accepted the Mandate of Heaven, and believed that popular uprisings against tyrants were manifestations of Heaven's displeasure. But this points to a contradiction in Mencius - how could he be both anti-war AND in favor of using force to overthrow tyrants [ie., King Wu overthrowing the Shang]? Confucius and Mencius appear to say war is justifiable only when initiated by the Son of Heaven to punish the wicked (xie邪), the violent (bao 暴), or the unruly (luan 亂). In this list includes tyrants, as they are no longer rulers in the eyes of heaven, but criminals. As such, resistance to tyranny is obedience to god meaning. According to Professor Green, Mencius never resolves this contradiction. Like Confucius, Mencius seems to reserve his criticism of war for those waged by rulers he did not like. He certainly liked Kings Wen and Wu of Zhou, and did much to elevate them to superstar status. In his writings he made constant reference to their exemplary acts: "The people of Qi attacked Yan and conquered it. King Xuan then asked Mencius his opinion: 'Some tell me not to annex this land for myself. For a kingdom of 10,000 chariots to attack another of equal strength and defeat it in 50 days is an achievement beyond most men. If I do not annex it, calamities from Heaven will surely come upon me. Should I annex Yan?' Mencius replied, 'If the people of Yan will be pleased with your annexation, then do it. Among the ancients there was one who acted on this principle - King Wu of Zhou. If the people will not be pleased at being annexed, then do not do it. Among the ancients there was one who acted on this principle - King Wen of Zhou.'"

According to Professor Green, what is Mo Zi best known for?

Mo Zi is best known for his condemnation of aggressive war. As was the case with Mencius, his views on warfare were a reflection of the time in which he lived. He called wars of conquest great thefts, and led his followers in defense of states under attack. They earned renown as masters of siege warfare, and wandered China seeking to help those under attack by power-mad kings. His most vocal attack on wars of aggression comes in the chapter called Fei Gong [非攻 - against aggression]: "If someone kills one man, he is condemned as unrighteous and must pay for his crime with his own life. According to this reasoning, if someone kills ten men, then he is ten times as unrighteous and should pay for his crime with ten lives, or if he kills a hundred men, he is a hundred times as unrighteous and should pay for his crime with a hundred lives. Now all the gentlemen in the world know enough to condemn such crimes and brand them as unrighteous. And yet when it comes to the even greater unrighteousness of offensive warfare against other states, they do not know enough to condemn it. On the contrary, they praise it and call it righteous. Truly they do not know what unrighteousness is! So they make a record of their wars to be handed down to posterity. If they knew that wars were unrighteous, then what reason would they have for making a record of their unrighteous deeds to be handed down to posterity?"

How powerful were the Eastern Zhou kings? How did they impose order on their feudal vassals? How successful was this?

Most of the states still recognized the traditional supremacy of the Zhou kings, but since the Zhou kings had no military power they could not enforce obedience if one of their "vassals" chose to ignore them. In an effort to impose some sort of order, the Zhou kings would sometimes confer upon the ruler of the strongest state the title of "hegemon" (ba wang or Lord Protector 霸公 or 霸王). In reality, this title only had real meaning if the other states recognized the power of the hegemon. Moreover, instead of enforcing Zhou authority and protecting the weaker states, the Hegemons frequently used their Zhou title to legitimize their own acts of aggression against others.

Will a powerful and wealthy China behave in the world like a gentle panda or a hungry tiger?

No one knows for sure! Deng's strategy seems to call for a stealthy buildup of Chinese power in order to avoid provoking a unified response by the status quo powers. A gradual increase in Chinese wealth and power coupled with repeated references to Confucian pacifism should calm Western nerves and allow China's rise to continue without interruption ... But what then?

According to Profess Green, what are the key moments of the life of Mo Zi?

Not long after Confucius died, his ideas were challenged by a man named Mo Di or Mo Zi (480-390 BCE) Mo Zi was from a humble background, and likely a carpenter by trade. He may also have been a criminal, if there is any significance to his name (墨 mo, or ink, perhaps a reference to a punishment tattoo) Given his class background, it is not surprising that Mo Zi did not talk of a distinction between the Superior Men and the Petty Men. Instead, he showed concern for everyone as embodied in his philosophy of universal love (Jian Ai 兼愛).

But was the early Western Zhou really an era of peace and harmony?

Not really - King Wu was supported by many former Shang vassals, but he was opposed by others, and his takeover involved additional campaigning against holdouts.

According to Professor Leary, what are universally desired characteristics of soldiers?

One of the easiest ways is height. Unfit soldiers won't have grown very tall. Fit, strong, well-nourished soldiers have a certain type of height. No sign of dangerously anti-social characteristics. Today, that would mean no criminal record. Young men, roughly late teens, or early twenties. Such young men are rarely married, so they do not have dependents, and are thus more likely to leave home. Also, young men are aggressive, and yet are more receptive to domineering sergeants. Also, young men rarely have any skills, so the army can promise to give them skills. Gender. Male. No Chinese army ever tried to recruit What Wellington called "the scum of the earth". You want aggression.

Tiān (天)

One of the oldest Chinese terms for heaven and a key concept in Chinese mythology, philosophy, and religion. During the Shang Dynasty (17-11th centuries BCE), the Chinese referred to their supreme god as Shàngdì (上帝, "Lord on High") or Dì (帝,"Lord"). During the following Zhou Dynasty, Tiān became synonymous with this figure. Heaven worship was, before the 20th century, an orthodox state religion of China. In Taoism and Confucianism, Tiān (the celestial aspect of the cosmos, often translated as "Heaven") is mentioned in relationship to its complementary aspect of Dì(地, often translated as "Earth").[1] These two aspects of Daoist cosmology are representative of the dualistic nature of Taoism. They are thought to maintain the two poles of the Three Realms (三界) of reality, with the middle realm occupied by Humanity (人, Rén), and the lower world occupied by demons (魔, Mó) and phantoms, "ghosts," haunts (鬼, Guǐ).[2] SOURCES 1 Woodhead, Linda; Partridge, Christopher; Kawanami, Hiroko (2016). Religions in the Modern World (Third ed.). New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 147-148. ISBN 978-0-415-85881-6. 2 Greg Woolf (2007). Ancient civilizations: the illustrated guide to belief, mythology, and art. Barnes & Noble. p. 212. ISBN 978-1-4351-0121-0.

Oracle bones (Chinese: 甲骨; pinyin: jiǎgǔ)

Pieces of ox scapula or turtle plastron, which were used for pyromancy - a form of divination - in ancient China, mainly during the late Shang dynasty. Scapulimancy is the correct term if ox scapulae were used for the divination; plastromancy if turtle plastrons were used. Diviners would submit questions to deities regarding future weather, crop planting, the fortunes of members of the royal family, military endeavors, and other similar topics.[1] These questions were carved onto the bone or shell in oracle bone script using a sharp tool. Intense heat was then applied with a metal rod until the bone or shell cracked due to thermal expansion. The diviner would then interpret the pattern of cracks and write the prognostication upon the piece as well.[2] Pyromancy with bones continued in China into the Zhou dynasty, but the questions and prognostications were increasingly written with brushes and cinnabar ink, which degraded over time. The oracle bones bear the earliest known significant corpus of ancient Chinese writing[a] and contain important historical information such as the complete royal genealogy of the Shang dynasty.[b] When they were discovered and deciphered in the early twentieth century, these records confirmed the existence of the Shang, which some scholars had until then doubted.

What is the Law of Avoidance?

Recognizing that officials existed in these two "skins" -- one of official identity and one of local identity -- the bureaucratic system was organized to prevent, whenever possible, people from acting in their official capacity in such a way that it would unfairly benefit their home province. This was done through the "rule of avoidance," which stated that an official could not serve in his home province or even in a province adjacent to his own province. Officials also served in each position for a relatively short period of time (usually three years) before rotating to a new position. One might argue that when people are rotated out of their positions too soon they are unable to really understand what is going on in the area in which they are serving, but the benefit is that they never become too attached to one place or too supportive of interests that applied only to that place and not to the empire as a whole.

What do CONTEMPORARY armies look for? What is the issue?

Right now, armies around the world are focusing on technological development, trying to stay ahead of the competition. The problem is that the best and brightest could make a LOT more money, with a LOT less risk, by working in the private sector or business.

Under the role of the Mandate of Heaven, what was the point of a Ruler?

Rulers served at the pleasure of Heaven, and Heaven was most concerned about the people. Therefore rulers had to look after the welfare of the people in order to prove their worthiness to retain the Mandate. If the ruler failed to promote harmony, happiness, and prosperity, Heaven could revoke the Mandate and give it to someone else. This it what happened to the Shang.

Who founded the Shang dynasty, and how?

Sima Qian's Annals of the Yin begins by describing the predynastic founder of the Shang lineage, Xie (偰) — also appearing as Qi (契) — as having been miraculously conceived when Jiandi, a wife of Emperor Ku, swallowed an egg dropped by a black bird. Xie is said to have helped Yu the Great to control the Great Flood and for his service to have been granted a place called Shang as a fief.[7] Sima Qian relates that the dynasty itself was founded 13 generations later, when Xie's descendant Tang overthrew the impious and cruel final Xia ruler in the Battle of Mingtiao. The Records recount events from the reigns of Tang, Tai Jia, Tai Wu, Pan Geng, Wu Ding, Wu Yi and the depraved final king Di Xin, but the rest of the Shang rulers are merely mentioned by name. According to the Records, the Shang moved their capital five times, with the final move to Yin in the reign of Pan Geng inaugurating the golden age of the dynasty.[8] SOURCE 7 Keightley, David N. "The Shang: China's first historical dynasty", in Loewe, Michael; Shaughnessy, Edward L., The Cambridge History of Ancient China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 232-291, ISBN 978-0-521-47030-8. 8 Keightley, David N. "The Shang: China's first historical dynasty", in Loewe, Michael; Shaughnessy, Edward L., The Cambridge History of Ancient China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 232-291, ISBN 978-0-521-47030-8, p. 233.

Was Sinicization China's secret weapon in the war against the nomads? Did this work out as the Chinese claimed?

Sinicization has a mixed record. Many nomadic tribes did settle on the northern fringes of the empire and gradually adopt Chinese ways. Intermarriage was common, and frontier society was multi-ethnic. The Chinese cultural frontier always extended beyond the political boundaries of the empire, so a "cooking" process did take place. The most successful "conquest" dynasties were the Khitan-Liao, Jurchen-Jin, and Manchu-Qing, all of which originated in the Manchurian transition zone. There is ample evidence to suggest that sinicization did take place in varying degrees and contributed to the longevity and stability of their rule. Others, such as the Mongols, remained stubbornly resistant, but the Chinese quickly point out that Mongol rule lasted less than a century (1279-1368). The assumption is that their refusal to sinicize caused the Mongols to be "rejected" by the Chinese body politic. In other words, alien conquest dynasties that adopted Chinese political norms and cultural practices - at least in public - were accepted as legitimate by the Chinese despite their nomadic origins, while those who clung to their steppe ways were quickly ousted.

What was the collective experiences of the Chinese during the period 200-960 CE with regard to teh military?

So what can we make of this? The collective experiences of the Chinese during the period 200-960 CE established a lingering distrust of military men. The readiness of these "crude men" to seize power made them a real danger to the dynasty. They were seen as a necessary evil, but they were never trusted by civilian officials. Dynasties frequently felt compelled to Compromise military effectiveness in the name of political reliability. Various strategies were adopted to ensure that these "men of wu" were kept on tap but never allowed to get on top. One standard practice involved appointing a civil official as the overall commander of military forces. It was assumed that as an outsider he would never be able to develop a personal following in the army. A related approach was to rotate commanders on a regular basis, but this caused problems when dealing with non-Chinese auxiliaries. They would only follow their own chiefs.

What is the relevance of "shi" for the commander/ general?

So what does this mean for the commander? Strategic configuration of power [shi] is in essence a comparative concept - one's shi must always be measured against the enemy's. The job for the commander is to combine the two elements - position and strength - in such a way that he enjoys a massive superiority to the enemy's own shi. When that happens he strikes, unleashing his army like rolling round boulders down a thousand-fathom mountain! So the commander must be astute in comparing relative strengths (quan 權) and establishing the advantages and disadvantages of terrain (dili 地利). He first seeks to place his forces in unassailable positions, and then seeks to maneuver/draw his enemy into weaker positions where the enemy's shi is minimized and his own strategic configuration of power can be realized.

What kind of technological change is easier to implement in the military? Solicited or Unsolicited?

Solicited technology is easier to integrate since the military already knows what it wants to do - it is simply a case of getting the engineers and scientists to create the technology. Unsolicited technological change is a very different matter, for it challenges the military imagination. In many instances armies have to receive bloody instruction in the use of new technology at the hands of their enemies. Occasionally armies get the opportunity to witness new technology in use against others and adapt before they themselves are targeted. For example, the use of the Atomic Bomb on Japan in August 1945 convinced the Soviet Union of the need to develop its own atomic weapons. In some cases armies possess new technology but fail to appreciate its significance. All of the combatants in World War One had the machine gun before 1914, but no one understood how this weapon had changed the nature of warfare. Only after suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties in the opening months of the War did commanders on all sides come to appreciate that the machine gun had rendered traditional tactics obsolete.

What is solicited and unsolicited technology in China?

Solicited technology is technology that asked for by generals and nobles. As nobles and generals already know what they want, they know how to integrate them into their militaries. Unsolicited technology is technology that wasn't asked for by generals and nobles. is a lot harder to use in a military, as commanders have to figure out what the significance for these innovations and how to use them in war. In China, there is a whole bunch of unsolicited technology, like Iron.

What is the similarity between the process that took place in the late Spring and Autumn and Warring States eras, and the rise of the nation-state in Europe?

Some historians argue that the process that took place in the late Spring and Autumn and Warring States eras bore a close resemblance to the process of war-driven state building that led to the decline of feudalism and the creation of Europe's absolute monarchies. In Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries the costs associated with warfare, maintaining huge standing armies and navies, and constructing massive fortresses forced rulers to increase tax revenues and centralize power, both of which required a reduction in the power of the aristocracy. In most European kingdoms the aristocracy survived this transition, but with greatly reduced power compared to kings. As a result of this process by the late 17th century Louis XIV could confidently assert " 'L'etat c'est moi" [I am the state!], a claim no feudal king could have made without angering his nobles! By the Warring States era, the political situation in China had come to resemble the competitive multistate system of early modern Europe, and just as interstate warfare would drive state building in Europe in the 16th - 18th centuries AD, escalating warfare drove state building in China between the 8th and 3rd centuries BC.

The European Military Revolution

Starting in the 16th Century, dramatic changes in the way wars were fought had a ripple effect, driving social and constitutional change in Europe, and propelling the Europeans to world dominance. At the heart of this military revolution was gunpowder. The new weapons that emerged (cannons, muskets) revolutionized warfare, and in the process transformed the face of not only Europe, but the world.

Does strategic culture reject rationality?

Strategic culture does not necessarily reject rationality, but it does color the perception of reality. When viewed through the lens of strategic culture, reality can be simplified into black and white. Or strategic culture can determine the prioritization of factors used in weighing options. Or strategic culture can guide choice in the here and now by reference to historical choices, analogies, metaphors, and precedents.

According to Sun Zi and the other Bingjia, what was the proper object of military operations?

Sun Zi and the other Bingjia understood that the proper object of military operations was not the enemy army, but rather the mind of its commander. Deception, manufactured chaos, engineered friction, the fog of war - these were the weapons deployed by the superior commander to paralyze his opponent with uncertainty and indecision. This would effectively decapitate the enemy army and render it incapable of resistance. In such a situation a bloodless (or at least less bloody) victory is possible. A classic example is the German defeat of France in 1940. Employment of a classic Sun Zi approach allowed the Germans to accomplish in 6 weeks what they had earlier failed to do in 4 years.

How significant was Sun Zi's contribution to warfare and strategy? To whom should he be compared?

Sun Zi's place in the pantheon of great strategists is well deserved. His work (or the work that bears his name) is full of timeless insights into the nature of war and the principles that commanders must bear in mind. Unlike many of the other military works, Sun does not even tip his hat to the role of virtue and benevolence - for him war is part of the human condition and therefore must be understood and mastered, if only to protect oneself. • It is useful to compare Sun Zi to the western world's greatest strategist, the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831 CE). Clausewitz had experienced the Napoleonic wars of the early 19th century, and he derived from them certain conclusions about the nature of warfare. These were eventually published under the title Zum Krieg - On War.

What is the strategic concept: the Unorthodox and the Orthodox?

THE UNORTHODOX AND THE ORTHODOX 奇正 The military concepts and applications of the unorthodox (qi 奇) and orthodox (Zheng 正) probably originate with Sun Zi, but the Art of War does not discuss them in great detail. The Dao De Jing mentions this pairing in relation to the government and the army: "With the orthodox govern the state; with the unorthodox employ the army." In other words, with government stick to precedent, with the military think outside the box. The other military classics such as the Wei Liao Zi and the Tai Gong Liu Tao all devote space to discussions of this pair. Sun Zi certainly believed them to be key to victory on the battlefield, and he felt only the great generals really understood their permutations and combinations. Although there is still debate over the exact meaning of these two concepts, consensus holds that unorthodox and orthodox refer to strategy rather than types of troops. Orthodox strategies are those that the enemy "expects", and that you expect the enemy to react to. Unorthodox strategies are those the enemy does not anticipate, and cannot react to in time to save themselves. In some sources, the unorthodox is associated with the idea of the indirect approach. Do not seek to engage the enemy's strength, but instead engage his weakness. Aim not for the core of his army, but seek to throw him off balance by striking his flanks or rear areas. And in good Daoist Yin-Yang fashion, unorthodox and orthodox are mutually defining, mutually transforming, and circular in essence! Today's orthodox is tomorrow's unorthodox, and vice versa. "In general, in battle one engages with the orthodox and gains victory through the unorthodox. Thus one who excels at sending forth the unorthodox is as inexhaustible as Heaven, as unlimited as the Yangzi and Yellow rivers. What reach an end and begin again are the sun and moon. What die and are reborn are the four seasons. The notes do not exceed five, but the changes of the five notes can never be fully heard. The colors do not exceed five, but the changes of the five colors can never be completely seen. The flavors do not exceed five, but the changes of the five flavors can never be completely tasted. In warfare the strategic configurations of power do not exceed the unorthodox and orthodox, but the changes of the unorthodox and orthodox can never be completely exhausted. The unorthodox and orthodox mutually produce each other, just like an endless cycle. Who can exhaust them?"

What did the Canton Trade system reflect about China's belief about foreign contact?

The Canton Trade System reflected China's belief in containing and controlling foreign contact. After all, good fences make good neighbors! The Canton rules imposed a physical and cultural quarantine on the Westerners, severely limiting their access to the Chinese market.

Given that the Chinese are credited with the invention of gunpowder back in the early centuries of the first millennium AD, and that primitive firearms were in use as early as the 11th century, why was China so unprepared for the Western onslaught?

The Chinese did invent gunpowder in the Tang, and they were quick to recognize its usefulness as a propellant and flame source. Early rockets were developed, as were flamethrowers and projectile weapons using spears and iron shot. In "The Asian Military Revolution" [web reading], Peter Lorge argues that the Chinese did in fact undergo a gunpowder-driven military revolution of sorts in the 12th - 14th centuries. As he notes, this has usually been overlooked by military historians because they were searching for signs of radical changes to state and society - but in China these did not occur in conjunction with the introduction of gunpowder weapons.

Did the Chinese learn anything from their "less civilized" neighbors?

The Chinese did learn from their "less civilized" neighbors. In particular, the northern Chinese states came to appreciate the advantages of cavalry because of their skirmishes with the horse-riding peoples who lived on the fringes of the Chinese culture world. In 307 BCE, King Wuling of Zhao (located in the north near the Ordos region) ordered his troops to practice mounted archery and adopt barbarian dress in order to be able to ride horses. This date is usually cited as the beginning of the cavalry era in China. Zhao used its new cavalry to conquer its barbarian neighbors, and the message was not lost on the other Chinese states. The advantages in mobility and striking power that came with mounted archery soon led the other Chinese states to copy Zhao.

What is the difference between the Confucians and the Bingjia with regard to strategic culture?

The Chinese have concepts quite similar to "si vis pacem parabellum" - "thinking about danger while living in peace" [ 居安思危] and "with sufficient preparations there will be no calamities" [有備無患]. The Bingjia and the Confucians all certainly advocate preparedness, but they differ in one key respect. The Confucians see military preparations as part of a Defensive strategy, used in conjunction with Accommodationist strategies to keep the enemy at bay or pacified while one's virtue woos him (or at least his people) into submission. The Bingjia, in keeping with the Parabellum Paradigm, see offensive warfare and the defeat or destruction of the enemy as effective courses of action - not always the best course, but certainly an effective one under favorable conditions. When the Bingjia advocate Accommodationist or Defensive strategies over Offensive ones, it is usually for reasons of expediency rather than an expression of any preference rooted in moral qualms about the use of force. In keeping with the concept of Flexibility [權變], they simply recommend adapting one's strategy to changing conditions. Sometimes the defense makes more sense given current relative strengths, sometimes accommodation serves to buy time for preparations, but eventually force might have to be applied, for only the total defeat of the enemy provides a permanent solution! Strategic Preferences are conditional and opportunistic, not absolute, and always subject to a Realpolitik assessment of ends/means, cost/benefit, and chances of success in managing or eliminating threats.

Shangdi (Chinese: 上帝; pinyin: Shàngdì; Wade-Giles: Shang Ti), also written simply, "Emperor" (Chinese: 帝; pinyin: Dì)

The Chinese term for "Supreme Deity" or "Highest Deity" in the theology of the classical texts, especially deriving from Shang theology and finding an equivalent in the later Tian ("Heaven" or "Great Whole") of Zhou theology.[1] The earliest references to Shangdi are found in oracle bone inscriptions of the Shang Dynasty in the 2nd millennium BC, although the later work Classic of History claims yearly sacrifices were made to him by Emperor Shun, even before the Xia Dynasty. Shangdi was regarded as the ultimate spiritual power by the ruling elite of the Huaxia during the Shang dynasty: he was believed to control victory in battle, success or failure of harvests, weather conditions such as the floods of the Yellow River, and the fate of the kingdom. Shangdi seems to have ruled a hierarchy of other gods controlling nature, as well as the spirits of the deceased.[7] These ideas were later mirrored or carried on by the Taoist Jade Emperor and his celestial bureaucracy. Shangdi was probably more transcendental than immanent, only working through lesser gods.[7] Shangdi was considered too distant to be worshiped directly by ordinary mortals. Instead, the Shang kings proclaimed that Shangdi had made himself accessible through the souls of their royal ancestors,[8] both in the legendary past and in recent generations as the departed Shang kings joined him in the afterlife. The emperors could thus successfully entreat Shangdi directly.[9] Many of the oracle bone inscriptions record these petitions, usually praying for rain[10] but also seeking approval from Shangdi for state action. SOURCES 1 Eno, Robert (2008), "Shang State Religion and the Pantheon of the Oracle Texts", in Lagerwey, John; Kalinowski, Marc, Early Chinese Religion: Part One: Shang Through Han (1250 BC-220 AD), Early Chinese Religion, Brill, pp. 41-102, ISBN 9004168354, p. 70. 7 Zhao, Yanxia. Chinese Religion: A Contextual Approach. 2010. p. 154 8 Jeaneane D. Fowler, Merv Fowler, 2008, Chinese religions: beliefs and practices, Sussex Academic Press. 9 Wu, K. C. (1982). The Chinese Heritage. New York: Crown Publishers. ISBN 0-517-54475X, 8 10 Wu, K. C. (1982). The Chinese Heritage. New York: Crown Publishers. ISBN 0-517-54475X, 138.

How did the Chinese misinterpret the significance of their defeats in 1839-42 and 1856-1860?

The Chinese would misinterpret the significance of their defeats in 1839-42 and 1856-1860. For the Chinese, their defeat at the hands of barbarians provoked yet another bout of cognitive dissonance. How could they reconcile their faith in their own superiority with the reality of Western strength? Rather than question the superiority of their ways, they chose to see the Western strength as narrowly based on technology, and this technological advantage would be overcome if the Chinese adopted Western weapons. They therefore did not see their defeats as proof that they needed to make significant changes in other areas such as organization and doctrine - all they needed to do was close the "technology gap" and all would be right once again. Would technological innovation solve all of China's problems? Only time would tell ...

What excerpt best captures the Confucian view of warfare?

The Confucian view of warfare is captured in this famous excerpt from the Zuo Commentary. In 598 BC, Chu defeated Jin at the Battle of Pi, and one of the Duke of Chu's advisers suggested making a commemorative monument out of Jin's dead to celebrate his lord's martial prowess. The Duke replied: "You do not know what you are talking about! The character for 'martial prowess' [武] is formed by those for 'to stay' [止] and 'a spear' [戈] ...Thus military prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of the weapons of war, the preservation of the Great Appointment, the firm establishment of one's merit, the giving repose to the people, the harmonizing of the states, and the enlargement of the general wealth. ...Now I have caused the bones of the soldiers of two states to lie bleaching on the earth, an act of cruelty. I display my weapons of war, so how can I preserve the Great Appointment? And while the state of Jin still exists, how can I establish my merit? There are many things by which I oppose what the people desire, so how can they get repose from me? Without the practice of virtue, striving by force for supremacy among the states, how can I produce harmony among them? I have made my gain from the perils of others and found safety in their disorders - these things are my glory, but what enlargement of the general wealth is there in them? Not one of the seven virtues belonging to military prowess [武] attaches to me - what have I got to display to my posterity? ...The merit of military prowess does not belong to me!" This is a very Confucian passage that says that war does not contribute to harmony, happiness, and prosperity. Just because you excel at war does NOT give you any bragging rights.

How did Daoist use of "wu wei" affect Chinse military strategy?

The Daoists were fond of water as a metaphor for non-striving - the softest of materials, when properly deployed water could overcome even the hardest rock. Moreover, by taking the path of least resistance, water got to where it wanted to go with the least amount of effort - the epitome of wu wei! In military terms, this Daoist idea led to an emphasis on strategy and tactics that achieved one's goal with a minimum amount of force. This stands in stark contrast to the Western emphasis on brute force.

How did the Qing change in the course of the 19th century?

The Qing military did change over the course of the 19th century. The old Banner and Green Standard forces were largely disbanded and replaced by Chinese armies organized by regional officials like Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang. These forces originated in the battle to suppress the Taiping rebellion in the period 1851-1864. Traditional Qing forces proved useless, so the court reluctantly authorized the creation of new regional armies under the command of trusted Chinese officials. After the rebellion, these forces were retained and re-equipped with Western weapons. But the Qing deliberately kept these forces divided - instead of ONE army and ONE navy, the Qing had several regional armies and fleets. Beijing compromised military efficiency for the sake of political reliability.

The Records of the Grand Historian, also known by its Chinese name Shiji

The Records of the Grand Historian, also known by its Chinese name Shiji, is a monumental history of ancient China and the world finished around 94 BC by the Han dynasty official Sima Qian after having been started by his father, Sima Tan, Grand Astrologer to the imperial court. The work covers the world as it was then known to the Chinese and a 2500-year period from the age of the legendary Yellow Emperor to the reign of Emperor Wu of Han in the author's own time.[1] The Records has been called a "foundational text in Chinese civilization".[2] After Confucius and the First Emperor of Qin, "Sima Qian was one of the creators of Imperial China, not least because by providing definitive biographies, he virtually created the two earlier figures."[3] The Records set the model for the 24 subsequent dynastic histories of China. In contrast to Western historical works, the Records do not treat history as "a continuous, sweeping narrative", but rather break it up into smaller, overlapping units dealing with famous leaders, individuals, and major topics of significance.[4] SOURCES 1 Nienhauser, William (2011). "Sima Qian and the Shiji". In Feldherr, Andrew; Hardy, Grant. The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 1: Beginnings to AD 600. Oxford University Press. pp. 463-484. ISBN 0-19-103678-1, pp. 463-464. 2 Hardy, Grant (1999). Worlds of Bronze and Bamboo: Sima Qian's Conquest of History. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-11304-5, p. Xiii. 3 Hardy, Grant (1999). Worlds of Bronze and Bamboo: Sima Qian's Conquest of History. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-11304-5 pp. xiii, 3. 4 Durrant, Stephen (1986). "Shih-chi 史記". In William H. Nienhauser Jr. The Indiana Companion to Traditional Chinese Literature, Vol. 1. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-253-32983-7. OCLC 11841260, p. 689.

In the Shang dynasty, what was the connection of the king and religious and political authority?

The Shang ruler combined religious and political authority in his role as king and head of the ruling lineage, but this authority ultimately rested on his ability to exercise military power.

What happened to Soviet aid to China in 1960?

The Sino-Soviet split in 1960 led to the withdrawal of all Soviet assistance, but the Chinese persevered on their own. Indeed, as Sino-Soviet tensions rose the development of a Chinese bomb became even more urgent - Moscow was a greater threat than the US!

What was the Spring and Autumn Era a time of?

The Spring and Autumn Era was therefore a time of constant intrigue, as rulers maneuvered for advantage against their neighbors. Alliances are made and broken. Threats just as often came not from outside "barbarians", but also rival nobles, not just the dukes, but subordinte nobles looking to advance their powers.

Was the Western Zhou ever a strong dynasty?

The Western Zhou was never astrong dynasty. The blood ties they hoped would maintain political stability cooled over time, and the regional feudal lords began to pursue their own interests. Even as it expanded eastwards into the old Shang territory, it came under attack from the north, west, and south. The Zhou had to exact more and more tribute from their feudal lords, which created further resentment.

When Han Gaozu died, how did his widow Empress Lü deal with the Xiongnu?

The Xiongnu apparently thought that the heqin policy could work both ways. After the death of Han Gaozu his widow Empress Lü took over as regent. She expected to be confronted with numerous challenges as a female ruler, but she likely never anticipated Maodun's next move. It came in the form of a startling offer: "I am a lonely widowed ruler, born amidst the marshes and brought up on the wild steppes in the land of cattle and horses. I have often come to the border wishing to travel in China. Your majesty is also a widowed ruler living a life of solitude. The both of us are without pleasures and lack any way to amuse ourselves. It is my hope that we can exchange that which we have for that which we are lacking." Deeply offended by Maodun's suggestion of a cross-border booty call, Empress Lü nonetheless had to respond diplomatically to the offer of marriage. The Han was still not strong enough to challenge the Xiongnu directly, and the Empress had serious domestic problems that were more pressing, so she had to let Maodun down gently: "My age is advanced and vitality weakening. Both my hair and my teeth are falling out, and I cannot even walk steadily. The shanyu ruler must have heard exaggerated reports. I am not worthy of his lowering himself. But my country has done nothing wrong, and I hope that he will spare it." • Her diplomatic and self-effacing response likely spared China another round of border clashes. The last line of her response clearly indicates Chinese awareness of Xiongnu military superiority.

According to Professor Green, how should the accounts of the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors be interpreted?

The Yellow Emperor's successor, his grandson the Zhuanxu emperor, is more complex. He supposedly severed the link between heaven and earth, which is seen as symbolic of the concentration of political and religious power in the one figure of the ruler.

What triggered the Zhous rebellion against the Shang ruler?

The Zhou had an on-again/off-again alliance with the Shang, sometimes fighting them, and sometimes acting as a vassal state. In the late 11th century BCE (approx. 1066 BCE) the Shang ruler had a falling out with the ruler of Zhou, placing him under arrest in the Shang capital. After 7 years of confinement he was ransomed by his people. Oddly, a year later the Shang king granted him sweeping military powers for campaigning against the Qiang. Apparently, the Shang king ignored the possibility that the Zhou would use these sweeping military powers to create a coalition of disaffected nobles to fight against the Shang. At that point (~1059 BCE), the Zhou ruler decided he had had enough of the Shang king's bullying and general nastiness. He started to think about rebelling against his overlord, and he reached out to other disaffected Shang vassals.

How did the founders of the Zhou dynasty use the mandate of heaven?

The Zhou ruler says the Shang ruler is a criminal because he failed with 3 conditions, so they must punish him. The Zhou claim to be acting as instruments for heavenly justice. Shang Ruler dies, King Wu of Zhou rolls into town in Chariot, and takes body and cuts off head. King Wu of Zhou claims that he is a new ruler based on the Mandate of Heaven. "he could not have overthrown the Shang if he did not have the support of Heaven. The fact that he succeeded is number one support for the mandate of heaven. No rebel could succeed if he did not have the mandate of heaven."

What were some of the causes for the escalation in violence during the Warring States period?

The Zuo Zhuan identifies over 500 interstate battles, as well as more than 100 civil wars, all in the 250 years covered by the commentary. At this time, the decline in the Zhou dynasties power saw powerful regional dukes and nobles the ability to wage more and more vicious tactics. Escalation was inevitable. Larger armies were needed for these bloodier wars, and chariots were simply too expensive - they were also ineffective against fortified cities built for defense. Mass infantry was the wave of the future - cheap, flexible, and obedient. The shift to infantry-centered armies had unexpected consequences that proved favorable to rulers. The chariots had been the preserve of the aristocracy, so the decline of the chariot helped eliminate the aristocracy's hold on the military. There were also technological developments that propelled changes in the way wars were fought. The introduction of iron around the 4th century BCE made the mass production of cheap but effective weapons possible - a prerequisite for mass armies. The invention of the crossbow also provided conscripts with a deadly but easy to use projectile weapon.

What did the Manchu attempt to modernize their military do to the Chinese view of soldiers?

The accelerating erosion of their sovereignty goaded the Chinese into action. As one cynical foreign observer noted, "feeling the closing jaws of the vice, Chinese patriots are now making the army the national pet in order to raise the despised calling of the soldier." For the first time in centuries, the military was seen in a positive light. Frightened at the prospect of partition at the hands of the great powers, even the literatistarted to call for military reforms and for the Chinese people to embrace a new martial spirit. Many Chinese came to see the military as a Vanguard Institutionin China's struggle to modernize. Not only was the military at the forefront of modernization, both in terms of technology and organization, it was also seen as the "school of the nation": "If one is clear about the principles of conscription, then one knows that in peacetime the army serves as the military school of the nation. Soldiers are the pick of the nation, so their education can influence local customs and affect the spirit of the people. The martial disposition formed during military training is sufficient to improve social mores and behavior. Indeed, if the citizens are strong and robust, the nation will flourish. Therefore, those who are responsible for educating the troops need to know that making a good soldier is the way to make a good person; the education of soldiers is the way by which citizens are moulded." Cai E

What brought about the rise of the Trace Italienne?

The age of the fortress was not over yet. By applying the laws of mathematics, geometry, and physics to the problem (a task hopelessly beyond the abilities of The average military commander), designers came up with a radical new design. The only problem was that it was incredibly expensive! By sinking the fortress into the ground and redesigning the walls, it became possible to protect the walls against most incoming cannon fire, while allowing the defenders to sweep the surrounding countryside with fire from their own cannons.

If one accepts the argument that in the West gunpowder weapons revolutionized warfare, which in turn led to radical changes in state and society (centralization of power and bureaucratization of administration), then logic dictates that the same processes ought to have taken place in China once the Chinese embraced gunpowder weapons. But they did not - why?

The answer - Chinese precociousness! More than a thousand years before the invention of gunpowder, the Chinese had already undergone a military revolution that smoothed the way for the much later introduction of gunpowder weapons. The Warring States era Military Revolution involved technological, organizational and doctrinal change - the invention of iron weapons and the crossbow, the introduction of conscription, and the use of larger infantry armies. These changes radically altered the way wars were fought. We also know that these changes in warfare necessitated radical changes in social, economic, and political organization - a classic example of the wider power of a Military Revolution! The demands of warfare drove state-building and social restructuring in China, culminating in the creation of the Legalist-inspired Qin empire in 221 BC. The imperial state was a highly centralized autocracy supported by a professional bureaucracy designed to supervise society and extract resources. As armies grew in size and sophistication, the imperial state developed the bureaucratic and institutional structures necessary to support them. By 221 BC the Chinese state had already developed capacities for the large scale production of weapons, and could field armies in the hundreds of thousands, supported by a sophisticated logistical system and efficient conscription - all very "Modern" by Western standards!

What does this apparent contradiction mean for the idea of Strategic Culture? After the Warring States era, did China in fact have TWO Strategic Cultures - One Confucian, the other Parabellum?

The answer to this question can be found in the works of the Bingjia. Alastair Johnston argues that when they appear to make reference to the Confucian consensus, they are in fact referring to an idealized Confucian Strategic Culture. All of the surviving Bingjia texts are products of the late Warring States era - a time when Confucian-Mencian rhetoric had already worked its way into political discourse [even the Legalists had to defend against its pernicious influence!] Even the practical strategists had to tip their hat to the Confucian consensus, but this did not stop them from also embracing an operational Parabellum Strategic Culture that recognized the efficacy of force.

What were the advantages, and the downside of the armies and style of warfare developed in the European Military Revolution?

The armies created by the European Military Revolution were the best the world had seen since the days of Rome. The changes in technology required changes in organization and doctrine, and the result was the creation of disciplined professional armies that relied on gunpowder more than cold steel. Discipline was key, since the effectiveness of muskets and artillery depended on volume rather than individual accuracy - the striking power of volleys compensated for the inaccuracy of the weapons. The downside of this approach was that armies had to slug it out at short range, trading volleys until one side or the other started to waver, at which point a bayonet charge would finish the enemy off. This terrible form of warfare required iron discipline and leadership from the front - these were the key to European dominance. This style of fighting was little more than a brutal slugging match - casualties were heavy, and only drill and discipline could hold soldiers in formation during such exchanges. But this also made European armies lethally effective against numerically superior but less well disciplined foreign armies. These foreign armies could not take the pounding!

According to Professor Green, who discovered total war?

The concept of "Total War" - the total mobilization of all material and manpower resources for warfare - is viewed as a Western construct associated with the great wars of the 20th century. Earlier wars had usually been conducted in a manner that minimized disruptions to the economies and societies of the nations involved. WWI changed this by forcing states to mobilize all of their resources for the war effort. But the Chinese discovered Total War even earlier. In the Warring States era the more frequent wars, longer campaigns, bloodier battles, and larger fortifications placed heavy demands on rulers. Where would the resources come from? Traditional feudal methods of extracting revenue and mobilizing manpower could not meet the demands of Total War. The solution? Centralization of power and creation of a bureaucracy to extract resources and mobilize manpower.

What happened to the Chinese army during the Warlord Era?

The decline of the military was precipitous - in the space of a decade China's soldiers had degenerated from protectors into predators, and the public reciprocated by labeling the soldiers as "bandits" and their commanders as "warlords". An English officer passing through on his way home from Japan in 1921 was shocked by the low status of soldiers in China: This is simply one amongst many striking differences between Japan and her large, though feeble, neighbour China. In the former country, the profession of arms is regarded as one of great honour, whilst in China, on the other hand, the soldier is regarded as a necessary evil, and, far from being looked up to, is considered a thief and a murderer - a reputation not infrequently well merited.

According to the Professor, what is a key part of Chinese culture?

The dynastic cycle. According to the new professor, this indicates that nothing lasts forever. No socio-political order lasts forever. For example, every Chinese dynasty and government is responsible for controlling the canals, and particularly the Yellow River. Those that fail to control this river by maintaining the dikes and canals will bring about flooding and disaster. In addition, every Chinese dynasty had to minister the people and keep them fed and happy.

After the consolidation, what does King Wu, and the Zhou dynasty, to with "barbarian" tribes

The dynasty continued to wage war against "barbarian" tribes along the frontiers of the Chinese world.

How reliable are the earliest records of the immortal sage kings?

The earliest records are of questionable reliability. This might be an effort to retrospectively whitewash a bloody era in Chinese history, or it might be an accurate reflection of how these early inhabitants of the Yellow River region associated the taking of human life with the blood sacrifices that were part of their religious beliefs.

How did the Western Powers treat China at the end of the Second Opium War?

The embarrassing defeat in the Second Opium War was not the end of China's humiliation. The threat posed by Western imperialism did not abate - it actually intensified in the last 20 years of the 19th century. Only rivalry between the powers prevented China from being partitioned outright, Instead, the powers forced China to grant concessions and leaseholds that effectively eroded Qing sovereignty over large parts of coastal China. The Chinese were not entirely passive during this period - they did invest heavily in modern weapons to close the "technology gap". But these efforts were uncoordinated and sporadic - and ultimately useless.

The Western Zhou (Chinese: 西周; pinyin: Xīzhōu; c. 1045[1] - 771 BC)

The first half of the Zhou dynasty of ancient China. It began when King Wu of Zhou overthrew the Shang dynasty at the Battle of Muye and ended when the Quanrong nomads sacked its capital Haojing and killed King You of Zhou in 771 BC. The Western Zhou early state[2] was successful for about seventy-five years and then slowly lost power. The former Shang lands were divided into hereditary fiefs which became increasingly independent of the king. In 771, the Zhou were driven out of the Wei River valley; afterwards real power was in the hands of the king's nominal vassals.

King Wu of Zhou (Chinese: 周武王; pinyin: Zhōu Wǔ Wáng)

The first king of the Zhou dynasty of ancient China. The chronology of his reign is disputed but is generally thought to have begun around 1046 BC and ended three years later in 1043 BC.[1] King Wu's ancestral name was Ji (姬) and given name Fa (發). He was the second son of King Wen of Zhou and Queen Taisi. In most accounts, his older brother Bo Yikao was said to have predeceased his father, typically at the hands of King Zhou, the last king of the Shang dynasty; in the Book of Rites, however, it is assumed that his inheritance represented an older tradition among the Zhou of passing over the eldest son.[2] (Fa's grandfather Jili had likewise inherited Zhou despite two older brothers.) Upon his succession, Fa worked with his father-in-law Jiang Ziya to accomplish an unfinished task: overthrowing the Shang dynasty. In 1048 BC, Fa marched down the Yellow River to the Mengjin ford and met with more than 800 dukes.[citation needed]He constructed an ancestral tablet naming his father Chang King Wen and placed it on a chariot in the middle of the host; considering the timing unpropitious, though, he did not yet attack Shang. In 1046 BC, King Wu took advantage of Shang disunity to launch an attack along with many neighboring dukes. The Battle of Muye destroyed Shang's forces and King Zhou of Shang set his palace on fire, dying within. King Wu - the name means "Martial" - followed his victory by establishing many feudal states under his 16 younger brothers and clans allied by marriage, but his death three years later provoked several rebellions against his young heir King Chengand the regent Duke of Zhou, even from three of his brothers. A burial mound in Zhouling town, Xianyang, Shaanxi was once thought to be King Wu's tomb. It was fitted with a headstone bearing Wu's name in the Qing dynasty. Modern archeology has since concluded that the tomb is not old enough to be from the Zhou dynasty, and is more likely to be that of a Han dynasty royal. The true location of King Wu's tomb remains unknown, but is likely to be in the Xianyang-Xi'an area. Wu is considered one of the great heroes of China, together with Yellow Emperor and Yu the Great.

Modu, Modun, or Maodun (simplified Chinese: 冒顿单于; traditional Chinese: 冒頓單于; pinyin: Mòdú Chányú, c. 234 - c. 174 BCE)

The fourth known Xiongnu ruler and the founder of the empire of the Xiongnu. He became the Xiongnu ruler after he ordered the execution of his father Touman in 209 BCE. Modu ruled from 209 BCE to 174 BCE. He was a military leader under his father Touman, and later Chanyu of the Xiongnu, centred in modern-day Mongolia. He secured the throne and established a powerful Xiongnu Empire by successfully unifying the tribes of the Mongolian-Manchurian grassland in response to the crisis of the loss of Xiongnu pasture lands to invading Qin forces commanded by Meng Tian in 215 BCE. While Modu rode and then furthered the wave of militarization and effectively centralized Xiongnu power, the Qin quickly fell into disarray with the death of the first emperor in 210, leaving Modu a free hand to expand his Xiongnu Empire into one of the largest of his time. The eastern border stretched as far as the Liao River, the western borders of the empire reached the Pamir Mountains, whilst the northern border reached Lake Baikal. Modu was succeeded by his son Laoshang.

Who was Maodun, and how did the Chinese emperor Han Gaozu deal with him?

The great Qin general Meng Tian drove the Xiongnu out of the Ordos sometime before 212 BCE. At this point the Xiongnu leadership passed to Maodun. In fact, Maodun killed his own father in order to claim the title. He led the Xiongnu to victory over the Eastern Hu and the Yuezhi, and he eventually consolidated all of the tribes of Mongolia to form a huge and powerful confederation. Then he turned southward ... what happened next would provide the Chinese with powerful and enduring lessons on how to deal with the barbarian nomads from the steppes. Taking advantage of the chaos accompanying the fall of the Qin, Maodun led his forces back into the Ordos. The founder of the Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) initially concentrated on consolidating internal control and reasserting the Chinese claim over regions only recently incorporated into the empire by the Qin. Liu Bang (Han Gaozu) recognized the threat posed by Maodun and the Xiongnu, but he did not take decisive action until Maodun made further advances towards the capital at Chang'an. Liu finally led his army in the field, but he was suckered into a trap by a feigned retreat. Surrounded by the Xiongnu, the emperor was forced to agree to an annual gift payment of silk, grain, and other foods tuffs The Xiongnu considered this tribute, but the Han saw the subsidy as the price of peace on the borders, and even attempted to forge blood ties by marrying Han princesses to Xiongnu leaders (heqin 和親 policy). This is a classic example of the Confucian-inspired Strategic Culture at work - use of Accommodationist policies to appease the enemy (while sinicizing them!) The idea was that the Chinese brides would sinicize their barbarian husbands. If that failed, then they placed their hopes in the sons they would bear - half barbarian and half Chinese. The idea was that once these barbarians were exposed to Chinese civilization, the "cooking" process would begin. Eventually, these combative horsemen would become sedentary farmers - in other words, Chinese.

What was the key to the trace italienne's effectiveness?

The key to the Trace Italienne's effectiveness was its relatively low profile (reduced vulnerability to artillery) and multiple layers of defensive works. A properly laid out fortress could dominate the surrounding ground out to maximum cannon range. Since fortress cannon did not have to be moved, they tended to be bigger than mobile guns, and therefore could out-range the attacker's guns. This forced the besiegers to dig in for their own protection. The clever use of glacis (sloping walls of dirt), hidden moats, bastions with interlocking fields of fire, outlying fortifications, and massively thick walls made the trace Italienne fortress almost impregnable. Small garrisons could hold off much larger attacking forces. An attack on a Trace Italienne fortress took time, troops, and talent. It could be done, but it took scientific precision!

What distinguishes the "Longshan" villages from the "Yangshao" villages?

The most distinctive trait of Longshan culture is precisely what is missing from Yangshao: settlement walls. At one Longshan site, the foundations of a city wall forty feet thick have been 8 excavated. Its foundation was laid five feet deep, and it is calculated to have risen to a height of almost twenty feet and been almost thirty feet wide at its top. It was constructed with layer upon layer of stamped earth, each thin layer being pressed down upon a previous dried layer with wooden boards so that these layers clearly survive today. The total circumference of this wall was 1680 meters, or slightly over a mile.

Nüwa or Nügua

The mother goddess of Chinese mythology, the sister and wife of Fuxi, the emperor-god. She is credited with creating mankind and repairing the Pillar of Heaven.[1] Her reverential name is Wahuang (Chinese: 媧皇; literally: "Empress Wa").[2] SOURCES 1 "Nügua". Oxford Reference. Retrieved 18 November2017. 2 "媧皇". Handian. Retrieved 18 November 2017.

What was the new face of battle during teh Warring States Era (475 BC - 221 BC)?

The new face of battle in China: infantry armies made up of conscripted peasants. Instead of a few thousand men, armies now fielded hundreds of thousands of foot soldiers, and when two armies of this size met in battle, the casualty figures could be equally large. The crossbow appeared as early as 700 BCE, but became commonplace only around 400 BCE.

At the beginning of the 19th century, what was the Green Standard Army?

The other component of the Manchu military establishment was a force called the Green Standard Army. This force originated with the Manchu conquest of China in the mid-17thcentury. During the conquest large numbers of Chinese troops defected to the Qing, and these were eventually organized into a force separate from the 24 Banners. Officers could be either Han Chinese or Manchu, but the soldiers were all Chinese. Although in theory based on voluntary recruitment, many of the soldiers came from hereditary military families. After the conquest, the Green Standard Army was scattered around China in small units under the command of both civil and military officials. The Green Standard Army backed up the Manchu Banners in the great campaigns of expansion during the late 17th and 18th centuries, but it eventually settled into a role as a sort of imperial constabulary, responsible for policing at the local level. The Green Standard Army had both a land and a naval branch (the Manchus wanted nothing to do with naval operations!), and was distributed across the empire (although there were large concentrations in Yunnan and along the southeastern coast, where Manchus were reluctant to go). Numbering roughly 600,000 men, this force was larger than the Banner forces, but it was never concentrated in one spot under a single commander, so it never posed a threat to Manchu rule.

Who were these steppe peoples?

The people who lived along the northern fringes of the Chinese culture world were nomadic pastoralists. They relied on herds of sheep, cattle, and horses for their survival, and the needs of the herd dictated their lifestyle. They had to move constantly, taking their herds to new grazing grounds as the old ones were picked clean. The harsh steppe winters and hot dry summers made water and forage for the herds their number one priority. The adoption of the horse made them even more mobile. Women, children, and slaves tended the herds, leaving the men free to engage in their only form of recreation - raiding. The best description we have comes from Sima Qian's 1st century BCE work: "As early as the time of Emperors Yao and Shun and before, we hear of these people living in the region of the northern barbarians and wandering from place to place pasturing their animals. The animals they raise consist mainly of horses, cows, and sheep...They move about in search of water and pasture and have no walled cities or fixed dwellings, nor do they engage in any kind of agriculture. Their lands, however, are divided into regions under the control of various leaders...The little boys start out by learning to ride sheep and shoot birds and rats with a bow and arrow, and when they get a little older they shoot foxes and hares, which are used for food. Thus all the young men are able to use a bow and act as armed cavalry in time of war. It is their custom to herd their flocks in times of peace and make their living by hunting, but in periods of crisis they take up arms and go off on plundering and marauding expeditions. This seems to be their inborn nature. For long-range weapons they use bows, and swords and spears at close range. If the battle is going well for them they will advance, but if not, they will retreat, for they do not consider it a disgrace to run away. Their only concern is self-advant age, and they know nothing of propriety and righteousness!"

From where did the Spring and Autumn period get its name?

The period's name derives from the Spring and Autumn Annals, a chronicle of the state of Lu between 722 and 479 BC, which tradition associates with Confucius(551-479 BC). These annals record each year by spring and autumn. The spring and autumns are the two most important times for an agricultural civilization, as the spring is the time for planting wheat and the autumn is the time for harvesting. By the time of Confucius, in the 6th century BC, the term "springs and autumns" (chūnqiū 春秋, Old Chinese *tʰun tsʰiw) had come to mean "year" and was probably becoming a generic term for "annals" or "scribal records".The Annals was not the only work of its kind, as many other Eastern Zhou states also kept annals in their archives.

What was the term for "Hegemony" used in China? What was the point of it?

The political, economic, or military predominance or control of one state over others. As a title of nobility, Ba Wang, hegemon, recognized overlordship of several subordinate kings while refraining from claiming the title of emperor within the imperium of the Chinese subcontinent, such as its borders were considered from era to era. In the Zhou dynasty, where the Zhou lacked the means to force the other vassals to tow the line, the Ba Wang would back the Zhou. Which state was the first of the hegemon states?

Empire-building

The practice of attempting to obtain greater power and authority within an organization for the purposes of self-aggrandizement, particularly by having extra staff or subordinates. In political science, empire-building refers to the tendency of countries and nations to acquire resources, land, and economic influence outside their borders in order to expand their size, power, and wealth. This expansion can be at the cost of those nations or people that have had resources taken away from them so that the conqueror can be enriched. In business, empire-building is demonstrated when individuals or small groups attempt to gain control over key projects and initiatives to maximize job security and promotability. Project leadership hoards potential credit and prestige the project can produce. Because this approach prevents other people in the organization from contributing in a meaningful manner and alternative or competing projects to address the project's goals are destroyed regardless of their merit, the company suffers as a whole, projects fail, and the goals of the project are achieved partially, inadequately, or not at all. This sort of behavior is supposed to be stopped by upper management but is nevertheless very common. In an organization, empire-building can also be demonstrated when an individual or small group eagerly and proactively suggests and pursues functions, activities or projects that are of questionable value to try to enhance legitimacy and future value. Pursuit of these activities is initially done at little or no marginal cost, but later the activities are used to justify increased resource allocation, being part of the organizational status quo, and thus the individual or group's overall command of resources, and influence, increases.

King You of Zhou (Chinese: 周幽王; pinyin: Zhōu Yōu Wáng; 795-771 BC)

The twelfth king of the Chinese Zhou dynasty and the last of Western Zhou Dynasty. He reigned from 781 to 771 BC. In 780 BC, a major earthquake hit Guanzhong. A soothsayer named Bo Yangfu (伯陽甫) considered this an omen foretelling the destruction of the Zhou Dynasty. In 779 BC, a concubine named Bao Si entered the palace and came into the King You's favour. She bore him a son named Bofu.[1] King You deposed Queen Shen (申后) and Crown Prince Yijiu. He made Baosi the new queen and Bofu the new crown prince.[2] It is said that Baosi did not laugh easily. After trying many methods and failing, King You tried to amuse his favorite queen by lighting warning beacons and fooling his nobles into thinking that the Quanrong nomads were about to attack. The nobles arrived at the castle only to find themselves laughed at by Baosi. Even after King You had impressed Baosi, he continued to abuse his use of warning beacons and lost the trust of the nobles.[3] Queen Shen's father, the Marquess of Shen, was furious at the deposition of his daughter and grandson Crown Prince Yijiu and mounted an attack on King You's palace with the Quanrong. King You called for his nobles using the previously abused beacons but none came. In the end, King You and Bofu were killed and Baosi was captured.[4] After King You died, nobles including the Marquess of Shen, the Marquess of Zeng (繒侯) and Duke Wen of Xu (許文公) supported the deposed Prince Yijiu as King Ping of Zhou[5] to continue the Zhou Dynasty. As the national capital Haojing had suffered severe damage, and was located near the potentially dangerous Quanrong, in 771 BC, King Ping of Zhou moved the capital eastward to Luoyang, thus beginning the Eastern Zhou Dynasty and ushering in the Spring and Autumn period which would last for more than 300 years.[6] In Shih-Ching, King You was mentioned by court hymns. In the minor court hymn Cai Shu(采菽), the author criticized King You for squandering feudal lords' respect and humiliating them.[7]

When developing strategies to target America's Achilles Heel, what exactly did China target?

Theorists in China focus on US dependency on C4IRS systems (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance). In their efforts to penetrate the Fog of War, the US military has become entirely dependent on high tech network warfare. This, in Chinese eyes, is the American Achilles Heel. If these systems were targeted by specialized Chinese weapons (referred to in general terms as the Assassin's Mace, sha shou jian 殺手鐧), American air and sea power could be neutralized, or at least seriously handicapped. In practical terms, this means anti-satellite weapons, computer network attacks (cyber warfare), or even EMP weapons (electro-magnetic pulse weapons to overload electronic warfare systems). These relatively inexpensive weapons could level the playing field in any confrontation between China and the United States. Denied access to C4IRS systems, US forces would be blind - no satellites, no GPS, no real-time surveillance, no AWACS targeting systems, no AEGIS radar defense systems. This would handicap US forces, neutralizing their technological advantage and giving the PLA forces the chance to inflict a knockout blow (destroying an aircraft carrier etc).

What virtues did the "superior men" (Jun Zi 君子) possess?

These "superior men" (Jun Zi 君子), possessed all of the following Confucian virtues: •Ren - humanity 仁 Xiao - filial piety 孝 • Yi - righteousness 義 Zhong - loyalty 忠 • Xin - trustworthiness 信 Jing- respectfulness 敬 • Lian - integrity 廉 Shu - reciprocity 恕 In sum, "The Superior Man thinks of righteousness, the Petty Man of profit!" In any situation, the Superior Man acts in accordance with propriety and righteousness.

What made the northern nomads so dangerous to the CHinese?

These nomads were masters of mounted warfare, and this made them especially dangerous to the Chinese. But they rarely posed a serious threat to the empire because of their chronic inability to cooperate. The harsh environment of the steppes made it very difficult for large numbers of people and animals to live in one place - the strain on the supply of forage and water was too great. It was the nomadic custom to operate in small tribal or clan groups to minimize the difficulties, but this also made them fiercely independent. Leadership within these groups was usually a matter of ability rather than birth. Any male could claim leadership, but he needed the support of all the senior males. This was a rough form of " steppe democracy".

The Hundred Schools of Thought (Chinese: 諸子百家; pinyin: zhūzǐ bǎijiā)

These were philosophies and schools that flourished from the 6th century to 221 BC, during the Spring and Autumn periodand the Warring States period of ancient China.[1] An era of great cultural and intellectual expansion in China,[2] it was fraught with chaos and bloody battles, but it was also known as the Golden Age of Chinese philosophybecause a broad range of thoughts and ideas were developed and discussed freely. This phenomenon has been called the Contention of a Hundred Schools of Thought (百家爭鳴/百家争鸣; bǎijiā zhēngmíng; pai-chia cheng-ming; "hundred schools contend"). The thoughts and ideas discussed and refined during this period have profoundly influenced lifestyles and social consciousness up to the present day in East Asian countries and the East Asian diaspora around the world. The intellectual society of this era was characterized by itinerant scholars, who were often employed by various state rulers as advisers on the methods of government, war, and diplomacy. This period ended with the rise of the imperial Qin Dynasty and the subsequent purge of dissent.

Sun Zi argues that force should be governed by the key principel of "preservation". How does this differ from Clausewitz?

This highlights one of the key differences between Clausewitz and Sun Zi - the role of force in achieving victory. Sun Zi sees the actual application of force as the least preferable option, while Clausewitz sees it as the essence of war: "Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. " ..." We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms." [On War]

In the Rites of Zhou, what are the offences that justify the use of force against an enemy?

This idea of Just War [jus ad bellum] is clearly outlined in the Rites of Zhou, a work attributed to the Duke of Zhou, brother of King Wu, but actually dating from approx. the 3rd century BC. The work lists what it means to be the wicked (xie邪), the violent (bao 暴), or the unruly (luan 亂), and lists several offences justifying the use of force against an enemy 1. bullying weaker states 2. bullying their own people 3. being violent internally and insulting other states externally 4. neglecting the welfare of their people 5. killing their people 6. behaving like a wild animal and causing disorder 7. rebelling against the established political and social order *Note that these are all "regime" offenses rather than crimes committed by the people. Many are R2P triggers! These are offences of the regime, NOT the people themselves.

What about China's actions is THE SOURCE of the nervousness among China's neighbors?

This nervousness is born of uncertainty - while Beijing claims to be a "status quo power" with no ambition to assert hegemony over its neighbors, China seems to be pursuing military capabilities well beyond its local defensive needs. Should strategic planners in Asia and elsewhere base their policies on China's PROCLAIMED INTENTIONS or its emerging CAPABILITIES? This is their dilemma - do they take Beijing's leaders at their word, or do they attempt to ascertain China's goals by assessing its current and future capabilities? Misreading Chinese intentions could be dangerous -viewing China as an emerging threat runs the risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. But ignoring China's military buildup might be equally dangerous! If one takes Beijing's pronouncements at face value, then China can be expected to act as a responsible member of the global community, upholding multilateral agreements and supporting the international status quo (a rule TAKER not a new rule MAKER) But there are some skeptics who point to a cryptic statement by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s: 冷靜觀察、站穩腳根、沈著應付、韜光養晦、善於守拙、絕不當頭[Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership]. This 24 Character Strategy is seen as the real guiding ideology behind China's rise. The Chinese pursuit of capabilities well beyond their defensive needs certainly seems to indicate that there is some sort of long-term agenda.

Throughout the Mao and post-Mao era, how did China's nuclear weapons program fair?

Throughout the Mao and post-Mao era, Chinese efforts to maintain a nuclear deterrent have continued unchecked. Even during the Cultural Revolution the nuclear program continued uninterrupted - it was too important to China's security.

During the Warring States period, what was the cause of the shift to infantry-centered tactics, and larger armies?

To protect themselves in the total war of the Warring States Era, nobles started building fortifications. To construct these fortifications they started gathering the peasants to build these fortifications. However, nobles realize that peasants, unlike nobles, do not make demands or want concessions for their service. Also, fortifications can only be defended (or taken) by infantry. In addition, there were a LOT of peasants, and they could be trained into an infantry force relatively quickly. So, rulers, began developing massive infantry-based armies.

What motivated the development of fortifications during the Warring States Era?

Warfare during the Warring States Era had escalated beyond the confines of chivalry into total war. Warfare was now a total-sum game. The losers would have the entire lineages wiped out, their land seized and the peasants controlled by the enemy.

Warfare is a particularly strong concern in the second of The Four Canons. This text contains a section titled "The Fundamental Types of Attack", that outlines three motives for warfare: Each state that houses armories and stores weapons has a way of warfare. The ways of warfare in our present times are three: there are those who act for profit, those who act out of righteousness, and those who act out of fury. To act for profit: observing ... ... ... famine, that state and its families are not at leisure, their superiors and inferiors are in discord, you may raise troops and take punitive action against that state. It may bring you no great profit, but there is no great harm in it either. To act out of righteousness: fighting chaos and putting an end to oppression, promoting the worthy and dismissing the inept. This is the principle of righteousness. A righteous cause is what the masses give their lives for. Therefore, while states may attack the rest of the world, among the rulers of large states with ten thousand chariots ... ... there are few who do not start from this principle, but many are able to uphold it to the end. This is not a question of constancy of heart, but because when things reach their limit, they turn around. To act out of fury: no matter how furious you are in your heart, you cannot simply act from anger, because an outburst of anger will have its consequences. Even if you are successful and have nothing left to desire, you have, in fact, begun to act in contravention. This is not the Way. Actions that correspond to the Way are marked by inevitability. Since they are marked by inevitability, they are limitless. Therefore, to ... is to expand, and to prohibit is to force. That is why one may carry it out everywhere without cease."22[22.] (p. 23) ¶1 This passage describes three motives for going to war. Regrettably, unclear syntax and illegible graphs impede a full understanding of these motives. ¶2 The first motive, "profit"!, probably means that the humane ruler of a flourishing state who observes a neighboring state on the verge of collapse may raise troops and annex it. Given the famine and social disruption in that state and the effort and cost of rebuilding it, the annexation will not bring the humane ruler great profit but, in view of the little resistance he can expect from the impoverished and demoralized people in that state, it will not cause him great harm either. ¶3 The second motive, "righteousness" is to replace a tyrant with a humane ruler and incompetent ministers with capable ones. This receives the wholehearted support of the people, who would give up their lives to fight for this noble cause. The problem with this motive, the text seems to suggest, is that rulers may attack other states out of righteous principles, but they rarely manage to uphold these principles to the very end because the desire for power and material possessions often overcomes them. Hence, the text approves of righteousness as a motive for attack, but only on the condition that the ruler's righteous principles remain upheld. ¶4 The third motive, "fury", takes warfare as a means for the ruler to vent his pent-up rage. But even if he successfully defeats the ruler who made his blood boil, and thereby extinguishes the cause of his fury, he is obviously held hostage by his emotions and, because he ignores diplomatic solutions, he is clearly blind to reason. Hence, the text disapproves of this motive." (Van Els 2013, 22-23)

What happened as the struggle for hegemony continued through the Warring States Period?

Warfare, previously a matter of aristocratic honor, became a deadly business upon which the state's survival depended. Instead of simply going home after an unsuccessful battle to lick one's wounds until the next summer, defeat now meant the obliteration of the loser's state and quite possibly the slaughter of the population as well. China had discovered total war!

What does European Rivalry among the states have to do with the European Military Revolution?

We must also remember that the European Military Revolution was born out of European rivalry. Unlike China in the 16th century, Europe was divided into dozens of rival political units. Constant political, ethnic, and religious rivalry translated into almost constant warfare. These wars - especially the Thirty Years War of 1618-1648 - were bloody contests between rival kingdoms (and religions!), and there were ample incentives for both proactive and reactive military innovation. Gunpowder was an unsolicited invention as far as the military was concerned, but the development of mobile field artillery, the perfection of man-portable firearms, and the creation of the Trace Italienne were all solicited by military men, and they would go on to change the face of European warfare forever.

How did Mao wage war against Chiang Kai-shek from 1946 and 1949?

What followed between 1946 and 1949 was a textbook example of the last stage of a Protracted War. The rag-tag guerrillas of 1937 were now a massive army of over a million men. The Red Army surrounded and destroyed the isolated and demoralized Nationalist armies in the northern cities, and then unleashed a conventional strategic offensive that took them south across the Yangzi and drove Chiang to Taiwan. Mao proclaimed his victory on October 1st, 1949.

What happened to militarize Chinese politics?

When the 1911 anti-Manchu political struggle became a military struggle, soldiers were pushed to the front of the political stage, and once there they proved reluctant to step aside after the Qing was overthrown. Yuan remained president until his death in 1916, at which point he was succeeded by a series of his former Beiyang Army subordinates. All of these men used military strength as the basis of their political power, and their opponents were forced to do the same - the militarization of politicsthat had started in 1911 culminated in Warlordism by the early 1920s. The "men of wu" were firmly in control. The Warlord Era lasted only a decade, but it was a terrible time for China, and largely destroyed the only recently rehabilitated reputation of the military. As the generals squabbled over the political spoils of a revolution gone wrong, the people were preyed upon by legions of "grey rats and grey wolves"

What kind of war was the PLA waging by the end of the Civil War?

While Mao had championed guerrilla war in the early stages of the war against the KMT and the Japanese, by the end of the Civil War the PLA was a large conventional army, complete with tanks, artillery, and even aircraft (courtesy of the Japanese and KMT!).

What is the major difference between Xunzi and Mencius when it came to the use of force?

Xun Zi was also more of a realist when it came to the use of force, but he still held to the Confucian emphas is on morality, virtue, and legitimate authority: A disciple once asked Xun Zi, "When you talk about the use of arms, you always speak of benevolence and righteousness as being the basis of military action. A benevolent man loves others, and a righteous man acts in accordance with what is right. Why, then, would they have any recourse to arms in the first place? Those who take up arms do so only in order to contend with others and seize some spoil!" Xun Zi replied, "This is something you would not understand! The benevolent man does indeed love others, and because he loves others, he hates to see men do them harm. The righteous man acts in accordance with what is right and reasonable, and for that reason he hates those who lead others astray. He takes up arms in order to put an end to violence and do away with harm, not to contend with others for spoil." Moreover, military force, when properly used, can have a positive effect on the people: "Therefore, where the soldiers of the benevolent man encamp they command a god-like respect; and where they pass, they transform the people. They are like the seasonal rain whose coming is welcomed by all men. Thus Yao attacked Huan Dou, Shun attacked the rulers of the Miao, Yu attacked Gonggong, Tang attacked the ruler of Xia, King Wen attacked Chong, and King Wu attacked Shang Zhou. These four emperors and two kings all marched through the world with their soldiers of benevolence and righteousness. Those nearby were won over by their goodness, and those far off were filled with longing by their virtue. They did not stain their swords with blood, and yet near and far alike submitted; their virtue flourished in the center and spread to the four corners!"

According to Professor Green, what are the key details of the life of Xunzi?

Xunzi was born in Zhao sometime around 310 BCE and lived until about 215 BCE. He lived a half century after Mencius, and was his rival as an interpreter of the Confucian legacy. His major disagreement with Mencius concerned the latter's "naïve" belief that humans were by nature good. Xunzi argued that far from being naturally good, humans were inherently selfish. Only through education and ritual could human nature be tamed: "When a son yields to his father, or a younger brother yields to his elder brother, or when a son takes on the work for his father or a younger brother for his elder brother, their actions go against their natures and Run counter to their feelings. And yet these are the way of the filial son and the principles of ritual and morality."

The Zuo zhuan ([tswò ʈʂwân]; Chinese: 左傳; Wade-Giles: Tso chuan), generally translated The Zuo Tradition or The Commentary of Zuo

an ancient Chinese narrative history that is traditionally regarded as a commentary on the ancient Chinese chronicle Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu 春秋). It comprises 30 chapters covering a period from 722 to 468 BC, and focuses mainly on political, diplomatic, and military affairs from that era. The Zuo zhuan is famous for its "relentlessly realistic" style, and recounts many tense and dramatic episodes, such as battles and fights, royal assassinations and murder of concubines, deception and intrigue, excesses, citizens' oppression and insurgences, and appearances of ghosts and cosmic portents. For many centuries, the Zuo zhuan was the primary text through which educated Chinese gained an understanding of their ancient history. Unlike the other two surviving Annals commentaries—the Gongyang and Guliang commentaries—the Zuo zhuan does not simply explain the wording of the Annals, but greatly expounds upon its historical background, and contains a large number of rich and lively accounts of Spring and Autumn period (771-476 BC) history and culture. The Zuo zhuan is the source of more Chinese sayings and idioms than any other classical work, and its concise, flowing style came to be held as a paragon of elegant Classical Chinese. Its tendency toward third-person narration and portraying characters through direct speech and action became hallmarks of Chinese narrative in general, and its style was imitated by historians, storytellers, and ancient style prose masters for over 2000 years of subsequent Chinese history. Although the Zuo zhuan has long been regarded as "a masterpiece of grand historical narrative", its early textual history is largely unknown, and the nature of its original composition and authorship have been widely debated. The "Zuo" of the title was traditionally believed to refer to one "Zuo Qiuming"—an obscure figure of the 5th century BC described as a blind disciple of Confucius—but there is little actual evidence to support this. Most scholars now generally believe that the Zuo zhuan was originally an independent work composed during the 4th century BC that was later rearranged as a commentary to the Annals.

In chapter 8 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was the Taiwan Strait crisis (1995-1996)?

§1 "... The crisis marked a dramatic escalation in the confrontation between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China on Taiwan. From August 1995 until March 1996, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a series of war games, live fire exercises, and missile tests in the vicinity of Taiwan. Beijing's rhetoric and activities raised the specter of a military conflict in East Asia over a dispute that had appeared to be at its lowest level of tensions in four Decades.1" (Scobell 2003, 171)

In chapter 8 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what triggered a crisis in the Taiwan Strait in June 1995?

§1 "A private visit to the United States by Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui in June 1995 triggered a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. ... " (Scobell 2003, 171)

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", did Confucius criticize ALL war?

§1 "Confucius did not criticize war per se but rather the improper use of war. He aid: When good government prevails in the empire, ceremonies music, and punitive military expeditions proceed from the son of Heaven. When bad government prevails in the empire, ceremonies, usic, and punitive expeditions proceed from the princes. Confucius explained that improperly motivated statecraft, violent or otherwise, led ot ruin for the dynasty in a matter of generation.35 Furthermore, Confucius said, "Let a good man teach his people seven years, and they may then be employed n war." What the sage condemned was a leader sending his "uninstructed people (bufiao min) into battle."36 If the conflict was simply gratuitous or merely for material gain, then it was wrong. Confucius viewed force used to unite the empire as proper.37 Some Confucianists approved of violence for vengeance -- indeed, it was considered "a highly moral act."38 §2 Simply because Confucius did not discuss military matters in great detail does not mean that he was a pacifist. Indeed it is only natural that he made "scanty mention of war" since his calling, as a teacher of a moral philosophy, was to inculcate religious like principles that governed idealized patterns of harmonious behavior.39 In fact, while aspiring to an ideal world, Confucius supported the use of war and violence under certain real-world conditions. Many scholars of China's strategic tradition are guilty of seeing Confucianism as virtually completely pacifistic.40 In short, we are presented with something of a false Confucian-Realpolitik dichotomy." (Scobell 2003, 21).

In chapter 9 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is, overall, a more accurate understanding of China's strategic culture?

§1 Contemporary perceptions of a belligerent China and a bellicose People's Liberation Army (PLA) are heavily influenced by enduring myths about the country's strategic tradition and the relationship between the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In one myth, the perception of a defensive-minded, pacifist ancient culture - symbolized by the Great Wall - clashes with the new image of a more belligerent 1990s China. In the other myth, the assumption of a military completely subordinate to, or totally in synchronization with, a civilian elite in the People's Republic of China (PRC) - symbolized by the Long March - collides with the appearance of outspoken and independent-minded soldiers, claiming to speak for the Chinese nation. §2 In fact, China's strategic culture is neither purely pacific nor belligerent. As Chapter 2 suggests, for hundreds of years there have been two strands, a Realpolitik one and a Confucian one. These strands interact to produce an enduring Chinese "Cult of Defense" that profoundly affects China's elites. Moreover, the careful analysis of Chinese communist civil-military culture in Chapter 3 demonstrates that it has long been possible to differentiate between civilian and military leaders. Even in the earliest days of the PRC, when the politico-military leadership dominated by Mao Zedong could be described as dual role, it was possible to make certain distinctions. Then in the late twentieth century, as civil-military culture was recast under Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, the PLA became far more separate and autonomous of the CCP, revealing in the process the potency of military culture. §3 The impact of culture, now considered a significant factor in security studies, is best appreciated by disaggregating this dimension into distinct layers, each of which exerts a considerable influence but in ways different from each other. The Cult of Defense explains the continuity and regularity with which China uses force. The transformation of civil-military culture from that under Mao (1949- (p. 193) §1-until the mid-1970s) to that under Jiang (since the mid-1990s) explains change in where and how China is likely to use force. Military organizational culture explains the difference in thinking between the soldier and the statesman about the way force should be employed. §2 This chapter reviews the nature and impact of strategic culture, civil-military culture, and military culture on China's use of force. Finally, the implications of this study are examined." (Scobell 2003, 193)

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is Scobell's argument about China's strategic culture?

§1 THE CHINESE CULT OF DEFENSE - I contend that there is a Realpolitik strand of Chinese strategic culture and alongside it a Confucian-type strand. The two strands of strategic culture combine in such a way as to imbue a distinct set of beliefs held by many Chinese leaders and researchers. I label this set of beliefs the "Chinese Cult of Defense."67[67.] I assert that Chinese elites believe passionately in the existence of a unique defensive, conflict-averse Chinese military approach to interstate relations. Coexisting alongside this -- but rarely explicitly acknowledged by leaders and researchers -- is a realist outlook that readily sanctions the use of violence in statecraft. The resultant mixture of these two outlooks s a worldview that rationalizes the use of force, even when used in an offensive capacity, as a purely defensive measure. The combined effect is paradoxical: While most of China's leaders, analysts, and researchers believe profoundly that the legacy of Chinese civilization is fundamentally pacifist, they are nevertheless very willing to employ force when confronting crises." (Scobell 2003, 26).

In chapter 5 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was, in brief, the context for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (CR) (1966-9)?

§1 THE CONTEXT - Launched by China's paramount political leader Mao in the summer of 1966, the Cultural Revolution was an attempt to shake up the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), purge those officials Mao viewed as disloyal to him, and reinvigorate the Chinese Revolution.5 He thus called upon the youth of China to attack the CCP and "bombard the headquarters." By circumventing the bureaucratic chain of command and appealing directly to China's youth to make revolution, Mao set the stage for a mass movement of unparalleled scope and momentum in post-1949 China. These mobilized youths formed themselves into paramilitary units called Red Guards, which quickly split into factions. Initially these groups merely vied energetically but relatively tamely to prove the superiority of the revolutionary ardor of their own particular group vis-`a-vis others. Eventually this zealous competition, fed by elite factions in Beijing jockeying for power, escalated into deadly armed conflict between rival groups. Other groups formed by workers, former soldiers, and party members joined them. The emergence of these paramilitary formations virtually autonomous from Beijing's control and largely independent of local civil or military authorities resulted in a particularly volatile and complex state of affairs.6" (Scobell 2003, 95)

In chapter 8 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the difference between "bellicose", "belligerent" and "hawkish"?

§2 "... An important distinction must be made between the terms bellicose, belligerent, and hawkish; the first refers to temperament, while the latter two refer to degrees of mental readiness to resort to war. A bellicose leader is warlike in mindset - that is, predisposed to resort to war in most situations. A belligerent leader is one who has crossed the mental threshold in a particular instance and is ready and eager for battle. In contrast, a hawkish leader is one who is prepared to use military means short of war - namely, saber-rattling, brinkmanship, and threats of war - to achieve a policy goal - in short, to practice coercive diplomacy. ..." (Scobell 2003, 171)

In chapter 4 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", in mid-September 1950, how did the Chinese interpret the UNC troops under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur continuing northward beyond the Thirty-Eighth Parallel toward the Yalu River?

§2 "After the overwhelming success of the Inchon operation in mid-September, UNC troops under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur continued northward beyond the Thirty-Eighth Parallel toward the Yalu River. In late September and early October 1950, Beijing issued stern public warnings to Washington and transmitted other private warnings via New Delhi that China would intervene if these troops did not pull back. Beijing's gradual escalation of rhetoric and military preparation appears evident - particularly the explicit warnings to UNC forces not to cross the Thirty-Eighth Parallel - up until the time the Chinese actually intervened in mid-October.12 However, while Chinese leaders considered the possibility of intervention as early as August,13 this is not to say that the decision was solidified at an early date, that intervention was inevitable, or that the leadership in Beijing spoke with one voice.14" (Scobell 2003, 80)

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what kind of strategic culture does China possess?

§2 "I contend that existing depictions of China's strategic culture are flawed. China's strategic disposition cannot accurately be characterized as either pacifist or bellicose. China, I argue, ahs a dualistic strategic culture. The two main strands are a Confucian one, which is conflict-averse and defensive-minded, and a Realpolitik one that favors military solutions and is offense-oriented. Both of these two stands are active and both influence and combine in dialectic fashion to produce what I label a "Chinese Cult of Defense."1[1.] Just as the "Cult of Offense" identified by Stephen Van Evera and Jack Snyder had a critical effect in precipitating World War I,2[2.] so the Cult of Defense increases the likelihood that China will be involved in a future war. This cult predisposes Chinese leaders paradoxically to engage in offensive military operations as a primary alternative in pursuit of national goals, while rationalizing these actions as being purely defensive and a last resort. This dualistic strategic culture has been a constant, and China has not become more bellicose or dangerous in recent years except to the extent that its military capabilities have improved and military doctrine has changed (see Chapter 3). (Scobell 2003, 15)

In chapter 5 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", why didn't the military overthrow the civilian leadership during the Cultural Revolution, in general?

§2 "The Dual Role Elite - When a country lapses into chaos because of the ineptitude or bumbling of political leaders, a powerful military often views this as justifying the overthrow of the civilian leadership. Rationalizing that it has no choice but to rescue the country from disaster, the armed forces either seize power themselves or, after ousting one set of civilians, install another set of civilians.101 This did not happen because the civil-military leadership configuration in the late 1960s remained dual role. That is, the key figures of the Long March generation remained in both the CCP and PLA hierarchies. Particularly important, of course, were paramount leader Mao and his dedicated premier Zhou, who, although best classified as civilians, each had impeccable military service credentials. PLA commanders considered both to be honorary soldiers. Similarly, CCP leaders viewed Marshals Lin and Xu Xiangqian as senior CCP members. Thus, it was not easy to separate the party from the army, or vice versa." (Scobell 2003, 112)

In chapter 5 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was the view among CCP regarding the PLA and the Cultural Revolution by mid-February 1967?

§2 "Three Groups and the February Adverse Current - In mid-February, there were three opinion groupings within the CCP leadership on the issue of the PLA and the Cultural Revolution. First, there was the conservative faction that favored swift, massive military intervention to restore order. Second, there was the radical group concentrated around the CCRG and led by Jiang, which opposed such intervention. Holding a position between these two extremes was a third group led by China's paramount political leader Mao and his faithful premier Zhou Enlai. The conservatives were adamant in their view because if current trends continued, not only would China descend into full-scale civil war but also they would be purged from power. The radicals were equally adamant in confronting the conservatives over this issue because their position and influence depended heavily on continuing the Cultural Revolution. They were quite willing to permit unrest in order to allow radical groups to attempt power seizures across China because this would strengthen their authority and influence. Wholesale intervention by the PLA, however, would be potentially disastrous for them. Such a move would undercut their position and destroy their power base: the revolutionary Red Guard and worker militia organizations. Mao and Zhou, meanwhile, wanted to strike a balance in order to ensure that neither group became too powerful and China did not lapse into complete anarchy. Hence they advocated limited PLA intervention." (Scobell 2003, 99)

In chapter 6 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was the reason that China decided to attack Vietnam?

§2 "Why did China decide to attack Vietnam? The decision was made because, as Chinese leaders stated repeatedly, commencing in very late December 1978, they wanted to "teach Vietnam a lesson."The phrase was used only after the fully fledged Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.25 The decision, although calculated, was an emotional response to Vietnam's all-around "anti-China" (fan-Hua) actions. The phrase "teach Vietnam a lesson" is itself filled with emotion and tinged with arrogance. The contempt and venom for Hanoi among Beijing's leaders was patently evident in the way they spoke about Vietnam to officials from other countries, including Thailand, Singapore, and the United States.26 The attack was deemed necessary because Beijing's efforts at coercive diplomacy had failed. China had failed to stop Vietnam from victimizing its citizens of ethnic Chinese origin, and had also failed to deter Vietnam from invading Cambodia.27 In principle, the decision for a military move was made quite easily because there seemed to be considerable agreement in Beijing that some kind of forceful Chinese response was in order. However, there were significant differences of opinion as to the appropriate size and scope of China's action as well as some opposition." (Scobell 2003, 125).

In chapter 5 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", how did the PLA feel about the Cultural Revolution, and the Red Guards?

§2 The Exasperated PLA - The exasperation of the PLA grew as the destruction and violence escalated and chaos loomed. In the late summer of 1966, youthful Red Guards throughout China got caught up in the enthusiasm of the movement and looked for ways to demonstrate their dedication to Mao, much to the frustration of soldiers. Red Guards vigorously sought to eradicate the "Four Olds" (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits). PLA consternation at the antics of high-spirited youths is typified by the response of a unit commander in a small village in Hebei Province who attempted to protect the Buddha at the local temple from destruction. After drawing up his men in front of the temple, he tried to dissuade the students from their mission. But while he and his men were thus distracted, another group of youths had surreptitiously entered the grounds and succeeded in toppling the statue. Horrified at the act and momentarily at a loss for words, the officer eventually blurted out: "You - You - What kind of Red Guards are You?"7" (Scobell 2003, 95)

In chapter 4 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", in 1950, who dominated the decision to deploy Chinese troops into the Korean War?

§3 "... In 1950 a single paramount leader dominated the decision-making apparatus: Mao. ..." (Scobell 2013, 79)

In chapter 6 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what truly pushed the Communist leadership to intervene?

§3 "It was the invasion of Khmer Rouge-ruled Cambodia, a Chinese ally, that by most accounts infuriated China's top civilian and military leaders. The subject of Chinese military action against Vietnam was first raised in connection with Cambodia. Discussion of a military response to a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia reportedly was first raised at an enlarged Politburo meeting in May 1978. The consensus was that such a move by Hanoi would merit a forceful response by Beijing.18" (Scobell 2003, 123).

In chapter 5 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", how did Lin Biao and the PLA leadership finally suppress the Cultural Revolution?

§3 "On August 9, Lin gave a pep talk to military personnel from the Wuhan, Shenyang, and Jinan Military Regions. There were two elements that ensured China would successfully weather the turmoil, said Lin: Chairman Mao and the PLA.96 This speech was important not only in raising the morale of soldiers but also in rallying support among the party leadership for a more proactive role for the PLA. And by late August, Lin was able to broker an agreement with regional military chiefs during a meeting of the CMC. The soldiers agreed to participate in the establishment of "Revolutionary Committees," which would be led by PLA members, and the central party leaders agreed to give the PLA full authority to deal with the Red Guards.97 On September 5, the PLA received formal authority to reassert control by force if necessary. The process of restoring order, suppressing armed groups, and disbanding the Red Guards continued for months - well into 1968 in many areas. The autumn trade fair in Guangzhou even had to be postponed a month (from mid-October to mid-November).98 The restoration of basic order and the reestablishment of effective power centers in each province, autonomous region, and municipality were officially signified by the formal declaration of the creation of a "Revolutionary Committee." Although composed of party officials, representatives of mass organizations, and soldiers, these organs were dominated by the PLA. Some two-thirds of these committees (twenty- (p. 111) §1-of twenty-nine) were not formed until 1968, the last two in September of that year.99 §2 The September 1967 announcement marked the culmination of a consensus decision by political and military elites to approve full-force employment of the PLA to deal with the chaos created by the Cultural Revolution. Despite this massive intervention, violence continued to flare up across China in 1968. But the worst was over, and the employment of the PLA ensured that the party-state would not totally collapse." (Scobell 2003, 110-111)

In chapter 6 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what did the actual attack on February 17, 1979 consist of? How did the offensive turn out?

§3 "The eventual attack on February 17, 1979, consisted of heavy artillery bombardments and fierce fighting by PLA infantry units. The assault consisted of co-ordinated advances on two fronts: from Yunnan in the west and from Guangxi in the east. After some initial successes, Chinese troops got bogged down because of the rugged terrain and the stubborn defense put up by Vietnamese defenders. As a result, the PLA's advance was much slower and casualties were far heavier than Beijing had anticipated. An indication of Beijing's displeasure at the way things were going was the demotion of Xu Shiyou. By one account, Xu Shiyou was replaced as operational commander by Yang Dezhi.43 Whether or not this occurred, we do know that less than a year later, in January 1980, Xu Shiyou was ousted from his position as commander of the Guangzhou Military Region. On March 5, after sixteen days of brutal fighting, the offensive portion of the operation was concluded following the capture of Lang Son, the last major border town held by Vietnamese forces. On the same day, Beijing announced that Chinese troops would be withdrawn from Vietnam. And the departure of Chinese troops was completed eleven days later." (Scobell 2003, 127).

In chapter 7 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was so disconcerting with the Student uprisings to the Elders and other CCP leaders?

§3 "To the Elders and other CCP leaders, China seemed on the brink of chaos, and swift, decisive action had to be taken; the protests had to be suppressed, and order had to be restored. Traditionally, Chinese governments have felt it necessary to claim a monopoly on morality. The students directly challenged this claim by capturing the moral high ground. A critical event in this regard was the hunger strike that began on May 13. In a political culture that values symbolism, the demonstrators' carefully worded, moralistic appeals and scrupulously nonviolent deeds paradoxically raised the stakes in the eyes of China's leaders. The contest soon escalated "from moralizing to revenge," with both student leaders and the Elders viewing the protests as a symbolic battle to the death.20 The Elders also came to fear they might be physically overthrown. They were apparently worried about the threat of a coup d'etat; the palace coup that toppled the Gang of Four in 1976 had also been preceded by huge demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. Elder Li Xiannian reportedly remarked at the May 18 meeting previously mentioned, "If we don't put Beijing under martial law we'll all end up under house arrest."21 In their minds, the specter of civil war also loomed. At the very least they recognized that there was clearly tremendous sympathy and support for the youthful protesters not only among the common people but also within the ranks of the CCP and the PLA." (Scobell 2003, 149)

In chapter 5 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what motivated Mao's decision to deploy the PLA to shut down the Red Guard and the Cultural Revolution?

§3 By the end of 1966, many of China's top leaders felt that the Cultural Revolution had spun out of control and that order had to be restored. The time was ripe to have the radical factions across the country bring the conflict to an end by ousting incumbent conservative officials and assuming control themselves. In early January 1967, Mao and the members of the Central Cultural Revolutionary Group (CCRG) instructed loyal Maoists to make "seizures of power." After the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of Red Guards from across China for massive rallies in Tiananmen Square, Mao and other leaders seemed confident that they now possessed a loyal, dedicated, and politically reliable force with which to oust conservative leaders and functionaries in the party and state hierarchies. §4 By the second half of January 1967, however, few "seizures of power" had been successfully carried out and most regions of the country remained in turmoil. Many of China's political leaders were alarmed that the situation did not seem to be stabilizing, and they were becoming concerned that the country might descend into complete chaos. According to an account of the period written by the CCP Political Research Institute's Teaching and Research Office for Party History: After the "Cultural Revolution" had entered the "power seizure" stage in January 1967, local-level party and government organs were paralyzed, and the power seizures of "rebel factions" had resulted in conflict. The chaotic situation only worsened by the day. [Therefore] Mao Zedong ordered the People's Liberation Army to intervene locally to support the Cultural Revolution.10 §5 While at this stage the intent of Mao and other political leaders as to what the army should do in practice is unclear, Mao seems to have wanted the military to supervise the process of ousting conservative leaders, installing radicals, and ensuring a basic level of stability.11 He feared that the Cultural Revolution had spun completely out of control.12 Mao realized it was impossible for the army to remain aloof, and he did not want the PLA to continue to find itself paralyzed in the midst of the conflict. Thus he ordered PLA regional forces across China to intervene.13 On January 23, 1967, the "Decision Concerning the People's- (p. 97) §1-Liberation Army Resolutely Supporting the Masses of the Revolutionary Left" was officially issued jointly by the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission (CMC), and the CCRG. The decision stated: The so-called "[policy of] noninterference [by the PLA]" is bogus: [the PLA] has already been involved for some time. Thus the issue is not intervention versus nonintervention; rather the issue is where to stand. The issue is whether to support the revolutionary factions or to support the conservatives, or even the rightists. The People's Liberation Army should actively support the leftist revolutionary faction.14 (Scobell 2003, 96-97)

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the Guiding Principles of General Security "Heightened Threat Perceptions"?

§3 Heightened Threat perceptions. China's political and military leaders see threats everywhere. The full extent of the siege mentality of China's leaders is not always appreciated. This paranoia results in elites viewing the foreign as well as domestic environments as treacherous landscapes filled with threats and conspiracies.109 This tendency reinforces and exacerbates the features of the military mind -- the pessimism and negative views of human nature.110 Moreover, China confronts a post-Cold War paradox: While the PRC has the most secure external security environment in its history, Beijing's leaders, particularly military leaders, have heightened threat perceptions. They see a world that is complicated and filled with uncertain challenges and threats.111 §4 This mindset may explain the need of the Chinese authorities during the Maoist era to come up with the seemingly innocuous phrase "China has friends all over the world."112 By the same token, one would expect that China had also at least some enemies in the world. Indeed, one is tempted to conclude that the slogan itself was prompted by Chinese insecurities. If a country has friendly states around the world, why is it necessary to recite this ad nauseum? The reality in the late Maoist era was that China actually had few staunch friends: the handful that come to mind are Albania, North Korea, and Pakistan. The fact of the matter is that maoist China believed itself to be surrounded by enemies. This was true of Deng's China, and also holds true for China in the post-Deng era. §5 Traditionally, Chinese governments have viewed with greatest alarm the combination of internal disturbances and foreign aggression (neiyou waikuan). In- (p. 34) §1-particular. "In the view of PRC leaders, the greatest danger to the regime exists when there is collaboration between internal and external hostile forces." This was clearly why, for example, Deng and other senior leaders viewed the popular protests in the spring of 1989 with such seriousness.113 In the last decade of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century, there are three sources of security threats to regime security and all are viewed as especially serious because of internal/external linkages: peaceful evolution, bourgeois liberalization, and social instability.114" (Scobell 2013, 33-34).

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the Guiding Principles of External Security of "Just War Theory?

§3 Just War Theory. The idea of just war (yi zhan) is an ancient one. Confucius adopted this idea, and Mao absorbed it.115 The distinction is simple: just wars are good wars and unjust wars are bad ones. Just wars are those fought by oppressed groups against oppressors; unjust wars are ones waged by oppressors against the oppressed. Since China has long been oppressed -- enduring more than a century of humiliation -- it follows that any war China wages is a just one, even a war in which China strikes first.116 The principle of just war seems to be a crucial element of China's traditional approach to war in the view of many contemporary military researchers.117(Scobell 2013, 34).

§3 Mao's Army - When armies launch coups against civilian authorities, the act is frequently justified by the claim that soldiers are loyal not to any specific civilian leader or the incumbent in a particular formal office but to an abstract entity such as the state, nation, or constitution.102 In the case of communist China, army allegiance to the "party" was no guarantee against a coup: Any number of individuals or groups of the dual role elites among Chinese military leaders could have attempted to seize power in the name of the party. However, a major reason there was no military coup in 1967 was because of the strong bonds of personal loyalty that most of these PLA men felt to Mao. This special allegiance to the paramount leader that many senior officers held reinforced the more abstract political loyalty to the CCP that PLA commanders had drummed into their heads. In short, to these soldiers, the party was synonymous with Mao.103 As General Xu Shiyou remarked to Mao adamantly in 1967 and on several subsequent occasions: I object to making the Cultural Revolution, but if someone wanted to kill the Chairman, go against the Central Committee, usurp power, and fight civil wars, then I would fight all the way to Peking [Beijing] to protect you.104 (p. 113) §1 In other words, for many military leaders, the PLA was Mao's army. While most soldiers were extremely frustrated at the degree of chaos in the country and its negative impact on the PLA, senior military leaders and most junior officers maintained an unwavering personal loyalty to Mao. Furthermore, this hallowed bond was identified as being synonymous with military loyalty to the party. While there appear to have been instances of military units battling each other, the most serious crisis in civil-military relations was the Wuhan Incident in July 1967." (Scobell 2003, 112-113).

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the SECOND core element of the "Cult of Defence"?

§3 Never Seek Hegemony. A Second deeply held belief is that China has never been as aggressive or expansionist state. According to many leaders and researchers, China has never fought an aggressive war throughout its long history. Neither has China threatened other countries. In post-1949 China, this belief has taken the form of constant pronouncements to the fact that "China will never seek hegemony."85 Senior soldier Liu told a Hong Kong interviewer in 1995: "China is opposed to the use of force and to threatening with force. ... China is against hegemonism and power politics in any form ... China does not seek hegemony now, nor will it ever do so in the future."86 And Deng asserted in 1980 that one of the main tasks for the decade of supporting peace was intimately linked to "opposing hegemony" (Fandui baquanzhuyi).87 Of course, at that time, hegemony wa code word for Soviet domination. Since the end of the Cold War, it has come to mean U.S. domination. But the term hegemony (ba) has a deeper meaing in in Chinese political thought. Badao, or "rule by force," has extremely negative connotations in contrast to wangdao or "kingly way" or "benevolent rule."88 §4 According to many Chinese analysts, China goes to war only in "self-defense." These analysts assert that virtually all of the wars China has fought have been waged to protect itself from external threats or to unify the country. According to one prominent Chinese military scholar, virtually all of the approximately thirty-seven hundred to four thousand wars that China has fought in more than four thousand years of dynasties (ending with the collapse of the- (p. 31) §1-Qing in 1911) have been civil wars or wars to unify the country. Moreover, all of the eight "military actions" since 1949, the scholar asserts, have been waged in "self-defense."89 When Chinese forces have ventured abroad, they have done so for a limited time and for nonexpansionist purposes. According to one analyst, "The facts are: There are no records showing that China invaded other countries or that China stations any soldiers abroad."90 Researchers regularly cite Mao's statement, "We [China] do not desire one inch of foreign soil."91" (Scobell 2003, 30-31)

§3 The Limited Corporateness of the PLA - Soldiers are likely to launch a coup if they believe that the survival of the military as an institution is threatened or its monopoly of the use of force is being usurped.109 With the paramilitarization of Chinese society during the Cultural Revolution, quasimilitary societal groups, such as Red Guards and factory militias, emerged prepared to wage urban warfare. Not only was the PLA under direct attack from mass organizations, but also by August 1967 it could no longer claim to have a monopoly on the legitimate use of armed force. Paramilitary groups armed with homemade weapons as well as firearms taken from PLA armories were engaged in pitched battles with each other and in some cases at war with the PLA itself. Zhou estimated that during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, "hundreds of thousands of casualties were inflicted" upon the PLA.110 §4 Whereas in most countries the frenzy and chaos of a Cultural Revolution and the destruction it unleashed on the armed forces might have triggered a coup or at least numerous mutinies, in China no such reaction was forthcoming. In large part, this was because the corporateness of the military, while strong in many ways, was limited. While infused with a staunch esprit de corps, the PLA did not see itself as autonomous of the party-state or society. Chinese soldiers were imbued with the idea that they were the party's army and the people's army. The army's link with the party was cemented by dual role elites and the belief that the PLA was Mao's force. The PLA was indoctrinated (p. 114) §1-into believing it was an army of the people comprised, in Mao's words, of "workers and peasants in uniform." Furthermore, the PLA did not see the existence of paramilitary groups as challenging the functional prerogatives or corporate interests of the army. Under the doctrine of People's War, the defense of China was predicated on arming and training the masses to wage protracted struggle against any invader. However, when these groups sparked a civil war by waging war against each other and even the PLA, military attitudes changed. Moreover, when a group such as the worker militia that backed the Gang of Four was seen as a rival power center, the PLA could be prompted to act.111" (Scobell 2003, 113-114)

In chapter 4 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", in 1950, how did the Chinese interpret the Korean People's Army (KPA)'s attack on South Korea on June 25?

§4 "... Beijing had been caught by surprise when forces of the Korean People's Army (KPA) launched a dramatic strike against South Korea across the Thirty-Eighth Parallel on June 25. The Chinese were aware of Kim Il Sung's goals, having (p. 80) §1-provided him with some fifty-thousand to seventy-thousand Korean troops from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) between late 1949 and mid-1950. However, Pyongyang did not keep Beijing appraised of its invasion plans or notify Beijing of the attack across the Thirty-Eighth Parallel until June 27.10 ..." (Scobell 2003, 79-80)

In chapter 6 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was Scobell's analysis of CHina's road to the war?

§4 "ANALYSIS - An analysis of China's road to the war with Vietnam reveals that, while Beijing was spoiling for a fight, it acted in a deliberate and controlled fashion. Especially after Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, China wanted to punish Vietnam militarily. The official rationale for China's attack given in- (p. 135) §1-Beijing pronouncements at the time and in subsequent accounts of the war even two decades after the fact is that Vietnamese forces intruded on Chinese territory on literally thousands of occasions during a five-year period (from 1974 until February 1979).84" (Scobell 2003, 134-135).

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what are the Guiding Principles of General Security IN GENERAL?

§4 "Guiding Principles for General Security - Counteracting these core elements at the overall security level are two guiding principles that justify military force: (1) efforts to achieve national unification or protect national unity, and (2) heightened threat perceptions that tend to produce a siege mentality among China's leaders." (Scobell 2003, 32)

In chapter 6 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what was Deng Xiaoping's tour of Southeast Asian states in August 1978 meant to accomplish?

§4 "Then in early November Chinese leaders were dispatched to the region to get a firsthand look at the overall situation. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping made a tour of Southeast Asian states to explain China's position on Cambodia and Vietnam. From accounts of Deng's discussions in Bangkok and Singapore, it seems clear that the Chinese leader was trying to gauge the thinking of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders on the situation in Indochina and prepare them for the possibility of Chinese military action. At the same time, Politburo member Wang Dongxing led a delegation, which included Hu Yaobang and Yu Qiuli, to Cambodia. Pol Pot appealed to the delegation for direct Chinese military intervention. In the aftermath of these trips, the Beijing leadership gathered to consider carefully the evolving situation and China's appropriate response.23" (Scobell 2003, 124).

In chapter 2 of Andre Scobell's 2003 book "China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March", what is the Guiding Principles of General Security "Primacy of National Unification"?

§5 Primacy of National Unification. National unification is a core value in China's national security calculus on which no compromise is possible. It is an immutable principle in part because of China's history of division and inability to- (p. 33) §1-stop exploitation and oppression by foreign powers. However, this is also probably an emotional and unwavering public stand precisely because the leadership of the PRC in the reform era seems to lack any other inviolable principles.105 According to Li: The most important strategic legacy of the Chinese nation is the awareness of identification and the concept of unification, and this is where lies the secret for the immortality of ... Chinese civilization ... [S]eeking unification ... [is] the soul of ... Chinese military strategy endowed by ... Chinese civilization.106 §2 According to another analyst, "[the] principle of unification hoping for unification, defending unification is a dimension of the Chinese people's ... thought culture and is a special feature of its strategic thought."107 (Scobell 2003, 32-33)

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, in ancient China, what were the factors that determined whether or not people saw a war as just?

¶1 "... In ancient China, as in some periods of Western history, whether or not a war was regarded as just depended not only on the justice of one's cause, jus ad bellum, but also on one's conduct in the prosecution of the conflict, jus in bello. In the West, this generally involved the observance of rules (or cultural norms) regarding the treatment of prisoners and non-combatants, the protection of property, and the avoidance of certain weapons and tactics (such as the use of poison) that were considered unacceptable.70[70.] ..." (Graff 2016, 206)

In "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution" by Maochun Yu in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 135-151, what kind of rebellions did the Qing dynasty face in the mid-nineteenth century?

¶1 "... In the southwest, the ethnic Miao rebelled in Guizhou province, and the Hui Muslims took up arms against the government in Yunnan from 1855 to 1873, establishing a small but violently defiant peasant government at Dali. In the north and northwest, Muslims in Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai also rose up to rebel against the dynasty in 1862. The rebellion spread to Xinjiang, where it was not put down until 1877. The fire of destruction sprang up not just in the border regions, but also in the heartland of China. In Shandong, Henan, and Anhui provinces, the Nian uprising (1851-1868) presented a powerful blow to the confidence and structure of the government. Of all these tremendous popular rebellions, however, none matches the scale, intensity, and level of destruction of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864)." (Yu 2012, 135)

¶1 "... all three texts consider righteousness ajustified motive for war. A ruler may deploy troops to oust an oppressor and rescue an impoverished population, if his intentions are (and remain) upright. ..." (Van Els 2013, 32)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what was the Battle of Barrier?

¶1 ... On 19 August 1840, Captain Smith ordered an attack on the so-called "Barrier," the boundary between Macao and China, which was guarded by nine war junks and about 1,500 Chinese troops. ¶2 About 200 British marines were loaded on to the Enterprise steamer, with two longboats in tow. Backed up by the firepower from several corvettes, including the Hyacinth and the Louisa, this small force worked its way along the coastline toward Cacilhas Bay. When theya rrived within about one-third of a mile from the barrier, the corvettes' 32-pound cannon began to fire. The Chinese battery was designed to guard the wall and gate, not the sea, and so proved almost useless; the Chinese gun crew eventually deserted their cannon to escape from the British fire. ¶3 After about an hour, Captain Smith ordered his men to land, take the Chinese battery, and spike its twenty-seven guns. A light artillery piece was brought ashore and was turned against the barrier. Meanwhile, Chinese war junks joined the battle, but two were sunk and the rest were soon forced by the superior British firepower to withdraw. Never intending to hold the barrier, the British troops instead burned down the Chinese stores and magazines." (Ellemen 2007, 22)

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, who are the Realists?

¶2 "... Although at one point it puts forward the notion that aggressive war is necessary in order to bring about the political unity that will put an end to war, the idea is not pursued and has the ring of rationalization.13[13.] In an amoral, dog-eat-dog world of perpetual armed conflict, the fact that one's neighbors and rivals were plotting aggression of their own was usually sufficient reason for aggression against them.14[14.] ¶3 These ideas are echoed in the writings of Han Feizi, who was active in the middle decades of the third-century BCE and perished in 233. Aggressive war leading to the advantage ( li ) of territorial aggrandizement is cause for celebration, and the "true kind is one who is in a position to attack others."15[15.] Those modern scholars who have identified Lord Shang and Han Feizi as belonging to a single "school of thought" have sometimes seen fit to assign them the label of "Realists."16[16.]" (Graff 2016, 199)

In Chapter Two of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", who began the process of expanding military service, according to received accounts?

¶2 "According to received accounts, the process of expanding military service and identifying the army with the people began with Guan Zhong and his policy of "lodging the army amidst the people" (yu bing yu min ...) in Qi state in the early seventh century. (Although all the records of this reform date from the Warring States period, several centuries after the time of Guan Zhong, their accounts limit his extension of military service to the capital, and the geographic range of Qi's effective power also does not go beyond the capital region.5[5.] Since the division between the capitals and the rural hinterlands had begun to break down as early as the seventh century, this archaism suggests that the surviving records were at least based on older documents, although they have doubtless been reworked to suit the needs and preconceptions of Warring States redactors." (Lewis 1990, 55).

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, in ancient China, what about the conflation of doing well and doing good?

¶2 "Another aspect of the ancient Chinese conflation of doing well and doing good was the assumption that whoever did well must necessarily be good. The belief in the inevitability of virtue's triumph over vice articulated by Mencius among others, gained widespread acceptance. In the words of a late (possibly post-Han) military text, the Three Strategies of Duke Yellowstone (Huangshi gong san lüe), "Now using the righteous to execute the unrighteous is like releasing the Yangtze and Yellow rivers to douse a torch, or pushing a person tottering at the edge of an abyss. Their success is inevitable!"90[90.] This sort of thinking remained in evidence throughout the two thousand-year history of imperial China (and beyond) as claimants to political authority strove to present themselves as supremely virtuous; those who succeeded, such as the founders of the Tang dynasty in the earlyseventh-century CE, saw to it that history portrayed their opponents as quite the opposite. To question the virtue of the ruling house, and the righteousness of its rise to power, was to challenge its right to rule." (Graff 2016, 210).

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", how di the British interpret the "Sanyuanli Incident", compared the Chinese?

¶2 "For the British, the Sanyuanli Incident resulted in the death of one private, which one officer and fourteen men were wounded. So insignificant was this skirmish that Ghough never even mentioned it in his official reports. To the Chinese it represented a significant victory, since it was the local militia that had spearheaded the attack. As Peter Ward Fay has concluded: The peasants ... thought they had struck a mighty and successful blow--had not the fan gui fled in confusion through the rain and the thunder?--and as the news of victory spread from village to village, thousands of fresh volunteers flocked to join the black flag of Sanyuanli.71 ¶3 Faced by approximately 10,000 to 12,000 Chinese militia the following day, Gough avoided further conflict by appealing to the Guangzhou prefect, She Baoshun. Gough warned that he would once again attack Guangzhou if the militia were not disbanded. The prefect and two local CHinese officials met with the gentry leaders of the militia to persuade them to withdraw, informing them that any further conflict would be their sole responsibility. Tensions eased as the militia dispersed. On 1 June 1841, the British troops evacuated to their ships and departed. ¶4 Described by Wakeman as "a bunker Hill and an Alamo rolled into one,"72[72.] the Sanyuanli Incident seemed to prove that Chinese militia could face and defeat a foreign foe; the Chinese view holds that only the intervention of the Chinese officials had stopped a more general slaughter of the foreigners. Instead of giving proper credit to the advanced weaponry and training of the foreign forces that allowed it to successfully repel a force ten times its size, the Chinese head exaggerated reports of this "victory" and wrongly believed that it confirmed the validity of their own methods. Over the following month news of this incident spread and officials in neighboring provinces, such as the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang, implored the Emperor to organize similar militia organizations throughout China." (Ellemen 2007, 24)

In Chapter Two of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the Confucian school's view regarding vengeance?

¶2 "The Confucian school identified proper vengeance as a highly moral act that was obligatory to uphold or validate the personal ties that created human society. The problem of reconciling this moral demand for vengeance with the claims of law remained one of the central dilemmas of legal theory and practice throughout the history of the Chinese empire. This tension is expressed clearly in the mediations on vengeance of the Eastern Han scholar, Xun Yue (148-209 A.D.). He began by noting that revenge was an ancient form of "rectitude," but it could not be allowed freely. He then argued that one must "establish [laws] (zhi ...) according to the demands of rectitude but make specific decisions (duan ...) according to law. In this way, he claimed, "rectitude and law can stand together." Should the murderer fail to observe the rule of avoidance stipulated in the ritual formulas, then the avenger should be free to kill him ,but if he observed the rule and the avenger still killed him, then the life of the latter should be forfeit. In this way Xun yue defended the claim of imperial law to ultimate authority, but still found within the regime of law a defined place for the social and familial virtues expressed in the act of vengeance.132[132.] In debates during the Tang dynasty the opposition traced by Xun Yue in terms of "rectitude" and "law" appeared in the guise of a tension between the claims of "ritual," which viewed revenge as a basic moral teaching, and "law," which forbade the taking of human life.133[133.] But what concerns us here is not the specifics of this debate but the fact that the violence of revenge was considered to be a fundamental constituent of the Confucian moral order and closely identified with the violence of legal punishments." (Lewis 1990, 88).

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, in ancient China, what was the connection between virtue and military power?

¶2 "The awareness of the practical value of good behavior glimpsed in the military texts (if not in the Mozi) may be a reflection of a much deeper belief that suffused ancient Chinese thinking about war, the notion that virtue is itself a source of power. If we are willing to accept the Zuo zhuan's speeches as source of insight into the mindset of the Spring and Autumn period, it was already widespread by the seventh-century BCE. In battle after battle, the relative moral standing of the combatants is presented as an important indicator--perhaps the most important indicator--of the ultimate outcome. ... The idea that virtue is a source of strength, that righteousness brings an army closer to victory ..." (Graff 2016, 208).

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what triggered the "Sanyuanli Incident"?

¶2 '... On 25 May [1841], General Gough's Indian and British soldiers captured the five Chinese forts on the hills overlooking the northern gate of Guangzhou, thus cutting off Guangzhou's main road to the north. To save Guangzhou, thus cutting off Guangzhou's main road to the north. To save Guangzhou from an imminent British attack, the Chinese officials agreed on 27 May to back down and to pay the $6-million indemnity. ¶3 The British appeared to have secured a complete victory against Guangzhou. Only two days later, however, a relatively small incident at Sanyuanli, a village near Guangzhou, convinced many Chinese that they could still win a war against the British This incident eventually entered Chinese lore as a great anti-foreign victory and was later glorified as an anti-Imperialist victory by the Chinese Communists." (Ellemen 2007, 23)

¶3 " ... Other passages in the text describe the ancient conflict between the Yellow Emperor and Chiyou, ... a mythical battle between good and evil. As the victor of that battle, the yellow Emperor represents the beginning of Chinese civilization. He is credited with the invention of warfare and praised for putting his military skills to good use, for he rid the world of evil to establish his humane rule.25]25. See Lewis for an extensive description of various Warring States and Han dynasty myths regarding the Yellow Emperor and his adversaries; Mark Edward Lewis: Sanctioned Violence in Early China (ALbany: State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 174-85.] To THE FOUR CANNONS, the Yellow Emperor embodies a perfect blend of civil virtue and martial vigor, both of which are required for good government ..." (Van Els 2013, 24)

In Chapter Two of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was changed about vengeance?

¶3 "... Vengeance remained a major element in the social and moral order of China during the Warring States and the early empires, but its uses and their rationalization changed in a manner much like that of blood oaths and sacrifice. Vengeance, like sacrifice, became a form of service to a superior and a means of defining or maintaining proper relations in the political realm or the family, so that the range and degree of the "debt" of vengeance served to define the major social relations that constituted the new social order. In the same way, the legalist state legally defined the significant social relations of its subjects through the range of collective punishments which implicated a man's family, neighbors, or colleagues." (Lewis 1990, 80).

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, what was the challenge that the Mohists' philosophy of war faced, and how did they deal with this?

¶3 "... the Mohists' resolute opposition to offensive war left them open to an obvious criticism. If aggressive military action was tantamount to robbery and murder, then were not the revered founders of the Zhou- (p. 200) ¶1-conquerors of Shang--and the other sage kings of high antiquity who were believed to have performed similar deeds really themselves no better than thieves and murderers? The book of Mozi responds to this objection by making a semantic distinction. The campaigns of the ancient sage kings did not involve the waging of offensive (gong), which was associated with base motives such as territorial aggrandizement, but were acts of punishment (zhu) applied to miscreants who had offended against the will of Heaven.29[29.] The last Shang king "cursed Heaven and blasphemed against the spirits above and destroyed the multitudes below. He exposed the aged and murdered the children, tortured the innocent, and opened a pregnant woman. The common people and the widows and the widowers cried aloud, but were not heard. Thereupon Heaven commissioned King Wu to carry out the judicious punishment."30[30.] Although all the examples of righteous punishment given in the Mozi come from the distant past, the text does not close the door on the possibility of such an event occurring in the present or the future.31[31.]" (Graff 2016, 199-200)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what was the outcome of the actual Battle of Chuanbi?

¶3 "Based on the list of damaged ships and estimated casualties, this encounter was clearly another British victory. The Volage sustained relatively light damage to its sails and rigging, while the Hyacinth's mizen-mast was hit by a 12-pound ball. Only one British sailor was wounded. Meanwhile, Chinese reports admitted that fifteen of their own soldiers were killed many more wounded. The Chinese reports greatly exaggerated the British loses, however, and so furthered the generally accepted myth that China was winning the Opium war." (Ellemen 2007, 20)

¶3 "Master Wu and Master Wen both mention two additional types of warfare, with one type from each text that appears to correspond to a type from the other. ¶4 What Master Wu calls "strong warfare" bears a resemblance to the "arrogant warfare" in Master Wen ... Master Wu succinctly describes this type of warfare as "relying on the masses to launch an offensive." Master Wen is more elaborate: "to rely on the sheer size of one's realm and take pride in the sheer number of one's people, while desiring to appear more worthy than one's enemies. 'Both texts seem to condemn this type of warfare as an attack on another state simply because one has the power to do so." (Van Els 2013, 32)

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, how similar, and how different, was the ancient Chinese concept of the "righteous war" (yi zhan or yi bang) was the Christian Europe?

¶3 "The ancient Chinese concept of the "righteous war" (yi zhan or yi bang) shows certain parallels with the ideas of just war that later evolved in Christian Europe, in particular the belief that war should be waged only for a just cause and with the goal of restoring peace.5[5.] On the other hand, several prominent elements of the Western discourse on just war remained undeveloped, ambiguous, or the subject of disagreement in the Chinese world. These included competent authority (that is, the identification of precisely which governing authority could legitimately wage a righteous war), proportionality (the expectation that the means adopted should not be disproportionate to the goals being pursued in the conflict), and the entire area of jus in bello, the determination of what sorts of actions were legitimate and illegitimate in the conduct of war. Some ancient Chinese thinkers put forward ideas that were at variance with the mainstream discourse of righteous war. And the doctrine of righteous war lent itself all too easily to cynical manipulation in the service of political expedience. The belief that virtue necessarily led to success not only encouraged the conflation of doing well and doing good, but also made it a political imperative." (Graff 2016, 196)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", during the Opium War (4 September 1839 - 29 August 1842), what was the final battle of the war?

¶3 ... On 21 July, the final major battle of the war was fought at Zhenjiang, a walled city that overlooked the southern entrance of the grand Canal to Xuzhou. ¶4 At ZHenjiang, about 2,000 Manchu Bannermen fought valiantly against two British brigades composed of over 5,000 men. The Han Chinese inhabitants of Zhenjiang were far less willing to fight on behalf of the Manchus. Perhaps they saw the foreign invasion as one "barbarian" fighting another; as Waley has commented about an account of this battle written by one Chinese observer--a poet named Zhu Shiyun-- "the author's animus, all through the account, is against the Manchus and in particular against their leader, Hailin, rather than against the English."80 ¶5 Although the Chinese troops camped outside Zhenjiang were easily dispersed, the Manchu Bannermen defended the city walls. Using special scaling-ladders that they brought with them, the British finally took control of the city walls and proceeded to blast the northern gate to the city. The Manchus refused to surrender, however, and first killed their "wives and children, and then themselves."81 Fighting continued in the streets until: Afterwards, with bodies still lying about the streets, the city was looted, wrecked and partially burned by Chinese, Englishmen, sepoys, and lascars, so that when Gough finally went away, leaving a garrison outside but blowing an enormous breach in the walls so that it could reenter instantly if need be, the desolation and the stench of death far exceeded anything experienced at Ningbo or at an other place. Before the city was subdued, total British casualties had grown to over 1,500, a sum that far outnumbered any previous single encounter. ¶6 With the British victory in Zhenjiang, the north-south trade on the Grand Canal was disrupted, as was the east-west trade along the Yangzi. The British fleet had a stranglehold on virtually all of China's major reverine traffic. It was this commercial disruption, rather than any specific territorial claim, that brought- (p. 31) ¶1-the Chinese to the negotiating table. As at the beginning, trade proved essential in ending the conflict." (Ellemen 2007, 30-31)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", during the Opium War, how did the Chinese interpret the initial skirmishes against the british in the Opium War (4 September 1839 - 29 August 1842)?

¶3 Later, once the battles were over, Chinese military leaders and officials vied with each other to exaggerate their supposed victories, knowing full well that riches and honors would be given only to those who claimed great success. The manchu leaders unwittingly supported misreporting and exaggeration by granting honors based on numbers of enemy killed and ships sunk. According to Waley, although Lin only listed the Battle of Chuanbi and two other skirmishes as victories, in a communication on 13 december 1839 from the Emperor this number was inexplicably doubled to six and soon became known as the "Six Smashing Blows" against the British. ¶4 The government-sponsored myth that the war against Britain was being won was an essential prop for the manchu, since their "Mandate of Heaven" was already suspect. However, it had the unintended effect of lulling most Chinese into a misdirected sense of complacency that the foreigners would eventually be fought off. This, in turn, meant that the Chinese government waited too long to adopt appropriate corrective measures." (Ellemen 2007, 28)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", during the Opium War, what was the single greatest mistake the Chinese made with regard to understanding the British?

¶3 Perhaps the single most damaging element to China was her misunderstanding of Britain's financial and political motives. Completely disregarding their own pre-eminent military philosopher, Sunzi, Commissioner Lin and other prominent Qing official snever thoroughly studied their enemy's motives. In particular, Lin refused to consider that Great Britain's main goal--free trade--was real, but evidently saw the British as being similar to Japanese marauders (the wokou or midget pirates) of the mid-sixteenth century, or to the Taiwan-based Coxinga of the late seventeenth century, who raised China's coastline for gold or supplies until Manchu resistance made it unprofitable. ¶4 Once Chinese officials made the crucial mistake of labeling the British as pirates, all incentive to organize large-scale resistance disappeared. Since an organized resistance would require enormous sums of money from Beijing, it was assumed that it would be better--and cheaper--simply to wait out the British by adopting a defense strategy. Therefore, China adopted the age-old tactic of trying to prolong the struggle so as to wear down and exhaust their enemy." (Ellemen 2007, 26-27)

In Chapter 3 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what are the origins of the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64)?

¶3 The origins of the Taiping Rebellion can be traced to Britain's victory over the Manchus in the Opium War, which revealed the Qing Dynasty's internal weakness. The British victory gave Han CHinese hope that teh Manchus had finally lost the "Mandate of Heaven' and that a new Han Dynasty might soon take its place. The effect of the Opium War on the Han Chinese leader of the Taipings, Hong Xiuquan, was especially profound: while Hong appears to have blamed himself for failing the Imperial Examinations three times during the 1820s and 1830s, after failing for the fourth time, in 1843, he angrily vowed to overthrow the Manchu government. Hong's subsequent conversion to Christianity and the Taipings' adoption of a unique mixture of Christianity and Confucianism also suggests the important impact of the Opium War on the Han Chinese people's perception of westernization--in this case Christianity as the symbol of European culture--as a means of obtaining their political and cultural liberty from the Manchus." (Ellemen 2007, 35)

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, what was the view of the Analects (Lunyu) of Confucius on wa

¶4 "... the Analects (Lunyu) of Confucius. This collection of the sayings of the great philosopher and stories about him was created by his disciples (and THEIR disciples) over several generations after his death in 479, and is now thought to contain both authentic and apocryphal material.20[20.] The text suggests that Confucius (and his disciples, and the disciples of the disciples) was not a pacifist inasmuch as he took weapons, armies, and the possibility of war as a given, part of the social environment of his time. When asked about the essentials of government, Confucius is supposed to have responded that they were three: food, arms, and the trust of the people.21[21.] He also held that men needed to be properly trained before they- (p. 199) ¶1-were sent into battle, and when it came to generalship favored prudent deliberation over heroic risk-taking.22[22.] When pressed, however, he identified arms as the most easily dispensable of his three essentials of government.23[23.] And when questioned by Kude Ling of Wei regarding military tactics, Confucius responded that he knew nothing about the subject--and left the next day.24[24.] Although the Analects never says it directly, the evidence is consistent with a view of war that acknowledges the legitimacy of self-defense while rejecting militarism and aggression. That which is implicit in the Analects becomes explicit in the writings of Mencius, the disciple of a disciple of the grandson of Confucius, who was active near the end of the fourth-century BCE. Mencius repeatedly excoriated the aggressive proclivities of the rulers of his time, but offered the following advice to the young ruler of the small state of Teng, which was threatened by more powerful neighbors, Qi and Chu: "Dig deeper moats and build higher walls and defend them shoulder to shoulder with the people. If they would rather die than desert you, then all is not lost."25[25.]" (Graff 2016, 198-199)

In Chapter Two of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the basis of the change in warfare as limited to the aristocracy, to a universal practice?

¶4 "... the basis of this change was the progressive extension of military service so that what had been a privilege of the urban aristocracy became the duty of the rural peasantry. This process culminated in universal military service and the complete identification of the people with the army." (Lewis 1990, 54).

In David Graff's chapter "The Chinese Concept of Righteous War", in the 2016 anthology The Prism of Just War, edited by Howard M. Hensel, what should distinguish the true conductor of the righteous war?

¶4 "As a rule, the conduct of the righteous war would be distinguished by exemplary behavior on the part of the upholders of moral order. According to Xun Kuang, the army of a True King "does not execute the aged or the young, nor does it trample- (p. 206) ¶1-down growing crops ... A True King does not butcher the inhabitants of a city, does not move his army by stealth, does not detain the people unduly, and does not commit the army to the field for more than a single season."68[68.] ..." (Graff 2016, 205-206)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what was the events leading up to the Battle of Barrier?

¶4 "Tensions between Britain and China continued unabated during early 1840, although neither party had issued a formal declaration of war. Commissioner Lin, having failed in his efforts to force the foreign ships to stop transporting opium from India, instead initiated a campaign against the Chinese smugglers, traders, and smokers. In April, British warships began to embargo Guangzhou, Xiamen (Amoy), Ningbo, and the mouths of the Yangzi and Yellow rivers. Although the goal was to prevent foreign ships from entering Chinese ports, large Chinese ships--such as salt junks--were also stopped; by early July ,seven or eight of these ships had been impounded near Guangzhou. ¶5 By early summer 1840, a British expeditionary fleet was ready to move northward toward central China. Brigadier-General George Burrell commanded the British force, which included twenty-two warships, twenty-seven transports, and 3,600 Scottish, irish, and Indian "sepoy" infantry.64 Led by the Wellesley, Conway, Alligator, the troopship Rattlesnake and then two troop transports, this expedition arrived at the mouth of the Yangzi River on 4 July and the next day occupied Dinghai, which had a commanding view over the Yangzi and Shanghai. ¶6 A smaller British force then moved further north. On 9 August 1840, Admiral George Elliot, supreme commander of the naval forces, and Captain Charles Elliot arrived at the mouth of the Bei He. The Dagu fortress guarded the river approach to Tianjin and Beijing. From this vantage point, the British could launch an attack against Beijing. A British letter from Lord Palmerston was presented to Chinese officials on 15 August and the Manchu Emperor reportedly received it himself on 20 August. The letter detailed the British- (p. 21) ¶1-complaints about the tensions in Guangzhou, and most of the blame was directed against Commissioner Lin. ¶2 Although the Manchu Emperor had formerly supported Lin, on 21 August he turned on him and accused him of supporting failed policies: Externally you wanted to stop the [opium] trade, but it has not been stopped; internally you wanted to wipe out the outlaws [opium smugglers and smokers], but they are not cleared way. You are just making excuses with empty words. Nothing has been accomplished but many troubles have been created. Thinking of these things, I cannot contain my rage. What do you have to say now?65 A tentative agreement for talks was reached, although the Manchus insisted that all negotiations be held in southern China, thus keeping the British at arm's length. On 17 September 1840, Qishan became the new imperial commissioner to Guangzhou, and on 25 September, the British left Tianjin. However, the Emperor simultaneously ordered that reinforcements be summoned and "water forces" be trained to repel the British on both the land and the sea.66 ¶3 Meanwhile, in Guangzhou, Lin had already issued an edict offering rewards for captured or killed British sailors and soldiers. The amounts varied greatly, but the equivalent of $100 was offered for a common sailor (or $20 for his head), while as much as $5,000 would be paid for a man-of-war's captain.67 Spurred on by these substantial rewards, Chinese mobs attacked several foreigners. On 5 August 1840, one British citizen--by the name of Stanton--was captured and imprisoned by Chinese troops while he was bathing at Cacilhas Bay, southeast of the barrier that separated Macao from Chinese territory. Stanton was soon brought to Guangzhou, where Commissioner Lin participated in his interrogation. ¶4 Lin might have been planning to release his prisoner anyway, but Captain Smith, who was in charge of British interests in Macao and Guangzhou while Elliot was away, pressured the Portuguese officials to demand Stanton's release. Lin, who regarded the Portuguese as occupying Macao only with China's permission, would not consent to show weakness by acceding to this demand. He therefore dispatched several thousand Chinese troops to Macao, nominally to protect the Portuguese from British interference. This Chinese action appeared designed to cut off foreign access to China from Macao. ¶5 Confirmation of this appeared on 16 August, when Lin reported his intention of inspecting his regular troops and the newly recruited militia units. If all was in order, he would soon "select a day, marshal them and send them all out to sea, to engage in a final battle of annihilation." As for reports that the British had occupied and controlled the city of Dinghai, Lin proposed that Chinese militia secretly enter the city and then turn on the foreigners, butchering them at easily as "chickens or dogs."68 (p. 22) ¶1 In preparation for carrying out this planned attack, Lin traveled to Lion Reach, twenty-eight miles downstream from Guangzhou, where the Chinese forces were being trained. His inspection was cut short, however, by the British decision to strike first. On 19 August 1840, Captain Smith ordered an attack on the so-called "Barrier," the boundary between Macao and China, which was guarded by nine war junks and about 1,500 Chinese troops." (Ellemen 2007, 20-22)

¶4 "one notable difference is that both Master Wu and Master Wen distinguish five types of warfare, while The Four Canons identifies only three. ..." (Van Els 2013, 31)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what was the outcome of the Battle of Barrier?

¶4 British casualties were exceedingly light during the "Battle of the Barrier," numbering only four wounded. Meanwhile, the British guns fired over 600 rounds during this encounter, causing substantial Chinese casualties. Once again, Lin reported this engagement as another victory to the Emperor; he claimed that the Chinese forces drove off the British with heavy losses to both their troops and ships. Still, as later events would show, the local military leaders must have realized that they lost the engagements, since no further attempts to assert control over Macao were ever made." (Ellemen 2007, 22)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", describe the "Sanyuanli Incident"?

¶4 Described by one scholar as the "final episode in the tragi-comic battle for Guangzhou," Sanyuanli village was located just a few miles north of the Guangzhou city walls, to the rear of the British land troops.49 On 29 May, a British patrol forced its way into a Chinese home, reportedly attacking the women of the household, and in response, the villagers at Sanyuanli armed themselves into a citizens' militia. Carrying mainly swords and spears, 5,000 of these militia assembled in front of the British camp on 30 May. ¶5 General Gough forced this group into retreat when he pushed forward with the 26th Cameronian REgiment, the 37th Madras Native Infantry, and the Bengal Volunteers. Chinese reinforcements arrived soon afterward, however, and increased the Chinese force to 7,500 To insure against an attack on the British camp, Gough ordered approximately seven hundred of his men to compose a general attack that succeeded in pushing back the Chinese. ¶6 As part of this attack, Lieutenant Hadfield took charge of the Third Company, composed of sixty sepoys, and three British officers, to open communications with the Twenty-sixth Cameronians, which had attacked to the left. Caught unexpectedly by a rainstorm, Hadfields' company was separated from the other British forces. The Chinese militia, under the command of Yan Haochang, soon intercepted Hadfield's forces. Frederic Wakeman has described the encounter as follows: "When Hadfield's company had strung itself out along the narrow path that ran through the hamlet, Yan attacked. In the turmoil, a sepoy was snatched from the ranks by a pike, and a young ensign named Berkeley left the protection of the line to try to save him.- (p. 24) ¶1-Yan himself led the men that surrounded Berkeley, hacking at him with knives and swords. Another barve picked up the ensign's fallen musket, and in spite of the dense rain, managed to apply his own match and ot lodge a ball in Berkeley's arm before the ensign was rescued and the troops reformed beyond the river on a small ridge.70" Forming a defensive square, Hadfield's company managed to fire a few volleys at the Chinese militiamen before they were rescued. Attracted by the torches of the Chinese militia, two companies of marines soon reached Hadfield and escorted them back to camp." (Ellemen 2007, 23-24)

In Chapter 3 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", what ended the Arrow War?

¶5 "Rather than fighting this foreign force, the Manchu Emperor quickly relented and setn Imperial Commissioners to Tianjin. On 26 June 1858, the fifty-six-article Treaty of Tianjin was signed with Great Britain. T almost the same time a separate treaty was signed with France, and several non-belligerents--Russia and the United States--gained similar advantages in their own bilateral treaties.113 By means of the Treaty of Tianjin, Britain received a more than ₤1 million indemnity for its losses in Guangzhou, tariff revisions, and the opening of five new treaty ports, including along the Yangzi River as far inland as Hankou. Most importantly, Beijing was now open to a British representative who would be treated as an equal by the Chinese officials. However, Elgin later agreed to modify this clause by stationing the British residence outside Beijing proper. This change gave "face" to Beijing and helped prop the Qing Dynasty's embattled "Mandate of Heaven" in its domestic quarrel with the Taipings. (p. 48) ¶1 In addition to making this important political concession to China, Elgin did not push for the immediate legalization of opium, which, although at the heart of the 1839 to 1842 Opium War, was never actually discussed in the Treaty of Nanjing. WHile this upset many British traders, Elgin explained: I did so not because I questioned the advantages which would accrue from the legalization of the traffic, but because I could not reconcile it to my sense of right to urge the Imperial [Chinese] Government to abandon its traditional policy in this respect.114" (Ellemen 2007, 47-48)

¶5 "The main concern in Master Wen, as expressed on one bamboo strip, is to ensure that "misfortune and chaos do not arise".31[31.] ..." (Van Els 2013, 26)

In Chapter 2 of Bruce Elleman's 2007 book " Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989", during the Opium War (4 September 1839 - 29 August 1842), how did the British wage for from 21 August 1841 to 29 August 1842?

¶5 Although the CHinese self-confidently thought that they had struck a telling blow at the British forces in Sanyuanli, the real fighting of the Opium War had yet to begin. From 21 August 1841 to 29 August 1842, the second British expeditionary force sailed northward to deal with the Manchu Emperor. ¶6 Since the previous expedition's attempts to threaten Beijing directly had failed, the goal of the second expedition was to take control of the Yangzi River and cut China in two. By taking Nanjing and close trade along the Grand Canal, the British could cut off crucial supplies of rice, grain, and salt to Beijing and virtually "starv" the Chinese rulers into submission. Although this strategy succeeded, it was at a higher cost than any previous period of the war; for example, in their final battle to take Zhenjiang--and thereby threaten Nanjing--British troops sustained 1,681 casualties out of a total force of 9,000." (Ellemen 2007, 28)

What phrase best sums up the Warring State period?

弱肉強食 - The strong shall feed upon the weak!

What are macroregions?

Inward-looking, more or less self-contained spheres of economic and socio-cultural activity.

In "State Making and State Breaking" by David A. Graff, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what did new dynasties have to do in order to secure their power?

"In many cases, dynastic founders thought it necessary or desirable to leave very large territories in the hands of their most powerful confederates. After he destroyed his great rival Xiang Yu in 202 B.C.E., the Han founder Liu Bang left his allies and generals in control of ten hereditary kingdoms which together accounted for well over half of the territory (and population) of the empire. Much the same approach was adopted by the Manchu founders of the Qing dynasty after 1644. They welcomed Ming generals who defected with their armies, and the most important of them were rewarded with large and virtually autonomus states, or "feudatories;' in the southern provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan. Such arrangements were, however, never more than interim solutions dictated by expediency. By 195 B.C.E. Liu Bang had squeezed out all but one of the original ten kings and replaced them with his own sons and brothers, and even these Liu family kings would be stripped of most of their power by the middle of the second century B.C.E. Once their realm was on a firm footing, the Manchu rulers in the seventeenth century also moved to rein in their overmighty subjects. An attempt to abolish the feudatories in 1673 provoked a major revolt that lasted until 1681, but this revolt ended in the complete defeat and elimination of the feudatories. New dynasties also worked to extend their authority at the local level, and eventually succeeded in replacing semiautonomous local strongmen with bureaucratic representatives of the center who were normally prohibited from holding (p. 53) -office in their home areas. Local or regional autonomy was never a stable equilibrium state, but a stage in the process of reintegration leading to restoration of centralized imperial rule." (Graff 2012, 52-53)

The End of History and the Last Man

A 1992 book by Francis Fukuyama, expanding on his 1989 essay "The End of History?", published in the international affairs journal The National Interest.[1] In the book, Fukuyama argues that the advent[clarification needed] of Western liberal democracy may signal the endpoint of humanity's sociocultural evolution and the final form of human government. "What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of historyas such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."[1] Fukuyama's position contradicts that of Karl Marx, who predicted that communism would displace capitalism.[2] Fukuyama himself identifies on some level with Marx, but more strongly with the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, by way of Alexandre Kojève. Kojève argued that the progress of history must lead toward the establishment of a "universal and homogenous" state,[3] most likely incorporating elements of liberal or social democracy; but Kojève's emphasis on the necessarily "post-political" character of such a state (and its citizens) makes such comparisons inadequate, and is irreducible to any mere "triumph" of capitalism.[4] SOURCES: 1. Fukuyama, Francis (1989). "The End of History?". The National Interest (16): 3-18. ISSN 0884-9382. JSTOR 24027184. 2. "This social formation constitutes, therefore, the closing chapter of the prehistoric stage of human society." Preface to 'A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy' (1859) 3. Strauss's term, from the Strauss-Kojève correspondence, published in Leo Strauss, On Tyranny (University of Chicago Press, 1961) 4. Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, (Basic Books, 1969), "Note to the Second Edition," p. 159.

According to Professor Green, what evidence was left behind by the "Neolithic" people?

Pottery. In order to store their food, which came all at once, and to protect against pests, pottery was widely used.

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the most advanced technology of the time, and what does it say about the concerns and priorities of the elite

"... Bronze metallurgy was the most advanced technology during the Shang, Western Zhou, and Spring and Autumn periods, and the production of bronze artifacts required resources and labor on a scale possible only for those with considerable power. Consequently, the types of artifacts made from bronze clearly demonstrate the concerns and priorities of the ruling elites, and as K.C. Chang has pointed out, bronze was used almost entirely for the manufacture of weapon, ritual paraphernalia associated with sacrifice, and carpenters' tools which were necessary for the construction of chariots.12[12.] The same priorities are demonstrated in the development of the technique of gold and silver inlay, which appeared first on weapons in the Spring and Autumn period, then on ritual vessels in the early Warring States, and on implements of daily use only in the late Warring States.13[13.]" (Lewis 1990, 18)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the connection between warfare, hunting, and sacrifice in the Spring and Autumn period?

"... In this period of Chinese history warfare was not clearly separated from hunting, for numerous early texts describe hunts as a form of military ritual or training, and it was not uncommon for a hunt to turn into a campaign or a campaign into a hunt.5[5. ] Writers would often invoke images of the hunt to describe the conduct of battles.6[6.]. Moreover, the hunt and warfare were equated in both linguistic usage and law. The most common terms for "military" or "martial" (wu, rong) also applied to hunting, the word "hunting" (lie) could also describe an army's attack, and the same word (huo) applied to what what was captured in battle or taken in the hunt. Collective oaths with the force of law were sworn at the beginning of a hunt jus as before a battle, and misconduct during a hunt was punished according to military law.7[7.] Hunting as a form of warfare thus was also one of the "great services"" (Lewis 1990, 18)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what in general did the common nobility ultimately reflect?"

"... the idea of a common nobility that was marked in terminology, ritual, and the patterns of sociability simply reflected the distribution of authority in the segmentary state articulated through the twin principles of "lineage law" and "feudalism." Members of the elite were linked by ascriptive kinship ties and marriage, access to office was gained through inheritance, and the powers of government were dispersed through a multitude of local centers that mimicked the royal court, so the primacy of the ruler remained a matter of degree. Indeed, the subordinates were in many ways stronger than the ruler, who always depended on their local levies to create his armies. As the ties of kinship and shared conquest that hard originally united the Zhou state weakened, this segmentary pattern of authority led to a general struggle- (p. 36) -for power and prestige in which the higher levels steadily lose authority to the lower ones that had direct control of military resources. Since the nobles were by definition warriors, it is scarcely surprising that this struggle took the form of almost continuous warfare, first between feudal states and later between the powerful lineages within the states." (Lewis 1990, 35-36)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what separated the Zhou elite from the nobility of imperial China?

"... there is abundant anecdotal evidence ot suggest that all members of the Zhou elite indeed enjoyed a social and ritual proximity that would have been inconceivable in imperial China. Unlike the exalted, unchallenged autocrat of the later Chinese state, the Zhou ruler—whether the king himself or the head of a feudal state—was only "first among equals." Various stories tell of nobles who upbraided the ruler in public and spat at him without being reprimanded or punished, who rejected requests for precious objects, who played board games with the ruler in the midst of his harem, who helped themselves uninvited to food from the ruler's table, or who called on the ruler to share dinner, only to find him out back shooting birds.78[78.] Being hereditary members of the nobility and rulers in their own domains, the officials and warriors of Zhou China were reduced images of the king or the feudal lords, inferior in rank but not in kind." (Lewis 1990, 33)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what were the lists of categories of men?

"... two recurring lists of categories of men that appearing many pre-Qin texts: the listing of the ranks of the nobility and those of the occupational classifications.66[66.] The first of these lists the four levels of nobility—king, feudal lord, hereditary minister, and "shi"—and attributes to each level a certain number of some ritual implement, a special appellation, or some type of subordinate. The number, title, and type descend in accord with the level of nobility. Thus the nine tripods were the symbol of monarchy, and each lower level was allowed correspondingly fewer tripods. Other hierarchical ritual attributes included the number of dancers employed in certain rituals, the number of rows of bells allowed in musical performances, the verb used to refer to a man's death, the rank of subordinates, the number of layers permitted for a coffin, the number of ancestral altars, the type and number of animals sacrificed, and the frequency of sacrifices.67[67.] Although many of these distinctions may have existed only on paper, archeological excavations have shown that some of them, most notably the number of tripods, were actually used to mark the status of a burial.68[68.] Those which were not related to the material elements of burials would unfortunately leave no trace in the archeological record, but numerous Confucian critiques of nobles who violated the ritual prescriptions suggest that these formulas were still a reality, if a fading one, in the fifth century B.C. These lists of ritual attributes prove that those who "devoted themselves to ritual" were men who held one of the four ranks of nobility, and the archeological evidence confirms that the basic principles sketched in the texts reflect the social reality of the period. The second list draws together those who are defined through their occupations (ye). Unlike the lists of the nobility, those dealing with occupations were not fixed. All include the basic categories of merchants, artisans, and peasants, but longer ones also refer to two types of merchants, those who work in orchards or gardens, stable hands, gatherers of wood, herdsmen, seamstresses, menials, and those who collect the produce of mountains and wastes.69[69.] Several times these people are explicitly identified as those who have an "occupation," and one of the hallmarks of the well-governed state was that these occupations would not be changed. These are clearly the "petty people" who hold to their "hereditary occupations," as contrasted with the nobles who devoted themselves to ritual." (Lewis 1990, 31)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, how is the period of Imperial China further divided?

".... The first subperiod is bounded by the rise of Qin in the Warring States and the end of the last of the Six Dynasties in 589 C.E., the second by the consolidation of the Northern Wei in the fifth century and the final Mongol conquest of the Song in 1279, and the third by the Kitan conquest of part of north China in the tenth century and the fall of the imperial system as a whole in the twentieth century. We will label these subperiods Han, Tang, and Mongol-Manchu." (Dreyer 2012, 29)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what was the goal of Legalist thinkers, and what was the legacy left behind Legalism?

"...The goal of the Legalist thinkers and the purpose of organizing the state in this way was to permit Qin to defeat, conquer, and absorb its rivals, a process completed with the conquest of all China in 230-221 B.C.E. Qin fell soon afterward and Legalism was discredited and blamed for its fall, but the autocratic, bureaucratic, centralized empire that Qin Legalism had created remained the master institution of Chinese political life for the next two thousand years, and its restoration was always the primary goal of Chinese political actors during periods of dynastic breakdown. Officials of successive dynasties thus had the means to raise tax revenues and to mobilize the population for war or for labor service to a degree that was unusual for a preindustrial society. Military activities might have been dysfunctional for various reasons, but most dynasties were capable of formidable military efforts." (Dreyer 2012, 23)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what were three consistent factors throughout the era of Imperial China before the nineteenth-century Western impact?

"...These cultural factors include Confucianism, the Legalist state, and hostility to the nomads of Inner Asia. All three of these emerged individually during the Warring States period that preceded the Qin unification, but should be viewed analytically as part of Imperial China." (Dreyer 2012, 22)

According to an artist's recreation of what we believe a typical Yangshao-era neolithic village looked like, what clues are there for warfare?

What is very much absent from the widely dispersed Yangshao sites is one of the most distinctive features of later Chinese culture: walled settlements. The Yangshao were clearly not a wall-building culture. In later China, wall-building was an activity of agriculturalists. Walls allowed the sedentary farming population a secure retreat in the event of attack from nomads or other more mobile tribes, and provided defensible bases for agricultural communities to war against one another as well. The Yangshao people were apparently unwarlike: very few of the many tools excavated at the village sites would have been suitable as weapons of war.

In "State Making and State Breaking" by David A. Graff, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, were all dynastic overturnings the same?

"After this extended discussion of the recurrent patterns of imperial China's civil wars, it is well worth noting that no two periods of rebellion and disorder followed exactly the same pattern. Some saw heterodox religious sectarians playing a prominent role, while others did not. Some led quickly to re-unification; others did not. In contrast to other periods of rebellion, the peasant risings against the Ming dynasty in the 1630s and early 1640s opened the door to the conquest of China by a non-Chinese people, the Manchus. Chinese culture was far from static over the more than two thousand years of the imperial era, and many periods had their own unique characteristics. During the "medieval" period from the fall of Eastern Han through the Tang, for example, pedigree and hereditary status counted far more than at other times, and the most viable and successful contenders for power were those who came from aristocratic families. This was in sharp contrast to the periods before and after, when humble men such as Liu Bang and Zhu Yuanzhang were able to fight their way to the imperial throne. The Ming dynasty was unique in the annals of imperial China be- cause it conquered the north from a base in the Yangzi valley. All the other dynasties that ruled over a united China began in the north and then spread their control over the Yangzi valley and the far south. The Ming case was not a fluke, but the consequence of long-term demographic and economic shifts. For most of China's history, the most populous and economically developed parts of the country had been the North China plain and the Wei River valley. By the time of the Song dynasty, however, centuries of southward migration, land reclamation, and urbanization had finally tipped the balance in favor of the south. The next dynasty after the Ming, the Qing, came from the north, to be sure, but it was something of an anomalous case since it was established by foreign conquerors rather than domestic rebels. The first insurgent group to unify China after the imperial period, the nationalists of the Guomindang, pushed north from their original base in Guangdong during the Northern Expedition of 1926-1928 to establish nominal (if not actual) control over almost all of China proper."(Graff 2012, 53)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the role of human sacrifice in the Zhou dynasty?

"Although apparently not as central as it had been to the Shang kings, the practice of human sacrifice continued into the Zhou. A tradition is preserved in many later Zhou works that following his defeat of the Shang army, King Wu sacrificed the Shang king and his two wives, presented the heads of all the slain enemy soldiers at his she altar, and then had the heads burnt as an offering at his ancestral temple.49[49.] The "Zuo zhuan" lists several instances of human sacrifice in order to criticize the practice, but the existence of this polemic—which also appears in the "Mozi"—suggests that the fourth century human sacrifice was still a common practice. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the king of Qin attempted to ban human sacrifice during the Zhou comes from archeological excavations, which show that it continued throughout the dynasty; indeed, more examples have been found from the Warring States period than the Spring and Autumn.51[51.] Even under the Han dynasty human sacrifice was still practiced in the Dian state on the southwestern frontier, as depicted on the covers of the bronze containers found at Shizhaishan.52[52.]" (Lewis 1990, 27)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what do the blood covenants suggest about the Zhou dynasty?

"Although enmeshed in a vision of history that idealized a mythic antiquity, the idea that covenants emerged in the Zhou and that their rise to prominence reflected a decline in royal power and an increasing reliance on force is both accurate and insightful. While they did not rule without commands or force, the Shang and Western Zhou monarchs had commanded great prestige as intercessors with the gods and had wielded a considerable military power that gave them clear superiority over other nobles and tribal chieftains. Although there is evidence of some covenant-like ceremonies under the Shang and literary references to their use in the early Western Zhou, it was in the struggles of competing states and lineages during the Eastern Zhou that the covenant came to play a decisive role.127[127.] Even the Confucian texts that regarded them as a sign of moral decay acknowledged their fundamental importance to the political order that emerged from the decline of the monarchy, and they described covenants as one of the "great services" of the state.128[128.]" (Lewis 1990, 44)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what was the social impact of technology?

"China's long history of technological progress provides scant comfort for theories that see certain kinds of social and political change as the (p. 29) -inevitable result of specific technologies. Neither the stirrup nor gunpowder had the dramatic consequences in China claimed for them in Europe. With respect to shipbuilding technology, Ming China's withdrawal from the sea was deliberate and dramatic, and had long-lasting consequences. It compares to Tokugawa Japan's "giving up the gun."3[3. ] In both cases, ruling establishments feared and prevented technology-driven change." (Dreyer 2012, 28-29)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", exactly were covenants?

"Covenants were forms of oaths in which all parties pledged to uphold a certain set of rules or pursue a certain course of action but they were distinguished from ordinary oaths through the killing of a sacrificial animal and the drinking of its blood. This ceremony invoked the presence of the gods and ancestors as witnesses who would punish any breach or nonobservance.129[129.] Some Confucian writers state that only after the first of the hegemons, Lord Huan of Qi, did men begin to use sacrifices to sanctify oaths, but various texts including the "Shi jing" refer to blood covenants as early as the Western Zhou, and the records of Lord Huan's activities show that he also used sacrifices.130[130.] In only one case, in 541 B.C., was a covenant sealed without a sacrifice, and that was only allowed after a special petition because it was imply the renewal of an old covenant.131[131.] Without the sacralising power of a sacrifice there could be no covenant." (Lewis 1990, 44)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what effect did the West's appearance have on China?

"During the modern period that begins with her defeat in the Opium War, China has faced a Western challenge whose military component alone would have forced major changes in Chinese society. The Western impact also confronted China with a major threat from the sea. The effect of the Western challenge was the destruction of the political and social order of (p. 36) -Imperial China and the creation of successor regimes influenced by the West. The Qing and its successors responded in various ways, with varying degrees ofsuccess, to wars and crises since 1839. However, these years witnessed sustained military and technical developments in the world as a whole, most of it not driven by events in China, and as ofthe beginning of the twenty-first century one may still debate the relative weight of the "traditional" as opposed to the "modern" in China's armed forces and society." (Graff 35-36)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the dominant class of China in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.?

"During the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., China was dominated by a warrior aristocracy whose privileged status was marked by its monopoly of ritually directed violence. Sanctioned killing in the forms of sacrifice, warfare, and hunting constituted the central rites of the cults of the ancestors and the state altars, and the performance of these rites set the aristocracy apart from the common people. This aristocracy was in turn divided on the basis of ascriptive kin ties into a hierarchy of lineages, each with its own capital, temple, and military forces. United by kinship and a shared nobility, and identical in their basic organizations and capacities, the senior and cadet lineages in a state enjoyed a proximate equality distinguished only by the ritual ranking of their cults. Originally, the senior lineages were dominant, and interstate wars were the primary form of the ongoing struggle for supremacy and glory, but over the centuries the cadet lineages proved able to expand their power and gradually asserted their dominance in the various states. This competition among lineages led to a world of vendetta and civil war, where alliances both among and within states could be secured only by the religious sanction of sharing the blood of a sacrifice in the ritual of the covenant, and the expansion of the social range of functions of these blood oaths led to a gradual redefinition of the political realm. Thus it was out of the aristocratic pattern of licit violence and the internecine struggles to which it led that the Warring States and the Chinese empire emerged." (Lewis 1990, 12)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, how successful was China's attempts to modernize their military?

"Efforts to modernize China's land forces contributed to the collapse of the Confucian imperial order, but in strictly military terms the armies created by these efforts were more effective at fighting each other than at defeating foreign enemies. The great success of the late-nineteenth-century reformers was the elite-mobilized "militia armies" that suppressed the Taiping and other rebellions and permitted Zuo Zongtang to bluff the Russians into a satisfactory territorial settlement in Central Asia. But- (p. 37) -defeats at the hands of the Japanese and the combined great power expedition against the Boxer "Rebellion" in 1900 persuaded the Qing rulers that it was necessary to create a truly modern army on the Western model, even if this meant abolishing the traditional education and examination systems. The new armies so created were instrumental in overthrowing the Qing in 1911-1912, and afterward fought with each other during the warlord period. The Guomindang "Party Army" (dangjun) led by Chiang Kai-shek imposed an imperfect unity on China in 1926-1928, but the various military groups were notoriously incapable of coordinating to resist the Japanese. The Communist People's Liberation Army (PLA) developed a peasant-based style of revolutionary war that ultimately prevailed in the 1946-1949 civil war and the subsequent conquests of Hainan and Tibet. Afterward the PLA fought fairly well in the Korean War and easily triumphed in the 1962 border dispute with India, but analysts were not impressed with its performance in the brief conflict with Vietnam in 1979." (Graff 36-37)

In "State Making and State Breaking" by David A. Graff, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, how did China's geography influence China's internal conflicts?

"Even after a new imperial regime had defeated it major rivals and brought an end to the civil wars, its authority over the empire was usually far from complete. An important element contributing to the unifier's victory in the civil war was his willingness to make deals with potential opponents. Territorial governors appointed by the previous dynasty, fence-sitting local strongmen of various stripe, and the semiautonomous (p. 52) -followers of other contenders for power were all won over with promises that they would be confirmed in office (or appointed to higher offices) and left in effective control of their own territories and armed forces. Care was usually taken to distinguish between major rivals with imperial pretensions and the lesser leaders who supported them; the former were marked for elimination, whereas the latter might be won over to one's own side by the right offer. The founders of the Tang dynasty created a large number of new units of local administration to accommodate de facto local power-holders within their state structure. They defeated the last serious armed challenge to their rule in 623, but it has been argued that several more decades passed before their government was able to extend its authority to the grassroots level and extract revenues from key areas of the North China plain.6 Dynastic founders were willing to trade local autonomy for nominal recognition of their authority because it spared them the trouble and expense of capturing every last county town and mountain fortress; it brought the violence and chaos of the civil wars more quickly to an end, and permitted the new emperor to get on with the work of reconstruction." (Graff 2012, 51-52)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", how does Mark Lewis divide the chapter?

"For expository purpose I have divided the chapter into four sections. The first discusses how the ritual violence of sacrifice, warfare, and hunting in the service of the ancestral cult defined the nobility of the- (p. 17) -period. The second shows how a political order defined by lineage segmentation dispersed authority throughout this nobility and produced a multitude of rivals for honor and power. The third section focuses on the obsession of the nobility with an honor based on martial prowess and shows how this led both to constant interstate warfare and a regular recourse to blood vengeance, vendetta, and civil war. The final section examines the crucial role of blood oaths in creating new political ties in a world where internecine struggles were destroying the old ties of shared kinship and cult." (Lewis 1990, 16-17)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what did Later Han do in terms of military service, and what consequences did this have?

"Guangwudi (r. 25-57), the founding emperor of the Later Han, lightened the military burden by eliminating the annual summer mobilization of the reservists. The Later Han maintained military pressure on the Xiongnu, and finally broke them up for good. Except for the adventures of Ban Chao (d. 102) in the Western Regions (now Xinjiang), which were a classic example of indirect rule maintained by locally recruited troops, the Later Han was not committed to territorial expansion. Despite coups and conflicts in Luoyang, relative peace prevailed in the provinces, along with increasing concentration of landownership. When the Later Han confronted its major military crisis, the Yellow Turban rebellion (from 184), the fastest way to mobilize large armies was to recruit among the dependent clients of already powerful notables; a breakdown to warlordism followed quickly." (Dreyer 2012, 30)

In "State Making and State Breaking" by David A. Graff, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, how accurate is a broad outline of Chinese history?

"In its broadest outline, Chinese history is often understood in terms of a succession of great dynasties-Han, Tang, Song, Ming, Qing-and Chinese military history can be presented as the successive conflicts between those dynasties and the "barbarian" inhabitants ofthe Inner Asian steppe, such as the Xiongnu, Turks, Jurchen, and Mongols. Like most simplifications, this is also a distortion. The great dynasties were separated by periods of internal chaos and civil war, and for every great dynasty there were many lesser regimes to complicate the chronological tables. Some, such as the Qin (221-206 B.C.E.) and the Sui (581-618), had a major impact on Chinese history despite their brevity. Many others, such as Northern Wei (386-534), never succeeded in establishing their control over all of the historically Chinese territory inhabited by ethnic Han populations. For long periods, China's territory was divided between two or more imperial states. The competition between the Three Kingdoms of Wei, Wu, and Shu-Han covered much ofthe third century C.E., and the empire was divided again when barbarian invaders overran much of north China in the early years of the fourth century. This new division between north and south lasted until the Sui reunification in 589; during this time five dynasties succeeded one another in the Yangzi valley, while a bewildering profusion of ephemeral local regimes rose and fell in north China. The decline of the Tang dynasty in the second half of the ninth century ushered in yet another age of disunity. Between 907 and 960 five dynasties ruled over the north in rapid succession, while "ten kingdoms" divided the south between them. The subsequent reunification by the Song emperors lasted only until 1127, when a Jurchen invasion initiated a new period of north-south division that ended with the conquest of Southern Song by the Mongol Yuan dynasty in 1279." (Graff 2012, 39)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", where did political authority derive in the Spring and Autumn period?

"In the Spring and Autumn period political authority was derived from the worship of potent ancestral spirits and the gods of locality through regular offerings made at the altars of the ancestral temple of the state. The actions that set the rulers apart from the masses were the "great services were ritually directed violence in the form of sacrifices, warfare, and hunting. These activities, symbolically linked through the ceremonial exchange and consumption of meat, reached their common culmination in the offering up of living beings at the altars. Thus the noble was above all a warrior and sacrifice, a man who took life in order to feed the spirits who gave him power." (Lewis 1990, 17)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, how did the Manchu organize their military?

"In the early seventeenth century Nurhachi and his successor organized the Manchu-formerly Jurchen-people into a military system, the Eight Banners, that had Inner Asian roots traceable to the Mongols and their predecessors, but was also influenced by Ming institutions of direct rule over Jurchen tributary people. The main theme continued to be hereditary enrollment in specific units. Before the Manchus conquered China proper, they organized some conquered Chinese and Mongols into the Chinese and Mongol Eight Banners. As with the Yuan dynasty's military forces at their height, the banner forces combined" Inner Asian cavalry skills with Chinese abilities in engineering and firearms to create a military power that neither a purely Inner Asian nor a purely Chinese society could resist. The Manchu conquest of China was aided by the defection of Ming armies, elements of which the Manchus organized into their Green Standard Army (luying), the other half of the Manchu military system. The military ranks and other terminology of the Green Standard forces can mostly be traced to the standing army of the middle and late Ming. Eventually outnumbering the banner forces, the Green Standard troops played an important part in the Qing conquest of south China. Thay also provided the personnel for Qing naval forces, whose signal success was the conquest and incorporation of Taiwan in 1683. As the Qianlong reign (1736-1795) ended, the variety of military forces at the disposal of the Qing dynasty, all of which were derived by various paths from the Yuan, seemed to have answered conclusively all of the military challenges posed by the history of Imperial China. Internal order was secure. The nomadic threat had been ended by the conquest and inclusion within the Qing empire of Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. And the annexation of Taiwan had deprived seagoing pirates and smugglers of their main base off the Chinese coast."(Dreyer 2012, 35)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", how did the segmented, hierarchical aristocracy manifest in the realm of warfare, in particular with regard to actual military command?

"In the realm of warfare this "segmented" pattern of authority—wherein peripheral foci of authority reproduced the administrative, ritual, and military forms of the central government on a reduced level—reappeared in the distribution of command and in the organization of the troops. Even in the early Spring and Autumn period, the actual power of military command lay not in the king or the ruler of the state but in the chief minister (dangguo, quozheng, lingyin) or in the minister of war (sigma). The story cited earlier of the king of Chu who desired to send out the army but was blocked by his chief minister demonstrates this fact, and numerous cases in the "Zuo zhuan" show that such a situation was not exceptional. The most famous case was in the state of Lu, where the three ministerial families who gained control of the state each took command of one of the state's three armies.80[80.] In another example, Xi Ke of Jin desired to invade Qi to avenge an insult he had received on a mission to that state, but the ruler- (p. 35) -refused to allow it. However, when the chief minister of Jin retired and yielded his position to Xi Ke, the latter proceeded to invade Qi over the objections of the ruler.81[81.] As early as the seventh century the "Grand Tutor" in Jin selected the sites of the training hunts and appointed the commanders of the armies, who were generally chosen from among the leading ministerial households. Whoever commanded the central army at the spring hunt would in the next year become chief minister and hence commander-in-chief.82[82.] These and many other cases show that the titular lords of states neither held supreme command in the army nor had the power to decide who did.83[83.] Of course these developments were to a degree simply the expression in the military realm of the general rise of the ministerial lineages to dominance, but that rise was made possible by the state's segmentary structure and the distribution of authority throughout the nobility." (Lewis 1990, 34-35)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, who were the barbarians that were most seen to threaten China?

"In theory, China was the Middle Kingdom (Zhanggua), bordered by different kinds of "barbarians" in each of the four primary directions. In reality, the successive nomadic and seminomadic peoples living in the steppe and desert environments of Mongolia and Manchuria have been the most significant "barbarians" in Chinese military history. Three of the directional terms for "barbarians" (yi, rang, and di) and a common general term for foreigners (hu, also often translated as "barbarian") usually refer to Inner Asian nomadic or seminomadic peoples. The Xiongnu, Turks, Kitan, and Mongols all practiced largely nomadic ways of life, while the Xianbi and their Jurchen and Manchu successors combined nomadism with agriculture to a degree that facilitated their rule over Chinese populations. The Mongols and Manchus both conquered all of China and ruled it for long periods, and both Mongol- and Manchu-language sources show us ruling elites animated by ideals of war and conquest that often diverged from Confucian values. Similar ideals motivated the elites of the other peoples mentioned, though we know of them largely through Chinese sources. While the Xianbi, Kitan, and Jurchen did not conquer all of China, they each established durable dynasties of conquest over substantial Chinese populations." (Dreyer 2012, 21)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the connection between the king's role as initiator of military campaigns, and master of ancestor worship?

"Like the collective hunts, military campaigns were also forms of serving the ancestors. This point is explicitly made in a story set in the state of Chu in 555 B.C. "[Zheng] was going to turn against Jin and raise the Chu army to drive them off, but Zi Kang [chief minister of Chu] did not agree. The king of Chu heard of this and sent his messenger Yang to tell Zi Kang, "The capital populace says that I am master of the state's altars but will not send out the army, and when I die they will not bury me with proper ritual. It has been five years since I ascended to the throne, and the army has not yet gone out. The people say that I am enjoying my leisure and have forgotten the inherited achievements of theprevious rulers. May the minister please plan some way to deal with this."28[28. ]" It was as "master of the altars' that the king was obliged to send out his armies. The purpose of sending them out was to defend the "inherited achievements of the ancestors," and the result of failure to do so would be denial of proper rites when he himself became an ancestor. The men of Jin, Chu's great northern rival, also justified warfare as a form of "service to the previous rulers," and in 539 B.C. Shu Xiang supposedly foretold the destruction of the lineage of the ruler of Jin because he and his officers no longer wen out on expeditions.29[29.] To a degree this prophecy reflects a utilitarian recognition of the need for military preparedness, but its stress on regular expeditions and the emphasis on the fate of the lineage clearly link it to the other passages which insist that the purpose of war is to serve the ancestors." (Lewis 1990, 22)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what did both the Mongol and the Manchu dynasties have in common?

"MONGOL-MANCHU. While the Mongol conquest of the Song might be seen as the beginning of the third period of evolution, in fact the Mongols derived both ideas and personnel from their Kitan and Jurchen predecessors in the conquest of north China. Both of these dynasties organized their tribal populations into military units that were also social organizations, and employed the decimal system as the partial basis for this organization (in the Jin meng'an-mouke system, the meng'an is an obvious cognate for the Mongolian mingghan, or "thousand"). Both dynasties also assigned troops to princely appanages (ordo, whence the English "horde"), and made these a vital part of their military systems. In general the Kitans welcomed Mongol rule, and many Jurchens came to accept it; both nations collaborated in the further Mongol conquest of China." (Dreyer 2012, 33-34)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what was the attitude of the educated elite official class during Imperial China?

"Over the long history of Imperial China the educated elite official class increasingly came to see itself as purely "civil," leaving military functions to be performed by others. In the Han (202 B.C.E.-220 C.E.) and the Six Dynasties (220-589), a successful official career might include provincial governorships and other positions having direct command of troops. In the Tang (618-907) this could still happen, but the civil and military positions were more sharply distinguished, and the An Lushan rebellion (from 755) was preceded by a personnel policy of placing only professional soldiers in command of troops. The An Lushan rebellion began a long period of dynastic weakness, followed by division during the Five Dynasties (907-960), and educated opinion blamed China's problems on the militarism of the standing armies and the barbarian generals prominent within them. During the Song (960-1279) strong antimilitary attitudes became dominant within the educated elite, which largely avoided political involvement during the period of Mongol rule that followed. In the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1912), the civil and militarychains of command were sharply differentiated, and even when civil officials had military responsibilities, they exercised them by giving orders to the military officers who actually led the troops. Meanwhile, the lifestyle of the educated elite emphasized separation from manual labor and other forms of physical activity, including warfare." (Dreyer 2012, 25)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what was the gradual change in attitude toward military service and professional soldiers?

"Over the long run of Imperial China, the military service obligation of the general population evolved from being nearly universal, as in the Qin and Han, to a burden imposed on a minority. While both the Tang tubing system and the Ming weisuo system employed the principle of soldier-farmers liable to conscription, in both dynasties this principle applied only to a minority of the population. In the Tang tubing membership seems to have been seen as a benefit in the early reigns of the dynasty, later evolving into a burden, while in the Ming weisuo membership seems to have been viewed (p. 26) -as a burden from the beginning. In the Song the troops of the standing army were poorly paid and used for menial work, while military officer status was conferred on many officials doing low-level work disdained by true scholar-officials. Coupled with the hypertrophy of "civil" values among the educated elite, these attitudes and patterns of treatment led to the denigration of soldiers (including officers), noticeable from Song times onward and expressed in the often-quoted saying, "Good iron isn't used for nails; good men aren't used as soldiers." Occasional efforts of civil officials to revive the militia ideal of classical antiquity seldom worked as intended." (Dreyer 2012, 25-26)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what does Rebecca Byrne's study say about the reasons for launching campaigns?

"These repeated statements that warfare was fought to secure glory or hegemony among the states are supported by Rebecca Byrne's study of the reasons for launching campaigns given in the "Zuo zhuan".91[91.] She has shown that virtually all the interstate wars of the period were fought to establish the dominance of one state amongst the others, to carry out the responsibilities that a recognized dominance entailed, to avenge insults to the state or its members, and to eliminate any perceived threat to the state. Thus interstate warfare in the Spring and Autumn period was on ongoing struggle for honor and pre-eminence among the states, and the wars between the ministerial lineages were likewise battles for pre-eminence within the state. In a society that defined its elite through the performance of licit violence and identified manhood with martial prowess, warfare was the ultimate trial of honor.92[92.]" (Lewis 1990, 37)

In "State Making and State Breaking" by David A. Graff, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, how did the social and cultural Confucian elite react to popular uprisings?

"Sectarian revolts inspired by "heterodox" ideas had great difficulty attracting support from members of the social and cultural elite, who were usually committed to a more rational Confucian outlook. As was the case during the Taiping Rebellion, they often inspired fierce resistance by Confucian-educated gentry and local elites. Other sorts of peasant rebels and bandits, however, could expect to gain some support from members of the elite if they managed to hold government forces at bay for an extended period of time and occupy towns and cities. Chen Sheng, the first to rebel against the Qin dynasty, was soon joined by learned men and ritualists who resented the government's harsh treatment of Confucian scholars. When bandit armies entered the Nanyang area of southwestern Henan some two hundred years later, many of the powerful landowning families there joined forces with them to bring down the usurper Wang Mang. Elite defection was also an element in the rebellions that ended the Sui and Ming dynasties. Opportunism was an important factor, but scholars who entered the rebel camp might also be moved by the belief that Heaven had transferred its mandate from the ruling house to the rebels, who badly needed to be instructed in court ritual and Confucian norms of government. The more ambitious of the rebel leaders, for their part, welcomed the administrative talent and the aura of respectability that the scholars provided. This mutual dependence of plebeian leaders and Confucian scholars helps to explain why successful rebels in imperial China replicated the pattern of the previous regime rather than moving in a truly revolutionary direction." (Graff 2012, 46)

In "State Making and State Breaking" by David A. Graff, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what is the traditional Chinese interpretation of the cycle of dynasties?

"The Chinese long ago identified a cyclical pattern in their history, a rhythm associated with the rise and fall of dynasties. Imperial regimes emerged out of the chaos of civil war to impose order and reunify the country. They enjoyed a period of vigor (including expansion into foreign lands) but then, after the passage of several generations, fell gradually into decline. Eventually rebellions broke out that brought down the dynasty and ushered in a new period of civil war, out of which a new unifier would emerge to repeat the process. The traditional Chinese explanation for this dynastic cycle was wrapped in Confucian moralism and rooted in the ancient concept of the "Mandate of Heaven." Heaven gave its blessing to a dynastic founder on (p. 41) -account of his superior virtue. When one of his royal heirs strayed from the proper path, Heaven indicated its displeasure through portents (such as comets, earthquakes, and other unusual phenomena); if he did not mend his ways, so the theory went, rebellions would break out and Heaven would transfer its support to a more virtuous leader and his new dynasty. In the Chinese dynastic histories, last emperors are often portrayed as monsters of depravity, moving from lurid orgies to acts of sadistic cruelty and all the while ignoring the tearful remonstrances of upright ministers. The archetype of the "bad last emperor" was the last Shang king, Di Xin, who invented the "roasting" punishment, arranged naked frolics amid forests of meat and pools of wine, and had one of his loyal ministers cut open to determine whether "the heart of a sage has seven apertures.1" (Graff 2012, 40-41)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, how was gunpowder deployed?

"The basic formula for gunpowder was known to the Song, weapons incorporating gunpowder were used prominently during the Yuan, and in the Ming Yongle reign (1402-1424) a special headquarters was established in Beijing to coordinate the training of gunners. Firearms added to the defensive strength of the Great Wall, itself a Ming creation, and the Chinese element of the Manchu banner system seem to have been valued, in part, as artillery specialists. However, we cannot discern a "gunpowder revolution" in Chinese military history. In the Ming, Qi Jiguang's successful and widely emulated military organization had gunners serving alongside bowmen, swordsmen, and spearmen in the same primary (squad-level) formations, and in the Qing Zeng Guofan's Hunan Army battalions combined newer and older weapons in the same way. Firearms originated in China, but in China they remained just another missile weapon. One does not see efforts to standardize manufacture, reduce the number of calibers, or create new tactics and organizations to exploit the potential of a new weapons system." (Dreyer 2012, 28)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", how central was honor to the aristocracy and military prowess?

"The cumulative weight of all this evidence shows that honor was supremely important to the aristocracy and that military prowess was absolutely central to their idea of honor. Warfare was one of the two great services of the state, and it was devoted to winning glory for the self and the lineage through victory in battle. In addition, a man's honor could be guaranteed in daily life only if he were ready to fight and conquer whoever slighted him. As the "Mozi" argued in the passage cited above, men demonstrated that they treasured honor and duty by fighting to the death over a single insulting word, so the only honourable man was the warrior." (Lewis 1990, 42)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what did the destruction of the state of Jin inaugurate?

"The estruction of the state of Jin inaugurated the Warring States era, in which great social and political change was accompanied by the end of the system of chariot warfare and the adoption of new military forms. The ritual and ceremony that had been a principle of Spring and Autumn warfare was replaced by an emphasis on deception, treachery, and stratagems whose sole moral justification was victory. This approach to warfare is codified in Sunzi's Art of War and the other military classics from this period, a body of work always considered morally dubious by later Confucian intellectuals. The heightened intensity and ruthlesness of warfare in the Warring States was matched by changes in weapons and the composition of armies. Chariots disappeared and cavalry was adopted, despite the cultural challenge this posed for robe-wearing Chinese men. But most of the Warring States armies were composed mainly of infantry conscripts, equipped with iron swords, iron-tipped spears, and, most important, crossbows, whose intricate trigger mechanisms required a high level of metalworking skill. The thousands of terracotta soldier statues guarding the tomb of the first emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi, are arranged in precise formations and grouped according to type of weapon, a large percentage being crossbowmen. The conventions of Chinese historiography are such that this sort of detailed deployment information is not presented for the many battles described in the standard dynastic histories." (Dreyer 2012, 21)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what was the importance of meat in the ritual exchanges?

"The mention of the ritual exchanges recalls the importance assigned to meat in the passage with which this chapter began, and the presentation and consumption of meat indeed played so crucial a role in the Zhou state that one term for the aristocracy was "the meat eaters."60[60.] Those who participated in a sacrifice received some share of the meat. The Zhou king regularly presented meat from his sacrifices as a special honor to feudal lords who bore his surname and to descendants of previous dynasties.61[61.] Like the Zhou king, the rulers of the feudal states presented meat to their officers and received meat in return, so that in fact all ties within the nobility were marked by the giving and sharing of the meat of sacrifice. This reliance on the "fruits" of sacrifice to bind men together was a direct expression of the organization of the state on the basis of kin ties that were constituted through the sacrificial ancestral cults. Meat was central not only to carrying out the social role of sacrifice, but also in the second "great service," warfare. The king gave a ritual present of meat to those of the feudal lords who performed signal services in the military realm, and consequently the presentation of meat came to play a fundamental role in the ceremony of designating the dominant feudal lord as hegemon.62[62.] Prior to launching any expedition the commander likewise received an offering of meat at the she altar as part of the ceremony of appointment.63[63.] Hunting, a form of warfare, also culminated in the offering up and communal eating of meat. So important were these offerings of meat that, according to the "Mencius", Confucius resigned from office simply because the lord of Lu neglected to give him his share of meat from the solstitial sacrifice.64[64.] As the ceremonial culmination of sacrifice, hunting, and even warfare, eating meat was a hallmark of aristocracy and a privilege of all nobles. In addition to defining men as aristocrats, the performance of the great services and the closely related ritual consumption of meat also set them apart from the common people. ..." (Lewis 1990, 30)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what did the overthrow of the Shang by the Zhou introduce?

"The overthrow of the Shang by the Zhou introduced the worship of Heaven (tian) and the concept of the Mandate of Heaven (tianming) as the basis of political legitimacy. ..." (Dreyer 2012, 20)

In "State Making and State Breaking" by David A. Graff, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what was the popular response to crises?

"The popular response to natural disaster, famine, and other crises of survival took two basic forms, dubbed the "predatory" and the "protective" by modern scholars.4 The predatory mode was adopted by peasant communities that found themselves more or less destitute, and involved the formation of bandit gangs to roam the countryside and prey on those communities that were somewhat better off. Bandit groups often began small and then coalesced to form great bandit armies, such as the Red Eyebrows of Han times or the Nian rebels of the mid-nineteenth century, that swept across vast regions. In response to the predatory threat, the better-off communities organized themselves for self-defense. Leadership was normally assumed by local elites and landowners, whose kinsmen, tenants, and retainers would form the nucleus of a protective militia force. Such forces often abandoned their home communities to take refuge in more defensible (p. 44-45) -terrain, building fortified encampments in hilly or mountainous areas. This was a very common response when barbarian invaders swept over most of north China in the early years of the fourth century, and quite similar behavior was seen in the same areas in the nineteenth century and even the first half of the twentieth century. In the unsettled conditions that followed the Japanese invasion, for example, the four hundred peasant households of Laowo, Henan, took refuge in a massive, earth-walled fort in 1938. The line between protector and predator was easily crossed when survival demanded it. Protectively oriented communities that found themselves deprived of their livelihood readily turned to banditry, just as they resisted excessive state exactions by turning to rebellion. As rebel movements grew in size, they often came to include both predatory and protective elements uneasily united in opposition to the rapacious demands of the state. " (Graff 2012, 44-45)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", briefly describe the military situation in the Spring and Autumn period, and what was done to create new bonds between people not tightly bound by the old Zhou order or by familial relations.

"The preceding sectiosn have revealed an elite defined through sacrifice and warfare, drawn together through kin ties established by the cult of the ancestors and the ritual exchanges of meat, but riven by a segmentary division of authority among men who were devoted to an honor defined by heroism and marital prowess. Interstate wars, interlineage conflicts, and vendettas launched to avenge slighted honor generated incessant conflicts that broke down the old hierarchies of ritual and lineage law and replaced them with an increasingly savage struggle for dominance through armed force. In the conflicts fo the Spring and Autumn period, the primary means devised to create new ties among men no longer tightly bound by the old Zhou order was the blood covenant (men). The practice of sealing these covenants- (p. 44) -through the collective drinking of the blood of a sacrificial victim became fundamental to the political and social order in the early Eastern Zhou period, and it developed increasing importance and new functions through the seventh and sixth centuries. In the beginning it was employed to forge large coalitions of states under the dominance of a hegemon, and these coalitions replaced the Zhou monarchy as the primary link between increasingly independent states. Over the course of the centuries, as the power of ministerial lineages grew and the feudal states were riven by internal conflicts, the covenants also came to play the key role in forming alliances between several lineages, between lineages and alien states, and between the various contestants for supremacy in the state and the capital populace. In short, the sacrifices of covenants gradually replaced those of the ancestral cult as the primary mode of constituting a political order, and this order thus began to detach itself from kin structures. In the changing role of the covenant we can see how under the pressure of internecine conflict one of the primary institutions of the old order, sacrifice, began to evolve into one of the bases of the new." (Lewis 1990, 43-44)

"The shape of China's internal conflicts was also influenced by geography. The major rivers flowing from west to east, and particularly the mighty Yangzi, facilitated "horizontal" offensive operations, while "vertical" campaigns from north to south found the rivers to be obstacles rather than high- ways of conquest. China's many mountain ranges divided the country into discrete, easily defensible regions in which new dynasties could be incubated and autonomous regimes could hold out for decades. One such region is the Wei River valley of northwest China, the "land within the passes;' which gave rise to the Qin, Han, Sui, and Tang dynasties. Another is the territory corresponding to today's province of Shanxi, which sheltered the regime of the Shatuo Turks in the first half of the tenth century and the warlord Yan Xishan from 1911 to 1949. The greatest of all the regional bastions, however, is the mountain-ringed Sichuan basin on the upper Yangzi in the southwest. This was the last important territory to hold out against the Eastern Han founder Liu Xiu (Guangwudi) and the Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang, and it was also one ofthe last to fall to the Communists in 1949. The boundaries of regional regimes often coincided with those of the eight "physiographic macroregions" into which the anthropologist G. William Skinner divided the territory of China proper. Each of these is a drainage basin largely bounded by hills or mountains. The peripheral areas of each macroregion are rugged and sparsely inhabited, while the major population centers are found in the river valleys and bottom lands of the regional "core," where transportation is cheapest and agriculture most productive. In imperial times, Skinner noted, most of China's trade occurred within rather than between the various macroregions.5 The cellular structure of the empire surely influenced the pattern and outcome of China's civil wars. During a period of dynastic dissolution and chaos, competing regimes initially established themselves in different macroregions (or in important subdivisions of the same macroregion). Reunification required the consolidation of control over one's own region, followed by the invasion and subjugation of adjacent regions. If population, arable land, and other resources were more or less evenly distributed among the major contenders, expansion could be an arduous and drawn-out process. Once one of the contenders had managed to extend his control over several populous regions, however, he tended to aquire a momentum that enabled him to dispose of his remaining opponents relatively easily. Liu Xiu, for example, began his rise to power in 24 C.E. from a territorial base in the northern part of the North China plain. It took him six years to subdue his rivals on the plain and in the Shandong peninsula, but once he had, the autonomous governors ofsouthern China (p. 51) -fell into line with minimal resistance. Liu's last rival, Gongsun Shu in Sichuan, was not eliminated until 36, but the ultimate victory of his new Eastern Han dynasty was a foregone conclusion after 30. A similar pattern can be seen in the founding of the Ming dynasty more than a thousand years later. The balance of power in the Yangzi valley between the states of Han, Ming, and Wu was shattered by the Ming victory over Han in 1363. The annexation of the Han territories then provided the Ming leader Zhu Yuanzhang with the resources to guarantee the conquest of Wu in 1367. And with all of the Middle and Lower Yangzi macroregions in his hands, Zhu was able to overrun most of the rest of China in 1367-1368." (Graff 2012, 50-51)

In "State Making and State Breaking" by David A. Graff, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, who were the vast majority of people in imperial China, and how did they react with the collapse of a dynasty?

"The vast majority of the people of imperial China were farmers, and the rise and fall of the major dynasties was in most cases accompanied by agrarian unrest and rebellion. These peasant uprisings had various causes and contributing factors, including drought, floods, famine, pestilence, government exactions, and exploitation by corrupt officials and wealthy landowners." (Graff 2012, 42)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", how did the nobility deal with vengeance?

"These acts of vengeance usually entailed violations of hierarchy and threatened the survival of the state, so they cannot strictly be considered as sanctioned violence like sacrifice, hunting and interstate warfare. However, they were so frequent that they seem to have been accepted by the nobility as a fact of life, and it appears that few aristocrats would have accepted the possibility of not responding to insults with some form of violence. ..." (Lewis 1990, 42)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", what created the elite of the Spring and Autumn period?

"This definition of political authority through the service of the altars in the forms of hunting, warfare, and sacrifice underlay the social order of China in the Spring and Autumn period. Those who participated in these services formed an elite which set itself apart from the general populace through its devotion to ritual performances, and this elite was in turn ranked as king, feudal lords, hereditary ministers, and nobles according to kin ties defined in "lineage law." These ranks were marked in the ritual performances which defined status in this period through the assignment of a graded number or form of various ritual implements or privileges. However, these gradations were based on incremental additions to a fundamental nobility common to all members of the elite on the basis of their kinship and joint participation in the "great services." This idea of a common nobility led to a proximity of status and a sharing of authority which was radically different from the later imperial system." (Lewis 1990, 28)

In Chapter One of Mark Edward Lewis' 1990 book "Sanctioned Violence in Early China", how pervasive was violence in the Spring and Autumn Period?

"Warfare was the greatest theater for sanctioned violence in the Spring and Autumn period, and it pervaded the life of the nobility. The "Zuo zhuan" lists some 540 interstate wars and more than 130 major civil wars in a span of only 259 years. Moreover, this list of wars is clearly not complete, for the text refers to campaigns which never appear in its pages, and the statistical distribution of wars among the various states clearly reflects limits in the sources employed by the redactors.86[86.] Years without combat would have been so infrequent that they would scarcely have been noticed, and if one counts the seasonal hunts as forms of warfare, which the Chinese did, then no year went by without military action. Thus the warrior aristocracy livedin a state of constant warfare." (Lewis 1990, 36)

In "Continuity" by Edward L. Dreyer, in the 2012 anthology "A Military History of China" edited by David A Graff & Robin Higham, pp. 19-38, what are the three natural divisions of Chinese military history?

(p. 19) "From the perspective of military history, Chinese history divides naturally into three periods. The first of these is Ancient China, from earliest times to the end of the Spring and Autumn period (722-481 B.C.E.). Separating fact from later idealizations has long been the major challenge confronting students of this period, but certain things are clear about its military history: The major weapons system was the two-wheeled Bronze Age war chariot, and the aristocratic and "feudal" social order symbolized by the chariot remained the ideal for most Chinese intellectuals throughout the following imperial period. The second period is Imperial China, which began militarily with the Legalist reforms in the state of Qin during the Warring States era (453-221 B.C.E.), reforms which Qin's rivals adopted with less success. After conquering all of China, the Qin ruler and his advisors invented the title huangdi, translated as "emperor" and used by successive imperial dynasties until 1912. Elements of continuity and change in the history of Imperial China, and more detailed periodization within it, are discussedlater, but the persistence of Confucian values, the Legalist state, and the military threat from the nomadic societies of Inner Asia throughout this long span of history point to the comparability of the many dynasties included therein. The third period is Modern China, beginning with the defeat of the Qing (Manchu) empire in the Opium War (1839-1842) and continuing down to the present. In the military as in other areas, China's efforts to respond to the West have led to drastic change, even as the continuing evolution of the major Western nations has made it difficult for other societies to catch up." (Dreyer 2012, 19)

According to Professor Green, how does the PRC leadership use Chinese and Confucian heritage to try to assuage modern accusations of aggression?

PRC leaders refer to a Confucian heritage that seems to condemn warfare on moral grounds, as well as historical records full of grim admonitions against military adventurism. They claim that when China waged war, it did so only to protect itself against outside aggressors bent on conquest. In sum, they argue that aggressiveness and striving for hegemony are not the Chinese way, so no one should be nervous about China's growing power.

So what does China's geography tell us?

Physical features and climate dictated the sites of settlement in what is today China. These sites, while densely populated, were relatively isolated within the vast expanse of the East Asian landmass. Geography promoted compartmentalization - macroregions. Geography is generally seen as a centrifugal force in Chinese history, promoting regionalism and fragmentation. Centrifugal forces could be balanced by man-made centripetal forces such as culture, the imperial institution, and military force. But military power could also be a centrifugal force!

What were the societies like in Neolithic villages of China?

Socially, Neolithic societies were all rather simple. People lived in scattered small villages based on lineages/clans, usually with no more than a 100 huts in any one village, and they subsisted on millet (a type of cereal grass) and domesticated animals such as pigs and dogs.

What changed the West's view of the Chinese ways of warfare?

The Korean War. The Americans came away from their encounter with the Chinese Red Army humbled. This also saw the dawn of the Wars of Decolonization. Unconventional warfare, revolutionary warfare, throughout the decolonizing nations, all followed Mao Tse-Tong's blueprints.

What is a centripetal force?

The military can be both. As a centripetal force, a proper military force can be used by a single ruler to bring the disparate macro-regions together, creating a unified China. However, too much military force wielded by a whole range of ambitious individuals can cause those disparate macro-regions to fly apart, devolving into warlordism and feudalism.

According to Professor Green, what is the difference between the "Paleolithic" and "neolithic"?

The role of agriculture in the sustenance of the people. Paleolithic people were primarily hunter-gatherers. Neolithic people developed and primarily used agriculture.

The Yangshao culture

A Neolithic culture that existed extensively along the Yellow River in China. It is dated from around 5000 BC to 3000 BC. The culture is named after Yangshao, the first excavated site of this culture, which was discovered in 1921 in Mianchi County, Henan Province by the Swedish geologist Johan Gunnar Andersson (1874-1960).The culture flourished mainly in the provinces of Henan, Shaanxi and Shanxi.

What is the definition of strategic culture?

A distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process.

Graham T. Allison and the Thucidydes Trap

Allison coined the phrase Thucydides Trap to refer to when a rising power causes fear in an established power which escalates toward war. Thucydides wrote: "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta." (τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκἀσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν).[6] The term appeared in a full-page ad in The New York Times on April 6, 2017, the day of U.S. President Donald Trump's meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping: "Both major players in the region share a moral obligation to steer away from Thucydides's Trap."[7] Other past examples of Thucyidides's Trap include the start of World War I, the War of the Spanish Succession, the U.S. Civil War, and the Thirty Years War.[citation needed] Sinologist Arthur Waldron has criticized the concept of the Thucydides Trap and Allison's application of it to US-China relations,[8]while others have argued that Allison's interpretation ignores many Asian precedents with quite differing implications.[9] Sources: 6. Ben Schott (January 31, 2011). "The Thucydides Trap". New York Times. Retrieved 2013-06-07. 7. Zhu Dongyang (Xinhua News Agency) (April 6, 2017). "Advertisement". New York Times. 8. "There is no Thucydides Trap". SupChina. 2017-06-12. Retrieved 2017-06-14. 9. "Thucydides Trap vs Ghengis Khan". African Century Journal. Retrieved 2018-11-07.

What is the difference between centrifugal and centripetal force in general terms with regard to origin?

Centrifugal forces tend to be natural. Centripetal forces tend to be man-made.

Generally speaking, what was the geo-political situation of the world from 1945-1991?

From 1945 to 1991 we lived in a bi-polar world (Soviet Bloc vs. the West led by the United States).

Generally speaking, what was the geo-political situation of the world from 1991 to today?

From 1991 until today we have lived in a uni-polar world largely dominated by US economic and military muscle.

What are the 3 M's necessary for the creation of a stable realm?

MUSCLE, military power. MONEY, in the sense of economic power, personel wealth. MYTH, in the sense of some sort of ideological legitimation for the exercise of secular power.

According to Professor Green, how do PRC leaders address concerns regarding their claims of hegemony?

PRC leaders are of course aware of these concerns, and seek to downplay fears and insecurities generated by China's meteoric rise. They emphasize "China's peaceful rise", even replacing the term "rise" with the less ominous word "development" ("rise" seemed to imply someone's "fall" - the US?) In their efforts to calm the jittery nerves of both their immediate neighbors and the United States, Chinese leaders have frequently made reference to China's supposed historical pacifism. According to this version of Chinese history, China's wealth and resources have made it a target of aggression for more than four millennia (including Western imperialist aggression - a fact Beijing never lets Western leaders forget!). China was always a victim of aggression, never a perpetrator!

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