Phil Final
What is it for an argument to be deductively valid? What is the difference between strong deductive and inductive arguments?
1) An argument is deductively valid if it is impossible for the premises to be true while the conclusion is false; If the premises are true the the conclusion must be true Example: a) If today is Tuesday its taco time b) Today is Tuesday ... so it is taco time 2) An inductive argument aims to show that a conclusion is likely and not necessarily certain Example: The odds of winning the lottery are .001 .... This lottery ticket is a loser
Explain one of Baron Reed's objections to the pragmatic encroachment view of knowledge/justification.
1) Knowledge and High Stakes objection -- I am taking part in a psych study that rests the efforts of stress and memory. I am asked a question: when was Julius Cesar born? If I give the correct answer, I get a jelly bean. If I give an incorrect answer, I am given a horrible electric shock. Nothing happens if I give no answer. I remember that Cesar was born in 100 BC but I am not sure if that is worth risking electrocution. Nevertheless, I quietly say to myself, "I know it's 100 BC" --- Notice that in this scenario it is plausible that I retain my knowledge even though the practical stakes are so high it isn't rational for me to act on it. If this is right, it is a case in which knowledge isn't sufficient for rational action. Notice, too, that it is natural for me to continue to attribute knowledge to myself, even when I recognize that I shouldn't treat it as a reason to act.
What is the "throwing away evidence" objection to the conciliatory view of peer disagreement?
1) One objection to conciliatory views is that it seems to sanction throwing away evidence. 2) When 2 peers disagree about some proposition, P, isn't it quite possible that one party to the disagreement, say Esther, has initially reasoned well while the other, Emile, reasoned poorly? Shouldn't Esther have received more epistemic credit for her initial assessment than Emile? This record of good vs bad reasoning should not be erased from the epistemic ledger, as it was. It should not disappear from the 2 agents lists of total epistemic credit in this particular epistemic task. 3) In general, they may deserve equal marks for reasoning well in the past. 4) In this particular occasion, since Esther reasoned much better than Emile did in the early phase of reflection, this fact should not be allowed to disappear from the record; it should not be thrown away. 5) The throwing away evidence objection: Conciliationism seems to imply that only evidence about what you believe and others believe matters. The original evidence doesn't.
Explain one argument in favor of the conciliatory view of the problem of peer disagreement.
1) People in peer disagreement situations who abandon their initially firm beliefs and move in the direction of their peer conform to conciliationism. 2) The idea is that each should conciliate with his peer. This would apply even if we frame the problem of peer disagreement to include more fine-grained attitudes than belief, disbelief and suspension of judgement. 3) Conciliatory view says to: a) Become agnostic or b) significantly less confident 4) An argument is the uniqueness theory. In regards to Lefty & Righty. For example, you have to suspend judgement in this case.
Why does Sarah Stroud think that friendship may require that we be epistemically irrational?
1) She believes that friendship constitutively involves being partial in one's beliefs as well as emotions. 2) As a friend, you are to always defend them and be there for their good. Stroud uses the example of your friend being accused of sleeping with someone and not calling them the next day. It is your job as a friend to defend them and be on their side. This would require epistemic irrationality. Without having this in friendship then you are violating the norms of friendship and are considered a bad friend.
Who does Socrates say is wise, and what is his account of wisdom?
1) Socrates says that the man who knows he is not wise is wise. Socrates believes that those who believe they are wise and have a high level of knowledge are ignorant. Socrates knows that he doesn't know and thus no one is wiser than he is. He believes that only gods are wise and craftsmen have a kind of wisdom because they know things and have a talent to do things that no one else can do. 1) Wisdom is about virtue and care of the soul (belongs to the gods and which poets can sometimes share in inspiration) 2) Wisdom about other matters in human life (belongs to craftsmen and politicians) 3) The recognition of the distinction between 1 and 2 together with the acknowledgement that one does not have wisdom 1
In what ways does the pragmatic encroachment theory of knowledge differ from contextualism?
1) The contextualist maintains that "knows" is similarly context-sensitive. The thesis for contextualism is: "Knows" varies in its sense across contexts of speech in such a way that "S knows P" can have one sense of use and another context. These senses of "know" vary by demandingness, so that there are stronger and weaker senses 2) Whereas, pragmatic encroachment is the thesis that differences in pragmatic factors - factors broadly related to the "practical" sphere, such as stakes - can make a difference to knowledge. Why believe this thesis? -- One argument simply appeals to the Bank Cases: Doesn't it seem that you don't know in Case B? And doesn't it seem that you do know in Case A? If so, this is evidence that knowledge varies across these cases alike except for variations in pragmatic factors and in particular stakes.
Why have some philosophers held that contextualism is supported by the "Bank Cases" (originally given by Keith DeRose)?
1) The thesis for contextualism is: "Knows" varies in its sense across contexts of speech in such a way that "S knows P" can have one sense of use and another context. 2) Contextualists might argue: a) In Bank Case A, you speak the truth when you say, "I know it'll be open." b) In Bank Case B, you speak the truth when you say, "Well, no I don't know it'll be open." c) Your epistemic position - which standards you meet, which possibilities you can rule out, how strong your justification is, how reliable you are, and so forth - is the same across Cases A and B. d) If your epistemic position across the cases is the same, then if "know" had the same sense in the 2 contexts (the contexts of the 2 cases), then you couldn't speak the truth in both cases in saying what you do. e) So, "know" must have a different sense in the 2 contexts. That is Contextualism about "know" is true. 3) Premise 1 and 2 seem plausible for 2 reasons. First, ordinary people do say things like this in a perfectly serious way without relying on mistakes factual assumptions in doing so. This doesn't entail that they speak truly but we might think it is good evidence that they do. Second, don't these statements seem intuitively correct? That again isn't decisive, but it is evidence. Premise 3 is presumably guaranteed by the description of the cases. And Premise 4 seems very plausible, insofar as it seems that whether a subject knows is a matter of how strong the subjects epistemic position is, which epistemic standards he or she meets and so forth. It is not a matter of practical stakes, nor is it a matter of whether the conversation has taken a certain shape, and practical stakes and conversational context are the only difference between Case A and Case B.
Explain Richard Feldman's "Uniqueness Thesis" and offer one argument for it.
1) This is the idea that a body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing set of propositions (e.g., one theory out of a bunch of exclusive alternatives) and that it justifies at most one attitude toward any particular proposition. As I think of things, our options with respect to any proposition are believing, disbelieving, and suspending judgment. The Uniqueness Thesis says that, given a body of evidence, one of these attitudes is the rationally justified one. 2) Argument: a) Uniqueness Thesis: A body of evidence justifies at most one doxastic attitude (e.g., belief, disbelief, or suspension of belief) toward a proposition. b) Andy and Betty are epistemic peers who have consulted the same evidence regarding p. c) Thus, either Andy or Betty is unjustified in believing what they do. d) Since Andy and Betty justifiably regard each other as epistemic peers, neither is justified in thinking that they are the one who has reasoned well with respect to the evidence for p. e) If you are not justified in thinking that you have reasoned well with respect to the evidence for or against p, then you are not justified in believing or disbelieving p. f) Thus, Andy and Betty are justified in withholding belief that p.
One argument for pragmatic encroachment depends on an epistemic principle connecting knowledge with action. If you know that p, then it is rational to act as if p is true. Explain.
1) This refers to the fallibilism. 2) Given fallibilsm, there is some case - call it LOW - in which you are justified in acting on a proposition P. (ie, in performing the action that P is a reason to perform). In LOW, the difference between the level of warrant you have for P and the warrant needed for absolute certainty in P doesn't make a difference to what you are justified in doing. But now imagine a different case, HIGH. In HIGH, you're in an identical epistemic position, as far as how warranted you are in P. However, in HIGH, because of the stakes involved, the difference between the level of warrant you have for P and the warrant needed for absolute certainty in P does make a difference to what you are justified in doing. In particular, you're not justified in HIGH in acting on P. Thus, by KJ, you don't know P in HIGH. But you do know P in LOW. It follows that knowledge can vary across cases alike except for the variation in a pragmatic factor, namely the practical stakes. That is, it follows that pragmatic encroachment is true.
Why does Alvin Plantinga think that, in addition to being reliably formed, a warranted belief must result from a proper functioning faculty?
Alvin Plantinga (1993) argues that not just any de facto reliable process provides a basis for justified belief. For example, suppose S has a brain lesion that causes her to believe that she has a brain lesion, but she has no other evidence for that belief (and perhaps has some evidence against it). Is her belief that she has a brain lesion warranted? Plantinga thinks not, and concludes that a belief is warranted, hence constitutes knowledge, only if formed from a properly functioning cognitive process or faculty. Because it is natural to suppose that the brain lesion case involves an improperly functioning process, one can conclude that S's belief is unwarranted. A belief is warranted if and only if your cognitive apparatus is functioning properly, working the way it is supposed to work , in producing and sustaining it. If our cognitive apparatus is not properly functioning we may be misled in our beliefs. For example, if a bird loses a wing it can no longer fly and it loses its ability to move different places until it is healed and even then it wont function properly. Or your doctor informs you of a thyroid problem, you may end up needing to get a synthetic thyroxin.
In what way or ways is Goldman's "Barn Façade Country" different from other Gettier cases? What reasons might there be for thinking that the subject of the case actually knows that there is a barn?
Barn Façade Country (Goldman 1976). Unbeknownst to him, Henry is driving in an area of the country where the residents have put up very realistic looking barn facades. While looking at what happens to be the only genuine barn in the county, Henry believes "that is a barn." Henry's belief is justified, according to TK, because Henry's visual experience justifies his belief. According to NTK, his belief is justified because Henry's belief originates in a reliable cognitive process: vision. Yet Henry's belief is plausibly viewed as being true merely because of luck. Had Henry noticed one of the barn-facades instead, he would also have believed that there's a barn over there. There is, therefore, broad agreement among epistemologists that Henry's belief does not qualify as knowledge. Neither the possession of evidence nor origination in reliable faculties is sufficient for ensuring that a belief is not true merely because of luck. traditional and a non-traditional approach = TK and NTK This is different than other Gettier cases because it involves no deductive reasoning at al. Gettier cases involve people making deductions from falsehoods to truths. It is when a person has a justified true belief but lacks knowledge. When compared to Gettier Case 1, Smith, Jones and the job, there is deductive reasoning. This case is plausible through reason however the Barn scenario is not it is primarily based on experiences. Henry believes just on experience however we can see that Henry doesn't know. He could have easily been wrong and was wrong many times before and after seeing the sole genuine barn. Reason to believe there actually is a barn: The deductive closure of knowledge: If you know P, O entails Q and you completely deduce Q from P, believing P as a result of the deduction, then you know Q.
What is the "New Evil Demon Problem" for externalist accounts of justification?
Descartes entertained the idea that an evil demon systematically deceived him, causing even his perceptual experiences to mislead him about his surroundings. Contemporary reliablists use the new evil demon problem to pose a counterexapmple to reliabism. Since the character in the evil demon world is systematically deceived by his perceptual experiences, his perceptual belief forming processes must be unreliable. Hence, he isn't justified in believing their outputs. Such beliefs should be classified as justified because agents in an evil demon world have the same experiences as people I the actual normal world. Basically, it is the problem that arises once we acknowledge that it is possible that someone might have had (apparent) perceptual experiences and memories indistinguishable from our own that were induced by a powerful demon bent on deceiving this hapless subject. On a reliabilist view, since you cannot have a justified belief about some matter unless the means by which you arrive at that belief is reliable, it seems the reliabilist ought to say that your counterpart's beliefs are not justified. However, many would consider that position to be strongly counterintuitive. They are convinced that while your counterpart knows nothing, your counterpart is no less justified in her beliefs than you are in yours. The new evil demon problem is the problem of accommodating these intuitions about the justificatory status of your counterpart's beliefs.
Explain Laurence Bonjour's case of "Norman the Clairvoyant." How is the example supposed to serve as an objection to externalist (reliabilist) theories of justification?
Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power, or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against his belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power, under circumstances in which it is completely reliable. (p. 21) Intuitively it seems that Norman's belief is not justified. Norman doesn't have any reasons for thinking that the President is in New York City. Norman just finds himself believing that. Were Norman to reflect on his belief he would come to see that that belief is unsupported. Yet in the situation imagined Norman's belief is the product of a reliable process. Norman is not aware of this fact. But nonetheless on some externalist analyses Norman's belief is justified because it is produced by a reliable process. The Norman case is used to illustrate a general problem with externalism. Externalists hold that the justification of basic beliefs requires only that the specified external condition is met. Yet where the subject lacks any internally accessible reason for thinking the belief is true it seems irrational for the subject to maintain that belief. Rationality requires good reasons
Explain Alvin Goldman's theory of process reliabilism. Why is his theory considered an example of "epistemic externalism"?
S is justified in believing p iff S's belief in p is caused by a reliable process (one that produces a high percentage of truths). (UR) A belief B is justified if it is produced by a belief-forming process that is unconditionally reliable. (CR) A belief B is justified if (i) B is produced by a belief-forming (or belief-retaining) process that is conditionally reliable, and (ii) all of the belief inputs to the belief-forming (or belief-retaining) process that causes B are justified. (R) A belief B (at time t) is justified if and only if B (at t) is the output of a series of belief-forming or belief-retaining processes each of which is either unconditionally reliable or conditionally reliable, and where the conditionally reliable processes in the series are applied to outputs of previous members in the series. (35) Because since truth (reliability) is a paradigm case of an external factor, reliablism is a prime example of epistemic externalism.
Explain John Greco's "success through ability" account of knowledge (an instance of what the textbook calls a "Competence Account". How does he think that the view solves the Gettier problem?
S knows that p =df S has a true belief and the belief is true because of an exercise of S's intellectual ability or competence. Motivation for the view: Analogy to sports. Success through competence is an important notion generally. To know is to have a true belief and for your belief to be true because it is an exercise of your intellectual competence. The Gettier cases are not mere oddities dreamed up by philosophers. They concern accidentally of a kind that we care about : we care not just about having a successful belief - a true one - but having a successful belief due to intellectual competence. In this way we might hope to appeal to the connection between knowledge and competence to show not only how the Gettier problem taps into something we care about but also how to solve it. Example: Your belief that the sun is shining today is true because of your competence for getting this right in situations like the one you're in.. In Gettier cases we get the truth only by luck and not by our competence
Explain why some philosophers have objected that the conciliatory view would lead to a rampant and problematic skepticism and why they have held that the view is "self-defeating."
Steadfast thinkers believe the conciliatory view is 1) implies a rampant skepticism and 2) self-defeating and that it 1) It has the consequence that beliefs about philosophy, ethics, politics, and religion are seldom, if ever, justified. 2) Conciliationism is self-defeating: hoist on its own petard; If and when there is disagreement about disagreement, there will be many situations in which conciliatory views call for their own rejection. But it is incoherent for a view on disagreement to call for its own rejection; so conciliatory views are incoherent.
Explain one of Gettier's counterexamples (or an example like Gettier's original ones) and explain how it demonstrates that knowledge is not justified true belief.
The Ten Coins Case (Gettier 1963): Smith believes that 'a person with 10 coins in his pocket will get the job' because he has good evidence that Jones will get the job and that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket. Someone else with 10 coins in his pocket gets the job. • Smith justifiably believes that P. • P is false. • Smith correctly infers that if P is true, then Q is true. • So, Smith believes Q, justifiably. • Q is true, but not because of P. • So, Smith has a justified true belief that Q. This demonstrates that knowledge is not justified true belief because there are many objects such as luck and no false assumptions. The Defeasibility account: To know P is to have justified true belief in P, where there are no defeaters for your belief. The no false assumption theories says: S knows that p =df S believes that p; p is true; and S is justified in believing that p. S's belief that p is not based on a false assumption.
Explain the argument for skepticism based on skeptical possibilities such as the possibility that you are a brain in a vat. Then explain the two strategies for dealing with it that involve "denying closure" and claiming that we can know that we are not in a skeptical scenario.
You are told to imagine the possibility that at this very moment you are actually a brain hooked up to a sophisticated computer program that can perfectly simulate experiences of the outside world. Here is the skeptical argument. If you cannot now be sure that you are not a brain in a vat, then you cannot rule out the possibility that all of your beliefs about the external world are false. Or, to put it in terms of knowledge claims, we can construct the following skeptical argument. Let "P" stand for any belief or claim about the external world, say, that snow is white. If I know that P, then I know that I am not a brain in a vat I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat Thus, I do not know that P. 2 strategies to know we are not in a skeptical scenario: - The Bold A Posteriori Proposal: GE. Moore's "Proof of an External World" 1. I have hands. 2. So, I am not a (handless) brain in a vat. The Straightforward a posteriori proposal The idea is that we can know that we are in a position to know that we are not in a skeptical scenario because the hypothesis that there is an external world (that is much like perception presents it) is a better explanation of our experiences than any skeptical hypothesis. Our justification for believing we are not in a skeptical scenario can be supported by an "inference to the best explanation" covered by the following general principle: (JEI) Justification by Explanatory Inference If hypothesis H purports to explain S's evidence E, and there is no incompatible hypothesis H' that provides a better or equally good explanation of E, then S is justified in believing H on the basis of E. (94)
