Phil 279 Midterm

attributability

(Mason and Wilson's view) a person is morally responsible based on his/her deep evaluative attitudes rather than in their conscious self awareness -ex. it doesn't matter if you think slavery is wrong on a conscious level as long as you are motivated by the right reasons (ex. respect for the dignity of all people)

mixed action

(closer to voluntary) -initiative is internal/in the agent, but the action is chosen under constrained circumstances, meaning difficult circumstances -ex. throwing cargo off a ship if it is sinking or stealing bread to feed your starving family -agent is usually not responsible, but forgiven or pitied -if you will either be killed or have to torture another person, aristotle believes you should never torture someone

Lake Wobegon effect

(example of endowment) tendency of people to think that they are above-average in some socially desirable trait or intelligence, driving skills, etc. we also believe more favorable events are more likely to happen to ourselves than to others and less favorable events are less likely to happen to us. leads to self-serving responsibility assessments. -due to optimistic self assessments and self-based definitions of ability (think we are above average on ambiguous traits and think that what we are above average in is more important for success). when asked to give a specific definition of a trait/skill, it will reduce our tendency to rate ourselves as above average

the representative heuristic

(explains clustering illusion and hot hand fallacy) people assess similarities on the basis of superficial features and we use these to make judgments (ex. like goes w/ like)

voluntary action

(free action) -initiative is in the agent (choice/desire), meaning I started the action -action is done in knowledge or ignorance and is free of force, meaning I knowingly did the action and no one forced me to -agent is responsible (praised or blamed)

decision problem (Tversky and Kahneman)

(neutral) the act or options among which one must choose, and those acts' outcomes/contingencies

involuntary action

(not free) -initiative is external to the agent (doesn't trace back to the person's choice or desire) -action is due to ignorance of particulars or forced -ignorance of particulars: the particulars that constitute the action (who is doing the action, what you're doing, who you're affecting, what the action is for, how it's done) -ex. giving someone poisoned water that you did not know was poisonous. you would be involuntarily poisoning the person. -ex. of being forced: someone pushes you into someone else -agent feels regret -agent is not responsible

accountability

(social aspect of moral responsibility) focus on how we hold other people accountable through certain reactive attitudes (ex. whether it is appropriate to feel gratitude towards you)

Frankfurt

-Compatibilist -morally responsible w/ determinism -argues that even in some cases where we couldn't have done otherwise, we can still be held morally responsible -free will is compatible w/ causal determinism

Aristotle

-Libertarian -believes we are sometimes free, and are morally responsibly for those actions that we perform freely

rational choice theory

-Tversky and Kahneman claim that using this theory as a normative theory has its problems -decisions based on expected utility (benefits, outcomes) -express personal preferences -people make consistent choices

principle of alternate possibilities (PAP)

-a principle that is assumed in the libertarian and determinist accounts of moral responsibility. the accounts assume that free will is incompatible w/ causal determinism (incompatibilism) -"a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise" -if all choice would have the same result, then you are not free (and not morally responsible)

multi-faceted observations

-a result of multiple endpoints -ex. Barnum effect: taking a personality test and reading the description is so multi-faceted that something will stand out to you as describing your personality.

Jones 2

-action was result of threat; it was coerced (threat leads to action) -is responsible for his decision, but not the action -person wants to kill his friend. then person is threatened that if they kill their friend, then their whole family will be killed. the person then forgets that he was going to kill his friend and the action is only determined by the threat.

nonvoluntary action

-agent lacks complete awareness of the action -no regret felt -agent is not responsible -ex. something falls out of your bag and you don't notice it, then it trips someone

prospect theory

-aimed at replacing rational choice theory as both a normative and descriptive theory. Tversky and Kahneman claim that prospect theory better describes how people actually make decisions -people make choices on the basis that values are reference dependent (make choices based on your current state, any loss or gain is measured against what you already have) -in gains, risk-averse (not take risks when something is framed as a gain) -in losses, risk-seeking -losses loom larger than gains

probabilistic sciences

-deal w/ phenomena that are not perfectly predictable and with causes that are generally neither necessary nor sufficient. -soft sciences (psychology, economics) -help us deal w/ the messy world -may be more effective -teaches statistical and methodological reasoning

Jones 1

-decision leads to action -threat has no effect -morally responsible -person wants to kill his friend. then person is threatened that if they kill their friend, then their whole family will be killed. the person is not affected by the threat because he already made the decision to kill his friend.

Jones 3

-decision leads to action, could not have done otherwise -if he decided not to act, the threat would have came in and forced him to act -so, he is morally responsible despite threat. -it was not the threat that caused him to act, but it would have been if he had not already came up w/ a motive to perform the action

the practical syllogism (Aristotle)

-decision making procedure/deliberation process that an agent goes through when making a decision 1. wish: goal, value (ex. I want to be just.) 2. universal premise: general moral principle (ex. stealing is unjust) -universal ignorance is not permissable (you are free and responsible if you claim that your ignorance is of some universal moral principle, such as stealing being wrong) 3. particular premise: looking at the situation you're in and determining what's going on in the situation (ex. If I take this item w/o permission, it is stealing.) 4. choice: conclusion, the result of deliberation (the first 3) (ex. Therefore, I will not take this person's property w/o permission)

Strawson

-determinist, believes there is no moral responsibility, we are not free at all

moral-epistemic vices

-epistemic: knowledge (intellectual motivation) -moral: ex. kind or cruel involves different motivations that are both moral and epistemic, a vice that has both a neglect of the truth and also moral considerations -ex. George bush had a failure of motivation not only for kindness and justice, but also for knowledge and truth

sunk cost effect

-people demonstrate a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made -takes into account earlier losses rather than just evaluating that last bet that is a long shot (ex. Bettor)

Jones 4 (can disprove PAP)

-shows that one can be morally responsible in some cases where one can't do otherwise -example where it is truly impossible to do otherwise (threats make it hard, but not impossible) -Jones 4 is rigged, character Black says a word that will activate Jones 4 performing the action Black wants him to perform. Black can read Jones 4 and determine whether or not he is going to go through w/ a decision. if Jones 4 makes the decision to kill his friend and goes through w/ it, then Black will never activate the rigging (hypnosis). but if Jones 4 decides not to kill his friend, Black says the magic word and Jones 4 is under hypnosis and he kills his friend. So he will kill his friend no matter what. -if Jones 4 makes the decision and performs the action w/o the mental rigging, then he would be morally responsible (intuitively). Frankfurt concludes that PAP is false bc Jones 4 is responsible despite not being able to do otherwise.

the regression fallacy

-we misunderstand instances of statistical regression. we are less conservative in our predictions, which gives rise to the regression fallacy. -ex. if score is really good, we think it will come together perfectly again next time -if we have an instance of an above average performance, we are more likely the next time around to regress to our mean/our normal average. -ex. sports illustrated jinx (have a bad game right after being on cover of sports illustrated).

vice (how to have a vice)

1. mirror of virtue: you have persistence, strength, and robustness, but you have the wrong targets and not valuable targets (ex. motivated towards being cruel to people) 2. motivational failure: you don't have the wrong targets, but you're motivation is weak

no-action default (Johnston & Goldstein)

a condition imposed when an individual fails to make a decision

self-handicapping

an interpersonal strategy we use to explain away our subpar performances, we attempt to manage how other people perceive us by controlling what they attribute to our performances

feigned self-handicapping

claiming there are obstacles -ex. old people saying they have back pain/injury when they play a sport for the first time in a long time (usually not as true as they claim)

confirmation bias

confirmatory information has an excessive impact on our beliefs. people focus on positive or confirmatory instances while gathering/evaluating information relevant to their hypotheses and downplay any counter evidence. -ex. if I have a belief and I went proof for it, I tend to seek any evidence that would prove my belief. if I come across anything that disproves it, I would find explanations for why it doesn't actually disprove my belief.

decision frame (Tversky and Kahneman)

decision-maker's conception of decision problem

law of large numbers

even if on small parts of the data set there appears to be clusters, after a larger number of those instances there will be a more even split. -ex. tossing a coin 100 times will make it more likely to have an equal 50/50 split, but there may be a streak of 6 heads and one tail in one part of the data set (clustering illusion)

one-and two-sided events

events that are either temporally focused or temporally unfocused

multiple endpoints

expectations can often be confirmed by multiple outcomes. many things can fulfill our expectations (ex. prophetic dreams are vague and open ended and can be confirmed by multiple events happening to you) -ex. most people are not well-adjusted -ex. taking vitamin C relieves cold symptoms

ad hoc explanations

forming an explanation on the spot that gives us evidence in support of our false beliefs -ex. our ability to explain why we are above or below average when we are told so -ex. if someone says you did way above average on an exam but you really didn't, and you say it was b/c you studied a lot or are naturally smart -when a person poses an explanation that is disputed by evidence the person has to resort to untestable answers to salvage their claim

-believed to be suggestions -going against default takes effort -defaults represent/indicate what most people believe/do

how do defaults influence choices? (Johnston & Goldstein)

-believes none of them disprove PAP -he does not think they are good enough examples -either no coercion involved (so the person is morally responsible) or the actions are coerced (so no moral responsibility)

how does Frankfurt view Jones 1, 2, and 3?

-thinks it is false -believes a person can be morally responsible even if they couldn't have done otherwise (his example of Jones shows a case where a person could not have done otherwise, but is still morally responsible)

how does Frankfurt view the PAP?

-consider the source -trust facts, distrust projections (no one knows future) -lookout for sharpening and leveling (saying as many as 500 vs. saying between 1 and 500 people could be affected) -be wary of testimonials (not a common experience)

how should we evaluate secondhand information?

the hidden or absent data problem

lacking access to some data, when data is unavailable -ex. when trying to decide what route to take while driving home, once you choose the route to take, the other route now becomes hidden or absent data. you can never know how long it would have taken you to take that other route. -special instance of this: self-fulfilling prophecy

self-fulfilling prophecy

mechanism that translates our expectation of something into a confirmatory action -either real/true or seemingly fulfilled/feigned -real: actually bring it about that confirmation bias occurs -ex. a teacher's expectation affects a student's outcome (like if the teacher thinks that student is better than others and so then treats them differently which allows the student to succeed) -seemingly fulfilled prophecy/feigned: our expectations alter the world in such a way that limit responses, making it difficult to confirm or disconfirm our beliefs. we don't bring it about -ex. if we think someone is unfriendly, we may not talk to them. then we take their not talking back to us as signs of their unfriendliness

the clustering illusion

naturally seeing order when there is none -want to make sense of the world around us, but we overapply this tendency -tend to think that if a data set is random, every bit of the set should look random. we don't take into account that certain data tends to cluster in certain segments of the random data set. ex. hot hand fallacy

explicit-consent (opt-in)

nobody is an organ donor w/o registering to be one (you're not a donor unless you opt-in)

minimal accounts

only evaluating the actions based on some immediate outcome

presumed-consent (opt-out)

people are organ donors unless they register not to be (you're a donor unless you opt-out)

groupthink

people want to maintain group cohesion so will go along w/ what the group is saying instead of sharing their contrary views (becomes exaggerated sense of agreement), our own beliefs get shaped w/o scrutiny ex. presidential advisory groups, withholding reservations

real self-handicapping

placing a real obstacle to doing well -ex. deciding not to study so you can blame your poor grade on the exam on the fact that you didn't study, and it doesn't indicate that you're not smart

deterministic sciences

sciences such as chemistry and many branches of physics that typically deal with much tidier phenomena for which the causal connections are more often necessary and sufficient.

hedonic asymmetry

stand out to us when they give a rise to some emotion or causes us to have to do something -ex. phone always rings when we're in the shower. it only stands out to us when it happens and causes us to feel emotion such as annoyed -ex. the vending machine only working when you want something -milkshake machine at mcdonalds never works

two-sided events

temporally focused: ex. we know at the end of a football game who will win or lose -at a certain time we will have an answer whether it is positive or negative -events stand out and register regardless of how they turn out -ex. I'm so mad I failed that test -ex. My hypothesis was confirmed

one-sided events

temporally unfocused: no set time where some result is going to occur (ex. prophetic dream) -seem to only stand out to us when they don't go our way

hot hand fallacy

the belief that success breeds success and failure breeds failure (ex. athlete getting "hot". if they hit shots, people think the probability they will hit more of their next shots increases)

inclusive accounts

the outcomes of the act affect the balance, we take into account earlier losses (sunk cost effect)

false consensus effect

the tendency for people's own beliefs, values, and habits to bias their estimates of how widely such views and habits are shared by others

sharpening and leveling

the tendency to emphasize (sharpen) the jist of the message and to de-emphasize (level) the less essential details, so that the secondhand accounts become cleaner w/ less ambiguity or inconsistencies (the point is sharper) -not always bad

definitional asymmetry

the way we define things makes something one-sided by definition -nature of belief makes it impossible to be disconfirmed -ex. people getting better once they hit rock bottom, we sort of define rock bottom as a point just before they start to turn things around -ex. she won't do better until she truly decides to work at it

secondhand information

things you learn about from other people rather than directly or from your own experience. -sharpening and leveling is a big problem w/ this

virtue (how to have a virtue)

valuable targets, persistence, strength, and robustness -Mason and Wilson will endorse a personal worth conception (sees virtue as deeply involved w/ an agent's motivations). when persistence, strength, and robustness are met to a sufficient level, then a person can be said to have a virtue

-no evidence: ignorance probably not caused by vice plenty of evidence: a. cognitive impairment (shouldn't be blamed for ignorance) b. bizarre circumstances (shouldn't be blamed for ignorance) c. clear-eyed akrasia: you knowingly put yourself in an ignorant position/state (ex. doctor decides not to test a patient for allergies before giving a drug, then the patient has a reaction, the doctor should be blamed b/c he knowingly put himself in an ignorant position since he knew he had to test for allergies and failed to do it) d. ignorant through vice (Mason and Wilson argue you can be blamed and are morally responsible) scant or culturally obscured evidence: -everyone is ignorant. (ex. slavery is good) therefore no one is blameworthy. (Mason and Wilson argue that whether normatively or statistically understood, this is problematic) -everyone is ignorant. this implies an exculpatory factor. therefore no one is blameworthy. if everyone is ignorant, there must be some factor involved that causes their ignorance that they're not responsible for. (is the factor difficulty/hard to see beyond that ignorance?) -Mason and Wilson distinguish between internal vs. external barriers. (what makes the knowledge difficult to attain) internal barriers, like a vice, may make it difficult to see if something is wrong but it doesn't mean that you shouldn't be blamed for the ignorance. internal barriers don't exculpate. Mason and Wilson believe external barriers can clear a person from blame, but the example of cultural moral ignorance isn't necessarily an external barrier. Why? there is always some evidence that a widespread cultural phenomenon is bad when it is bad, and some agents in a culture do see that evidence. the people that recognize it have a good will and they don't have vices.

vice and cultural ignorance: what are ways cultural ignorance stems from a vice? (and thus we can be blameworthy for it)

endowment effect

we tend to overvalue our own properties/lives simply b/c it is connected to us in some way -beliefs about ourselves -ex. Lake Wobegon effect

self-serving beliefs

we're more likely to attribute our failures to our circumstances than to ourselves. whereas when we look at others we attribute their failures to their character/to themself. we don't consider the circumstances as much. we also give more charitable evaluations to our own performances than others do. (over valuing of our own abilities)

1. avoid drawing conclusions from incomplete or unrepresentative data 2. "consider the opposite" strategy (when gathering evidence) 3. dealing w/ secondhand accounts 4. be wary of false consensus effect (just b/c someone doesn't explicitly disagree w/ us, we shouldn't think that means that person agrees w/ us) 5. be wary of inputing order on random data

what are Gilovich's 5 mental habits used to correct for poor reasoning?

1. compatibilist: (Frankfurt may make this objection) moral responsibility for what one does as long as not caused by any of a certain kind of constraints (klepto-impulses, neuroses, alien desires, hypnosis, threats, physical force) -response: this is not true moral responsibility 2. libertarian: agents in an undetermined world can have free will. -response: how is this different than luck? 3. appeal to the self: one's self is independent of one's character/personality/motivational structure (can act out of character on the basis of what the self decides) -response: the self is also problematized by the basic argument (basic argument applies). Strawson believes the self makes decisions in characteristic ways and we are not responsible for forming the self

what are Strawson's responses to the 3 objections to his basic argument?

-actions done in ignorance: unknown cause of ignorance, but we put ourselves in the state of ignorance and are still responsible (ex. telling someone's secret while you are very drunk) -actions due to ignorance: action caused by ignorance, you are not responsible (ex. giving someone poisoned water that you did not know was poisonous. you would be involuntarily poisoning the person)

what are actions done in ignorance vs. actions due to ignorance? (Aristotle)

cognitive/motivational causes: -kind of info/people we're exposed to -desire to maintain self-esteem social causes: -inadequate feedback from others (people agree w/ us anyways or are reluctant to openly question our beliefs). evidence: people who live alone worry about developing odd habits, etiquette handouts/social norms, changing how you talk depending on audience. it is unpleasant to be in conflict and we want others to like us.

what are causes of the false consensus effect?

-self-aggrandizement: motivation to see oneself as infallible (people don't want to be wrong, they hold on to their beliefs and may fail to see if they are wrong in a moral matter) -laziness: motivation to comfort, motivational causes of cognitive biases, motivation to conformity -apathy: failure of strength (don't care enough)

what are examples of moral-epistemic vices? (Mason and Wilson)

hedonic, base-rate, pattern, definitional

what are the different asymmetries of one-sided events?

-exaggerated immediacy -omit qualifications (ex. chocolate makes you lose weight. you omit the fact that it is only one type of chocolate) -stretch facts (for sake of informativeness) ex. exaggerate the danger/risk of something -combining experience w/ data

what are the distortions of sharpening and leveling?

name-dropping, boasting, "coming on strong," "holding forth" (dominating conversation), showing off -flattery doesn't count since it normally works

what are unsuccessful social strategies used in an attempt to sound awesome and increase their self-esteem/reputation?

ambiguous data: our interpretations are sometimes affected by our preconceptions -optional stopping -one-and-two-sided events -multiple endpoints (multi-faceted observations)

what biases arise when we are looking at ambiguous data?

-confirmation bias -the hidden or absent data problem (self-fulfilling prophecy) -incomplete data ex. you know someone who cured cancer through mental imagery, so you think cancer can be cured through mental imagery

what biases arise when we are looking at incomplete data sets?

-the clustering illusion (hot hand fallacy, representative heuristic, law of large numbers) -the regression fallacy (sports illustrated jinx) -ad hoc explanations

what biases arise when we are looking at random data sets?

-even when no effort was required, being in an opt-in condition affected how many people would be donors compared to being in a neutral or opt-out condition. opt-in imposes the cost of switching. -whether you live in an opt-in or opt-out country will affect your preferences and consequently your decision -conclude that we should consider that all policies have a no-action default (physical, cognitive, or emotional costs), we should think of saving lives

what do Johnston and Goldstein conclude?

-ignorance can be culpable even in a situation of widespread cultural ignorance if the ignorance stems from a flawed will -blameworthiness does not require previous self-conscious act of wrongdoing

what do Mason and Wilson believe?

-vices are culpable. (deserve blame) therefore, ignorance that follows from vices is culpable. (deserve blame) -ex. person should be blamed for their laziness. if ignorance to some moral truth is caused by their laziness and not wanting to consider other viewpoints, then they should be blamed for their ignorance

what do Mason and Wilson conclude?

we are responsible for the actions that stem from our character because we are responsible for forming our character (i.e., performing voluntary actions that develop character).

what is Aristotle's argument for responsibility for character?

"a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only b/c he could not have done otherwise" -if black activated the rigging, then the only reason Jones 4 would have killed his friend was b/c he was coerced/rigged in some way. -but, if he made the decision and it had the result that he intended, then that is not b/c he could not have done otherwise. it is b/c of his decision

what is Frankfurt's revised PAP? (his view of moral responsibility)

-argues no, we are not truly morally responsible 3 premises: 1. you do what you do b/c of the way you are 2. so, to have true and moral responsibility for what you do, you must be truly morally responsible for the way you are-at least in certain crucial mental respects. 3. but, you can't be truly morally responsible for the way you are, so you can't be truly morally responsible for actions (conclusion: no moral responsibility for actions) -experiences/family/other people's influences affect who you are but are external to you (can't control it) -to be responsible for an action, you have to be responsible for the character that caused that action. But to be responsible for that character, you have to be responsible for becoming or developing into that character, and nobody is. -any time we make a decision to change our character, it is always in the context and influence of things outside of our control -we can never be truly morally responsible for any of our actions

what is Strawson's basic argument?

believes that true moral responsibility is the kind of responsibility that makes sense for most people. this is the kind that heaven and hell makes sense with. -he thinks it would only make sense to punish or reward people if they were truly morally responsible (if they were truly responsible for what they do based on who they were, if they were responsible for the kind of person that they are) -morally responsible for action only if morally responsible for who you are

what is Strawson's view of moral responsibility?

-ignorance of particulars: not responsible, unaware of the particulars that constitute the action (who is doing the action, what you're doing, who you're affecting, what the action is for, how it's done) -ex. giving someone poisoned water that you did not know was poisonous. you would be involuntarily poisoning the person. -ignorance of universals: responsible, you are free and responsible if you claim that your ignorance is of some universal moral principle, such as stealing being wrong

what is ignorance of particulars vs. ignorance of universals in Aristotle?

both cognitive and motivational mechanisms -gilovich believes we have some initial motivation for self-serving beliefs (we want to believe we're better than average) and we maintain this belief through cognitive mechanisms (the kind of evidence we consider, how much evidence we consider, how we judge it to be sufficient)

what mechanisms support self-serving beliefs?

framing bias (Tversky and Kahneman)

when a preference is shown for one option even though each have equal expected value

base-rate departure asymmetry

when people follow social norms it does not stand out to us but when people break those norms, it does stand out to us. -outcome violates our expectation and stands out in our memory -ex. she always calls me w/o texting first. you're not supposed to do that

certainty effect

when there is a certain gain, (such as a sure win of $30), people are more likely to choose that option than when there is a similar probability though no certainty

pattern asymmetry

when there is a pattern, it stands out to us. -numerical, spatial, temporal -ex. we always wake up at 1:11 am -ex. every guy I like drives a blue car

pseudocertainty effects

when there is a perception of some kind of certainty but there is actually no certainty (ex. getting a sure win of $30 but only if you make it to the second stage of the game)

optional stopping

when we are looking for evidence and we stop as soon as we get evidence that confirms our beliefs

exaggerated immediacy

while telling a story about something that happened to someone else they know, the tendency that people have to change it so that it now happened to them or someone closer to them. so they exaggerate how close they were to the happening that they're telling about. -type of distortion in sharpening and leveling

distortions for the sake of entertainment, being informative, self-serving reasons, or plausibility

why do people use sharpening and leveling?

-inadequate feedback from others -confirmation bias -hidden data problem

why do we continue to use unsuccessful social strategies even though we know they are ineffective?