Module 3 (ch 7 & 8)

To show that it is fairly common for people to hold realist views in one branch of science, and instrumental views in another, DeWitt uses the examples of sun-centered models of the solar system (helocentrism) and quantum mechanics. He suggests that . . .

- Many take an instrumentalist attitude towards much of modern quantum theory.- Virtually everyone holds a realist attitude towards helocentrism.

According to lecture . . .

- empiricism vs. rationalism is a primarily epistemological issue. -realism vs. instrumentalism is a primarily metaphysical issue.

According to lecture, it's important to distinguish between two types of instrumentalism. They are . .

-Instrumentalism about particular scientific theories at early stages of their development or acceptance .-Instrumentalism about all scientific theories making reference to unobservable entities.

According to lecture, a theory like "Zach is fat because he eats too much" . . .

-cannot be falsified because "too much" just means "whatever amount makes the person fat." -is insensitive and not always so. -is fundamentally a value judgment rather than a testable empirical claim.

According to lecture, the naive view of perception, upon which at least some forms of strong philosophical instrumentalism rely . . .

-fails to appreciate that ordinary physical objects are, like the theoretical entities of science, not directly observable. -fails to appreciate that our brain constructs theories about what it is experiencing just as scientifc theories do.

According to lecture, DeWitt's view that falsifiability is not so much a property of theories as attitudes we take toward those theories is . . .

-somewhat at odds with Feynman's claim that theories can be unfalsifiable because they are vague.-somewhat at odds with Deutsch's view that theories can be unfalsifiable because they are inherently easy to vary.

According to lecture, the instrumentalist, as opposed to the realist . . .

-tends to be skeptical of the idea that scientific theories can be true in the sense of corresponding to an external reality. - necessarily foregoes any explanation of the success of scientific theories.

According to lecture . . .

-the close association of explanation with prediction is actually more typiical of instrumentalists than realists. -considering the close connection between explanation and causation, it may be better to associate explanation more closely with understanding than DeWitt suggests here.

According to lecture, many people say they believe in the effectiveness of prayer, but . . .

-they deny that it is the sort of thing that can be tested. -can not acknowledge conditions that would falsify their expectation that a prayer will be answered. -the effectiveness of prayer has been studied and no clear evidence of its effectiveness has ever been detected.

According to lecture, Darwin's theory of natural selection . . .

-would in fact be falsified by the unambigous discovery of organisms that only experienced advantageous mutations or which had completely novel traits that did not exist in any form in the organism's recent ancestors. -would now be difficult to falsify because it is a core conceptual theory in science. -appeared to be intially falsified by the best estimates of the age of the earth.

DeWitt asks the question "What do we want from scientific theories?". Which of these are the non-controversial answers to this question:

ability to make accurate prediction, ability to explain relevant data

According to DeWitt, realists and instrumentalists _____________ that a good theory has to at least accurately predict and explain the relevant data. They _______________ on whether a theory must accurately model the way things really are.

agree... disagree

DeWitt argues that instrumentalism and realism are _______________ scientific theories, rather than ________________ scientific theories.

attitudes towards . . . aspects of . . .

According to lecture, a common rationale for the strong, philosophical form of instrumentalism is . . .

based on a naïve view of perception.

According to lecture, explanations identify _________________, and are not simply tools for making prediction sas DeWitt suggests.

casual relationships

According to lecture, Popper developed the criterion of falsification in order to _____________.

demarcate science from pseudo-science.

To explain issues regarding explanation, DeWitt says that, philosophers of science tend to distinguish between which of these two:

explanation, understanding

According to lecture, the falsification of theories is similar in interesting ways to the . . .

extinction of species.

A "corroborated" theory is one that has been confirmed multiple times without failure.

false

According to DeWitt there is widespread agreement as to what counts as an adequate explanation.

false

According to DeWitt, it is only accurate to speak of a particular theory as being unfalsifiable. The attitudes of people who hold the theory are irrelevant.

false

According to DeWitt, the Ptolemaic system would not have been accepted by an instrumentalist during Ptolemy's lifetime (in the 2nd Century).

false

According to lecture, contemporary anti-realists and instrumentalists are typically idealists (like Berkeley).

false

According to lecture, instrumentalism about scientific theories, at this stage of the game, is largely indefensible.

false

According to lecture, one of the advantages of not being religious is that it makes you much less inclined to hold beliefs in an unfalsifiable way.

false

According to lecture, some instrumentalists or anti-realists think that our scientific theories do not actually resemble a physical world existing beyond our ideas. This means that instrumentalists or anti-realists are necessarily idealists: they do not believe in a physical world that exists beyond our experiences.

false

According to lecture, the predicament of ancient astronomers was that they lacked the modern technology that now permits us to directly observe the paths of planetary orbits.

false

DeWitt argues that one can be a realist about some scientific theories, while being an instrumentalist about others. It is not possible, however, to be a realist about a part of a theory, and an instrumentalist about a different part of the same theory at the same time. This would be inconsistent.

false

DeWitt concludes chapter 7 by stating that falsifiability turns out to be as simple a concept as it initially seemed: in disputes, it is a straightforward matter to determine when someone is simply refusing to countenance evidence against his or her theory.

false

DeWitt thinks that the moment any scientist starts to defend her theory from disconfirming evidence by making reference to conspiracy theories, then she has passed from "reason to unreason". This, he says, is also the absolute mark of treating a theory as unfalsifiable.

false

Falsifiability, according to DeWitt, is the characteristic of a theory: it is possible for the theory to be false.

false

In chapter seven's discussion on falsifiability and the problems related to it, DeWitt is suggesting that some sort of relativism must be true.

false

In the 1500s European universities often taught both the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems: professors and students generally took an instrumentalist attitude towards the Ptolemaic system, and a realist attitude towards the Copernican system.

false

Statements that include phrases like "too much", "too little", "not enough", etc., are quantitative, empirical claims.

false

The question of who is and who is not holding an attitude of falsifiability to a theory x is a matter of subjective opinion, and cannot be definitively answered, says DeWitt.

false

Theory x: the moon is made out of cheese. Jeff believes in x. He then goes to the moon on a space shuttle. He finds no cheese on the moon. Nevertheless, Jeff still believes in x. Clearly, theory x is unfalsifiable.

false

There is a necessary connection between realism and correspondence theories of truth. One has to endorse a correspondence theory of truth in order to be a realist about any scientific theory.

false

To say that a theory is falsifiable is to say that it is very likely to be false.

false

When Galileo Galilei told the Catholic church that the earth was moving around the Sun, the church conducted an experiment: A rock was dropped from a high tower. When it landed directly beneath where it had been dropped, the church suggested that this was disconfirming evidence against Galileo's theory. Galileo continued to believe in his own theory. This means that he was treating his own theory as unfalsifiable.

false

According to lecture: _______________ is to theory, as _______________ is to species.

falsification... extinction

According to lecture, philosophical instrumentalists today think that you can explain the success of scientific theories by reference to the idea of representational accuracy.

flase

The two attitudes towards scientific theories that DeWitt introduces in chapter eight are:

instrumentalism, realism

According to lecture, Popper's view of scientific progress is . . .

interestingly Darwinian, in the sense that our current best theories are just the ones that have survived so far, but are not by any means guaranteed of continued acceptance.

According to lecture, Popper's view that scientific progress depends on theories that risk disconfirmation . . .

is analogous to the fact that improving our own lives requires us to be willing to to take the risk of failure.

According to lecture, to be corroborated, Popper requires that a theory . . .

make risky predictions that are not disconfirmed by experiment.

According to lecture, the reluctance to falsify strongly held views affects the scientific community as well. For example, _________ has been falsified by comprehensive studies, but the evidence has had little effect on practice.

mammography

Instrumentalism and Realism are two possible characteristics of scientific theories.

no

According to lecture, it is possible to have a theory that is highly predictive but . . .

not explanatory

Mixtures of instrumentalist and realist views are . . .

not uncommon

According to lecture, which of the followign sayings is a good summary of Popper's ideas surrounding falsifiability?

"No risk, no reward."

According to lecture, there is an important difference between the following two statements: The ambient temperature in a room rising is an accurate prediction the rising of mercury in a thermometer. The rise of mercury in a thermometer is an accurate prediction of the ambient temperature in the room rising. What is the difference?

(1) provides an explanation for why the mercury rose; (2), however, does not provide an explanation for why the ambient temperature rose.

According to lecture, why is strong or philosophical instrumentalism unpopular today.

Because it seems to make the success of science inexplicable.

According to lecture, some of our best scientific theories are those that have actually not been rejected simply because they appeared to be falsified by early evidence against them. For example . . .

Darwin's theory of natural selection.

Though it would not be logically contradictory to match instrumentalism/realism with either a coherence or correspondence theory of truth, how are they more likely to be matched?

Instrumentalism> coherence theories of truth... Realist> correspondance theories of truth

In his discussion of falsifiability, DeWitt makes the claim that . . .

It can be quite a complicated matter to show that someone is treating their theory as unfalsifiable.

DeWitt discusses the attitudes of various scientists investigating the theory of cold fusion. Faced with disconfirming evidence, these scientists appealed to various auxiliary hypotheses, ever-growing in complexity. What is DeWitt's conclusion?

It was initially reasonable for the scientists to continue working with the theory, even in the face of disconfirming evidence. However, there was a point in which some scientists moved beyond what was reasonable: when they appealed to conspiracy theory to explain the failure of their predictions. The difficulty lies in deciding exactly where the line was crossed.

You hold theory x to be true. A friend of yours, however, holds y to be true and x to be false. You have evidence (specifically the results of scientific experiments) that support x. Which of these statements is true:

Nothing here definitively suggests that either you or your friend is treating either x or y as unfalsifiable.

What does DeWitt mean when he suggests we conceive of explanation as being a "retroactive prediction"?

That a theory explains something when a piece of existing data or observation is something that the theory could have predicted.

All the cards have a number on one side, and a colored face on the other. Someone states the following: "If a card has an even number on one side, then the opposite side will be red". Which cards do you have to turn over to falsify this statement?

The card showing "8" and the one showing the brown face.

Clearly people often disagree about theories, and have different ideas about many things (whether cold fusion is real, the earth is flat, global warming is real, etc.) . . .

To make things worse, says DeWitt, we sometimes disagree on what counts as good evidence.

DeWitt does not think that a worldview solely based on the evidence of scripture is reasonable, and that such evidence as literal readings of religious texts is outdated. How then, are we to deal with the fact that proponents of such worldviews may think of themselves as holding an attitude of falsifiability, just as the scientist does?

We need to consider what is more reasonable: to appeal to empirical evidence or to rely on religious scripture.

DeWitt invites us to consider the case of Steve, who, following Vedic scriptures, believes that "the moon is inhabited with intelligent life" and "that the moon is further from the Earth than the sun is". When we offer evidence that contradicts his beliefs, Steve disregards them in favor of the evidence he draws from scripture. What problem does DeWitt draw from this case?

We think that Steve is treating his own theory as unfalsifiable and, in turn, Steve thinks that we are treating our theory as unfalsifiable. We actually both treat our theories as falsifiable, but disregard the other's evidence. The problem then, is what counts as relevant evidence?

Referring back to disconfirming evidence and auxiliary hypotheses, as discussed in chapter 4, DeWitt suggests that one of these is a difficult question for the idea of falsifiability:

What counts as "sufficient evidence" to reject a theory? I.e. when should we give up on a theory?

Feynman and Popper agree that . . .

a scientific theory can never be proven true, only proven false.

According to lecture, an instrumentalist about a particular scientific theory thinks that it is . . .

a useful instrument for making predictions, and that's all.

According to DeWitt, Einstein (at least later in his life) thought that _______________ is the business of physics. This would make Einstein a ______________ about physics.

reality...

Realism is the view that an adequate scientific theory must not only predict and explain, but must also . . .

reflect the way things really are.

For an instrumentalist, the question "Are epicycles real?" would be unimportant.

right

DeWitt focuses on a discussion of the characteristics of explanation and prediction in scientific theories, but what other ones does he say are regularly appealed to?

simplicity, beauty, elegance

According to lecture, ancient astronomists never did, and modern astronomists ________________ the paths of the planets or the earth.

still never do directly observe

Match the blank with the correct missing word: Thought there is nothing inherently contradictory about doing so, says DeWitt, it would nevetheless be ___________ for someone having _____________ about reality when considering theories of truth to then _____________ that theories model or reflect the way _________________.

strange . . . qualms . . . insist . . . things really are . . .

In a minimal sense of the term, says DeWitt, a theory explains an existing piece of data if . . .

the theory could have been used to predict the data or observation

According to lecture, psychological theories like "a patient must have a positive attitude in order for medical treatments to be effective" is problematic from a falsificationist perspective because . . .

the theory resists falsification since evidence against it can always be rejected by postulating unconscious mental states that are not detected by experiment.

According to lecture, most philosophers today think of explanation as more closely connected with the representation of causal relationships.

true

DeWitt suggests that many scientists are at least instrumentalists about some theories, or some areas of science. Surprisingly, one doesn't even have to be a realist about one's own theories! For example, he claims that it is possible that Ptolemy was not a realist about his own theory of planetary motion.

true

Popper rejected induction as a method of confirming the truth of theories.

true

Regarding the problems related to falsifiability, DeWitt is not claiming that all theories or worldviews are equally reasonable.

true

According to lecture, the paths of planetary orbits are . . .

undertermined by the data, just as any curve through a set of data points is.

According to Popper, an unfalsifiable theory is a(n) ________ because it __________.

unscientific theory . . . nothing counts as evidence against it.

According to DeWitt, unfalsifiability is not so much a characteristic of theories as it is an attitude that a person holds toward a theory.

yes

According to Karl Popper, scientific theories can never be confirmed, only disconfirmed.

yes