PA Comp

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY Kingsley, Donald (1944) Representative Bureaucracy

Coins the term in his study of the British civil service, arguing that the civil service should reflect the characteristics of the ruling class. Similar premise to the impetus for the Jacksonian "spoils system", in which Jackson argued that the bureaucracy should be an extension of the majority party (or at least the party of the president). Such patronage systems invite just the sort of problems that prompted scholars such as Goodnow and Wilson to seek a division between politics and administration: technical incompetence, favoritism, and outright corruption.

HUMAN RELATIONS: OVERVIEW

"Behavioral revolution" struck public administration in the wake of the Hawthorne Experiments and the appearance of a number of works emphasizing the human dimensions of organizational life. Machine model (orthodoxy) contained in Sci. Mgt. seen as "closed system", while human relations approach emphasized the a-rational aspects of management under the same remaining conditions (e.g., informal groups) and interaction of organization w/ forces in its environment ("open system"). Orthodoxy- emphasis on work design; HR- emphasis on behavioral factors. Population Ecology Model: views forces in the institutional environment as selecting winners/losers among orgs dependent on capacity to change.

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: CURRENT STATE OF THEORY Hood and Jackson (1991) Administrative Argument

"Proverbs" are better understood as doctrines. As doctrines, they are powerfully influential both in debating and carrying out policy. Six Recurring Features: (1) They are ubiquitous throughout organizations (2) Constantly shifting "received view/wisdom", (3) Have more to do w/ metaphor, rhetoric, packaging, and presentation; and less to do w/ objectively or conclusively demonstrating the scientific superiority of one view over another (4) They are often contradictory (5) They are unstable—the changing fads or fashions of taste makers (6) They tend to rotate—old wine in new bottles These doctrines are argued, just as during Progressive era, on the bases of so-called best practices rather than on replicable social science.

BEHAVIORALISM Simon, Herbert (1947) Administrative Behavior

"Rational" decision-making requires (1) comprehensive list of alternatives; (2) known consequences of each; (3) ability to compare these consequences Too many direct and indirect factors that can influence this process: cognitive abilities, authority structures, org identification/loyalty, personnel policies, training, procedures, etc. Two standards to measure decisions: (1) "adequacy": the degree to which its goals have been reached (2) "efficiency": the degree to which its goals have been reached relative the available resources

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Waldo (1948) The Administrative State Waldo on Simon:

"Science" was a code word for preserving the core principle of efficiency in both the orthodoxy and Simon's work, knowingly or not. Simon simply recast the problem by substituting his logical division of politics and administration for an institutional division. Efficiency could not remain the discipline's talisman against politics, because administration is political. Efficiency itself is a political claim. For Waldo, the central problem of democratic administrative theory, as of all democratic theory, is how to reconcile democracy with the demands of authority.

HUMAN RELATIONS Follett, Mary Parker (1918) The New State: Group Organization in the Solution to Popular Government

"The individual is created by the social process and is daily nourished by that process. There is no such thing as a self-made man. What we possess as individuals is what is stored up from society." The Giving of Orders Law of the Situation: Flows from two key pathways: nature of organizational authority and nature of the environment; Authority = power with, not over Power with = "integration": requires that authority in a situation is a function of all actors understanding both the value of the knowledge presented and where that relevant knowledge is coming from. Authority should be circular, not hierarchical. Human interaction is not comprised of sequentially discrete assessments in a static environment. It is continuous and endogenous phenomenon. This understanding necessitates the study of the entire situation or organization, not just the constituent parts.

BUREAUCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS Moe, T. M. 1989. "The politics of bureaucratic structure"

"The whole point of structural choice is to anticipate, program, and engineer bureaucratic behavior." Dynamics: 3 forces: (1)opponents (losing or future coalitions) will jump on every opportunity they can to impose structures inhibiting bureaucratic discretion and make their actions more transparent to the coalition; (2) winning coalition is always ready to defend existing structure and attack what it sees as its insufficiencies; (3) president will impose structural constraints on agency in line with his priorities—which vary from pres to pres on what coalition these priorities are prompted by or correlated with. 1. Even the winning coalition will not demand an effectively designed organization because of political uncertainty. 2. Seldom do winning coalitions win structural battles without some compromise. These compromises inherently increase transaction costs on agency decision making. 3. Presidents impose structure on top of the legislatively designed structure.

HISTORY: ORTHODOXY Brownlow, Louis; Gulick, Luther; and Merriam, Charles "The Brownlow Committee": President's Committee on Administrative Management (1937)

"the president needs help" - FIVE MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) expand WH staff; (2) strengthen the managerial agencies of govt as "arms of the chief exec"; (3) extend merit system to all non-policy-determining posts and reorg civil service system to attract best talent; (4) reorg entire exec branch under a few umbrella departments; and (5) extensively revise the fiscal system - Recommendations were attempted to be codified in 1938 in proposed legislation that was characterized at the time as "the dictator bill" - Some modified recommendations were codified by the Reorganization Act of 1939: allowed six executive-level admin assistants to prez and reorg of the exec branch; w/ EO 8248, FDR created EOP and moved Bureau of Budget (later OMB) within EOP, out of Treasury - "high noon" of orthodox public administration

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Frederickson 2003 Governance: the term itself, connotes blending between private and public sectors; corporate governance is equated w/ democratic governance Common core elements:

(1) Adoption of market-based management and resource allocation techniques (2) Increased reliance on private sector to deliver public services (3) Deliberate and sustained effort to downsize and decentralize government's role as the central policy actor in society (4) Accountability increasingly about performance To keep up w/ new reality, PA scholars must rethink their discipline and its theoretical foundations. The definition of "public" must now include a broad variety of institutions and organizations traditionally considered outside the realm of government

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Waldo (1948) The Administrative State Two critical contributions:

(1) Argued that orthodox PA revolved around a core set of beliefs that cumulatively constrained theoretical development; i.e., efficiency and democracy were compatible and the work of govt could be divided neatly into separate realms of decision and execution Orthodoxy was itself driven by a particular philosophy of politics that attempted to answer the five fundamental questions of political theory: good life, criteria for action, who should rule, how powers of state should be divided, and centralization v. decentralization

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Frederickson (2003) Similarities between NPM and Governance Theory:

(1) Decentralization: Predicated on assumption that government is too distant from citizens and society, and agents have become inefficient and discourteous as a result (2) Competition: Both models seek to use competition to correct inefficiencies (3) Performance: Both results oriented towards the control of outputs rather than inputs (4) Downsizing: Both embrace the concept of "steering": setting broad policy objectives and letting entrepreneurial activity in relevant policy networks "row".

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Peters and Pierre (1998) Governance without Government? Four basic elements characterize discussions of governance:

(1) Dominance of Networks: governance is dominated by amorphous collection of actors having influence over what and how public goods are produced (2) State's Declining Capacity to Control: Power of the state is now tied to its ability to negotiate and bargain with actors in policy networks. Network members are increasingly accepted as coequals in policy process. (3) Blending of Public and Private Resources: Public and private actors use each other to obtain resources they cannot access independently. (4) Use of Multiple Instruments: Increased willingness to use nontraditional means of making and implementing public policy. This often includes indirect tools of governance (See Salamon 2001) focusing on incentives to influence behavior rather than command-and-control regulations

GOVERNANCE: CONTRACTING Goal Conflict in Contract Mgt:

(1) Effectiveness vs efficiency vs equity (2) Inherent goal conflict in contract mgt: cost vs speed; risk vs cost; savings vs internal costs; competition vs cost (3) Vertical goals (mandated goals, indirect govt-wide contracting regulations) vs Horizontal goals (expediency, fostering partnerships, and integrating a firm with the agency) Lack of Contract Mgt capacity, may lead to Goal Displacement Lack of functional expertise and competence; increasing dangers of collusion due to recruitment incentives from the private sector; lack of budgeting for contract mgt; and simply a shortage in the # of professionals needed to oversee/negotiate contracts (Rubin 2006, Cooper 2003, Prager 1994)

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THEORY Frederickson/Smith 2003 Three meanings of theory:

(1) Formal Theory: Rigorous testing of predictive theorems or hypotheses using observable and comparable data (2) Social Science: Ordering of factual material so as to present evidence through definitions, concepts, and metaphors; Because of this, important to make explicit and describe assumptions that guide action and develop categories, concepts, definitions, and metaphors that foster an understanding of those assumptions (3) Normative: All theories of PA are theories of politics (Waldo 1946) (i.e., who should rule; who gets what, when, and how much); Theories of PA guide authoritative allocation of public goods.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Peters and Pierre (1998) Governance without Government? Differences between NPM and Governance Theory: Philosophical Differences

(1) Governance does not have the ideological baggage of NPM. NPM is an attempt to unilaterally impose corporate values, objectives, and practices on public service provision. (2) Despite its ideological stripes, NPM rests on solid theoretical foundations supplied by public choice and the broader literature of organizational theory. Governance borrows from this too, but also draws from the much broader well of democratic theory.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Peters and Pierre (1998) Governance without Government? Differences between NPM and Governance Theory: Theoretical Bases

(1) Governance is less concerned w/ institutions than w/ understanding the relationship between government and society; less hostile to the Weberian model and perfectly willing to incorporate it when and where it is deemed appropriate. Governance is essentially a political theory seeking to explain the "authoritative allocation of values". (2) NPM is essentially an organization theory, building on rational choice institutionalism and/or public choice. Its explanatory orientation and its prescriptive conclusions are focused on organizational structure.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Peters and Pierre (1998) Governance without Government? Differences between NPM and Governance Theory: Concept v. Ideology:

(1) Governance represents a relationship between government and society that has always been part and parcel of democratic polity; (2) NPM is an attempt to inject corporate values into the public sector, for which it sees no sacrosanct cultural or societal role and separates it from private sector only by type of product produced (See Savas 1982) Process v. Outcomes: (1) Governance is concerned w/ understanding the process by which public policy is created, implemented, and managed (2) NPM is concerned w/ how much rather than the how of policy. Its explanatory targets are efficiency and customer satisfaction.

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) Improving Governance: New Logic Like network theory, LHH's concept operates on at least three levels:

(1) Institutional: stable formal and informal rules, hierarchies, boundaries, procedures, regime values, and authority; draws from public choice, political control, and broader political philosophy; aims at understanding formation, adoption, and (especially) implementation of public policy (2) Organizational/Managerial: hierarchical bureaus, departments, commissions, agencies, and various nongovernmental orgs linked to public authority by contract or other incentives; draws from agency theory, leadership theory, and network theory; aims at understanding incentives, discretion, performance measures, and civil service functions (3) Technical: task environments where public policy is carried out at the street level; draws on techniques and theories of efficiency, management, leadership, accountability, incentives; aims to understand professionalism, technical competence, motivation, accountability, and performance

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) Improving Governance: New Logic Governance Theory Has Two Primary Antecendents:

(1) Institutionalism: structural arrangements can shape behavior w/in orgs, determine org performance, and structure relationship w/ external actors (2) Study of Networks: the role of multiple social actors in networks of negotiation, implementation, and delivery But, governance is a broader idea that synthesizes and pushes forward key ideas from the institutional and network literatures while also drawing on several other theoretical traditions.

GOVERNANCE: CONTRACTING Kettl, Donald (1993) Government by Proxy A "smart-buying government" must have a somewhat different kind of bureaucracy, one with many frontline bureaucrats who are trained, hired, and rewarded to do contract management (See Koppell 2006) Smart-buying Government Includes:

(1) Mid-level bureaucrats trained in contract theoretic form of mgt (2) Lowered rhetoric from elected officials, consultants, and academics (3) Avoids contracting out essential/inherently governmental functions (4) Recognize that application of market methods in pubic sector raises new issues of governance Frederickson 2003: It is argued by NPM that contracting out allows mgrs to focus on goal-setting, performance standards, and policy framing; i.e., "steering", leaving contractors to "row". But, contrary evidence: Contracting appears to export much of the capacity to direct or control policy.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Kettl, Donald (2000) The Global Public Management Revolution NPM predicated on six core issues:

(1) Productivity: sustaining/expanding pub service w/ less resource investment (2) Marketization: leverage market mechanisms to conquer bureaupathologies (3) Service Orientation: connect govt w/ citizens; improve cust. satisfaction (4) Decentralization: conscious effort to decision-makers closer to people affected by those decisions (5) Policy: improve govt capacities to create, implement, and administer public policy (6) Accountability: effort to make govt deliver on what it promises Governance, to NPM, refers to "core issues of the relationship between govt and society"; and the reevaluation and reformation of this relationship at the core of NPM represents a fundamental shift in the politics of the admin state.

BUREAUCRACY: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

(1) Tasks that are not part of the org culture will not be attended to w/ same energy and resources as tasks that are part of it. (2) Orgs in which more than one culture struggles for supremacy will inflict serious conflict as one's defenders seek to dominate others. (3) Orgs resist taking on tasks incompatible with dominant culture

Gulick, Luther (1936) Papers on the Science of Administration

- Coauthored by Lyndall Urwick; foundation for President's Committee on Administrative Management (PCAM- 1937) - In first essay of Papers, Gulick argues that all executive functions could be boiled down to the acronym PODSCORB: Planning Organizing Directing Staffing Coordinating Reporting Budgeting

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Waldo (1948) The Administrative State Orthodoxy's answers to the five questions of political theory:

(1) The Good Life: It is industrial, urban, and centrally planned by scientific experts; it has no poverty, no corruption, and no extremes of wealth. Science is ideal, and waste and inefficiency are its enemy. (2) Criteria of Action: Scientific analysis of the facts should decide actions. (3) Who Should Rule: Technocrats blessed w/ requisite competence and expertise (4) Division of Power: Hostile to tripartite system; sought to increase power of the executive at expense of judiciary and legislature (5) Centralization v. Decentralization: Favored centralized state Waldo- How could orthodoxy claim that politics was largely external to their interests when their intellectual history revealed a systematic value-based philosophy of govt?

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Themes of Debate (per Lynn forthcoming and Heinrich et al 2010):

(1) The concept of governance is hardly a new one, with its intellectual roots stretching back centuries. (2) Despite the centrality of this concept to present debates, we still lack common agreement on precisely what governance means. (3) Where consensus does exist, it is that a generation of managerialism has both lengthened chains of delegation and made them more complex, posing serious challenges to accountability in a democracy. (4) Evidence supporting the idea of a 'new governance' is weak, typically anecdotal, and bereft of reference to contradictory evidence. (5) Empirical evidence points in exactly the opposite direction, thus making the question of whether governance has trumped government meaningless. Society-centered governance has not eclipsed state-centered governance

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Four of its most prominent meanings or models:

(1) Third-party government: (Salamon 1981; Kettl 1987, 2002) (2) Multilevel governance: (Lynn, Hill, and Heinrich 2001; Hill and Hupe) (3) Governance as networks: (Peters and Pierre 1998; Rhodes 1996; Frederickson and Smith 2005) The new governance: (Salamon 2002)

GOVERNANCE: CONTRACTING From Public Choice perspective:

(1) Traditional Weberian bur'cy: hierarchical, rule-bound antithetical to optimal performance (2) Civil servants are protected from the competitive forces of a market, able to shirk, hoard, and manipulate information and otherwise thwart political and policy objectives (Brehm and Gates 1997); Follows Weber's prediction that bureaucracy would eventually overcome democratic polity (3) Contracting = greater cost effectiveness, efficiency, service, capacity as f(market competition for govt contract and private choice in service)

GOVERNANCE: CONTRACTING From Transaction Cost perspective:

(1) Transaction costs are those intrinsic to economic exchange (Williamson 1985; 1999); in contracting, they are costs of managing the relationship btwn govt/contractor (2) Costs include: arranging and implementing bidding process, putting out requests for proposals, selecting vendor, bargaining/negotiating over terms, continuing resolution disagreements, monitoring contractor performance (3) Williamson 1999: "differential implementation costs need to be included in the efficiency calculus when deciding between public or private production and provision" (4) Transaction costs often failed to be considered or purposely ignored Lowery 2000: "efficiency degrading" transaction costs > direct public delivery costs

GOVERNANCE: NETWORKS What Powers Does Govt Retain in the Shift to Networked Governance?

(1) Ultimate Legal Authority: Authority with regard to regulations and standards, along w/ court guidance (2) Financial Superiority: "Fiscal Spine"; superior public revenue scope and capacity (3) Oversight (or review) of contracted services (though See Johnston and Girth 2008 and Marvel and Marvel 2007) (4) Auditing Function Thus, the transactional core of network operations—funding, standards writing, and auditing—lies outside of the network's normal deliberations. Even in the most well-defined network of public-nongovernmental organization connections, government agencies are not replaced. Under these circumstances, how is it possible to embrace the principle that networks and nongovernmental actors are replacing government agencies as the key agents of governance in America?

GOVERNANCE: CONTRACTING Donahue 1989 "When Contracting Works Best" Conclusion: Contracting works best when:

(1) goal clarity (2) outputs are measurable (3) penalties are uniformly imposed for noncompliance (4) contractors can be discontinued or changed Problems that confront contract management: (1) capacity: fewer govt employees responsible for more and more contracts (2) transaction costs not considered in "efficiency calculus" (3) lack of competition/market

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Public organizations (compared to business firms):

(1) goals that are more multiple, conflicting, and vague than the goals of business firms (Allison 1983; Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Downs 1967; Drucker 1980; Lowi 1979; Lynn 1981; Wildavsky 1979; Wilson 1989) (2) greater challenges measuring performance (3) greater challenges in organizational control, avoiding red tape, and monitoring employees

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW Problems w/ Lim's (2006) Normative Argument:

(1) he assumes that bureaucrats w/out minority advocacy roles are implementing policy neutrally; (2) assumes implementation can be defined as biased or unbiased; (3) assumes that bureaucrats who adopt minority advocacy roles will implement in ways unfair to non-minority clients, but most of the empiricism based in institutions w/ historical legacies of discrimination (4) assumes implementation is zero-sum game, yet several studies evidence majorities are not harmed by increasing passive representation for minorities; (5) some scholars argue that increasing diversity may decrease policy effectiveness b/c diversity brings disagreement; Pitts (2005) distinguishes between diversity and representation; finds representation has positive effects, diversity both positive and negative

GOVERNANCE: CONTRACTING Kettl (1993) Govt by Proxy When market imperfections increase:

(1) interdependence of buyers (govt) & sellers (contractors) increases (2) boundaries between public and private sectors are blurred, making it difficult to know what functions are governmental or public (3) The problem of absorbing uncertainties increases (4) Buyers and sellers become more highly coupled, making their interests indistinguishable (5) Conflicts of interest on the part of contractors reduce the quality and quantity of information they supply government (6) Internal org cultures become more important than market incentives (7) Organizational capacity for learning declines and the likelihood of instability increases

GOVERNANCE: CONTRACTING Smith and Lipsky (1993) Nonprofits for Hire Nonprofit social service manager tasks:

(1) problem w/ cash flow; Govts are slow, feeble, and unpredictable in making reimbursements for services rendered (2) Nonprofits typically have a board of directors that can vary from staying at policy level of org to becoming meddling micromanagers (3) Renegotiating the contract and bidding for new contracts is a nonprofit way of life (4) Nonprofits constantly reconfigure structure, processes, and payrolls to squeeze out savings and remain competitive (5) "Dance of Contract Renewal" is often protracted and political; managers devote large amounts of time to survival activities SUM: NP Mgr more worried w/ survival, cashflow, & politics of board.

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW Normative Debates; Lim 2006: Two types of scholars regarding "partiality":

(1) rejectors, such as himself and Mosher (1968): partiality or advocacy is harmful b/c it costs to democracy outweigh benefits to minorities; once bureaucrats are allowed to act partially twd minority clients, non-minority bureaucrats will be free to act partially too; (2) non-rejectors such as Selden (1997) and Meier. Non-rejectors argue that active representation actually can improve policy implementation by attenuating if not undoing past discrimination

Elemental features of PA, following Weber (1952):

(1) some basis of formal authority w/ claims to obedience (2) intentionally established laws and rules, which apply to all (3) specific spheres of individual competence (4) organization of persons into groups or categories according to specialization (5) coordination by hierarchy (6) continuity through rules and records (7) organization as distinct from the persons holding positions or offices in it (8) development of particular and specific organizational technologies

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Governance as Networks Frederickson (2005

): undertakes to both narrow and make more precise the concept of governance in order to rescue it from the oblivion of meaninglessness His conceptualization encompasses three network-related parts: (1) vertical and horizontal inter-jurisdictional and inter-organizational cooperation; (2) extension of the state or jurisdiction by contracts or grants to third parties, including sub-governments; (3) forms of public non-jurisdictional or nongovernmental policy making and implementation' Governance is 'a kind of public administration' rather than a replacement for public administration'. It is inter-jurisdictional contracts with third parties and utilizes nongovernmental institutions and actors, what Frederickson terms 'the extended state.'

Fayol, Henri (1916) General and Industrial Management

- 14 principles of management (and 5 "elements of management", largely absorbed in Gulick's POSDCORB; for Fayol: Plan, Organize, Command, Coordinate, Control): Division of Work Authority Unity of Command Unity of Direction (goal clarity) Subordination of Individual Interest Remuneration Centralization (decentralization): depends on condition of biz & personnel quality Scalar Chain (line of authority)- hierarchy is necessary, but not overstretched Order- achieved through organization and selection Equity- combination of kindliness and justice is needed Stability of Tenure of Personnel- better employees w/ job security/career progress Initiative- allowing personnel to show initiative is a source of strength for org Esprit de Corps- management must foster employee morale

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Kingdon. 1984/2003. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies

- At critical junctures, three streams "converge" and the greatest policy changes grow out of that coupling. Solutions join to problems and are supported by political forces. Most likely when political windows - opportunities for pushing favored proposals or connections of problems - are open. - When open, participants rush to take advantage, and may bring their own additional problems hoping for resolution. But windows are unpredictable and instable. o Policy entrepreneurs push "pet" projects or problems, and: Get important people to pay attention; Couple solutions to problems; Couple solutions and problems to politics. While agendas are set in problem or political streams, chances of items rising on decision agenda are influenced by this coupling into a package.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Kingdon. 1984/2003. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies

- Comprehensive, rational policymaking is impractical for the most part although there are instances where it happens - Present a new model - modification of the March-Olsen-Cohen garbage can model: • Three process streams going through the system: o Problem stream o Policy stream o Politics stream • Largely independent of one another and each develop according to its own rules & dynamics. So, agendas are set in the problems and politics stream, and alternatives are generated in the policy stream.

White, Leonard (1926) Introduction to the Study of Public Administration

- First PA textbook; Codification of principles; Follows Goodnow: Four main pillars of the study of PA: 1. Singular in process: "Administration is a single process." Imposing divisions between the basic principles of administration between varying organizations was unrealistic. 2. Question of management, not of law: "The study of Administration should start from the base of management rather than the foundation of law." 3. PA is an art transitioning to a science: "Administration is still primarily an art." White praised efficiency focus of Taylorism, but recognized value of discretion. Held a place for role of judgment in facilitating a flexible process. 4. Central to the problem of modern government: To the extent this is true, discretion and complexity in the civil service will continue to increase, necessitating continual administrative optimization and updating.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Lowi, Theodore. 1969. The End of Liberalism

- Interest group system is inimical to democracy - Pluralism has been replaced by a hyperpluralistic world in which too many groups have influence on public policy - Results in unfocused, ineffectual government - Pluralism applied to the implementation as well as the formulation of policy; treats all values in the process as equivalent interests - Liberal leaders do not wield the authority of democratic govt w/ the resoluteness of men certain of legitimacy of their positions, integrity of their institutions, or justness of programs they serve Democratic forms were supposed to precede and accompany the formulation of policies so that policies could be implemented authoritatively and firmly

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Lowi, Theodore. 1969. The End of Liberalism Juridical Democracy

- Proposes a return to the Schecter rule, in which the Court declares invalid and unconstitutional any delegation of power to an agency that is not accompanied by clear standards of implementation - In Schecter Poultry (1936) SCOTUS shot down provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act that delegated the ability to write codes as an impermissible delegation to the executive; (last piece of New Deal legislation struck down by SCOTUS; Roosevelt's court-packing scheme changed the balance of the Court and accelerated bureaucracy's growth - Blanket invalidation under Schecter rule is a Court order for Congress to do its own work. Therefore, the rule is a restraint rather than an expansion of the judicial function. - Eliminating all ambiguity of legislation is impossible, so Lowi calls for increased and earlier administrative rulemaking, administrative reform w/ a truly independent and integrated Senior Civil Service to provide a balance of legal and technological considerations

Frank Goodnow Comparative Administrative Law (1893)-

- discusses the separation of powers, administrative law, and judicial authority - First scholarly discussion and definition of 'administrative law' Politics and Administration (1900)- - Shifts away from legal, constitutional approach to one that emphasized managerial and administrative sciences; published in era of reform; follows outrages of the spoils system - This shift transformed study of Public Administration - Lays down his call for a politics-administration dichotomy- though keenly aware of the influence/interaction of politics on administration, attempts to provide an alternative perspective in order to establish a practical relationship between functions, base on the needs of American government at the time; defined politics as "policies" or "expression of the will of the state" and administration as the execution of those policies

NETWORKS O'Leary and Bingham (2009) The Collaborative Manager Collaborative Governance

: a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations. Collaboration is characterized as "co-labor" in an effort to achieve common goals in "multisector and multi-actor relationships". It is based on reciprocity and can include public participation in decision making at all levels of government. Collaborative governance relies on third parties to achieve public policy and programmatic objectives. Third parties may be in contract, grant, or other formal agreements with govt or informal cooperative understandings.

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Moe, Ronald (1987) "Exploring the Limits of Privatization

A clear division should be made between the public and private sectors, especially concerning the assignment of functions. Instead of efficiency, PA should be asking where it is rooted in public law. If the field is rooted in public law, then PA should be challenging the concept of privatization and whether it is possible to transfer sovereign powers to private entities. Public law would suggest that privatization weakens the state (See Suleiman 2003- political legitimacy is direct product of burcrtic performance). "The public and private sectors may be alike in nonessentials, but it is in the essentials that they differ, and these distinctions cannot be glossed over lightly."

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Rosenbloom/O'Leary (1997) Administrative Law and Judicial Review

A pivotal issue of admin law is judicial review. Marbury v. Madison (1803) established judicial review (the power to overturn statutory and exec laws that are in conflict with the Constitution). Starting w/ Warren Court in 1950s: Utilized powers of judicial review to issue several rulings that went against the then dominant sci-mgt approach to government

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Rosenbloom/O'Leary (1997) Administrative Law and Judicial Review

APA (1946) is foundation of contemporary federal admin law: enacted by Congress to protect against arbitrary use of admin power. Administrative Law: constitutional requirements, statutes, other regulations, and court decisions that define the authority of administrative agencies and regulate their processes... it speaks to agency collection and dissemination of information, use of delegated legislative authority, administrative enforcement, adjudication, rule making, investigation meetings, public participation in agency decision making, and judicial review of administrative action or inaction.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Heclo, Hugh. 1978. Issue Networks and Executive Establishment

Advantages of Issue-Network system: - More attuned to issue-based politics - Establishes a technocratic connection between branches that cannot be established in a party system - Presents an opportunity structure for policy entrepreneurs to develop innovative solutions to policy problems Problems of Issue-Network system: - Loss of democratic control (See Lowi 1969) - Loss of legitimacy (See Rauch 1994) Public disenchantment

GOVERNANCE: NETWORKS Challenges to Network Effectiveness

Agranoff 2007: It is also a mistake to think that government agencies dominate the process either. No one consistently dominates. Each participant has something the others need or network would not have been established in the first place. Therefore, dominance by any one actor is typically precluded. Challenges to Successful Networking: (1) Agency Resistance to successful networking (See Wilson 1989 on "turf") (2) The Networking Process itself: agency managers choose among vast number of tools that are often indirect; can lead to complex exchanges among network actors; make securing determined action difficult (3) Design of structure/form of networks: No one single model for network formation exists (Provan and Kenis 2008); Contingent on the nature of the task

GOVERNANCE: NETWORKS Networks Overtaken Government?

Agranoff 2007: Public agency-nongovernmental org connections overlay hierarchicy, rather than act as replacements for govt action; agencies retain their authority under law (legal, financial, servicing, auditing powers) Agranoff 2007: Practitioners in networks both inside and outside of govt generally agree that the government agency virtually always makes the final policy call, even if implementation of the decision might be shared.

GOVERNANCE: NETWORKS Have Networks Overtaken Government?

Agranoff 2007: Public agency-nongovernmental org connections overlay hierarchicy, rather than act as replacements for govt action; agencies retain their authority under law (legal, financial, servicing, auditing powers) Salamon 2002: Networks are not the exclusive mode of collaborative governance; More standard tools of govt (grants, loans, regulatory programs, insurance guarantees, cooperative agreements) tie govts together and agencies to nongovt orgs w/out contracted network arrangements Agranoff & McGuire 2003: Many administrators spend little portion of their time working in collaborative activity

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: GOAL CONFLICT/AMBIGUITY Effects of Goal Ambiguity on Organizations

Allison 1983: Goal ambiguity weakens the administrative authority of executives in government Lynn 1981: Higher-level administrators have more difficulty assessing performance so they delegate less authority to lower levels and impose more requirements for rule adherence, leading to a pattern of "inevitable bureaucracy" Leads to focus on goals in reform initiatives an literature: NPM's heavy theme of goal clarification (Hood 1991) GPRA 1993: Required federal agencies to publish strategic plans and performance plans to measure program performance against those goals PART 2001: required program administrators to state performance goals All reflective of the Hamiltonian-based "rationality project"

THEORY: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY Lipsky, Michael (1980) Street-Level Bureaucracy

Altered our thinking about American bureaucracy. Waldo and Simon were silent on the normative challenges and routine demands of street-level work. Pressman/Wildavsky (1979) explored the intricacies of intergovt'l regimes, described complex web of players, interests, & strategies. Yet, overlooked the role of frontline staff, whom Lipsky calls the "ultimate policymakers." Lipsky placed dilemmas of frontline worker discretion, judgment, & power at center of our understanding of PA, reflected in Wilson's (1989) emphasis on the role and influence of frontline "operators". Core insight: politics, prospects, & perils of admin discretion penetrate to frontlines. Discretion may even be more telling at frontlines than in top mgt.

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Is there a New Governance? Hill and Lynn (2005):

Analysis of over 800 empirical studies from 1990-2001, find vast majority adopt a top-down perspective on governance. Influence modeled as flowing downward from legislation and management toward treatments and consequences, and this pattern is evident for virtually every level of governance being modeled "Paradigmatic" shift away from hierarchical government and toward horizontal governing is less fundamental than it is tactical: new tools or administrative technologies are added that facilitate governance within hierarchical system. Constitutional authority (manifested in hierarchy) and the 'fiscal spine' of appropriated funds remain the structures within which relational and networked forms are enabled to flourish.

ACCOUNTABILITY Romzek/Dubnick (1987) Accountability in Pub Sector: Challenger Lessons

Appropriateness of each accountability system is linked to: (1) Nature of agency's tasks (2) Management strategy adopted by those heading the agency (3) Institutional context of agency operations Changing institutional conditions before the Challenger launch, including political pressures, budget cuts, and administrative decentralization, created an organizational setting that encourage more reliance on bureaucratic and political accountability systems. This shift in accountability systems produced circumstances that made the agency ill-equipped to contend with the problems that eventually led to the Challenger disaster.

BUREAUCRACY Goodsell, Charles (1985) The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic

Argues that public servants and administrative structures are well-organized and meet constituents' demands and preferences in an efficient and effective manner. Methods: empirical data from citizen surveys; inquiries about client satisfaction and bureaucrats' performance records Findings: American public servants and bureaucracy perform well and people were overall satisfied with public servants, services, and performances.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Osborne, David and Gaebler, Ted (1992) Reinventing Government

Argument: Politicians and bureaucrats under great fiscal pressure are introducing market forces into government enterprises; these changes are happening b/c the public wants quality and choice of goods and services, and efficiency of procedures Prescription: Entrepreneurial government that focuses on measurable results, decentralizes authority, reduces bureaucracy, promotes competition in and outside of govt; clients are put first and redefined as customers who are able to choose among providers of various services. Prescription based on numerous case studies. Careful to point out that market orientation is only half the story because markets are impersonal, unforgiving and inequitable. Entrepreneurial govts must utilize both markets and communities as they shift away from administrative bureaucracies.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Savas, ES (1982) Privatizing the Public Sector: How to Shrink Government

Argument: There are cheaper and better ways to provide individual goods and toll goods than having the government directly perform the work or deliver the service; privatizing the public sector can bring about "greater freedom, justice, and efficiency"; possible to check the growth of govt and reduce unwarranted dependence on agencies; Two intrinsic properties about basic goods and services: Exclusion: goods trade hands only when buyer/seller agree on terms Jointness of Consumption: some consumed collectively, others not Degree to which a good/service has these properties determines who can provide the service other than the government.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Gore, Al (1993) Report of the National Performance Review "From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less"

Argument: echoes many of the principles of Reinventing Govt; stresses cutting red tape (decentralizing, deregulating, streamlining) and unnecessary spending; putting customers first thru market solutions; and empowering employees to focus on results <<SEE KETTL 2006 FOR MORE>>

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Arrow (1951) Social Choice and Individual Values

Arrow demonstrates that the aggregation of collective preferences is likely to lead to irrational social action. Required some rather unrealistic assumptions: (1) all preferences accounted and ranked; (2) IIA; (3) Monotonicity; (4) Non-imposition (no limit on which commodity can be preferred over another) Paradox of Voting: idea that the most popular preferences in a population may not be served by a vote of rational actors Social interaction necessitates conformance to preferences that often do not align with the priorities of the individual. Ironically, with this acceptance, Arrow directly attacked the neoclassical base from whence he came (i.e., idealization of markets). His work demonstrates importance of org behavior.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Appleby, Paul (1949) Policy and Administration

Aspects that distinguish public from private sector: (1) breadth of scope, impact, and consideration; (2) public accountability; (3) political character Theoretical Argument: It is impossible to be a rigid bureaucracy that followed the "scientific law" in a democratic society; in reality, public administration was more reflective of an administrative pluralism. Appleby believes firmly in the effectiveness of the "top down" approach to government, and the influence that aggressive federal mandates and guidance can have on the successful adoption and integration of new attitudes, approaches, and policies at the local and state levels.

HUMAN RELATIONS Mayo, George Elton (1945) Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization

Based on "Hawthorne Studies" by National Academy of Sciences Research Council at Western Electric Company in Hawthorne, IL, beginning in 1924. - First empirical challenge to Taylor's sci-mgt. - "illumination studies": research the effect of lighting on productivity - found consistent increases in productivity under varying conditions - Gave rise to idea that productivity had basis in psychological factors Subjects became a team (informal org) spontaneously dedicated to cooperation in the experiment. Mayo's 3 persistent problems in mgt: (1) application of science and tech skill; (2) systematic ordering of operations; (3) organization of teamwork (sustained cooperation); 1&2 = effectiveness; 3 = efficiency Pace of work set by informal group rather than mgt quotas; incentives possessed by peers are equal to or greater than those possessed by employers

BEHAVIORALISM Simon, Herbert (1947) Administrative Behavior

Based on "logical positivism": asserted that philosophy can only deal with what "is" not what "ought to be"—fact/value dichotomy; dismisses values/ethics, emphasizes analysis, empiricism, and logic. Simon argued that public administration as a field should become more theoretically abstract and more consciously scientific. Two key concepts: (1) Bounded Rationality: all decision makers have cognitive and rational limitations (most are emotional and irrational to an extent, without enough information to make completely rational decisions to begin with) (2) Satisficing: Given these limitations, there is an inclination to choose the selection that covers and meets most needs rather than the perfect or optimal choice

THEORY: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY Subsequent Work Since Lipsky

Brehm and Gates (1997): Examine control of frontline discretion; Observe that chain of supervision and accountability breaks down at street-level; Supervision and control place few limits on street-level discretion; BUT organizational norms and culture can meaningfully shape the exercise of discretion and judgment (See Kaufman 1960; Riccucci 2005; Wilson 1989) Sandfort (2000): Social relations and meaning—schemas—are also core elements of the structure of street-level work; Street-level routines create shared knowledge/collected beliefs that, in turn, have causal implications for how work is carried out; frontline workers develop "their own measures of success" based on the on-the-ground realities of the task environment; The social context of the org is constructed based on these factors combined w/ the resources available to the frontline workers and valued within that context

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Redford, Emmett (1969) Democracy in the Administrative State

Built on Don Price's concept of estates (scholars, profs, admins, politicians); added power brokers, opinion makers, lay persons, rest of pop (nonleaders, minimally influential, but can be given access to elites). Administrators interact with all of these estates, and the estates are part of administration because they directly and indirectly influence it. In response to Paul Appleby's belief that the problems of the political process are a result of the interwoven nature of policy and politics, Redford stated that the "problem" is actually the solution. Both policy and politics are necessary in a successful political process.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Neustadt, Richard (1960) Presidential Power

Bureaucracies and executive branch officials are not neutral agents of implementation. They are active participants in determining the will of the state. Neustadt's work served as impetus for a general theory of bureaucratic politics centered on bargaining games in the executive branch.

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY Long, Norton (1952) Bureaucracy and the Constitution

Bureaucracy had more of a democratic character than the legislature because the ranks of the federal civil service were much more reflective of the American public. Normative claim: the bureaucracy actually made up for the representative deficiencies of the legislature. Two key questions: (1) Do public organizations broadly represent the interests and values of the American public? (2) Are these interests and values reflected in the policy actions of the bureaucracy?

BUREAUCRACY Bennis, Warren (1966) Organizations of the Future

Bureaucracy is out of line with contemporary culture and not responsive to change. Bennis vision referred to as "Adhocracy" (i.e., orgs as temporary, flat, democratic, and authority based on ability rather than office) Bennis recognizes an important trend in four threats to bureaucracy: (1) Rapid and unexpected change (2) Growth in size to the extent that merely increasing the volume of the organization's traditional activities is not enough (3) The complexity of modern technology and the increasingly specialized skills required. (4) A fundamental change in the basic philosophy of managerial behavior Five Key Problems Confronting Contemporary Organizations: (1) Integration of individual needs and org goals; (2) Social Influence- distribution of power; (3) producing mechanisms of Collaboration to control conflict; (4) Adaptation to environmental changes; (5) Revitalization- problem of growth and decay

BUREAUCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS Moe, T. M. 1989. "The politics of bureaucratic structure"

Bureaucracy not meant to be organized. Interest groups look to Congress to structure bureaucracies so that the interests they meet are insulated from opposing interests' control. Congress interested in least costly oversight mechanism with greatest payoff fire-alarm oversight to trigger particularized remedies for important constituencies Prez wants centralized bureaucracy motivated by place in history? Groups may find Prez beneficial, but prezs come and go and uncertainty remains; but legislation sticks; so they focus on Cong. to structure bureaucracy in their favor. Bureaucratic players: Careerists want to reduce political uncertainty by nurturing relationships w/ groups and politicians; Appointees are not long-term, focus is on short-term Prez victories, Interest groups cannot rely on politicals in longterm; Bureaucrats promote further insulation from political control; promote professionalism, technocracy;

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Rohr, John (1986) To Run a Constitution

Bureaucracy performs the constitutional function that was envisioned for the US Senate: executive advice, consultation, and policy oversight and implementation. As the Senate evolved into a second legislative institution, bureaucracy was pressed into service to perform those key functions. Regime values: Values that undergird and support the current political regime, found in the Constitution or evolve from its interpretation Understanding these normative standards are best achieved by reading and understanding the decisions (and dissents) of the Supreme Court. Rohr clearly has in mind rules about access, due process, fairness, majority rule, protection of minority interests, etc.

ACCOUNTABILITY Romzek/Dubnick (1987) Accountability in Pub Sector: Challenger Lessons

Case study shows NASA's technical and managerial problems resulted from efforts to respond to legitimate institutional demands. Pursuit of political and bureaucratic accountability distracted NASA from its strength: professional standards and mechanisms of accountability. Four types of accountability; Each based on (1) ability to define and control expectations inside or outside agency; (2) degree of control an entity is given: (1) Bureaucratic: expectations are managed through a hierarchical arrangement based on supervisory relationships (2) Legal: relationship btwn outside control in position to impose legal sanctions or assert formal contractual arrangements (3) Professional: gives expert employees control over organizational activities to get the job done (4) Political: responsiveness to constituents' policy priorities and programmatic needs

BUREAUCRACY Hummel, Ralph (1977) The Bureaucratic Experience

Contrary to Goodsell's work on the benefits of bureaucracy, Hummel argues that bureaucracy is a necessary evil and the consequence of the need for rational rulemaking in modern society. Hummel argues that bureaucracy may be understood by comparing it to where we would be without it: ex post facto rulemaking, arbitrariness, and inefficiency. 1Popular Negative Imagery 2OptimisticOpposites 1Impersonality 2Neutrality 1Slowness 2 Deliberativeness 1Oppressiveness 2Capacity to mobilize for projects of unprecedented magnitude 1Rigidity 2Predictability

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Selznick, Philip (1949) TVA and the Grassroots

Cooptation: "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an org as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence"; "a product of the tension between formal authority and social power" Formal Cooptation: organization publicly adopting new elements b/c (1) org legitimacy called into question and must win consent through (e.g.) direct representative role of the governed; or (2) establishing clear and reliable lines of communication to public Does not involve actual transfer of power. Participation emphasized, but actual decision-making still in hands of initial members of organization.

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW

Critical Mass: Some minimum level of passive representation w/in agency; exact percentage needed to achieve critical mass varies from study to study (Keiser et al 2002; Meier 1993) Stratification: The number of focal bureaucrats in supervisory positions; Some argue that it enhances the link between passive and active representation b/c it is those higher up in the hierarchy who have the policymaking authority to affect implementation more directly (Selden 2006); Others argue the opposite (Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody/Musheno 2003) Studies that include rep variables at both upper and lower levels: Pitts 2005: Finds more effects at upper levels Meier 1993: Finds more effects at lower levels Wilkins and Keiser 2006: Find effects only at upper level

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: GOAL CONFLICT/AMBIGUITY

Dahl/Lindblom 1953: Agencies are distinct from private firms in the greater multiplicity and diversity of the agencies objectives Linblom 1959: Need for political compromise leads to vague goals for public organizations Moe 1989: Agencies are not meant to work Lowi 1979: Vague legislative statutes, borne of the need to compromise, disseminate vague goals throughout govt Wildavsky 1979: Goals for pub orgs have "three outstanding qualities: they are multiple, conflicting, and vague" Wilson 1989: Besides the goals imposed upon them, public agencies have "contextual goals" that are dictated by their situational imperatives, the predispositions of the operators, and the organizational culture

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Rauch, Jonathan. 1994. Demosclerosis

Demosclerosis: Govt's increasing loss of the ability to adapt - Attributes the phenomenon to the rise of special interests - Borrows from Olson's observations of economic rationality: what is good for the individual is not necessarily good for the community - Indictment of the pluralist model: every fed program is an entitlement! - Entitlements imply permanence (seen as property), inclusivity (if property, then govt should spread the wealth), criterion for fairness (if property, then if you take from one you should take from all) "Governmentalism": "Every social argument becomes one about govt, politics, or law; every idea and ideology framed by its relation to govt. If you fail to propose a govt solution, liberals say you're 'doing nothing.' If you find a problem whose solution doesn't entail blaming, shrinking, or reorienting govt, conservatives yawn & look for a more exciting problem."

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT DiUlio, John (1994) "Principled Agents: Cultural Base of Behavior"

Derived from "group theory" that the effective group will develop shared goals and values, norms of behavior, customs, and traditions Focus: Accounting for behavior of Bureau of Prisons employees; Turned to a version of group theory some call "strong-culture organization, mixed w/ theories of leadership Rational choice theorists understand Barnard (1938), in that orgs are devices for fostering and sustaining cooperation among self-interested workers w/ disparate beliefs, motivations, and conflicting goals. They recognize that the functions of the exec are to induce self-interested workers to cooperate and foster org goals. RC misses other half of Barnard, discounting importance of Barnard's "moral factor". RC discounts tug of social sentiments and relegates the efficacy of moral motivations to a limbo of lesser behavioral reality. In sum, RC underestimates the propensity of people to redefine their self-interest in terms of preferences of leaders they respect, the well-being of workers they care about, and the survival of orgs they labor for.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Niskanen (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government

Describes the bureaucrat as being a person who, when faced with a number of possible actions, will choose the action that will maximize their own personal preferences. Bureaucrat as "budget maximizer". External factors influence the behavior of the bureaucrat by limiting the possible actions from which the bureaucrat can choose, changing the relationships between bureaucratic actions and outcomes, and by influencing the bureaucrat's personal preferences.

GOVERNANCE: CONTRACTING Provan and Milward (1995) "Theory of Network Effectiveness"

Determined that a stable and continuing relationship w/ government funders contributed to higher performance (See Relational Contracting- DeHood 1990; Bertelli et al 2010) Network management is more effective when it is centralized and monopolistic. Resource-rich governments and their contractors are more effective than resource-starved governments. Direct funding to a stable, centralized, monopolistic provider proved most effective.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Heclo, Hugh. 1978. Issue Networks and Executive Establishment

Development of specialized subcultures composed of highly knowledgeable policy-watchers. These policy-watchers thrive in "issue networks" (i.e., webs of influence that provoke/guide exercise of power) Issue network: A shared knowledge group having to do with some aspect (or as identified by the network, some problem) of public policy Heclo shows how politicized organizational culture increases the influence of political appointees, who are becoming more like "journeymen of issues" than technocrats. They are, rather, leaders of "proto-bureaucracies"—the supportive structures and institutions within networks: academia, government, business, and elective politics.

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW

Diversity of Causal Mechanisms: Various researchers posit different and multiple causal mechanisms. Lim 2006: provides taxonomy to distinguish btwn direct and indirect causality Direct causal mechanisms: when minority bureaucrats act specifically in the interests of minority clientele by providing more substantive benefits to members of their social group than to equally eligible members of other groups Both Lim (2006) and Mosher (1968) find this normatively troublesome; Lim (2006) defines it as "partiality" Indirect causal mechanisms: when passive representation has an impact on individuals other than minority bureaucrats w/in agency; presence of minorities may change behavior of non-minorities by checking them from engaging in discriminatory practices and socializing them to the needs of minority clients; may also indirectly affect behavior b/c passive rep leads to symbolic rep, leading clients to feel more comfortable engaging w/ agency

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: CURRENT STATE OF THEORY Hood and Jackson (1991) Administrative Argument

Doctrine Traditional Contemporary Discretion By laws, regulations (J) By professional latitude (H) By deregulation (J) By risk taking (J) Employment By merit, affirmative action, technical skill Same Leadership Based on neutral competence Professional expertise (H) Based on entrepreneurial advocating (M) Purpose To carry out law To manage orderly and reliable institutions (H) To facilitate change (J) To create public value (M) Hamiltonian = H; Madisonian = M; Jeffersonian = J

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: CURRENT STATE OF THEORY Hood and Jackson (1991) Administrative Argument

Doctrine Traditional Contemporary Scale Large—centralized (H) Small—decentralized (J) Service Provision Direct government service Compel costs/benefits (H) Contract out (M) Choice in costs/benes (M) Specialization By characteristics of work By work processes and purpose (H) By characteristics of the clientele (M) By location (J) Control By prof. standards (H) By inputs (budget, staff, size) (J) By outputs, processes By administration (H) By competition (M) By outcomes (H) By administrative (H) Hamiltonian = H; Madisonian = M; Jeffersonian = J

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Rosenbloom, David (1983) "PA Theory and the Separation of Powers"

Does not patently admonish the roe of the management view of administration, but rather its dominance as the sole formative base of institutional analysis. Identifies two other approaches that have been influential throughout the existence of sovereign US govt: political and legal. Political Approach: emphasizes representativeness, political responsiveness, and accountability through elected officials. - Guides organizational structure in observable ways: basic concept behind pluralism w/in PA; Since the admin branch is a policy-making center of govt, it must be structured to enable faction to counteract faction (Madison, Fed#10) by providing political representation to a comprehensive variety of the organized political, economic, and social interests - Faction conceptualization bolstered by view of the individual as one part of a larger constituency whose members share common characteristics; this is in sharp contrast to the dehumanization that typifies managerial constructs

GOVERNANCE: NETWORKS Challenges to Network Effectiveness: Managing Silvia/McGuire 2008:

Effective network managers working in public agencies take initiative to (1) approach other network members as equals (2) share information across the network (3) share leadership roles (4) create trust (5) remain mindful of external environment, its resources and stakeholders (6) cross-disciplinary; wide knowledge of KSAs of network actors Network Managers: (1) are less apt to be taskmasters (2) set tangible expectations (3) schedule work to be done in the network

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Effects of Public Management Constraints • Managers have a strong incentive to worry more about constraints than tasks, which means to worry more about processes than outcomes. • The multiplicity of constraints on an agency enhances the power of potential interveners in the agency. • Equity > efficiency in the management of many government agencies. • The existence of many contextual goals, like the existence of constraints on the use of resources, tends to make managers more risk averse. • Public agencies have more managers than private ones, performing similar tasks. • The more contextual goals and constraints that must be served the more discretionary authority in an agency is pushed upward to the top.

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Third-Party Government: Cons

Elmore (1986): 'managing indirect relations (on either end) requires an understanding of differences in incentive structures and modes of operation among different types of organizations and also of the mechanisms of influence other than direct controls. Indirect management requires a range of skills far wider than those necessary for more conventional superior-subordinate relationships' Milward and Provan (1993): problems with the 'hollowing-out' of the state: (1) loss of managerial control over agents, (2) loss of political control to organized contractor interests, (3) substitution of self-interest for the public interest in service delivery, (4) weakened or confused accountability to citizens and to legislatures, (5) lower service quality, (6) creation of organizations dependent on public funds, goal displacement in the nonprofit sector

HUMAN RELATIONS: OVERVIEW "Behavioral revolution" struck public administration in the wake of the Hawthorne Experiments and the appearance of a number of works emphasizing the human dimensions of organizational life.

Elton Mayo- Popularized Hawthorne findings on worker motivation and power of informal groups; launched the behavioral movement Abraham Maslow- hierarchy of needs: physiological, security, social, esteem, and self-actualization; explains why employees respond differently to different incentives Mary Parker Follett- "law of the situation": remade concept of authority from power assigned to office to one based on communication and shared understanding Chester Barnard- behavioral roles of the executive: establish system of communication; incentivize participation; set organizational purpose Douglas McGregor- two methods of motivation: Theory X (top-down, command-and-control); Theory Y (integration and self-direction) Herbert Kaufman- power of organizational culture as force constraining decisions and behavior of public servants in the field, well removed from constraints of formal central control; also developed population ecology model

THEORY: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY Subsequent Work Since Lipsky

Emotional Labor (Guy, Newman, Mastracci 2008): Researches the emotional demands of relational work; stretch core definition of street-level in different ways (i.e., 911 operators; public guardians; prison guards) Smith and Lipsky (1993): Stressed that contracting out work of state also involves contracting out power/authority of state in street-level discretion; private workers now play roles of social control w/ respect to rights and claims of citizenship Riccucci (2005): Broad review of welfare reform (PRWORA); found changes in law/practice reformed the structure of welfare but "did not fundamentally change the job duties and responsibilities of SLBs in welfare agencies"; SLBs continued to approach their tasks as they had before welfare reform, despite the law calling for a shift in their responsibilities from service provision to clients placing them in jobs.

HUMAN RELATIONS McGregor, Douglas (1960) Human Side of Enterprise

Employees are motivated by either (1) authoritative direction and control (Theory X) or (2) integration and self-control (Theory Y) Builds on Maslow's hierarchy of needs, grouping the levels into "lower order" (Theory X) and "higher order" (Theory Y). Problem with Theory X: Once a basic level of subsistence is maintained, then employees become motivated primarily by their higher needs; at this point, management is no longer in control, but rather only able to make a decision to either create conditions that foster and address these needs or not. Theory Y: Assumes workers may be ambitious, self-motivated and willing to exercise self-direction and autonomy; if given freedom without excessive rules, employee may generate greater productivity and actualize themselves Suggests the following activities: decentralization/delegation, job enrichment, participation and consultation, performance appraisals

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW

Ensuring that public service resembles the population provides one solution to the accountability problem (Dolan/Rosenbloom 2003). As such, RBT is inherently normative: early writers feared that b/c bureaucrats staffing govt did not reflect socioeconomic and demographic diversity w/in general population, 3 problems would arise: (1) unrepresentative bur'cy would lead to lack of democratic legitimacy (Kingsley 1944 and Krislov 1974) (2) Reflect lack of equal access to govt jobs (Krislov 1974) (3) Bureaucratic accountability to broader range of substantive policy and democratic constitutional values would not be maintained (Mosher 1968) THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW Early writers focused on "passive representation": bureaucracy as reflective of society as a whole (Krislov 1974; Krislov/Rosenbloom 1981) Additional benefits arise from "active representation": representation leads to policy implementation being more equitable for disadvantaged groups (Denhardt and deLeon 1995; Meier and Nigro 1976) Not all scholars see active representation as a solution. If bureaucrats behaviors reflect an effort to work in the interests of people who share their background rather than reflect the norms of objectivity and rationality, it may not distribute resources equitably to similarly situated groups (Lim 2006)

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW

Evidence that passive representation leads to active representation: Hindera (1993): study of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) finds link in the EEOC for race. This occurs when active representation measured by % of charges filed on basis of racial discrimination Selden (1997): study of Farmers Home Administration (FmHA); finds link, with active rep as increase in % of mortgages awarded to AfrAm farmers Variety of studies demonstrate link when measuring active rep as education policy outputs, such as test scores and discipline rates (Keiser et al 2002; Meier and O'Toole 2006; Meier 1993) In all of these studies, evidence that implementation more beneficial for a minority group when passive representation exists is taken as support for RBT. Evidence that passive does not lead to active representation: Although Hindera (1993), Selden (1997), and Meier et al (2005) find effects for race, none finds effects for women in the FmHA or the EEOC.

HUMAN RELATIONS Barnard, Chester (1938) The Functions of the Executive

Exec Functions: (1) establish and maintain system of communication (defined, open, accessible, direct channels); (2) secure essential services from individuals (inclusion and eliciting service; seen as maintaining morale); (3) formulate organizational purpose (aggregating actions, rather than a set of words; achieved through delegation, and indoctrination of larger purpose) Formal and informal orgs are endogenous: both depend on the other to survive; informal orgs act as conduit for communication, promote cohesiveness, and maintain the inetrity and self-esteem of the individual worker

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Rohr, John (1978) Ethics for Bureaucrats: Essay on Laws and Values

Explores difficulties of teaching standardized, specific ethics w/in PA. Asserts that ethics education is forced to generalize ethics relying on shared values. Impossible to effectively teach situational-specific ethics. Bureaucratic ethics should be taught and rooted in common values. Constitution and bureaucrats' shared oath to it provide a shared set of regime (polity) values that they can use when faced w/ ethical problems. Regime values expressed are necessarily vague (e.g., property, equality, freedom) but they are not w/out meaning. The values set the overall tone of the regime. To protect against arbitrary use of discretion, institutions must "structure" their discretionary tools. Forms of structure include: use of rule-making procedures, rules to clarify broad delegations of authority, publicly announced policy statements, and treating prior agency rulings as precedents.

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Extraordinarily difficult to coordinate the work of different agencies. Government agencies view any interagency agreement as a threat to their autonomy. Many agencies that must cooperate enter into agreements designed to protect each other from any loss of autonomy. Also leads to resistance toward regulation by other agencies

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Redford, Emmett (1969) Democracy in the Administrative State

First person to aggressively evaluate the relationship btwn democracy and the admin state. Identified a real problem btwn democracy and efficiency. Administrative State: "political-administrative system which focuses on its controls and renders its services through administrative structures" Administration can = Democracy thru 3 ideals: (1) individual realization (Rosenbloom's legal); (2) equality (DR's legal); (3) universal participation in order to ensure liberty (DR's political)

THEORY: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000) "State Agent or Citizen Agent"

Focus: Street-level workers in police dpts, schools, and vocational rehab offices; work from a "logic of appropriateness" perspective of decision-making Methods: Narrative Methodology: Worker stories about fairness and unfairness are the primary source for observations about decision norms Two dominant models of decision discretion: (1) State Agent Model: acknowledges inevitability of street-level discretion, but emphasizes self-interest as the guiding norm; thus rules should direct self-interested behavior (2) Street-Level Worker Model: acknowledges discretion and assumes it is exercised to make work easier, safer, and more rewarding

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Allison, Graham (1971) Essence of Decision

Focus: Why the US and Soviet govts did what they did during Cuban Missile Crisis. RQ: How is policy made? Who determines or influences it? Three models: (1) Rational actor model (Model I): decisions understood by viewing them as single rational actor in pursuit of his own self-interest (2) Organizational Process Paradigm (Model II): numerous actors are involved in decisionmaking, and decisionmaking processes are highly structured through SOPs. (3) Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm (Model III): actions as a product of bargaining and compromise among the various organizational elements of the executive branch (following Neustadt)

GOVERNANCE: NETWORKS Network:

Formal activities involving public agencies initiated to address public problems that span organizational boundaries and in which authority relationships are nonhierarchical O'Toole 1997: 'Networks are structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement' Agranoff & McGuire 2003: networks involve official organizational representatives who are conscious of their roles in 'facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved, or solved easily, by single organizations'

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Allison, Graham (1971) Essence of Decision

Four Basic Propositions of Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm: (1) individuals have divergent objectives and agendas (2) no one actor in the executive branch is able to act unilaterally (3) outcome of bargaining and compromise (4) decision is handed over to others who must also make decisions about specific actions to take; these decisions are shaped by SOPs and interests of implementers Model III assumes bargaining is highly structured: action channels and rules shape process and power distribution. Subsequent studies conclude that Model III is not generally applicable. Rosati (1981) argues that the deciding factor is presidential involvement; others argue that the model ultimately overreaches and an "analytical kitchen sink", lacking parsimony (Bendor and Hammond 1992)

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Is there a New Governance?

Frederickson (2005): 'governance theorists must be ready to explain not only what governance is, but also what it is not [and] be up-front about the biases in the concept and the implications of those biases' Andy Smith (2006): 'Multi-level governance' is under-theorized and excessively general. It is essentially a useful term for synthesizing general trends in government practices, but doesn't encourage rigorous hypothesis-building and detailed analysis

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Frederickson, H. George (1971) "Toward a New Public Administration"

From first Minnowbrook Conference (1968); Places focus of NPA by looking for a new value framework: social equity; Adds to the question of efficiency and economy a third question: Does this service enhance the quality of life? Administrators should not be neutral; they should be both concerned w/ good mgt and social equity. Differentiated from traditional views in four ways: (1) less generic and more public (2) less descriptive and more prescriptive (3) less institution oriented and more client-impact oriented (4) less neutral and more normative Three likely consequences: (1) require PA to sacrifice support from traditional allies in exchange for newly mobilized minorities; (2) likely to come in conflict w/ elected officials, resulting in tighter legislative controls; (3) could result in a system where elected officials represent majorities and admins and court represent minorities

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

From mgt view, agencies differ in two main respects: (1) Can operator activities be observed? (i.e., outputs) (2) Can results of activities be observed? (i.e., outcomes); (See Moynihan 2010 on Performance Measurement) Outputs: work agency does - May be hard to observe b/c what operator does is esoteric; If actions are esoteric, moral hazard arises; Operator may shirk or subvert Outcomes: how, if at all, world changes because of outputs - May be hard to observe b/c the organization lacks a method for gathering information about the consequence of its actions; b/c operator lacks a proven means to produce an outcome; b/c outcome results from unknown combination of operator behavior and other factors; b/c outcome appears after long delay

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: GOAL CONFLICT/AMBIGUITY

Goal Ambiguity: the extent to which an organizational goal or set of goals allows leeway for interpretation Feldman 1989: Ambiguity is the state of having many ways of thinking about the same circumstances or phenomena Dimaggio 1987: Organizational goals become ambiguous when they are subject to multiple differing interpretations

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) Improving Governance: New Logic Basic Question: How can public-sector regimes, agencies, programs, and activities be organized and managed to achieve public purposes? LHH do not claim to create a theory, but seek to lay a systematic foundation for the study of governance.

Governance Defined: "regimes of laws, administrative rules, judicial rulings, and practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable government activity, where such activity is broadly defined as the production and delivery of publicly supported goods and services" (1) Implies that governance is inherently political, involves bargaining and compromise among actors w/ diff interests, and comprises both formal structures and informal influence (2) "Governance Regime": a particular configuration of these elements (3) Regime formation is product of a dynamic process: "logic of governance"

THEORY: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY Lipsky, Michael (1980) Street-Level Bureaucracy

Impacts of work: (1) fundamental altering of thought about bureaucratic rationality in orgs (2) Much of the work following, exploring discretion and how to contain it, presented discretion in negative light—discretion seen as structured by rule-bound orgs and institutions (3) Instead, as Maynard-Moody/Musheno (2000) posit, research should focus on how discretion is nested w/in context of routines, practice ideologies, rule following, and law

GOVERNANCE: CONTRACTING Light (2003):

In 2002, over 5 million contractor positions supplemented 1.7 million federal civil servants and 1.5 military personnel Problems w/ increased contracting: (1) downward political pressures + increased public service demand = diminished admin capacity (2) govts began using contractors to craft public policy = lack of accountability; OMB redefined "inherently governmental" functions govts increasing outsourced contract oversight itself (Johnston and Girth 2008; Marvel and Marvel 2007)

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Moe, Ronald (1987) "Exploring the Limits of Privatization

In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) SCOTUS set precedent that if the federal govt owned any part of a corporate body, that the entire body must be treated as a sovereign. Moe contends that a sovereign has the legitimate right to use coercion as an enforcement tool, can do no wrong, is indivisible, cannot declare bankruptcy, and has the right to declare rules for public and private property. Therefore, the private sector should not be held to any of these advantages and restrictions. Orgs in the gray area btwn pub/priv are most susceptible to corruption; thus a distinction must be made to properly assign functions to each. See Circular A-76 on "inherently governmental" definitions.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: OVERVIEW Two Basic Variants: (1) Westminster Model; (2) Reinventing Government

In US, because local, state, and national govts share responsibility in most policy arenas and are subject to different political motivation, there is not central agent powerful enough to force functional reorgs on the scale pursued in Westminster Model. Reinvention Model tends to emphasize competition to a greater degree, and to fundamentally alter the regulatory role of government.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THEORY Frederickson/Smith 2003

In the past 40 years, PA scholarship has developed forms of analysis to be scientific: a kind of formal rationality by which insights and discoveries form foundation of inquires for subsequent development Validity of any theory depends on capacity to provide: (1) Description: require analyst to decide which elements in a complex phenomenon to emphasize; descriptive features help us see (2) Explanation: account for the known distortions of reality embedded in description; explanatory features help us understand Prediction: account for patterns, probabilities, and likely outcomes given the descriptive and explanatory features; helps us prescribe

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW New Governance: redefinition of governance motivated by the belief that the locus of public administration has been shifting away from direct government by a bureaucratic state toward a 'third-party government' (Salamon 1981) and the 'hollow state' (Milward and Provan 1993; Rhodes 1994)

In this view, PA encompasses a variety of indirect relationships with dispersed societal entities; contrasts with a traditional view of PA as supervision of civil servants org'd by dpts/bureaus & governed by employment contracts and oaths of office mandating compliance with applicable laws (Frederickson 2005). "Governance" as a new meaning dissociated from govt goes too far. It is more useful to regard the rising status of governance as reflecting professional recognition that there is a widening array of public and private instruments needed for collective action Within PA, two ends of the spectrum: those who regard governance as various modes of societal steering but with government as its backbone, and those who regard governance as primarily nongovernmental modes of steering.

BUREAUCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Influence of outside interests on an agency will depend on the way those interests are arrayed in the agency's environment (1) Per Capita Low Costs v. Per Capita High Benefits = client politics; benefits directed to some single, reasonably small interest, costs dispersed over many (e.g., CAB, FCC, CCC) (2) Per Capita High Costs v. Per Capita Low Benefits = entrepreneurial politics; costs heavily concentrated on one industry/profession/locality; affected group incentivized to oppose; benefits have small per-capita value, recipients have little incentive advocate; members of the agencies in this environment will be drawn from social movement that helped create it; but as time passes, agency will be at increased risk (e.g., NHTSA) BUREAUCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy Influence of outside interests on an agency will depend on the way those interests are arrayed in the agency's environment (3) Per Capita High Costs v. Per Capita High Benefits = interest group politics; Both likely beneficiaries and the likely cost-payers have strong incentives to organize and press their competing claims (e.g., OSHA: industry v. labor) (4) Per Capita Low Costs v. Per Capita Low Benefits = majoritarian politics (e.g., Antitrust division of Justice Dept.)

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Selznick, Philip (1949) TVA and the Grassroots

Informal Cooptation: involves actual transfer of power; response to specific centers of power; e.g., individuals the organization relies upon for resources; these individuals may insist on having an impact on policy determination; should the public become aware of informal cooptation, the end result would likely lead to decreased organizational legitimacy Entering into a situation of cooptation often presents a paradox: Leadership placed between two goals: (1) if participation is ignored, then the benefits of cooptation are put at risk; (2) if participation goes too far, then the leadership risks their own power over org and policy.

THEORY: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY

Inherent Discretion: Irreducible discretion and the barriers it poses to accountability are essential characteristic of SLB (Lipsky 1980); paradox: SLB extensively regulated by rules/procedures that surround street-level work (1) constraints often engineered by political principals to control shirking (Wood/Waterman 1994; Krause 1999; Moe 1989) (2) Excess of rules also has effect of introducing discretion; rules' applicability must be decided on a case-by-case basis (Prottas 1979) (3) Needs and circumstances of clients rarely fit into rule-based categories (4) Face-to-face confrontations necessitate responses to variable human dimensions—especially pronounced w/ regard to normative judgements (5) SLBs are motivated to enhance/protect their discretion; motivation is structural, not individualistic; they are required to manage political demands, thus they seek autonomy to decide what is best followed (6) Creaming: use discretion to help manageable/responsive subset of clients; reforms to eliminate discretion risk driving it underground (Brown 1981); doesn't necessarily promote accountability, rather it may exacerbate matters

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Selznick, Philip (1949) TVA and the Grassroots

Institution: An organic structure that is self-sustaining. It constantly searches for new tasks to remain important (but see Wilson 1989). TVA as example: B/C TVA worked to integrate itself into the environment at grassroots level, it was able to sustain the test of time and influence more policy. Some sacrifices were made: TVA met local resistance over land-use policies. So, TVA forced to prioritize programs and ultimately deemphasized land-use policies (handing over ag programs to powerful land-grant universities and area farmer orgs) in exchange for realizing top priority: bringing electricity to rural parts of the valley. - Diff explanation than Selznick's says TVA tasks defined by law, experience, and professional norms; it was made to make dams, staffed by engineers, and had org culture w/ little interest in environmental policy and rural planning. Though relations w/ local interest groups may have had some effect, it seems clear that the evolution of the TVA would have been much the same had they never existed (Wilson 1989).

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) Improving Governance: New Logic

Intended as a starting point, but it is difficult to parse out differences among key elements; e.g., difference between Environmental Factors and Structures. LHH call for studies that attend to the hierarchical system of government organizations, that use data from multiple sources and multiple levels of analysis, that employ methodologies capable of employing multiple data inputs Two problems: (1) lacks parsimony; (2) when parsimony gained, generalizability lost Governance regimes seem shaped by policy domains, which helps explain the diffusion of policy implementation research (O'Toole 2000; Saetran 2006); and earlier calls to focus on policy design as starting point for implementation analysis (Ingram and Schneider 1991)

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW

Intersectionality: identities such as race and gender can intersect Few studies address intersectionality: Research has yet to create designs or theory that allow us to effectively sort out the influence of multiple identities Gay and Tate 1998: Analysis on public-opinion polling data indicates that race remains dominant screen through which black women view politics, not only because most consider racism greater evil than sexism, but b/c gender is simply a weak vehicle for political participation

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Heclo, Hugh. 1978. Issue Networks and Executive Establishment

Iron triangle concept (Cater 1964) "disastrously incomplete": doesn't accommodate sheer mass of activity + associated expectations of govt - loose-jointed play of influence accompanied by growth in govt - ↑ appointee layering + ↑ specialization overtakes the bureaucracy - Dissolved organized party politics + politicized organizational life. "Hybrid interests": Every new policy or policy change, govt reform movement, and govt action creates new stakeholders that accompany the new change in processes and/or programs. Results in... - - few policies drop off agenda - - constant efforts at "reform" - - policy congestion leads to accidental collisions of interests

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW New Governance

Ironically, Salamon sees policymakers as under increasing political pressures to select tools that are most difficult to manage and hardest to keep focused on their policy goals; tools that are indirect, invisible, and automatic, thereby, in his view, sacrificing efficiency, effectiveness, and social equity. These sacrifices are, Salamon believes, high prices to pay for whatever advantages such tools are thought to have. This is presumably why he believes the overt, rather than covert, embrace of a tools approach to governance will lead to better policy choices and better public administration and management.

BEHAVIORALISM Simon, Herbert (1947) Administrative Behavior

Ironically, like Gulick/Taylor, Simon shared their faith in achieving a better world by introducing tough-minded scientific rationality for the field. Continues doctrine of poli-admin dichot., instrumentalism, professionalism, science, rationality, reductionism, and technical problem-solving. Logical positivism's only ends were logical positivism. Methods of administration become goals in themselves. Leads to new ruling dogma and doctrines of methodology for post-war administration. A methodology in accordance w/ needs and necessities of postwar American state: technocratic, professional, instrumentalist, and free of normative, political or value concerns.

THEORY: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY

Irreducible Autonomy: Nature of street-level work makes it difficult to supervise activity: principals cannot be confident of conformity to their prefs (Brehm & Gates 1997); Sources of Autonomy: (1) SLBs are motivated to minimize danger and discomfort and maximize income and gratification; autonomy closely related to power, so successful SLBs make supervisors dependent on them for key information (2) Inadequacy of resources: SLBs are forced to make allocation decisions, answering the most fundamental political question: "Who gets what from government?"; such decisions have enduring material consequences on individuals and communities

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Rosenbloom, David (1983) "PA Theory and the Separation of Powers"

It is the very conflict among these ideals that founders sought to encapsulate in our tripartite system of govt. The idea was to create structural resistance to emotional action in general, and protect minority from passionate majority. Thus, the system is "weighted in favor of inertia and inflexibility". The rise of the admin state can be conceptualized as a folding of all three govt functions. PA makes rules (legislates), implements these rules (manages), and adjudicates questions concerning their application and execution (judicial function). Requires new guidelines for appropriate analysis: (1) Theorists must recognize the validity and utility of all three approaches (2) Each approach has varying levels of applicability in different situations (3) We should make greater use of political theory to address the full implications of the separation of powers concept. (4) Practitioners should be utilized as valuable sources of information

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW Saliency:

Keiser et al (2002): demographic characteristics in question must be a salient identity; through politics, diff identities become more salient over time; indicators for saliency include: interest group involvement, direct policy benefits, distinguishable patterns in public opinion polls Wilkins and Keiser (2006) highlight importance of policy being salient and beneficial to focal population. Passive representation of women affects policy impltn only when female clients directly benefit from bureaucratic activity. Dolan (2000): Sex of SES predicts attitudes twd family accommodation policies at work, a policy area salient for gender Selden (1997): Lack of saliency may offer possible explanation for Selden's finding that sex is not predictor of role orientations or policy impltn @ FmHA Meier/Nicholson-Crotty (2006): Teacher's sex correlates w/ math performance of girls in public schools; area where policy meets condition of saliency for gender

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY Krislov, Samuel (1974) Representative Bureaucracy

Kingsley's (1944) focus on representativeness in the British civil service was on class representation. Krislov argued that the more important focus for American studies should be on race, ethnicity, and gender. These factors are assumed to be a key source of socialization, and thus of values. A large portion of subsequent empirical research follows Krislov's argument. Krislov also argued that demographic composition of the bureaucracy (passive representation) did not necessarily account for policy outputs and outcomes. That type of representation (active) should be the basis of any claim of the bureaucracy being representative, as well as its "symbolic" representation: the legitimacy granted to the institution by minority clients based on their shared demographic characteristics with agency employees.

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Multi-level Governance

LHH 2001: Governance as 'regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and services' through formal and informal relationships with agents in the public and private sectors Logic of Governance: Outcome=f[E, C, T, S, M] Outcomes = f(environment in which the policy is implemented (culturally, temporally, and physically), the characteristics of the clients, the alternative methods of treatments available, the structure of the relationships and the organizations of the actors involved in the production and delivery, and the managerial roles) (1) too much included to start from that model any kind of deductive experimentation; (2) lends itself to being policy specific, so no credibility in terms of generalized findings

BUREAUCRACY Downs, Anthony (1967) Inside Bureaucracy

Law of Increasing Conservatism: Agencies/bureaus grow more conservative as they mature 3 Hypotheses: (1) officials are utility maximizers; (2) officials fall into one of five categories, motivated by self-interest; (3) organization's social functions are influenced by internal structure and behavior, and vice versa Types of Bureaucrats: Zealots and advocates are the types that create new bureaus; Climbers are attracted to a growing bureau and prospects of career advancement; Conservers seek to retain power and position; Statesmen are often forced to behave like advocates

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Rosenbloom, David (1983) "PA Theory and the Separation of Powers"

Legal Approach originates from three sources: (1) Law gives agencies the authority to materially affect the lives of citizens (2) There has been a trend toward judicialization w/in agencies as we see an increasing level of adjudicative activity occurring w/in exec branch (3) The rise of constitutional rights recognition has significantly reduced the notion that govt services are mere privileges. To the contrary, it is the responsibility of govt to protect the rights of an individual, even if the material cost of doing so is high. - Organizational structure heavily incorporates adversarial frameworks (e.g., negotiated rulemaking, administrative hearings) to facilitate "discovery" of the underlying truth. - Individuals in the legal framework are recognized as unique individuals with unique circumstances, thus this variability and subsequent complexity of interaction necessitate reliance on adversarial confrontation to illuminate facts.

NETWORKS O'Leary and Bingham (2009) The Collaborative Manager

Premise of the book is that collaborative differs from noncollaborative—presumably hierarchical—public management. However, the editors conclude that "collaborative managers need to be both participative and authoritative" (264). This points to the broad conclusion that collaborative management cannot be conflated with collaborative organization, which would entail internal diminution of hierarchical authority and expansive employee participation.

BEHAVIORALISM Simon, Herbert (1947) Administrative Behavior

Levels criticism of the orthodoxy, saying their supposedly scientific principles were nothing more than "proverbs" which were imprecise and contradictory, not precise enough to be a science. Suggested alternative as the "behavioral theory of the firm" looking for decision analysis focus, rather than structural analysis. Argues that decisions can be analyzed and measured. Administrators defined narrowly as questions of choice, not broader institutional roles, or the historical, philosophical and moral dilemmas they faced. New poli-admin dichotomy? Defines admins' roles as "choice mechanisms". "Politics" to Simon and orthodoxy were left to others, or ought to be.

THEORY: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY Lipsky, Michael (1980) Street-Level Bureaucracy

Locates problems of street-level bureaucrats in the structure of their work: SLBT places them in org context where relations w/ supers, peers, clients, and citizens shape their motives and judgements. Five characteristics of structure identified in SLBT: (1) who they are and their status in organization (frontline workers) (2) with whom they interact (citizens and clients) (3) discretion they wield (4) autonomy they necessarily have (5) policymaking power they derive from their position, discretion, and relative autonomy

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THEORY Frederickson/Smith 2003

Logical Positivism: collective human behavior exhibits enough order to justify a rigorous search, measurement, classification, and depiction of that order. Done by "separating facts from values". Thus, formal logic from basis in utilitarian maximization is separate from values (emotions) and provides a positive (absolute) means by which to measure human decision-making

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Management of govt agencies is powerfully constrained by limitations on the ability of managers to buy/sell products or hire/fire employees on the basis of what best serves the efficiency or productivity of the organization. Laws and regulations limit w/ countless rules about fairness and procedure.

THEORY: INSTITUTIONALISM March and Olsen (1995) Democratic Governance

March/Olsen assert that most institutionalist work from a few key ideas: (1) Institution is a formal bounded framework of rules, roles, and identities (2) Preferences are inconsistent, changing, and at least partially endogenous; structural arrangements, socialization, and cooptation shape preferences (3) Emphasizes action by a "logic of appropriateness": based on the assumption that institutional life is organized by sets of shared memories and practices that come to be taken as a given (4) Appropriateness is influenced by laws and constitutions and other authenticated expressions of collective preferences. But, it is also shaped by emotions, uncertainties, and cognitive limitations From this, institutional theorists are divided on the assumption of human motivation. Some (sociologists) accept altruism and the idea of community as human motivation. Others (rational choice) assume utility-maximization and self-interest.

BUREAUCRACY Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Max Weber's "ideal type": (1) bureaucracy as monolith—a distinctive form of social organization (2) exists to increase the predictability of govt action by applying general rules to specific cases (3) members possess authority of office (4) enjoy lifelong careers; high social esteem (5) operate the levers of power that makes bureaucracy a force against which citizens and politicians struggle in vain Only partly correct: (1) Not only do many agencies fail to apply general rules to specific cases; they resist efforts to set forth their policies in clear and general ways (2) Overt power of bur'cy hard to reconcile w/ ease w/ which Congress challenges, rebukes, and influences agencies (3) Sometimes predictable; just as often irregular and inpredictable (4) Some bur'cies resist change, others seem always engaged in reorganizing their structures and modifying doctrines

THEORY: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY Subsequent Work Since Lipsky

Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003): Based on field and story-based research in five agencies w/ three types of social workers—cops, teachers, vocational rehabilitation counselors—they show irresolvable tension between two street-level identities: (1) state-assigned meta-identity as state-agents and strict rule enforcers; and (2) worker-assumed meta-identity as citizen-agent and responsive user of discretion; Find that workers first make judgments about citizens and clients, then apply, bend, or ignore rules to support their moral reasoning; SLBs don't think of their role as policy impltn, but as fixing and enforcing citizen-client identities forms the premise for their judgment. Meyers (1997): Found that most caseworkers were not antagonistic to policy goals and structural changes of welfare reform—most were enthusiastic; yet, most studies of SLBs generally stress resistance/subversion

HUMAN RELATIONS Kaufman, Herbert (1960) The Forest Ranger

Method: Field Research; Focus: The operative employee; RQs: (1) What influences a forest ranger's "decisions and behaviors" when removed from their superior/direct line of command? (2) Why don't centrifugal forces tear apart the adherence to policy amongst agents that are so far removed from one another? Centrifugal Forces: local community pressures; isolated locations Findings: Administrative procedures to ensure compliance are insufficient. What worked for the Forest Service were behavioral factors where rangers were effectively taught to think the same way. Forest Service Strategies for Compliance: (1) selection (finding individual "fit" to position); (2) training (indoctrination); (3) building identification with the Forest Service (professional identity) Behavioral factors result in voluntary conformity allowing standard to be kept and measured against. These factors better counteract centrifugal forces than admin procedures.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Wildavsky, Aaron (1964) The Politics of the Budgetary Process

Method: Interviews w/ govt officials; Findings: Behavior predicated on a belief about what others in the budgetary process would do, how they would react in turn, how 3rd participant would react, and so on "Obvious truth is budget is inextricably linked to the political system." Descriptive theory to understand decisions as they were actually made, within a dynamic social framework. Argues that the budget process is based on an incremental advocacy-based system. The truth emerges from a clash of perspectives ("Rashoman Effect"). Rational political actors attempt to reduce uncertainty. Risk aversion leads to intractability of comprehensive reform. Potential losers pursue course as close to status quo as possible. Result is incrementalism.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Peters and Waterman (1982) In Search of Excellence

Methodology is fairly simplistic, identifying 75 companies that were "highly regarded". Widely criticized as a poor social science research construct, and for their lack of control group. Devoted to 8 principles of mgt, commonly echoed in NPM: (1) results orientation; (2) customer-driven; (3) entrepreneurship/autonomy; (4) integration; (5) flattening hierarchy; (6) singular org purpose; (7) simplify structure; (8) aligning autonomy w/ core values (centralization/decentralization) P&W argue against "simplistic and misguided" notions of rationality as a management tool. Individuals respond to positive reinforcement, autonomy, and forms of motivation that are less like the theoretical assumptions espoused by Frederick Taylor and more like the perspectives of Chester Barnard.

BUREAUCRACY: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Mission: "Distinctive competence" (Selznick 1947); confers a feeling of special worth on the members, provides a basis for recruiting and socializing new members, and enables the administrators to minimize the use of other incentives Sometimes an org is endowed w/ a sense of mission despite ambiguous goals, personal predispositions, group pressures, and situational imperatives. This usually happens during the formative experience of the organization. When a single culture is broadly shared and warmly endorsed it is a mission.

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW

Modern RBT rejects spoils system and embraces Weberian ratio-technical, ideal-type bureaucracy. Modern RBT begins with the assumptions that there are good reasons for public agencies to be arranged in Weberian fashion, while rejecting the orthodox's notion of a poli-admin dichotomy. Meier 1975: RBT begins w/ recognition that administration is politics and the basis of bureaucratic power is derived from discretionary decisionmaking authority that it has. Selden 1997: RBT stems, in part, from Lipsky's (1980) work on street-level discretion and says that the key challenge for administrative theory is to account for this fact (discretionary power) in the context of democratic values

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Morton Halperin (1974): Counters Niskanen (1971), saying bureaucracies "are often prepared to accept less money with greater control than more money w/ less control" Little support for the widespread notion that government agencies are imperialistic, always seeking to grow by taking on new functions and gobbling up their bureaucratic rivals. Facts are inconsistent w/ theories of Tullock and Niskanen. e.g., DOD under McNamara- growth + unpopularity w/in professional ranks; under Marvin Laird- downsizing + popularity w/in professional ranks

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW Perhaps the most explicit attempt to address the central problem of democratic administrative theory raised by Waldo (1947)

Mosher (1982): "How does one square a permanent (and powerful) civil service—which neither the people by their vote nor their representatives by their appointments can readily replace—with the principle of government "by the people"?" Krislov 1974: Central tent of RBT: bureaucracy reflecting the diversity of the community it serves is more likely to respond to the interests of all groups in making policy decisions; diversity of interests will be reflected in the decisions and behavior of bureaucracy; bureaucracy can then be considered a representative institution

HUMAN RELATIONS Maslow, Abraham (1943) A Theory of Human Motivation

Needs are deficiencies that require satisfaction: Physiological- Basic needs vital to survival; all other needs are secondary; includes hunger, thirst, homeostasis; incentives: salary and benefits Security- important for survival, but 2ndary to physiological; incentives: job security Social- relationships w/ others (friends, lovers, families, community); need to receive and give love and affection; incentives: recognition of good performance Esteem- personal worth, social recognition, respect of peers, accomplishment; incentives: ability to take pride in work, tied to social needs and incentives Self-actualization- not a deficiency need, but comes from desire to grow; fulfilling potential; incentives: personal and professional development Explains why employees respond differently to different incentives.

BUREAUCRACY: OPERATORS Meier and Nigro (1976) "Representative Burcy & Policy Prefs"

No systematic evidence that ideology matters (Wilson 1989; but see Aberbach/Peterson 2005 and Aberback/Rockman 1990) M/N look at beliefs of a sample of higher-level federal civil servants and found that the social origins only explained 5% of variance in opinions; Agency affiliations, however, explained much more. Findings: political views of bureaucrats tend to correspond to their agency affiliation more than they reflect their social status.

GOVERNANCE: CONTRACTING Smith and Lipsky (1993) Nonprofits for Hire

Nonprofits are usually the contract agencies for social services. Compared to govt hierarchies, nonprofits employ fewer professionals, recruit more volunteers, and hire more part-time and nonpermanent workers at lower salaries and benefits. Top professionals in nonprofits have considerably higher incomes than counterparts in govt agencies. Tend to find nonprofit settings more attractive b/c opportunities for wider discretion and greater commitment are more plentiful than in govt hierarchies.

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) Improving Governance: New Logic

O = f[E, C, T, S, M] O = Outputs/Outcomes: The end product of a governance regime E = Environmental Factors: Political structures, levels of authority, economic performance, level of supplier competition, resource levels and dependencies, legal frameworks, and characteristics of target pop. C = Client Characteristics: Attributes, characteristics, and behavior of clients T = Treatments: Primary work or core processes of the orgs in regime. Include: org missions/objectives, recruitment criteria, methods for determining eligibility of service, and program technologies/treatments S = Structures: org types, level of coordination, integration among orgs, relative degree of centralized control, functional differentiation, administrative rules or incentives, budgetary allocations, contractual arrangements/relationships, and institutional culture and values M = Managerial Roles and Actions: leadership characteristics, staff-mgt relations, communications, decision-making, professionalism, monitoring, control, and accountability

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Observing outputs and outcomes produces four agency types: (1) Craft: Outputs are hard to measure, but outcomes easy to evaluate (e.g., DOL, Forest Service); Relies heavily on the ethos and sense of duty of its operators to control behavior; ethos derives from internalized set of professional norms; hence, "craft" organizations (2) Coping: Neither outputs or outcomes are observable (e.g., State, Ed, Intel); Operators driven by situational imperatives; managers driven by the constraints they face, esp. need to cope w/ complaints from political constituencies; (May explain recent rollback of pay-for-performance initiative in intel agencies); managers will have strong incentive to focus their efforts on the most easily measured (and thus most easily controlled) activities of their operators; mgrs try to achieve compliance by attending to alarms; punishing workers who set off alarms to send message across org; b/c alarms are set off randomly, punishment may not be perceived as fair

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Observing outputs and outcomes produces four agency types: (1) Procedural: Outputs measurable, but not outcome (if any) (e.g., OSHA); conditions seem ripe for management to encourage the development of professionalism; best way to manage org activities in which outcomes cannot be observed is to recruit professionals to work in accordance w/ highest prof standards; reason: govt agencies cannot allow operators to exercise discretion when outcome is in doubt or likely to be controversial; b/c constraint driven, mgt becomes means-oriented; How employees go about their jobs > whether jobs produce desired outcomes; SOPs are pervasive; managers use many forms of continuous surveillance to achieve compliance

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Observing outputs and outcomes produces four agency types: (1) Production: Both outputs and outcomes are observable (e.g., IRS, USPS); simplifies management problem; Depending on sovereignty status of work, may be amenable to privatization (Moe 1987), not merely b/c of exclusivity and jointness of consumption (Savas 1982); also depends on market conditions (Johnston and Romzek 2005); problem that confronts managers of all production agencies is that they may give most attention to the more easily measured outcomes at the expense of those less easily measurable; achieve compliance by measurement w/ minimum use of resources

BUREAUCRACY: ORGANIZATIONS MATTER! Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Only two groups of people deny orgs matter: economists and everyone else. To economists, govt orgs are like firms: black boxes that convert, at the will of a single entrepreneur, inputs into outputs. (1) Empirically, rather arid arguments about principal/agent relationships (2) That bur'cies adopt different org arrangements w/ different consequences is still about as foreign a notion To noneconomists, it's not the org that matters, but people in it. Two problems w/ that view: (1) people are products of their org position (Simon) People's accomplishments depend on having authority and resources w/ which to act (Simon- if we have to give a person authority to act, in what ways will his effectiveness depend on how others are organized around him?)

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Seidman, Harold (1970) Politics, Position, and Power

Organization of administration is about power and politics. Central argument: The institutional location and environment of a policy or program and the organizational structure, process, and procedures that govern it help determine the distribution of power and influence w/in the polity. Organizational structure and location = f(distribution of power in polity) The bureaucracy's organizations, staff, authority, and responsibilities are involved in and often the focus of much broader and more intense political games.

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW

Organizational Context: Meier/Nigro (1976): attitudes twd policies not generally salient to sex/race, the agency is better predictor of policy attitudes; M/N look at beliefs of a sample of higher-level federal civil servants and found that the social origins only explained 5% of variance in opinions; Agency affiliations, however, explained much more. Meier et al (2005): EEOC pursued more sex discrimination cases when mission changed after Clarence Thomas hearings; passive rep of women in EEOC did not have an impact

BUREAUCRACY: ORGANIZATIONS MATTER! Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Organizations are not simply, or even principally, org charts. Chester Barnard (1938): An organization is "a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons." If orgs matter, then it is true that there is no one best way of organizing. Three main organizational issues (or understanding orgs' relative success): (1) Each has to decide how to perform its critical task: behaviors which enable org to manage its critical enviro problem; agencies > priv firms have vague, inconsistent goals; tasks (outputs) and goals (outcomes) not necessarily connected in straightforward manner (2) Agreement about/widespread endorsement of critical task's definition; when definition widely accepted/endorsed, it constitutes org's mission (3) How to acquire sufficient freedom/autonomy of action to redefine tasks as org sees fit and to infuse sense of mission; i.e., degree of autonomy

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: OVERVIEW

Originated from reforms in GB and NZ; aimed to reduce the heavy presence of government by the use of business-like practices, through techniques such as the privatization of state-run industries and contracting out. Strongly related to public choice economics: formal models provided empirical foundation for ideology that govt programs were larger and more aggressive than the public wanted them to be. Yet, most of the foundational literature from NPM is based on case-study histories of either singular public agencies or businesses to build "best practice" principles for reform. Light (2006): NPM not alone; All three sectors are plagued by lack of evidence-based research on which reforms work under which circumstances. Values of NPM: (1) efficiency and effectiveness; (2) flexibility; (3) public value; (4) customer satisfaction; (5) business-like practices

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW

Originated w/ Kingsley's (1944) work concerned w/ class representation in the British Civil Service. Focus in American literature has been on race/ethnicity, as racial and ethnic minorities have been underrepresented and historically disadvantaged in American politics in some way. Frederick Mosher (1968) first to distinguish btwn passive and active. Generalizability of RBT is limited by scholarship's small number and types of bureaucracies studied and questions raised. Little evidence of its impact on public opinion generally, on citizen's relationships w/ and expectations of govt, and on govt legitimacy.

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Waldo, Dwight (1948) The Administrative State

Orthodox prescriptions were not value-free, but constituted a political theory themselves, which Waldo saw as inconsistent with constitutional principles, namely the separation of powers. The idea that PA could be reduced to one set of clear propositions was highly questionable, given the complexity of the subject. Waldo questioned whether administration was well-suited to the "methods of physical science." Efficiency is simply one world view as it relates to administration, but there are numerous other valid views as well.

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Waldo, Dwight (1948) The Administrative State

Orthodox principles arose out of material and ideological conditions of the late 1800s and early 1900s: (1) rise of corporation; (2) urbanization; (3) industrialization; (4) specialization/professionalization; (5) depressions and wars Orthodox values of science and efficiency helped provide answers to five problems of political philosophy: (1) What is the "good life"?; (2) What is the Criteria of Action?; (3) Who should rule?; (4) separation of powers; (5) Centralization vs Decentralization Orthodox PA had taken a position on all of these questions.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Hitch and McKean (1960) The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age

PPBS: Planning, Programing, Budgeting System; formal system of fiscal management; Operated in three key stages: (1) Strategic Planning- SWOT analysis (2) Program Selection/Competition- cost-benefit analysis (3) Budget Allocation- Based completed analysis, five-year plan is developed Distinguished between PPBS and traditional budgeting: (1) Emphasis on outputs, rather than inputs (2) Emphasized future planning and budgeting to consider full implications of a program rather than only presenting immediate, annual costs Wildavsky and other critics argue that PPBS compatible w/ DOD's characteristics (politically insulated, top-down hierarchy, clear divisions of expertise), but these characteristics not inherent within other agencies NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Buchanan and Tullock (1962) The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy Public Choice Theory: economic approach that attempts to explain the rules governing public administration; applies CBA of private decision-making to political decision-making; foundation is microeconomic conception of humans as rational utility maximizers; foundations in Kenneth Arrow and Duncan Black's theorems on the inability of majority rule to promote public interest - View public decisions as aggregates of private preferences - Thus, governmental decisions are part of the economy, not separate from it B/T identify a two-level structure of collective decision-making: (1) ordinary politics- which consists of decisions made by legislature (2) constitutional politics- consists of decisions made about the rules of ordinary politics: political game is played to influence outcomes where costs/benefits are unevenly spread

BUREAUCRACY Parkinson, C. Northcote (1958) The Pursuit of Progress

Parkinson's Law: Work expands so as to fit the time available for its completion.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS: OVERVIEW Political approach rose out of fundamental distrust of poli-admin dichotomy. Argues that dichot. does not exist in practice and can not form the basis for an effective understanding of administration. Direct challenge of the orthodoxy by emphasizing intrinsic differences between PA and business management. Embraced sub-government model (subsystems, iron triangles, issue networks).

Paul Appleby- Administration is politics Emmette Redford- Accountability to exec modified by bureaucrats' responsiveness to interest groups, constituencies, and Congress Philip Selznick- Formal and informal "cooptation"; constituency groups influence admin policy and admins build political support for agency actions Hugh Heclo- Iron triangle concept disastrously incomplete Aaron Wildavsky- politics of budgetary process; formulation of budgets inextricably linked to political concerns; "incremental budgeting" Theodore Lowi- "interest group liberalism"; policy networks are too strong and self perpetuating

BUREAUCRACY: OPERATORS Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Peer expectations are both a source of motivation and a force defining what acceptable and unacceptable tasks are. When the goals are too vague or ambiguous to permit them to become a ready basis of task definition, tasks often will be shaped not by exec prefs, but by incentives valued by the operators (See Sandfort 2000). Definition of tasks = f(naturally occurring incentives > agency-supplied) Naturally occurring incentives = f(situational imperatives + peer expectations + preexistent attitudes/predispositions/preferences) Situational imperatives > attitudes/beliefs, except when task definition not specified by laws, rules, and circumstances and org incentives are weak

THEORY: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY

People Processing: People transformed into clients, treated (and treating themselves) as if they fit standardized definitions of units consigned to specific bureaucratic slots (Lipsky 1980) (1) encounters w/ clients/ctzns typically face-to-face; (2) workers often feel a mix of compassion, disgust, fear, and annoyance in their personal encounters w/ clients/ctzns; (3) clients are nonvoluntary—do not choose to purchase a desired service & cannot seek alternative if dissatisfied or poorly treated; (4) SLBs have little to lose if they fail to satisfy clients (Lipsky 1980); however, they do work to meet the needs of clients deemed worthy of such effort (M/M 2000) (5) Standardized classifications of clients can transform citizens into suspects/offenders—creating lifelong consequences that erode family and community strength (Prager 2007)

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Kingdon. 1984/2003. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies

Policy Stream: Generation of policy proposals much like natural selection. Possible ideas float around in the "primeval policy soup" in which specialists try out their ideas through bill introductions, speeches, testimony, papers, meetings and conversation. This is impacted by: o Fragmentation of the policy communities = fragmentation of alternatives, outlooks, stability o Policy entrepreneurs & Incentives (incl. power and access) - inevitably "pet" solutions become introduced o Proposals come into contact with other, are revised, combined with one another, and floated again Those that "survive" are technically feasible; fit w/ dominant values and national mood; have budget workability and political support.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Wildavsky, Aaron (1979) Speaking Truth to Power

Policy analysis is an art that is not just about economics. "If every opinion wer geven equal weight or every policy, like social security, were subject to reversal, the political process could not cope." Dogma is necessary to ensure things are not taken for granted, and skepticism is necessary to ensure that evaluation is not an empty ritual. PPBS damaged policy analysis. PPBS took the art out of policy analysis and attempted to create a science of policy analysis. PPBS did not transfer well to non-defense agencies. It was inflexible and ignored the politics of the policy process. PPBS failed to take individuals and their desires into account.

BUREAUCRACY: OPERATORS Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Politicians and interest groups know that professionals can define tasks in ways that are hard for administrators to alter, and so one strategy for changing an organization is to induce it to recruit a professional cadre whose values are congenial to desired change (See Moe 1989; Eisner and Meier 1990)

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Kingdon. 1984/2003. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies

Politics Stream: Composed of factors such as swings of national mood, administration or legislative turnover, interest group pressure campaigns. - Issues are more likely to rise to agenda prominence if: - Congruent with the national mood. Don't have to be "public": "moods" can be based on small # of hard pushers. - Enjoy interest group support/lack organized opposition - Fit the orientations of the prevailing legislative coalitions or administration - turnover introduces new problems and makes others unacceptable for attention - Organized forces are more likely to affect the alternatives that are seriously considered.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: POLITICAL CONTROL Frederickson/Smith 2003

Politics-Administration Dichotomy: (1) Traced to Constitutional origins: Hamilton arguing for energetic executive to control day-to-day operation of govt; Jefferson arguing for elected legislature exercising direct and heavy control over exec (2) Emergence of permanent civil service to correct spoils system caused theorists to legitimize the service through poli-admin dichot; Wilson (1887) early proponent; Gulick; White; etc (3) Waldo (1946) and Simon (1947) challenged for different reasons; To Waldo, all administrative acts were political; To Simon, it was difficult to unbundle politics and administration (4) Dichotomy reemerges in 1980s and alive and well in Control theories of bureaucracy

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW

Powerful stakeholders and ordinary citizens are demanding larger roles in public authority. Consequently, the boundaries btwn agencies and levels of government, btwn govts, orgs and institutions of civil society are redrawn. Transformed relationships btwn pub/priv spheres described as "governance". Often invoked without definition as a neutral way of characterizing governing. The argument that governance is replacing government is sharply contested. Some skeptics doubt that such a transformation is in fact occurring. They argue that government, with its superior access to societal resources and its monopoly of the coercive power of the territorial state, remains central to state-society relationships. To others, the extent to which public authority is in fact coming into the hands of nongovt entities represents a profound and disturbing challenge to the republican institutions that, by constitutional design, protect the citizenry from abuses of power by both public and private interests.

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Mosher, Frederick (1968) Democracy and the Public Service

Prescribes recommendations for the effective training, professional development, and engagement of subject-matter experts in a democratically governed society. Provides solid response to Waldo's question "Who should rule?" by identifying six values that bureaucracies have sought to represent across time: Govt by (1) Gentlemen (early republic); (2) Common Man (Jacksonian "spoils system"); (3) the Good (good government reform movement); (4) the Efficient (Sci-Mgt); (5) Administrators (Waldo); (6) Professionals Mosher asserts the need to account for historical change and development in the PA field; strongly emphasizes role of professionals; places role of public service in society

BUREAUCRACY Weber, Max (1914) Bureaucracy

Principle characteristics of bureaucracy: Fixed authority- jurisdictions are clearly specified; activities are distributed as official duties Hierarchy of Officers- Subordinates follow orders of superiors, but have right of appeal Impersonality- Means of production or administration belong to office, not the person in the office Career Service- Employment by the organization is a career; job stability; tenure of position; protects from arbitrary dismissal Principal of Rules- Rules are stable, exhaustive, and can be learned; Decisions are recorded in permanent file Ascendancy explained by the primacy of legal-rational systems of authority and perspectives on work contained in Protestant norms.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Kingdon. 1984/2003. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies

Problem Stream: problems come to be recognized and how conditions become defined as problems by the following: - Systemic indicators (e.g., unemployment); subjective uses; often used to reinforce preconceptions - Focusing events (crises)- calls attn to problem; symbolic; emotive - Define issues as problems by comparing current conditions to "ideal"; comparing performance cross-country; categorizing as condition or problem - Problems can also fade from agendas: "Feel" they have addressed the problem - e.g. passed legislation, issue simply fades from view (without having necessarily been addressed), others run out of steam/resources; fads.

BUREAUCRACY: OPERATORS Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Professional: Person who receives important occupational rewards from a reference group whose membership is limited to people who have specialized formal education and accepted a group-defined code of proper conduct. The more a person allows his behavior to be influenced by the desire to obtain rewards from this reference group, the more professional is his orientation (See Stillman's "Pro-state" advocates; may present problems w/ democratic accountability). Professionals are those employees who receive some significant portion of incentives from organized groups outside the agency. Behavior of profs is not wholly determined by org incentives. External incentives weaken org's ability to develop and maintain shared sense of mission.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THEORY Frederickson/Smith 2003

Public administration is "organization and management practices in collective or public settings."

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Seidman, Harold (1998) Politics, Position, and Power

Public bureaucracy has a parallel private bureaucracy—businesses that perform contract work for the government—who are heavily interested in the status quo. Using private companies also helps reduce the number of civil servants on the public payroll, an important consideration for presidents dealing with the size of public bureaucracy. The downside to these arrangements is loss of accountability and the resistance of private firms to changes in the public bureaucracy.

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: OVERVIEW It can plausibly be argued that both the theory and the logic of scientific management have been the most influential land enduring of all PA theories. Since 1980s, subject of management returned to PA w/ vengeance. Contrasting Perspectives:

Public management: the formal and informal processes of guiding human interaction toward public organizational objectives. The units of analysis are processes of interaction between managers and workers and the effects of management behavior on workers and work outcomes. Public organization theory: the design and evolution of the structural arrangements for the conduct of public administration and with the descriptions/theories of the behavior of organizations as unit of analysis.

BUREAUCRACY Merton, Robert (1940) Bureaucratic Structure and Personality

Questions the effectiveness of bureaucracy, recognizes antinomies or pathologies that arise from its characterized virtues: Strict adherence to procedure and rules Goal displacement, where instrumental values (means) become terminal values (ends) leads to inefficiency Overconformity to rules Rigidity and ritual inflexibility to change or adapt

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW

RBT raises central issues to study of PA: (1) Directly addresses inherent importance of government responsiveness and accountability in democracy (Meier and O'Toole 2006) (2) Understanding of whether sociodemographic representation in the bureaucracy explains why benefits/costs to private entities are distributed as they are (3) RBT is important for understanding role that racial, ethnic, and gender-based groups play in US government Some of the normative prefs for a representative bur'cy rest on the assumption that it will implement policy differently. Others rest on the assumption that the public will respond differently to a rep bur'cy.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Baumgartner and Jones (1993) Agendas & Instability in American Politics

RQ: How and why policy issues emerge and recede from policy agenda Theory: Punctuated Equilibrium- Policy Stability = f(issue definition, salience); (similar to social construction theory) - positive issue definitions w/ low salience will result in incrementalism - negative issue definitions w/ high salience will cause policies to be challenged - disadvantaged policy entrepreneurs seek to destabilize existing policy monopolies and can manipulate perceptions/issue definitions

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Buchanan (1977) Budgets and Bureaucrats

RQ: Why are budgetary results not those desired by a majority of citizens? Tax Consciousness: people may think they know the taxes they pay, but do not account for large segments of taxes built into their consumption habits Politics for Profit: Politicians seek "political income" and may go against the will of their constituents and "over-invest" in agencies that will benefit them Conflicts of Interest: Bureaucrats seen as utility (here, budget) maximizers; will rationally vote to further their own interests Individuals own bias to see their success often causes large wasteful spending in order to increase their own worth. Overinvestment produces more government than is needed.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Coase, Ronald (1937) The Nature of the Firm

RQ: Why do firms exist? Answer: Individuals are not able to capture certain inefficiencies in production, while firms are able to reduce all the transaction costs emerging from the production and distribution processes. Transaction costs: information-gathering, bargaining, maintaining secrets, policing/enforcementall result in the actual price in the market compared to the original price of the good. To avoid transaction costs and their inherent inefficiencies, people have a tendency to make firms to internally produce goods how they want, without using contracts in the market. (See Williamson 1985 on hierarchy reducing transaction costs; and Frederickson/Stazyk generally). Argument against some of the contracting arguments emanating from NPM.

GOVERNANCE: NETWORKS Has Network Governance Replaced Government?

Radin et al 1996: Because of dominant leadership roles taken by important state and federal agencies, networks rarely become involved in new funding initiatives or in changing policy. 'To make or change policy or to seek additional funds could easily be perceived as encroaching on the turf of these agencies. Helping these agencies facilitate regulatory problems or with grant programs, or to provide information, or to demonstrate a new approach appears much less threatening'. Agranoff 2007; O'Toole 1997: 'Majority rule' is not the way that effective networks make decisions, but the consensus that is needed to act is sometimes elusive or, at a minimum, takes a great deal of time to realize In sum, the need to operate in both hierarchical and network settings can place great demands on public sector managers, but it is clear that decision processes and activities within govt agencies can and often do trump network demands.

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: GOAL CONFLICT/AMBIGUITY Chun/Rainey 2005:

Rainey and Chun 2005: Goal ambiguity varies along four dimensions: (1) Mission Comprehension Ambiguity: leeway for interpretation allowed when communicating the reason for the existence of the organization (mission); measured by Gunning Fog Index (2) Directive Goal Ambiguity: Interpretative leeway available in translating an organization's mission or general goals into directives and guidelines for specific actions to be taken; measured by Rules/Law ratio (3) Evaluative Goal Ambiguity: Extent to which performance targets can be precisely defined; measured by multiple coders evaluating agencies' goal statements in strategic plans as "objective" or "subjective" and "results-oriented" or "workload-oriented" (4) Priority Goal Ambiguity: Extent to which there is clarity over the priority of multiple goals

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: GOAL CONFLICT/AMBIGUITY Chun/Rainey 2005:

Rainey and Chun 2005: Main Findings: (1) Directive Goal Ambiguity: positively related to financial publicness and policy problem complexity (2) Evaluative Goal Ambiguity: strongly and positively related to financial publicness and policy problem complexity; also status as a regulatory agency; independent agencies had higher evaluative goal ambiguity than agencies in cabinet departments (3) Priority Goal Ambiguity: number of constituencies showed strongest effect on priority goal ambiguity;

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: GOAL CONFLICT/AMBIGUITY State of Research on Goal Conflict/Ambiguity

Rainey/Bozeman 2000: reviewed results of survey of public and private mgrs: found that "everyone says that public agencies have greater goal complexity and ambiguity than business firms—everyone, that is, except the public managers responding to surveys" Chun/Rainey 2005: Attempt to obtain more "objective" sources for measuring goal clarity than perceptual survey data; develop measure of goal ambiguity related to different antecedent variables: agency size, age, policy problem complexity, regulatory status, competing demands, financial publicness Rainey/Lee 2005: introduce variables "political salience" and "structural insulation"; salience (+) w/ ambiguity; insulation (-) impact on relationship between salience and ambiguity

DECISION THEORY Lindblom, Charles (1959) "The Science of Muddling Through"

Rather than make rational choices, organizations "muddle through". "Muddling through" is making small incremental decisions based on means and ends that are: (1) mixed together (2) limited in knowledge (3) limited in analytic capabilities (4) limited in time (5) risk averse Characterization of Simon's claims b/c Simon's initial decision theory anticipated the limits of rationality and described them.

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Related to mgt constraints are a few other factors affecting bureaucratic behavior: 1. Bureaucrats do not (legally) profit from their positions. Normal businesses try to limit expenditures and raise revenues to generate profits, but bureaucrats have no such incentive. 2. Official routines are characterized by excessive complexity. 3. The specific, clear and unquestionable goals imposed on bureaucrats create an aversion to take risks. After all, the cost to a bureaucrat of ignoring these goals could be very high. But normal businesses thrive by taking risks.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Buchanan (2003) Public Choice

Rent Seeking: presupposes that if there is value to be gained through politics, persons will invest resources in efforts to capture this value; leads to overinvestment; e.g., porkbarrel politics, where politicians promise discriminatory transfers of wealth in exchange for constituency support Market failure was the focus of economics, which was set against idealized politics. Public choice theory provided analyses of the behavior of persons acting politically in the same way as those in the private sector, hence "nonmarket failure". Cautions public choice theorists: "Let us be careful not to claim too much. Public choice does little more than incorporate a rediscovery of this wisdom [of the workings of politics] and its implications into economic analysis of modern politics."

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW

Research shifts to necessary conditions in which passive leads to active: (1) level of discretion; (2) saliency; (3) org context; (4) intersectionality (multiple identifications); (5) critical mass; (6) stratification Discretion: Meier and Bohte (2001): Bur'cies w/ frontline workers who have more discretion produce more beneficial policy outputs for minorities Sowa and Selden (2003): Individuals w/in FmHA who perceive themselves as having more discretion make more favorable decisions to minority clients Riccucci and Meyers (2004): Race and gender is more highly correlated with policy attitudes when bureaucrats have higher levels of discretion

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM: OVERVIEW

Response to the heavy emphasis placed on efficiency by the orthodoxy (Goodnow, White, Gulick, etc). DC argues that focus on efficiency is misleading b/c it assumes that pure objectivity is achievable. Waldo- perhaps earliest on this concept; challenges notion of value-free "neutral competence" as achievable Rosenbloom- expands on Waldo; argues efficiency is not only value of governing; stresses other values that originate in Const (representativeness, due process, transparency, equity, individual rights) Kaufman- neutral comp not only historical objective; also represntvnss Mosher- six values: govt by gentlemen, common man, the good, the efficient, administrators, professionals Rohr- structural design of govt should adhere to moral standards of Const; not efficiency-enhancing, but rather protective of civil liberties Frederickson- New Public Administration Romzek/Dubnick- Accountability mechanisms Paul Posner: Accountable to whom? Accountable for what?

BUREAUCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Restraints on "Agency Capture": (1) Lower costs of political organization: technological advances make it much easier and less costly to mobilize interests (2) Redistribution of political access: Access to government has become more widely distributed because the number of points through which the system could be entered multiplied and the number of points through which privileged groups enjoyed exclusive access declined. Result, due to noise, is sometimes babble rather than decision. Nonetheless, increasingly unlikely that agency will confront just one source of info or incentives. (3) Professional Norms: (A) Material and nonmaterial satisfactions of public service may equal or exceed those of private employment; (B) Work that might attract a private employer conveys evidence of talent and energy (eg, private law firms don't want antitrust lawyers who lost cases for FTC)

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: CURRENT STATE OF THEORY Hood and Jackson (1991) Administrative Argument Has Simon's positivist decision theory been empirically verified?

Results disappoint on three counts: (1) Simon's proverbs (old principles of mgt) thrive (2) Commonly accepted paradigm in PA based on decision theory (3) Yet, decision theory seems to have had little effect on he day-to-day practices of public management It seems that Simon's attack on the proverbial approach might never have existed, for all the practical influence it has (not) had on practice.

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Governance as Networks

Rhodes (1996): Governance is about managing networks, which are autonomous and self-governing and resistant to government steering. In Rhodes's narrative of transformation in Great Britain, the state was gradually hollowed out to the point that central government no longer was in charge of either service delivery or the policies governing it. Rhodes is careful to point out that governance is not a panacea for all the challenges of the public sector. Both public sector bureaucracies and private markets may prove more effective in certain circumstances. But governance is, he suggests, in the ascendant. 'Game playing, joint action, mutual adjustment, and networks are the new skills of the public manager' (See Bardach 1977)

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Mintzberg, Henry (1992) Structure in Fives: Designing Orgs

Role Theory; Three Primary Managerial Roles: (1) Interpersonal Role: figurehead; leader; liaison emphasizing contacts (2) Informational Role: monitor (seeking info); disseminators (transmitting info internally); spokesmen (transmitting info externally) (3) Managerial Role: entrepreneurs (initiating/encouraging innovation); disturbance handlers; resource allocators; negotiators Based on contingency, managers take on combinations of these role characteristics. Bozeman and Straussman's (1991) Public Management Strategies develops several of the same theories for the public sector

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: POTENTIAL POSITIVES

Rosenbloom and O'Leary (1997): Emphasis on the customer may bring PA closer to a democratic orientation in terms of accountability to the citizen Lynn (2006): If NPM used as framework to pose questions, rather than provide answers, it can strengthen the intellectual foundations of the field engaging in a comparison between the logic of management with the framework of competitive markets with the logic of management within the framework of constitutional governance. Stillman (1998): Challenges the field to address the proper role of government Wilson (2000): Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (1994) & Federal Acquisition Reform Act (1995) permitted agencies to buy off shelf if < $100K; cut back on detail required for procurement requests; reduced transaction costs, increased expediency

GOVERNANCE "State of Agents"

Ruth DeHoog (1990): 'relational' contracting: a strategy whereby contractors and agencies work with each other over time to build trust and understanding Bertelli et al (2010):

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Third-Party Government

Salamon (1981): increasing extent to which govts providing social welfare services used subnational govt, nonprofits, hospitals, universities, and proprietary firms to deliver services, 'often with a fair degree of discretion about who is served and how' Kettl (1987): increasing reliance of the federal government upon a variety of intermediaries (nonprofit organizations, hybrid entities, subnational govt, priv sector) to implement national policies; which he termed 'government by proxy' Though 3rd-party govt was motivated by civil rights (deinstitutionalization) & humanitarian concerns, Reagan forwarded for different, conservative reasons. Light (2008): 'true size' of the fed govt, taking into account the extent of 3rd-party govt, rose to nearly six times the size of the federal civilian workforce by 2005.

BEHAVIORALISM Simon, Herbert (1947) Administrative Behavior

Simon's world composed of organizations, not public organizations, introducing a generic focus for the field based on organization. Organizations were instruments created to enhance human rationality. B/C humans rationally bounded, they must link together organizations to enhance rationality. Public administration was the means for creating such linkages within organizations with the ultimate aim of producing "efficient decisions".

THEORY: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY Subsequent Work Since Lipsky

Smith and Larimer (2004): given a complex and difficult task environment, "street-level bureaucrats are likely to measure [performance results] by outputs that are not readily linked" to strategically imposed performance measures "but are critical to meeting the basic goals" of the policy environment; this tradeoff is often result of a lack of resources devoted to multi-task environment Hasenfeld (2000): Practice Ideologies: enduring types of client classifications, such as diagnostic labels and shared perceptions of client worth. Practice ideologies guide street-level worker responses to people and situations and create self-fulfilling prophesies as workers screen out information that does not correspond to their established categories (Handler 1990)

ACCOUNTABILITY Romzek/Dubnick (1987) Accountability in Pub Sector: Challenger Lessons

Source of Agency Control Internal External Degree of control over agency actions High 1. Bureaucratic 2. Legal Low 3. Professional 4. Political

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW

Symbolic Representation: whether increasing passive representation improves public perceptions of overall favorability and legitimacy of different govt agencies; this type of representation was of central concern to early writers (Krislov 1974), but less studied today Theobald and Haider-Markel 2006: examine impact of police officer race; people were more likely to feel traffic stops were legit if common race Limited empirical evidence exists that increasing passive representation will have an impact both by changing the policy outputs of the bureaucracy and by altering the attitudes of the clients affected by the bureaucracy.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Barzelay (1992) Breaking through Bureaucracy: A New Vision for Managing in Government

Takes on two issues: (1) a narrative account of how/why organizational change occurred in a natural setting; (2) a formulation of an organizational strategy in staff agencies Argues that a bureaucratic paradigm does not fit the needs and actions of public managers and citizens. A new paradigm, the "post-bureaucratic paradigm", need to be introduced, highlighting the need to move to a customer-driven government and away from the rigidity of the typical bureaucracy: Away from "public interest" to results citizens value; Away from efficiency to quality; Away from control to winning adherence to norms; From rigidity to more flexible and business-like actions that provide adaptation to govt actions.

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Rosenbloom (1987) The New Partnership

The New Partnership: involuntary partnerships that public administrators have with the courts (remedial law) Administrative rules tend to be general, apply to all individuals under the agency's jurisdiction, and are future-looking. The judiciary applies a retrospective approach to see if specific individuals have had their constitutional rights violated by an agency's rule. The dynamics of this relationship makes the judiciary the senior partner in its relationship w/ public administrators. New Partnership rests on three broad legal challenges: (1) Declaration of new Constitutional rights as individuals come into contact w/ public administrators (2) Development of the "public law litigation" suit, which is the vehicle for efforts to use adjudication to obtain broad reforms of public institutions. (3) Broad switch from a presumption that public administrators have an absolute immunity from civil suits to a presumption of only qualified immunity.

HUMAN RELATIONS Barnard, Chester (1938) The Functions of the Executive

Theory of the organization as a cooperative system. Organizations are "consciously coordinated activities of forces of two or more persons". Counters Gulick. 1st comprehensive behavioral theory of management. Authority comes from the ability to communicate. Zone of Indifference: comprised of tasks that a subordinate would unquestionably accept as opposed to orders that might be rejected because the burden exceeds the motive. Exec must be cognizant of this zone. Like Simon's "zone of acceptability" and March and Simon's "logic of appropriateness"

THEORY: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000) "State Agent or Citizen Agent"

They find neither model. Rather, they find a Citizen Agent Model: (1) street-level workers act in response to individuals and circumstances (2) They do not describe what they do as contributing to policymaking or even carrying out policy (3) They do not describe their decisions and actions based on their views ofo the correctness of the rules, wisdom of the policy, or accountability to hierarchical authority or democratic principle (4) They base their decisions on their subjective judgment of the individual client's worth (5) They discount the importance of self-interest and will make their work harder, more unpleasant, more dangerous, and less officially successful in an effort to respond to these individuals (6) Decisions are based on normative choices, not in response to rules, procedures, or policies

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Third-Party Government: Pros

Third-party government was celebrated as a way of expanding the role of government in service delivery without expanding government itself. It was a way of harnessing the manifold capacities of civil society on behalf of public purposes and of expanding the foundations for the legitimacy of the welfare state. Francis Rourke (1987) argued that, 'what all these varied efforts to involve the public more directly in the administration of government programs reflect is a deep-seated belief on the part of legislative and executive officials that bureaucratic power can best be legitimized by being democratized, by bringing the decisions of public bureaucrats much more closely under the control of private citizens'

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Three Constraints on Management in Public Agencies: 1. Government agencies cannot lawfully retain and devote to the private benefit of their members the earnings of the organizations (so unlike McDonald's, there is no profit-maximization incentive); 2. Government agencies cannot allocate the factors of production in accordance with the preferences of the organization's administrators (so unlike McDonald's, we cannot necessarily move people and equipment to where it is most needed); Government agencies must serve goals not of the organization's own choosing

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Lowi, Theodore. 1969. The End of Liberalism

Three charges against pluralism: 1. Propagates and perpetuates the faith that a system built primarily upon groups and bargaining is perfectly self-correcting 2. Failed to grapple with the problem of oligopoly or imperfect competition as it expresses itself in the political system 3. Depends on the idealized and almost miscast conception of the group—ignoring Madison's conception that factions are "adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community" To Madison and early progressives, groups were evils much in need of regulation. To the modern pluralist, groups are good and require accommodation.

BUREAUCRACY: ORGANIZATIONS MATTER! Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Three foundational elements of describing organizational action: (1) Rank-and-file employees: What do they do? Formal goals may explain, more often operators' actions depend on situations they encounter (Lipsky 1980), prior experience and beliefs, expectations of peers (Sandfort 2000), array of interests in which agency is embedded (Heclo 1978), and impetus given to org by founders (Selznick 1947); all these factors comprise organization's culture: way of viewing a reacting to the world that shapes discretionary authority (2) Managers: Further managers are from day-to-day work of operational employees, the more their lives are shaped by constraints placed on agency by political environment; type of mgr depends on goal clarity and ability to observe operators (3) Executives: Main concern is protecting turf (org autonomy); twin goals: maintaining agencies (Terry 1990) and maintaining political position execs following a variety of strategies and at times encouraging innovation

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW

To Pierre and Peters (2000), governance means providing direction to society. Harlan Cleveland (1972): 'what the people want and need is not necessarily more government, but more governance—meaning the full range of governmental, quasi-governmental, parastatel (sic), nonprofit, contracting, voluntary and other organizations that participate in the conduct of public affairs'. In The Transformation of Governance, Donald Kettl employs the concept of governance to confront the realities of administrative roles that require 'capacities that lie far beyond the standard responses, structures, and processes that have gradually accumulated within American government' (2002). Frederickson (1997) saw the newest meanings of governance as the public choice-oriented thinking of the NPM, as well as other antidotes to command-and-control bureaucracy and to merit-based civil service. He thought they tended to diminish the importance of political and administrative institutions to the governing of America.

BUREAUCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

To extent operators' tasks are shaped by external interest group pressures will vary dependent on which of the four political environments surround the agency: (1) Interest Group Agency: Anything operators do will be criticized by one or the other party; political superiors, depending on political winds, may shift from advocating one or the other (2) Majoritarian Agency: Vigor or laxness will almost entirely depend on the character of its executive and backing from president; May arouse organizational foe who will lobby either branch to make agency back down (e.g., FTC)

THEORY: REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW Generalizability Issues: Limited types of orgs studied to date

Two Reasons for This Singular Focus: (1) Researchers must invest heavily in understanding the bureaucracy's area of policy implementation and how the bureaucracy works to create valid measures of policy implementation Testing hypotheses about policy implementation across completely different bureaucracies in one statistical model is very difficult; different activities for different organizations

NETWORKS O'Leary and Bingham (2009) The Collaborative Manager

Two competing themes can "account for some of the schism in how public management scholars study collaboration": Classical liberalism: emphasis on private interest; collaboration as a process that aggregates private preferences into collective choices thru self-interested bargaining; i.e., most contractual arrangements with for-profit third parties Civic republicanism: emphasis on a commitment to do something larger than the individual; collaboration as an integrative process that treats differences as the basis for deliberation in order to assist at 'mutual understanding, a collective will, trust and sympathy [and the] [sic] implementation of shared preferences; i.e., processes for public and nonprofit participation

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM Krislov, Samuel (1974) Representative Bureaucracy

Two ways to judge representativeness: (1) composition and in the manner of its selection (2) in terms of its substantive product Representativeness is a mirroring of demographics and beliefs in the society at large. But no matter how it is measured or how it is enacted (quotas, fair shares, etc), it is never truly obtained.

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

Types of agencies and types of executives: (1) Production: Careerists have best chance of being successful, provided the goals command wide political support (2) Procedural: Hard for careerists b/c outsiders cannot easily observe and evaluate their outcomes, but can observe their outputs and lobby for changes in work procedures; to maintain org in this environment requires high order political skills; depends less on knowledge and more on their ability to find political support, deal w/ critics, and negotiate a resolution (3) Craft: Career leadership may be especially easy to sustain in a craft organization that has developed an aura of mystery and romance about its work. (4) Coping: Obviously in need of political leadership to deal w/ constant external pressures.

THEORY: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY

Ultimate Policy Making: "To say that actions are political is to indicate that some people are aided and some are harmed, by dominant patterns of decision making... At times, SLBs' routines and simplifications virtually are the policies that are delivered." (Lipsky 1980) (1) Stands PA on its head; traditional PA saw frontline workers as last influential step in policy implementation; also seen as less authoritative (2) Later PAT saw frontline policy changes as either shirking or sabotage, not reasoned and essential judgments (Brehm and Gates 1997) (3) Lipsky (1980) did not see street-level deviations from legislation/exec orders/admin rules as policy or implementation failures as did Pressman/Wildavsky (1979) and other 1st gen impltn (Goggin 1990); Deviations were an essential remedy for impractical mandates, a perspective embraced by 2nd gen impltn (see Elmore 1982) (4) Focus on top-down insufficient, rather scholarship should start w/ street-level implementation

BUREAUCRACY: OVERVIEW Bureaucratic form promised higher levels of efficiency and equality of treatment.

Weber and Merton set out two dominant viewpoints: (1) Weber identifies the characteristics of bureaucracy and sought to explain its ascendancy ("ideal type") (2) Merton focused on the more vulgar aspects of the form: red tape, impersonality, and rigidity ("bureaupathologies") Bureaucracy remains the dominant form of government organization. Closely associated with the industrial revolution and the practice of establishing large public institutions to carry out the work of the early social welfare state.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Waldo (1948) The Administrative State Waldo on "efficient administration":

When administration scholars operationalized the concept, they seemed to be talking about an input-output ratio. This concept is fundamental to business operations in capitalistic markets, but not nearly so important to democratic govt. Equity, consensus, or the satisfaction of particular interests are frequently the criteria for action in democratic processes, and none of them are efficient; in fact, many criteria were hostile to efficiency. By pushing for poli-admin dichot and limiting attention to "nonpolitical" element, it freed scholars to pursue their political ideals of centralized power, technocracy, and reliance on authoritarian bureaucracy.

BUREAUCRACY: OPERATORS Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy

When goals are vague (See Chun/Rainey 2005), circumstances become important (street-level discretion) Situational imperatives may seem to have greatest effect on how operators define their tasks when org must deal w/ uncooperative/threatening clients face-to-face, but situation may shape tasks when orgs not street-level bur'cies Task defined by situational imperative leads to development of org culture that emphasizes caution. Even when goal is clear, situation may make one way of doing things more attractive. Then technology (any form of tactics) determine tasks (e.g., OSHA focus on safety > health b/c outcomes measurable). Tasks are defined more by available technology and prior experiences than by a clear understanding of what kinds of tasks are appropriate to conditions.

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Multi-level Governance

Whereas LHH postulate authority as reflecting hierarchically ordered delegations, Hill and Hupe generally disavow any a priori notion of causal relationships, either down or across the grid. (1) All supposed causal relationships are to be treated as hypotheses to be subjected to empirical test. (2) 'One function of the multiple governance framework,' they write, 'is to provide a conceptual (meta-)basis for contextual theory building in the study of the policy process'. They continue: 'At a meta-level, it designates organizing concepts that enable the formation of specific low- or middle-range theories of a more "localized" (in the sense of locus-related) character. (See Hjern and Porter 1981) Like DeLeon (1999), H&H advise against reaching for a "grand unifying theory".

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS Wildavsky, Aaron (1964) The Politics of the Budgetary Process

Wildavsky notes during his interviews of government officials the behavior they described as strategic calculations, anticipating others' actions and reactions: budget is inextricably linked to political system. Descriptive theory to understand decisions w/in dynamic social frmwk. Argues that budget is based on an incremental advocacy system (see Lindblom 1959). Truth emerges from clash of perspectives. Rational actors attempt to reduce uncertainty. Potential losers protect the status quo. Risk aversion explains intractability of comprehensive reform. Result is a standing policy of incrementalism

Wilson, Woodrow. (1887) "The Study of Administration" PSQ

Wilson was not as influential as some later scholars would perceive; essay not cited extensively until the 1940s (Van Riper 1983) Two objectives of administrative study: (1) "what government can properly and successfully do"; (2) "how it can do these things with the utmost possible efficiency and the least possible cost" (efficiency & economy) "It is getting harder to run a constitution than to frame one." PA like a field of business "removed from the hurry and strife of politics". "Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics." "Administrative questions are not political questions." "If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly..."- Call for a comparative study of administration to import lessons from European states

HISTORY: ORTHODOXY Gulick, Luther (1936) Papers on the Science of Administration

Work coordination achieved in one of two ways: (1) superiors giving orders to subordinates (top to bottom) (2) a group of people having a collective agreement and working individually to achieve a common goal or idea Span of Control: exec can supervise lmtd # of employees effectively Unity of Command: employee should only have one direct supervisor; more than one leads to confusion and inefficiency Believed that structure and success of org was directly related to organization's successful division of labor: (1) specialization- allows individuals to excel in their areas of expertise and be more efficient; (2) time- tasks could be performed simultaneously, rather by a sequential process, increasing efficiency; (3) space/geography- allows tasks to be divided by location

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW Frederickson 2003 Governance Theory

a new theory of PA based on understanding the diffuse networks increasingly responsible for providing public service Argued to be a more empirically valid way of understanding how government programs actually operate, of providing a more realistic way to teach those preparing for careers in public sector, and offering more useful construction materials for theory building Much of the literature putatively about "governance" does not even bother to define the term (e.g., Osborne and Gaebler 1993) Governance is more an acknowledgement of the empirical reality of changing times than it is a body of coherent theory.

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW New Governance Stephen Osborne (2006)

also proposes that we are entering a new stage in PA. First stage (traditional PA) emphasized politics but gave short shrift to mgt and impltn. The next stage, NPM, focused on mgt, but used an unduly narrow conception of mgt that relegated democratic institutions to status of mere context, or outright impediments to managerial effectiveness. The new stage, new public governance (NPG), corrects these theoretical and practical shortcomings. NPG's roots in org sociology and network theory. NPG reconceptualizes: (1) the state as plural and pluralist (2) the focus of action (similar to Frederickson) as interorganizational governance (3) the emphasis of management as service processes and outcomes (4) nongovt actors as interdependent agents within ongoing relationships, (5) the primary governance mechanism as trust or relational contracts (See Bertelli/Smith 2010), (6) the value basis as what he calls 'neo-corporatist' rather than either traditional public service values or market-tested values.

GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW New Governance Salamon (2002)

announces "new governance" in Tools of Government (1) Urges fundamental shift in unit of analysis to the 'tool'; away from the org, policy, program, function, or outcome. Tool: 'an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to address a public problem' (2) Direct tools: classic direct government, regulation, and public info; Indirect tools: contracting, loan guarantees, tax expenditures, grants (3) Proposes framework for analyzing tools by: degree of coerciveness, directness, automaticity, and visibility; and analyses should guide public choice. (4) Policymakers must think in different terms about their work. Each tool is an institution in its own right: a distinctive way of achieving the goals of public policy or of organizing public service delivery

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: GOAL CONFLICT Organizational Cheating or "Goal Displacement" Bohte and Meier (2000):

assess Texas schools on their propensity to cut corners and use sampling bias to improve district pass rates on the state's standardized reading and mathematics tests (TAAS exams). Three types of cheating when org assessed on quantifiable performance measures: (1) Cutting corners: emphasis on the "production of outputs without regard to the quality of agency activity"; f(Limited resources) (2) Lying: exploiting info asymmetries; f(principals lack oversight mechanisms and rely on agency's own reporting) (3) Sampling bias: directing activity toward easy cases while diverting agency resources away from more difficult one (See Brown 1981 on "creaming")