pol119 midterm
Rationality of Agents in OP (§25)
Agents in the OP are prevented from knowing their principals' full conception of the good; thus, how do they even know what to choose? They have in its place a thin theory of the good, i.e., they "normally prefer moresocial primary goods rather than less" (p. 123). In short, agents are the rational maximizers familiar from economic theory (homo oeconomicus).2.Rawls explicitly says that "the motivation of the persons in the OP must not be confused with the motivation of persons in everyday life, who accept the principles of justice and who have the corresponding sense of justice" (p. 128); he is not advocating egoism or materialism. The veil "stands in," so to speak, for citizens' reasonableness and sense of fair play...& for their rationality as well (self-critical distancing).
Second (2) Principle
Ambiguity of terms (more on this shortly)2.Social (vs. Natural) Primary Goods (§15)a.Rights and liberties [Principle 1]b.Office and position [Principle 2.b; see p. 53]c.Income and wealth [Principle 2.a; see p. 53]d.Self-respect [mainly Principle 1; see §82]3.Representative Persons (§16): Principle 2.a refers not to individuals but to average persons in socioeconomic groups (e.g., unskilled labor); important wrt DP interpretation of Principle 2.a
second principle interperetation
Phrases "open to all" and "everyone's advantage" are ambiguous.2.Each has two natural interpretations, with the second being Rawls's preferred interpretation:a."open to all"1.Careers open to talents (formal equality of opportunity)2.Fair equality of opportunity (or FEO)b."everyone's advantage"1.Principle of Efficiency (Pareto optimality) (p. 58)2.Difference Principle (or DP)
Principle of Rectification II
use patterned principles to implement): "Perhaps it is best to view some patterned principles of distributive justice as rough rules of thumb meant to approximate the general results of applying the principle of rectification of injustice.... A rough rule of thumb for rectifying injustices might seem to be the following: organize society so as to maximize the position of whatever group ends up least well-off in the society [since they are most likely to have been the victims].... Although to introduce socialism as the punishment for our sins would be to go too far, past injustices might be so great as to make necessary in the short run a more extensive state in order to rectify them." (p. 231) Major concession: look at history—genocide, expropriation, war, etc.
Neutrality Argument
"If it would be illegitimate for a tax system to seize some of a man's leisure (forced labor) for the purpose of serving the needy, how can it be legitimate for a tax system to seize some of a man's goods for that purpose? Why should we treat the man whose happiness requires certain material goods or services differently from the man whose preferences and desires make such goods unnecessary for his happiness? Why should the man who prefers seeing a movie (and now has to earn the money for a ticket) be open to the required call to aid the needy, while the person who prefers looking at a sunset (and hence need earn no extra money) is not?" (p. 170)b.Remember the comment about labor compulsion above: redistributive taxes apply to labor income and/or consumption, not leisure. If this is the case, then the state is not being neutral towards its citizens: it is discriminating in its redistributive activities against citizens who are consumption-loving (as opposed to leisure-loving). Do the identical twin example: yuppie and surfer (Philippe Van Parijs's RFFA).c.Of course, redistributive taxes do not have to have this feature: we could use lump-sum taxes instead, based not on labor income or consumption but on, say, ability level. But this would involve labor compulsion in a meaningful sense: we must do enough work to pay our tax bill, and the tax bill might be quite high if we're very talented.
Distributing Manna from Heaven:
"Things come into the world already attached to people having entitlements over them.... those who [adopt patterned principles] treat objects as if they appeared from nowhere, out of nothing. A complete theory of justice might cover this limit case as well; perhaps here is a use for the usual conceptions of distributive justice" (p. 160). Major concession that sounds minor: natural resources (cf. left-libertarians).
Conception of society
"cooperative venture for mutual advantage"b.Humean circumstances of justice (MS, LB)c.justice regulates cooperation for good of all
Basic Structure of society
"political constitution and principal economic and social arrangements"b.excludes: civil and international societyc.criticisms: Okin (feminist); Cohen (Marxist
Principle of Rectification I
(use patterned principles to break ties): "If the principle of rectification...yields more than one description of holdings, then some choice must be made as to which of these is to be realized. Perhaps the sort of considerations about distributive justice and equality that I argue against play a legitimate role in this subsidiary choice" (p. 153, FN). Minor concession (perhaps).
Slavery Argument
-continued-2.Slavery Argumenta."Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor.... Seizing the results of someone's labor is equivalent to seizing hours from him and directing him to carry on various activities. If people force you to do certain work, or unrewarded work, for a certain period of time, they decide what you are to do and what purposes your work is to serve apart from your decisions. This process whereby they take this decision from you makes them a part-owner of you; it gives them a property right in you. [Such taxes] institute (partial) ownership by others of people and their actions and labor. These principles involve a shift from the classical liberals' notion of self-ownership to a notion of (partial) property rights in other people." (p. 172) (must unpack it)b.What is forced labor? Let's take an extreme example, which Nozick uses himself (pp. 290-2): slavery. How does redistributive taxation differ from slavery? In at least three ways: (1) labor compulsion (cf. lump-sum taxation), (2) alienability, and (3) identity of beneficiary.c.Are these differences morally relevant? You'll have to decide. Another way to describe redistributive taxation, while still retaining Nozick's insight about "property rights in other people," is to view the redistributive state as a permanent minority shareholder in all of its citizens (Gorr). Is this morally troubling? If so, Nozick has a point.d.Potential problems with 1. and 2.: parasitizing CSO intuitions
The Role of Justice
.Priority of justice: "first virtue of social institutions" (vs. efficiency, etc.)
wide/narrow reflective equilibrium
Back-and-forth process (that is hopefully convergent) b/wn conceptions/conditionsand principles/convictions (see diagram)2.Can be narrow or wide (latter preferred)a.Narrow: local equilibrium; more conservative with respect to assumptions, etc.; mainly a guarantor of internal consistencyb.Wide: global equilibrium; more radical; looks at different systems (analogy: hiking in fog)
First (1) Principle
Basic liberties given by a list (p. 53)a.Political liberty (right to vote & hold office)b.Freedom of speech & assemblyc.Liberty of conscience & freedom of thoughtd.Freedom of person (psych. & phys. integrity)e.Right to hold personal propertyf.Freedom from arbitrary arrest & seizure2.Familiar from various bills of rights3.Some liberties not basic (contract; FEO)
The Two Principles of Justice
First (1): each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.Second (2): social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. (p. 53)
Balancing These Values1.
It's unsurprising that considerations of the instrumentaland intrinsic values of political participation would push Rawls in different directions. Consider how his liberal predecessors differed:a.Benjamin Constant (and Isaiah Berlin):An instrumentalconcern for the protection of nonpolitical liberties led them to endorse a narrow reading of Principle (representation, etc.)b.John Stuart Mill: A belief in the intrinsic value of political participation (for perfectionist reasons) led him to endorse a broad reading of Principle (highly participatory, more direct local government; inconsistent with plural voting? [you value more what you compete for; fair opportunity to acquire votes])2.What Rawls fails to do here is explain how we should balance these different considerations. An exercise left for reader? Extend earlier calculus, maybe? Still room for (guided) political judgment (via 4-stage seq.).
Three Dimensions of Political Participation
Its Meaning (pp. 196, 203-5):a.Rawls initially argues that the Principle requires several things: "one elector, one vote"; representation of electoral districts of equal population (e.g., no "rotten boroughs"); the absence of gerrymandering; equal access to public office, etc. (p. 196)b.He goes on to suggest, however, that unequal political liberty might be justified if it "would be accepted by the less favoredin return for the greater protection of their other liberties that results from this restriction." (p. 203; examples;show why it is consistent in principle with the Priority of Liberty)c.John Stuart Mill's "plural voting"; ship analogy (pp. 204-5)d.If analogy works, "the political liberties are indeed subordinateto the other freedoms that, so to say, define the intrinsic good of the passengers," such as free speech, etc. (p. 205)e.By focusing on the instrumental value of the political liberties (i.e., their tendency if properly circumscribed to promote good governance), Rawls in effect open to possibilityof unequalpolitical liberties—a narrower reading of the Principle.Its Extent (pp. 197, 200-3)a.Rawls says that the "main variation in the extent of equal political liberty lies in the degree to which the constitution is majoritarian," where the most extensive system would be one of "bare majority rule" with no constitutional limitations. (p. 197)b.The various features of limited constitutional regimes—a bill of rights with judicial review, representation, separation of powers with checks and balances, federalism, bicameralism—are all limitations on the extent of the (equal) political liberties and therefore prima facie suspect.c.How does Rawls believe that we should determine the extent of the Principle? Purely instrumentally: "we should narrow or widen its extent up to the point where the danger to liberty from the marginal loss in control over those holding power just balances the security of liberty gained by the greater use of constitutional devices." (p. 202; graph and give examples) d.Instrumental concerns lead Rawls to view sympathetically certain limitations on the extent of the Principle—again, a narrower reading of the Principle.Its Worth (pp. 197-9, 205-6)a.Rawls says that a just constitution must protect the "value" of the political liberties by underwriting "a fair opportunity to take part in and to influence the political process." (p. 197) b.As the word "fair" indicates (think FEO), this underwriting will certainly involve financial support: Rawls endorses the wide(r)distribution of property and wealth, public financing of parties, elections, and advertising, & limits on campaign advertising in order to "level the playing field" of political competition.c.His concern here is largely (but not wholly: unjust laws) with the intrinsic value of the political liberties: for example, Rawls says that the "effect of self-government where equal political rights have their fair value is to enhance [public] self-esteem and the sense of political competence of the average citizen," both of which are constitutive of political participation. (p. 205)d.Here, a consideration of the intrinsic value of the political liberties has led Rawls to a broader reading of the Principle.
Reflective Equilibrium
Justify principles by assumptionsa.Conceptions of person and societyb.OP structure that reflects these conceptions in its conditions generates principles2.Justify principles by conclusionsa.Compare principles to our considered convictions of justice (p. 42)b.Match or conflict: affects confidence in them
Priority Rules
Lexical Priority: hierarchy of principles (37-8)a.Principle 1 (equal-liberty principle→basic liberties)b.Principle 2.b ("open to all" principle→positions)c.Principle 2.a ("everyone's advantage" principle→$)2.Higher principles and their associated goods cannot be traded off for the lower ones (e.g., political liberty and economic growth [p. 55]), no matter what the rate of exchange.3.Special Conception (w/priority rules) versus General Conception (w/out) of justice (p. 54): latter like highly generalized DP; invertebrate
Implementing the DP
Maximizing social-minimum income much easier than maximizing social welfare or meeting basic needs: no (or little) knowledge of preferences/needs required.•How might one go about doing it? One idea (although not the one that Rawls would necessarily endorse: see pp. 244-5, 251-2): maximize government revenue, which will maximize both the amount available for redistribution and the size of the social-minimum income (although we need to take account of disincentives on the expenditureside too).
critique
Nozick is noticing a certain tension in Rawls's account of moral agency. Rawls simultaneously believes that:a.We are fully responsible for our preferences and more generally for our plan of life and the conception of the goodthat it reflects. Our capacity for rationality gives us the power to revise and reshape these aspects of ourselves; we are not inevitably tied to ways of life determined by our families, our cultures, or even our genes.b.We bear no responsibility for our abilities and talents or for our ambition and drive. These things are a product of "social circumstances...accident and good fortune." The implication seems to be that we lack the power to shape significantly these features of ourselves.2.It is hard to believe that these two beliefs are actually part of the same theory of moral agency, as they have entirely different implications for human autonomy. The former offers a soaring vision of human freedom and our capacity for self-transformation, the latter a rather depressing and even deterministic view of character and ability formation.
Nozick on Rawls
Nozick's target is the DP. He generally argues as if the other principles of justice, along with their lexical priority over the DP, did not exist. (He does finally acknowledge them in FN 29 and on pp. 226, 229.)2.I think this argument is his strongest not merely due to its quality but also because of its target—he attacks Rawls's primary defenses of the DP, which (to review very briefly) are:a.Informal Defense: Our natural ability and ambition are undeservedand their distribution is therefore morally arbitrary, as they are the result of a genetic and familial lottery. The DP strives to nullify these natural contingencies, not by eliminating them but by treating them as collective assets to be exploited for the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged. (N.B.: details missing; key intuition only.)b.Formal Defense: The DP is the distributional principle (for wealth and income) that would be chosen in the OP under the following conditions: (1a) radical uncertainty about our position in the income distribution; (1b) radical uncertainty about the location of the basic-needs threshold; (2) very little desire to achieve income above that threshold; & (3) a great desire to avoid income below that threshold.3.Nozick's argument directly undermines the informal defense and indirectly undermines the formal defense. I'll now back Nozick....
Reasoning for the Two Principles
Rawls later says that "the force of justice as fairness would appear to arise from two things: the requirement that all inequalities be justified to the least-advantaged person [DP] and the [lexical] priority of liberty" (p. 220). Let's now examine the arguments for each of these in reverse order: radeoffs between the basic liberties and other social primary goods are prohibited, regardless of the rate of exchange Rawls holds that certain interests we have (e.g., religious interests or interests in bodily integrity) are fundamental ones that we must secure at all costs. He says that we can come to understand why they are so fundamental if we examine the "notion of a free person." As he explains in the following key passage
What justifies such a strong claim?
Rawls makes at least three arguments for the priority of liberty in Theory:a.Self-Respect Argument (§82)b.Equal Liberty of Conscience Argument (§§26, 29, 33, 39, 82)c.Hierarchy Argument (§§26, 40, 82)2.I will argue that a. and b. both fail: a. because it falsely holds that the lexical priority of the basic liberties can be inferred from the high priority of the interest they serve, b. because it justifies the lexical priority of a subset of the basic liberties only. {BUT: their virtues.}3.I will argue that c. can survive both of these objections. Unfortunately, it is radically incomplete as stated, but it can be reconstructed using concepts and techniques provided by Theory—though not without controversy.
The Force of Justice as Fairness
Rawls says that "the force of justice as fairness would appear to arise from two things: the requirement that all inequalities be justified to the least-advantaged person [DP] and the [lexical] priority of liberty" (p. 220).•
Conception of the person
Rationality: capacity for conception of goodb.Reasonableness: capacity for a sense of justice
Rawls on Ownership and Markets
Rawls argues that "there is no essential tie between the use of free markets and private ownership of the instruments of production," i.e., they are separable issues. (p. 239; return to table)2.Rawls is agnostic on the issue of ownership: the decision should be made on the basis of such things as "the traditions, institutions, and social forces of each country," as "the theory of justice does not include these matters." (p. 242) Questions/comments:a.Should he be agnostic given FEO and DP? (cf. Roemer)b.Is it just too messy an empirical issue for a philosopher? (raises questions of information, incentives, etc.) ↓c.4-Stage Sequence (§31): varying application of principlesd.Liberal socialist regime vs. property-owning democracy(v. welfare state) (pp. xiv-xvi, 239-42; JF): some additional detaile.Cf. John Stuart Mill: socialism for perfectionist reasonsf.Also see my STP article "Illiberal Socialism" on all of this.... -continued-3.Rawls is strongly supportive of markets (over central planning). Why?a.Efficiency: straight neoclassical reasoning by Rawls—the First Welfare Theorem shows the efficiency of perfectly competitive markets and suggests that imperfectly competitive markets can be made efficient through state intervention to prevent externalities, price fixing, & information asymmetries. (p. 240)b.Consistency with Equal (Nonbasic) Liberty and FEO:i.Equal Liberty: Rawls considers this the most important of the three reasons. Equal liberty requires "free choice of careers and occupations." Like Hayek, Rawls says that "in the absence of some differences in earnings as these arise in a competitive scheme, it is hard to see how, under ordinary circumstances anyway, certain aspects of a command society inconsistent with liberty can be avoided." (p. 241; graph: 3 mkts. w/fixed wage)ii.FEO:Competitive markets entail no concentrations of economic power, which hinder the entry of innovative firms into industries and corrupt politics. (If centralization is highly efficient, as with so-called "natural monopolies," public ownership or intensive regulation might be adopted.)
Political Participation
Rawls begins with a "Principle of (Equal) Participation," which "requires that all citizens are to have an equal right to take part in, and to determine the outcome of, the constitutional process that establishes the laws with which they are to comply." (p. 194; cf. political liberties)2.What precisely does the Principle require, and how can it be justified? (1st, Plato: intrinsic v. instrumental value.)3.These two questions turn out to be closely related:a.Rawls sometimes argues for the intrinsic value of the Principle (e.g., it "preserves the equal representation of the OP" [p. 195] & thus moral autonomy or it enhances the public self-esteem and political competence of citizens [p. 205] → constitutive).b.At other times he argues for its instrumental value in promoting just legislation and protecting the other basic liberties (p. 202).c.I will argue that when he does the former (argue for its intrinsic value), he tends to define the Principle more broadly, and when he does the latter (argue for its instrumental value), he tends to define the Principle more narrowly.
"Very roughly the parties regard themselves as having a highest-order interest in how all their other interests, including even their fundamental ones, are shaped and regulated by social institutions.... Free persons conceive of themselves as beings who can revise and alter their final ends and who give first priority to preserving their liberty in these matters. Hence, they not only have final ends that they are in principle free to pursue or reject, but their original allegiance and continued devotion to those ends are to be formed and affirmed under conditions that are free.... Only by [lexical priority] can the parties be sure that their highest-order interest as free persons is guaranteed." (p. 132; emphasis added) (parse this→)
Rawls is here justifying the lexical priority of basic liberties by the lexical priority of the interest that they protect: viz.,our interest in "revising and altering our final ends...under conditions that are free."2.We need freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, etc., in order to make intelligent decisions about not just constructing but also reconstructing our plans of life.3.The absolute priority of these liberties is grounded on the absolute priority of this interest, which takes priority over allother interests, including our interest in seeing our plan of life realized (explain: blueprint for house). This unusual variety of asceticism (qualify) will also play a part in the defense of the DP, as we shall soon see.4.Rawls does offer one qualification to the lexical priority of the basic liberties: he says that it only applies under "reasonably favorable conditions," i.e., conditions in which the "effective establishment of these basic rights" is possible (p. 132). What does Rawls mean by this? We will discuss it later, but the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory (§39)will play a big role in the explanation.
A List of Reasonable Alternatives
Rawls suggests certain formal constraints on the principles of right to be considered by agents in the OP, a way to limit the vast array of principles from which they would otherwise have to choose.2.These five "uncontroversial" constraints are as follows:a.Generality (form): must not use proper names (e.g., Pericles)b.Universality (application): must bind all moral persons; examples that distinguish a. and b.: "everyone must serve Pericles' ends" is universal but not general; a principle binding only a certain class of individuals (e.g., a particular ethnic group), on the other hand, may be general but isn't universal (Rousseau)c.Publicity: no esoteric doctrines (cf. Plato/Sidgwick); transparencyd.Ordering: must order conflicting claims to prevent resolution by "force and cunning"; problem with egoism, for examplee.Finality: principles must be ultimate court of appeal, because justice is the "first virtue of social institutions."3.Rawls's summary: "a conception of right is a set of principles, general in form and universal in application, that is to be publiclyrecognized as a final court of appeal for ordering the conflicting claims of moral persons" (p. 117) Canonical principles that meet these criteria are listed on p. 107 (excluding egoism)
§13 Statement of Second Principle
Second (2): social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged (DP) and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (FEO). (p. 72; cf. p. 53)
Main Idea of Theory
Social contract hypothetical not historical2.Object not particular form of government but rather a set of political principles3.Method: Original Position (OP; cf. S of N)a.Agent/rep. (rational maximizer; not citizen!)b.Information (Veil of Ignorance: hide/show?)4.Outcome: Two Principles of Justice5.Application: Four-Stage Sequence(§31)
Equal Liberty of Conscience Argument
Summary: The integrity of our religious beliefs (and, by extension, of our moral and philosophical ones) is of such importance that liberty of conscience (and, by extension, other basic liberties) must be given lexical priority.1.Essentially a strains of commitment(§29) argument: the parties in the OP, given their general knowledge of human psychology, must avoid committing to political principles whose outcomes they (or those whom they represent) might not be able to accept.2.Political principles that place fundamental interests, such as the religious interest and our interest in bodily integrity, at even the slightest risk (by refusing lexical priority to liberty of conscience and self-ownership) make the strains of commitment intolerable.
Hierarchy Argument
Summary: The lexical priority of all basic liberties is justified by the lexical priority of a certain interest that they protect—namely, our interest in the free choice of our final ends, our plan of life.1."Free persons conceive of themselves as beings who can revise and alter their final ends and who give firstpriority to preserving their liberty in these matters" (pp. 131-2) (explain)2.Rawls proposes a "hierarchy of interests"(p. 476):a.Highest-order interest in shaping all of our other interests, including our fundamental onesb.Fundamental interests themselves (e.g., religious interest)c.Lower-order interests in consumption, etc.3.Lexical priority of basic liberties justified by the lexical priority of the highest-order interest that they protect.Put differently: the Hierarchy Argument justifies a hierarchy of goods (basic liberties over other social primary goods) with a hierarchy of interests (a highest-order interest in the free choice of final ends over an interest in advancing those same ends). (explain; FEO and DP provide means for final-end advancement)5.At least two questions arise, however:a.Why is our interest in the free choice of our final ends of such paramount importance that it cannot be sacrificed under any circumstances (at least in ideal theory)?b.Why are the basic liberties the necessary and imprescriptible conditions for such choice?6.Rawls never answers these two questions directly, which is why a reconstruction of the argument is needed.
The Four Systems
System of Natural Liberty Liberal Equality Natural Aristocracy Democratic Equality
Prefatory Comments: Maximin
The DP is clearly the maximin solution in the OP, at least: it maximizes the position of the least-advantaged (representative) person, i.e., it selects the distribution of income with the best worst outcome. It's not the right solution, though, just because it's the maximin solution: why shouldn't agents act more tolerant of risk (say, as risk-neutral)? there must be some reason for sharply discounting estimates of these probabilities," i.e., extreme uncertainty about the likelihood of the various payoffs (rules out all but "maxis"↓)2.alternative decision rules "have outcomes that one can hardly accept and that the parties would find intolerable," i.e., agents are worried about payoffs falling below a certain threshold3."the person choosing has a conception of the good such that he cares very little, if anything, for what he might gain above the minimum stipend" (Rawlsian asceticism) (pp. 134-5)
Why Democratic Equality?1.
The System of Natural Liberty and Democratic Equality are both internally consistent equilibrium positions, so why should the latter be preferred to the former? Why should we care about contingency at all? <pause>2.Rawls defends Democratic Equality via FEO and DP:a.FEO (§14): pure procedural justice (define); track metaphor (LBJ); fair conditions will generate a fair outcome—removing the "weights" of family and class is the task of FEO; also ↙b.DP (§17): Both natural and social contingencies are morallyarbitrary, products of a genetic, familial, and locational lottery. Rawls argues "no one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society." / More controversially, he maintains that we don't even deserve our superior character (allowing us to work hard and to postpone gratification), "for such character depends in good part upon fortunate family and social circumstances in early life for which we can claim no credit." (p. 89) / The DP is a kind of insuranceagainst the outcome of this complex lottery. (luck-egal. read)
The Entitlement Theory (ET)
The Three Principles of Justice in Holdingsa.Principle of Acquisition (pp. 150-1, 174-82)i.Explains how unowned things can come to be ownedii.Lockean labor-mixing as base—enhance value (pp. 174-5)iii.Limits on acquisition—the (Lockean) Proviso (pp. 175-82)1.Nonworsening relative to baseline (w/compensation)2.Baseline? Tragedy of commons. (pp. 181-2; orange tree ex.)3.Move to full private-property regime won't violate Proviso.b.Principle of Transfer (pp. 150-1, 179-80)i.voluntary exchange (sale and barter), gift, bequest, etc.ii.limited by Proviso (you cannot buy what you cannot acquire originally, e.g., prohibition of some types of "purchased monopoly" [water holes in desert])c.Principle of Rectification (pp. 151-3)i.violations include disobeying Proviso; theft & fraud; etc.ii."counterfactual history" key to rectification
Equal Liberties and Their Priority
The equal basic liberties are given by a list (p. 53):a.Political liberty (right to vote & hold office)b.Freedom of speech & assemblyc.Liberty of conscience & freedom of thoughtd.Freedom of person (psych. & phys. integrity)e.Right to hold personal propertyf.Freedom from arbitrary arrest & seizure2.The basic liberties cannot be sacrificed for the sake of other social primary goods (opportunities for office and position [FEO] or income and wealth [DP]), regardlessof the rate of exchange.Numerous possibilities for conflict: "hate speech" v. FEO; advocacy of anti-materialist [ascetic] doctrines v. DP.3.Nor can they be sacrificed for the sake of efficiency or for utilitarian or perfectionist ideals (priority of right).
normative conditions
The first condition (extreme uncertainty both about one's location in the income distribution and about basic needs) is plausible given the veil of ignorance, which was supported on controversial moral grounds.2.The second condition (strong desire to meet basic needs) appears plausible: preventing hunger and destitution should have a high moral priority.3.The third condition (relative indifference to income above threshold) does not appear to be particularly plausible: Why should income above the threshold have so little value? (Merely a scholar's tastes?)a.Possible defenses: $/happiness studies; luxury/status a trap (arms race); (all? most?) plans "scalable" (e.g., hiking); etc.b.If indefensible, then maximizing minimum income and pursuit of wealth in competition? If so, then much hinges on veil: if thinner, the threshold might be knowable and the DP less attractive relative to B.3.(a) {see previous discussion}.
The "Formal" Argument
The parties/reps in the OP are rational (§25)b.and subject to certain information constraints (§24),c.and they choose principles of justice from a list of reasonable alternatives (§23).
Information Constraints
What agents in OP don't know: principals' socioeconomic status, their place in the distribution of natural assets (e.g., intelligence, strength), their conception of the good and associated plan of life, their special psychological features (e.g., risk aversion, liability to impatience, akrasia, etc.), the character of their own society, the generation to which they belong, etc. In short, all individuating characteristics of those they represent are hidden from them.2.What agents in the OP do know:general facts about persons & societies, e.g., all human societies are subject to circumstances of justice (in brief, moderate scarcity and conflict of interests; see §22); political science; economic theory; general laws of social organization and human psychology; conceptions; etc.3.Why are individuating characteristics hidden from agents in the OP by the veil of ignorance? Rawls offers two sets of reasons:a.Practical: simplifies choice of principles (effectively one agent decides, so no bargaining, etc.); justice decided by prudentialreasoning alone—choice-theoretic rather than game-theoretic.b.Normative: the veil prevents "arbitrary contingencies" from polluting the choice of principles; Rawls shows same hostility to the moral arbitrariness of distribution of natural and social goods that motivated his argument for Democratic Equality
Reconstruction
Why is our highest-order interest in the free choice of final ends absolute? (§40 vital: Rawls's Kantianism)a.Free beings are autonomous beings, and one of the facets of autonomy is rationality: our capacity to adopt and revise not only a conception of the good (including final ends) but also a plan of life that pursues it. But isn't it really heteronomous, with its substance given to us by nature and/or society?b.Just as one aspect of our autonomy is the distancing from our immediate desires that is involved in acting upon reciprocal principles of justice (reasonableness), so another aspect is the less radical distancing involved in scheduling, prioritizing, tempering, and pruning these desires in accordance with a coherent plan of life (rationality). Rationality as master, not slave, of desire (contra Hume; cf. Plato...or even Mill).c.We thus cannot sacrifice free choice in these matters without sacrificing autonomy itself and stooping to the level of creatures that live by natural impulse rather than by a life plan. (p. 225; rationality vs. animality, but hierarchy not Manichaeism) -continued-2.Why are the basic liberties necessary for such choice?a.Freedoms of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, and freedom of thought are essential to the creation and revision of plans of life: without secure rights to explore ideas and beliefs with others (whether in person or through various media) and consider these at our leisure, we would be unable to make informed decisions about our conception of the good.b.Freedom of the person (including both psychological and bodily integrity), as well as the right to personal property and immunity from arbitrary arrest and seizure, are necessary to create a stable and safe personal space for the purposes of reflection and communication, without which rationality would be compromised if not crippled.c.Even small restrictions on these basic liberties would threaten our highest-order interest, however slightly, and such a threat is disallowed given the absolute priority of this interest over all other concerns. (BUT: content-neutrality v. TPM restraints) Notice how the (reconstructed) Hierarchy Argument avoids the pitfalls of the first two arguments that Rawls offered:a.Unlike the Self-Respect Argument, it offers a reasonwhy its core interest should be paramount (self-respect versus the free choice of final ends).b.Unlike the Equal Liberty of Conscience Argument, it defends the lexical priority of all basic liberties, not a subset of them. (Really? Is anything missing from the previous list?)
To make the case for lexical priority, Rawls would need to argue that:
any (equal) sacrifice of basic liberties would jeopardize self-respect andb.any sacrifice of self-respect is unacceptable, however small it is and however much other interests are advanced by it (e.g., stability).7.Implausible: Rawls never argues that self-respect is an interest that has lexical priority over other interests, but such priority would be necessary (not sufficient: a.) to underwrite the lexical priority of liberty.
Unpatterned Principles (PROCESS)
certain socialist principles (e.g., "labor gives title," which incorporates effort, skill, luck, etc.)b.Nozick's Entitlement Theory (ET)i.Strands of patterning evident, perhaps, but only thatii.E.g.: Hayek, Kristol: distribution by benefit to others (Ford)c.randomizing device (e.g., a lottery)less (obvious) patterning[continuum]
Difference Principle (DP)a.
maximize income/wealth expectations of the least-advantaged (representative) personb.again, includes 1.: choose from the universe of Pareto-optimal (efficient) distributions (explain)c.goal: even out the effects of natural contingencies(e.g., differences in native abilities [e.g., IQ])d.tools: progressive income taxes; minimum incomes, wage subsidies (e.g., EITC), etc. {4-stage caveat}e.does not require equality: sometimes inequality will work to the advantage of the least advantaged (Laffer-curve example: Invalids & Ables [few])f.Why is this to everyone's advantage? How would this help the rich or middle class? (diagram
Patterned Principles (OUTCOME)
nd-result or end-state principles: judged by the structural features of the final distribution itselfi.current time-slice principles (e.g., SWF, Rawls's DP)ii.sequences of (i): link distributions across time (intergen.)b.nondistributional principles: looks to information that is not contained in the final distribution itself (but is perhaps in other distributions)i.nonhistorical (e.g., distribution by IQ)ii.historical (e.g., distribution by moral merit)
self-Respect Argument
ummary: The priority of the (equal) basic liberties is needed in order to secure equal citizenship, which is itself a prerequisite for self-respect.•Self-respect is "perhaps the most important primary good": it counters threat of "apathy and cynicism" (p. 386) by assuring us we and our projects have worth.•Self-respect linked to status (one's position in various social hierarchies), which will be unequal even in Rawls's ideal society.•Political equality, or equal citizenship, affirms equality of status along a key dimension, thereby securing self-respect (so long as social and economic inequalities are kept within reasonable bounds by the second principle).•Equal citizenship demands equal basic liberties: otherwise, the humiliation of political subordination (permanent minority status).
