stuff

In the reading, the idea that people should only be assessed for things over which they have control is described as Highly intuitive Rationally self-evident Fairly compelling A fundamental "truism"

"Highly intuitive" means: it is definitely something we all believe and believe strongly—it "strikes us" (that's the intuitive part) as absolutely correct, going to the heart of morality itself, even if we cannot immediately explain ourselves. This is the phrase used repeatedly.

A "theory of rightness" is a normative theory that seeks to Identify the criterion or the essence of moral rightness (and thus wrongness) Identify what has value and what lacks value—the constituent elements of the summum bonum Demonstrate specifically that an act is right just in case it "brings about the greatest happiness for the greatest number" Reveal that, ultimately, only pleasure (and the absence of pain) have value

A normative theory seeks to identify what is right or good; in the case of a theory of rightness, it seeks to identify the criterion or essence of moral rightness. The DCT is a good example of a normative theory of right action, as is Utilitarianism. A theory of rightness is contrasted with a theory of value, such as hedonism.

According to the "control principle," we are assessable (i.e., subject to moral judgment) only to the extent that what we are assessed for is under our control for that which we do deliberately and consciously for that which occurs that is controlled—i.e., determined my physical laws to the extent that we are under the control of the moral law

Again, the highly intuitive "control principle" is that people are morally assessable (open for judgment) only with regard to those things they control—not such fortuities as "luck." I.e., judging drunk drivers who kill people more harshly than drunk drivers who luck out and who don't kill people is irrational/inconsistent.

The issue of moral luck concerns Whether we should acknowledge the reality or moral luck or not Whether we should judge people for what they do or what they are Whether we are to hold people responsible for their free choices Whether we ought to view the universe as fair or not

As explained repeatedly, the issue is whether we are to recognize it as a real moral phenomenon or reject it on the grounds that it violates the CP. Kant, for instance, seemed to take a view according to which the very idea of moral luck was preposterous. He seemed disposed to deny that any such thing occurs or exists (as do the likes of Mothers Against Drunk Driving).

Kant was greatly influenced by this British philosopher: David Hume John Stuart Mill Jeremy Bentham John Locke

As I explain in the Zoom lecture, Kant was deeply influenced by Hume and his analysis of causation

Which of these is, for Kant, a categorical imperative? Thou shalt not kill If you want to lead a long and healthy life, stop smoking To avoid car repair, buy Toyotas or Hondas Get a good education!

As I explained elsewhere, Kant speaks of "categorical imperatives" (note the plural)—but he also speaks of "the" categorical imperative (note the singular), which is confusing. When he speaks of categorical imperatives PLURAL, he is referring to imperatives that are not conditioned or qualified by the agent's having some interest. He is referring to moral imperatives, which apply to everyone despite their interests, such as "thou shalt not kill," etc. Categorical imperatives contrast with hypothetical imperatives, which are imperatives that are valid for one insofar as one has a particular interest that one might not have. The imperative "don't smoke" is not valid for one who knows that he has only months to live. The other imperatives here are hypothetical.

Immanuel Kant sought to demonstrate that the demands of morality are Inescapable Rational Emotional Applicable to all living things

As I explained in lecture (and elsewhere), Kant seemed determined to reveal morality as inescapable for us, something it would not be were it to rest on, say, our natural sympathy (some people seem to have natures devoid of sympathy).

MILL: I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial (Links to an external site.) as a disinterested (Links to an external site.) and benevolent (Links to an external site.) spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth (Links to an external site.), we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute (Links to an external site.) the ideal (Links to an external site.) perfection of utilitarian morality. Here, Mill implies that he rejects Psychological egoism The validity of self-interest Nationalism or ethnocentrism Any interests

As I explained in lecture, Mill broke with his father and Bentham, who clearly embraced a form of Psychological Egoism (Psychological hedonism). Unlike the prior generation of utilitarians, Mill has no trouble attributing to human beings genuine altruistic motives/desires. "Love," of course, is the classic instance of such a motive, when it is applied to "others" than the self. Mill compares the "love" philosophy of Jesus (the Sermon on the Mount) to the Utilitarian conception of the "other": a desire for the other's wellbeing, feeling pain at the other's pain, etc. Mill does not deny that people can be self-interested, but he also clearly believes that they are capable of love of, and concern for, others. Mill's repeated reference to the wellbeing of "all" is not a reference to one's nation, but to "sentient creation" (all sentient beings). (Sentience: capable of consciousness, the ability to feel pleasure and pain, etc.) He does occasionally lapse into talk of "society," though he officially cares about the whole of sentient creation.

The doctrine or theory of Utilitarianism emerged during the Age of Enlightenment English civil war Early-Modern period Age of Progress

As I explained in the Zoom lecture, Bentham's Utilitarianism arrived during the late 18th Century, which was part of the "Age of Enlightenment." Utilitarianism reflects the concerns of that historical period.

Utilitarian thinking has tended to Erase the heavy line traditionally drawn between humans and (non-human) animals Emphasize humanity's unique capacity for suffering and ecstasy Reject liberalism and endorse authoritarian forms of government Approach morality as a system of rules to be followed, whatever the consequences

Bentham seemed to think that, as we progress, we will focus attention on the pain and suffering of animals, which he regretted. Later, the Benthamites led the charge for the world's first humane laws (anti-cruelty laws). Today, Peter Singer, a Utilitarian, is considered the foremost "animal rights" theoretician. Where there are Utilitarians, there are those advocating for non-human animal welfare

A key or central idea that (often) arises in discussions of free will is this: That, for an action to count as freely performed, the actor must have been able to do otherwise than he or she did That an action is free only if it was consciously and deliberately chosen by the actor That, according to a conceptual analysis of a freely performed action, Jones acts freely only if Jones is unmotivated All of these None of these

Clearly, it is the notion that, to count as freely performed, an action must be such that the actor could have done otherwise; or, to put it philosophically, that one can do otherwise is a necessary condition for one's action's being freely performed. The point is appealed to in both the "argument from Determinism" and the "Post Deterministic Argument," the two arguments I focused on.

One kind of moral luck discussed by Nagel is luck in the traits and dispositions that we have luck in the possible world we exist in (as opposed to other possible worlds) luck in how happy or fortunate we are luck in our social class

Constitutive luck—Nagel's 3rd category—is explained, in the reading, as "luck in who one is, or in the traits and dispositions that one has."

To someone like Bentham, what mattered about a being (i.e., what made a being matter) was Whether it/she/he was sentient: capable of consciousness and experiencing pleasure and pain Its intellectual sophistication: whether it possessed advanced "rational faculties" Its ability to follow the rules and principles of rationality and doing what is sensible and practical His/her/its generosity

Famously, the Utilitarians asked, "can it feel pain?" If so, it mattered. Sentiency is what matters. Not rationality. Not genetic code.

MILL: It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency (Links to an external site.), safety, uncostliness, &c., of the former—that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic (Links to an external site.) nature. And on all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. Here, Mill discusses "utilitarian" (hedonist) writers of the past, who have emphasized the "superiority" of mental over bodily pleasures. Why is this an important point for him to make? Because Mill seeks to refute an old objection: that, according to hedonism, the highest attainment for humanity is the life of sensual pleasure. Because Mill needs to show that, according to the Utilitarian doctrine, the object of right action is an increase of happiness of the whole, not simply of the part (i.e., the self) He wants to show that these earlier writers viewed pleasures of the mind to be intrinsically superior to the pleasures of the body. None of these

He is amid refuting the old objection that hedonism (the doctrine that, ultimately, only pleasure has value) is a demeaning "doctrine fit for swine," since critics took hedonists to be implying that the best life that a person could hope for is a life of constant sensual gratification. Part of his refutation is the factoid that the early hedonists (Epicurus, et al.) always judged pleasures of the mind to be superior to the pleasures of the body, though only for "circumstantial" reasons.

MILL: I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic (Links to an external site.), as well as Christian elements require to be included. But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments (Links to an external site.), a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation (Links to an external site.). Here, Mill notes that hedonists have always Valued pleasures of the mind over pleasures of the body Borrowed from other traditions Presented faulty theories of happiness and pleasure Praised intellectual pleasure as intrinsically better than bodily pleasure

He is noting that hedonists have always valued pleasures of the mind over pleasures of the body.

Peter Singer, the Utilitarian, denies that he is a vegan in this sense: He would consume animal food if creating it entailed no suffering and did not cause other serious"unhappiness" problems He is a vegan, but he would cease being a vegan if doing so helped prevent some of the worst abuses done to animals in animal agriculture He does not believe that dairy cows suffer, and so he is willing to consume milk products He refuses to consume animal foods but only because the animal food industry is harmful to human wellbeing, especially the wellbeing of future generations of humans

He notes that he is not really a vegan since he would eat meat if there were not "happiness" issues attached to that practice: that, as things stand, agricultural animals are made to suffer, that our animal food diets vastly contribute to global climate change, etc.

MILL: But to speak only of actions done from the motive of duty, and in direct obedience to principle: it is a misapprehension (Links to an external site.) of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fix (Links to an external site.) their minds upon so wide a generality (Links to an external site.) as the world, or society at large. The great majority of good actions are intended, not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights—that is, the legitimate and authorized expectations—of any one else. The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue: the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale, in other words, to be a public benefactor (Links to an external site.), are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility (Links to an external site.); in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to. Those alone the influence of whose actions extends to society in general, need concern themselves habitually about so large an object. Here, Mill explains that, according to Utilitarianism, All of these The venue or theater of moral action is usually immediate or directly affected company, not the world Very few people are "public benefactors" For most of us most of the time, as moral agents, we need only attend to private utility None of these

He quite plainly says all of these things in the passage. See highlighted parts above.

For the Utilitarian Peter Singer, just what is the matter with our treatment of non-human animals? He believes we are engaging in non-justified discrimination—speciesm—which is akin to racism and sexism He believes that we are causing much suffering, and, according to Utilitarianism, it is wrong to cause suffering He believes that we are engaging in a kind of rational elitism: regarding humanity as better than non-human animals on the basis of our greater intellectual faculties As a Utilitarian, he believes that it is not enough to cause happiness; we must maximize the causing of happiness, and animal agriculture fails to do that

He specifically notes that, in treating non-human animals badly, we discriminate between humans and non-humans illegitimately. Utilitarians believe that what makes a being matter is his/her capacity to suffer. Utilitarians do not believe that it is wrong to cause suffering; they believe that we should choose that action that maximizes net happiness, and that action might entail some suffering (as when one chooses to bring one's small child to the dentist, causing pain)

MILL: Now, such a theory of life excites (Links to an external site.) in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable (Links to an external site.) in feeling and purpose, inveterate (Links to an external site.) dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure—no better and nobler (Links to an external site.) object of desire and pursuit—they designate (Links to an external site.) as utterly mean (Links to an external site.) and grovelling (Links to an external site.); as a doctrine worthy only of swine (Links to an external site.), to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened (Links to an external site.); and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants (Links to an external site.). What is Mill doing here? Explaining that some of the best people around hate hedonism on the grounds that it lowers humanity to the level of pigs Explaining that some of the best people around hate the utilitarian "greatest happiness" principle on the grounds that it leads to "a life of pleasure." He is defending Utilitarianism despite the obnoxiousness of some of its practitioners. He is explaining the low quality of Utilitiarianism's critic

He's explaining that some of the best people (estimable in purpose) hate his doctrine since it is, in their view, degrading.

KANT: A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes—because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing alone—that is, good in itself. Considered in itself it is to be esteemed beyond comparison as far higher than anything it could ever bring about merely in order to favour some inclination or, if you like, the sum total of inclinations. Even if by some special disfavour of destiny or by the niggardly endowment of step-motherly nature, this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left (not, admittedly, as a mere wish, but as the straining of every means so far as they are in our control); even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value of itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add to, nor subtract from, this value. Its usefulness would be merely, as it were, the setting which enables us to handle it better in our ordinary dealings or to attract the attention of those not yet sufficiently expert, but not to commend it to experts or to determine its value. Clearly, Kant would All of these Disagree with Mill's conception of moral rightness Recognize that some people have not been endowed by nature or destiny with the power to do much Value someone's will, in response to the moral law, to help another, even when, by accident, his act actually hurts rather than helps None of these

Here we have Kant's explicit rejection of what came to be called consequentialism. Here, Kant quite clearly is disposed to all of these. This announcement is closed for comments

According to your instructor, Kant's goal was to demonstrate that Morality, or the moral law, is inescapable Morality, or the moral law, is ultimately a matter of concrete fact Our bodily "inclinations" are purely evil Morality concerns the maximization of duty

I have explained that Kant's goal seems to be to show that morality (the applicability of the moral law) is inescapable. Kant does not view the moral law as a concrete fact; rather, it is a matter of abstraction/consistency Kant did not view inclinations as purely evil, though he did suppose that we fail to be perfectly moral because of our bodily nature, i.e., our inclinations

What is the conclusion of the argument from Determinism (AfD)? That, if D is (or were) true, then no actions are freely performed That no actions are freely performed That no humans are free That D means that no one can ever do otherwise than they do

If you're paying attention, you'll know that the argument has a "conditional" or "hypothetical" conclusion. It does not conclude that no action is freely performed; rather, it concludes that IF D IS TRUE, then no action is freely performed. The problem or course is that we seem to have no reason to believe that D is true. Hence the change of focus from the AfD to the PDA.

The issue of moral luck is associated with which classic philosopher? Immanuel Kant David Hume John Stuart Mill Rene Descartes

Immanuel Kant was the heavy-hitter (in philosophy) who opined, early on, concerning what came to be known as the problem of Moral Luck, as is made clear in the reading

As explained by your instructor, the thesis of Determinism is that All events are necessary All events are caused All events are contingent All of these None of these

It's simple: it's the idea that all events are necessary. Causal determinism is the idea that all events are necessary SPECIFICALLY BECAUSE all events are caused (i.e., are governed by laws). Determinism is the generic idea; causal determinism is a species of D, as is logical and theological D.

An imperative is a Command Question Convention Statement

It's typically a command, such as the orders barked by a military officer or the commandments on tablets.

MILL: As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin (Links to an external site.), first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole.... By "enjoin," Mill means Impose Forbid Prohibit Join

In context, it is clear that he means "impose." He certainly does not mean "forbid" or "prohibit." "Enjoin" never means "join."

The defeasibility (of rights) is illustrated by The practice of eminent domain The U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights Disagreements between societies regarding the "rights of man" The destruction of the great library in Alexandria

In lecture, I explained the common practice of eminent domain, which involves taking property from people (even though they do not wish to sell the property), handing them fair market value, and justifying this on the grounds that the interests of the community outweigh the interests of any individual. E.g., building the Mexico/US wall involves condemnation of many private persons' properties for the purpose of building the wall. Also, building a freeway or a park usually involves condemning private parties' property.

Your instructor raised and discussed the question: "What is it to have (a) morality?" Among other things, he raised this question: All of these Is morality a way of life—e.g., the life of the scholar, the military life? Is morality being a soldier for, a pursuer of, a particular goal or goals? Is morality a kind of rule-following or adherence to rules/authorities? Is morality about having virtues and avoiding vices? None of these

In my most recent Zoom lecture, I raised all of these questions.

Milgram's experiment can be seen as particularly relevant in explaining Nazi WWII war crimes, which were defended by citing obedience to authorities Nazi WWII war crimes, which were defended by citing obedience to Adolph Hitler Nazi WWII war crimes, which were defended by citing peer pressure and fear Nazi WWII war crimes, which were defended by citing society's "social contract"

Infamously, during the Nuremberg Nazi war crime trials (1945-6), defendants defended their actions by noting that they were "just following orders" (generally, not orders from Hitler but from lower officials). That raised the profile of "obedience to orders" (to authorities) as an excuse for wrongful behavior.

In the Milgram Experiment, there were "learners," who were asked questions, and "teachers," who asked the questions, and supervisors who directed the tests. The Milgram experiment focused on The teachers and how far they would go along with the questioning The learners and how far they would go along with the questioning The providers of electro-shock punishments, meted out when teachers or learners made mistakes; how far would the go? The supervisors, who were told to instruct teachers and learners to continue and that they—the supervisors—would "take full responsibility"

Infamously, the "teachers" were the focus of attention. They were instructed to give painful shocks, some of them evidently lethal. The experiments were done on ordinary people who were put in the "teacher" role and who, at a rate of 65% [i.e., nearly two-thirds], complied, if sometimes noisily, to the bitter end. Supervisors and learners were "in on" the deception of the experiment. Nowadays, in our society, this kind of experiment would be declared "unethical," owing to the awful stress it put subjects under.

What, according to Singer, is the relationship of animal agriculture to climate change? Animal agriculture greatly exacerbates the problem of climate change—e.g., by contributing to greenhouse gases They are entirely distinct issues, which is why he does not object to eating meat that is produced humanely According to Singer, animal food consumption is altering humanity, making it more aggressive, thereby increasing greenhouse gases Both violate the rights of non-human animals

It is a truism nowadays that animal agriculture vastly increases: depletion of soil fertility, use of disappearing ground water, creation of greenhouse gases, etc. If we were to feed ourselves as vegetarians, all of these issues would be greatly ameliorated.

According to the Post Deterministic Argument (the PDA, which neither assumes nor asserts Determinism), For any given action, it is either caused or it is not caused All actions are caused; hence no action is such that the actor could have done otherwise than he did If an action is not caused, then it is freely performed None of these All of these

It is called the "post" deterministic argument because it is an argument one might consider "after" one has recognized that we have no reason to believe that determinism is true. This argument neither assumes nor asserts determinism. Instead, it asserts the (uncontroversial) claim that an action is either caused or it isn't—which derives from the LEM (law of excluded middle, something we've discussed previously).

A "theory of value" seeks to Identify what has value (e.g., what would be the nature of the best kind of human life) Identify the criterion or essence of moral rightness (and wrongness) Demonstrate specifically that one should always act to bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number Reveal that, ultimately, only pleasure (and the absence of pain) have value

It seeks to identify what has value—the sort of knowledge one would need in constructing the best life. Hedonism is one example of a theory of value: it suggests that the best life would be the pleasurable life, free of pain. As we'll see, Kant had a different theory of value.

KANT: It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and any other talents of the mind we may care to name, or courage, resolution, and constancy of purpose, as qualities of temperament, are without doubt good and desirable in many respects; but they can also be extremely bad and hurtful when the will is not good which has to make use of these gifts of nature, and which for this reason has the term "character" applied to its peculiar quality. It is exactly the same with gifts of fortune. Power, wealth, honour, even health and that complete well-being and contentment with one's state which goes by the name of "happiness", produce boldness, and as a consequence often overboldness as well, unless a good will is present by which their influence on the mind—and so too the whole principle of action—may be corrected and adjusted to universal ends; not to mention that a rational and impartial spectator can never feel approval in contemplating the uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced by no touch of a pure and good will, and that consequently a good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition of our very worthiness to be happy. Kant is saying, among other things, that Many things have value, but only the Good Will has unqualified moral value Only the Good Will has value In order for something to have value, it must have unqualified moral value The virtue of courage has unqualified moral value

Kant acknowledges that many things have value, but only the Good Will has "unqualified" or "unconditioned" moral value.

Which of these actions (a moment of "will") has moral worth, for Kant? The shopkeeper assisted the man who needed directions because of her duty to assist others, but, unfortunately, the man she assisted was an assassin on his way to a "job" The shopkeeper is honest with her customers because, in the long run, that's good for business The sad shopkeeper is afraid of death and so she will never commit suicide The bold shopkeeper is a ruthless businesswoman, but she always reveals courage in her business dealings

Kant is clear on this: to have moral worth, an action must be motivated by recognition of the moral law; that is, only the shopkeeper—who inadvertently assisted the hit man—performed an action (assistance) that has moral worth, since she was motivated by her moral duty—as opposed to, say, her love of others or her sympathy. He uses the example of the shopkeeper who is habitually honest with her customers to illustrate an action done "in accordance with" duty, but not "from" duty. No moral worth.

Which of these things has worth to Kant? All of these The good will Wealth Talent Virtue None of these

Kant is clear that all of these things have worth, though only the good will has unconditioned or unqualified moral worth

KANT: On the other hand, to preserve one's life is a duty, and besides this every one has also an immediate inclination to do so. But on account of this the often anxious precautions taken by the greater part of mankind for this purpose have no inner worth, and the maxim of their action is without moral content. They do protect their lives in conformity with duty but not from the motive of duty. When, on the contrary, disappointments and hopeless misery have quite taken away the taste for life; when a wretched man, strong in soul and more angered at his fate than faint-hearted or cast down, longs for death and still preserves his life without loving it—not from inclination or fear but from duty; then indeed his maxim has a moral content. According to Kant, Usually, people's attempts to preserve their own lives have no moral worth Most people who act to preserve their own lives display wickedness, for they are motivated by self-interest, but when the utterly miserable person acts to preserve herself, contrary to her own interests, we finally come upon a self-preserving act that is moral Most people act to preserve themselves without a "maxim" The military person—even the Nazi—who acts from duty acts rightly

Kant makes the curious observation that most people's strenuous efforts to stay alive have no moral worth, since they are motivated by fear of death and the like, not a recognition of moral duty.

1 MILL: As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin (Links to an external site.), first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble (Links to an external site.) association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes (Links to an external site.) of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes (Links to an external site.): so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments (Links to an external site.) connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient (Links to an external site.) existence. Here, Mill reveals a conception of Utilitarianism according to which Utilitarian societies are careful how they arrange society and socialize individuals The Utilitarian individual would concentrate on promoting appropriate social arrangements and education systems "Mind control" would be ruthlessly enforced by the state People would be raised to be patriots for their nation

Mill moves beyond the simple picture perhaps painted by the first generation of Benthamites: the simple application, by the individual, of the "greatest happiness principle" per moment. Instead, in various ways, Mill moves to a more complex picture. For instance, he clearly means to apply the Utilitarian's end (maximizing happiness) to the consideration of how society should be arranged and how children should be socialized, as we see here. (He seems to imagine a choice situation for society at large: a decision in how to arrange things that aims at maximizing happiness.) He later also reveals that he applies the GHP, not to (or not just to) moments for the individual, but to the choice of moral rules to be generally embraced by individuals in society. He says (later) that no intelligent utilitarian would engage in some action that would truly maximize happiness but that is such that, if everyone engaged in it, that would be "injurious" to society. (Consider the innocent hospital orderly example. What if people generally took such opportunities to "maximize happiness"? People throughout society would live in constant fear.) Mill does not seem to gravitate to patriotism. When he refers to the interests of "all," he does occasionally seem to mean "society," but he officially means or should mean "sentient creation," i.e., all sentient beings. Not just one's countrymen.

The Utilitarian theory of value is called Hedonism Intuitionism Felicific naturalism Consequentialism

The Utilitarian theory of value is that, ultimately, only pleasure has value—i.e., it is the only thing with intrinsic value; all other things that have value have it because they are instrumental for promoting pleasure or preventing/lessening pain. That view was first propounded by the Ancient Greek Epicurus. It is called Hedonism.

Insofar as it was valid, what did the Milgram Experiment establish? That (many) ordinary people, under the direction of an authority figure, would obey just about any order they were given, even to torture That (many) ordinary people, when coerced with social pressures, would obey just about any order they were given, even to torture That (many) ordinary people, when faced with peer pressure, would obey just about any order they were given, even to torture That (many) ordinary people, when given the opportunity, would obey just about any order they were given, even to torture

Milgram was interested, in particular, in ordinary people and how they respond to authority. During the post-war period (i.e., after 1945), it was widely thought that the German people were somehow unusual—perhaps they were overly-obedient to authorities—and that is why the Nazi horrors occurred there and not elsewhere. So Milgram set about to determine whether ordinary Americans would comply with plainly wrongful orders when given by authoritative figures (such as clip-board-wielding scientists at Yale University). As it turns out, they would, and thus, perhaps, American society too could harbor atrocities, etc. (Remember: the American people widely and easily assented when, in 2003, President Bush proposed a highly dubious plan to invade Iraq, selling the idea based on Iraq's plans to attack us (they had had nothing to do with the 9-11 attack; they were not planning an assault on America) and their ongoing development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (false). The result? Among other things, the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, achieving nothing, making matters worse, etc. Politically, those few political leaders (Obama, Sanders, et al.) who refused to authorize the dubious plan have had their careers boosted; all others (Clinton, et al.) have had to construct explanations and apologies, with at best mixed results.)

MILL: It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency (Links to an external site.), safety, uncostliness, &c., of the former—that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic (Links to an external site.) nature. And on all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. Here, Mill discusses "utilitarian" (hedonist) writers of the past, who have emphasized the "superiority" of mental over bodily pleasures. Those writers noted that the pleasures of the mind are safer and cheaper than pleasures of the body. Mill responds as follows: Those writers could have and should have stated that pleasures of the mind are just better than pleasures of the body Those writers were exactly right, and thus critics should cease their unfair criticism that hedonism is a doctrine "fit for swine." In terms of quantity, pleasures of the mind are superior to pleasures of the body Pleasures of the body are not as intense and do not last as long as do pleasures of the mind

Mill agrees with these earlier writers (hedonists) but believes that they could have, and should have, gone further with their arguments: they could have simply argued that pleasures of the mind are just intrinsically better than pleasures of the body, and that is indeed the point he begins to make here. The "circumstantial factors" point does not go far enough for Mill.

MILL: Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked (Links to an external site.) preference to the manner of existence which employs (Links to an external site.) their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent (Links to an external site.) to be changed into any of the lower (Links to an external site.) animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance (Links to an external site.) of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool (Links to an external site.), no instructed person would be an ignoramus (Links to an external site.), no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce (Links to an external site.), or the rascal (Links to an external site.) is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign (Links to an external site.) what they possess more than he, for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. By "higher faculties," Mill means Faculties of the mind, such as reason and imagination Faculties of sensation, such as touch and smell and hearing Any powers or abilities The capacity to cooperate with others

Mill is very clear here and elsewhere that he is referring to the higher mental faculties such as reason, imagination, etc. Note even here, he is referencing "intelligence," being "instructed," "feeling and conscience," etc. By "lower faculties" he means those powers that allow us to enjoy sensual pleasures, pleasures of the body.

MILL: We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscriminately (Links to an external site.) to some of the most and to some of the least estimable (Links to an external site.) feelings of which mankind are capable; we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics (Links to an external site.) one of the most effective means for the inculcation (Links to an external site.) of it; to the love of power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation (Links to an external site.) is a sense of dignity... Mill clearly believes that the dignified life (of the exercise of our higher faculties) Is the most pleasant life May not be the most pleasant, but it is the best life Is the most contented life None of these

Mill makes clear that he is not abandoning hedonism: he continues to argue, as did the hedonists, that, ultimately, only pleasure has value, though he complicates this with his point about quality as well as quantity—and dignity. He continues to maintain that the "dignified" life of the mind is the more pleasurable life, despite its often lacking "contentment." The point is that Mill isn't just saying that the life of the mind is preferable; he is saying that it is more pleasant, though possibly lacking in "contentment," which he takes pains to distinguish from pleasure/happiness.

MILL: Again, defenders of utility often find themselves called upon to reply to such objections as this—that there is not time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness. This is exactly as if any one were to say that it is impossible to guide our conduct by Christianity, because there is not time, on every occasion on which anything has to be done, to read through the Old and New Testaments. The answer to the objection is, that there has been ample (Links to an external site.) time, namely, the whole past duration (Links to an external site.) of the human species. During all that time mankind have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions; on which experience all the prudence (Links to an external site.), as well as all the morality of life, is dependent. People talk as if the commencement (Links to an external site.) of this course of experience had hitherto (Links to an external site.) been put off, and as if, at the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle with the property or life of another, he had to begin considering for the first time whether murder and theft are injurious to human happiness. Even then I do not think that he would find the question very puzzling; but, at all events, the matter is now done to his hand (Links to an external site.). It is truly a whimsical (Links to an external site.) supposition (Links to an external site.) that if mankind were agreed in considering utility to be the test of morality, they would remain without any agreement as to what is useful, and would take no measures for having their notions on the subject taught to the young, and enforced by law and opinion. Here, Mill portrays the Utilitarian individual as All of these Heavily relying on the wisdom of past generations with regard to right conduct Avoiding constant maximization calculations by relying on past human experience Accepting many precepts and rules of conventional morality None of these

Mill quite plainly does all of these things here. Mill's approach here implies that he honors and respects conventional morality, for he sees it as the distillation of past experience. And in general, the Utilitarians were not radical moral reformers. There "reform" was more a case of providing the tacit justification for existing moral conventions. We keep promises because, in a society in which people can rely on others' word, more happiness is produced (for people are supported in their plans and projects).

MILL: If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided (Links to an external site.) preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign (Links to an external site.) it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing (Links to an external site.) to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account. Suppose that pleasure A is a pleasure of the body and pleasure B is a pleasure of the mind. According to Mill, pleasure B is superior to pleasure A because Competent judges prefer pleasure B to pleasure A When people are given the opportunity to experience both pleasures, they always prefer pleasure B Only those who distinguish between quantity and quality are competent to judge a pleasure's value In the end, pleasure B wins over pleasure A in any popularity contest

Mill repeatedly notes that the judges in the comparison are not just anybody but are "competent," i.e., they are sufficiently experienced in both kinds of pleasure—i.e., "up to speed" in appreciating both enjoyments. The average person is not a competent judge of such pleasures as, say, the charms of reading poetry, listening to jazz, etc., though he may be fully skilled in enjoying a meatball sandwich.

In Kant's moral philosophy, the "categorical imperative" is A test for the moral permissibility of a proposed action A test for whether a proposed action is a duty Any moral imperative or value The imperative that one should "obey the law"

Observe that, here, we are referring to THE categorical imperative (singular). That's a reference, not to imperatives that are categorical (applying to all rational beings), but to a famous test for the moral permissibility of some proposed action.

Among Kant's examples is this case: A person seeks a loan, knowing that he will never be able to pay it back A person refrains from helping someone because that someone is a bitter enemy A person tells the truth because he would be imprisoned if he lied A person refuses to give to charity, saving up money for a trip to Paris

One of his famous cases: the person who contemplates taking out a loan knowing that he will not be able to pay it back. (Falsely promising to gain a convenience.) It violates the "categorical imperative," since, in willing that everyone perform that action, one wills a situation in which no one would benefit from a false promise (who would believe one's false promise if everyone were to issue false promises?), and thus one defeats one's purpose in falsely promising.

Suppose that Jim and Jack, two loathsome individuals, are nephews of Joe, a rich man. They stand to inherit lots of money should Joe die, but he seems very healthy. Let us suppose that, independently, the two nephews decide to kill Joe: at the exact same moment, they shoot their rifles, aiming at Joe. But, as it turns out, after Jack pulls the trigger, a bird flies in the path of the bullet, which deflects it away from Joe. Meanwhile, Jim's bullet is not deflected, and it kills Joe. The actions of both men are discovered; ultimately, they were both convicted of crimes. Jim is convicted of 1st degree murder and is given the death penalty; Jack, however, is convicted of attempted murder, and is given 20 years. Which of the following speakers embraces moral luck? The difference between Jim and Jack's sentences is right and proper; after all, Jim killed someone and Jack did not. It's pretty simple. It is unfortunate that Jack and Jim did not receive the same sentences; after all, there is no difference in what they did that they had control over Who was lucky and who was not? Well, I'd say that Jim was lucky because he succeeded in what he set out to do; not so for Jack: that bird was a bit of bad luck Nobody gets executed in this state anymore. Chances are, Jim and Jack will both die in prison. That is as it should be.

One who embraces (does not reject) Moral Luck recognizes that one may be assessed based on things over which one has no control—e.g., the drunk driver who kills someone is rightly judged more harshly than the drunk driver who lucks out and kills no one, even though each driver's contribution to the situation is precisely the same. The difference is a fact over which neither driver has any control (or, alternatively, over which each has the same control). Ditto for Jim and Jack: Jim killed someone, Jack didn't—a fact determined by the contributions of bird flight.

According to the Utilitarian theory of value, ultimately, only one thing has value, namely, Pleasure Happiness Experience, sentiency, consciousness Bringing about the greatest happiness for the greatest number

Pleasure of course. Utilitarians are in the habit of suggesting that rightness is a matter of promoting happiness, but they define happiness (see J.S. Mill) as the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. For them, pleasure is the fundamental value

If two drivers have taken all precautions, and are abiding by all the rules of the road, and in one case, a dog runs in front of the car and is killed, and not in the other, then, given that the dog's running out was not something over which either driver had control, it seems that we are reluctant to blame one driver more than the other the dog should not be blamed for his unfortunate death; he's just a dog we should punish the driver who killed the dog, but not very much it is irrational to call one driver "fortunate" and the other "unfortunate"; in terms of fortune, they are the same

Quoting directly from the reading, in the case of these two drivers, it seems that "we are reluctant to blame one driver more than the other"—i.e., they are equally free of blame. This is the part of our thinking that tends to reject moral luck.

According to "rule utilitarianism," an approach that Mill seems at one point to embrace or nearly embrace, The Greatest Happiness Principle applies to the rules that society could set up to maximize happiness; they are the rules that, when or if adopted, would maximize happiness for everyone when followed by everyone; everyone should follow those rules The Greatest Happiness Principle applies to individuals and the actions that are available to them at any given moment; it requires that they choose that action among alternatives that maximizes happiness At any given moment, one should choose that action, from among all alternative available actions, that will bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number An intelligent Utilitarian moral agent will adopt "rules of thumb," i.e., rules that, though not always reliable means of maximizing happiness, are usually productive of the most utility; embracing those rules saves individuals from having to calculate in individual cases; they simply follow the rule

See Mill's "abstinences" paragraph. He argues against individuals acting like "act utilitarians" when everyone's doing that would be injurious to society. That sounds like rule utilitarianism: applying the "greatest happiness principle," not to individuals, but to the choice of the set of rules a Utilitarian society would adopt for all to follow (with utility maximization in mind).

Singer is on the side of those Utilitarians who think that, in principle, it would be good to create more "happy" lives. But he does not favor efforts to increase the human population. Why? He recognizes the great challenges posed by global climate change and threats to future food resources; and these are made worse by increased human population He believes that, thought things might be otherwise, in fact, on the whole, humanity does more harm than good in the world, and thus the size of the human population should be decreased Singer embraces the principle of "equitable hedonics," the notion that happiness should be spread among all sentient species; hence human population should only grow if non-human animal population grows, too Increases in the human population entail decreases in the non-human animal population

Singer was an early appreciator of the challenge of global climate change and recognizes that many issues created by massive human populations.

Some qualities are even helpful to this good will itself and can make its tasks very much easier. They have none the less no inner unconditioned worth, but rather presuppose a good will which sets a limit to the esteem in which they are rightly held and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good. Moderation in affections and passions, self-control, and sober reflexion are not only good in many respects; they may even seem to constitute part of the inner worth of a person. Yet they are far from being properly described as good without qualification (however unconditionally they have been commended by the ancients). For without the principles of a good will they may become exceedingly bad; and the very coolness of a scoundrel makes him, not merely more dangerous, but also immediately more abominable in our eyes than we should have taken him to be without it. Among other things, Kant is saying that Disciplined self-control can be very helpful, but can be very bad The Ancients failed to value self-control Where the Good Will is absent, all is wicked and beastly Moderation, a virtue, is a supreme good

Such virtues as self-control and self-discipline are good, but, in the wrong hands, they can be very bad indeed. They can even be part of what we regard as monstrous.

Let us suppose that Smith attempts to shoot and kill his Uncle Harry. At exactly the same moment, from another spot, Smith's cousin Jones attempts to shoot and kill Uncle Harry. Smith's bullet finds its mark and Harry dies. But, though Jones also expertly aims and shoots, a bird happens to fly in the path of his bullet, and thus he fails to hit and kill Uncle Harry. Smith has committed murder and Jones has committed "attempted murder," but not murder. Smith is tried and sentenced to life in prison. Jones is tried and gets six years. NOW SUPPOSE that WE reject the notion that Smith is more blameworthy than Jones. We insist that the two men are equally guilty or blameworthy since, with regard to what they controlled, their actions are exactly the same and are equally horrendous. THUS:

THE perspective here described is that of one who REJECTS moral luck—i.e., one denies that there is any such phenomenon (of someone being blameworthy [or the reverse] for things about which they have no control). There's the Problem of Moral Luck, and then there's [at least] two positions one might take: embracing it or rejecting it. Those who embrace it seem to be abandoning the "control principle." Those who reject it persist in holding to that principle. Nagel seems to stake out a dismal position in the middle: he recognizes that the control principle is essential, but he also recognizes that a systematic application of that principle would overthrow the moral order as we understand it. He sits uncomfortably on the edge of an abyss (as do most of us on this score).

In his discussion of the Post Deterministic Argument (PDA), your instructor presented 5 distinct scenarios in which Jack suddenly got up to do jumping jacks. The "science fiction" scenario in which a jumping jacks action pops randomly into existence (right where Jack is sitting) is used to Illustrate an uncaused action and show that such an action is not something we would hold the actor responsible for Illustrate a freely performed action, namely, an action that literally occurs "because of nothing" Illustrate that randomness is a kind of causation that negates freedom None of these

That case illustrates an action that is not caused. One must use one's imagination—one must challenge oneself—to picture an uncaused action. (Action A is clearly caused, yet it is this kind of action that many imagine when they try to imagine an uncaused action!) That's the point of the five scenarios. It reveals just what is involved in an "uncaused" action. (It is something truly exotic, bizarre. It is not scenario A.) And such an action surely fails to qualify as "free" (it is not something for which we would hold the actor responsible); that's because he has nothing to do with it; he fails to author or create it. Only in scenario A does Jack author his action.

Utilitarian thinkers ultimately abandoned the formula "act to bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number" because It was ambiguous; in some instances, it gave unclear direction It was impossible to follow, since happiness is a subjective matter It was overly-ambitious: no one can be expected to pursue so lofty a goal as the "greatest happiness for the greatest number" It was overly egalitarian: it failed to discriminate between "better" and "worse" human beings

The GHP using that formula gave uncertain or ambiguous direction, for, sometimes, an action produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number of beings; yet another action produces the greatest amount of happiness, though not for the greatest number of beings. Which action is right? Utilitarians opted to eliminate the distributive clause; the new GHP required that we maximize happiness, not the number of beings made happy.

The organization "Mothers Against Drunk Driving" (MADD) used to [still do?] insist that a drunk driver who manages NOT to hurt anyone (despite his or her drunk driving) is just as blameworthy as a drunk driver who does hurt someone. Insofar as they take that position, they Reject moral luck Embrace moral luck Insist on the "problem of moral luck" Directly reject Immanuel Kant's view on moral responsibility

The MADD crew, like Kant, refuse to let the "lucky" drunk driver off the hook: he/she is as guilty as the "unlucky" drunk driver (who unfortunately manages to hurt or kill someone). That's rejection of moral luck. Embrace of moral luck is complacency over the status quo: that millions of drunk drivers skate by on the basis of fate or luck (they get a slap on the wrist despite the fact that only luck keeps them from landing in the "killer" category).

A "corollary" (implication) of the control principle is that Two people ought not to be morally assessed differently if the only other differences between them are due to factors beyond their control People should be assessed based on what they do, not on what they would do under hypothetical circumstances Owing to differences in control, some people are born morally lucky and some are born morally unlucky Ultimately, no one is responsible for what they are or do

The clear implication of the "control principle" is that two people ought not to be assessed differently if the only differences between them are due to factors beyond their control, such as luck (good or bad: a kid happens to cross the intersection just as the drunk driver approaches it—or not)

Consequentialists believe that rightness is that aspect of an action such that it causes or maximally causes something (such as happiness, pleasure, etc.). Deontologists, however, believe that Some actions are obligatory regardless of their consequences Right actions maximize duty Value is more important than rightness An action is obligatory if it is not morally impermissible

The defining feature of deontology is that some actions are obligatory regardless of their consequences. For instance, I exhibit deontology when I feel strongly that I will not betray my niece or best friend under any conceivable circumstances. ("Here's a billion dollars if you'll betray your best friend! Think of the good you could do with it!" -Nope, I say.)

Nowadays, Utilitarians are more likely to embrace the motto, "one should act to maximize happiness." What do they mean? One should choose that action that, among alternatives, creates the greatest net happiness, not the greatest number of beings made happy One should simply choose that action which, among alternatives, creates the greatest amount of happiness (whether or not it also causes pain) One should choose that action that causes more happiness than unhappiness One should specifically choose that action that, among alternatives, causes the greatest net increase in the number of people made happy.

The greatest "net" happiness, when all the happiness and unhappiness caused by the action are taken into account. Utilitarians (J.S. Mill) sometimes speak as though the goodness of an action is a matter of degree, but, over time, the doctrine has settled on the notion that the only right action is the one that maximizes happiness. It is right; all other actions are wrong

Your instructor cites the Existentialist JP Sartre's famous case of the young man torn between going off to war or Remaining to take care of his ailing mother Remaining in the safety of his life in Paris Seeking to flee France because he thinks killing is immoral Remaining to help reconstruct France after the war

Yes, the issue is that his going off to war means abandoning his mother, who has no one but him to help her

KANT: I will here pass over all actions already recognized as contrary to duty, however useful they may be with a view to this or that end; for about these the question does not even arise whether they could have been done for the sake of duty inasmuch as they are directly opposed to it. I will also set aside actions which in fact accord with duty, yet for which men have no immediate inclination, but perform them because impelled to do so by some other inclination. For there it is easy to decide whether the action which accords with duty has been done from duty or from some purpose of self-interest. This distinction is far more difficult to perceive when the action accords with duty and the subject has in addition an immediate inclination to the action. For example, it certainly accords with duty that a grocer should not overcharge his inexperienced customer; and where there is much competition a sensible shopkeeper refrains from so doing and keeps to a fixed and general price for everybody so that a child can buy from him just as well as anyone else. Thus people are served honestly; but this is not nearly enough to justify us in believing that the shopkeeper has acted in this way from duty or from principles of fair dealing; his interests required him to do so. We cannot assume him to have in addition an immediate inclination towards his customers, leading him, as it were out of love, to give no man preference over another in the matter of price. Thus the action was done neither from duty nor from immediate inclination, but solely from purposes of self-interest. Among other things, Kant is saying that The grocer's honesty has no moral worth if it is motivated by long-term self-interest The grocer's honesty is a good thing despite its not being done "from" duty The grocer is motivated by love, an inclination None of these All of these

The grocer is acting "in accord" with duty but not "from" duty; hence, her honesty has no moral worth, says Kant. Self-interest is a kind of "inclination." In general, our "inclinations" are tied to our bodily (not rational) natures.

The issue of moral luck has been described as arising from a tension between our embrace of the "control principle," on the one hand, and the many routine practices we employ and judgments we make that seem to violate that principle the principle of "just deserts," on the other our belief in free will, on the other the many routine practices we employ and judgments we make that assume that we have no control over our lives and even who we are

The issue concerns the TENSION between our embrace of the control principle—the idea that a person should be assessable only for things under his/her control—on the one hand, and our routinely acting and thinking in violation of that principle, e.g., in the difference in how we treat murderers vs. attempted murderers. One might say that our moral life appears incoherent and contradictory

For Kant, in responding to the moral law, we are responding to Our reason, our rationality Our "inclinations," such as sympathy or empathy The demands of prudence and survival of the species Our respect for all living things

The moral law is a demand of reason. It demands rationality. Kant was a notorious anthropocentric (one who supposed that humanity is all that matters in the world).

In the end, Milgram found that 65% of participants, who were ordinary people, showed a willingness to obey orders to torture and kill 33% of participants, who were ordinary people, showed a willingness to obey orders to torture and kill 100% of participants, who were ordinary people, showed a willingness to obey orders to torture and kill Women (24%) were far less likely than men (65%) to follow wrongful and monstrous orders

The notorious figure is 65%--nearly two thirds. That is, most people (or so suggested the experiment) would go along with plainly wrongful acts based on "authorization" from authoritative people. More recent efforts to replicate the experiment yield similar results. Note: one complaint about the original M Experiments was that all participants were male. Did Milgram's findings apply, then, universally? Or only to men? (Later iterations of the ME included women and, as far as I know, women did about as badly as men did.)

Your instructor suggested that "reasons" are "defeasible." That means that It is sometimes rational not to perform an action despite having a reason to perform that action since one can have reasons that conflict What counts as a reason to do or believe something for person A might not count as such a reason for person B Since there is no way to quantify the "weight" of reasons, reasons have no weight at all and, in that sense, they are defeated Moral dilemmas exist

The phenomenon of conflicting reasons (having a reason to do X while having a reason to do Y, which precludes doing X) establishes that reasons are often defeasible (override-able, outweigh-able). When the first reason outweighs the second, the second is "defeated", though not necessarily nullified (there is residue), as in the case of moral reasons. I did the right thing by helping the hit-and-run victim (and not going to the party), but I did owe my friend an apology.

Return to Bauer's "promise to attend party" case. As your instructor explains, in the past, some philosophers attempted to recognize the defeasibility of moral reasons by distinguishing between real obligations and "prima facie" obligations. According to those philosophers, your obligation to attend your friend's party (based on your promise to him to attend) turned out not to be real but only "prima facie" (i.e., based on first impression). Your instructor explained why this terminology was later rejected: Such terminology falsely implies that your obligation was not real; but it was real, indicated by the fact that, despite your doing the right thing (not attending the party), you owe your friend an apology for failing to do so; that you owe him an apology suggests that you have violated a real obligation Such terminology falsely implies that moral obligations that are defeated in a case of conflicting moral reasons are defeated by the person with the obligation rather than by the situation itself "Prima facie" is Latin for "on the face of it." Such terminology implies that, "on the face of it," one had an obligation of a certain weight; but, in truth, one's obligation had lesser weight. But a difference in moral weight is not the issue here, and Latin terminology simply confuses the matter Trick question! Your instructor did not reject but embraced that terminology!

The problem with using such terms is that such usage implies that the overridden obligations turned out not to be obligations, but that's not true at all, as the party example illustrates. That I owed my friend an apology reveals that the obligation persisted.

Some philosophers have responded to the issue of moral luck by suggesting that what people are really responsible for are their intentions or their "willings," not how things turn out. However, A case can be made that who we are and what we intend & will are also matters of luck Efforts to pursue this course were pursued through the massive legislative efforts of the 60s called the "Great Society." But these proved impractical and were later abandoned It is impossible to know what people intend; we can only know what they do In truth, each of us has tremendous control over how things turn out, contrary to popular opinion

The reading attributes this view to the great liberal economist Adam Smith; but it also rejects this approach, since "a case can be made that who we are and what we intend & will are also matters of luck." That is, even our willings seem beyond our control (since who we are is ultimately beyond our control, if we are to believe the sciences).

One of the readings quoted in the virtual lecture about moral luck asserts that "we certainly seem to be committed to the existence of moral luck." Why? Our moral practices suggest that, e.g., we routinely punish those who have murdered more than we punish those who have merely attempted murder Like Kant, we insist on blaming people based on their intentions, not based on what their wills and actions actually bring into being Our society is very judgmental and vindictive, as evidenced by our notorious love of the death penalty and other Draconian (severe) punishments As Americans, we are natural gamblers

The reason that the issue of Moral Luck is striking is that the "control principle" seems to express the very essence of morality, yet a consistent application of the CP would utterly change our moral order, for violations of CP are everywhere [unavoidably?] in our moral reality. Part of the problem is that our moral practices seem to reveal a commitment to the existence of moral luck (i.e., a commitment to violation of the CP). —Our differential treatment of murderers and attempted murderers is an example.

The argument from Determinism relies on, among other things, the notion that If all members of a set have feature F, then all members of any subset of that set have feature F To count as "freely performed," an action must be such that the actor did not know he would perform that action until he performed it All events are necessary If an action is necessary, then the actor could have done otherwise than he did only if he freely chose it

The second premise notes that, if all events are necessary, then all actions are necessary. Why? Because, if all members of some set have feature F, then all members of any subset of that set have feature F. If all cars have wheels, then all Porsches have wheels. (The set of Porsches is a subset of the set of cars.)

MILL: It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.... . By "both sides," Mill has this in mind: The ability to experience and enjoy both the life of the use of higher faculties and the life of the use of lower faculties The life of human beings vs. the life of non-human animals The life of pleasure vs. the life of intellect The "examined life" vs. the "unexamined life"

Throughout, Mill has been working with a preference test involving pleasures of the body, on one hand, and pleasures of the mind, on the other. He asserts that those who are competent in the enjoyment of the life of the use of the higher (mental) faculties (imagination, problem-solving, etc.) invariably prefer that life to the life of the senses/body.

Consider Nazi collaborators in 1930s Germany who are condemned [judged harshly] for committing morally atrocious acts, even though their very presence in Nazi Germany was due to factors beyond their control. Had those very people been transferred by the companies for which they worked to Argentina in 1929, perhaps they would have led exemplary [good] lives. If we correctly morally assess the Nazi collaborators differently from their imaginary counterparts in Argentina, then we have a case of circumstantial moral luck resultant moral luck Constitutive luck Causal luck

This is what Nagel has in mind as an alleged instance of circumstantial moral luck. (See discussion of four types in the virtual lecture, Zoom lecture.)

One kind of (alleged) moral luck is called "resultant." Here's an example of resultant moral luck: Of two equally drunk drivers, only one comes upon a child riding his bike across the intersection (whom he kills) Had Herr Schmidt settled in Argentina rather than returning to Germany, who would not now share the guilt for the Holocaust In the end, who you are is a matter of genetics, upbringing, and socialization—matters of fate that differ between persons All of these None of these

Thomas Nagel, one of the two main authors discussed in the reading (the other is Bernard Williams), refers to four types of moral luck: resultant (how things happen to turn out), circumstantial (the luck of circumstance: are we tested in the way German civilians were tested?), constitutive (who we are), and causal.

The word "utility" has long referred to Usefulness Goodness Pleasure Unpleasant necessities (e.g., sewage services)

Usefulness, of course.

What does Peter Singer make of the concept of moral rights? Singer states that "rights" are not a fundamental concept in Utilitarian ethics, but if utility can be maximized by organizing society around the notion of rights, we should do that He has his doubts about non-human animal rights but does embrace the notion of human rights He thinks that, according to Utilitarianism, both humans and non-human animals have a fundamental right to life and to wellbeing that must not be violated He utterly rejects the idea of moral rights

Utilitarianism does not essentially recognize "rights," since it focuses entirely on the maximization of happiness by whatever means necessary. But Singer does suggest that our adoption of practices that include a recognition of "rights" might be useful in maximizing happiness.

An important aspect of the Utilitarian theory of rightness is its Impartiality (rejection of bias toward oneself or one's friends/relatives) Egalitarian neutrality (insistence that all living things are equally valuable and worth preserving) Ruthless simplicity (focusing on one and only one moral principle) Impartiality (refusal to regard any pleasure as superior to any other)

Utilitarianism's famous impartiality is its notion that one ought to promote happiness without partiality (bias) toward oneself or one's loved ones, et al. Everyone counts the same.

Thinkers like Bentham viewed morality As sensible and practical; thus as involving behaviors that improved people's lives As traditional: i.e., in terms of rules and principles that have "stood the test of time" As emotional: as rooted in our feelings, especially our viewing all life as sacred, a tragedy to lose As perfect just as it is, for it is a set of rules that, if followed, bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number

Utilitarians, such as Bentham, rejected a conception of morality as involving arbitrary commands. For them, morality has a point, and that point is improving lives, making them happier. The Utilitarians often saw themselves as reformers, reforming morality and law so that it better reflected the core point that these things should address "human weal and woe" (welfare). Bentham was a major force in legal reform.

Consider the views of philosopher Michael Walzer. Walzer discusses a moral dilemma in which a leader must decide whether to order the torture of a captured terrorist to find out where bombs are hidden that will soon go off and kill thousands. Walzer judges that The good leader would make the order but accept blame for having done wrong by ordering the torture The good leader would hold steady in his refusal to do a wrongful thing in order to achieve a morally desirable result (i.e., preventing the bomb from killing millions of innocents) The good leader decides based on a simple count, in lives sacrificed, of the expected outcome of either action: ordering the torture or not Walzer refuses to view this decision as moral; he argues that it is a political decision and that, therefore, it is intrinsically wicked

Walzer rejected the idea that the "good leader" would refuse to order the torture. He would, with great regret, order the torture and then accept any punishment or condemnation for having done that. That way he isn't just good and he isn't just a politician. He's the good leader who honors both demands: to honor what is right while recognizing the demands of morality—which, in this case, surely is the need to torture the man (in order to prevent the deaths of millions).

Consider the Churchill case (an apocryphal case involving Winston Churchill and the city of Coventry). The Brits had broken the German code, and thus they could understand German military communications. Churchill learned that the Germans were planning to bomb the city of Coventry. However, Warning the people of Coventry might tip the Germans off that their codes had been compromised and would have to be changed He simply did not have the resources to protect Coventry unless he pulled large numbers away from the battle front He had come to realize that Germany must win the war in order that a nation would remain that was strong enough to deal with the threat of evil posed by the Soviet Union None of these

Warning Coventry would likely tip off the Germans that the Brits had broken their code: leading to a change in the code, putting the Brits back in the position of not being able to understand German communications (losing a crucial asset in winning the war).

According to Utilitarianism, one should maximize The amount of net happiness, without bias with regard to who is made happier One's own happiness, understood as the presence of pleasure and absence of pain Others' happiness, understood as the presence of pleasure and absence of pain An equal share of happiness for all

We are to maximize happiness without bias (utilitarian "impartiality"). Since one's own happiness is as important as anyone else's, it would be erroneous to suggest that, according to U, one should maximize "others" happiness but not one's own. One should simply maximize happiness, without regard for who is made happy or unhappy. Everyone's happiness matters equally.

What impact did the Utilitarian movement have had on liberalism, as it developed in Western societies? It encouraged viewing the state as an instrument for improving lives (e.g., protecting people from natural disasters, providing them health care, providing social security safety nets, etc.) Sticking to liberalism's original vision of a minimal state that serves only to secure individuals in their rights to life, liberty, and estate—for, as such, it permits a maximally happy society Rejecting those who urged that we view the state as having a larger function than to secure individuals' rights Rejection of individualism and the notion that human beings properly flourish when allowed to engage in "experiments of living"

We know what impact Util had on Liberalism. Many of the great Utilitarians were liberals, John Stuart Mill being the foremost example. Mill championed freedom and liberty (in his famous essay, "On Liberty"). He believed that the happiest society is one that allowed individuals to find a way of living that is suitable to them as distinct individuals. He was very much against the "one size fits all" approach to human living, happiness. Ultimately, the Utilitarians put pressure on government to expand the role of government beyond mere security (protection of rights) to providing social security nets, providing jobs or income, providing relief in case of natural disasters, addressing racial and other discrimination, etc. The Utilitarians were at the forefront of women's rights, animal rights, workers' rights, etc.

In a recent Zoom lecture, your instructor focused on an argument—he called it the "argument from Determinism" (AfD)— that raises the question: what if Determinism (i.e., the thesis of Determinism) were true? It starts with the premise, "If D is true, then all events are necessary." What is its next premise? If all events are necessary, then all actions are necessary If all events are necessary, then no events are contingent If all events are necessary, then no action is freely performed If all events are necessary, then, no action is such that the actor could have done otherwise

Well, it's a simple piece of reasoning, and either one understands it or one doesn't. Anyone who understands it knows that the next premise is: "If all events are necessary, then all actions are necessary." (The argument depends on the transitivity of conditional statements: If A then B If B then C Thus if A then C)

Insofar as Utilitarianism is based on a view of human nature, it rests on Our capacity for empathy and our desire for pleasure Our hedonistic egoism plus the joy we feel in benefitting others Our primal sense that all is one; the unity of the universe Our fundamental recognition that we are not alone; that others exist whose welfare is as important as our own

Well, most obviously, it focuses on our desire for pleasure and aversion to pain—uncontroversial matters. But the Util theory of rightness clearly relies upon or presupposes human empathy—i.e., concern for the suffering of others

A consequentialist theory approaches rightness Purely in terms of what our actions cause or bring about Purely in terms of duties and obligations that attach to our circumstances and roles With a focus on the development of virtues and the avoidance of vices In terms of how embrace of a set of moral rules (or a moral "way of life") transforms society

Well, obviously, such a theory focuses on the consequences of our actions, i.e., what our actions cause or bring about Consequentialist theories, such as Utilitarianism, are contrasted with deontological theories, which approach morality in terms of duties that are to be honored even when that has bad consequences

According to your instructor, the notion of a "moral dilemma" is a technical concept. Accordingly, a "moral dilemma," in the strict sense, is a situation in which one has a moral reason to do X while simultaneously one has a moral reason to do Y, which entails not doing X. Further, Both reasons are "weighty" and it is not clear which is the weightier of the two It is in one's personal interests to side with one reason over the other Both obligations are considered "absolute": obligations that must never be violated The violation of either "reason" means that one will be ostracized

What makes a case of conflict a moral dilemma (properly speaking) is the presence of two conditions: that much morally is at stake and it isn't clear which of the two reasons is weightier.

Eichmann was one of the designers of the Nazi "final solution." In her famous writings concerning the Eichmann trial, philosopher Hannah Arendt Noted that, to her surprise, Eichmann was not a monster; rather, he was a bland bureaucrat. He exemplified the "banality of evil." Argued that the real cause of the Nazi atrocities was not the few leaders, but the many "followers," who harbored secret sadism. Noted that, to her surprise, Eichmann was not a monster; rather, he was a bland bureaucrat. This exemplified the "inevitability of evil." Noted that Eichmann's strongest defense was his honesty about hatred of the Jews and his genius as an architect of evil.

Yes, Arendt scandalized many with her description of Eichmann as a "bland bureaucrat," the embodiment of what she famously referred to as the "banality [ordinariness] of evil." (Not "inevitability" of evil, which is very different.) She was making a point not unlike the one made by Milgram in interpreting the results of his experiments—that ordinary people, without whom great wrongs cannot be accomplished, are as much the "face of evil" as is the face of Hitler or Goebbels or Stalin or Pol Pot

Hume seemed to believe that an action's being caused in the manner of the first "jumping jacks" scenario (in which Smith does jumping jacks to get back at Bauer) is both necessary and sufficient for an action's being freely performed. But some philosophers, including your instructor, have argued that, though that sort of causation is indeed a necessary condition for freedom, it is not sufficient; it is not sufficient if the agent can't help but have the character and personality that he has that leads to his act of will That sort of causation is neither necessary nor sufficient for a freely performed action An action's being caused in the manner of the first "jumping jacks" scenario is a bizarre action, not a freely performed action Hume seems to have forgotten that, in order for an action to count as freely performed, the action must be such that the actor could have done otherwise than he did at the time of the action

Yes, I presented the reflections of those philosophers who agree with Hume that, in order to be freely performed, an action must be caused by the will of the agent. However, that the action was caused by the agent, though necessary for freedom, is not sufficient to establish that it is freely performed (though Hume seems to think so). For what if the actor couldn't help but have the character/personality that he has and that caused him to form that act of will? (The upshot of modern science is that humans, no less than the rest of nature, are phenomena governed by laws, causes, random electrons, etc.—and none of us has any control over those factors, factors that yield our personality and character, something formed in early childhood.) And so some philosophers—Sam Harris is a good example—conclude that humanity lacks free will, since humans do not control the factors that produce their character. (I recognize, of course, that, as an adult, one is capable of modifying one's character—of defining who one is. The problem is that THE ADULT AGENT who is doing that was formed [his personality/character was formed] in early childhood, that agent was created owing to processes over which one had no control.)

For Kant, one problem with basing morality on the fact that people are naturally sympathetic is this: All of these Not everyone is sympathetic, and thus morality would not apply to him/her Sympathy is easily diminished by misfortune and constant misery Sympathy can lead to wrong actions None of these

Yes, Kant rejected our natural sympathy as the basis for our moral agency on the grounds that not everyone is sympathetic and even among those in whom it is strong it wavers, it ebbs and flows, waxes and wanes. It weakens in particular when we are gravely weighed down with troubles. Further, as I've explained in lecture, sympathy and love can even lead to wrong action.

A hypothetical imperative is an imperative that is valid for you Insofar as you have a particular goal or desire or interest independent of any particular goal or desire or interest that you have; it applies to you "absolutely" As a rational being, whatever your interests Because it derives entirely from reason

Yes, a hypothetical imperative is an imperative whose validity (for one) depends on an "if," a condition that might or might not hold. For instance, the imperative, "quit smoking," though valid for many, would make little sense to someone who has just learned that he only has a year or so to live.

Some would say that David Hume showed us that the second premise of the Post Deterministic Argument (as your instructor presented it) is false. That's because he showed us that The only actions that count as freely performed are those that are caused by the agent's own will In order to be truly freely performed, an action must be literally uncaused An uncaused action is a bizarre action, but it is not a freely performed action It is not true that, if all events are caused, then all actions are caused, for a caused action is a free action

Yes, another point made by contemplating the five scenarios is that, in order to qualify as a freely performed action (something for which we would hold the actor responsible), it must be caused by the actor/agent, which is scenario A. We see that action E is no free action. Then what is? The action of scenario A is the only candidate. We realize that, in order for an action to be free, it must be CAUSED—specifically by the will of the actor.

According to the moral doctrine/theory of hedonism, Many things have value, but only pleasure has value in itself Only one thing has value: pleasure One ought to pursue a life filled with sensual pleasure Life is the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain

Yes, as Mill points out, on the Utilitarian scheme, many things have value, though only pleasure has value as an end in itself; only pleasure has value intrinsically.

MILL: Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked (Links to an external site.) preference to the manner of existence which employs (Links to an external site.) their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent (Links to an external site.) to be changed into any of the lower (Links to an external site.) animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance (Links to an external site.) of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool (Links to an external site.), no instructed person would be an ignoramus (Links to an external site.), no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce (Links to an external site.), or the rascal (Links to an external site.) is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign (Links to an external site.) what they possess more than he, for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. Mill clearly believes that those who are "up to speed" on a full range of enjoyments prefer A life involving the use of our minds to solve problems, to imagine, to plan, to be conscientious, and so on. A life involving the use of our minds to lead a strictly moral life The life of an advanced being who feels no emotions The life of satisfaction of our desires

Yes, he is drawing attention to the special charms of the life of the exercise of mental faculties: reason, imagination, conscientiousness, etc. He is saying that, as a matter of fact, those who are competent in those pleasures prefer them to the pleasures of the body (exercise of lower faculties). He seeks to capture this factoid by suggesting that we want to lead dignified lives, and the life of the mind is more dignified than the life of the body/senses. He is, after all, a Victorian.

Consider the Truman/"atom bomb" example. The argument in favor of using the A-bomb was that Without a Japanese surrender, there would have to be a land invasion that would kill perhaps millions Upon using that weapon, the US could control the world and thus could ensure peace for generations Only the use of such a weapon would cause the Japanese soldier to run away in fear, guaranteeing a victory for the Americans Upon using that weapon, the Japanese would rightly regard the Americans as insane

Yes, the point was that only something extraordinary—such as use of the atomic bomb—would motivate the Japanese hierarchy to surrender. Without surrender, millions would die, a moral disaster. The ploy worked. The Japanese surrendered. The deaths of millions was avoided (at a price: the death of over 100,000 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki).

MILL: In the case of abstinences (Links to an external site.) indeed—of things which people forbear (Links to an external site.) to do, from moral considerations, though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial—it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a class which, if practised generally, would be generally injurious (Links to an external site.), and that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it. The amount of regard for the public interest implied in this recognition, is no greater than is demanded by every system of morals; for they all enjoin (Links to an external site.) to abstain (Links to an external site.) from whatever is manifestly (Links to an external site.) pernicious (Links to an external site.) to society. . . . Here, Mill seems to embrace a "rule" approach to the Greatest Happiness Principle, i.e., Applying the GHP to the choice of rules to follow based on which set of rules, when generally adopted, would maximizes happiness Applying the GHP to the choice of "rules of thumb"—i.e., rules that, though not infallible or perfect, will generally produce the desired results To ask, "How would you like it if everyone did that?" To conceive of the Utilitarian individual as always aware of the rules of society

Yes, here we have Mill embracing "rule utilitarianism," a kind of Utilitarianism that does not (simply or at all) apply the GHP to acts of individuals, but, rather, on the choice of sets of rules for society to follow. Mill seems to realize that, in a society in which everyone always wields the GHP, we would have acts like the distribution of the parts of the innocent hospital orderly. But that world would be one in which people would live in constant fear of being the next sacrificial lamb to Utility. Mill says that the intelligent Utilitarian would reject actions that are such that, if everyone were to perform them (despite their in fact maximizing happiness!), great disutility ("injury") would result. A society that would permit such happiness-maximizing acts as the sacrifice of the orderly would be a very unhappy one. Hence, the intelligent Utilitarian rejects such happiness-maximizing acts! Rules thus understood are nothing like "rules or thumb," which are simply "generally reliable precepts." The Rule Utilitarian does not ask, "How would you like it if everyone would do that?" Rather, he or she asks, "would happiness be maximized if everyone were to do that?" Mill thinks that the set of rules that would be embraced in this spirit would preclude practices involving the sacrifice of the orderly and would include: promise-keeping, fidelity, etc. The general observance of such rules would make for the happiest society.

Kant's theory of value holds that Many things have worth, but only the Good Will has unqualified moral worth Many things have worth, but only the Good Will reveals our moral core Only virtue has moral worth The only thing of value is morality

Yes, many things have worth, but only the Good Will has unqualified moral worth. He compares it to a jewel that shines beautifully in the world no matter the setting.

The Milgram Experiments deliberately focused on Ordinary people Particularly obedient people Particularly patriotic people "Leadership" types and their relation to authority

Yes, ordinary people. Milgram was aware of popular understandings of the war—the notion that we Americans are not followers, that we are more independent, that we are friendly and altruistic, etc. (Such notions seem increasingly silly, in part because of such experiments as Milgram's and better scholarship of recent historical events.) And he seemed to want to explore the possibility that it was not something specific to Germans that permitted the Holocaust, that perhaps it was something true about ordinary people everywhere, that they are prepared to go along with plainly questionable and even evil projects (such as the rounding up of innocent children, imprisoning them, making them vulnerable to lethal contagions, etc.).

MILL: I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial (Links to an external site.) as a disinterested (Links to an external site.) and benevolent (Links to an external site.) spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth (Links to an external site.), we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute (Links to an external site.) the ideal (Links to an external site.) perfection of utilitarian morality. Here, Mill responds to a misconception about Utilitarianism: That it demands that each individual pursue his or her own happiness That it is atheistic That it demands that one ignore one's own well-being That it rejects greed

Yes, that it involves a pursuit of one's own pleasure. No, says Mill: it is the pursuit of the happiness of all, pursued impartially

Concerning his famous experiment, Milgram concluded that Ordinary people are likely to follow orders given by an authority figure, even to the extent of killing an innocent human being. Obedience to authority is ingrained in us all from the way we are brought up People generally are happy to ignore the evidence before their eyes in order to conform to the group consensus, no matter how absurd Placed in experimental "aggressive" settings—e.g., taking on the role of prison guards—ordinary people "instinctively embraced sadistic and authoritarian personalities" All of these None of these

Yes, the Milgram Experiments, done on the heels of the Eichmann trial in Israel, was about specifically ordinary people and their willingness to obey wrongful orders. Milgram suggested that the world is vulnerable to atrocities in part because ordinary people—everywhere—are capable of following wrongful orders and policies. It's not a German or Japanese thing; according to Milgram, it's a human (or modern) thing. Ignoring evidence and going along with what "everyone thinks" was the focus of Asch's famous "conformity" experiments in the 1950s. These predated the Milgram Experiments and did not focus on obedience to authorities (rather, conformity to beliefs of one's group, peers, etc.). The business about prison guards sounds like the famous (or infamous) Stanford "prison" experiments, which occurred about 10 years after Milgram's and were not particularly about obedience to wrongful directions. These (poorly done) experiments concerned the kinds of behavior that can be expected to develop when individuals are given such roles as prison guard. These kinds of experiments were requested by the Navy, as I recall. The correct "ordinary people" option is a direct quote from the reading.

Interestingly, the Milgram Experiments were started in 1961, not long after Nazi Adolf Eichmann's trial for war crimes in Jerusalem Prison guard Adolf Eichmann's trial for war crimes at Nuremberg Mass-murderer Adolf Eichmann's trial in New York John F. Kennedy's "missile crisis" in Cuba

Yes, the experiments started not long after the Cuban Missile Crisis, but that incident had little if anything to do with obedience to wrongful orders. They started not long after Adolf Eichmann's trial of war crimes. He had been captured by Israeli agents (in South America) and brought back to Jerusalem, Israel, for trial. He was tried (publicly) and sentenced to hanging. The trial was an international news event and covered with interest all around the world, especially in the U.S. Eichmann was one of the organizers/architects of what has come to be known as the "Holocaust," the systematic killing of Jews (among others) by the Nazi regime, starting c. 1938. Perhaps 10-12 million people were killed, including Gypsies, homosexuals, communists, et al.

According to your instructor's "promise to go to friend's party" example, "you" decide to stay to help the victim of a hit-and-run accident, thereby failing to attend "your" friend's party, something you had promised him you would attend. Your decision means that You have violated an obligation to your friend; but you did the right thing, though you owe your friend an apology You have violated an obligation to your friend; thus you have acted wrongly You have violated an obligation to your friend; but you did the right thing; hence you do not owe your friend an apology Ethical relativism is true, for no obligation is absolute, demonstrated by this situation

Yes, you have violated an obligation and you did the right thing; but you do owe your friend an apology, which demonstrates that defeasibility is not quite the same as nullification (the obligation did not quite disappear). That it did not disappear is suggested by the fact that you owe the friend an apology.