PHIL 1730 Final

Like Peter Singer, Onora O'Neill argues that we have serious moral duties to assist the needy. But the form that duty takes is very different, according to O'Neill, than Singer's argument would lead one to believe. Compare and contrast their approaches; which is, on your view, closer to the truth?

-Both O'Neil and Singer believe that we have serious moral duties to assist the needy. However, while O'Neil is a Kantian while Singer is a utilitarian. As a result, their perceptions of the nature and scope of this duty vary drastically. -O'Neil focuses on people's intentions. For, example, according to Kant, the moral worth of one's actions is determined not by the act's consequences, but by the maxim, or intention, that governs the decision to act. -In addition, O'Neil adheres to one of the central claims of Kantian ethics, that one must never treat a person as a mere means, but always as an end. Using a person as a means involves an intention to involve the person in an action to which they could not in principle consent. Deception is an example of using a person as a means because that person might not have given consent if they knew the whole truth. Other ways of treating people as means include: coercion and violent action. In contrast, treating people as ends involves acknowledging them as autonomous, rational beings. According to O'Neil, our duty to assist the needy stems from our duty to treat people as ends. Therefore, the way in which we donate must promote the self sufficiency and autonomy of other beings. This may involve donating money to the building of a university that teaches people how to use their skills to make a living and support themselves. - In contrast, Singer believes that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it. --While the duty to assist the needy only extends insofar as we satisfy the self-sufficiency and autonomy of others in O'Neil's argument, it extends much farther in Singer's. - In Singer's argument, we have a duty to donate anything and everything we can until donating any more would cause comparable suffering on our parts. -I believe the form that duty takes in O'Neil's argument is closer to the truth. For example, consider the issue of high infant mortality rates in third world countries. The seems to be an intuitive answer. However, one argument gets it right while the other gets it wrong. Singer would argue that we have a duty to donate incubators because these technologically advanced machines have drastically reduced infant mortality rates in first world countries. In fact, this is exactly what many affluent nations have done. However, these incubators often do not get used because of a lack of electricity and a lack of understanding on how to use them. O'Neil would instead argue to donate money that goes toward classes that teach doctors and mothers how to reduce the risk of infant deaths. This would teaching the importance of mother-child contact and sterilizing rooms to prevent harmful bacteria. In fact, studies show that these techniques drastically reduce the risk of infant death. While donating incubators just throws money at a problem in the hopes of fixing it, donating money to fund informational classes promotes autonomy, allowing people in third world countries to solve a problem in their own way. Therefore, O'neil's argument is closer to the truth.

James Rachels thinks that our current practice of allowing people to refuse medical treatments (and so hasten their death) but denying them the right to kill themselves results in morally arbitrary decisions being made. Is he right about that? Why or why not?

-James Rachels thinks that active euthanasia is not any worse than letting someone die. In addition, he believes our current practice of allowing people to refuse medical treatments (and so hasten their death) but denying them the right to kill themselves results in morally arbitrary decisions being made. He uses the smith and jones case to support his argument. -For example, Smith and Jones would be in line to get an inheritance if their 6 year old cousin wasn't around. The pair separately decide to try and kill the young man, thereby clearing the way for them to receive the inheritance. In one scenario and outcome Smith waits for the cousin to have a bath, and then sneaks in and drowns him, making the death look accidental. In the other scenario and outcome, Jones waits for the cousin to have a bath, but as he walks into the bathroom to drown him, finds the cousin has slipped over, knocking himself unconscious and lying face down in the bath, already in the process of drowning. Instead of helping him (or assisting with the drowning process already occurring), Jones merely lets the cousin drown 'accidentally' thereby accomplishing the deed without action. -Rachels point is that there is no moral difference between Smith's action of drowning the cousin (killing) and Jones inaction of stopping the cousin from drowning (letting die), each of them are just as (morally) responsible for the cousin's death. It demonstrates that some cases of letting die are at least as bad as killing. Therefore, there is no morally relevant difference between killing and letting die. As a result, making moral decisions on this basis is arbitrary. -Rachels argument is not convincing because the smith and jones case is disanalogous to active euthanasia. For example, in active euthansia, also known as physician assisted suicide, the patient is seeking death. In contrast, the child in the smith and jones case does not want to die. Furthermore, smith and jones both have something to gain in killing the child, while physicians have nothing gain by helping their patients die. -therefore, Rachels analogy only shows that there is no morally relevant difference between killing someone who does not want to die and letting someone die who does no want to die. Since the analogy does not present a situation similar to physician assisted suicide, in which a person is seeking death, Rachels cannot claim that .... results in morally arbitrary decisions being made

Is Noonan right that there is no non-arbitrary criterion for personhood besides conception? What other possible criteria might one defend?

-Noonan argues that personhood starts at the moment of conception because all other criteria, such as viability, for determining personhood is completely arbitrary. -For example, lawmakers often allow abortion in the first few months of pregnancy because the fetus is not yet viable, or able to be removed from the mother and live apart from her. Since the fetus is not viable, it is not yet a person and therefore, can be aborted. However, Noonan argues that one cannot base personhood on viability because it is completely arbitrary. After all, advancements in technology have allowed many more premature babies to survive than one hundred years ago. In addition, due to technological advancements, babies in first world countries become viable at an earlier age than babies in third world countries. According to this logic, modern babies and first world babies become persons earlier than babies in the past and third world babies, a notion that is absolutely absurd. -While Noonan is right that viability is a completely arbitrary criterion for determining personhood, he fails to consider other criterion that are not. For example, 1.) Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain. 2.)Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems). 3.) Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control). 4.) The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics. 5.) The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both.

Is Nozick right that, even if people do not deserve the talents they have, they are nonetheless entitled to the fruits of their labor? Why or why not?

-Nozick's theory of justice claims that whether a distribution is just or not depends entirely on how it came about. -According to Nozick, a distribution is just if they were acquired in the right way, transferred in the right way, or any combination of the two. He uses the Lockean Proviso to show that a person is entitled to own what he makes, and appropriate anything not already owned, provided he leaves 'enough and as good' for others. For example, if I plow a field in order to plant crops, then I have mixed my labor with that field. Therefore, I am entitled to the crops produced on it. A just transfer consists of something that is voluntarily exchanged, such as a gift. A distribution is just insofar as it came about in a just manner -However, one might argue against this by saying that people are not responsible for the talents and abilities that they are born with. Therefore, they are not entitled to the things they acquire from these talents and abilities. -Nozick would disagree with this statement, however, because all though we do not do anything to deserve our bodies, we are entitled to them. Since we are entitled to our bodies, we are entitled to the things we acquire for them. -exclusionary property rights, such as the right to bodily autonomy. if did not have right, could be enslaved/ forced to do things against will- would not be just- therefore since exclusionary property rights are necessary, have a right to our bodies and the fruits of our labor

Peter Singer's direct argument for a strong duty to aid the needy depends crucially upon a key moral premise. Singer distinguishes a strong and weak version of that premise, and argues that only the weak version is needed to prove his conclusion. Is he right about that?

-Peter Singer's direct argument for a strong duty to aid the needy depends crucially upon a key moral premise. -He distinguishes a strong and weak version of that premise, and argues that only the weak version is needed to prove his conclusion. -Singer's strong argument states that: 1.)Absolute poverty is very bad 2.) If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we ought to do it. 3) We can prevent some absolute poverty without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance. 4.) Therefore, we ought to prevent some absolute poverty. - Singer's supports this argument by providing a pond analogy. For example, suppose I am walking to work when I see a child drowning in a pond. By saving the child, I will muddy my clothes. However, I am obligated to save the child because my clothes are not of comparable moral significance to saving a life. Now, suppose I am have plenty of food in my refrigerator, but I am really craving a burrito from Chipotle. Buying that burrito would make me happy and of course my happiness has moral significance. However, the temporary happiness I would get from buying the burrito is not more morally significant than saving a starving person's life in Africa. Therefore, since I am not sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, I ought to instead donate the money I would spend on the burrito to saving someone from starvation. Therefore, by proving that there is no morally relevant difference between the pond example and famine relief, Singer is able to reach the conclusion he wants about a strong duty to aid the needy. -The weaker version of Singer's argument is similar, except for one fundamental difference in premise 3. In the weaker version, "If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without sacrificing ANYTHING morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it." Singer believes his weaker version is also sufficient in motivating the Pond example, and getting him to the conclusion that he wants. However, one must consider the fact that some people believe aesthetics, such as the Mona Lisa or the Grand Canyon, have moral significance. According to Singer's weaker version, a person would not have to save the drowning child because the fact that their clothes would get muddy means they would be sacrificing something of aesthetic moral significance. Likewise, I could spend the money on the burrito that I want because donating it would involve sacrificing my temporary happiness, which is morally significant. -Of course this sounds absurd because the moral value of one's clothes is no where near the moral value of saving a child's life. Therefore, Singer's weaker version is not sufficient in motivating the pond example and nor sufficient in proving their is a strong duty to aid the needy.

How might a utilitarian respond to Rawls's argument for the second principle of justice? Would her response be convincing

-Rawls claims that a society is just if and only if it conforms to his two principles of justice: the principle of equal liberty and the difference principle. -Rawls's first principle of justice, the principle of equal liberty states that in a just society, each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberties compatible with similar liberties for all. Rawls's second principle of justice, the difference principle, states that a just society is one in which social and economic inequalities are arranged so that they are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged persons, and attached to positions open to all under conditions of equality of opportunity. It is important to note that Rawls's principles of justice are lexically ordered. Therefore, the first principle of justice is prioritized over the second principle of justice and the first stipulation of the second principle of justice is prioritized over the second stipulation. -A utilitarian would disagree with Rawls's second principle of justice because it strives to make the least advantaged in society better off. In other words, the second principle of justice maximizes the minimal position. However, the utilitarian believes that the best actions are the ones that maximize average utility. -This argument is not convincing, however, because maximizing utility seems to conflict with justice. By fixing on the sum of utilities, utilitarianism calls for freely trading off one person's happiness for another's. Any imposition of misery on a few must be acceptable under utilitarianism so long as it leads to an increase in the sum of happiness. For example, the world's wealth increased and mortality rates decreased as a whole due to slave labor. However, the distribution of these benefits were strictly limited to European societies. While it increased the sum of happiness, slavery impeded on the happiness and liberty of others. Furthermore, slavery directly violates the first principle of justice, which is prioritized over the second principle of justice. Therefore, since utilitarianism allows for the violation of human liberties, it is not the best way to promote a just society.

Rawls claims that a society is just if and only if it conforms to his "two principles of justice". What are the two principles of justice? How does Rawls argue for them? Is the argument persuasive?

-Rawls claims that a society is just if and only if it conforms to his two principles of justice: the principle of equal liberty and the difference principle. According to his argument, we must to imagine ourselves in what Rawls calls the Original Position. In the original position, we are all self-interested, rational persons and we stand behind "the Veil of Ignorance." To say that we are self-interested rational persons is to say that we are motivated to select, in an informed and enlightened way, whatever seems advantageous for ourselves. To say that we are behind a Veil of Ignorance is to say we do not know the following sorts of things: our sex, race, physical handicaps, generation, social class of our parents, etc. But self-interested rational persons are not ignorant of (1) the general types of possible situations in which humans can find themselves; (2) general facts about human psychology and "human nature". Self-interested rational persons behind the Veil of Ignorance are given the task of choosing the principles that shall govern the actual world. Rawls believes that he has set up an inherently fair procedure here. Because of the fairness of the procedure Rawls has described, he says, the principles that would be chosen by means of this procedure would be fair principles. Thus, self-interested rational persons behind the veil of ignorance would choose to structure society under the principle of equal liberty, in which each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberties compatible with similar liberties for all. Furthermore, self-interested rational persons behind the veil of ignorance would choose to structure society under the difference principle, in which social and economic inequalities are arranged so that they are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged persons, and attached to positions open to all under conditions of equality of opportunity. -yes -may not seem, for example-utilitarin may argue this -but.....

Some commentators have suggested that Mary Anne Warren's argument in defense of the permissibility of abortion will also commit her to defending infanticide. Warren argues that it will not. Who is right?

-Warren argues that all and only persons have moral rights, including the right to life, health, happiness, and freedom. However, according to Warren, a being that fails to meet her five conditions of personhood cannot be considered a person. The five condition of personhood include: 1.) Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain. 2.)Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems). 3.) Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control). 4.) The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics. 5.) The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both. Since a fetus fails to meet all five conditions of personhood, it is not a person. In contrast, any woman at the age to be capable of becoming a pregnant can at least meet some of the five conditions and is therefore, considered a person. Therefore, whatever rights a fetus has, if any at all, will always be outweighed by the mother's rights. Therefore, abortion is never morally impermissible when the fetus infringes upon the mother's rights. -However, some commentators may argue that newborn infants are not significantly more person-like than late-stage fetuses. Therefore, they are not persons either. Thus, if abortion is not murder, one might claim on similar grounds that infanticide is not murder. -Thompson would respond to this by arguing that while birth does not mark an overnight change in the infant's right to life, it does mark the end of a parent's right to determine its fate. As long as the infant is valued by someone, we would prefer that it not be gratuitously destroyed, provided others are willing to care for it. Indeed, one might argue that the infant's destruction would deprive others of the pleasure raising and caring for it. So, despite Warren's central claim that abortion is never morally impermissible, these considerations might be used to ground the claim that infanticide is morally impermissible. -talking about after birth

How does Philippa Foot argue that there is, often, a morally significant difference between killing and letting die? How convincing do you find her argument?

According to foot, 2 factors come into play in the morally significant difference between killing and letting die: One is the nature of agency, and the second is the nature of rights. She illustrates this with the following two stories. In Rescue I we can save either five people in danger of drowning in one place or one person drowning somewhere else. In Rescue II, we can save the five drowning people only by driving over and killing someone who is trapped on the road. In Rescue I we act permissibly if we save the five, even though the one dies as a result. We let the one die. In Rescue II we do not act permissibly if we save the five. The only way to save the five involves killing the one. The distinction, according to Foot, is between originating or sustaining a fatal sequence on the one hand, and allowing such a sequence to run its course on the other. It is often permissible, she claims, to bring about a harm by letting someone die while it is not permissible to bring about harm by killing. The different types of agency receive their moral significance via their connection with different types of rights: the right of non-interference and the right of goods and services. The right of non-interference includes the right for people not to interfere with your bodily autonomy while the tight to goods and services includes the right to receive aid. The right of non-interference is much stronger than the right to receive aid. For example, my right not to be poisoned is stronger than my right, if any, to be given the food I need to survive. Originating or sustaining a harmful sequence will usually involve the violation of a right to noninterference, whereas allowing such a sequence to run its course will, at most, involve the violation of a right to goods or services. The former type of right is stronger than the latter, so the former type of agency is less likely to be permissible than the latter. -The argument is convincing because it can accommodate the s & j case by keeping a distinction btw killing and letting die -both s & j are wrong but for different reasons -smith was the agent and violated right to noninterference -jones was not the agent but violates positive duty to provide aid to children (we have special obligation to aid children)

What does Rawls mean by the "burdens of judgment"? Is he right about the existence and degree of the "burdens of judgment"?

The burdens of judgement are obstacles such as: differences in life experiences, the complexity of varying evidence, and the necessity of weighing possible considerations, that explain why reasonable pluralism should be expected in public discourse. The fact of reasonable pluralism means that absent coercion, we should not expect any fundamental agreement on moral, philosophical, and cultural doctrines. Due to reasonable pluralism, we should justify our political actions according to a criterion of reciprocity and a duty of civility. -A criterion of reciprocity entails only exercising power when we reasonably believe others could accept the reasons offered. -Similarly, a duty of civility means we should act from and explain our political actions in terms we reasonably believe others could reasonably accept. -In other words, we should not justify our political actions on the basis of: Religious doctrines, philosophical theories, or cultural values -Some may claim that rawls is wrong about the existence and degree of the burdens of justice. Religious appeals and philosophical doctrines have often forwarded the cause of justice rather than impeding it. For example, abolition and civil rights movements in the US were full of biblical imagery about the nature of justice. -However, slavery was an enormous systematic injustice in society which made it acceptable for appeals to religious and other sentiments. While the burdens of judgement may not be so burdensome in societies with enormous systematic injustices, rawls is right that they are obstacles to public reason in a well ordered society in which everyone is regarded as equals.

Some people object to Nozick's account on the grounds that, given the actual history of the world we live in, it is simply useless. Why do they think this? Even if they are right, how serious a problem is it for Nozick's view?

The principle of rectification is central to Nozick's theory of justice. For example, if the chain of just transfers is broken anywhere down the line by an unjust transfer, then the principle of rectification means we must take action to rectify this past injustice. Rectifying past injustices is the only way to make a current unjust distribution just again. There are many historical justices in our society such as slavey and internment camps. However, it is impossible to quantify all that was lost during these year. Not only is it impossible to quantify what was lost, but it is impossible to know the totality of what was lost from material objects to things with sentimental value. Furthermore, the question of who such redistribution should go to comes into play. After all, everyone who was enslaved in the United States is now dead. All of these create serious problems for Nozick's view. If the principle of rectification is impossible, then Nozick's theory does not tell us anything about what a just society would look like.