PHI 111 Chap 2
According to emotivism, how do reasons function in moral discourse?
"For the emotivist, 'moral' reasons . . . are intended not to support statements (since there are no moral statements) but to influence the emotions of attitudes of others. Because moral utterances express emotions or attitudes [according to emotivism], 'presenting reasons' is a matter of offering nonmoral facts that can influence those emotions and attitudes" (42).
How does subjective relativism differ from cultural relativism?
"Subjective relativism [is] the view that an action is morally right if one approves of it. Moral rightness and wrongness are relative not to cultures but to individuals. An action then can be right for you but wrong for someone else" (30). "Cultural relativism is the view that an action is morally right if one's culture approves of it. Moral rightness and wrongness are therefore relative to cultures. So in one culture, an action may be morally right; in another culture, it may be morally wrong" (30). For Cultural Relativism, morality becomes a popularity contest. If most of the people in a particular culture approve of an action, take for example, premarital sex, then it is moral. If most of the people in a particular culture disapprove of a particular action, then it is immoral. As a result, morality can change over time. Indeed, in the United States, premarital sex was once considered highly immoral and its prohibition was enforced by law: it was illegal for a man and a woman to cohabitate or rent a motel room together unless they were married or blood-relatives. (As of 2013, it was still illegal in Mississippi, Michigan, Florida, and Virginia). In the USA in 1950, heterosexual couples who cohabitated would have been shunned by their communities, refused service at restaurants, prohibited from entering schools and churches, etc. Since the 1960's, most people have changed their attitudes, and premarital sex, while not approved of by everyone, seems to be accepted by the majority, and thus, is now morally permissible in the United States. However, this doesn't mean that it is moral (or immoral), just that more people now find it acceptable. This aspect of Cultural Relativism, that an action can be considered immoral at one time and then moral a few years later (or vise versa) is a serious flaw, and suggests that Cultural Relativism is a highly dubious moral theory.
How does subjective relativism imply moral infallibility?
"Subjective relativism implies that in the rendering of any moral opinion, each person is incapable of being in error. . . . If we approve of an action—and we are sincere in our approval—then that action is morally right. We literally cannot be mistaken about this because our approval makes the action right" (31).
What is the emotivist view of moral disagreements?
Emotivists "maintain that moral disagreements are not conflicts of beliefs . . . instead, moral disagreements are disagreements in attitude. . . . The disagreement is emotive, not cognitive." (41). I talked a lot about this on Chapter 1 when discussing the difference between normative ethics and metaethics.
What is the argument for cultural relativism? Is it valid?
In syllogism form the argument is this (from page 34): Major Premise: If people's judgements about right and wrong differ from culture to culture, then right and wrong are relative to culture, and there are no objective moral principles. Minor Premise: People's judgements about right and wrong differ from culture to culture. Conclusion: Therefore, right and wrong are relative to culture, and there are no objective moral principles. Yes, this argument is valid; however, the Major Premise is false: "even if the moral judgments of people in various cultures do differ, such difference in itself does not show that morality is relative to culture. . . . their disagreement does not prove that no view can be objectively correct" (34). So while the argument is Valid it is not Sound (see definitions of Valid and Sound Arguments on page 74). Consider two 5-year-olds debating where babies come from. One insists that according to her family (her culture), a stork brings the baby and drops it down the chimney. The other insists that according to his family (his culture), babies are found under cabbage leaves in the garden. According to Cultural Relativism, both children are correct. Their cultures determine which view is the "moral" one. However, we know that neither child is correct. Just because most of the people in a particular culture believe that a particular action is moral or immoral, it doesn't mean that it is. This is a significant problem with Cultural Relativism as a moral theory and suggests that it is highly dubious.
Does the diversity of moral judgement in cultures show that right and wrong are determined by culture? Why or why not?
No, it does not. "Even if the moral judgments of people in various cultures do differ, such difference in itself does not show that morality is relative to culture. . . . their disagreement does not prove that no view can be objectively correct" (34). I addressed this in question 6 above. However, Cultural Relativism shares the same flaws as Subjective Relativism but between cultures instead of individuals. According to Cultural Relativism, a culture can never be mistaken about its moral values. If a culture approves of it, then it is moral. If a culture approves of slavery, or genocide, or gender discrimination, or the accumulation of tremendous wealth while others starve, then those actions are moral. But it doesn't mean they really are. Also, like Subjective Relativism, no two cultures can ever disagree about morality. According to Cultural Relativism, if an action is considered moral by one culture and immoral by another culture, they are both right. They aren't really disagreeing, just observing that they have different attitudes about the issue. But as I suggested above with the example of the 5-year-olds, they could both just as easily be wrong. Popular opinion is not a sound basis for determining morality. And, like Subjective Relativism, these problems are fatal flaws for Cultural Relativism. Only Objectivism provides a logically viable basis for morality. According to objectivism, morality must be universal: the same act in similar circumstances cannot be both moral and immoral, such a contradiction is unacceptable, and any moral theory that suggests that a particular act can be both moral and immoral is highly dubious.
Does objectivism entail intolerance?
No, objectivism does not entail intolerance. "To advocate tolerance is to advocate an objective moral value" (36). "Rejecting cultural relativism (embracing moral objectivism) does not entail intolerance. In fact, it provides a . . . starting point for tolerance" (38).
Does objectivism require absolutism?
No, objectivism does not require absolutism. "Moral objectivism [is] the doctrine that some moral norms or principles are valid for everyone—universal, in other words—regardless of how cultures may differ in their moral outlooks. You need not hold [emphasis added], however, that the objective principles are rigid rules with no exceptions (a view known as absolutism) or that they must be applied in exactly the same way in every situation and culture" (29). One of the biggest criticisms of Kantian Ethics is its absolutism: the notion that we must perform a particular action, every time, without exception. According to Kant, if the moral action is to execute someone convicted of murder (capital punishment), then we must always do so. It doesn't matter how old they are, or whether they were victims of abuse, or if they were mentally or emotionally disabled, or if the person they killed deserved to die, or if by killing that person they saved thousands of lives, or if by executing them we will condemn thousands of others to die: no circumstances or consequences matter. If we have a categorical imperative to perform some act, we must perform it.
Can cultural relativists consistently advocate tolerance? Why or why not?
No. "Cultural relativists cannot consistently advocate tolerance. To advocate tolerance is to advocate an objective moral value. But if tolerance is an objective moral value, then cultural relativism must be false, because it says that there are no objective moral values. So instead of justifying tolerance toward all, cultural relativism actually undercuts universal tolerance. Moreover, according to cultural relativism, intolerance can be justified just as easily as tolerance can. If a culture approves of intolerance, then intolerance is right for that culture" (36-37).
How does subjective relativism imply that disagreement cannot happen?
Subjective relativism says that when a person states that an action is right, they are just saying that they approve of it, and if a different person states that that action is wrong, they are just saying that they disapprove of it. "They are not really disagreeing, merely describing their attitudes toward" that particular action (32). As I noted in the Chapter 1 review questions, these two experiences (in questions 4 and 5 above), making mistakes and having disagreements about morality, are common to everyone. Because Subjective Relativism suggests that they cannot happen, it is a highly dubious moral theory. These two problems are fatal flaws to the theory and, logically, we must reject Subjective Relativism as a viable moral theory.